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Official Army Records
1865-1
HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Goldsborough, N. C., April 4, 1865.
GENERAL: I must now endeavor to group the events of the past three months connected
with the armies under my command, in order that you may have as clear an understanding of the
late campaign as the case admits of. The reports of the subordinate commanders will enable you
to fill up the picture.
I have heretofore explained how, in the progress of our arms, I was enabled to leave in the
West an army under Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, of sufficient strength to meet emergencies in
that quarter, while in person I conducted another army, composed of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth,
Seventeenth, and Twentieth Corps, and Kilpatrick's division of cavalry, to the Atlantic slope,
aiming to approach the grand theater of war in Virginia by the time the season would admit of
military operations in that latitude. The first lodgment on the coast was made at Savannah,
strongly fortified and armed, and valuable to us as a good sea-port with its navigable stream
inland. Near a month was consumed there in refitting the army, and in making the proper
disposition of captured property, and other local matters; but by the 15th of January I was all
ready to resume the march. Preliminary to this, General Howard, commanding the Right Wing,
was ordered to embark his command at Thunderbolt, transport it to Beaufort, S. C., and thence
by the 15th of January make a lodgment on the Charleston railroad, at or near Pocotaligo. This
was accomplished punctually, at little cost, by the Seventeenth Corps, Major-General Blair, and
a depot for supplies was established near the mouth of Pocotaligo Creek, with easy water
communication back to Hilton Head.
The Left Wing, Major-General Slocum, and the cavalry, Major-General Kilpatrick, were
ordered to rendezvous about the same time near Robertsville and Coosawhatchie, S. C., with a
depot of supplies at Purysburg, or Sister's Ferry, on the Savannah River. General Slocum had a
good pontoon bridge constructed opposite the city, and the "Union Causeway" leading through
the low rice-fields opposite Savannah was repaired and corduroyed, but before the time
appointed to start the heavy rains of January had swelled the river, broken the pontoon bridge,
and overflowed the whole bottom, so that the causeway was four feet under water, and General
Slocum was compelled to look higher up for a passage over the Savannah River. He moved up to
Sister's Ferry, but even there the river with its overflowed bottoms was near three miles wide,
and he did not succeed in getting his whole wing across until during the first week of February.
In the meantime General Grant had sent me Grover's division, of the Nineteenth Corps, to
garrison Savannah, and had drawn the Twenty-third Corps, Major-General Schofield, from
Tennessee, and sent it to re-enforce the commands of Major-Generals Terry and Palmer,
operating on the coast of North Carolina, to prepare the way for my coming.
On the 18th of January I transferred the forts and city of Savannah to Major-General Foster,
commanding the Department of the South, imparted to him my plans of operation, and instructed
him how to follow my movements inland by occupying in succession the city of Charleston and
such other points along the sea-coast as would be of any military value to us. The combined
naval and land forces under Admiral Porter and General Terry had on the 15th of January
captured Fort Fisher and the rebel forts at the mouth of Cape Fear River, giving me an additional
point of security on the sea-coast. But I had already resolved in my own mind, and had so
advised General Grant, that I would undertake at one stride to make Goldsborough, and open
communication with the sea by the New Berne railroad, and
had ordered Col. W. W. Wright,
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superintendent of military railroads, to proceed in advance to New Berne, and to be prepared to
extend the railroad out from New Berne to Goldsborough by the 15th of March.
On the 19th of January all preparations were complete and the orders of march given. My
chief quartermaster and commissary, Generals Easton and Beckwith, were ordered to complete
the supplies at Sister's Ferry and Pocotaligo, and then to follow our movement coastwise,
looking for my arrival at Goldsborough, N. C., about March 15, and opening communication
with me from Morehead City.
On the 22d of January I embarked at Savannah for Hilton Head, where I held a conference
with Admiral Dahlgren, U. S. Navy, and Major-General Foster, commanding the Department of
the South, and next day proceeded to Beaufort, riding out thence on the 24th to Pocotaligo,
where the Seventeenth Corps, Major-General Blair, was encamped. The Fifteenth Corps was
somewhat scattered--Woods' and Hazen's divisions at Beaufort, John E. Smith marching from
Savannah by the coast road, and Corse still at Savannah, cut off by the storms and freshet in the
river. On the 25th a demonstration was made against the Combahee Ferry and railroad bridge
across the Salkehatchie, merely to amuse the enemy, who had evidently adopted that river as his
defensive line against our supposed objective, the city of Charleston. I reconnoitered the line in
person, and saw that the heavy rains had swollen the river so that water stood in the swamps for a
breadth of more than a mile, at a depth of from one to twenty feet. Not having the remotest
intention of approaching Charleston, a comparatively small force was able, by seeming
preparations to cross over, to keep in their front a considerable force of the enemy disposed to
contest our advance on Charleston. On the 27th I rode to the camp of General Hatch's division,
of Foster's command, on the Tullifinny and Coosawhatchie Rivers, and directed those places to
be evacuated, as no longer of any use to us. That division was then moved to Pocotaligo to keep
up the feints already begun, until we should with the Right Wing move higher up and cross the
Salkehatchie about Rivers' or Broxton's Bridge.
On the 29th I learned that the roads back of Savannah had at last become sufficiently free of
the flood to admit of General Slocum putting his wing in motion, and that he was already
approaching Sister's Ferry, whither a gun-boat, the Pontiac, Captain Luce, kindly furnished by
Admiral Dahlgrens, had preceded him to cover the crossing. In the meantime three divisions of
the Fifteenth Corps had closed up at Pocotaligo, and the Right Wing had loaded its wagons and
was ready to start. I therefore directed General Howard to move one corps, the Seventeenth,
along the Salkehatchie, as high up as Rivers' Bridge, and the other, the Fifteenth by Hickory Hill,
Loper's Cross-Roads, Angley's Post-Office, and Buford's Bridge. Hatch's division was ordered to
remain at Pocotaligo, feigning at the Salkehatchie railroad bridge and ferry, until our movement
turned the enemy's position and forced him to fall behind the Edisto.
The Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps drew out of camp on the 31st of January, but the real
march began on the 1st of February. All the roads northward had for weeks been held by
Wheeler's cavalry, who had, by details of negro laborers, felled trees, burned bridges, and made
obstructions to impede our march. But so well organized were our pioneer battalions, and so
strong and intelligent our men, that obstructions seemed only to quicken their progress. Felled
trees were removed and bridges rebuilt by the heads of columns before the rear could close up.
On the 2d of February the Fifteenth Corps reached Loper's Cross-Roads, and the Seventeenth
was at Rivers' Bridge. From Loper's Cross-Roads I communicated with General Slocum, still
struggling with the floods of the Savannah River at Sister's Ferry. He had two divisions of the
Twentieth Corps, General Williams, on the east bank, and was enabled to cross over on his
pontoons the cavalry of Kilpatrick. General Williams was ordered to Buford's Bridge by way of
Lawtonville and Allendale; Kilpatrick to Blackville via Barnwell, and General Slocum to hurry
the crossing at Sister's Ferry as much as possible, and
overtake the Right Wing on the South
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Carolina Railroad. General Howard, with the Right Wing, was directed to cross the Salkehatchie
and push rapidly for the South Carolina Railroad at or near Midway. The enemy held the line of
the Salkehatchie in force, having infantry and artillery intrenched at Rivers' and Buford's
Bridges. The Seventeenth Corps was ordered to carry Rivers' Bridge and the Fifteenth Corps
Buford's Bridge. The former position was carried promptly and skillfully by Mower's and Giles
A. Smith's divisions, of the Seventeenth Corps, on the 3d of February, by crossing the swamp,
nearly three miles wide, with water varying from knee to shoulder deep. The weather was bitter
cold, and Generals Mower and Smith led their divisions in person, on foot, waded the swamp,
made a lodgment below the bridge, and turned on the rebel brigade which guarded it, driving it
in confusion and disorder toward Branchville. Our casualties were 1 officer and 17 men killed,
and 70 men wounded, who were sent to Pocotaligo. The line of the Salkehatchie being thus
broken, the enemy retreated at once behind the Edisto at Branchville, and the whole army was
pushed rapidly to the South Carolina Railroad at Midway, Bamberg (or Lowry's Station), and
Graham's Station. The Seventeenth Corps, by threatening Branchville, forced the enemy to burn
the railroad bridge and Walker's Bridge below, across the Edisto. All hands were at once set to
work to destroy the railroad track. From the 7th to the 10th of February this work was thoroughly
prosecuted by the Seventeenth Corps, from the Edisto up to Bamberg, and by the Fifteenth Corps
from Bamberg up to Blackville. In the meantime General Kilpatrick had brought his cavalry
rapidly by Barnwell to Blackville, and had turned toward Aiken, with orders to threaten Augusta,
but not to be drawn needlessly into a serious battle. This he skillfully accomplished, skirmishing
heavily with Wheeler's cavalry, first at Blackville and afterward at Williston and Aiken. General
Williams, with two divisions of the Twentieth Corps, marched to the South Carolina Railroad at
Graham's Station on the 8th, and General Slocum reached Blackville on the 10th. The
destruction of the railroad was continued by the Left Wing from Blackville up to Windsor. By
the 11th of February all the army was on the railroad from Midway to Johnson's Station, thereby
dividing the enemy's forces, which still remained at Branchville and Charleston on the one hand
Aiken and Augusta on the other.
We then began the movement on Orangeburg. The Seventeenth Corps crossed the South Fork
of Edisto River at Binnaker's Bridge, and moved straight for Orangeburg, while the Fifteenth
Corps crossed at Holman's Bridge and moved to Poplar Springs in support. The Left Wing and
cavalry were still at work on the railroad, with orders to cross the South Edisto at New and
Guignard's Bridges, move to the Orange-burg and Edgefield road, and there await the result of
the attack on Orangeburg. On the 12th the Seventeenth Corps found the enemy intrenched in
front of the Orangeburg bridge, but swept him away by a dash, and followed him, forcing him
across the bridge, which was partially burned. Behind the bridge was a battery in position,
covered by a cotton and earth parapet, with wings as far as could be seen. General Blair held one
division (Giles A. Smith's) close up to the Edisto, and moved the other two to a point about two
miles below, where he crossed Force's division by a pontoon bridge, holding Mower's in support.
As soon as Force emerged from the swamp the enemy gave ground, and Giles Smith's division
gained the bridge, crossed over, and occupied the enemy's parapet. He soon repaired the bridge,
and by 4 p.m. the whole corps was in Orangeburg and had begun the work of destruction on the
railroad. Blair was ordered to destroy this railroad effectually up to Lewisville, and to push the
enemy across the Congaree and force him to burn the bridges, which he did on the 14th; and
without wasting time or labor on Branchville or Charleston, which I knew the enemy could no
longer hold, I turned all the columns straight on Columbia.
The Seventeenth Corps followed the State road, and the Fifteenth crossed the North Edisto
from Poplar Springs at Shilling's Bridge, above the mouth of "Caw Caw Swamp" creek, and took
a country road which came into the State road at
Zeigler's. On the 15th the Fifteenth Corps found
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the enemy in a strong position at Little Congaree bridge (across Congaree Creek) with a tete-depont
on the south side, and a well-constructed fort on the north side, commanding the bridge with
artillery. The ground in front was very bad, level, and clear, with a fresh deposit of mud from a
recent overflow. General Charles R. Woods, who commanded the leading division, succeeded,
however, in turning the flank of the tete-de-pont by sending Stone's brigade through a cypress
swamp to the left, and following up the retreating enemy promptly he got possession of the
bridge and the fort beyond. The bridge had been partially damaged by fire, and had to be
repaired for the passage of artillery, so that night closed in before the head of the column could
reach the bridge across Congaree River in front of Columbia. That night the enemy shelled our
camps from a battery on the east side of the Congaree, above Granby. Early next morning
(February 16) the head of column reached the bank of the Congaree, opposite Columbia, but too
late to save the fine bridge which spanned the river at that point. It was burned by the enemy.
