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OFFICIAL ARMY RECORDS

1864-5

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

Saint Louis, December 7, 1864.

COLONEL: The commanding general of the military division is already informed by my

current official dispatches of the principal incidents of the late campaign against Price in this

department, but it is proper that I should submit a more detailed and connected report of the

operations for a correct understanding of their extent and the importance of the results.

From early in the spring it was known through the lodges of the O. A. K.'s and other rebel

sources that Price intended a great invasion of this State, in which he expected the co-operation

of that order and of rebels generally, and by which he hoped to obtain important military and

political results. In pursuance of these plans the lodges with rebel recruiting officers and agents

sent into Missouri clandestinely, or under cover of the amnesty oath for that purpose, began an

insurrection in Platte County on the 7th of July last. From that time guerrilla warfare raged in the

river counties west from Callaway on the north and from Cooper on the south side of the

Missouri. This department having been depleted of troops permission was obtained to raise

volunteers to meet the exigencies of our situation, and under it about five complete and as many

incomplete regiments of twelve-months volunteer infantry had been organized previously to the

raid. On the 3d of September General Washburn sounded the tocsin by information that the force

under Shelby at Batesville, Ark., was about to be joined by Price for the invasion of our State.

The ripening of the corn lent to this additional color of probability, so that on the 6th, Maj. Gen.

A. J. Smith passing Cairo with a division of infantry on the way to General Sherman, I

telegraphed General Halleck the state of affairs, requesting orders for this division to halt at that

point and wait until we could ascertain the designs of the enemy. The division was halted, and on

the 9th General Smith received orders from General Halleck to "operate against Price & Co.,"

but deeming it impracticable to penetrate between 100 and 200 miles into Arkansas with a small

column of infantry in pursuit of a large mounted force, the exact whereabouts as well as

intentions of which were still unknown, he decided to move his command to a point near Saint

Louis, whence he could readily move by rail or river and await Price's movements. From that

time information accumulated showing the imminence of the raid. On the 23d we received

certain information that Price had crossed the Arkansas with two divisions of mounted men,

three batteries of artillery, a large wagon train carrying several thousand stand of small-arms, and

was at or near Batesville on White River. From this point midway between the Mississippi and

the western boundary of the State there are three practicable routes of invasion. One by

Pocahontas into southeast Missouri, another by West Plains and Rolla or vicinity north toward

Jefferson City, a third by Cassville north either through Springfield and Sedalia or by the Kansas

border to the Missouri River. Strong military reasons favored the movements of their main force

by the central route; while a detachment should go by Pocahontas and strip Southeastern

Missouri. Under these circumstances my first object was to secure our great depots at Springfield

and Rolla, the hay cut during the summer, and our train of Government wagons required to

maintain the troops in the Springfield district. To do this and as far as possible save the scanty

agriculture of the country from devastation it was necessary to hold both Springfield and Rolla.

Indeed, to have abandoned these points would have been not only to abandon the loyal people of

those districts and their property to destruction, but to invite the enemy to destroy our trains

while moving them, capture our stores, and beat our troops in detail. Generals Sanborn and

McNeil were therefore informed and ordered to place the trains and public property of their

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districts under the protection of the fortifications at Springfield and Rolla, to put their forts in the

best possible state of defense, using every foot and dismounted cavalry soldier, including citizens

and local militia, to the best advantage, and with all their efficient mounted force to watch the

enemy's motions and report the earliest indications of the direction of the coming storm. General

Brown was ordered to concentrate all troops from the west of the Central District at Sedalia, to

notify the citizen guards, and see that neither they nor their arms were exposed to capture. On the

24th Shelby was reported south of Pilot Knob, moving toward Farmington, with 5,000 men and

four pieces of artillery. General Ewing was ordered to concentrate the troops, in the southern part

of his district at Pilot Knob and Cape Girardeau, and to verify the accuracy of this report, which

proved true. On the 26th General A. J. Smith, with two of his brigades, was ordered to a point on

the Iron Mountain Railroad "as far toward Pilot Knob as he deemed compatible with certainty

that his position would not be turned," and the enemy get between him and Saint Louis. On the

day before Sanborn had orders to move with all his mounted force to Rolla, it having become

evident that the enemy would not probably strike west of that point. The safety of Saint Louis

was vital to us. I therefore telegraphed Brig. Gen. H. E. Paine, commanding in Illinois, who

promised me assistance from some regiments of returning 100-days' volunteers, who, though

they had already served beyond their time, generously consented to come for the defense of the

city. The enrolled militia of Saint Louis, though but skeleton regiments, were called out and the

citizens also requested to organize and arm. General Ewing was sent to Pilot Knob, with

directions to use his utmost exertions to find out whether any more than Shelby's division was in

Southeast Missouri, and to that end to hold Pilot Knob until he was certain. With a soldierly

comprehension of the importance of his duties, while reporting the current rumors of the advance

of Price with his whole force, he expressed his doubts, and held his position until the 27th, when

he sustained a terrific assault in Fort Davidson, a small field-work in the valley, surrounded by

hills within cannon-range, which he held with about 1,000 men, one-half raw troops, establishing

beyond question the presence of all Price's command in that quarter. He gloriously repulsed,

killing and wounding some 1,500 of the enemy, and lost only 28 killed and 56 wounded, as

appears from his report herewith. While Ewing's fight was going on Shelby advanced on Potosi,

and thence to Big River bridge, threatening General Smith's advance, which withdrew from that

point to within safer supporting distance of his main position at De Soto. Previous to and

pending these events the guerrilla warfare in North Missouri had been raging with redoubled

fury. Rebel agents, amnesty oath-takers, recruits, sympathizers, O. A. K.'s, and traitors of every

hue and stripe, had warmed into life at the approach of the great invasion. Women's fingers were

busy making clothes for rebel soldiers out of goods plundered by the guerrillas; women's

tongues were busy telling Union neighbors "their time was now coming." General Fisk, with all

his force, had been scouring the brush for weeks in the river counties in pursuit of hostile bands,

composed largely of recruits from among that class of inhabitants who claim protection, yet

decline to perform the full duty of citizens on the ground that they "never tuck no sides." A few

facts will convey some idea of this warfare carried on by Confederate agents here, while the

agents abroad of their bloody and hypocritical despotism--Mason, Slidell, and Mann in Europe--

have the effrontery to tell the nations of Christendom our Government "carries on the war with

increasing ferocity regardless of the laws of civilized warfare." These gangs of rebels, whose

families had been living in peace among their loyal neighbors, committed the most cold-blooded

and diabolical murders,. such as riding up to a farm-house, asking for water, and, while receiving

it, shooting down the giver, an aged, inoffensive farmer, because he was a radical "Union man."

In the single Sub-District of Mexico its commanding officer furnished a list of near 100 Union

men, who, in the course of six weeks, had been killed, maimed, or "run off" because they were

"radical Union men or damned abolitionists."

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About the 1st of September Anderson's gang attacked a railroad train on the North Missouri

road, took from it twenty-two unarmed soldiers, many on sick leave, and after robbing placed

them in a row and shot them in cold blood. Some of these bodies they scalped, and put others

across the track and ran the engine over them. On the 27th this gang, with numbers swollen to

300 or 400, attacked Major Johnston with about 120 men of the Thirty-ninth Missouri Volunteer

Infantry, raw recruits, and, after stampeding their horses, shot every man, most of them in cold

blood. Anderson a few days later was recognized by General Price at Boonville as Confederate

captain, and with a verbal admonition to behave himself, ordered by Colonel Maclean, chief of

Price's staff, to proceed to North Missouri and destroy the railroads, which orders were found on

the miscreant when killed by Lieutenant-Colonel Cox about the 27th of October ultimo.

On the 28th, when information of Ewing's fight and Price's presence at Pilot Knob came to

hand, General Smith, discovering the enemy on his front moving to west and north, in pursuance

of his orders to hold "the most advanced position compatible with the certainty of keeping

between the enemy and Saint Louis," determined to leave De Soto and retire behind the

Meramec, a stream which, at from ten to fifteen miles south of Saint Louis, offers considerable

obstacle to the passage of a hostile force with wagons and artillery. General Ewing, finding

Mamaduke's and Fagan's rebel divisions before him, and his position commanded by a

numerically superior artillery, acting on suggestions made when discussing with him the

possibilities of the position, on the night of the 27th spiked his heavy guns, blew up his

magazine, ammunition, and supplies, and with the field battery and remains of his command

retreated through the hills toward the Meramec Valley, hoping to reach a point on the railroad

from whence he could move to Saint Louis. But, as will be seen from his reports, the enemy

pursued him, harassed his rear on the march, which he directed along a ridge where the enemy

could not flank him, and overtook him near Harrison's Station, where, seizing and extending the

temporary defenses constructed by the militia, he displayed such vigor that after harassing him

for thirty-six hours and making several attacks, on the approach of a detachment of Sanborn's

cavalry the rebels left him and he escaped with all his command to Rolla. The enemy's strength

and position thus developed, my first business was to secure the points he could best strike---

Saint Louis, Jefferson City, and Rolla. General Smith's 4,500 infantry and the mounted force we

could raise, the Seventh Kansas, just in from Memphis, part of the Thirteenth Missouri Volunteer

Cavalry, under Colonel Catherwood, and the recruits of Merrill's Horse, hastily mounted and

organized, a total of 1,500 men, were all the force we could place between Saint Louis and an

invading army of at least 15,000 mounted men, whose advance was within a day's march of the

city. Meanwhile Brigadier-General Pike, ably seconded by Generals Wolff and Miller, of the

Enrolled Missouri Militia, had assembled and armed skeletons of the First, Second, Third, Fifth,

Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, Thirteenth, and Fifty-second Regiments of Enrolled Militia. The

mayor and others, under the direction of the Hon. B. Gratz Brown and Major Ledergerber,

organized the citizens exempt from militia duty, who volunteered for the defense of the city, into

companies and regiments, numbering by the 30th some 4,000 or 5,000 men. The One hundred

and thirty-second, One hundred and thirty-fourth, One hundred and thirty-eighth, One hundred

and fortieth, and One hundred and forty-second Illinois (100-days' volunteers) also began to

arrive on the 30th, and were all in by October 1 and formed into a brigade, under Colonel

Wangelin, for the immediate defense of the city, beyond which they did not wish to serve, as all

of them were out over time, and many having desirable offers as substitutes.

The enemy moving up by Potosi seemed to halt at Richwoods, about forty miles southwest of

Saint Louis, in the hills between Big River and the Meramec, as if concentrating for an attack on

the city. This appeared the more possible from the magnitude of his interest in it, and the fact that

he did not show much force in the Meramec Valley, even on the 30th. On that day Major-

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General Smith was ordered to occupy Kirkwood, which commands the Richwoods road and

crossing of the Meramec to Saint Louis, his cavalry to reconnoiter south and west, Colonel

Merrill going as far as Franklin. General Fisk, previously ordered to join General Brown with all

his available force, reached and reported from Jefferson City to-day. At the close of it news came

that a brigade of rebel cavalry had burned the Moselle Bridge and were moving north toward

Franklin. General Smith was ordered to send a brigade of infantry to support the cavalry at that

point, and on the 1st of October Colonel Wolff, with his brigade, reached Franklin, and after a

sharp skirmish drove the enemy from the place, but not until he had burned the depot.

The rebels were now apparently at bay with 1,500 cavalry and 4,500 infantry. General Smith

was not in condition to attempt offensive movements against a force of 15,000 veteran mounted

rebels who could reach Saint Louis from any point in the Meramec Valley where he might

confront them in haft the time it would take his infantry to reach it. Our obvious policy under

these circumstances was to keep as close as possible to the enemy without risking Saint Louis

until General Mower's command should arrive from Arkansas, or at least we be able to join to

Smith's our mounted forces at Rolla. Every hour's delay of the enemy in the Meramec Valley

brought Mower nearer and increased our chances of striking him as it did the security of

Jefferson City. On the 2d the enemy was reported massing in the vicinity of Union, on the road

either to Jefferson City or Rolla, and General Smith was ordered to Franklin. But as the enemy's

movements appeared to tend westward, on the 3d General Smith was advanced to Gray's Summit

and General Pike moved to Franklin. On the 4th General Smith pushed his cavalry toward the

Gasconade, advanced his infantry to Union, followed up by General Pike's militia. On the 5th

Price's command took Hermann, burned the Gasconade bridge, and was crossing that stream at

the old State Road Ford. General Smith followed him. General Mower reported his arrival at

Girardeau out of supplies, his teams worn down, part of his cavalry dismounted, and many

horses unshod. Transports and supply-boats were at once dispatched, and on the 8th and 9th his

command reached Saint Louis, from whence the infantry was pushed forward by water as rapidly

as the low stage of the river would permit to join General Smith. The cavalry under Winslow

reshod and started by land from Saint Louis on the 10th toward Jefferson City, which point it

reached on the 16th instant, one day in advance of the infantry. On the 6th the enemy began

crossing the Osage at Castle Rock and one or two other fords, under cover of his artillery,

opposed by Colonel Philips with the available cavalry at Jefferson City. While thus engaged

Generals McNeil and Sanborn reached Jefferson City by a forced march with all the mounted

force from Rolla, and uniting with Fisk and Brown gave us a garrison there of 4,100 cavalry and

2,600 infantry, mostly the new and partially organized twelve-months' men, with a few citizens

and militia. As this force, though capable of giving a strong battle behind intrenchments, was not

very formidable to act offensively against a veteran force like that of the enemy, it was decided

by General Fisk, the other three generals concurring, to oppose a moderate resistance to the

enemy's advance across the Moreau, a small stream with muddy banks and bad bottom, four or

five miles east of the city, and then to retire and receive his attack at the defensive line, which

with industry and good judgment had been prepared by the entire laboring force, civil and

military, at Jefferson City. The enemy burned the Osage bridge and crossed the river on the 6th.

