The more we share the more we have to share
MILITARY: Civil War History SIXTH REGIMENT IOWA VOLUNTEER CAVALRY The Sixth Regiment of Iowa Cavalry was organized under a special order of the War Department, dated September 9, 1862. The twelve companies of which the regiment was composed were ordered into quarters by the Governor, on dates ranging from about the 1st of November, 1862, to near the last of February, 1863. The rendezvous designated in the order was Camp Hendershott, near Davenport, Iowa, where the companies were mustered into the service of the United States, by Captain H. B. Hendershott, of the Regular Army, on dates ranging from January 31 to March 5, 1863. Upon the muster in of the last company the regiment had an aggregate strength of 1,125, rank and file. Subsequent enlistments and transfers increased the number of the total enrollment shown at the close of this historical sketch., but the number at the muster in of the regiment is included in the original roster. In the subjoined roster, the name of every officer and enlisted man, who at any time belonged to the regiment, will be found, with his personal record of service, in the paragraph opposite his name. These records have been transcribed from the book in the office of the Adjutant General of Iowa, supplemented by such additional information as could be obtained from the records of the War Department, when the State records were found to be incomplete. There may be some cases in which names are not correctly spelled, and other in which errors and omissions have occurred, but every effort has been made to secure accuracy, and to make each personal record as complete as it could be made from the official archives of the State, and the Government at Washington. In like manner the material for this historical sketch has been obtained. The official reports of regimental commanders, and those of the General under whose command they served, have been carefully consulted, and extracts from the reports, together with other official data, constitute the principal portion of this condensed history. Limitation of space has compelled the omission of many interesting details but the leading events which occurred during the most active period of the service of the regiment have been given the largest amount of space. It has been the aim of the compiler to demonstrate clearly the importance of the service rendered to the inhabitants of the northern frontier, for the protection of whom the regiment was organized, at the time when the resources of the Government were taxed to the utmost by the great War of the Rebellion, then in progress. Prior to the commencement of that war the troops of the Regular Army had been mainly employed on the northern and western frontiers, for the purpose of keeping the various Indian tribes in subjection and confining them within the limits of the reservations to which they had been assigned. During the war the Indians had taken advantage of the inability of the Government to supply the necessary number of regular troops to protect the settlers upon the frontier, and hence came the necessity of organizing regiment s of volunteers for that purpose. The character of the service was such as to involve great hardship and suffering, particularly in the winter season of the year. The situation upon the northern border of the State of Iowa, at the time of the breaking out of Indian hostilities in the autumn of 1862 and winter and spring of 1862-3, is described in the exhaustive report of S. R Ingham, to Governor Kirkwood, also the reports of Lieutenant Colonel James A. Sawyer, commanding the Northwest Frontier Forces, and other official reports of the same general character. These reports describe with great particularity of detail the alarming conditions that existed, the preparation for defense that had been made and were being made, in the way of the erection of forts, block houses, quarters for the soldiers, stables for the horses, and supplies of provisions and forage. The names of the different tribes of Indians, their location and numbers and the location of the white settlers are also given. An extract from the report of George L. Davenport to Governor Kirkwood will suffice to show the necessity for placing a large force of cavalry—the only effective troops for active operations against Indians—along the northern frontier: Upon my arrival at St. Paul, I called on Governor Ramsey, who gave me all the information in his power. He informed me that the outbreak with the Sioux Indians is of the most serious character, and the massacre of men, women and children of the frontier settlements, the largest known in the history of the country. Nearly six hundred persons are known to be killed, and over one hundred women and children are in the hands of the savages as prisoners. The Indians are very bold and defiant, repeatedly attacking the forts and the troops sent out against them. They have plundered many stores and farm houses, and have driven off a very large number of cattle and horses. The Indians continue to attack the settlements almost every week, keeping up a constant alarm among the people. It is estimated that over five thousand persons have left their homes and all their property, causing immense loss and suffering. Governor Ramsey informs me that he will have, in a short time, to operate against the Indians, about four thousand troops—one thousand of cavalry, as soon as horses can be obtained. Parties have been sent out to cut large quantities of hay, at various points on the frontier, for the use of the cavalry during the winter. It is also proposed to erect stockade forts, at a short distance apart, along a frontier of two hundred miles, and garrison them with forty or fifty men each. This it is supposed will induce many to return to their farms, and feel that they are protected, and in case of alarm have a place to fly to. I am much alarmed in regard to the safety of the settlement on the northwestern border of our State. I think they are imminent danger of an attack at any moment, and will be in constant alarm and danger during the coming winter. As the Indians are driven back from the eastern part of Minnesota, they will fall back towards the Missouri slope, and will make inroads upon our settlements