While waiting for the pontoons to come to the front we could see people running about the
streets of Columbia, and occasionally small bodies of cavalry, but no masses. A single gun of
Captain De Gress' battery was firing at their cavalry squads, but I checked his firing, limiting
him to a few shots at the unfinished State-house walls, and a few shells at the railroad depot to
scatter the people who were seen carrying away sacks of corn and meal that we needed. There
was no white flag or manifestation of surrender. I directed General Howard not to cross directly
in front of Columbia, but to cross the Saluda at the factory, three miles above, and afterward
Broad River, so as to approach Columbia from the north. Within an hour of the arrival of
General Howard's head of column at the river opposite Columbia, the head of column of the Left
Wing also appeared, and I directed General Slocum to cross the Saluda at Zion Church, and
thence to take roads direct to Winnsborough, breaking up, en route, the railroads and bridges
about Alston.
General Howard effected a crossing of the Saluda, near the factory, on the 16th, skirmishing
with cavalry, and the same night made a flying bridge across Broad River, about three miles
above Columbia, by which he crossed over Stone's brigade, of Woods' division, Fifteenth Corps.
Under cover of this brigade a pontoon bridge was laid on the morning of the 17th. I was in
person at this bridge, and at 11 a.m. learned that the mayor of Columbia had come out in a
carriage and made a formal surrender of the city to Colonel Stone, Twenty-fifth Iowa Infantry,
commanding Third Brigade, First Division, Fifteenth Corps. About the same time a small party
of the Seventeenth Corps had crossed the Congaree in a skiff, and entered Columbia from a point
immediately west. In anticipation of the occupation of the city I had made written orders to
General Howard touching the conduct of the troops. These were to destroy absolutely all arsenals
and public property not needed for our own use, as well as all railroads, depots, and machinery
useful in war to an enemy, but to spare all dwellings, colleges, schools, asylums, and harmless
private property. I was the first to cross the pontoon bridge, and in company with General
Howard rode into the city. The day was clear, but a perfect tempest of wind was raging. The
brigade of Colonel Stone was already in the city, and was properly posted. Citizens and soldiers
were on the streets, and general good order prevailed. General Wade Hampton, who commanded
the Confederate rear guard of cavalry, had, in anticipation of our capture of Columbia, ordered
that all cotton, public and private, should be moved into the streets and fired, to prevent our
making use of it. Bales were piled everywhere, the rope and bagging cut, and tufts of cotton were
blown about in the wind, lodged in the trees and against houses, so as to resemble a snow-storm.
Some of these piles of cotton were burning, especially one in the very heart of the city, near the
court-house, but the fire was partially subdued by the labor of our soldiers. During the day the
Fifteenth Corps passed through Columbia and out on the
Camden road. The Seventeenth did not
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enter the town at all; and, as I have before stated, the Left Wing and cavalry did not come within
two miles of the town.
Before one single public building had been fired by order, the smouldering fires, set by
Hampton's order, were rekindled by the wind, and communicated to the buildings around. About
dark they began to spread, and got beyond the control of the brigade on duty within the city. The
whole of Woods' division was brought in, but it was found impossible to check the flames which,
by midnight, had become unmanageable, and raged until about 4 a.m., when the wind subsiding
they were got under control. I was up nearly all night, and saw Generals Howard, Logan, Woods,
and others, laboring to save houses and protect families thus suddenly deprived of shelter, and
even of bedding and wearing apparel. I disclaim on the part of my army any agency in this fire,
but, on the contrary, claim that we saved what of Columbia remains unconsumed. And without
hesitation I charge General Wade Hampton with having burned his own city of Columbia, not
with a malicious intent, or as the manifestation of a silly "Roman stoicism," but from folly and
want of sense, in filling it with lint, cotton, and tinder. Our officers and men on duty worked well
to extinguish the flames; but others not on duty, including the officers who had long been
imprisoned there, rescued by us, may have assisted in spreading the fire after it had once begun,
and may have indulged in unconcealed joy to see the ruin of the capital of South Carolina.
During the 18th and 19th the arsenal, railroad depots, machine shops, foundries, and other
buildings were properly destroyed by detailed working parties, and the railroad track torn up and
destroyed down to Kingsville and the Wateree bridge, and up in the direction of Winnsborough.
At the same time the Left Wing and cavalry had crossed the Saluda and Broad Rivers,
breaking up railroad about Alston, and as high up as the bridge across Broad River on the
Spartanburg road, the main body moving straight for Winnsborough, which General Slocum
reached on the 21st of February. He caused the railroad to be destroyed up to Black Stocks
Depot, and then turned to Rocky Mount, on the Catawba River. The Twentieth Corps reached
Rocky Mount on the 22d: laid a pontoon bridge, and crossed over during the 23d. Kilpatrick's
cavalry followed, and crossed over in a terrible rain during the night of the 23d, and moved up
to. Lancaster, with orders to keep up the delusion of a general movement on Charlotte, N. C, to
which General Beauregard and all the cavalry of the enemy had retreated from Columbia. I was
also aware that Cheatham's corps, of Hood's old army, was aiming to make a junction with
Beauregard at Charlotte, having been cut off by our rapid movements on Columbia and
Winnsborough. From the 23d to the 26th we had heavy rains, swelling the rivers and making the
roads almost impassable. The Twentieth Corps reached Hanging Rock on the 26th, and waited
there for the Fourteenth Corps to get across the Catawba. The heavy rains had so swollen the
river that the pontoon bridge broke, and General Davis had very hard work to restore it and get
his command across. At last he succeeded, and the Left Wing was all put in motion for Cheraw.