On the 7th he advanced on the city, crossed the Moreau after sharp fighting, and developed a line

of battle three or four miles long, east, south, and west of the place. But after reconnoitering its

apparently formidable intrenchments, warned by his Pilot Knob experience in storming earthworks,

he declined attacking, and passing his train in rear moved around, massing on the west,

and finally retiring.

On the 8th General Pleasonton, on his arrival at Jefferson, under orders to assume command,

dispatched General Sanborn with all the available cavalry, 4,100 men, to follow and harass the

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enemy until General Smith's command could come up. General Smith was informed of the rebel

failure at Jefferson and directed to move by the most expeditious route to that place, where

Mower's infantry were to join and the cavalry overtake him. He was to send all his cavalry, under

Colonel Catherwood, in advance to report to Pleasonton, who, on its arrival, was to join

Sanborn's and assume direction of the Provisional Cavalry Division thus formed. General Pike,

with his militia, was charged with the control of the country and the defenses of our line of

communication from Saint Louis to Jefferson City. Sanborn followed the rebels, attacked their

rear guard at Versailles, where it was uncertain what course they would take, found they were

going north toward Boonville, followed and drove them into line of battle near that place, and

when he found himself nearly enveloped by their entire army, fell back out of their reach to meet

Catherwood's command and his provisions, which both arrived at California on the 14th. The

enemy taking advantage of this crossed the La Mine at Scott's and Dug Fords and moved north

toward Arrow Rock. Sanborn immediately followed this movement by Georgetown bridge,

keeping between the Pacific Railroad and the line of the enemy's march, and holding the line of

the Blackwater a western tributary of the La Mine, while Price, crossing a part of Shelby's

command at Arrow Rock on the Boonville ferry-boat to the north side of the river, advanced on

Glasgow, which he captured after a seven-hours' fight with a part of Colonel Harding's regiment,

Forty-third Missouri Volunteer Infantry, and small detachments of the Ninth Missouri State

Militia and Seventeenth Illinois Cavalry. On the 17th our cavalry, following his westward

movement, keeping south of without pressing him, until Generals Smith's and Mower's troops

could be brought up, kept the line of the Blackwater, and on the 17th reported themselves out of

supplies and the enemy between Marshall and Waverly. On the 17th Mower's infantry, except

two small regiments, arrived at Jefferson City and went at once by rail to La Mine bridge to join

General Smith, who, passing Jefferson by land on the 14th, had followed the cavalry movement

to that point, taking charge of the supplies which, in consequence of the destruction of the bridge

by the rebels, could go by rail no farther. Winslow's cavalry, marching, reached Jefferson, the

advance twenty miles beyond at California, on the 16th, and was ordered to join General

Pleasonton without delay. On the 18th General Smith was ordered to move to Dunksburg near

the cavalry headquarters, taking five days' rations and leaving minimum garrisons to guard and

handle stores at Sedalia and La Mine bridge. The 19th found this movement accomplished, the

cavalry with its center near Cook's Store, its right behind the Blackwater toward Marshall, and its

left near Kirkpatrick's Mills toward Warrensburg. The enemy apparently hesitated in the vicinity

of Marshall as if uncertain whether to go west or double on his tracks between Sedalia and

Jefferson, but our cavalry advanced, receding a few miles to meet supplies and concentrate on

the 17th and 18th, seemed to decide his movements toward Lexington, where General Curtis

telegraphed me on the 19th the head of his column had arrived, General Blunt, after a sharp

skirmish, retiring toward Independence and destroying the bridges in his rear. I informed General

Curtis of our position; that our troops reported Price near Waverly; advised that Blunt check his

advance at Wellington, and as soon as we were sure his main force was moving on Lexington we

would endeavor by a forced march to strike him in the flank. To ascertain Price's real intentions

General Pleasonton was directed to make a strong reconnaissance toward Waverly. The results of

this reached me on the morning of the 20th, and Pleasonton was directed at once to push the

center of his cavalry to Lexington, and General Smith, with his infantry, to support the

movement. At 7 p.m. Pleasonton reported the enemy had left Lexington, going west, and McNeil

and Sanborn entering the town. October 21 our cavalry advance followed the enemy to Fire

Creek Prairie, Brown's and Winslow's brigades reaching Lexington at 2 p.m. and the infantry at 9

p.m. of the same day. General Curtis also reported a fight with the enemy's entire force at the

Little Blue from 10 a.m. to 2 p.m., and that to prevent being flanked he should retire to the Big

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Blue, where his militia and artillery were in strong position. Supposing the enemy could not

cross the Big Blue in the face of Curtis, I dispatched General Pleasonton my belief that he would

move south, and that while McNell's brigade should harass his rear, he, with the other three

brigades, should move toward Lone Jack, near which would be General Smith's infantry, now

marching from Lexington to Chapel Hill. At 10 p.m. a dispatch from Pleasonton informed me of

the receipt of these conditional orders, and that the enemy in full force was moving far to the

west, followed by his cavalry. October 22 Pleasonton's cavalry reached the Little Blue at 10

a.m.; found the bridge destroyed; a temporary one was constructed, the enemy's skirmishers

driven, the command crossed, when the enemy opened with artillery, and was steadily driven

toward Independence, which place was taken by a brilliant cavalry charge, in which

Catherwood's regiment captured two guns complete. Near a hundred prisoners fell into our

hands, and our troops pushed the enemy's rear guard all night. At 8 p.m. Pleasonton reports "all

my brigades have been engaged; the enemy have left 40 killed and many sick and wounded in

my hands. Heard nothing from Curtis. If Smith can come up in case we get a fight it will be well.

Have sent McNeil's brigade to Little Santa Fé. Price is reported intrenched this side of the Big

Blue. Fighting still going on with an obstinate rear guard. Let Smith come to this place."

Reluctantly General Smith was dispatched to move to Independence, as requested, the messenger

reaching him at Chapel Hill as he was putting his column in motion to march there in response to

a direct message from General Pleasonton advising him of the posture of affairs.

On the morning of the 23d Pleasonton began to move on the enemy. At the crossing of the

Big Blue, where the fight opened at 7 a.m. and continued until 1 p.m., when Shelby, who had

been fighting General Curtis' command, finding Marmaduke and Fagan were giving away,

turned on Pleasonton and "for a moment shook Sanborn's brigade," but by the skillful use of

Thurber's battery, throwing double-shotted grape and canister, and the gallant charging of our

troops, they were routed and fled southward, pushed by Generals Pleasonton and Curtis that

night beyond Little Santa Fé. General Smith's command arriving at Independence at 5 p.m. was

ordered to move that night by a forced march to Hickman Mills, hoping it would strike the

enemy in flank while passing that point. Had he been ordered and marched for that point instead

of Independence the day before General Smith would have arrived in time to strike the enemy's

compact column and train with 9,000 infantry and five batteries. But it was too late. He did not

reach the Mills until long after not only the enemy's but our own column had passed there. News

from the cavalry fronts during the night showed that nothing remained but to push the enemy

with our cavalry, allowing the infantry to follow as best it could to act as support in case of

possible reverse to us or re-enforcements which were constantly reported on their way to meet

the enemy. On the 24th, with the Kansas troops in advance, we pursued the enemy until within

fifteen miles of the Trading Post, when, at General Curtis' request, General Pleasonton's

command took the lead and at the end of a sixty-miles' march overtook the rebels about

midnight, at the Marais des Cygnes; began skirmishing, and on the 25th, at 4 a.m., opened upon

their bivouac with artillery, creating the greatest consternation, following it up by an attack

which drove them promptly from the field, leaving in our hands horses, mules, wagons, arms,

and some prisoners. Our troops followed them in a running fight until 2 p.m., when they came up

with them at the Little Osage Crossing in position, with eight pieces of artillery on their line of

battle. With the instinct of a true cavalry general, Pleasonton immediately ordered an attack by

Benteen's and Philips' brigades, which by a magnificent charge completely routed them,

capturing 8 guns, 2 stand of colors, Major-General Marmaduke, Brigadier-General Cabell, 5

colonels, many other officers, and near 1,000 prisoners, besides wagons, small-arms, &c.

Sanborn's brigade, which was one mile and a half behind, and the Kansas troops still farther in

the rear, did not arrive in time to take part in this battle, but Sanborn's brigade led in the pursuit

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of the routed enemy, overtook them at a small stream a few miles beyond the battle-ground,

charged them in the timber, drove them across it into the open prairie, where they formed in

order of battle three lines deep. But such was the enthusiasm of the men of this brigade when

they reached the edge of the wood and saw this triple line they charged it without orders,

knocked it in pieces, and chased the fugitives until night closed the pursuit, and the enemy fled

under cover of the darkness toward the Arkansas border. Besides the wagons captured during

this day at the Marais des Cygnes, on the way to and at the Little Osage, the enemy had

destroyed many, including ammunition-wagons, and for twenty-five or thirty miles beyond the

Osage battle-field their route was strewn with debris of burning wagons and other property.

Pleasonton's cavalry had now been in motion almost day and night for six days, during which

it had marched at least 204 miles and fought four battles. It was pretty well exhausted and broken

down and went into Fort Scott that night for food and a little rest. He reported to me the results

of his day's work, that the enemy was going at his utmost and his own troops were so broken

down it would be impossible without fresh horses to strike the enemy another great blow this

side of the Arkansas, and recommended that Generals Sanborn and McNeil follow, to support

Curtis' troops in pursuit so long as there was any prospect of damaging the enemy, and then

return to Springfield and Rolla. On the receipt of the news of the enemy's rout General Smith,

whose command was out of provisions, was directed to move to Harrisonville and thence get

supplies from Warrensburg, where 100 wagons were waiting with provisions for our command,

sending 30,000 rations to the cavalry. Further reports of the enemy's condition satisfied me there

would be no use of breaking down any more of our horses since General Curtis, whose cavalry

horses were fresher than ours, supported by Sanborn and McNeil on their way down the State

line, would be more than ample to deal with any resistance Price's command would offer this

side of the Arkansas. Orders Were accordingly given and General Pleasonton returned with

Philips' brigade, the cannon, and part of the prisoners to Warrensburg. The Kansas troops and

Benteen's brigade pursued the enemy's flying columns, a part of whom made their last stand at

Newtonia, Mo., where General Blunt overtook and attacked them on the 28th, but was being

worsted when Sanborn, having marched 102 miles in thirty-six hours, arrived in time to save the

day. The enemy fled and made no further stand this side of the Arkansas. In a country destitute

of food for man and beast, five times defeated, pursued 400 or 500 miles, with the loss of nearly

all their artillery, ammunition, and baggage train, demoralization and destitution, and want of

supplies would drive the rebels across the Arkansas for supplies at the risk of falling into the

hands of Thayer's forces or Steele's cavalry, and if allowed would almost disintegrate and

disband them on the way thither. General Curtis thought pushing them was best, and accordingly

followed, although he did not again overtake them. At his urgent instance, against my own

judgment as well as that of Generals Sanborn and McNeil, I pushed their two brigades down to

the Arkansas border, whence Sanborn sent an advance to Fort Smith, reaching there on the

morning of the 8th [November], to notify General Thayer of the enemy's desperate condition and

the direction he had taken from Cane Hill toward the Indian Nation, between Fort Smith and Fort

Gibson. Meanwhile at Sherman's request, followed by orders from the General-in-Chief, I

directed Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith to move his command by the most expeditious route to the

Mississippi, in the vicinity of Saint Louis, there to embark and proceed to Nashville and report to

Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas. On the 3d of November I returned to Saint Louis to be there

during the election, and on the receipt of the news of the enemy having crossed the Arkansas

directed the cavalry to repair to their respective districts and Winslow's cavalry to move by the

best route and join General Thomas at Nashville.

In entering into details I have aimed to give the general commanding a sort of military

photograph of our daily condition and movements as well for his critical judgment as for history,

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omitting events of whatever magnitude not having a bearing on our movements and most of the

minor ones which did enter into their determination. I trust that the precautions taken in advance

of Price's movements, the preparations before we knew where he was coming, the measures

taken to secure our most important points and occupy him until we could concentrate the forces

to strike him with a certainty of success outweighing any damage he could meanwhile do us, the

energy and activity in concentration, vigor in pursuit, and fiery gallantry of our troops in battle,

will receive the approbation of the general commanding the military division.

