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OFFICIAL ARMY RECORDS

1864-5

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

Saint Louis, December 7, 1864.

COLONEL: The commanding general of the military division is already informed by my

current official dispatches of the principal incidents of the late campaign against Price in this

department, but it is proper that I should submit a more detailed and connected report of the

operations for a correct understanding of their extent and the importance of the results.

From early in the spring it was known through the lodges of the O. A. K.'s and other rebel

sources that Price intended a great invasion of this State, in which he expected the co-operation

of that order and of rebels generally, and by which he hoped to obtain important military and

political results. In pursuance of these plans the lodges with rebel recruiting officers and agents

sent into Missouri clandestinely, or under cover of the amnesty oath for that purpose, began an

insurrection in Platte County on the 7th of July last. From that time guerrilla warfare raged in the

river counties west from Callaway on the north and from Cooper on the south side of the

Missouri. This department having been depleted of troops permission was obtained to raise

volunteers to meet the exigencies of our situation, and under it about five complete and as many

incomplete regiments of twelve-months volunteer infantry had been organized previously to the

raid. On the 3d of September General Washburn sounded the tocsin by information that the force

under Shelby at Batesville, Ark., was about to be joined by Price for the invasion of our State.

The ripening of the corn lent to this additional color of probability, so that on the 6th, Maj. Gen.

A. J. Smith passing Cairo with a division of infantry on the way to General Sherman, I

telegraphed General Halleck the state of affairs, requesting orders for this division to halt at that

point and wait until we could ascertain the designs of the enemy. The division was halted, and on

the 9th General Smith received orders from General Halleck to "operate against Price & Co.,"

but deeming it impracticable to penetrate between 100 and 200 miles into Arkansas with a small

column of infantry in pursuit of a large mounted force, the exact whereabouts as well as

intentions of which were still unknown, he decided to move his command to a point near Saint

Louis, whence he could readily move by rail or river and await Price's movements. From that

time information accumulated showing the imminence of the raid. On the 23d we received

certain information that Price had crossed the Arkansas with two divisions of mounted men,

three batteries of artillery, a large wagon train carrying several thousand stand of small-arms, and

was at or near Batesville on White River. From this point midway between the Mississippi and

the western boundary of the State there are three practicable routes of invasion. One by

Pocahontas into southeast Missouri, another by West Plains and Rolla or vicinity north toward

Jefferson City, a third by Cassville north either through Springfield and Sedalia or by the Kansas

border to the Missouri River. Strong military reasons favored the movements of their main force

by the central route; while a detachment should go by Pocahontas and strip Southeastern

Missouri. Under these circumstances my first object was to secure our great depots at Springfield

and Rolla, the hay cut during the summer, and our train of Government wagons required to

maintain the troops in the Springfield district. To do this and as far as possible save the scanty

agriculture of the country from devastation it was necessary to hold both Springfield and Rolla.

Indeed, to have abandoned these points would have been not only to abandon the loyal people of

those districts and their property to destruction, but to invite the enemy to destroy our trains

while moving them, capture our stores, and beat our troops in detail. Generals Sanborn and

McNeil were therefore informed and ordered to place the trains and public property of their

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districts under the protection of the fortifications at Springfield and Rolla, to put their forts in the

best possible state of defense, using every foot and dismounted cavalry soldier, including citizens

and local militia, to the best advantage, and with all their efficient mounted force to watch the

enemy's motions and report the earliest indications of the direction of the coming storm. General

Brown was ordered to concentrate all troops from the west of the Central District at Sedalia, to

notify the citizen guards, and see that neither they nor their arms were exposed to capture. On the

24th Shelby was reported south of Pilot Knob, moving toward Farmington, with 5,000 men and

four pieces of artillery. General Ewing was ordered to concentrate the troops, in the southern part

of his district at Pilot Knob and Cape Girardeau, and to verify the accuracy of this report, which

proved true. On the 26th General A. J. Smith, with two of his brigades, was ordered to a point on

the Iron Mountain Railroad "as far toward Pilot Knob as he deemed compatible with certainty

that his position would not be turned," and the enemy get between him and Saint Louis. On the

day before Sanborn had orders to move with all his mounted force to Rolla, it having become

evident that the enemy would not probably strike west of that point. The safety of Saint Louis

was vital to us. I therefore telegraphed Brig. Gen. H. E. Paine, commanding in Illinois, who

promised me assistance from some regiments of returning 100-days' volunteers, who, though

they had already served beyond their time, generously consented to come for the defense of the

city. The enrolled militia of Saint Louis, though but skeleton regiments, were called out and the

citizens also requested to organize and arm. General Ewing was sent to Pilot Knob, with

directions to use his utmost exertions to find out whether any more than Shelby's division was in

Southeast Missouri, and to that end to hold Pilot Knob until he was certain. With a soldierly

comprehension of the importance of his duties, while reporting the current rumors of the advance

of Price with his whole force, he expressed his doubts, and held his position until the 27th, when

he sustained a terrific assault in Fort Davidson, a small field-work in the valley, surrounded by

hills within cannon-range, which he held with about 1,000 men, one-half raw troops, establishing

beyond question the presence of all Price's command in that quarter. He gloriously repulsed,

killing and wounding some 1,500 of the enemy, and lost only 28 killed and 56 wounded, as

appears from his report herewith. While Ewing's fight was going on Shelby advanced on Potosi,

and thence to Big River bridge, threatening General Smith's advance, which withdrew from that

point to within safer supporting distance of his main position at De Soto. Previous to and

pending these events the guerrilla warfare in North Missouri had been raging with redoubled

fury. Rebel agents, amnesty oath-takers, recruits, sympathizers, O. A. K.'s, and traitors of every

hue and stripe, had warmed into life at the approach of the great invasion. Women's fingers were

busy making clothes for rebel soldiers out of goods plundered by the guerrillas; women's

tongues were busy telling Union neighbors "their time was now coming." General Fisk, with all

his force, had been scouring the brush for weeks in the river counties in pursuit of hostile bands,

composed largely of recruits from among that class of inhabitants who claim protection, yet

decline to perform the full duty of citizens on the ground that they "never tuck no sides." A few

facts will convey some idea of this warfare carried on by Confederate agents here, while the

agents abroad of their bloody and hypocritical despotism--Mason, Slidell, and Mann in Europe--

have the effrontery to tell the nations of Christendom our Government "carries on the war with

increasing ferocity regardless of the laws of civilized warfare." These gangs of rebels, whose

families had been living in peace among their loyal neighbors, committed the most cold-blooded

and diabolical murders,. such as riding up to a farm-house, asking for water, and, while receiving

it, shooting down the giver, an aged, inoffensive farmer, because he was a radical "Union man."