for supplies of food and plunder. . . . It will thus be seen that the States if Iowa and Minnesota had a no less common cause, in the protection of their citizens upon their northern frontiers, than in furnishing troops, upon the call of the President, for the purpose of suppressing treason and rebellion against the general Government in the South. Both States had nobly responded to every call, and on all battlefields of the South their loyal sons had been in the thickest of the fight and had won imperishable honor. They now responded to the call of their Governors, asking them to go to the defense of the helpless settlers and save them from the ravages of the savage and relentless Indians. Into that field of warfare the Sixth Iowa Cavalry was sent soon after the completion of its organization. Most of the companies were in rendezvous a sufficient length of time to enable them to become fairly well drilled and disciplined. Colonel Wilson and the other field and company officers had exerted themselves to put the regiment in the best possible state of efficiency before leaving the State. It was well mounted and armed, and an inspection of its roster shows that the average age of the men was considerable greater than that of the majority of the Iowa regiments which had preceded it. Very many of the officers and men had wives and children, and had answered the call to go to the aid of the helpless settlers upon the border, in response to that feeling of sympathy born of their affection for their own families. The regiment left its camp at Davenport on the 16th of March, 1863, and marched across the State of Iowa to Sioux City, where it arrived on the 26th of April. This long march was made over bad roads and, for the greater portion of the way, in stormy weather, but it was a good preliminary experience and prepared the men for the greater privations and hardships they were later called upon to endure. Upon the arrival of the regiment at Sioux City, Colonel Wilson reported to Brigadier General John Cook, commanding the military district of Iowa and Dakota, and was ordered to cross the Sioux River and go into camp, until the preparations for an active campaign against the Indians—who were then upon the war path—could be completed. Two expeditions were being fitted out; one to move up the east bank of the Missouri River, the other to move westward from Minnesota into the Indian country, the two expeditionary forces to endeavor to form a junction at some point on the upper Missouri. While these preparations were being mad, intelligence was received that a large ban of Indians was moving in the direction of Fort Randall, evidently with the intention of attacking the fort. As the garrison was considered too small to withstand the attack of so large a force, General Coo ordered a battalion of the Sixth Iowa Cavalry, under command of Major TenBroeck, to proceed immediately to Fort Randall and reinforce the garrison. On the 22d of May another battalion of the regiment, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Pollock, with Major Shephard as second in command was ordered to proceed to Fort Randall and, upon his arrival there, to take command of the combined forces and assume the offensive against the Indians, a large body of whom were at that time encamped near the fort. Upon the approach of this additional reinforcement, the Indians broke up the encampment and fled toward the north. Lieutenant Colonel Pollock sent out detachments to scour the country and watch the movements of the Indians until the balance of the troops, under General Cook should arrive. Near the end of May the battalion, under command of Major TenBroeck, was ordered to march to fort Pierre, on the Missouri River, about two hundred miles from Fort Randall, at which point troops were being concentrated for further aggressive movements against the Indians, who had thus far managed to avoid coming into conflict with the forces sent against them. Early in June, General Cook was relieved of his command by General Sully, who was a trained Indian fighter. General Sully established his base of supplies at Fort Pierre, and, as soon as all the troops which were available for that purpose of drawing him as far away from his base of supplies as possible, before they would make a stand and risk a conflict with his troops. The details as to the preparations made and the movements of the troops after the march began are given with much particularity in the official reports, but, as the battle with the Indians, which followed later, and in which the Sixth Iowa Cavalry took a conspicuous part, is the subject of the greatest importance, only such details need to be given as will give an intelligent idea of the events and movements which led up to and immediately preceded the battle of White Stone Hill. In his official report, sent from his camp at the mouth of the Little Cheyenne River, under date of September 11, 1863, General Sully refers to his previous report of August 16, 1863, and says that his movements had been so rapid, and the danger of sending any communication so great, that he had found it advisable to defer doing so. He then describes the movements of his command subsequent to his last report. Portion of his report are here quoted, as follows: On the morning of August 19, the steamer I was waiting for, with supplies, finally arrived. She was immediately unloaded, and all the baggage of the officers and men of the command was sent down by her to the depot at Fort Pierre, together with every man who was in the least sick or not well mounted. By this I reduced my force considerably, and was unable to transport, with the wretched mules that had been furnished me, about twenty-three days' rations and forage enough to keep these transportation animals alive, depending on grass I might find to feed the cavalry and artillery horses. Luckily, I found the grazing north in much better condition than I had dared to hope for. On the 20th we were visited by one of the most terrific rain and hail storms I have ever seen. This stampeded some of my animals and a few were lost-—hey swam the Missouri—and it also destroyed a quantity of my rations in the wagons, thereby causing me some delay in the march; but I succeeded in getting off on the