It will appear from these details and accompanying reports that our dismounted cavalry,

infantry, and militia nobly performed their duty, watching, marching, and fighting whenever and

wherever opportunity offered, that by their aid in holding our depots and supporting our mounted

force we have saved all our important posts and most of the country, from pillage, except a belt

of some twenty miles wide along the route of the invasion, and with less than 7,000 effective

cavalry have pursued, overtaken, beaten in several engagements, and finally routed an invading

cavalry, variously estimated at from 15,000 to 26,000 men, re-enforced by 6,000 armed recruits

from Missouri, taken from them 10 pieces of artillery, 2 stand of colors, 1,958 prisoners of war, a

large number of horses, mules, wagons, and small arms, compelled them to destroy most of their

remaining wagons, train, and plunder, blasted all the political schemes of the rebels and traitors

who concerted with Price to revolutionize Missouri, destroy Kansas, and turn the State and

presidential election, against the Union cause, and by our triumph in the late elections have given

to gallant and suffering Missouri the fairest prospect she has ever yet seen of future freedom,

peace, and prosperity, all the fruits of a campaign of forty-eight days, in which most of our

victorious troops had never before seen a great cavalry battle. Rarely during this or any other war

has cavalry displayed more persevering energy in pursuit, more impetuous courage and gallantry

in attacking, regardless of superior numbers, or had its efforts crowned with greater fruits of

success. While paying a just tribute of thanks to all the officers and soldiers of the cavalry,

artillery, infantry, militia, and citizen guards who served during the raid, for their prompt and

cheerful obedience to all orders, whether to labor, march, or fight, I must refer to the

accompanying reports of their commanders for special mention of individual gallantry. Major-

General Pleasonton deserves the thanks of the country for the able manner in which he handled

and fought the cavalry, and for the brilliant and fruitful victories he won over triple his own

force. I hope he may receive promotion in the regular army. Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith deserves

thanks for promptitude, energy, and perseverance in all his movements, and for the good

judgment displayed in his campaign. Nor must I omit a tribute of admiration to those brave and

true soldiers who, under Mower, followed Price from Arkansas, marching 300 miles in eighteen

days, and after going by boat from Cape Girardeau to Jefferson City, again resumed the march

after him, making another march of 462 miles before they embarked for Nashville to take part in

the not doubtful contest before that city for the mastery of Middle Tennessee. The district

commanders all deserve my thanks for prompt and cordial co-operation in the measures

precautionary and preparatory for the raid. General Ewing deserves special mention for military

judgment, courage, and gallantry, in holding Pilot Knob till he had certainty of the enemy's force,

as well as for the manner in which he withdrew his troops to Rolla. General McNeil for

promptitude and energy in putting Rolla in a state of defense, and for moving with all force to

Jefferson City in time to succor it. General Fisk for the prompt and cheerful discharge of very

trying administrative duties, and for the energy and good sense in preparing the defenses of

Jefferson City, as in the subsequent repair of La Mine bridge. General Brown displayed energy

and good sense in preparing the city for a good defense, and General Sanborn for vigilance,

energy, and soldierly judgment while commanding the cavalry advance between Jefferson City

and Dunksburg, as well as throughout the campaign. Col. J. V. Du Bois, aide-de-camp, chief of

9

staff; Captain Henry, assistant quartermaster of General Steele's staff, volunteer staff

quartermaster in the field; Capt. G. Scull, chief commissary; Surg. P. V. Schenck, medical

director in the field; Captain Hoelcke, acting aide-de-camp, engineer; Major Fischer, Fifth

Missouri State Militia, on engineer duty; Capt. J. F. Bennett, assistant adjutant-general, and my

personal aides, Maj. F. S. Bond, aide-de-camp, and Capt. R. S. Thorns, aide-de-camp, Captain

Hills, Tenth Kansas, acting provost-marshal, accompanied me during the campaign, and were

zealous and indefatigable in the discharge of their respective duties. Major McDermott, First

Iowa Cavalry, who, with his battalion of First Iowa Cavalry, did such good service in North

Missouri and behaved very gallantly in the pursuit of the rebels from Jefferson City to Boonville,

commanded the escort from Sedalia, and deserves honorable mention. Brig. Gen. J. B. Gray,

adjutant-general of Missouri, and Brigadier-General Pike, of the Enrolled, are entitled to public

thanks for their valuable and indefatigable services in connection with the Enrolled Militia. Col.

T. J. Haines, commissary of subsistence, to whom all the armies West, as well as the country,

owe a debt of gratitude for invaluable services not likely to be overpaid, displayed his usual

promptitude and foresight in providing for the wants of our troops and depots. Col. William

Myers, chief quartermaster, in supplying animals, fitting up trains, and providing for the wants of

our troops, exhibited his characteristic care and skill.

I must also mention the voluntary services of those tried veterans, Colonel Wangelin, late of

the Twelfth Missouri Volunteer Infantry, and Colonel Laiboldt, who did all in their power to aid

in the defense of Saint Louis. Senator B. Gratz Brown and Mayor Thomas, seconded by the

efforts of many patriotic citizens of all classes, did much to prepare for the defense of the city,

and deserve my thanks. I should be glad to call the general's attention to many militia officers,

such as General Craig, whose able management in the northwest, in the absence of General Fisk,

Colonel Gale, who so promptly organized his militia regiment (Fifty-fourth Enrolled Missouri

Militia) at Franklin, and many others scattered over the State, who rendered great service to the

country. But as the chief motive of these officers and the men of their commands was their

country's good the consciousness of duty manfully performed must be their chief reward, until

the day comes when our children, pointing to them as to others who have borne arms in this

great national struggle, shall say, "There go some of the men who helped to save our nation."

The accompanying reports show our total losses in this campaign were 164 killed, of whom

116 were murdered at Centralia, 336 wounded, 171 prisoners, of whom many, if not all, are

illegally parolled, 681 hors de combat, besides which there were several small squads of

prisoners illegally captured and parolled in Southeast Missouri, and the troops at Glasgow whose

surrender was, I think, justifiable and possibly lawful.

W. S. ROSECRANS,

Major-General.

Lieutenant-Colonel CHRISTENSEN,

A. A. G., Mil. Div. of West Mississippi, New Orleans, La.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 220.

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

Saint Louis, Mo., December 8, 1864.

I. The reports of the commanders of troops in the late campaign against Price, delayed till

now by the necessities of the case, furnish a record so brilliant of arduous service and gallant

fighting, that the commanding general deems it a duty to express to the officers and men of his

command his admiration of their behavior, and to congratulate them and their fellow-citizens on

the result.

10

II. Vague rumors and threats of an invasion of Missouri by Price had been in circulation for

months among rebels, bushwhackers, and "O. A. K.'s."

About the 21st of September these rumors ripened into certainty by the information that

Price, crossing the Arkansas with two divisions of cavalry and three batteries of artillery, had

joined Shelby near Batesville, sixty miles south of the line of our State, and would invade us

with from 15,000 to 20,000 veteran mounted men.

We had then about 6,500 mounted men for field duty in the department, scattered over a

country 400 miles long and 300 broad, which, with the partially-organized new infantry

regiments and our dismounted men, constituted the entire force to cover our great depots at Saint

Louis, Jefferson City, Saint Joseph, Macon, Springfield, Rolla, and Pilot Knob, guard our

railroad bridges against this invasion and protect, as far as possible, the lives and property of our

citizens from the guerrillas who swarmed over the whole country bordering on the Missouri

River. Fortunately, Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith's troops, passing Cairo toward Nashville, at the urgent

solicitation of the general commanding, were ordered to halt and oppose Price, thus giving us

4,500 veteran infantry.

III. Unable to concentrate until the point was determined where the enemy would strike,

without surrendering all the remaining portion of the State, you could only make preliminary

preparations and await the coming storm, while the Enrolled Missouri Militia, which had never

yet failed to respond to the call of patriotism, prepared to defend their homes against the invader

and his traitor friends in our midst.

IV. When Springfield appeared safe from the blow, General Sanborn moved with all his

available cavalry to re enforce Rolla, where General McNeil was preparing to secure our depots

and great supply trains, while Ewing and his band of heroes, the young Forty-seventh Missouri

Infantry, detachments of the First, Second, and Third Missouri State Militia, the Fourteenth Iowa

Infantry, and Battery H, Second Missouri Light Artillery, by their grand defense of Pilot Knob,

September 27, proved the presence of the enemy's entire force in Southeast Missouri, gave him

the first staggering blow, and allowed time for the Enrolled Missouri Militia and citizens of Saint

Louis to prepare for its defense, then covered only by General Smith's infantry and three

regiments of cavalry, thrown as far as practicable toward the enemy.

V. The zeal and energy of the citizens, aided by the timely arrival of the One hundred and

thirty-second, One hundred and thirty-fourth, One hundred and thirty-sixth, One hundred and

thirty-ninth, One hundred and fortieth, and One hundred and forty-second Illinois Regiments

(100 days' volunteers), who generously and promptly came to our assistance, soon put us at ease

about the safety of Saint Louis, and struck the second blow to the invasion. The gallant First,

Second, Third, Fourth, Tenth, Eleventh, Thirteenth, Eightieth, and Eighty-fifth Regiments of

Enrolled Missouri Militia, and the National Guard of Saint Louis, under Generals Pike, Wolff,

and Miller, organized to support General Smith's infantry, and roll the rebel tide westward.

General Brown concentrated at Jefferson City the troops of the Central District, and reenforced

by General Fisk, with all available troops north of the Missouri, prepared for the

defense of the capital of the State, the citizens of which vied with the military in their

enthusiastic exertions to bring the great invasion to naught.

The enemy, after waiting at Richwoods for a day or two and threatening Saint Louis, started

for the State capital, accompanied by Tom Reynolds, Trusten Polk, and other Missouri traitors,

to inaugurate another bogus election. McNeil and Sanborn, moving with all their available

cavalry, by forced marches reached the point of danger a few miles in advance of him, and

uniting with Fisk and Brown saved Jefferson City, and struck the third blow to the hopes of the

invaders and traitors, who had boasted they would plant themselves there and hold the State.

11

VI. On the 8th of October, when General Pleasonton assumed command at Jefferson City, he

sent Sanborn with all his mounted force, 4,100 strong, to follow the rebel track and harass them

until all our remaining cavalry could join you, and the infantry supports come up. You drove the

enemy's rear guard upon their main force in line of battle near Boonville, and bearded them in

position with a force of only 5,500 men. Pursuing their retreat westward, and keeping them

between you and the Missouri River, without an opportunity to double on their track, you waited

the arrival of Winslow's command, 1,500 strong, which followed the enemy from Arkansas, and

when, on the 19th, it joined, forming the Provisional Cavalry Division of 6,500 men, exclusive of

escort guards, under General Pleasonton, you moved on the foe for battle and victory, overtook

and gave them the first sweet taste of your sabers on the 22d, at Independence, where you routed

Fagan and captured two of his guns. On the 23d you forced the passage of the Big Blue, fought

them from 7 in the morning until 1 p.m. Their advance quitting Curtis then fell upon you, when

by the combined use of Thurber's double-shotted canister and the saber you routed their main

force, and by dark had thrown them beyond Little Santa Fé.

On the 24th, at midnight, after marching some sixty miles, with little water, except the rain

on your backs, and less food for men or horses, you again overtook them at the Marais des

Cygnes, began skirmishing, and at 4 a.m. on the 25th, opening with artillery, routed them with

loss; capturing mules, horses, &c. Thence, in a running fight, you pursued them to the Little

Osage Crossing, where two advanced brigades, under Benteen and Philips, charged two rebel

divisions, routed them, captured eight pieces of artillery, and near 1,000 prisoners, including

Generals Marmaduke and Cabell Sanborn's brigade again led in pursuit, overtook them and made

two more brilliant charges, driving everything before it, across the Marmiton, whence the enemy

fled, under cover of night, toward the Arkansas. After thus marching 204 miles in six days and

beating the enemy, his flying columns were pursued toward the Arkansas by the Kansas troops

and Benteen's brigade, while Sanborn, following, marched 104 miles in thirty-six hours, and on

the 28th reached Newtonia, where the enemy made his last stand, in time to turn the tide of battle

which was going against General Blunt, again routing the enemy, and giving the final blow to the

greatest cavalry raid of the war.

VII. The substantial results of this brilliant series of operations are, that while our infantry

and dismounted men nobly performed their share of the work by fighting at Pilot Knob and

Glasgow, holding the depots and important points, and backing your hazards, the enemy,

entering the State with a mounted force of veteran troops, variously estimated at from 15,000 to

26,000, and eighteen pieces of artillery, with vast expectations of revolutionizing the State,

destroying Kansas, and operating on the Presidential election, after having added to his force

6,000 Missourians, which General Marmaduke told General Pleasonton were armed and

organized into a division, has been defeated in all his schemes, his mischief confined to the

narrow belt of country over which he passed, and routed by you in four engagements, he has lost

ten pieces of artillery, a large number of small-arms, nearly all his trains and plunder, and,

besides his killed, wounded, and deserters, 1,958 prisoners, which we have now in possession,

and the latest reports confirm the statement that when the enemy's forces recrossed the Arkansas,

demoralization, desertion, and losses had reduced their strength to less than 5,000, but partially

armed and mounted, with three pieces of artillery, and their horses in the most wretched

condition. All this has been accomplished by less than 7,000 cavalry, most of whom never before

saw a great battle, and your entire loss in killed, wounded, and missing is only 346 officers and

men. The records of this war furnish no more brilliant and decisive results.

VIII. To Major-General Pleasonton and the officers and soldiers of the Provisional Cavalry

Division, by whom this work was wrought, the general commanding tenders his thanks for their

12

gallantry and efficiency in the campaign, and congratulates them on having acquired the true

spirit of cavalry service.

He also returns his thanks to the district commanders, to the officers and soldiers of our

infantry and artillery, and the Enrolled Militia, and to Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith and his command

for the zeal and energy with which they performed all the duties devolving upon them in the

campaign which brought to naught Price's formidable raid and defeated the schemes of the rebels

and traitors in Missouri and elsewhere against the State and the Nation.

IX. A department order will announce the regiments entitled, and the names of the

engagements they are to inscribe on their banners.

By command of Major-General Rosecrans:

FRANK ENO,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

FIRST DIVISION, COMMANDED BY COL. JOSEPH J. WOODS, TWELFTH IOWA

VOLUNTEERS.

During the past month this division has been actively engaged as a portion of the army

pursuing the rebel General Price through Missouri. Marching has been almost continuous and

very hard, making as high as thirty-three miles per

THIRD BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, COMMANDED BY COL. SYLVESTER G. HILL,

THIRTY-FIFTH IOWA INFANTRY.

October 1.--Marched at 7 a.m. from near Poplar Bluff, Mo., toward Greenville, Mo., thirteen

miles; command on three-quarter rations.

October 2.--Marched at 6 a.m.; forded the Saint Francis River; encamped at Greenville;

fourteen miles.

October 3.--Marched on Cape Girardeau road; seventeen miles.

October 4.--Marched at 2 a.m.; a forced march; raining and roads bad; encamped at 8 p.m. on

White Water Creek; thirty miles.

October 5.--Marched to Cape Girardeau; eighteen miles; encamped one mile below town.