In the single Sub-District of Mexico its commanding officer furnished a list of near 100 Union

men, who, in the course of six weeks, had been killed, maimed, or "run off" because they were

"radical Union men or damned abolitionists."

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About the 1st of September Anderson's gang attacked a railroad train on the North Missouri

road, took from it twenty-two unarmed soldiers, many on sick leave, and after robbing placed

them in a row and shot them in cold blood. Some of these bodies they scalped, and put others

across the track and ran the engine over them. On the 27th this gang, with numbers swollen to

300 or 400, attacked Major Johnston with about 120 men of the Thirty-ninth Missouri Volunteer

Infantry, raw recruits, and, after stampeding their horses, shot every man, most of them in cold

blood. Anderson a few days later was recognized by General Price at Boonville as Confederate

captain, and with a verbal admonition to behave himself, ordered by Colonel Maclean, chief of

Price's staff, to proceed to North Missouri and destroy the railroads, which orders were found on

the miscreant when killed by Lieutenant-Colonel Cox about the 27th of October ultimo.

On the 28th, when information of Ewing's fight and Price's presence at Pilot Knob came to

hand, General Smith, discovering the enemy on his front moving to west and north, in pursuance

of his orders to hold "the most advanced position compatible with the certainty of keeping

between the enemy and Saint Louis," determined to leave De Soto and retire behind the

Meramec, a stream which, at from ten to fifteen miles south of Saint Louis, offers considerable

obstacle to the passage of a hostile force with wagons and artillery. General Ewing, finding

Mamaduke's and Fagan's rebel divisions before him, and his position commanded by a

numerically superior artillery, acting on suggestions made when discussing with him the

possibilities of the position, on the night of the 27th spiked his heavy guns, blew up his

magazine, ammunition, and supplies, and with the field battery and remains of his command

retreated through the hills toward the Meramec Valley, hoping to reach a point on the railroad

from whence he could move to Saint Louis. But, as will be seen from his reports, the enemy

pursued him, harassed his rear on the march, which he directed along a ridge where the enemy

could not flank him, and overtook him near Harrison's Station, where, seizing and extending the

temporary defenses constructed by the militia, he displayed such vigor that after harassing him

for thirty-six hours and making several attacks, on the approach of a detachment of Sanborn's

cavalry the rebels left him and he escaped with all his command to Rolla. The enemy's strength

and position thus developed, my first business was to secure the points he could best strike---

Saint Louis, Jefferson City, and Rolla. General Smith's 4,500 infantry and the mounted force we

could raise, the Seventh Kansas, just in from Memphis, part of the Thirteenth Missouri Volunteer

Cavalry, under Colonel Catherwood, and the recruits of Merrill's Horse, hastily mounted and

organized, a total of 1,500 men, were all the force we could place between Saint Louis and an

invading army of at least 15,000 mounted men, whose advance was within a day's march of the

city. Meanwhile Brigadier-General Pike, ably seconded by Generals Wolff and Miller, of the

Enrolled Missouri Militia, had assembled and armed skeletons of the First, Second, Third, Fifth,

Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, Thirteenth, and Fifty-second Regiments of Enrolled Militia. The

mayor and others, under the direction of the Hon. B. Gratz Brown and Major Ledergerber,

organized the citizens exempt from militia duty, who volunteered for the defense of the city, into

companies and regiments, numbering by the 30th some 4,000 or 5,000 men. The One hundred

and thirty-second, One hundred and thirty-fourth, One hundred and thirty-eighth, One hundred

and fortieth, and One hundred and forty-second Illinois (100-days' volunteers) also began to

arrive on the 30th, and were all in by October 1 and formed into a brigade, under Colonel

Wangelin, for the immediate defense of the city, beyond which they did not wish to serve, as all

of them were out over time, and many having desirable offers as substitutes.

The enemy moving up by Potosi seemed to halt at Richwoods, about forty miles southwest of

Saint Louis, in the hills between Big River and the Meramec, as if concentrating for an attack on

the city. This appeared the more possible from the magnitude of his interest in it, and the fact that

he did not show much force in the Meramec Valley, even on the 30th. On that day Major-

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General Smith was ordered to occupy Kirkwood, which commands the Richwoods road and

crossing of the Meramec to Saint Louis, his cavalry to reconnoiter south and west, Colonel

Merrill going as far as Franklin. General Fisk, previously ordered to join General Brown with all

his available force, reached and reported from Jefferson City to-day. At the close of it news came

that a brigade of rebel cavalry had burned the Moselle Bridge and were moving north toward

Franklin. General Smith was ordered to send a brigade of infantry to support the cavalry at that

point, and on the 1st of October Colonel Wolff, with his brigade, reached Franklin, and after a

sharp skirmish drove the enemy from the place, but not until he had burned the depot.