afternoon of the 21st, and marched up the Little Cheyenne about eleven miles, the road being very heavy. General Sully continues his description of the march and the country over which his command was passing, but records no event of special importance until the 24th, on which date the troops came into the buffalo country. Scouting parties were sent out and succeeded in killing many buffaloes; they also reported coming in sight of Indians. Two days later, a small scouting party captured two Indian squaws and some children. The squaws said they were on their way to the Crow Creek Agency, but were alone. The scouts, however, had found tracks of a large number of Indians, all going up the Missouri. As the march continued, signs of Indians having passed along the route were daily discovered. An old Indian was captured who reported that General Sibley's command had fought the Indians, fifty miles farther north, some weeks before, had been defeated by them, and was compelled to retreat to James River; that the Indians had pursued General Sibley's troops for a long distance, and had several fights with them, but they had given up the pursuit and gone back to the north. The old Indian also said that on their way back the Indians had attacked a Mackinaw boat on the river, had killed all on board-twenty-one men, three women and some children—and had then sunk the boat. The report was so much in keeping with the Indian mode of warfare that, although it came from an Indian, was very likely to prove as a whole or in part correct. The Indians were expected to make a stand and fight, as they were now beyond their favorite hunting grounds, and would not be likely to retreat to a much greater distance. Scouting parties were out in advance every day. The Sixth Iowa Cavalry performed its full share of scouting duty. A detachment of two companies from the regiment, under command of Captain Cram, made one of the longest and most important scouts that was performed on the march. Each day evidence accumulated, showing that a large force of Indians was slowly falling back before the advance of General Sully's command, and that a battle was impending, unless the Indians should send messengers with offers to surrender without a fight, and return to their reservations. They were in too strong force, however, to make an offer to surrender probable. Continuing his report General Sully says: On the 3d of September we reached a lake, where, on the plains near by, were the remains of a very large number of buffalo, some of which had been killed quite recently. Here I encamped to await the reports of the commands I had out during the march, who every day discovered fresh signs of Indians, their lodge trails spread over the country, but all moving toward a point known to be a favorite haunt of the Indians. I had this day detached one battalion of the Sixth Iowa, Major House commanding, and Mr. Frank LaFromboise as guide, to keep ahead of me five miles, and in case they saw a small ban of Indians, to attack them or take them prisoners. If they should find a large band, too large to successfully cope with, to watch the camp at a distance and send word back to me, my intention being to leave my train under charge of a heavy guard, move up in the night time, and attack them at daybreak. But, for some reason satisfactory to the guide, he bore off much to my left, and came upon the Indians in an encampment of over four hundered lodges—some say six hundred—in ravines where they felt perfectly secure, being fully persuaded that I was still on my way up the Missouri. This is what the Indian prisoners say. They also stated that a war part followed me on my way up, in hopes of stampeding me; but this they could not do. I marched with great care, with an advance guard and flankers; the trains in two lines sixty paces apart, the troops on each side; in front and center myself with one company and the battery; all loose stock was kept between the lines of the wagons. In this way I lost no animals on the campaign, except about a dozen that got out of camp at night. Nor did the Indians, during all the trip, ever attack me or try to stampede me. Major House, according to my instructions, endeavored to surround and keep in the Indians until word could be sent me; but this was an impossibility with his 300 men, as the encampment was very large, mustering at least 1,200 warriors. This number is what the Indians say they had; but I, as well as everybody in the command, say over 1,500. These Indians were partly Santees, Cutheads, Yanktonais, and some Blackfeet, and, as I have since learned, Unkpa-pas, the same party who fought General Sibley and destroyed the Mackinaw boat. Of this I have unmistakable proof from letters and paper found in the camp, and on the persons of some of the Indians, besides relics of the Minnesota massacre; also from the fact that they told Mr. LaFromboise, the guide, when he was surrounded by about 200 of them, that "they had fought General Sibley, and they could not see why the whites wanted to come to fight them unless they were tired of living and wanted to die." Mr. LaFromboise succeeded in getting away from them after some difficulty, and ran his horse a distance of more than ten miles to give me information, Major House, with his command, still remaining there. He reached me a little after 4 o'clock. I immediately turned out my command. The horses at the time were out grazing. At the sound of the bugle the men rushed with a cheer, and in a very few minutes saddled up and were in line. I left four companies and all the men who were poorly mounted in the camp, with orders to strike the tents and corrall all the wagons, and, starting off, with the Second Nebraska on the right, the Sixth Iowa on the left, one company of the Seventh Iowa and the battery in the center, at a full gallop, we made the distance of over ten miles in much less than an hour. On reaching near the ground I found the enemy were leaving, and carrying off what plunder they could. Many lodges, however, were still standing. I ordered Colonel Furnas, Second Nebraska, to push his horses to the utmost, so as to reach the camp and assist. Major House in keeping the Indians corralled. This order was obeyed with great alacrity, the regiment going over the plains