This concludes a march of 317 miles in nineteen days from Brownsville, Ark.

October 7.--Embarked on boats for Saint Louis.

October 9.--Re-embarked at Saint Louis for Missouri River.

October 18.--Landed at Jefferson City, Mo., and moved by cars to La Mine Bridge.

October 19.--Marched via Sedalia to Roletta; went into camp at 11.30 p.m.; nearly the whole

command left by the roadside exhausted; thirty-three miles.

October 20.--Marched sixteen miles.

October 21.--Marched into Lexington; twenty-five miles.

October 22.--Marched southwest twenty-four miles.

October 24.--Marched at 1 a.m. via Independence to Big Blue River; eighteen miles.

October 25.--Marched via Little Santa Fé, Kans.; fifteen miles.

October 26.--Marched to Harrisonville, Mo.; twenty-three miles.

October 27 to 29.--Remained in camp waiting supplies.

October 30.--Marched to Pleasant Hill, Mo.; twelve miles.

October 31.--Marched to Chapel Hill, Mo.; sixteen miles; went into camp at 9 p.m.

SECOND BRIGADE, THIRD DIVISION, COMMANDED BY COL. JAMES L. GILBERT,

TWENTY-SEVENTH IOWA INFANTRY.

October 1.---Found this command at Jefferson Barracks, Mo.

13

October 2.--Marched in the morning, forming a part of the command under Maj. Gen. A. J.

Smith, to Kirkwood; thirteen miles.

October 3.--Marched to Dutch Holland; eighteen miles.

October 4.--Marched to Summit Station; ten miles.

October 5 and 6.--Lay in camp.

October 7.--Marched to Cedar Creek; ten miles.

October 8.--Marched on Jefferson City road; eighteen miles.

October 9.--Lay in camp.

October 10.--Marched on Jefferson City road, fording Gasconade River; eighteen miles.

October 11.--Marched to Big Mary Creek; twenty-two miles.

October 12.--Marched to Moreau Creek; nineteen miles.

October 13.--Passing through Jefferson City, nine miles, west; thirteen miles.

October 14.--Marched to California, passing Lookout Station; seventeen miles.

October 15.--Lay in camp.

October 16.--Marched to La Mine Bridge; twenty-four miles.

October 17.--Lay in camp.

October 18.--Marched, passing Sedalia two miles toward Georgetown; eighteen miles.

October 19.--Marched on Lexington road, passing Georgetown; fifteen miles.

October 20.--Marched on Lexington road to Deer Creek; seventeen miles.

October 21.--Marched into Lexington; twenty-three miles.

October 22.--Marched on Harrisonville road fourteen miles and took the Independence road;

seventeen miles.

October 23.--Marched on Independence road eighteen miles.

October 24.--At midnight passing Independence to Big Blue River; fifteen miles.

October 25.--Marched south, passing Santa Fé, and encamped on Big Blue; fifteen miles.

October 26.--Marched at 3.30 o'clock in the morning and passed one mile beyond

Harrisonville; twenty-six miles.

October 27 to 29.--Lay in camp.

October 30.--Marched on the Warrensburg road to within one mile of Pleasant Hill; eleven

miles.

October 31.--Mustered for pay and marched toward Wellington to Big Snibar River; twelve

miles.

The command has thus marched during the month 369 miles, and is now in camp for the

night, en route for Lexington.

HDQRS. FOURTEENTH IOWA INFANTRY VOLUNTEERS,

Rolla, Mo., October 3, 1864.

On the 25th [September] I moved with my command by rail on the Iron Mountain road. By

order I detached and left at various stations, from Jefferson Barracks to Mineral Point, Mo., five

companies of my command, namely, Companies A, G, H, I, and K. Encamped at Mineral Point

on the night of the 25th. Proceeded from thence on the morning of the 26th, with Companies B,

C, D, and E, to Pilot Knob, Mo, whence we marched to Ironton, distant one mile, where we

encamped during the night of the 26th of September.

On the morning of the 27th, at early daylight, the enemy appeared in force, when they were

engaged by two pieces of the Second Missouri Battery. The enemy being too strong in numbers

we were compelled to fall back, which was done in good order to the southeast point of

Shepherd's Mountain, where our forces again formed line of battle under command of Major

Wilson. Here I was joined by a detachment of eighteen men of Company H, Fourteenth Iowa

14

Infantry. I was ordered, with my command, to occupy the summit of Shepherd's Mountain,

which I did. At this point I had a brisk skirmish with the enemy, who attempted to flank my

position, and I fell back to the rifle-pits of Fort Davidson, where I remained till I was ordered, at

1 p.m., to occupy the face of Shepherd's Mountain south of the fort. I held that position till the

enemy attacked me in heavy force, and I was compelled to fall back within the fort, when a

general engagement commenced.

On the morning of the 28th, at 2 a.m., by order of Brigadier-General Ewing, I moved my

command in advance, and took up line of march on the Caledonia road, arriving at Webster,

distant thirty miles, where we encamped. On the 29th of September, at 1 a.m., took up line of

march, covering the retreat with my command to Leasburg, distant thirty-six miles. About 10

a.m. the enemy attacked our rear guard of cavalry, and drove them in. I immediately formed line

of battle, and checked the advance of the enemy. The column moved forward, and I covered the

retreat, with continual skirmishing the entire way. Arriving at Leasburg at sunset my command

was formed in line of battle on the left, facing the enemy, where we remained encamped during

the night. On the 30th of September commenced building temporary fortifications, which were

occupied till the morning of October 2, at 2 o'clock, when we took up our line of march for

Rolla, Mo., distant thirty-one miles, where we arrived at 6 p.m., and are encamped at the present

time.

The officers and men of my command behaved with the utmost coolness and bravery during

the several engagements in which we took part. First Lieut. Hugo Hoffbauer, acting adjutant, has

my warmest thanks for the manner in which he conducted himself, and the valuable service

rendered by his untiring energy during the several engagements, and while on the march.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. J. CAMPBELL,

Captain Company K, Comdg. Fourteenth Iowa Infty. Vols.

Lieut. G. D. O. KELLMAN,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. SECOND DIV., CAV. CORPS, DIST. OF WEST TENN.,

October 23, 1864.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of detachments

of about 2,000 men of my command:

Under instructions from Maj. Gen. C. C. Washburn, commanding District of West

Tennessee, I crossed the Mississippi River at Memphis, Tenn., with about 1,900 officers and

men of my division, the detachments from First Brigade in charge of Col. Joseph Kargé and

those from the Second under command of Lieut. Col. George Duffield, Third Iowa Cavalry.

Marched at noon of the 2d of September, moving on the military road to Clarendon, 100 miles,

arriving at 11 a.m. 6th instant, having bridged four bayous and ferried one--Black Fish--where

seven men of the Fourth Missouri Cavalry, one negro, and four horses were drowned by the

sinking of the boat. The Saint Francis and L'Anguille Rivers were forded without trouble. It

would be quite impracticable to move a column by this route during the wet season. On the 7th

instant [ultimo] I was directed by Major-General Steele, commanding Department of Arkansas,

to move to Brownsville, and being ferried over the White River, marched to that point, thirtynine

miles, arriving on the 9th instant [ultimo] at noon. I had sent about 100 men and animals

from Clarendon by river to Memphis, and on my departure therefrom left 150 men sick and

dismounted, with about 100 horses, at Brownsville. During our stay at this point many of my

men became ill, the weather being very warm and the water very bad. The animals were

insufficiently supplied with forage. Notwithstanding every possible effort was made I could not

15

get my animals shod, and because of this many were abandoned during the march to Cape

Girardeau. Colonel Kargé was left at Brownsville sick, and the command of his brigade devolved

on Major Simonson, Seventh Indiana Cavalry. The Second New Jersey Cavalry, about 250 men,

which I had directed to report to Major-General Mower at Memphis, was here returned to the

command. On the 18th instant [ultimo], under orders from Major-General Mower, commanding

expedition, I moved from Brownsville and arrived at Cape Girardeau, Mo., on the 5th of October

at noon. Distance 316 miles direct march.

October 7, the command embarked on steamers for Saint Louis, arriving on the 8th, 9th, and

10th, and going at once to Benton Barracks. Here I caused to be turned in all unserviceable

animals, and the command was supplied with 500 fresh horses, five ambulances, and five sixmule

teams and wagons. (Our transportation to this time had included no wagons.) The men

were also supplied with clothing, which was much needed. At 5 p.m. 10th instant the First

Brigade moved toward the Missouri River, arriving at noon next day, thirty-five miles, and

embarked on steamers for Jefferson City, while I marched with the Second Brigade at 6 a.m. on

the 11th instant, reaching Independence, via Washington, Russellville, California, Tipton,

Sedalia, and Lexington, on the evening of the 22d instant, distance about 305 miles direct. A

portion only of the First Brigade joined me on the march, the Second New Jersey and Nineteenth

Pennsylvania Regiments having fallen to the rear by orders from Major-General Pleasonton. At

Independence we first came up with an enemy, and my command was directed to support that of

Brigadier-General Brown (Missouri State Militia) in pushing the enemy over Big Blue River.

General Brown, saying his men were out of ammunition, directed me to take the advance at dark,

which I did, and with the Third Iowa (dismounted) pushed the enemy from Independence to

within two miles of the river, where I was ordered to halt, at 10.30 p.m. On the morning of the

23d, General Brown's brigade being ordered to the front and himself to the rear, I was requested

by the major-general commanding to take charge of the front and conduct the fighting.

Immediately assuming direction, I formed on the edge of the stream one regiment of Missouri

State Militia, together with the Fourth Missouri, Captain Knispel, and one battalion of the Fourth

Iowa, Captain Doe, which I had previously placed there, and ordered a charge upon the enemy

on the other bank. The enemy were at once driven back upon his main line, half a mile farther

back. Almost three companies, being partially surrounded, would have been captured from the

enemy but for awkwardness or negligence on the part of some militia officers. Dismounting two

other regiments of Missouri State Militia, and directing Captains Knispel and Dee to hold their

commands in reserve, and at the same time ordering forward my whole command, I advanced

upon the main position of the enemy. Their line was formed in the edge of a long piece of

timber, just on the brow of the rising ground, while in front was a fine open stretch of clearing

descending gradually to the river. When within 400 yards of the enemy I directed the line to

advance rapidly and drive them from the timber. This was well commenced only, when the

whole line gave way under the fire of the enemy and retreated in disorder to the reserve, where I

succeeded in reforming the broken detachment. I again ordered an advance with the Third and

Fourth Iowa Regiments closely supporting. This time we reached the woods, and after a short,

spirited resistance from the enemy drove them out of position with some loss. The retiring foe

was followed by our troops through the skirt of timber about two miles, when, having been

struck, just as we gained the edge of the timber, in the leg with a rifle-ball, and disabled thereby,

I turned over the command to Lieut. Col. F. W. Benteen, Tenth Missouri Cavalry, who had

commanded the Second Brigade since leaving Washington, Mo.

Having been left on the field I could not learn our loss or that of the enemy. I know of

Captain Brown and Lieutenant Watts, Third Iowa, and Lieutenant Bowman, Fourth Iowa

Cavalry, being wounded while gallantly leading their men. I presume our loss to this time did not

16

exceed in my division 25 all told. The command is still pursuing the retreating enemy. During

the march to Clarendon and until nearing Brownsville, Ark., the command was but partially

supplied with grain, and had very little hay. From Brownsville, Ark., to Cape Girardeau, Mo.,

grain was readily found and some hay was obtained. From Saint Louis to time of arrival at

Independence a sufficient amount of grain and considerable hay was secured. That the march

was severe in many respects is evident, and yet at the time of the fight, 23d of October, there

were no dismounted men. Of course during the march from Saint Louis no horses were taken

from citizens. Previous to the arrival of the command at Cape Girardeau about 250 animals were

taken and captured, all of which were branded, and most of them turned into the quartermaster's

department at Benton Barracks. The men were dismounted and led their animals from one-eighth

to one-fourth of each day's march, and every effort was made by steady moving, frequent rests,

and regular and abundant feeding, when practicable, to keep the command in an effective

condition. The officers generally did all they could to second my endeavors, although, as is the

case in all our movements, many company commanders neglected to enforce obedience to orders

received from higher authority. I am especially indebted to the several brigade commanders, and

to Lieut-A. Hodge, acting assistant adjutant-general; Captain Fitch, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant

Madigan, acting commissary of subsistence; Capt. J. F. Young, Tenth Missouri Cavalry, acting

assistant quartermaster, and Lieutenant Thiel, aide-de-camp, for much valuable aid.

Immediately after the return from the pursuit of Price the command should be reunited, and I

respectfully represent the necessity of this being done. The detachment in Missouri is composed

of details from about every company in eight regiments, the company and regimental records

being yet at Memphis with the portion there encamped.

I submit herewith a statement of the daily marches with remarks. Only the direct marches are

shown, to which aggregate should be added 25 per cent for scouting, flanking, and foraging.

Miles marched, 772; traveled by boats, 150; total distance, 922 miles.

Respectfully submitted.

Your obedient servant,

E. F WINSLOW,

Colonel, Commanding Division.

