Regal Mine Explosion January 15, 1912

 

 

Part of report of District 2 Mine Inspector R T Rhys of fatal accident at Regal mine

 

Ottumwa, Iowa, Jan. 16, 1912
Upon being notified that an explosion had taken place yesterday, January 15th, at the Regal Coal Company's mine No. 3, seven miles north of Albia, I proceeded to the place as soon as possible.
The main shaft of this mine reached the coal last July, and is 210 feet deep. The air shaft is about the same depth, and located 400 feet almost due north of the main shaft. The vein of coal will average about four and one-half feet in thickness, and what has been developed of it, so far, lies in a wavy or hilly formation. The mine was last inspected December 14, 1911. At that time parts of it, here and there, were wet, and the dry places in it did not, in my opinion, near approach the stage to be called dusty. But since the above date, the unusual cold weather that has prevailed almost continually since the last of December, has frozen the wet places, and the mine now is dry throughout--except at the bottom of the air shaft. While it could not be classed as a dusty mine, yet on account of its dryness, the roadways were sprinkled. The last sprinkling was done January 7th. Parts of the mine, however, were so cold that the water very soon after it was sprinkled, formed into small cakes of ice on the floor and sides of the roadways. Connection between the hoisting shaft and the air shaft was made last month. The mine is ventilated for the present by a 10X2 1/2 foot fan, on top of the quarter shaft. This is only a temporary method of ventilating the mine. The same was used in sinking it. A larger fan will be erected on top of the air shaft in the near future. At the request of the shot firers the top of the air shaft was covered with boards, and hence was made of no use as an air shaft since the cold weather prevailed. This they (the shot firers) thought would diminish the possibility of an explosion to take place, and therefore add to their safety. The day shift had retired at 4:30 p.m., and no person, except the two shot firers, was in the mine at the time of the explosion, which occurred a few minutes before 5 pm. Both cages (self-dumping) were not far from being midway in the shaft, when the explosion took place, and the force of it lifted the west cage up to the dump room. The east cage, by all account, was only lifted a few feet. The partition between the quarter shaft, (which is on the east side of the main shaft) and the hoisting compartment, was burst open from the bottom up for about sixty or seventy feet. This undoubtedly accounts for the east cage not being lifted like the west cage, because the force found a way of escape through the quarter shaft. Several feet of the guides were made useless. No material damage was done to the fan nor its casing, but on account of the partition of the quarter shaft being out, its service, immediately after the explosion, was of no value. Eye witnesses stated that the explosion appeared first through the main shaft, and a second or two later through the air shaft. Before and after the explosion the main shaft acted as an upcast, and rescuers were lowered through the air shaft, and found the shot firers in about one hour and a half, after it had taken place. The body of Thomas Bridges was found between the second and third room, on the first west entry, on the north side of the mine. His torch lamp, however, was found in room number three in the same entry. No signs of burns was discovered on the body nor clothing, nor was he mutilated or seemingly injured, except his neck, which the physician declared broken. He was dead when found. George Mitchell was found in room number four, in the second west entry, on the same side of the mine. He was severely burned, and died from his injuries January 16th, without regaining consciousness. The two shot firers had fired all the shots in the mine that evening, except the shots in the rooms of the first and second west entries on the north side of the mine. As was their custom, one took one entry and the other the other parallel entry. They fired each pair of entries by lighting the entry shots first, and then the room shots of their respective entry on retreating. As stated, none but the entry shots had been fired in the first and second west entries, and it was plain to be seen that the explosion had originated in one of these entries. The last ninety feet of both of these entries are going to the rise of about 6 per cent grade. Both are driven about fifteen or twenty feet beyond the last cross-cut, which is partially completed. The second cross-cut from the face is open and of proper area. In the first west entry two holes had been fired. One was about the center of the entry and was about five feet deep. This hole was drilled practically straight in, and was fully three feet in the solid coal beyond what little cutting was done, and remained to be seen as an indisputable evidence against the dangerous practice of drilling holes far into the solid coal beyond the cutting. The second hole in this entry was on the left rib, drilled to a depth of about four feet, and charged with seven charges of black powder. The hole was a fair one, and aimed to remove both top and bottom coal, but it only removed the bottom coal. According to the testimonies of the men working this entry, these shots were not examined by the shot examiner, but he was informed by them that they had two shots, and the understanding was that he was to fire the center hole first, which was charged with dynamite. In the second west entry only one shot was fired. This was on the right rib, and was about five feet deep, and claimed to have been charged with dynamite only. This hole was also drilled practically straight in, and was two feet three inches in the solid coal beyond the cut.