at a full run. I was close upon the rear of the regiment with the Sixth Iowa. The Second Nebraska took to the right of the camp, and was soon lost in a cloud of dust over the hills. I ordered Colonel Wilson, Sixth Iowa, to take the left; while I, with the battery, one company of the Seventh Iowa, Captain Millard, and two companies of the Sixth Iowa, Major TenBroeck commanding, charged through the center of the encampment. I found here an Indian Chief, by the name of Little Soldier, with some few of his people. This Indian has always had the reputation of being a "good Indian" and friendly. I placed them under guard and moved on. Shortly after I met with the notorious chief, Big Head, and some of his men. They were dressed for a fight, but my men cut them off. These Indians, together with some of their warriors, mustering about 30, together with squaws and children, numbering in all over 120, gave themselves up. About the same time firing began about half a mile ahead, and was kept up, becoming more and more brisk until it was quite a considerable engagement. A report was brought to me (which proved to be false) that the Indians were driving back some of my command. I immediately took possession of the hillocks near by, forming line and placing the battery in the center on a higher knoll. At this time night had about setting, but still the engagement was briskly kept up and in the melee it was hard to distinguish my line from that of the enemy. The Indians made a very desperate resistance, but finally broke and fled, prusued in every direction by bodies of my troops. I would here state that the troops, though mounted, were armed with rifles, and, according to my orders, most of them dismounted and fought on foot until the enemy broke, when they remounted and went in pursuit. It is to be regretted that I could not have had an hour or two more of daylight, for I feel sure, if I had, I could have had annihilated the enemy. As it was, I believe I can safely say I gave them one of the most severe punishments that Indians have ever received. After night set in, the engagement was of such a promiscuous nature that it was hard to tell what results would happen; I therefore ordered all the buglers to sound the "rally" and building large fires, remained under arms during the night, collecting together my troops. The next morning early (September 4th), I established my camp on the battlefield, the wagon train, under charge of Major Pearman, Second Nebraska, having in the night been ordered to join me, and sent out strong scouting parties in different directions to scour the country and to overtake what Indians they could; but in this they were not very successful, though some of them had slight skirmishes. They found the dean and wounded in all directions, some miles from the battlefield; also immense quantities of provisions, baggage, etc. . . One party that I sent out went near the James River, and found there eleven dead Indians. The deserted camp of the Indians, together with the country around it, was covered with their plunder. I devoted this day, together with the following (the 5th), to destroying all this property, still scouring the country. . . A very large number of ponies were found dead and wounded on the field; besides a large number were captured. The prisoners (some 130) I take with me below, and shall report to you more especially in regard to them. The remaining portion of General Sully's report gives very full details as to the casualties among the Indians and to his own command, both in the battle and in the subsequent skirmishes in which his scouting parties were engaged; describes the hardships endured upon the return march and every incident which he considered worthy of note; but, for the purpose of this history, it is briefly condensed as follows: One of his scouting parties fell into an ambuscade and lost four men killed by the Indians. Another detachment was sent out and succeeded in overtaking and killing three of the Indians. One hundred dead Indians were found. The officers and guides estimated the total number of Indians killed at 150. The hill near which the engagement took place was call by the Indians "Whitestone," hence the battle was officially designated "White Ston Hill." The conduct of the troops under his command is highly commended by the General. He states that the official reports of Colonel Wilson of the Sixth Iowa, and Colonel Furnas of the Second Nebraska, accompany his own, and highly commends both for their bravery and cheerful obedience to his orders, and makes mention of the fact that both these officers had their horses shot under them. Upon the return to Fort Pierre, his command made rapid marches, the rations being barely sufficient to enable them to reach the fort. The horses were almost entirely worn out on the march. The command reached the mouth of the Little Cheyenne River on the 11th of September, and found the steamboat which General Sully had previously ordered to be there to meet him on his return. Had the boat—which was loaded with provisions for the men and grain for the animals—failed to reach the place designated, the train could not have been taken through to Fort Pierre, as the grass was then about all gone. The wounded men were placed on the boat, and a part of the empty wagons, thus relieving the worn out mules and enabling them to haul the remaining wagons to the fort. The loss of both horses and mules on the return march had been heavy. As fast as they gave out they were killed, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Indians. By actual count the number of Indian prisoners was 156-32 men and 124 women and children. General Sully had between 600 and 700 men actually engaged in the battle of White Stone Hill, of whom 20 were killed and 38 wounded. Of this number, 22 were of the Sixth Iowa, as shown in the official report of Colonel Wilson, which describes in detail the conduct of his regiment, and is here given in part as follows: ON BATTLEFIELD OF WHITE STONE HILL September 3, 1863. Sir: I have the honor to submit to you an account of the participation of the Sixth Iowa Cavalry in the battle of White Stone Hill, on the 3d day of September, 1862. As you are aware, the command left the mouth of the Big Cheyenne on the 