In the meantime the Right Wing had broken up the railroad to Winnsborough, and thence
turned for Peay's Ferry, where it was crossed over the Catawba before the heavy rains set in, the
Seventeenth Corps moving straight on Cheraw via Young's Bridge, and the Fifteenth Corps by
Tiller's and Kelly's Bridges. From this latter corps detachments were sent into Camden to burn
the bridge over the Wateree, with the railroad depot, stores, &c. A small force of mounted men
under Captain Duncan was also dispatched to make a dash and interrupt the railroad from
Charleston to Florence, but it met Butler's division of cavalry, and after a sharp night skirmish on
Mount Elon was compelled to return unsuccessful. Much bad road was encountered at Lynch's
Creek, which delayed the Right Wing about the same length of time as the Left Wing had been at
the Catawba.
On the 2d of March the leading division of the Twentieth Corps entered Chesterfield,
skirmishing with Butler's division of cavalry, and the
next day about noon the Seventeenth Corps
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entered Cheraw, the enemy retreating across the Pedee, and burning the bridge at that point. At
Cheraw we found much ammunition and many guns which had been brought from Charleston on
the evacuation of that city. These were destroyed, as also the railroad trestles and bridges down
as far as Darlington. An expedition of mounted infantry was also sent down to Florence, but it
encountered both cavalry and infantry, and returned, having only broken up in part the branch
road from Florence to Cheraw.
Without unnecessary delay the columns were again put in motion, directed on Fayetteville,
N. C., the Right Wing crossing the Pedee at Cheraw, and the Left Wing and cavalry at
Sneedsborough. General Kilpatrick was ordered to keep well on the left flank, and the Fourteenth
Corps, moving by Love's Bridge, was given the right to enter and occupy Fayetteville first. The
weather continued unfavorable and roads bad, but the Fourteenth and Seventeenth Corps reached
Fayetteville on the 11th of March, skirmishing with Wade Hampton's cavalry, that covered the
rear of Hardee's retreating army, which, as usual, had crossed Cape Fear River, burning the
bridge. During the march from the Pedee General Kilpatrick had kept his cavalry well on the left
and exposed flank. During the night of the 9th of March his three brigades were divided to picket
the roads. General Hampton detecting this dashed in at daylight and gained possession of the
camp of Colonel Spencer's brigade, and the house in which General Kilpatrick and Colonel
Spencer had their quarters. The surprise was complete, but General Kilpatrick quickly succeeded
in rallying his men, on foot, in a swamp near by, and by a prompt attack, well followed up,
regained his artillery, horses, camp, and everything save some prisoners whom the enemy carried
off, leaving their dead on the ground.
The 12th, 13th, and 14th were passed at Fayetteville, destroying absolutely the U. S. Arsenal
and the vast amount of machinery which had formerly belonged to the old Harper's Ferry U.S.
Arsenal. Every building was knocked down and burned, and every piece of machinery utterly
broken up and ruined by the First Regiment Michigan Engineers, under the immediate
supervision of Col. O. M. Poe, chief engineer. Much valuable property of great use to an enemy
was here destroyed or cast into the river.
Up to this period I had perfectly succeeded in interposing my superior army between the
scattered parts of my enemy. But I was then aware that the fragments that had left Columbia
under Beauregard had been re-enforced by Cheatham's corps from the West and the garrison of
Augusta, and that ample time had been given to move them to my front and flank about Raleigh.
Hardee had also succeeded in getting across Cape Fear River ahead of me, and could therefore
complete the junction with the other armies of Johnston and Hoke, in North Carolina And the
whole, under the command of the skillful and experienced Joe Johnston, made up an army
superior to me in cavalry, and formidable enough in artillery and infantry to justify me in
extreme caution in making the last step necessary to complete the march I had undertaken.
Previous to reaching Fayetteville I had dispatched to Wilmington from Laurel Hill Church two of
our best scouts with intelligence of our position and my general plans. Both of these messengers
reached Wilmington, and, on the morning of the 12th of March, the army tug Davidson, Captain
Ainsworth, reached Fayetteville from Wilmington, bringing me full intelligence of events from
the outer world. On the same day this tug carried back to General Terry, at Wilmington, and
General Schofield, at New Berne, my dispatches to the effect that, on Wednesday, the 15th, we
would move for Goldsborough, feigning on Raleigh, and ordering them to march straight for
Goldsborough, which I expected to reach about the 20th. The same day the gun-boat Eolus,
Captain Young, U.S. Navy, also reached Fayetteville, and through her I continued to have
communication with Wilmington until the day of our actual departure. While the work of
destruction was going on at Fayetteville, two pontoon bridges were lead across Cape Fear River,
one opposite the town, the other three miles below.
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General Kilpatrick was ordered to move up the plank road to and beyond Averasborough. He
was to be followed by four divisions of the Left Wing, with as few wagons as possible; the rest
of the train, under escort of the two remaining divisions of that wing, to take a shorter and more
direct road to Goldsborough. In like manner General Howard was ordered to send his trains,
under good escort, well to the right, toward Faison's Depot and Goldsborough, and to hold four
divisions, light, ready to go to the aid of the Left Wing if attacked while in motion. The weather
continued very bad, and the roads had become mere quagmire. Almost every foot of it had to be
corduroyed to admit the passage of wheels. Still, time was so important that punctually,
according to order, the columns moved out from Cape Fear River on Wednesday, the 15th of
March. I accompanied General Slocum, who, preceded by Kilpatrick's cavalry, moved up the
river or plank road that day to Kyle's Landing, Kilpatrick skirmishing heavily with the enemy's
rear guard about three miles beyond, near Taylor's Hole Creek. At General Kilpatrick's request
General Slocum sent forward a brigade of infantry to hold a line of barricades. Next morning the
column advanced in the same order, and developed the enemy, with artillery, infantry, and
cavalry, in an intrenched position in front of the point where the road branches off toward
Goldsborough through Bentonville. On an inspection of the map it was manifest that Hardee, in
retreating from Fayetteville, had halted in the narrow, swampy neck between Cape Fear and
South Rivers, in hopes to hold me to save time for the concentration of Johnston's armies at some
point to his rear, namely, Raleigh, Smithfield, or Goldsborough. Hardee's force was estimated at
20,000 men. It was necessary to dislodge him that we might have the use of the Goldsborough
road, as also to keep up the feint on Raleigh as long as possible. General Slocum was, therefore,
ordered to press and carry the position, only difficult by reason of the nature of the ground,
which was so soft that horses would sink everywhere, and even men could hardly make their
way over the common pine barren.