Capt. S. L. WOODWARD,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Cavalry Corps, Dist. of West Tennessee.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH BRIGADE, CAVALRY DIVISION,

Near Kansas City, October 23, 1864.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to submit the following brief report of operations of my

command from the 16th instant to date:

By direction of the major-general commanding the department, I reported to the majorgeneral

commanding division from Prince's Ford on Osage River, where my command was then

in bivouac. From this point the command moved thirty miles per diem, to Wellington, camping

at dark on the 21st instant; moved at 12 o'clock same night in rear of Sanborn's brigade to

Independence, when I was directed to support Brigadier-General Brown and aid in driving the

enemy to Weston. Moved at 5 p.m., and by direction of General Brown my brigade took the

advance, pushing the enemy (Clark's rebel brigade in the rear) to within three miles of Big Blue,

when, at 10.30 p.m., I received orders to wait for the moon to rise. Moved about 4 a.m. 23d,

driving the enemy over Big Blue, at which stream General Brown's brigade was ordered to take

the advance and General B. ordered to the rear. At the request of the major-general commanding

division I assumed direction of the fighting in front, the enemy being posted on the opposite

bank of the river with their main line formed about half a mile from the stream. With one

17

battalion Fourth Iowa Cavalry, 100 Fourth Missouri Cavalry, and one regiment of Brown's

brigade, Missouri State Militia, formed on the bank of the stream, the enemy were at once driven

to their main line by a vigorous charge. Dismounting two other regiments of Missouri State

Militia and forming line about 400 yards from that of the enemy, under the cover of the crest of a

small hill, I directed a charge on the enemy, having previously placed a regiment in reserve.

When within about 100 yards of the enemy the entire line broke and ran to the rear. Succeeded in

rallying upon the reserve most of the broken troops, and bringing forward my brigade in support

I again ordered a charge on the enemy's line. This movement was perfectly successful, though

the enemy held their position, a good one, until our men engaged them hand-to-hand. Just as the

enemy turned to run I was struck in the left leg with a rifle-ball, and, though able to keep the

saddle until the enemy had been driven a mile, was obliged then to turn over my command to

Lieutenant-Colonel Benteen, Tenth Missouri Cavalry.

I cannot give a list of casualties, not having received any reports, but think the losses in my

own command will not exceed 25 killed and wounded, principally in the Third Iowa Cavalry,

which did the work on the night of the 22d.

I respectfully call the attention of the major-general to the condition of my command, which,

though having marched over 800 miles direct line, had then no dismounted men.

Very truly, yours,

E. F. WINSLOW,

Colonel Fourth Iowa Cavalry, Commanding.

Lieut. CLIFFORD THOMSON,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH BRIGADE, CAVALRY DIVISION,

Cross Timbers, Mo., November 3, 1864.

GENERAL: I beg respectfully to submit the following report of the operations of this brigade

since I have had the honor of commanding it: On the morning of the 23d of October, Colonel

Winslow commanding, was unfortunately wounded in the leg and had to retire from the field,

and the command devolved upon me as the next ranking officer. At that time I found the enemy

well posted on the opposite side of the Big Blue with a very strong position and in considerable

numbers. Captain Dee, of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry, had succeeded, with a detachment of that

regiment, in gaining a position on the same side with the rebels and the brigade of General

Brown had been ordered to the front. As soon as the command devolved upon me I dismounted

the Third Iowa Cavalry, Maj. B. S. Jones commanding, and advanced them as skirmishers

toward the enemy, through the woods that lined the immediate banks of the creek, until I arrived

at an open space, some 200 yards in width, on the near side of which I found 200 or 300 men of

the Missouri State Militia posted behind some houses at which the enemy was pouring a very hot

fire. By dint of great urging and exertion of authority, I succeeded in getting them from behind

their places of shelter, and then, with them and my dismounted men, advanced across the field at

a double-quick to the woods beyond; the enemy at the same time resisting us stoutly. The woods

attained, we pushed the enemy through them rapidly to the prairie beyond, where he had

stationed a battery, from which he played among us shell after shell. My command, nevertheless,

moved on and with such rapidity that the rebel commander, fearing, I suppose, for the safety of

his cannon, withdrew them with his command rapidly and fell back quite a distance across the

prairie beyond even the range of artillery. In the meantime I had sent for the Fourth Iowa Cavalry

and dismounted them and advanced them in line of skirmishers as a support to my advanced line.

The enemy thus for the moment having been pushed beyond our reach, my whole command was

brought forward on the prairie, and after a few minutes being allowed for rest the whole was

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mounted, and, at your direction, 1 moved out on what was called the Ridge road toward the

position the enemy had taken. It had now got to be past noon, and after some distance had been

gained, I sent Captain Young to find you and obtain permission to feed our hungry animals. The

captain shortly after reporting that he could not ascertain your whereabouts, I took the

responsibility upon myself to halt my command in a large corn-field and take a few minutes to

feed. I had not taken much time when I perceived there was work to be done, as I could plainly

see a battle raging in our front, and immediately ordered my men into the saddle and moved out

on a trot toward the State line. A few minutes sufficed to bring us to the scene of the conflict.

Here I found the enemy making a charge and some of our troops ingloriously falling back. I

tried, with the assistance of Captain Young, to rally them, but without avail. I then ordered my

leading regiment, the Tenth Missouri Cavalry, to form a line to the left and ordered them to make

a counter-charge, which they did in gallant style, turning the rebels and driving them. I then

formed the rest of my brigade and ordered a charge, in which the whole command participated,

driving the enemy far beyond the battle-ground, beyond Missouri into Kansas and beyond the

town of Santa Fé. In this charge Second Lieut. M. C. Auld, Company I, Tenth Missouri Cavalry,

was severely wounded. Our horses having become jaded and worn down, I formed my column

and proceeded to a point just beyond the Kansas line and about two miles and a half from Santa

Fé, and halted to rest both animals and men. Here I received orders from you to go into camp for

the night and in the morning move out and meet you at or near the last-named town.

On the morning of the 24th, just after daylight, we moved out to Santa Fé, and taking our

position just in the rear of General Sanborn's command marched until late that night, reaching

the Osage River, where, on the order of General Sanborn, we bivouacked around the house of

Elder Williams, that officer deeming it too dark and the enemy too well posted for an attack that

night. That day we marched over a desolated country, where even water was scarce, at a speed

that necessarily kept the rear at a trot, and bivouacked, without forage for our jaded horses, a

distance of at least forty-two miles. The morning of the 25th broke and gave promise of a dull

and dreary day, when I was ordered with my brigade to march to the river and cross, receiving

from you the order to charge the enemy whenever the opportunity offered. I crossed, and

reaching the prairie formed my column in the following order: First, the Tenth Missouri Cavalry,

Maj. W. H. Lusk; second, the Fourth Iowa Cavalry, Maj. A. R. Pierce; third, the Third Iowa

Cavalry, Maj. B. S. Jones, and fourth, the Seventh Indiana Cavalry and Fourth Missouri Cavalry,

consolidated, under the command of Maj. S. E. W. Simonson, of the former regiment, and

moved as rapidly as possible after the retreating enemy. The skies now cleared, and the sun

smiled out upon the scene as if foretelling the glorious day that awaited us. After forming, a few

advanced skirmishers were thrown out to prevent a too sudden approach upon the enemy, who

might be behind any of the numerous hills of the undulating prairie. Three short miles were

scarcely accomplished when one of the advanced skirmishers galloped back and reported that the

enemy was only a few hundred yards ahead in line of battle, in large force, and with eight pieces

of artillery. About the same time Major Hunt, of General Curtis' staff, came up and told me the

enemy's exact position, stating that there was a brigade already in position in his front, but too

weak to begin the attack. I at once determined to form on the left of this brigade, especially as a

few more paces brought us in view of the line of rebels; seeing the position in which he had his

artillery, I immediately surmised that the rebel commander had committed a fatal blunder, and

resolved to capture it. I sent an officer to the commanding officer of the brigade on my right with

the information that I was going to charge, and a request for him to charge with me, for God's

sake, and at the same time formed my command in column of regiments in the same manner I

had formed them for marching, and immediately sounded the charge. The line of the brigade on

my right was soon passed, but it did not charge with us; this brigade I have since learned was the

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one commanded by Col. J. F. Philips, of the Missouri State Militia. The fire of the enemy was

now so hot that for a moment it staggered even my own gallant regiment, but it soon recovered

and went on with an exulting yell. At the time the charge was sounded, I gave the orders for the

different regiments to execute a right half-wheel, and dispatched my staff to see it executed, then

to completely cut off the enemy's chance to escape with his artillery. This maneuver was

successfully executed, and we captured the guns in a shorter space of time than is necessary to

record it. Then began a fierce hand-to-hand fight, one that surpassed anything for the time it

lasted I have ever witnessed.

My loss in this part of the day's transaction was large, but in comparison with the gains it was

small. Lieutenant Curtiss, of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry, was instantly killed while gallantly

encouraging on his men,. and Lieut. B. Armbrust, Company A, Fourth Cavalry Missouri

Volunteers, was wounded in the bridle-arm while bravely charging at the head of his company.

The enemy was completely routed and driven in the wildest confusion from the field; several of

his wagons were abandoned in the narrow road that crosses the creek just in the rear of his

position. Many of his force were left dead and wounded upon the field and in our hands. It is a

matter of impossibility for me to state the number, as I had no opportunity of passing over the

scene of the conflict afterward. After the action of the morning my brigade took no part in any

lighting, until the final one of the day, when the enemy drew up his whole force in the afternoon

upon what I am informed is called the Little Marmiton Creek. In this action I formed my

command as you ordered for a charge as follows: The Tenth Missouri in line of battle, the Third

and Fourth Iowa and Major Simonson's command in column of squadrons in their rear, with the

intention to charge as soon as a striking distance could be reached. I ordered the charge at one

time, but the enemy fell back too rapidly upon his strong lines and I felt that it would be more

than useless to continue, so I halted and formed a line of battle, my ammunition by this time

being reduced to a very few rounds per man and my horses completely tired out. Major

Simonson's command was not included in the line of battle, as you had stationed him to support

the section of artillery you had stationed to the left and rear of the command.

In this lost action we lost several men wounded, and amongst them Maj. A. R. Pierce, of the

Fourth Iowa Cavalry, who was severely wounded in the foot while leading his men toward the

rebels. He did not leave the field until the night had set in and the command bivouacked on the

field, the enemy in the meantime having retired. This ended the fighting up to the present time in

which we have had any participation. The next morning I moved my command to Fort Scott,

halting to feed on the road. The next day I received orders from you to report to Major-General

Curtis, and am at present still under his orders.

This report does not pretend to give any history of our operations previous to my assumption

of command. I suppose Colonel Winslow, my predecessor, will make his report as soon as

possible of the movements up to the time of his departure.

You will find annexed Exhibit A, which gives a list of the casualties of the command for the

whole period of time the command has been in pursuit of Price. Hundreds of prisoners have

fallen into our hands, but owing to the nature of our movements, I have not been able to keep a

record of them.

My thanks are due to the officers and men for their gallant and cheerful performance of duty

at all times. Maj. W. H. Lusk, of the Tenth Missouri; Maj. A. R. Pierce, of the Fourth Iowa; Maj.

B. S. Jones, of the Third Iowa; Maj. S. E. W. Simonson, of the Seventh Indiana, and Captain

Knispel, of the Fourth Missouri, are entitled to especial mention for the brave examples they set

their men and the gallant style in which they led them into danger. To Private James Dunlavy,

Company D, Third Iowa Cavalry, belongs the honor of capturing Major-General Marmaduke,

and to Sergt. Calvary M. Young, of the same company [Company L,] and regiment, that of

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taking General Cabell. We also captured besides the guns and prisoners two stand of colors. Of

my staff, I beg particularly to mention Capt. J. F. Young, Tenth Missouri Cavalry, acting

assistant adjutant-general, and Lieut. August Thiel, of the Fourth Missouri Cavalry, acting aidede-

camp, for their gallantry in the field and their unceasing attention to duty at all times. I do not

desire to make any invidious distinctions, however, for all did well and nobly and deserve the

thanks of their country.

In conclusion, allow me, general, to return you my sincere thanks for the uniform kindness

you have displayed toward me during our official connection, and I shall always cherish it with

the kindest of feelings and regard.

I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. W. BENTEEN,

Lieut. Col. Tenth Cavalry Missouri Vols., Comdg. Fourth Brig.

Maj. Gen. A. PLEASONTON.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD IOWA CAVALRY,

Benton Barracks, Mo., November 28, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the actions of the Third Iowa Cavalry

in the recent campaign in Missouri against the rebel forces commanded by General Price:

In pursuance of orders I assumed command of 483 men with 15 line officers, all the available

mounted forces of the regiment, and marched from camp near Memphis, Tenn., at 2 o'clock on

the morning of the 2d day of September, 1864, and formed a part of Winslow's brigade, with

which I crossed the Mississippi, and marched to Brownsville, Ark., where I arrived on the 9th

day of September, and remained with the brigade almost without forage for my horses, awaiting

the arrival and fitting up of an infantry force, commanded by Major-General Mower, until the

morning of the 18th of September, during which time I left sick in hospital fifty men and one

officer, when we marched with said force via Austin and Searcy, and crossed White River fifteen

miles below Batesville, and Black River at Elgin, ten miles above its junction with White River.