The rebels were now apparently at bay with 1,500 cavalry and 4,500 infantry. General Smith

was not in condition to attempt offensive movements against a force of 15,000 veteran mounted

rebels who could reach Saint Louis from any point in the Meramec Valley where he might

confront them in haft the time it would take his infantry to reach it. Our obvious policy under

these circumstances was to keep as close as possible to the enemy without risking Saint Louis

until General Mower's command should arrive from Arkansas, or at least we be able to join to

Smith's our mounted forces at Rolla. Every hour's delay of the enemy in the Meramec Valley

brought Mower nearer and increased our chances of striking him as it did the security of

Jefferson City. On the 2d the enemy was reported massing in the vicinity of Union, on the road

either to Jefferson City or Rolla, and General Smith was ordered to Franklin. But as the enemy's

movements appeared to tend westward, on the 3d General Smith was advanced to Gray's Summit

and General Pike moved to Franklin. On the 4th General Smith pushed his cavalry toward the

Gasconade, advanced his infantry to Union, followed up by General Pike's militia. On the 5th

Price's command took Hermann, burned the Gasconade bridge, and was crossing that stream at

the old State Road Ford. General Smith followed him. General Mower reported his arrival at

Girardeau out of supplies, his teams worn down, part of his cavalry dismounted, and many

horses unshod. Transports and supply-boats were at once dispatched, and on the 8th and 9th his

command reached Saint Louis, from whence the infantry was pushed forward by water as rapidly

as the low stage of the river would permit to join General Smith. The cavalry under Winslow

reshod and started by land from Saint Louis on the 10th toward Jefferson City, which point it

reached on the 16th instant, one day in advance of the infantry. On the 6th the enemy began

crossing the Osage at Castle Rock and one or two other fords, under cover of his artillery,

opposed by Colonel Philips with the available cavalry at Jefferson City. While thus engaged

Generals McNeil and Sanborn reached Jefferson City by a forced march with all the mounted

force from Rolla, and uniting with Fisk and Brown gave us a garrison there of 4,100 cavalry and

2,600 infantry, mostly the new and partially organized twelve-months' men, with a few citizens

and militia. As this force, though capable of giving a strong battle behind intrenchments, was not

very formidable to act offensively against a veteran force like that of the enemy, it was decided

by General Fisk, the other three generals concurring, to oppose a moderate resistance to the

enemy's advance across the Moreau, a small stream with muddy banks and bad bottom, four or

five miles east of the city, and then to retire and receive his attack at the defensive line, which

with industry and good judgment had been prepared by the entire laboring force, civil and

military, at Jefferson City. The enemy burned the Osage bridge and crossed the river on the 6th.

On the 7th he advanced on the city, crossed the Moreau after sharp fighting, and developed a line

of battle three or four miles long, east, south, and west of the place. But after reconnoitering its

apparently formidable intrenchments, warned by his Pilot Knob experience in storming earthworks,

he declined attacking, and passing his train in rear moved around, massing on the west,

and finally retiring.

On the 8th General Pleasonton, on his arrival at Jefferson, under orders to assume command,

dispatched General Sanborn with all the available cavalry, 4,100 men, to follow and harass the

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enemy until General Smith's command could come up. General Smith was informed of the rebel

failure at Jefferson and directed to move by the most expeditious route to that place, where

Mower's infantry were to join and the cavalry overtake him. He was to send all his cavalry, under

Colonel Catherwood, in advance to report to Pleasonton, who, on its arrival, was to join

Sanborn's and assume direction of the Provisional Cavalry Division thus formed. General Pike,

with his militia, was charged with the control of the country and the defenses of our line of

communication from Saint Louis to Jefferson City. Sanborn followed the rebels, attacked their

rear guard at Versailles, where it was uncertain what course they would take, found they were

going north toward Boonville, followed and drove them into line of battle near that place, and

when he found himself nearly enveloped by their entire army, fell back out of their reach to meet

Catherwood's command and his provisions, which both arrived at California on the 14th. The

enemy taking advantage of this crossed the La Mine at Scott's and Dug Fords and moved north

toward Arrow Rock. Sanborn immediately followed this movement by Georgetown bridge,

keeping between the Pacific Railroad and the line of the enemy's march, and holding the line of

the Blackwater a western tributary of the La Mine, while Price, crossing a part of Shelby's

command at Arrow Rock on the Boonville ferry-boat to the north side of the river, advanced on

Glasgow, which he captured after a seven-hours' fight with a part of Colonel Harding's regiment,

Forty-third Missouri Volunteer Infantry, and small detachments of the Ninth Missouri State

Militia and Seventeenth Illinois Cavalry. On the 17th our cavalry, following his westward

movement, keeping south of without pressing him, until Generals Smith's and Mower's troops

could be brought up, kept the line of the Blackwater, and on the 17th reported themselves out of

supplies and the enemy between Marshall and Waverly. On the 17th Mower's infantry, except

two small regiments, arrived at Jefferson City and went at once by rail to La Mine bridge to join

General Smith, who, passing Jefferson by land on the 14th, had followed the cavalry movement

to that point, taking charge of the supplies which, in consequence of the destruction of the bridge

by the rebels, could go by rail no farther. Winslow's cavalry, marching, reached Jefferson, the

advance twenty miles beyond at California, on the 16th, and was ordered to join General

Pleasonton without delay. On the 18th General Smith was ordered to move to Dunksburg near

the cavalry headquarters, taking five days' rations and leaving minimum garrisons to guard and

handle stores at Sedalia and La Mine bridge. The 19th found this movement accomplished, the

cavalry with its center near Cook's Store, its right behind the Blackwater toward Marshall, and its

left near Kirkpatrick's Mills toward Warrensburg. The enemy apparently hesitated in the vicinity

of Marshall as if uncertain whether to go west or double on his tracks between Sedalia and

Jefferson, but our cavalry advanced, receding a few miles to meet supplies and concentrate on

the 17th and 18th, seemed to decide his movements toward Lexington, where General Curtis

telegraphed me on the 19th the head of his column had arrived, General Blunt, after a sharp

skirmish, retiring toward Independence and destroying the bridges in his rear. I informed General