The remainder of my report, dealing with the course of the explosion, and also of the different opinions that prevailed at the time as to its origin, is here omitted, deeming it more essential in this report to call attention to what I believe were errors, and dangerous practices revealed by this explosion, with the hope that in the future the former may not be committed, nor the latter practiced.
First. I believe it was an error to close up the top of the air shaft during firing time.
Second. That it was an error to have allowed the cages to remain in the position they were in the shaft during firing time.
I do not charge these two things as having caused the explosion, but I am of the belief that they were conducive to bring about a condition favorable to an explosion; or, at least they were more of an aid for one to occur than they were of prevention. With these things named existing, and the large number of shots to be fired, and the area excavated in the mine but small, there was very little room for the air to expand, or for it to escape rapidly as the successive shots were fired and raised in temperature.
Third. I also believe that these unfortunate men erred in the manner of firing shots. The simultaneous firing of entries in pairs as they did is evidently not a safe method, and should not be practiced. Ample time should be taken to fire shots at all times, and in all mines, but this is especially essential in winter season, and in new mines like this one.
Fourth. It was an error also to think that holes charged with dynamite would not cause an explosion. This belief existed among some of the men in this mine, as the testimonies in the coroner's inquest over the bodies indicated it. And I have found this erroneous belief to be in a number of other mines throughout this district. While I do not believe that this explosion can be attributed to a charge of dynamite, yet the extent of the center hole in the first west, and of the rib hole in the second west entry, were drilled into the solid coal ahead of the cut, both of which were charged with dynamite, was such as not to make it impossible for one or both of these holes to cause an explosion. This belief in the supposed safety of dynamite from causing as explosion, has undoubtedly led men to drill holes far into the solid beyond the cut, and for the same reason shot examiners have been led to accept them as safe. It is true dynamite is less liable to cause an explosion than ordinary black powder, but it is not a sure preventive. If dynamite was incapable of igniting or of causing an explosion the problem of mine explosions would have been practically solved, but unfortunately there is not an explosive made for mining purposes but what will when used in certain quantities and under certain conditions cause an explosion.
Fifth. The inquiry into the cause of this explosion led me to suspect that some men in this mine would occasionally use two kinds of explosives (powder and dynamite) in the same hole. I am glad to say that this dangerous practice is not as common in this district as it has been. If two kinds of explosives are used today, it is usually without the knowledge of the shot firer. No matter what may be gained, if there is anything at all, by using two explosives in this manner, the risk from it to human life is too great, and it should never be practiced in our mines. All explosives should be used as the makers intended for them to be used. Any other method makes each explosive less safe than if used alone.
Sixth. From the testimonies of the men working in the first and second west entries, we must conclude that the unfortunate victims of this explosion failed to examine the holes in these two entries. They simply inquired as to the number of shots that were to be fired, and that was all. It would be far more agreeable to me to pass by this error and charitably say nothing about it; but duty demands that I point it out to other shot examiners, and to warn them against the temptation of allowing friendship and good fellowship to interfere with the performance of their duties, and not to neglect examining every hole before it is charged. I sincerely believe in the wisdom and the protective value of our shot examiners' law, especially when the examiners employed are also shot firers. This law is to us today, because of the way we are mining coal, like a safety valve, and without a question in my mind, has preserved us from great catastrophies. It was enacted with the sole purpose of preserving life and property, and it is to be greatly regretted that some of our shot examiners have not respected and observed it better.

 

Sixteenth Biennial report of the State Mine Inspectors, to the Governor of the State of Iowa for the Two Years Ending June 30, 1912

 

by Iowa Department of Mine Inspectors