21st day of August last. Nothing occurred to vary the monotony of the usual hard marches until the above date. On the morning of that day I received an order from you to detail from my command one battalion. It being the turn of the Third Battalion to scout, and order was issued directing Major A. E. House to report to your headquarters for instructions, which was promptly done. Company M, commanded by Captain V. J. Williams, of said battalion, having their horses used up by constant scouting, was unable to proceed with the detail, its place being supplied by Company H, of the Second Battalion. The detail for the scout was Company C, L, A. Ainstworth, Captain; Company I. L. R. Wolfe, Captain; Company F, S. Shattuck, Captain, and Company H, of the Second Battalion, C. J. Marsh, Captain. In speaking of the Third Battalion, I always include Company H in it in this battle. They let the command at an early hour. After the departure of the battalion, the brigade took up its line of march to a point ten miles east of this place, where we arrived about 2 o'clock P. M. In the space of two hours, the messenger dispatched by Major House rode swiftly into camp, with the information that there was a very large body of Indians near him, and that he was in process of negotiation with them, until we could arrive. It was but the work of a few minutes for the whole command to be upon its way to the battlefield. The ten miles distance was quickly passed, When we neared the battlefield, I received an order from you, directing me to take on of my battalions in addition to the Third. The First was taken by me and the Second was left with brigade headquarters. I then proceeded to carry out your orders to surround the Indians and drive them in. On every side of the battlefield were straggling Indians, endeavoring to escape. Immediately joining the flank of the First upon the Second Battalion, and marching both in line, we succeeded on driving a arge portion of the Indians toward your headquarters down into a ravine. By the shifting and dressing of the line as it marched, I became detached from the First, and was thrown into the Third Battalion. The Indians after having been driven quietly for quite a distance into a common center, availed themselves of the darkness that was coming, by suddenly firing upon us, which fire, though entirely unexpected, was immediately returned by us with terrible effect. We then commenced making preparations to fight on foot, when the darkness became so impenetrable that it was impossible to proceed further. It wa at this fire of the enemy, when riding some little distance in advance of the battalion, that my horse was shot and fatally wounded with s slug; he lived long enough to carry me about thirty rods. After the darkness set in we went into camp immediately on the battlefield, corralled our horses and threw out pickets , while the command slept upon its arms. The night was excessively dark and cold. The picket guard killed two Indians that were found straggling near our camp. At length the day appeared, when we found that the enemy, availing themselves of the darkness, had suddenly decamped, but leaving the country strewed for miles around with their dried meats, provisions, packs, robes, tepees and ponies. We lost in this engagement one commissioned officer and ten privates killed, and had eleven wounded, one of them since dying, some of the rest being badly wounded and some very slightly….I wish to call to your particular attention every one of the field and line officers of the regiment without enumerating them by name. From the highest to the lowest they deserve the most favorable consideration; and the same may be said of almost the entire command engaged. Being their first battle, this was their baptism of fire and steel, and most nobly did they behave. The high reputation earned by the noble action of the Iowa troops upon the bloody fields of battle has not been tarnished by the gallant Sixth Iowa, at White Stone Hill. I have the honor to be Very respectfully, your obedient servant, D. S. WILSON, Colonel Sixth Iowa Cavalry. Captain J. H. PELL, A. A. G. It may be inferred that General Sully had instructions to surround the Indians and, if possible, secure their surrender without a fight, although he does not say that he had such instruction in his report. The statement that the guide, Frank LaFromboise, was "surrounded by about two hundred of the Indians, from whom he succeeded in getting away after some difficulty," plainly indicates that he was holding a conference with them, and endeavoring to pursuade them to give up their arms and return peaceable to their reservations, and that he could not have been allowed to return to General Sully, unless it was for the purpose of conveying a message from the Indians, which was probably of such a character that it caused the General to consider further negotiations useless. In the subsequent movement of his troops against the Indians it will be observed that the advance continued with the purpose of surrounding the Indians, who opened fire just as darkness was coming on. If the movement to surround them had been successful, it seems most likely that another opportunity would have been given them to surrender without a conflict. The inference is strengthened by the report of Colonel Wilson, in which he states that, at the time Major House sent his message to General Sully, advising him of the discovery of the Indian encampment, he was in process of negotiating with them for the purpose of holding them in check until the General could arrive with the rest of his command, and by his further statement that the Indians had been driven "quietly" for quite a distance towards a common center, and, when they suddenly opened fire upon his troops, it was "entirely unexpected." The question whether such an inference is justified by the facts is involved in doubt, by the previous statement in General Sully's report, that he intended to surround the camp of the Indians during the night and attack them at daylight. In any event, the punishment inflicted upon the Indians was well deserved, and was not even adequate, when compared with the terrible massacres of men, women and children, of which they had been guilty. In obedience to his orders to