The Twentieth Corps, General Williams, had the lead, and Ward's division the advance. This
was deployed, and the skirmish line developed the position of a brigade of Charleston heavy
artillery armed as infantry (Rhett's) posted across the road behind a light parapet, with a battery
of guns enfilading the approach across a cleared field. General Williams sent a brigade (Case's)
by a circuit to his left that turned this line, and by a quick charge broke the brigade, which
rapidly retreated back to a second line better built and more strongly held. A battery of artillery
(Winegar's) well posted, under the immediate direction of Major Reynolds, chief of artillery of
Twentieth Corps, did good execution on the retreating brigade, and on advancing Ward's division
over this ground General Williams captured 3 guns and 217 prisoners, of which 68 were
wounded and left in a house near by with a rebel officer, four men, and five days' rations. One
hundred and eight rebel dead were buried by us. As Ward's division advanced he developed a
second and stronger line, when Jackson's division was deployed forward on the right of Ward,
and the two divisions of Jeff. C. Davis' (Fourteenth) corps on the left, well toward the Cape Fear.
At the same time Kilpatrick, who was acting in concert with General Williams, was ordered to
draw back his cavalry and mass it on the extreme right, and, in concert with Jackson's right, to
feel forward for the Goldsborough road. He got a brigade on the road, but it was attacked by
McLaws' rebel division furiously, and though it fought well and hard the brigade drew back to
the flank of the infantry. The whole line advanced late in the afternoon, drove the enemy well
within his intrenched line, and pressed him so hard that next morning he was gone, having
retreated in a miserable stormy night over the worst of roads. Ward's division of infantry
followed to and through Averasborough, developing the fact that Hardee had retreated, not on
Raleigh but on Smithfield. I had the night before directed Kilpatrick to cross South River at a
mill-dam to our right rear and move up on the east side toward Elevation. General Slocum
reports his aggregate loss in this affair, known as that
of Averasborough, at 12 officers and 65
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men killed and 477 wounded. We lost no prisoners. The enemy's loss can be inferred from his
dead (108) left for us to bury. Leaving Ward's division to keep up a show of pursuit, Slocum's
column was turned to the right, built a bridge across the swollen South River, and took the
Goldsborough road, Kilpatrick crossing to the north in the direction of Elevation, with orders to
move eastward, watching that flank. In the meantime the wagon trains and guards, as also
Howard's column, were wallowing along the miry roads toward Bentonville and Goldsborough.
The enemy's infantry, as before stated, had retreated on Smithfield, and his cavalry retreated
across our front in the same direction, burning the bridges across Mill Creek. I continued with
the head of Slocum's column and camped the night of the 18th with him on the Goldsborough
road, twenty-seven miles from Goldsborough, about five miles from Bentonville, and where the
road from Clinton to Smithfield crosses the Goldsborough road. Howard was at Lee's Store, only
two miles south, and both columns had pickets three miles forward to where the two roads came
together and became common to Goldsborough.
All the signs induced me to believe that the enemy would make no further opposition to our
progress, and would not attempt to strike us in flank while in motion. I therefore directed
Howard to move his Right Wing by the new Goldsborough road, which goes by way of Falling
Creek Church. I also left Slocum and joined Howard's column with a view to open
communication with General Schofield, coming up from New Berne, and Terry from
Wilmington. I found General Howard's column well strung out, owing to the very bad roads, and
did not overtake him in person until he had reached Falling Creek Church, with one regiment
forward to the cross-roads near Cox's Bridge across the Neuse. I had gone from General Slocum
about six miles when I heard artillery in his direction, but was soon made easy by one of his staff
officers overtaking me, explaining that his leading division (Carlin's) had encountered a division
of rebel cavalry (Dibrell's), which he was driving easily. But soon other staff officers came up,
reporting that he had developed near Bentonville the whole of the rebel army under General
Johnston himself. I sent him orders to call up the two divisions guarding his wagon trains, and
Hazen's division of the Fifteenth Corps, still back near Lee's Store, to fight defensively until I
could draw up Blair's corps, then near Mount Olive Station, and with the remaining three
divisions of the Fifteenth Corps come up on Johnston's left rear from the direction of Cox's
Bridge. In the meantime, while on the road, I received couriers from both Generals Schofield and
Terry. The former reported himself in possession of Kinston, delayed somewhat by want of
provisions, but able to march so as to make Goldsborough on the 21st; and Terry was at or near
Faison's Depot. Orders were at once dispatched to Schofield to push for Goldsborough and to
make dispositions to cross Little River in the direction of Smithfield, as far as Millard; to
General Terry to move to Cox's Bridge, lay a pontoon bridge, and establish a crossing; and to
Blair to make a night march to Falling Creek Church; and at daylight the Right Wing, General
Howard, less the necessary wagon guards, was put in rapid motion on Bentonville. By
subsequent reports I learned that General Slocum's head of column had advanced from its camp
of March 18, and first encountered Dibrell's cavalry, but soon found his progress impeded by
infantry and artillery. The enemy attacked his head of column, gaining a temporary advantage,
and took three guns and caissons of General Carlin's division, driving the two leading brigades
back on the main body. As soon as General Slocum realized that he had in his front the whole
Confederate army he promptly deployed the two divisions of the Fourteenth Corps, General
Davis, and rapidly brought up on their left the two divisions of the Twentieth Corps, General
Williams. These he arranged on the defensive, and hastily prepared a line of barricades. General
Kilpatrick also came up at the sound of artillery and massed on the left. In this position the Left
Wing received six distinct assaults by the combined forces of Hoke, Hardee, and Cheatham,
under the immediate command of General Johnston himself,
without giving an inch of ground,
9
and doing good execution on the enemy's ranks, especially with our artillery, the enemy having
little or none.