Bridged and crossed the latter stream, marched up its left bank, crossing into the State of

Missouri, at or near Poplar Bluff, turning to the east, and marching to Cape Girardeau, Mo.,

where we arrived on the 5th day of October, 1864. Embarked on transports and moved to Saint

Louis, Mo., where I arrived and refitted my command on the 10th and marched out on the 11th

up the valley of the Missouri River on the direct road to Independence, marching rapidly and

constantly until the 22d day of October, when we joined the forces of the Department of the

Missouri, commanded by Major-General Pleasonton, and which were fighting the enemy near

Independence, Mo. Winslow's brigade being ordered to the front that evening, my regiment not

having the advance was, however, dismounted, sent to the front, and immediately engaged the

enemy on the Kansas City road, fighting and driving Clark's (rebel) brigade, from 5 o'clock until

9.30 p.m., a distance of five miles, when my command was relieved. The command rested on the

field for the night in the face of the enemy, having marched from 12 o'clock on the night of the

21st, and without forage or water for our animals. Our brigade was in motion again at 4 a.m. of

the 23d, the Fourth Iowa Cavalry and Tenth Missouri in the advance, and drove the enemy after

light skirmishing to and across the Big Blue (a distance of two miles) to a strong position. A

brigade of Missouri State Militia was thrown in to dislodge them, but failed to accomplish it. My

command was dismounted and formed line on the right and in front of the enemy, who were

posted across an open field behind piles of rails in the woods. We charged them, killing and

wounding many of their men (Company A captured one stand of their colors) and completely

routed them from their strong position, but suffered a considerable loss in wounded. Soon after I

mounted my command and proceeded with my brigade to the front on the open prairie, and

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joined in a gallant mounted charge against the enemy in column of regiments, following the

Tenth Missouri and Fourth Iowa Cavalry, which was continued through farms and over the

prairie for five or six miles, breaking his lines, and completely scattering his men in every

direction, and inflicting severe loss upon him in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Here again I

lost in both killed and wounded, and our brigade camped for the night on the State line between

Missouri and Kansas, fed our hungry and jaded animals on corn and fodder from a fine field on

the rich and free soil of Kansas, and rested fearless of an enemy. We marched early, constantly,

and rapidly on the 24th, in a southerly direction, after a retreating enemy, down the line dividing

Missouri and Kansas, over extensive prairies dotted with devastated farms and lonely chimneys

which mark the ravages of war before the rebellion, and in of which it would have been worse

than fanaticism to the days have prophesied that on the 24th day of October, 1864, the

governments of Missouri and Kansas would unite as they did on that day and drive out the

defenders of African slavery and the destroyers of the Government, as it was our delight to do,

uniting with the Army of the Border, commanded by General Curtis, with which we marched

without halting until 3 a.m. of 25th, at Trading Post, on the Osage River, where we found the

enemy and eagerly waited for daylight.

The enemy having been routed from their position on the river, was followed by Winslow's

brigade at a gallop in the order of Tenth Missouri, Fourth Iowa, Third Iowa, Fourth Missouri,

and Seventh Indiana Cavalry for several miles, and when he attempted to make a stand, formed

in two lines of battle, supported by eight pieces of artillery, my command was formed in line of

battle, with the brigade in column of regiments in their order of march, and, constituting the left

center of our whole line, charged the enemy, breaking his right and center, killing, wounding,

and capturing many of his men. Among the captured was Major-General Marmaduke and

Brigadier-General Cabell, the first by Private James Dunlavy, of Company D, and the latter by

Sergeant C. M. Young, of Company L, both of the Third Iowa Cavalry. Companies C, D, and E

captured three pieces of the enemy's artillery. The whole of my command did nobly on that field,

as also on others, and the highest commendations are due to every man and officer. The

remainder of this day was one continual charge upon the enemy and his complete rout. We rested

on the open prairie over night near Fort Scott, Kans. On the 26th day of October we rested with

our brigade at Fort Scott, and early on the 27th again joined in the pursuit of the enemy and

continued through Arkansas and Indian Territory to a point on Arkansas River forty miles above

Fort Scott, without again seeing the enemy, and from which we returned to this place, having

marched since September 2, 1,650 miles, and participated in three general engagements, and

marched through a country destitute of forage, or having been devastated, by the enemy, and

many times without having food for my men, having had only three-fifths rations from the 28th

ultimo to 7th instant and not any bread from the 7th to 12th instant in consequence of the

destitution of the country (Indian Territory) through which we marched, and great distance from

the base of supplies.

Hoping you will make proper allowances for the length of this report,

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. S. JONES,

Major, Commanding Third Iowa Cavalry Veteran Volunteers.

N. B. BAKER,

Adjutant-General of Iowa.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH IOWA CAVALRY,

Diamond Grove Prairie, October 27, 1864--7.30 p.m.

22

GENERAL: Fearing that justice will not be done my regiment in the reports made of the

battle of Osage, I take the liberty to call your attention to the charge made by them on the

enemy's right, at a time when our line on the right had halted and were receiving a destructive

fire from the enemy. At that time a perfect rout of our line appeared to be almost certain. My

regiment had just formed on the extreme left of our line when I commenced the charge. The

three companies on the right of my regiment charged through the line of the Tenth Missouri

Volunteer Cavalry Regiment, which was formed in their front. In that charge we crushed the

enemy's right completely. We pressed them so close that I cut eight rebels from their horses with

my own saber. My regiment captured over 200 prisoners with two stand of colors. We advanced

so far into the enemy's ranks that Major-General Pleasonton ordered our own battery to shell us,

thinking we were the retreating enemy, and my men were obliged to scatter to avoid being cut to

pieces by our own shells. I should have called to see you, general, had not I received a severe

wound in my foot, which prevents my riding my horse.

A. R. PIERCE,

Major, Commanding Fourth Iowa Veteran Cavalry.

Major-General CURTIS.

SAINT LOUIS, MO., November 30, 1864.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the movements and actions of

the First Brigade while operating under Brigadier-General Sanborn, commanding in the late

campaign after the rebel forces under Price. This report has been thus far deferred on account of

my serious affliction of sore eyes and prostrate health:

On the 8th day of October I had been engaged all the afternoon skirmishing and fighting with

the enemy from Jefferson City west to the Moreau. At night I had selected position and gone into

camp when 1 received the order assigning me to the command of the First Brigade of your

cavalry division. The brigade was composed of the First Iowa Cavalry, Major McDermott

commanding; First Missouri State Militia, Col. James McFerran commanding; Fourth Missouri

State Militia, Maj. G. W. Kelly commanding; Seventh Missouri State Militia, Lieut. Col. T. T.

Crittenden commanding. On the morning of the 9th I moved at 5 a.m. and pressed rapidly

forward to the junction of the two roads leading from Jefferson City to Russellville, where I

found that the general commanding had passed with the remainder of the division, and had stuck

the enemy's rear and was pressing him with great vigor through Russellville. I closed up

immediately and so marched until we arrived at this town. Here it was determined, in view of the

enemy's supposed purpose to carry his main column to Versailles, to move on his right flank and

gain California at an early hour. I was ordered to bring up my brigade and take the advance on

account of my knowledge of the route. I had not gone far before I discovered that the enemy had

sent no inconsiderable force directly in my advance toward California, and on reaching an

eminence within one mile of the town we discovered the enemy had formed a junction there of

his entire army and had left Marmaduke's command to dispute our entrance into town. He was

already in position just south and southeast of town, and on the appearance of the head of my

column he opened on us with two guns, compelling us to halt, as our approach was through a

narrow lane and the enemy had perfect range. The advance regiment, Fourth Missouri State

Militia, was immediately dismounted and deployed, and the remaining regiments of the Missouri

State Militia were promptly up and the Seventh thrown forward dismounted, with instructions to

extend the line well to the left and move boldly on the enemy's right, while the First Missouri

State Militia was dismounted and advanced to the center of our line, forming the connection

between the Fourth and Seventh. The First Iowa Cavalry was quickly up and was held in reserve.

23

In the meantime a section of artillery, under command of Lieutenant Wachsman, had come

up and was by the general commanding (who was ever present to see and direct) assigned a

position and began to reply vigorously to the enemy's guns, now shelling us with fearful

precision. Our whole line advanced. The Seventh Missouri State Militia had moved at the

double-quick, driving in the enemy's skirmishers, and came so suddenly upon his right as to

cause it to give way as if alarmed. The enemy's position was much exposed to our artillery, and

his center, to which this artillery practice was directed, soon fell in sympathy with his right, and

the whole began to retire hurriedly to the north side of the railroad track, leaving their guns only

partially protected, which fact was quickly discovered by the officer in charge, who "limbered

up" and left in hot haste. The Seventh Missouri State Militia had now reached the town, and soon

swept it of the last straggling rebel.

My casualties in this engagement were, 1 officer (Lieutenant Chambers), I sergeant, and 1

private Fourth Cavalry Missouri State Militia., wounded with a shell. The loss of the enemy was

much greater. Citizens of California informed me that they carried off large numbers of

wounded.

I cannot in this connection fail to make special mention of the cool bravery and gallant

conduct of Robert Weeden, commissary sergeant, Seventh Cavalry Missouri State Militia. When

his regiment dismounted to fight he had tied his horse, and supposing the men left in charge of

the horses would bring his forward, as they brought up the others, he went on into town with the

command. At dark he discovered that his horse had been left behind. Accompanied by Colonel

Crittenden's orderly (Joshua Lorring, a faithful friend and true soldier) he started in quest of his

horse. While hunting him these boys were approached from the brush by a party of straggling

rebels, some twelve in number, who inquired of Weeden, "Is our boys in town?" "Yes." "Who

are you; what commands?" was Weeden's inquisitive answer. "I belong to Colonel Slemons'

brigade," was the answer. As quick as thought, Weeden shot him. The orderly's pistol failed to

fire. Weeden followed up his work and succeeded in killing some three or four of the party and

mortally wounding one. He got his horse, returned to camp, and in his coolness and modesty,

scarcely considered his adventure worthy of mention.

We encamped with the division for the night at California. At daylight on the morning of the

10th we marched west, on the line of the Pacific Railroad, via Clark's Station and Tipton, when

we turned north and moved direct for Boonville. After arriving within ten miles of Boonville

night was on us, and we bivouacked for the night near the "coal mines." On the morning of the

11th our line of march was resumed. When a short distance out, in obedience to orders from the

general commanding, I sent one regiment, the First Missouri State Militia, under command of

Colonel McFerran, toward the Bell Air and Boonville road, on our left, with instructions to pass

over, if possible, to the Boonville and Georgetown road, and ascertain whether or not the enemy

was passing on these roads, and to gather all the information possible of his movements and

designs. About 4 p.m. I was ordered to move with my entire brigade over to Georgetown and

Boonville road, and if the enemy was found moving his train westward, to attack it fiercely, and

if unable to capture it to punish him severely, or if the enemy was found not to have moved west

to attack his pickets, drive them in, and feel the enemy well, to ascertain his position, and

strength. It was dark when I tapped the road. I soon learned the enemy was not passing west.

Eight miles from Boonville I found his outer pickets, drove them in, capturing their good hot

supper, just prepared at a hospitable farm house. We steadily drove the pickets, constantly

increasing in strength, for two miles, where I found the enemy had several regiments in camp

and seemed disposed to resist stubbornly my farther advance. Disposing the command so as to

secure it against any movement the enemy might attempt on me under cover of the darkness, I

pressed forward two battalions of the Fourth Missouri State Militia to annoy and punish the

24

enemy. The night was so dark and the enemy's position so well taken, it was found difficult and

hazardous to approach him, without incurring more danger to my own men than I could

reasonably hope to justify in any success to be had in a general onset. I therefore contented

myself with keeping up a brisk and alarming fire on the enemy's camp from 11 p.m. to 2 a.m.

with the two battalions, while the remainder of the command slept quietly beyond range. The

enemy, however, was kept up in force and in line much of the night. Leaving these battalions to

demonstrate on the enemy, I quietly withdrew the brigade and rejoined the division at 4 a.m. on

the Tipton road. Colonel McFerran had, prior to my arrival with the remainder of the brigade,

come upon several bands, a hundred strong in some cases, chasing and firing on and wounding

quite a number and capturing some horses and arms. My entire casualties through the night were,

I man, William Wiley, private, Company G, Seventh Cavalry Missouri State Militia, killed, and

2 men Fourth Cavalry Missouri State Militia captured. I have since learned that we wounded

quite a number of the enemy, some of whom died.

I cannot in this connection refrain from expressing my admiration of and wonder at the

temerity of that generalship which enabled our division commander, with a force of less than

5,000 cavalry, to hang for two nights and one day on the enemy's rear, front, and flank,

threatening, attacking, and seemingly investing an army of 15,000 or 20,000 men. The military

strategy thus displayed was as splendid as the boldness of design was magnificent in execution.

On the 12th we were compelled to fall back to California for rations. Returning on the 13th to

the theater of operations it was found the enemy had left Boonville and moved west. We

followed briskly, passing through Palestine and Bell Air, and encamped for the night at Nebo

Church. On the 14th we marched at 4 a.m., via Pleasant Green, Cole Neck, and Georgetown, and

encamped for the night on the Basin Fork of Blackwater, having marched forty-three miles that

day. On the 15th I sent heavy scouting parties north through Brownsville and moved the brigade

fourteen miles to vicinity of Cook's Store, La Fayette County. Here we remained until the 17th.

In this time I sent heavy reconnoitering parties toward Waverly and Grand Pass, driving in and

skirmishing with the enemy's flanking parties and gathering much valuable information. On the

17th I dropped down the road toward Georgetown about twelve miles, and went into camp on the

Bee Branch, a tributary of the Blackwater, throwing out parties of observation to the north, it

being understood the enemy were in that direction in camp, and sending Lieutenant-Colonel

Crittenden to Georgetown after a commissary train made up for the use of the division. It was

here I learned that Capt. O. B. Queen, Company M, Seventh Cavalry Missouri State Militia, sent

to Sedalia on the night of the 15th after ammunition, was found at that town with his squadron by

the rebel forces under Jeff. Thompson when they captured the place on the 15th. Captain Queen,

supposing it was [the duty] of the militia forces to defend it, very properly placed his command

behind the improvised defenses and was fighting gallantly, when he discovered that the garrison

had precipitately [fled] and left him unsupported. He was instantly surrounded and himself and

27 of his company were taken prisoners and irregularly paroled by the mock general Jeff.

Thompson. On the 19th I moved my brigade, in obedience to the order of the general

commanding, about seven miles to Brownsville, with instructions to observe the movements of

the enemy and collect important information. At Brownsville Brig. Gen. E. B. Brown came up,

and in pursuance of orders of Major-General Pleasonton assumed command of the brigade,

whereupon I returned to the command of my regiment.