select an eligible location for the building of another fort, General Sully selected a site on the east bank of the Missouri River, about fifteen miles below Fort Pierre. The work of constructing the fort was begun by the Sixth Iowa Cavalry, but, before the completion, General Sully—leaving Lieutenant Colonel Pollick with five companies of the Sixth Iowa to finish the work and to remain as a garrison for the fort—marched with the rest of his command to Fort Randall, and then to Sioux City. The detachment of the Sixth Iowa completed the construction of the fort, which was officially designated as "Fort Sully," in honor of the distinguished soldier who was in command of all the troops then engaged in the defense of the northern frontier. As active operations against the Indians could not be undertaken and prosecuted during the severe winter which followed, the troops were compelled to remain idle in their winter quarters until the opening of spring. The report of Major General John Pope, commanding the Department of the Northwest, fully describes the conditions that existed on the frontier at the beginning of the next campaign and the subsequent operations against the Indians. A portion of his report is here given, which will serve to show the magnitude of the campaign, and the important results accomplished: The operations of last year ended with such defeats of the Indians occupying the vast regions east of the Missouri River as forced them for a time to take refuge in the British possessions, and relieved the entire frontier settlements of Minnesota, Iowa and Dakota from any danger of Indian hostilities. During last winter, however, the whole Dakota Nation, from the Rocky Mountains to the Minnesota frontier, and from the Platte River and the Iowa line to the British possessions on the north, succeeded in combining their various and scattered tribes for a final effort against the white, and by the opening of spring has slowly concentrated their whole force on and near the Upper Missouri, to resist the navigation of the Missouri River, prevent the passage of emigrants across the great plains, and to deliver, with their combined forces, a final battle against the United States troops under General Sully. This Indian force was then estimated by competent authorities, and so reported by me to the War Department early in the spring, at about 6,000 warriors, and this estimate was subsequently confirmed by General Sully, after his battles with them near the Little Missouri. It was also reported at the time, and has been confirmed since by undoubted testimony, that ammunition and other necessary supplies were brought to the Indian camps during the winter, by h?ÁG? ?¿ ? ? ? ???? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ] ? ' ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? $ ? ? ? ^ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? d with means to continue the war by the half-breeds and other British subjects of the Selkirk settlements. As I felt sure that if once their entire force of warriors could be met and defeated, this Indian war in the North-west, on any considerable scale, would be closed, preparations for an active campaign, during the summer of 1864, were made during the close of last winter. The plan of operations consisted of putting into the field, under the command of Brigadier General Alfred Sully, an active column of about 2,500 men, entirely cavalry, to advance against the Indians, wherever they could be found, and deliver battle with them, and the same time to follow up the movements of this force with detachments of infantry, large enough to establish strong posts in the Indian country. These posts were so located as to cover the frontiers of Iowa and Minnesota and the frontier settlements of Dakota Territory at a long distance; to interpose between the different tribes so as to prevent concerted action; to command the hunting grounds of the Indians so that they would be constantly under the supervision of the military forces, which, by concerted action, could easily and promptly march a heavy force of cavalry upon any portion of the region in which the Indians are obliged to hunt for subsistence; to command the Indian trails toward the frontier settlements, so as to detect the passage of even the smallest parties, attempting to make raids upon the settlers, and to follow them up, and, so far as military necessities would allow, to protect an emigrant route from the Upper Mississippi River to the territories of Idaho and Montana. The details of this plan of operation were submitted to you, and approved in February last, and immediate preparations made to carry them into execution. General Sully collected the forces under the command from the various posts and stations in his district early in the spring, and commenced to move up the Missouri River, leaving only much detachments as were necessary to cover the frontier from small Indian raids during his absence. He was re- enforced by about 1,500 mounted men from Minnesota, leaving General Sibley with about 800 effective men to protect the frontier settlements of Minnesota during the summer. The mouth of Burdache Creek on the Upper Missouri was selected as the point where the Minnesota troops should join the forces of General Sully moving up the Missouri, and the junction of these forces was made on the 30th of June. The spring rise in the Missouri River did not come down until very late in the season, and General Sully only reached the mouth of Cannon Ball River, at which point he was to establish a strong post, which was to be his depot of supplies on the 7th of July. He established Fort Rice at that point, distant from Sioux City 450 miles, and garrisoned it with five companies of the Thirtieth Wisconsin Volunteers. The Indians, who had been concentrated on and near the Missouri River, about 50 miles above this post, had meantime crossed to the southwest side of the river, and occupied a strong position in a very difficult country near the Little Missouri River, due west and about 200 miles from Fort Rice. On the 26th of July, General Sully marched upon these Indians with the following forces: Eighth Minnesota Volunteers (mounted) and six companies of the Second Minnesota Cavalry, with four light guns, eleven