Curtis of our position; that our troops reported Price near Waverly; advised that Blunt check his

advance at Wellington, and as soon as we were sure his main force was moving on Lexington we

would endeavor by a forced march to strike him in the flank. To ascertain Price's real intentions

General Pleasonton was directed to make a strong reconnaissance toward Waverly. The results of

this reached me on the morning of the 20th, and Pleasonton was directed at once to push the

center of his cavalry to Lexington, and General Smith, with his infantry, to support the

movement. At 7 p.m. Pleasonton reported the enemy had left Lexington, going west, and McNeil

and Sanborn entering the town. October 21 our cavalry advance followed the enemy to Fire

Creek Prairie, Brown's and Winslow's brigades reaching Lexington at 2 p.m. and the infantry at 9

p.m. of the same day. General Curtis also reported a fight with the enemy's entire force at the

Little Blue from 10 a.m. to 2 p.m., and that to prevent being flanked he should retire to the Big

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Blue, where his militia and artillery were in strong position. Supposing the enemy could not

cross the Big Blue in the face of Curtis, I dispatched General Pleasonton my belief that he would

move south, and that while McNell's brigade should harass his rear, he, with the other three

brigades, should move toward Lone Jack, near which would be General Smith's infantry, now

marching from Lexington to Chapel Hill. At 10 p.m. a dispatch from Pleasonton informed me of

the receipt of these conditional orders, and that the enemy in full force was moving far to the

west, followed by his cavalry. October 22 Pleasonton's cavalry reached the Little Blue at 10

a.m.; found the bridge destroyed; a temporary one was constructed, the enemy's skirmishers

driven, the command crossed, when the enemy opened with artillery, and was steadily driven

toward Independence, which place was taken by a brilliant cavalry charge, in which

Catherwood's regiment captured two guns complete. Near a hundred prisoners fell into our

hands, and our troops pushed the enemy's rear guard all night. At 8 p.m. Pleasonton reports "all

my brigades have been engaged; the enemy have left 40 killed and many sick and wounded in

my hands. Heard nothing from Curtis. If Smith can come up in case we get a fight it will be well.

Have sent McNeil's brigade to Little Santa Fé. Price is reported intrenched this side of the Big

Blue. Fighting still going on with an obstinate rear guard. Let Smith come to this place."

Reluctantly General Smith was dispatched to move to Independence, as requested, the messenger

reaching him at Chapel Hill as he was putting his column in motion to march there in response to

a direct message from General Pleasonton advising him of the posture of affairs.

On the morning of the 23d Pleasonton began to move on the enemy. At the crossing of the

Big Blue, where the fight opened at 7 a.m. and continued until 1 p.m., when Shelby, who had

been fighting General Curtis' command, finding Marmaduke and Fagan were giving away,

turned on Pleasonton and "for a moment shook Sanborn's brigade," but by the skillful use of

Thurber's battery, throwing double-shotted grape and canister, and the gallant charging of our

troops, they were routed and fled southward, pushed by Generals Pleasonton and Curtis that

night beyond Little Santa Fé. General Smith's command arriving at Independence at 5 p.m. was

ordered to move that night by a forced march to Hickman Mills, hoping it would strike the

enemy in flank while passing that point. Had he been ordered and marched for that point instead

of Independence the day before General Smith would have arrived in time to strike the enemy's

compact column and train with 9,000 infantry and five batteries. But it was too late. He did not

reach the Mills until long after not only the enemy's but our own column had passed there. News

from the cavalry fronts during the night showed that nothing remained but to push the enemy

with our cavalry, allowing the infantry to follow as best it could to act as support in case of

possible reverse to us or re-enforcements which were constantly reported on their way to meet

the enemy. On the 24th, with the Kansas troops in advance, we pursued the enemy until within

fifteen miles of the Trading Post, when, at General Curtis' request, General Pleasonton's

command took the lead and at the end of a sixty-miles' march overtook the rebels about

midnight, at the Marais des Cygnes; began skirmishing, and on the 25th, at 4 a.m., opened upon

their bivouac with artillery, creating the greatest consternation, following it up by an attack

which drove them promptly from the field, leaving in our hands horses, mules, wagons, arms,

and some prisoners. Our troops followed them in a running fight until 2 p.m., when they came up

with them at the Little Osage Crossing in position, with eight pieces of artillery on their line of

battle. With the instinct of a true cavalry general, Pleasonton immediately ordered an attack by

Benteen's and Philips' brigades, which by a magnificent charge completely routed them,

capturing 8 guns, 2 stand of colors, Major-General Marmaduke, Brigadier-General Cabell, 5

colonels, many other officers, and near 1,000 prisoners, besides wagons, small-arms, &c.

Sanborn's brigade, which was one mile and a half behind, and the Kansas troops still farther in

the rear, did not arrive in time to take part in this battle, but Sanborn's brigade led in the pursuit

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of the routed enemy, overtook them at a small stream a few miles beyond the battle-ground,

charged them in the timber, drove them across it into the open prairie, where they formed in

order of battle three lines deep. But such was the enthusiasm of the men of this brigade when

they reached the edge of the wood and saw this triple line they charged it without orders,

knocked it in pieces, and chased the fugitives until night closed the pursuit, and the enemy fled

under cover of the darkness toward the Arkansas border. Besides the wagons captured during

this day at the Marais des Cygnes, on the way to and at the Little Osage, the enemy had

destroyed many, including ammunition-wagons, and for twenty-five or thirty miles beyond the

Osage battle-field their route was strewn with debris of burning wagons and other property.