Thanking the staff officers of General Sanborn for the uniform courtesy shown me, and

acknowledging my grateful appreciation of the marked kindness of the general himself,

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN F. PHILIPS,

Col. Seventh Cavalry Missouri State Militia, Comdg. Brigade.

25

Capt. WILLIAM T. KITTREDGE,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF SOUTHWEST MISSOURI,

Springfield, Mo., November 13, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to report, for the information of the major-general commanding, the

part taken by my command in the recent campaign in Missouri against the rebel army,

commanded by Major-General Price, while reporting to Major-General Pleasonton:

Under paragraph 5 of Special Orders, No. 1, dated headquarters U.S. forces, Jefferson City,

Mo., October 8, 1864, I immediately proceeded with all the available cavalry force of the

command and one battery of light artillery in the direction of the enemy. This command

consisted of the following regiments and detachments, viz: First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,

Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Regiments Missouri State Militia Cavalry, Sixth and Seventh

Provisional Regiments Enrolled Missouri Militia, Second Arkansas Cavalry, First Iowa Cavalry,

Seventeenth Illinois Cavalry, with Battery H, Second Missouri Light Artillery, to which was

added one section of Battery L, Second Missouri Light Artillery, the whole under command of

Captain Thurber, of Battery H, numbering in effective force pressed for duty about 4,100 men.

This force was at once organized into brigades as follows: First Brigade, consisting of the First,

Fourth, and Seventh Missouri State Militia Cavalry and the First Iowa Cavalry, under command

of Col. John F. Philips, of the Seventh Missouri State Militia; Second Brigade, consisting of the

Third, Fifth, and Ninth Missouri State Militia Cavalry and the Seventeenth Illinois Cavalry, with

a battery of mountain howitzers, under command of Colonel Beveridge, of the Seventeenth

Illinois Cavalry; Third Brigade, consisting of detachments of the Sixth and Eighth Missouri State

Militia Cavalry, Sixth and Seventh Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia, and the Second

Arkansas Cavalry, under command of Col. J. J. Gravely, of the Eighth Missouri State Militia

Cavalry. The artillery (six guns), Captain Thurber commanding, was attached to the division

generally to act under my orders. The First Brigade, Colonel Philips commanding, already in

motion, was ordered to continue its march on the Jefferson City and Springfield road toward

Versailles and Warsaw, and the Second and Third Brigades were ordered forward along the line

of the railroad toward California and Tipton. Before I left Jefferson City artillery firing was

heard in the direction of the Springfield road, and soon after I received a dispatch from Colonel

Philips informing me that the enemy had made a stand at the crossing of the Moreau, occupying

a very strong position, and that artillery was needed to enable him to carry this position without

serious loss. The Second Arkansas Cavalry had already been sent to his support, and I

immediately ordered the rest of the Third Brigade, Colonel Gravely commanding, with one

section of Thurber's battery, to turn off from the California road, and move forward to the

support of Colonel Philips. The enemy retired from the Moreau before the arrival of Colonel

Gravely, with some loss in killed and wounded, leaving about seventy horses abandoned on the

field. No loss was sustained by my command. The First and Third Brigades and one section of

artillery bivouacked on and near the Moreau that night, and the Second Brigade, with three

sections of artillery, at Gray's Creek, about ten miles from Jefferson City, on the California road.

At daylight on the 9th the entire force of the enemy moved forward rapidly on the Springfield

road toward Versailles from its place of bivouac east of Russellville, the Third Brigade moving

in pursuit. The Second Brigade moved across by a neighborhood road from the California road to

the Springfield road and advanced to the support of the Third Brigade, already engaged with the

enemy's rear guard. The enemy resisted the advance of the column strongly with a heavy line of

dismounted skirmishers and strong reserves while passing through the heavily timbered country

east of Russellville. The entire Third Brigade was immediately formed in line, with a line of

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dismounted men as skirmishers in front, and the other brigades moved forward in support. The

enemy, on account of the timber and formation of the ground, was able to resist the advance of

our skirmishers to such an extent that it was deemed proper to charge with a mounted force

through the enemy's line of skirmishers and attack his reserves. This was accomplished by a

detachment of the Sixth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, under Lieut. R. B. Riggs, Company K,

Sixth Missouri State Militia, and the enemy retreated rapidly through Russellville, leaving

several dead on the field. My loss in this affair was Lieut. R. B. Riggs killed and -- wounded.

Lieutenant Riggs was a most gallant officer, and fell within five yards of the enemy's reserves,

which he was charging so vigorously. The Seventh Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia,

deployed as skirmishers, and the Sixth and Eighth Cavalry Missouri State Militia, which were

also engaged, behaved most gallantly. This cleared the road to the open prairie, on which the

enemy's columns and trains were plainly visible within artillery range. When my advance

emerged from the woods artillery was immediately opened upon the flying columns, which

continued to move forward toward Versailles until it had passed every road turning to the right

toward California but one, viz, the road at High Point. This movement of the enemy induced me

to move by the shortest route and by a rapid march to California for the purpose of striking his

flank if he should turn north toward Boonville at High Point, and also for the purpose of moving

rapidly on his flank during the night toward Warsaw, with a view of reaching that point before

him, if he continued his march in that direction. The First Brigade, with one section of artillery,

led in this march and the Second and Third Brigades followed, with another section of artillery

with the rear brigade. The head of the column emerged from the timber upon the open prairie

near California about 5 p.m., and found a large force of the enemy in that town, a portion

engaged in tearing up the railroad and a large force in line of battle. The enemy opened with one

section of artillery upon my advance immediately. The First Brigade was at once formed in close

column of squadrons in rear of the crest of a ridge running east and west, about half a mile south

of the town, and dismounted and formed line in rear of this crest, the right extending northeast of

the California and Russellville road, on which my command was marching, and the left

extending in a southwesterly direction across this road toward the road leading from California to

High Point. The section of artillery with the First Brigade, under Captain Thurber, went into

position on the left of the road about 700 yards from the enemy's guns and opened a welldirected

fire. Three squadrons of the First Iowa Cavalry, mounted, were ordered to our extreme

left on the road leading from California to High Point, as a party of observation. The Second and

Third Brigades were still in reserve with the exception of two regiments. The line was ordered to

advance and moved forward with the utmost alacrity. The enemy soon ceased his fire and as the

left of our line entered the town he fled with great precipitancy, leaving five dead on the field.

Our loss was one man wounded in the First Brigade. It was now dark. Shelby's division moved to

and occupied Boonville during the night. The main body of the enemy bivouacked on the

Moniteau and moved out on the Boonville road at daylight. My command started at daylight

also, and moved through Tipton, bivouacking for the night within nine miles of Boonville, on the

Tipton and Boonville road. During the evening Fagan's division was reported moving into

Boonville. Early in the morning of the 11th the Sixth Provisional Regiment Enrolled Missouri

Militia was sent across to the Boonville, Pisgah, and California road, with orders to Lieutenant-

Colonel McMahan, commanding, to advance up that road as far as possible. The balance of the

Third Brigade was ordered forward on the Tipton and Boonville road. At the same time Colonel

Eppstein, of the Fifth Missouri State Militia Cavalry, was ordered to proceed west to the

Boonville and Georgetown road, and advance up that road, driving in the enemy's pickets and

ascertaining whether the enemy had moved west or not. The Second Arkansas Cavalry, which

had the advance of the Third Brigade, on the Tipton road, encountered the enemy's pickets about

27

three miles south of Boonville, and drove them in in the most spirited manner. The enemy

deployed a line of skirmishers about two miles in length. The Sixth Provisional Enrolled

Missouri Militia came up on the Pisgah road without opposition and joined the Second Arkansas

Cavalry, and the enemy's skirmish line, though repeatedly re-enforced, was driven back to his

main line. Lieutenant Gideon, Company H, Sixth Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia, with one

company advanced into the outskirts of the town and entered, and for a short time occupied two

or three houses for protection to his men. The enemy opened artillery upon these houses and the

line, and his main line opened fire. I ordered the line to retire, the enemy advancing but a short

distance as it withdrew. The line was ordered to advance again, and moved forward to within

short musket range of the enemy's main line. A dispatch from Colonel Eppstein, on the

Georgetown road, announced that no portion of the rebel army had moved west, and I withdrew

my lines to the south side of the Petit Saline. In the affair of this day my loss was 1 man killed

and -- wounded. The enemy's loss is known to have been 15 killed, and 28 so severely wounded

that they could not be moved, and a large number were wounded and taken along with the army.

Several officers, one a colonel, were reported among the rebel wounded. My command had been

out of rations for thirty-six hours, the men had become much exhausted, and I could not learn of

any train on the way to me. I determined to move toward California in the morning, until I

should meet a subsistence train, and return immediately upon procuring supplies. Four days'

rations were procured and issued at California, and the command moved back to its position in

front of Boonville by 10 o'clock on the morning of the 13th of October. Colonel Catherwood's

brigade of veteran troops, 1,500 strong, reported to me at California and held the advance in this

day's march. A reconnaissance made by a detachment of the Seventh Kansas Cavalry, under

Captain Turley, developed the fact that the enemy had left Boonville on the morning of the 13th

and moved westerly, crossing the La Mine River at Dug Ford and Scott's Ford. My apprehension

was that the enemy would move by rapid marches to Lexington and into Kansas, and thereby

prevent the organization and concentration of the troops of that department on the border against

him, and at the same time place so great a distance between his army and the infantry and

cavalry of this department, then moving to the front in support of my command, that it would be

impossible for them to join me if I should follow him, and thereby avoid a battle with the large

number of troops then being marshaled for that purpose or with any command larger than my

own. Hence all my movements after the enemy left Boonville were made with the view of

holding the enemy in or near Saline County until the Kansas troops were organized and on the

border, and Winslow's brigade of cavalry and General A. J. Smith's command of infantry and

artillery should be within striking distance. I therefore moved my command, with the exception

of a small force under Captain Turley, which was ordered to follow the enemy's trail by Nebo

Church, through Georgetown up the Georgetown and Lexington road to Cook's Store, arriving at

this point at 3 p.m. on the 15th day of October, with the view of resisting the advance of the

enemy, and attacking his flanks if he should advance immediately.

After the first day's march from Boonville the enemy moved slowly, portions of his

command halting a short time near Marshall, Arrow Rock, and Waverly. Detachments from my

command reconnoitered the position and movements of the enemy daily. On the 17th day of

October some movements were reported that indicated a design on the part of the enemy to move

southeast through Marshall, and his advance not having appeared at Dover I moved south to the

Blackwater to be in a better position to strike the enemy if he should move in that direction.

Subsistence supplies had also been exhausted for two days, and it was absolutely necessary to get

a train from Sedalia. Immediately upon my command moving south to the Blackwater the enemy

commenced moving west rapidly. Subsistence was obtained and issued on the 19th day of

October, and on this day I received the first dispatch from General Blunt, giving the force and

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position of the troops from Kansas and indicating a state of readiness on the part of General

Curtis and himself. On the same day I received information from your headquarters of the arrival

of Winslow's brigade of cavalry and General Smith's corps at Sedalia, and your order

reorganizing the cavalry and taking immediate command. I sent a dispatch to Major-General

Blunt immediately upon receiving his dispatch informing him of the position of the enemy and

of all our forces and intended movements, and having on this day, by order of the general

commanding, moved the First Brigade to Boonville and the Second Brigade to Kirkpatrick's

Mill, I moved with the Third Brigade to Cook's Store and halted. At 3 p.m. I received a dispatch

from Major-General Blunt, then in Lexington, and sent one immediately in return. I ordered Col.

John E. Phelps, Second Arkansas Cavalry, to move forward on the Dover road at midnight till he

should strike the main body of the enemy or reach the Missouri River. At 3 a.m. a dispatch from

him announced that the rebel army had been moving through Dover west during the afternoon

and evening of the 19th, and that cannonading was heard late in the evening in the direction of

Lexington, adding that he would move forward and attack the force remaining in Dover. This

information was immediately communicated to the general commanding, and the entire [force] at

once commenced advancing. I sent dispatches to General Blunt on the evening of the 19th and

again on the morning of the 20th. None of these dispatches reached him, and I consider it the

most unfortunate thing of the campaign that he did not know our position and plans at this time.

A determined stand by the forces in the enemy's front at Lexington, Little Blue, or Independence,

which would have been made, of course, if the commanding officers had been fully advised of

our position and intended movements, would have brought all our forces, including the infants,

into action, and the entire destruction of the enemy would seem to have been made certain.

On this day, General Pleasonton coming up in person, I assumed command of my brigade

and moved forward in support of General McNeil's brigade, which held the advance. On the

following day, 21st, I moved in the same order to Independence, where the leading brigade

became quite heavily engaged with the enemy. Pursuant to orders from the general commanding

I moved my brigade to the right of the Second Brigade under a severe artillery fire, dismounted

the men, formed in two lines, and advanced rapidly on the left of the enemy's position. Colonel

Phelps, Second Arkansas Cavalry, held the advance and moved forward through gardens, yards,

and streets so rapidly that he captured a staff officer of General Cabell's and the general's sword,

and their whole line commenced giving way. A charge by the Thirteenth Missouri Veteran

Cavalry, simultaneously made, carried everything, and the enemy was routed, losing his artillery

and many prisoners. The enemy reformed on the west bank of Stony Creek, and I moved by a

circuitous route on our right with a view of turning this position. But before I reached the desired

position the gallant fighting of Winslow's brigade had forced the enemy back, and he was at this

time, though long after dark, fighting heavily and driving the enemy rapidly toward the Big Blue.