companies Sixth Iowa Cavalry, three companies Seventh Iowa Cavalry, two companies Dakota Cavalry, four companies Brackett's Battalion Cavalry, one small company of Scouts, and four mounted howitzers, numbering in all 2,200 men. General Pope, in continuing his report, describes the subsequent movements of the troops, prior to and during the battle with the Indians which ensued. His report covers a large amount of space, and includes an extract from the official report of General Sully, which gives and interesting description of the country which was covered by the expedition. The entire report gives many interesting details in connection with the history of the campaign and the proper manner of dealing with the Indians in order to prevent future trouble with them, but, for the purpose of this history, the compiler is again compelled to condense such portions of the report as apply exclusively to the concluding military operations. General Sully marched with his command to the head of Heart River, where he corralled his trains and, leaving a sufficient guard with them, marched rapidly toward the northwest until he reached the point where the combined forces of the Indians were assembled. On the morning of July 28, 1864, he found, confronting his command of about 2,000 men, 6,000 Indian warriors, strongly posted in a wood country, cut up with rugged hills and deep ravines. Under a flag of truce he advanced toward the position of the Indians and invited a conference with them. The leading chiefs came out to meet him, and he had an hour's talk with them. They were very defiant and refused to consider the terms of surrender to the authority f the Government which the General offered them, and, finding his efforts to prevent bloodshed of no avail, the conference was ended and orders were given to the troops to get into position for battle. The artillery opened the engagement, the troops advancing and firing rapidly. For a time the engagement was sharp and severe, but the superior range and destructiveness of the troopers' arms and the deadly fire of the artillery proved to be more than a match for the Indians, notwithstanding their having so great an apparent advantage in numbers. They were steadily driven back to their extensive camps and compelled to abandon them, together with the winter supply of provisions which they had long been engaged in collecting, and all their property of every description. A running fight of nine miles ensued, the Indians finally scattering and escaping with nothing except their wounded, whom, according to the Indian custom, they carried with them, and also as many of their dead as they could. One hundred twenty-five dead warriors were left upon the field. The part taken in this battle by the Sixth Iowa Cavalry is described in the official report of Lieutenant Colonel Pollock; also that, of other engagements with the Indians in which the regiment participated, on the 8th and 9th of August, 1864, while the expedition was on the return march. The regiment had performed its full share in all the operations of General Sully's command. The General highly commended the officers and men of the regiment for their faithful and efficient service, in conjunction with the other troops under his command, in winning such a complete and decisive victory over the combined Indian tribes. The command reached the Yellow Stone River on the 12th of August, and there found a couple of small steamers loaded with rations. With the aid of the steamers the little army with its train crossed the river, and moved up to Fort Union on the Missouri River. Remaining there for a short time, the army crossed the river and marched down to Fort Berthold. Leaving one company of the Sixth Iowa, under command of Captain Moreland, to garrison the post, General Sully again marched north with the rest of his command in pursuit of a band of Indians, who were reported to be again upon the war path, but did not succeed in overtaking them. The army then returned to Fort Rice, arriving there on the 9th of September. The active campaigning of the regiment was now mostly over for the summer. A large emigrant train was reported to be having trouble with the Indians, and a detachment of one hundred men of the Sixth Iowa, Captain D. F. Eicher commanding, joined a considerable force, made up of detachments from other regiments, and marched to the relief of the train. Upon the approach of the troops, the Indians rapidly retreated toward the north. These troops returned to Fort Rice after an absence of three weeks. Small bands of Indians were still lurking in the surrounding country, and scouting parties were sent after them until they were finally broken up and dispersed. In one of the encounters with the Indians, September 21, 1864, Sergeant Alfred Murphy, of Company L, Sixth Iowa Cavalry, was killed, and in another, September 27th, Sanford Murphy, of company E, was killed, both in the vicinity of Fort Rice. During the winter the regiment was widely scattered, detachments having winter quarters at Fort Randall, Sioux City, Yankton, at the Sioux and Winnebago Indian Agency and at fort Berthold. The official reports do not show any active operations of the regiment against the Indians during the spring and summer of 1865. The Indians seemed to have relaized that the great War of the Rebellion was over, and that the Government could send andy number of troops that might be requisite to quickly surpress further outbreaks, and so, for a time at least, those savage wards of the nation became comparatively quiet. The Sixth Iowa Cavalry was retained in the service, however, during the summer and part of the autumn, when troops of the Regular Army took the place of the volunteers, and the regiment was assembled at Sioux City, at which place it was mustered out of the service of the United States, on the 17th of October, 1865. It then proceeded to Davenport, Iowa, and was there disbanded. The Sixth Iowa Cavalry spent more than two years and a half upon the northern frontier, a considerable part of the time engaged to active operations against a barbarous and treacherous foe. Its officers and men endured great privations and displayed true heroism in their conflicts with the Indians. A great part of the country over which they marched