Johnston had moved by night from Smithfield with great rapidity, and without unnecessary
wheels, intending to overwhelm my left flank before it could be relieved by its co-operating
columns. But he "reckoned without his host." I had expected just such a movement all the way
from Fayetteville, and was prepared for it. During the night of the 19th General Slocum got up
his wagon train with its guard of two divisions, and Hazen's division of the Fifteenth Corps,
which re-enforcement enabled him to make his position impregnable. The Right Wing found
rebel cavalry watching its approach, but unable to offer any serious opposition until our head of
column encountered a considerable body behind a barricade at the forks of the road near
Bentonville, about three miles east of the battle-field of the day before. This body of cavalry was,
however, quickly dislodged, and the intersection of the roads secured. On moving forward the
Fifteenth Corps, General Logan found that the enemy had thrown back his left flank, and had
constructed a line of parapet connecting with that toward General Slocum, in the form of a
bastion, its salient on the main Goldsborough road interposing between General Slocum on the
west and General Howard on the east, while the flanks rested on Mill Creek, covering the road
back to Smithfield. General Howard was instructed to proceed with due caution until he had
made strong connection on his left with General Slocum. This he soon accomplished, and by 4
p.m. of the 20th a complete and strong line of battle confronted the enemy in his intrenched
position, and General Johnston, instead of catching us in detail, was on the defensive, with Mill
Creek and a single bridge to his rear. Nevertheless, we had no object to accomplish by a battle,
unless at an advantage, and therefore my general instructions were to press steadily with
skirmishers alone, to use artillery pretty freely on the wooded space held by the enemy, and to
feel pretty strongly the flanks of his position, which were, as usual, covered by the endless
swamps of this region of country. I also ordered all empty wagons to be sent at once to Kinston
for supplies, and other impediments to be grouped near the Neuse, south of Goldsborough,
holding the real army in close contact with the enemy, ready to fight him if he ventured outside
his parapets and swampy obstructions.
Thus matters stood about Bentonville on the 21st of March. On the same day General
Schofield entered Goldsborough with little or no opposition, and General Terry had got
possession of the Neuse River at Cox's Bridge, ten miles above, with a pontoon bridge laid and a
brigade across, so that the three armies were in actual connection, and the great object of the
campaign was accomplished.
On the 21st a steady rain prevailed, during which General Mower's division, of the
Seventeenth Corps, on the extreme right, had worked well to the right around the enemy's flank,
and had nearly reached the bridge across Mill Creek, the only line of retreat open to the enemy.
Of course there was extreme danger that the enemy would turn on him all his reserves, and, it
might be, let go his parapets to overwhelm Mower. Accordingly I ordered at once a general
attack by our skirmish line from left to right. Quite a noisy battle ensued, during which General
Mower was enabled to regain his connection with his own corps by moving to his left rear. Still
he had developed a weakness in the enemy's position of which advantage might have been taken;
but that night the enemy retreated on Smithfield, leaving his pickets to fall into our hands, with
many dead unburied, and wounded in his field hospitals. At daybreak of the 22d pursuit was
made two miles beyond Mill Creek, but checked by my order. General Johnston had utterly
failed in his attempt, and we remained in full possession of the field of battle.
General Slocum reports the losses of the Left Wing about Bentonville at 9 officers and 145
men killed, 51 officers and 816 men wounded, and 3
officers and 223 men missing, taken
10
prisoners by the enemy; total, 1,196. He buried on the field 167 rebel dead, and took 338
prisoners.
General Howard reports the losses of the Right Wing at 2 officers and 35 men killed, 12
officers and 289 men wounded, and 1 officer and 60 men missing; total, 399. He also buried 100
rebel dead and took 1,287 prisoners.
The cavalry of Kilpatrick was held in reserve, and lost but few, if any, of which I have no
report as yet. Our aggregate loss at Bentonville was 1,595.
I am well satisfied that the enemy lost heavily, especially during his assaults on the Left
Wing during the afternoon of the 19th; but as I have no data save his dead and wounded left in
our hands I prefer to make no comparisons.
Thus, as I have endeavored to explain, we had completed our march on the 21st, and had full
possession of Goldsborough, the real objective, with its two railroads back to the sea-ports of
Wilmington and Beaufort, N. C. These were being rapidly repaired by strong working parties
directed by Col. W. W. Wright, of the railroad department. A large amount of supplies had
already been brought forward to Kinston, to which place our wagons had been sent to receive
them. I therefore directed General Howard and the cavalry to remain at Bentonville during the
22d, to bury the dead and remove the wounded, and on the following day all the armies to move
to the camps assigned them about Goldsborough, there to rest and receive the clothing and
supplies of which they stood in need. In person I went on the 22d to Cox's Bridge to meet
General Terry, whom I met for the first time, and on the following day rode into Goldsborough,
where I found General Schofield and his army. The Left Wing came in during the same day and
next morning, and the Right Wing followed on the 24th, on which day the cavalry moved to
Mount Olive Station and General Terry back to Faison's. On the 25th the New Berne railroad
was finished and the first train of cars came in, thus giving us the means of bringing from the
depot at Morehead City full supplies to the army.
It was all-important that I should have an interview with the general-in-chief, and presuming
that he could not at this time leave City Point, I left General Schofield in chief command and
proceeded with all expedition by rail to Morehead City, and thence by steamer to City Point,
reaching General Grant's headquarters on the evening of the 27th of March. I had the good
fortune to meet General Grant, the President, Generals Meade, Ord, and others of the Army of
the Potomac, and soon learned the general state of the military world, from which I had been in a
great measure cut off since January. Having completed all necessary business, I re-embarked on
the navy steamer Bat, Captain Barnes, which Admiral Porter placed at my command, and
returned via Hatteras Inlet and New Berne, reaching my own headquarters in Goldsborough
during the night of the 30th. During my absence full supplies of clothing and food had been
brought to camp, and all things were working well.