Pleasonton's cavalry had now been in motion almost day and night for six days, during which

it had marched at least 204 miles and fought four battles. It was pretty well exhausted and broken

down and went into Fort Scott that night for food and a little rest. He reported to me the results

of his day's work, that the enemy was going at his utmost and his own troops were so broken

down it would be impossible without fresh horses to strike the enemy another great blow this

side of the Arkansas, and recommended that Generals Sanborn and McNeil follow, to support

Curtis' troops in pursuit so long as there was any prospect of damaging the enemy, and then

return to Springfield and Rolla. On the receipt of the news of the enemy's rout General Smith,

whose command was out of provisions, was directed to move to Harrisonville and thence get

supplies from Warrensburg, where 100 wagons were waiting with provisions for our command,

sending 30,000 rations to the cavalry. Further reports of the enemy's condition satisfied me there

would be no use of breaking down any more of our horses since General Curtis, whose cavalry

horses were fresher than ours, supported by Sanborn and McNeil on their way down the State

line, would be more than ample to deal with any resistance Price's command would offer this

side of the Arkansas. Orders Were accordingly given and General Pleasonton returned with

Philips' brigade, the cannon, and part of the prisoners to Warrensburg. The Kansas troops and

Benteen's brigade pursued the enemy's flying columns, a part of whom made their last stand at

Newtonia, Mo., where General Blunt overtook and attacked them on the 28th, but was being

worsted when Sanborn, having marched 102 miles in thirty-six hours, arrived in time to save the

day. The enemy fled and made no further stand this side of the Arkansas. In a country destitute

of food for man and beast, five times defeated, pursued 400 or 500 miles, with the loss of nearly

all their artillery, ammunition, and baggage train, demoralization and destitution, and want of

supplies would drive the rebels across the Arkansas for supplies at the risk of falling into the

hands of Thayer's forces or Steele's cavalry, and if allowed would almost disintegrate and

disband them on the way thither. General Curtis thought pushing them was best, and accordingly

followed, although he did not again overtake them. At his urgent instance, against my own

judgment as well as that of Generals Sanborn and McNeil, I pushed their two brigades down to

the Arkansas border, whence Sanborn sent an advance to Fort Smith, reaching there on the

morning of the 8th [November], to notify General Thayer of the enemy's desperate condition and

the direction he had taken from Cane Hill toward the Indian Nation, between Fort Smith and Fort

Gibson. Meanwhile at Sherman's request, followed by orders from the General-in-Chief, I

directed Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith to move his command by the most expeditious route to the

Mississippi, in the vicinity of Saint Louis, there to embark and proceed to Nashville and report to

Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas. On the 3d of November I returned to Saint Louis to be there

during the election, and on the receipt of the news of the enemy having crossed the Arkansas

directed the cavalry to repair to their respective districts and Winslow's cavalry to move by the

best route and join General Thomas at Nashville.

In entering into details I have aimed to give the general commanding a sort of military

photograph of our daily condition and movements as well for his critical judgment as for history,

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omitting events of whatever magnitude not having a bearing on our movements and most of the

minor ones which did enter into their determination. I trust that the precautions taken in advance

of Price's movements, the preparations before we knew where he was coming, the measures

taken to secure our most important points and occupy him until we could concentrate the forces

to strike him with a certainty of success outweighing any damage he could meanwhile do us, the

energy and activity in concentration, vigor in pursuit, and fiery gallantry of our troops in battle,

will receive the approbation of the general commanding the military division.

It will appear from these details and accompanying reports that our dismounted cavalry,

infantry, and militia nobly performed their duty, watching, marching, and fighting whenever and

wherever opportunity offered, that by their aid in holding our depots and supporting our mounted

force we have saved all our important posts and most of the country, from pillage, except a belt

of some twenty miles wide along the route of the invasion, and with less than 7,000 effective

cavalry have pursued, overtaken, beaten in several engagements, and finally routed an invading

cavalry, variously estimated at from 15,000 to 26,000 men, re-enforced by 6,000 armed recruits

from Missouri, taken from them 10 pieces of artillery, 2 stand of colors, 1,958 prisoners of war, a

large number of horses, mules, wagons, and small arms, compelled them to destroy most of their

remaining wagons, train, and plunder, blasted all the political schemes of the rebels and traitors

who concerted with Price to revolutionize Missouri, destroy Kansas, and turn the State and

presidential election, against the Union cause, and by our triumph in the late elections have given

to gallant and suffering Missouri the fairest prospect she has ever yet seen of future freedom,

peace, and prosperity, all the fruits of a campaign of forty-eight days, in which most of our

victorious troops had never before seen a great cavalry battle. Rarely during this or any other war

has cavalry displayed more persevering energy in pursuit, more impetuous courage and gallantry

in attacking, regardless of superior numbers, or had its efforts crowned with greater fruits of

success. While paying a just tribute of thanks to all the officers and soldiers of the cavalry,

artillery, infantry, militia, and citizen guards who served during the raid, for their prompt and

cheerful obedience to all orders, whether to labor, march, or fight, I must refer to the

accompanying reports of their commanders for special mention of individual gallantry. Major-

General Pleasonton deserves the thanks of the country for the able manner in which he handled

and fought the cavalry, and for the brilliant and fruitful victories he won over triple his own

force. I hope he may receive promotion in the regular army. Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith deserves

thanks for promptitude, energy, and perseverance in all his movements, and for the good

judgment displayed in his campaign. Nor must I omit a tribute of admiration to those brave and

true soldiers who, under Mower, followed Price from Arkansas, marching 300 miles in eighteen

days, and after going by boat from Cape Girardeau to Jefferson City, again resumed the march

after him, making another march of 462 miles before they embarked for Nashville to take part in

the not doubtful contest before that city for the mastery of Middle Tennessee. The district

commanders all deserve my thanks for prompt and cordial co-operation in the measures

precautionary and preparatory for the raid. General Ewing deserves special mention for military

judgment, courage, and gallantry, in holding Pilot Knob till he had certainty of the enemy's force,

as well as for the manner in which he withdrew his troops to Rolla. General McNeil for

promptitude and energy in putting Rolla in a state of defense, and for moving with all force to

Jefferson City in time to succor it. General Fisk for the prompt and cheerful discharge of very

trying administrative duties, and for the energy and good sense in preparing the defenses of