and fought is now occupied by a happy and prosperous people, and the remnants of the once powerful Indian tribes are now living quietly and peaceably upon the reservations which the Government has established for them. The descendants of the hardy pioneer settlers of the Northwest will hold in grateful remembrance the brave sons of Iowa, who went forth from their homes and drove the relentless savages from the scenes of their brutal massacres to the desolate regions of the North. SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES. Total Enrollment 1,420 Killed 22 Wounded 19 Died of wounds 8 Died of disease 62 Discharged for disease, wounds or other causes 104 Buried in National Cemeteries and Forts 23 Captured ------- Transferred 7 Mustered into service of the United States at Davenport, Iowa, on dates ranging from January 31 to March 5, 1863, by Captain H. B. Hendershott, United States Army. Mustered out of service Oct. 17, 1865, Sioux City, Iowa. FIELD AND STAFF. Edward P. TenBroeck. Age 23. Residence Clinton, nativity New Hampshire. Appointed First Battalion Major Oct. 21, 1862. Mustered Jan. 31, 1862. Resigned Oct. 22, 1864. NON-COMMISSIONED STAFF. Charles W. Fogg. Age 24. Residence Wheatland, nativity Maine. Promoted Sergeant Major from Second Sergeant of Company A. Jan. 31, 1863. Promoted Quartermaster April 10, 1865. Mustered May 1, 1865. Mustered out Oct. 17, 1865, Sioux City, Iowa. COMPANY "A" Arp, Hans. Age 27. Residence Camanche, nativity Germany. Enlisted Oct. 7, 1862, as Third Corporal. Mustered Oct. 7, 1862. Promoted Second Corporal March 10, 1863; First Corporal Nov. 1, 1863; Sixth Sergeant May 29, 1865. Mustered out Oct. 17, 1865, Sioux City, Iowa. Baker, William. Age 25. Residence Camanche, nativity Pennsylvania. Enlisted Oct. 1, 1862. Mustered Oct. 1, 1862. Died Oct. 14, 1863, Camanche, Iowa, Bragg, Ethan. Age 40. Residence DeWitt, nativity New York. Enlisted Nov. 24, 1862. Mustered Nov. 24, 1862. No further record. COMPANY "A" Coleman, Egbert M. Age 27. Residence Clinton, nativity New York. Enlisted Sept. 29, 1862. Mustered Sept. 29, 1862. Discharged Jan. 31, 1863, Davenport, Iowa. Dunkleman, Henry. Age 21. Residence Lyons, nativity Germany. Enlisted Nov. 13, 1862. Mustered Nov. 13, 1862. Promoted Eighth Corporal March 23, 1865; Fifth Corporal May 28, 1865. Mustered out Oct. 17, 1865, Sioux City, Iowa. Dwire, Samuel G. Age 32. Residence DeWitt, nativity Pennsylvania. Enlisted Oct. 27, 1862, as Third Sergeant. Mustered Oct. 27, 1862. Promoted Second Sergeant March 10, 1863; First Sergeant March 1, 1865. Mustered out Oct. 17, Sioux City. Fogg, Charles W. Age 23. Residence Wheatland, nativity Maine. Enlisted Oct. 4, 1862, as Second Sergeant. Mustered Oct. 4, 1862. Promoted Sergeant Major Jan. 31, 1863. See Field and Staff. Folck, John. Age 37. Residence DeWitt, nativity Illinois. enlisted Oct. 6, 1862. Mustered Oct. 6, 1862. Killed in action March 1, 1864, Ft. Randall, Dak. Buried at Fr. Randall, Dak. Gates, Henry V. Age 18. Residence DeWitt, nativity Massachusetts. Enlisted Nov. 24, 1862. Mustered Nov. 24, 1975, Sioux City, Iowa. Hass, William. Age 18. Residence DeWitt, nativity Germany. Enlisted Feb. 26, 1862. Mustered March 16, 1863. Mustered out Oct. 17, 1865, Sioux City, Iowa. Ivy, Charles E. Age 44. Residence Lyons, nativity Tennessee. Enlisted Oct. 27, 1862, as Teamster. Mustered Oct. 27, 1862. Discharged May 18, 1865, Sioux City, Iowa. Kennedy, Hiram C. Age 27. Residence Clinton County, nativity Vermont. Enlisted Nov. 4, 1862. Mustered Nov, 4, 1862. Discharged March 28, 1865, Davenport, Iowa. Long, Joseph. Age 22. Residence Lyons, nativity Canada. Enlisted Oct. 6, 1862, as Eighth Corporal. Mustered Oct. 6, 1862. Promoted Seventh Corporal March 10, 1863. Deserted July, 1865, from Hospital, Davenport, Iowa. Loy, Jacob. Age 35. Residence DeWitt, nativity Ohio. Enlisted Oct. 27, 1862. Mustered Oct. 27, 1862. Discharged June 22, 1865, Sioux City, Iowa. See Company H., Twenty- Sixth Infantry. McAllaster, Hugh A. Age 24. Residence Clinton, nativity New Hampshire. Enlisted Sept. 22, 1862, as First Sergeant. Mustered Sept. 22, 1862. Promoted First Lieutenant Jun3 19, 1864. Mustered out Oct. 17, 1865, Sioux City, Iowa. McLaughlin, John. Age 38. Residence Wheatland, nativity Ireland. Enlisted Oct. 24, 1862. Mustered Oct. 24, 1862. Mustered out Oct. 17, 1865, Sioux City, Iowa. COMPANY "B" McIntosh, Perrie. Age 18. Residence Clinton County, nativity Pennsylvania. Enlisted Oct. 7, 1864. Mustered Oct. 7, 1864. Mustered out Oct. 17, 1865, Sioux City, Iowa. COMPANY "F" McAllister, Elijah. Age 18. Residence Lyons, nativity Kentucky. Enlisted March 14, 1863. Mustered March 16, 1863. Killed in action Sept. 3, 1863, White Stone Hill, Dak. COMPANY "A" Murphy, John. Age 31. Residence DeWitt, nativity Ireland. Enlisted Oct. 6, 1862. Mustered Oct. 6, 1862. Transferred to Company M. COMPANY "M" Murphy, John. Age 31. Residence DeWitt, nativity Ireland. Enlisted Oct. 6, 1862. Mustered Oct. 6, 1862. Discharged July 29, 1865, Ft. Randall, Dak. See Company A. COMPANY "A" Names, Daniel. Age 23. Residence DeWitt, nativity New York. Enlisted Oct. 2, 1862. Mustered Oct. 2, 1862. Mustered out Oct. 17, 1865, Sioux City, Iowa. Pence, David. Age 44. Residence Lyons, nativity Pennsylvania. Enlisted Oct. 8, 1862, as Farrier. Mustered Oct. 8, 1862. Died of disease Oct. 25, 1863, Ft. Sully, Dak. Renfeldt, Frederick. Age 31. Residence Lyons, nativity Germany. Enlisted Oct. 14, 1862. Mustered Oct. 14, 1862. Died of disease Oct. 24, 1864, Ft. Randall, Dak. Buried at Ft. Randall, Dak. Snow, Daniel C. Age 18. Residence Lyons, nativity Vermont. Enlisted Oct. 16. 1862. Mustered Oct. 16. 1862. Mustered out Oct. 17, 1865, Sioux City, Iowa. Toll, Simon J. Age 33. Residence Lyons, nativity New York. Appointed Second Lieutenant. Mustered Oct. 9, 1862. Resigned April 21, 1865. Vanderburg. William H. Age 18. Residence DeWitt, nativity Canada. Enlisted Oct. 4, 1862. Mustered Oct. 4, 1862. Mustered out Oct. 17, 1865, Sioux City, Iowa. UNASSIGNED RECRUITS. Barnes, James L. Age 28. Residence Clinton County, nativity Indiana. Enlisted Oct. 6 1864. Mustered Oct. 7, 1864. No further record. Boyer, Benjamin. Age 27. Residence Clinton, nativity Pennsylvania. Enlisted Nov, 24, 1864. Mustered Nov. 25, 1864. No further record.