I have thus rapidly sketched the progress of our columns from Savannah to Goldsborough,
but for more minute details must refer to the reports of subordinate commanders and of staff
officers, which are not yet ready, but will in due season be forwarded and filed with this report. I
cannot even with any degree of precision recapitulate the vast amount of injury done the enemy,
or the quantity of guns and materials of war captured and destroyed. In general terms, we have
traversed the country from Savannah to Goldsborough, with an average breadth of forty miles,
consuming all the forage, cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry, cured meats, corn meal, &c. The public
enemy, instead of drawing supplies from that region to feed his armies, will be compelled to send
provisions from other quarters to feed the inhabitants. A map herewith, prepared by my chief
engineer, Colonel Poe, with the routes of the four corps and cavalry, will show at a glance the
country traversed. Of course the abandonment to us by the enemy of the whole sea-coast from
Savannah to New Berne, N. C., with its forts, dock-yards,
gun-boats, &c., was a necessary
11
incident to our occupation and destruction of the inland routes of travel and supply. But the real
object of this march was to place this army in a position easy of supply, whence it could take an
appropriate part in the spring and summer campaign of 1865. This was completely accomplished
on the 21st of March by the junction of the three armies and occupation of Goldsborough.
In conclusion, I beg to express, in the most emphatic manner, my entire satisfaction with the
tone and temper of the whole army. Nothing seems to dampen their energy, zeal, or cheerfulness.
It is impossible to conceive a march involving more labor and exposure, yet I cannot recall an
instance of bad temper by the way, or hearing an expression of doubt as to our perfect success in
the end. I believe that this cheerfulness and harmony of action reflects upon all concerned quite
as much real honor and fame as "battles gained" or "cities won," and I therefore commend all--
generals, staff, officers, and men--for these high qualities, in addition to the more soldierly ones
of obedience to orders and the alacrity they have always manifested when danger summoned
them "to the front."
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General, Commanding.
Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Chief of Staff, Washington City, D. C.
HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field, City Point, Va., May 9, 1865.
GENERAL: My last official report brought the history of events, as connected with the
armies in the field subject to my immediate command, down to the 1st of April, when the Army
of the Ohio, Maj. Gen. J. M. Schofield commanding, lay at Goldsborough with detachments
distributed so as to secure and cover our routes of communication and supply back to the sea at
Wilmington and Morehead City; Maj. Gen. A. H. Terry, with the Tenth Corps, being at Faison's
Depot; the Army of the Tennessee, Maj. Gen. O. O. Howard commanding, was encamped to the
right and front of Goldsborough, and the Army of Georgia, Maj. Gen. H. W. Slocum
commanding, to its left and front; the cavalry, Bvt. Maj. Gen. J. Kilpatrick commanding, at
Mount Olive. All were busy in repairing the wear and tear of our then recent and hard march
from Savannah, and in replenishing clothing and stores necessary for a further progress.
I had previously, by letter and in person, notified the lieutenant-general commanding the
Armies of the United States that the 10th of April would be the earliest possible moment at
which I could hope to have all things in readiness, and we were compelled to use our railroads to
the very highest possible limit in order to fulfill that promise. Owing to a mistake in the railroad
department in sending locomotives and cars of the five-foot gauge we were limited to the use of
the few locomotives and cars of the four-foot-eight-and-a-half-inch gauge already in North
Carolina, with such of the old stock as was captured by Major-General Terry at Wilmington and
on his way up to Goldsborough. Yet such judicious use was made of these, and such industry
displayed in the railroad management by Generals Easton and Beckwith and Colonel Wright and
Mr. Van Dyne, that by the 10th of April our men were all reclad, the wagons reloaded, and a fair
amount of forage accumulated ahead.
In the meantime Maj. Gen. George Stoneman, in command of a division of cavalry operating
from East Tennessee in connection with Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, in pursuance of my
orders of January 21, 1865, had reached the railroad about Greensborough, N. C., and had made
sad havoc with it, and had pushed along it to Salisbury, destroying en route bridges, culverts,
depots, and all kinds of rebel supplies, and had extended the break in the railroad down to the
Catawba bridge.
12
This was fatal to the hostile armies of Lee and Johnston, who depended on that road for
supplies and as their ultimate line of retreat. Maj. Gen. J. H. Wilson, also in command of the
Cavalry Corps, organized by himself under Special Field Orders, No. [103], of October 24,
1864, at Gaylesville, Ala., had started from the neighborhood of Decatur and Florence, Ala., and
moved straight into the heart of Alabama, on a route prescribed for General Thomas after he had
defeated General Hood at Nashville, Tenn.; but the roads being too heavy for infantry General
Thomas had devolved that duty on that most energetic young cavalry officer, General Wilson,
who, imbued with the proper spirit, has struck one of the best blows of the war at the waning
strength of the Confederacy. His route was one never before touched by our troops, and afforded
him abundance of supplies as long as he was in motion, namely, by Tuscaloosa, Selma,
Montgomery, Columbus, and Macon. Though in communication with him, I have not been able
to receive as yet his full and detailed reports, which will in due time be published and
appreciated. Lieutenant-General Grant, also in immediate command of the armies about
Richmond, had taken the initiative in that magnificent campaign which, in less than ten days,
compelled the evacuation of Richmond, and resulted in the destruction and surrender of the
entire rebel army of Virginia under command of General Lee.
The news of the battles about Petersburg reached me at Goldsborough on the 6th of April. Up
to that time my purpose was to move rapidly northward, feigning on Raleigh and striking straight
for Burkeville, thereby interposing between Johnston and Lee. But the auspicious events in
Virginia had changed the whole military problem, and in the expressive language of Lieutenant-
General Grant, "the Confederate armies of Lee and Johnston" became the "strategic points."