Jefferson City, as in the subsequent repair of La Mine bridge. General Brown displayed energy

and good sense in preparing the city for a good defense, and General Sanborn for vigilance,

energy, and soldierly judgment while commanding the cavalry advance between Jefferson City

and Dunksburg, as well as throughout the campaign. Col. J. V. Du Bois, aide-de-camp, chief of

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staff; Captain Henry, assistant quartermaster of General Steele's staff, volunteer staff

quartermaster in the field; Capt. G. Scull, chief commissary; Surg. P. V. Schenck, medical

director in the field; Captain Hoelcke, acting aide-de-camp, engineer; Major Fischer, Fifth

Missouri State Militia, on engineer duty; Capt. J. F. Bennett, assistant adjutant-general, and my

personal aides, Maj. F. S. Bond, aide-de-camp, and Capt. R. S. Thorns, aide-de-camp, Captain

Hills, Tenth Kansas, acting provost-marshal, accompanied me during the campaign, and were

zealous and indefatigable in the discharge of their respective duties. Major McDermott, First

Iowa Cavalry, who, with his battalion of First Iowa Cavalry, did such good service in North

Missouri and behaved very gallantly in the pursuit of the rebels from Jefferson City to Boonville,

commanded the escort from Sedalia, and deserves honorable mention. Brig. Gen. J. B. Gray,

adjutant-general of Missouri, and Brigadier-General Pike, of the Enrolled, are entitled to public

thanks for their valuable and indefatigable services in connection with the Enrolled Militia. Col.

T. J. Haines, commissary of subsistence, to whom all the armies West, as well as the country,

owe a debt of gratitude for invaluable services not likely to be overpaid, displayed his usual

promptitude and foresight in providing for the wants of our troops and depots. Col. William

Myers, chief quartermaster, in supplying animals, fitting up trains, and providing for the wants of

our troops, exhibited his characteristic care and skill.

I must also mention the voluntary services of those tried veterans, Colonel Wangelin, late of

the Twelfth Missouri Volunteer Infantry, and Colonel Laiboldt, who did all in their power to aid

in the defense of Saint Louis. Senator B. Gratz Brown and Mayor Thomas, seconded by the

efforts of many patriotic citizens of all classes, did much to prepare for the defense of the city,

and deserve my thanks. I should be glad to call the general's attention to many militia officers,

such as General Craig, whose able management in the northwest, in the absence of General Fisk,

Colonel Gale, who so promptly organized his militia regiment (Fifty-fourth Enrolled Missouri

Militia) at Franklin, and many others scattered over the State, who rendered great service to the

country. But as the chief motive of these officers and the men of their commands was their

country's good the consciousness of duty manfully performed must be their chief reward, until

the day comes when our children, pointing to them as to others who have borne arms in this

great national struggle, shall say, "There go some of the men who helped to save our nation."

The accompanying reports show our total losses in this campaign were 164 killed, of whom

116 were murdered at Centralia, 336 wounded, 171 prisoners, of whom many, if not all, are

illegally parolled, 681 hors de combat, besides which there were several small squads of

prisoners illegally captured and parolled in Southeast Missouri, and the troops at Glasgow whose

surrender was, I think, justifiable and possibly lawful.

W. S. ROSECRANS,

Major-General.

Lieutenant-Colonel CHRISTENSEN,

A. A. G., Mil. Div. of West Mississippi, New Orleans, La.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 220.

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

Saint Louis, Mo., December 8, 1864.

I. The reports of the commanders of troops in the late campaign against Price, delayed till

now by the necessities of the case, furnish a record so brilliant of arduous service and gallant

fighting, that the commanding general deems it a duty to express to the officers and men of his

command his admiration of their behavior, and to congratulate them and their fellow-citizens on

the result.

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II. Vague rumors and threats of an invasion of Missouri by Price had been in circulation for

months among rebels, bushwhackers, and "O. A. K.'s."

About the 21st of September these rumors ripened into certainty by the information that

Price, crossing the Arkansas with two divisions of cavalry and three batteries of artillery, had

joined Shelby near Batesville, sixty miles south of the line of our State, and would invade us

with from 15,000 to 20,000 veteran mounted men.

We had then about 6,500 mounted men for field duty in the department, scattered over a

country 400 miles long and 300 broad, which, with the partially-organized new infantry

regiments and our dismounted men, constituted the entire force to cover our great depots at Saint

Louis, Jefferson City, Saint Joseph, Macon, Springfield, Rolla, and Pilot Knob, guard our

railroad bridges against this invasion and protect, as far as possible, the lives and property of our

citizens from the guerrillas who swarmed over the whole country bordering on the Missouri

River. Fortunately, Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith's troops, passing Cairo toward Nashville, at the urgent

solicitation of the general commanding, were ordered to halt and oppose Price, thus giving us

4,500 veteran infantry.

III. Unable to concentrate until the point was determined where the enemy would strike,

without surrendering all the remaining portion of the State, you could only make preliminary

preparations and await the coming storm, while the Enrolled Missouri Militia, which had never

yet failed to respond to the call of patriotism, prepared to defend their homes against the invader

and his traitor friends in our midst.

IV. When Springfield appeared safe from the blow, General Sanborn moved with all his

available cavalry to re enforce Rolla, where General McNeil was preparing to secure our depots

and great supply trains, while Ewing and his band of heroes, the young Forty-seventh Missouri

Infantry, detachments of the First, Second, and Third Missouri State Militia, the Fourteenth Iowa

Infantry, and Battery H, Second Missouri Light Artillery, by their grand defense of Pilot Knob,

September 27, proved the presence of the enemy's entire force in Southeast Missouri, gave him

the first staggering blow, and allowed time for the Enrolled Missouri Militia and citizens of Saint

Louis to prepare for its defense, then covered only by General Smith's infantry and three

regiments of cavalry, thrown as far as practicable toward the enemy.

V. The zeal and energy of the citizens, aided by the timely arrival of the One hundred and

thirty-second, One hundred and thirty-fourth, One hundred and thirty-sixth, One hundred and

thirty-ninth, One hundred and fortieth, and One hundred and forty-second Illinois Regiments

(100 days' volunteers), who generously and promptly came to our assistance, soon put us at ease

about the safety of Saint Louis, and struck the second blow to the invasion. The gallant First,

Second, Third, Fourth, Tenth, Eleventh, Thirteenth, Eightieth, and Eighty-fifth Regiments of

Enrolled Missouri Militia, and the National Guard of Saint Louis, under Generals Pike, Wolff,

and Miller, organized to support General Smith's infantry, and roll the rebel tide westward.

General Brown concentrated at Jefferson City the troops of the Central District, and reenforced

by General Fisk, with all available troops north of the Missouri, prepared for the

defense of the capital of the State, the citizens of which vied with the military in their

enthusiastic exertions to bring the great invasion to naught.

The enemy, after waiting at Richwoods for a day or two and threatening Saint Louis, started

for the State capital, accompanied by Tom Reynolds, Trusten Polk, and other Missouri traitors,

to inaugurate another bogus election. McNeil and Sanborn, moving with all their available

cavalry, by forced marches reached the point of danger a few miles in advance of him, and

uniting with Fisk and Brown saved Jefferson City, and struck the third blow to the hopes of the

invaders and traitors, who had boasted they would plant themselves there and hold the State.

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VI. On the 8th of October, when General Pleasonton assumed command at Jefferson City, he

sent Sanborn with all his mounted force, 4,100 strong, to follow the rebel track and harass them

until all our remaining cavalry could join you, and the infantry supports come up. You drove the

enemy's rear guard upon their main force in line of battle near Boonville, and bearded them in

position with a force of only 5,500 men. Pursuing their retreat westward, and keeping them

between you and the Missouri River, without an opportunity to double on their track, you waited

the arrival of Winslow's command, 1,500 strong, which followed the enemy from Arkansas, and

when, on the 19th, it joined, forming the Provisional Cavalry Division of 6,500 men, exclusive of

escort guards, under General Pleasonton, you moved on the foe for battle and victory, overtook

and gave them the first sweet taste of your sabers on the 22d, at Independence, where you routed

Fagan and captured two of his guns. On the 23d you forced the passage of the Big Blue, fought

them from 7 in the morning until 1 p.m. Their advance quitting Curtis then fell upon you, when

by the combined use of Thurber's double-shotted canister and the saber you routed their main

force, and by dark had thrown them beyond Little Santa Fé.

On the 24th, at midnight, after marching some sixty miles, with little water, except the rain

on your backs, and less food for men or horses, you again overtook them at the Marais des

Cygnes, began skirmishing, and at 4 a.m. on the 25th, opening with artillery, routed them with

loss; capturing mules, horses, &c. Thence, in a running fight, you pursued them to the Little

Osage Crossing, where two advanced brigades, under Benteen and Philips, charged two rebel

divisions, routed them, captured eight pieces of artillery, and near 1,000 prisoners, including

Generals Marmaduke and Cabell Sanborn's brigade again led in pursuit, overtook them and made

two more brilliant charges, driving everything before it, across the Marmiton, whence the enemy

fled, under cover of night, toward the Arkansas. After thus marching 204 miles in six days and

beating the enemy, his flying columns were pursued toward the Arkansas by the Kansas troops

and Benteen's brigade, while Sanborn, following, marched 104 miles in thirty-six hours, and on

the 28th reached Newtonia, where the enemy made his last stand, in time to turn the tide of battle

which was going against General Blunt, again routing the enemy, and giving the final blow to the

greatest cavalry raid of the war.

VII. The substantial results of this brilliant series of operations are, that while our infantry

and dismounted men nobly performed their share of the work by fighting at Pilot Knob and

Glasgow, holding the depots and important points, and backing your hazards, the enemy,

entering the State with a mounted force of veteran troops, variously estimated at from 15,000 to

26,000, and eighteen pieces of artillery, with vast expectations of revolutionizing the State,

destroying Kansas, and operating on the Presidential election, after having added to his force

6,000 Missourians, which General Marmaduke told General Pleasonton were armed and

organized into a division, has been defeated in all his schemes, his mischief confined to the

narrow belt of country over which he passed, and routed by you in four engagements, he has lost

ten pieces of artillery, a large number of small-arms, nearly all his trains and plunder, and,

besides his killed, wounded, and deserters, 1,958 prisoners, which we have now in possession,

and the latest reports confirm the statement that when the enemy's forces recrossed the Arkansas,

demoralization, desertion, and losses had reduced their strength to less than 5,000, but partially

armed and mounted, with three pieces of artillery, and their horses in the most wretched

condition. All this has been accomplished by less than 7,000 cavalry, most of whom never before

saw a great battle, and your entire loss in killed, wounded, and missing is only 346 officers and

men. The records of this war furnish no more brilliant and decisive results.

VIII. To Major-General Pleasonton and the officers and soldiers of the Provisional Cavalry

Division, by whom this work was wrought, the general commanding tenders his thanks for their

12

gallantry and efficiency in the campaign, and congratulates them on having acquired the true

spirit of cavalry service.

He also returns his thanks to the district commanders, to the officers and soldiers of our

infantry and artillery, and the Enrolled Militia, and to Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith and his command

for the zeal and energy with which they performed all the duties devolving upon them in the

campaign which brought to naught Price's formidable raid and defeated the schemes of the rebels

and traitors in Missouri and elsewhere against the State and the Nation.

IX. A department order will announce the regiments entitled, and the names of the

engagements they are to inscribe on their banners.

By command of Major-General Rosecrans:

FRANK ENO,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

FIRST DIVISION, COMMANDED BY COL. JOSEPH J. WOODS, TWELFTH IOWA

VOLUNTEERS.