General Grant was fully able to take care of the former, and my task was to capture or destroy
the latter. Johnston at that time, April 6, had his army well in hand about Smithfield, interposing
between me and Raleigh. I estimated his infantry and artillery at 35,000, and his cavalry from
6,000 to 10,000. He was superior to me in cavalry, so that I held General Kilpatrick in reserve at
Mount Olive, with orders to recruit his horses and be ready to make a sudden and rapid march on
the 10th of April.
At daybreak of the day appointed all the heads of columns were in motion straight against the
enemy, Maj. Gen. H. W. Slocum taking the two direct roads for Smithfield; Maj. Gen. O. O.
Howard making a circuit by the right and feigning up the Weldon road to disconcert the enemy's
cavalry; Generals Terry and Kilpatrick moving on the west side of the Neuse River and aiming to
reach the rear of the enemy between Smithfield and Raleigh; General Schofield followed
General Slocum in support.
All the columns met, within six miles of Goldsborough, more or less cavalry, with the usual
rail barricades, which were swept before us as chaff, and by 10 a.m. of the 11th the Fourteenth
Corps entered Smithfield, the Twentieth Corps close at hand. Johnston had rapidly retreated
across the Neuse River, and, having his railroad to lighten up his trains, could retreat faster than
we could pursue. The rains had also set in, making the resort to corduroy absolutely necessary to
pass even ambulances. The enemy had burned the bridge at Smithfield, and as soon as possible
Major-General Slocum got up his pontoons and crossed over a division of the Fourteenth Corps.
We there heard of the surrender of Lee's army at Appomattox Court-House, Va., which was
announced to the armies in orders, and created universal joy. Not an officer or soldier of my
armies but expressed a pride and satisfaction that it fell to the lot of the Armies of the Potomac
and James so gloriously to overwhelm and capture the entire army that had held them so long in
cheek, and their success gave new impulse to finish up our task. Without a moment's hesitation
we dropped our trains and marched rapidly in pursuit to and through Raleigh, reaching that place
at 7.30 a.m. of the 13th, in a heavy rain. The next day the cavalry pushed on through the rain to
Durham Station, the Fifteenth Corps following as far as
Morrisville Station, and the Seventeenth
13
Corps to Jones' Station. On the supposition that Johnston was tied to his railroad as a line of
retreat, by Hillsborough, Greensborough, Salisbury, Charlotte, &c., I had turned the other
columns across the bend of that road toward Ashborough. (See Special Field Orders, No. 55. The
cavalry, Bvt. Maj. Gen. J. Kilpatrick commanding, was ordered to keep up a show of pursuit
toward the Company's Shops, in Alamance County; Maj. Gen. O. O. Howard to turn to the left
by Hackney's Cross-Roads, Pittsborough, Saint Lawrence, and Ashborough; Maj. Gen. H. W.
Slocum to cross Cape Fear River at Aven's Ferry, and move rapidly by Carthage, Caledonia, and
Cox's Mills; Maj. Gen. J. M. Schofield was to hold Raleigh and the road back, and with his spare
force to follow an intermediate route.
By the 15th, though the rains were incessant and the roads almost impracticable, Major-
General Slocum had the Fourteenth Corps, Brevet Major-General Davis commanding, near
Martha's Vineyard, with a pontoon bridge laid across Cape Fear River at Aven's Ferry, with the
Twentieth Corps, Major-General Mower commanding, in support, and Major-General Howard
had the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps stretched out on the roads toward Pittsborough, whilst
General Kilpatrick held Durham Station and Chapel Hill University.
Johnston's army was retreating rapidly on the roads from Hillsborough to Greensborough, he
himself at Greensborough. Although out of place as to time, I here invite all military critics who
study the problems of war to take their maps and compare the position of my army on the 15th
and 16th of April, with that of General Halleck about Burkeville and Petersburg, Va., on the 26th
of April, when, according to his telegram to Secretary Stanton, he offered to relieve me of the
task of "cutting off Johnston's retreat." Major-General Stoneman at the time was at Statesville,
and Johnston's only line of retreat was by Salisbury and Charlotte. It may be that General
Halleck's troops can outmarch mine, but there is nothing in their past history to show it, or it may
be that General Halleck can inspire his troops with more energy of action. I doubt that also, save
and except in this single instance, when he knew the enemy was ready to surrender or disperse,
as advised by my letter of April 18, addressed to him when chief of staff at Washington City, and
delivered into his hands on the 21st instant by Major Hitchcock, of my staff.
Thus matters stood at the time I received General Johnston's first letter and made my answer
of April 14, copies of which were sent with all expedition to Lieutenant-General Grant and the
Secretary of War, with my letter of April 15. I agreed to meet General Johnston in person at a
point intermediate between our pickets on the 17th at noon, provided the position of the troops
remained statu quo. I was both willing and anxious thus to consume a few days, as it would
enable Colonel Wright to finish our railroad to Raleigh.
Two bridges had to be built and twelve miles of new road made. We had no iron except by
taking up that on the branch from Goldsborough to Weldon. Instead of losing by time I gained in
every way, for every hour of delay possible was required to reconstruct the railroad to our rear
and improve the condition of our wagon roads to the front, so desirable in case the negotiations
failed and we be forced to make the race of near 200 miles to head off or catch Johnston's army,
then retreating toward Charlotte.
At noon of the day appointed I met General Johnston for the first time in my life, although
we had been interchanging shots constantly since May, 1863.
Our interview was frank and soldier-like, and he gave me to understand that further war on
the part of the Confederate troops was folly, that the cause was lost, and that every life sacrificed
after the surrender of Lee's army was the "highest possible crime." He admitted that the terms
conceded to General Lee were magnanimous and all he could ask, but he did want some general
concessions that would enable him to allay the natural fears and anxiety of his followers, and
enable him to maintain his control over them until they
could be got back to the neighborhood of
14
their homes, thereby saving the State of North Carolina the devastations inevitably to result from
turning his men loose and unprovided on the spot, and our pursuit across the State.
He also wanted to embrace in the same general proposition the fate of all the Confederate
armies that remained in existence. I never made any concession as to his own army, or assumed