During the past month this division has been actively engaged as a portion of the army

pursuing the rebel General Price through Missouri. Marching has been almost continuous and

very hard, making as high as thirty-three miles per

THIRD BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, COMMANDED BY COL. SYLVESTER G. HILL,

THIRTY-FIFTH IOWA INFANTRY.

October 1.--Marched at 7 a.m. from near Poplar Bluff, Mo., toward Greenville, Mo., thirteen

miles; command on three-quarter rations.

October 2.--Marched at 6 a.m.; forded the Saint Francis River; encamped at Greenville;

fourteen miles.

October 3.--Marched on Cape Girardeau road; seventeen miles.

October 4.--Marched at 2 a.m.; a forced march; raining and roads bad; encamped at 8 p.m. on

White Water Creek; thirty miles.

October 5.--Marched to Cape Girardeau; eighteen miles; encamped one mile below town.

This concludes a march of 317 miles in nineteen days from Brownsville, Ark.

October 7.--Embarked on boats for Saint Louis.

October 9.--Re-embarked at Saint Louis for Missouri River.

October 18.--Landed at Jefferson City, Mo., and moved by cars to La Mine Bridge.

October 19.--Marched via Sedalia to Roletta; went into camp at 11.30 p.m.; nearly the whole

command left by the roadside exhausted; thirty-three miles.

October 20.--Marched sixteen miles.

October 21.--Marched into Lexington; twenty-five miles.

October 22.--Marched southwest twenty-four miles.

October 24.--Marched at 1 a.m. via Independence to Big Blue River; eighteen miles.

October 25.--Marched via Little Santa Fé, Kans.; fifteen miles.

October 26.--Marched to Harrisonville, Mo.; twenty-three miles.

October 27 to 29.--Remained in camp waiting supplies.

October 30.--Marched to Pleasant Hill, Mo.; twelve miles.

October 31.--Marched to Chapel Hill, Mo.; sixteen miles; went into camp at 9 p.m.

SECOND BRIGADE, THIRD DIVISION, COMMANDED BY COL. JAMES L. GILBERT,

TWENTY-SEVENTH IOWA INFANTRY.

October 1.---Found this command at Jefferson Barracks, Mo.

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October 2.--Marched in the morning, forming a part of the command under Maj. Gen. A. J.

Smith, to Kirkwood; thirteen miles.

October 3.--Marched to Dutch Holland; eighteen miles.

October 4.--Marched to Summit Station; ten miles.

October 5 and 6.--Lay in camp.

October 7.--Marched to Cedar Creek; ten miles.

October 8.--Marched on Jefferson City road; eighteen miles.

October 9.--Lay in camp.

October 10.--Marched on Jefferson City road, fording Gasconade River; eighteen miles.

October 11.--Marched to Big Mary Creek; twenty-two miles.

October 12.--Marched to Moreau Creek; nineteen miles.

October 13.--Passing through Jefferson City, nine miles, west; thirteen miles.

October 14.--Marched to California, passing Lookout Station; seventeen miles.

October 15.--Lay in camp.

October 16.--Marched to La Mine Bridge; twenty-four miles.

October 17.--Lay in camp.

October 18.--Marched, passing Sedalia two miles toward Georgetown; eighteen miles.

October 19.--Marched on Lexington road, passing Georgetown; fifteen miles.

October 20.--Marched on Lexington road to Deer Creek; seventeen miles.

October 21.--Marched into Lexington; twenty-three miles.

October 22.--Marched on Harrisonville road fourteen miles and took the Independence road;

seventeen miles.

October 23.--Marched on Independence road eighteen miles.

October 24.--At midnight passing Independence to Big Blue River; fifteen miles.

October 25.--Marched south, passing Santa Fé, and encamped on Big Blue; fifteen miles.

October 26.--Marched at 3.30 o'clock in the morning and passed one mile beyond

Harrisonville; twenty-six miles.

October 27 to 29.--Lay in camp.

October 30.--Marched on the Warrensburg road to within one mile of Pleasant Hill; eleven

miles.

October 31.--Mustered for pay and marched toward Wellington to Big Snibar River; twelve

miles.

The command has thus marched during the month 369 miles, and is now in camp for the

night, en route for Lexington.

HDQRS. FOURTEENTH IOWA INFANTRY VOLUNTEERS,

Rolla, Mo., October 3, 1864.

On the 25th [September] I moved with my command by rail on the Iron Mountain road. By

order I detached and left at various stations, from Jefferson Barracks to Mineral Point, Mo., five

companies of my command, namely, Companies A, G, H, I, and K. Encamped at Mineral Point

on the night of the 25th. Proceeded from thence on the morning of the 26th, with Companies B,

C, D, and E, to Pilot Knob, Mo, whence we marched to Ironton, distant one mile, where we

encamped during the night of the 26th of September.

On the morning of the 27th, at early daylight, the enemy appeared in force, when they were

engaged by two pieces of the Second Missouri Battery. The enemy being too strong in numbers

we were compelled to fall back, which was done in good order to the southeast point of

Shepherd's Mountain, where our forces again formed line of battle under command of Major

Wilson. Here I was joined by a detachment of eighteen men of Company H, Fourteenth Iowa

14

Infantry. I was ordered, with my command, to occupy the summit of Shepherd's Mountain,

which I did. At this point I had a brisk skirmish with the enemy, who attempted to flank my

position, and I fell back to the rifle-pits of Fort Davidson, where I remained till I was ordered, at

1 p.m., to occupy the face of Shepherd's Mountain south of the fort. I held that position till the

enemy attacked me in heavy force, and I was compelled to fall back within the fort, when a

general engagement commenced.

On the morning of the 28th, at 2 a.m., by order of Brigadier-General Ewing, I moved my

command in advance, and took up line of march on the Caledonia road, arriving at Webster,

distant thirty miles, where we encamped. On the 29th of September, at 1 a.m., took up line of

march, covering the retreat with my command to Leasburg, distant thirty-six miles. About 10

a.m. the ene