At 5 o'clock on the following morning I moved forward to the support of the First Brigade,

holding the advance. This brigade commenced advancing at 7 o'clock and in a short time was

hotly engaged with the enemy at the Big Blue, advancing and driving the enemy in the most

gallant manner. Soon after my command reached the front line the Second Arkansas Cavalry was

dismounted and ordered to advance against the enemy's right. The regiment moved forward and

the enemy fell back, whereupon, pursuant to an order from the general commanding, I charged

with the rest of my brigade in line and drove the enemy back to the Harrisonville road, a distance

of some three miles. The lines were now reformed and soon the order came to charge again. In

this instance the order was given directly to regimental commanders in two or three cases, and

the points at which the several regiments were to strike the enemy's line were not designated.

The result was that, although the troops charged with the greatest gallantry and carried the

enemy's position, the charge was made so far to our right that the enemy was allowed to escape

29

with his artillery on the Harrisonville road. My line immediately preceding the charge had been a

little confused by one of our own batteries opening upon it from the rear, and hence was not in as

good a position as it was a few moments before. As it was, the enemy burned a large number of

wagons and abandoned a large amount of artillery, ammunition, and other property. The Second

Arkansas Cavalry pursued the enemy across the creek south, killing 8 of them in a skirmish at

the creek. My command moved forward this night to Little Santa Fe, and the following day, the

24th, it moved to the immediate vicinity of the Marais des Cygnes, a distance of sixty miles,

passing the commands of Generals Curtis and Blunt, and taking the advance on the road twelve

miles south of this point, followed by the First, Second, and Fourth Brigades, all having been

placed by General Pleasonton under my direction for the night. My advance reached this point a

little after mid night and immediately commenced skirmishing with the enemy. The road leading

to the Trading Post, on the Marais des Cygnes, passes through a gap between two high mounds

about half a mile from the river, each from one-half to a mile in length. Col. J. J. Gravely, Eighth

Cavalry Missouri State Militia with his own regiment and the Sixth Cavalry Missouri State

Militia, Maj. William Plumb commanding, was ordered to advance until the position of the

enemy should be fully developed. The night was dark and it was raining heavily. Colonel

Gravely advanced gallantly with his command and the enemy opened musketry fire from the

gap. The line was deployed as skirmishers and advanced toward the base of the mounds. The

enemy opened a line on fire from the foot, sides, and summits of the mounds and the intervening

gap, and in an instant the clamor and noise of many voices indicated that we were near the

position of the enemy.

My ignorance of the topography of the country, the impenetrable darkness and incessant rain,

induced me to postpone a general attack until 4 o'clock in the morning. Previous to this hour

Lieutenant-Colonel Benteen, commanding Fourth Brigade, had by my order sent one regiment of

his brigade along a road leading west to a ford about three miles above the Trading Post and the

place where the enemy was camped, and had sent forward the Fourth Iowa Cavalry to report to

Colonel Gravely and assist him in taking possession of the two mounds. Colonel Gravely was

ordered to advance and occupy the summits of the two mounds and the intervening gap without

delay, and Captains Thurber and Montgomery were ordered to open fire with all their guns at 16

degrees elevation, bearing across the right end of the mound on our left through the gap, the

mounds and gap being now just visible through the receding darkness. The Fourth Iowa Cavalry

gained the mound on our right without serious opposition, but Colonel Gravely met with strong

resistance in his advance toward the crest of the mound on our left. The enemy's line extended

the entire length of this mound, and as our line advanced it opened a rapid but ill-directed fire.

The line formed by the Sixth and Eighth Cavalry Missouri State Militia, almost crawling upon

the ground by reason of the abrupt assault, moved steadily forward until within a few yards of

the enemy, when a loud cheer from our line, followed by one or two sharp volleys of musketry,

proclaimed the position gained. Captains Thurber and Montgomery had kept up a steady fire

from their batteries during this advance, and, was afterward ascertained, many of their shell

exploded in the enemy's camp, creating the greatest excitement and confusion. General

Pleasonton was now upon the ground and ordered me to advance my line to the Marais des

Cygnes and cross the river as soon as possible. This order was immediately executed, and in a

few moments my command occupied the ground just abandoned by the enemy, who left one

piece of artillery and many wagons, horses, mules, cattle, sheep, cooking utensils, &c. Colonel

Phelps, Second Arkansas Cavalry, was directed to take the advance and move forward as rapidly

as possible. He soon reached the river and found the enemy busily engaged felling trees across

the road on the opposite side. The Seventh Provisional Enrolled Missouri Militia was at once

dismounted and thrown across the river, about 400 yards above the ford, and ordered to advance

30

as skirmishes down the river till it should reach the ford. Colonel Phelps at the same time

advanced, under a heavy musketry fire, and the enemy was driven from his position opposite the

ford, where he had felled but two trees of moderate size across the road. The Second Arkansas

Cavalry continued to advance, followed by the Sixth and Eighth Cavalry Missouri State Militia,

which were already nearly exhausted from their labors during the night. The other two regiments

of my brigade were still deployed as skirmishers. Upon reaching the open prairie, about half a

mile from the ford, the enemy displayed a long line of battle, supported by one section of

artillery. I ordered Colonel Phelps not to charge this line until other troops came up, unless he

was certain that he could break it and capture the artillery, and proceeded to the ford to hurry up

some artillery and other troops. The enemy had already opened his artillery and General

Pleasonton was at the ford, throwing forward troops and artillery as rapidly as possible. Colonel

Phelps, with his regiment, aided by the Sixth and Eighth Cavalry Missouri State Militia,

dismounted, had already charged the enemy's position and had forced them to yield. A section of

artillery now came up and was immediately placed in position on our left within good range of

the enemy's guns and opened fire rapidly. Colonel Phelps came forward with his entire brigade

upon the gallop, and advanced upon the enemy's left, and Colonel Benteen brought his brigade

upon the field with similar spirit, although two of his regiments had been on duty nearly the

entire night, and advanced against the enemy's center. The Third Brigade bearing strongly to the

left at this time, the enemy gave way immediately, followed rapidly by Philips' and Benteen's

brigades, and fled with such precipitancy that it seemed improbable that he would form again

soon. My brigade having been on duty all night and engaged all the morning without anything

for horses or men to eat, by permission of the general commanding I fell to the rear to feed for a

few moments. Hardly were the horses unbridled when musketry firing was again heard beyond a

ridge to the front, which was soon followed by artillery. "To horse!" was immediately sounded,

and the brigade moved off on a gallop to the scene of conflict. Before it could reach the spot,

however, the impetuosity and gallantry of the First and Fourth Brigades had broken the enemy's

line, captured his artillery, and put him to complete rout. I moved forward rapidly and took the

advance again about three miles from the battle-field, and moved forward in line at a walk until

near the Little Osage, where the enemy had reformed under cover of thick timber and brush, at

which point I received an order from the general commanding to charge their position and move

through the timber to the open prairie beyond and there halt and reform. The brigade charged the

enemy concealed in the timber in the most gallant manner; drove him across the Little Osage and

through the timber, where we halted and reformed the line. Three full lines of the enemy were

visible within rifle-range, and the command became so eager for the fray that it seemed

impossible to restrain them, and the entire brigade charged the enemy again, without any orders,

and drove him fully four miles, killing and wounding many, capturing a number of prisoners, and

compelling the enemy to burn a large number of wagons and other property; nor would the

brigade have halted here, but the powers of nature both of men and horses had failed, and not

even the excitement of battle could keep them up longer. The Second Brigade moved on in

pursuit, and after an hour's rest my command moved forward, but could not again reach the

enemy that day, and moved to Fort Scott for subsistence, and there rested for one day. On the

morning of the 27th I left Fort Scott with my command and one section of Montgomery's battery,

under Lieutenant Smiley, with the hope of striking the enemy one more blow in the vicinity of

Newtonia or Neosho, as it was probable that he would make a short stay there to obtain supplies

before entering the desert region of Northern Arkansas. I marched sixty-two miles that day,

keeping the artillery and teams along, and reached Newtonia on the 28th about 4 p.m., having

marched 104 miles with artillery and a train in thirty-six hours. I found General Blunt heavily

engaged with the enemy, his line slowly receding, and the enemy's line extending much beyond

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his on both flanks, advancing rapidly upon the right and left. General Blunt directed me to form

upon his left, and if possible to turn the enemy's right. The horses being exhausted and the fields

intersected with stone walls and other obstacles, I was induced to dismount my command and the

regiments were ordered to advance as fast as they could dismount and form. The Sixth Cavalry

Missouri State Militia was the first to meet the advancing force of the enemy. This regiment

advanced most gallantly, and had fired two or three volleys in rapid succession, when a

triumphant cheer from the line announced that the enemy had turned and was falling back. All

the regiments of the brigade behaved with equal promptness and vigor, and the enemy was

driven back some three miles, when darkness, the flight of the enemy, and the exhaustion of our

troops closed the battle and the pursuit. During the night I received the orders of the general

commanding to proceed with my command to Springfield and assume command of my district,

and on the following morning I moved in compliance with said order.

In a campaign of greater hardships and privations for its duration than any in which I have

ever taken part, the troops of my entire command conducted themselves in the most

uncomplaining, energetic, and gallant manner. I neither saw nor heard of a single straggler

during the campaign, and the greatest effort required of me was to restrain the advance from a

general attack upon the enemy until the rear was in supporting distance. The commanders of

brigades, Colonel Philips, of the Seventh Cavalry Missouri State Militia; Colonel Beveridge, of

the Seventeenth Illinois Cavalry, and Colonel Gravely, of the Eighth Cavalry Missouri State

Militia, throughout the campaign, while under my command, conducted themselves in the most

energetic and soldierly manner, and have earned the gratitude and confidence of the country. My

staff officers--Capt. William T. Kittredge, assistant adjutant-general; Surg. H. H. Maynard,

acting medical director; Maj. A. B. Freeburn, Second Arkansas Cavalry; Capt. John G. Quinn,

Sixth Cavalry Missouri State Militia; Capt. Charles W. Rubey, Sixth Provisional Enrolled

Missouri Militia; Lieut. S. Lee Davis, Seventh Minnesota Infantry, and Lieut. D. E. Murphy,

Eighth Cavalry Missouri State Militia, my personal aides, and Lieut. George Graves, Sixth

Provisional Regiment Enrolled Missouri Militia, acting commissary of subsistence, and Lieut.

Samuel Turner, Sixth Provisional Regiment Enrolled Missouri Militia, acting quartermaster--

conducted themselves throughout the entire campaign in the most prompt, energetic, and gallant

manner.

During the campaign my brigade captured 1 piece of artillery, 250 stand of small-arms, and

800 prisoners, including those captured in the district. The casualties in my brigade during the

entire campaign were 1 officer killed and 5 officers wounded, and 9 enlisted men killed and 76

enlisted men wounded, and 1 man missing, as will appear more fully from the accompanying

lists. Reports from subordinate commanders are transmitted herewith.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN B. SANBORN,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Lieut. CLIFFORD THOMSON,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Cavalry Division.

HDQRS. EIGHTH CAVALRY MISSOURI STATE MILITIA,

Springfield, Mo., November 15, 1864.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by a detachment

of the Eighth Cavalry Missouri State Militia in the late campaign against the rebel force under

Maj. Gen. Sterling Price, from the 27th of September, 1864, to the 31st of October, 1864:

The detachment, under my command and composing a part of General Sanborn's brigade, left

Springfield, Mo., on the 27th of September, 1864, with 13 commissioned officers and 298

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enlisted men, and marched to Jefferson City, Mo., via Rolla, Cuba, Vienna, and encamped on the

Moreau, three miles from the city, October 5, 1864, and was directed to act in conjunction with

the Sixth Cavalry Missouri State Militia, as an advance post, and to resist the enemy advancing

toward the city. On the afternoon of the 6th the pickets commenced fighting two miles south of

the Moreau. The enemy was held in check, or did not attempt to advance until 6 a.m. on the 7th

of October, 1864. The Sixth Cavalry Missouri State Militia, and the Eighth Cavalry Missouri

State Militia were arranged so as to check and annoy the enemy as much as possible in their

advance. The enemy advanced their line of skirmishers about 7 a.m. and attacked Squadron C of

the Eighth Cavalry Missouri State Militia, commanded by Captain Human, who resisted them

stubbornly until ordered by me to fall back, the enemy having moved a strong column to his left

flank. The fighting commenced at this time, the Eighth Regiment being arranged one squadron in

rear of the other, and each in turn fighting the enemy until ordered to fall back. Captain Foster

had his horse killed while encouraging his men to fight at the commencement of the attack.

When overpowered and flanked by the enemy, the two squadrons (C and F) moved to the rear;

the enemy seeing that they had compelled this move ordered a charge which soon brought them

to a line formed near the edge of the timber, composed of Squadrons A, E, G, D, and K; the fight

was renewed by these squadrons with energy; the officers and men fought well, driving the

enemy's skirmish line, and again compelling him to bring up artillery to drive us from our strong

position, as had been done in their attack on Captains Human and Foster. The Eighth Cavalry

Missouri State Militia was then moved across the Moreau, and were relieved by the Sixth

Cavalry Missouri State Militia, posted so as to protect the crossing. The Eighth Regiment was

again formed on a ridge near the Fair-Ground, and again fought the enemy stubbornly for more

than one hour, assisted by the Sixth Cavalry Missouri State Militia, and in compliance with

orders the command moved into Jefferson City. On the 8th of October I was placed in command

of the troops from Southwest Missouri, leaving the Eighth Cavalry Missouri State Militia under

command of Capt. R. G. Chitwood, Company G, Eighth Cavalry Missouri State Militia.

On the 9th of October one squadron of the Eighth Cavalry Missouri State Militia, under

command of Lieutenant Chitwood, assisted Major Mitchell, Seventh Provisional Enrolled

Missouri Militia, to drive in the strong rear guard of the enemy near Russellville, Mo., seventeen

miles west of Jefferson City, and did good service. The Third Brigade was not engaged in the

battle at California on the evening of October 9, 1864. The battle at Boonville, on the 11th of

October, was fought by the Second Arkansas Cavalry and the Sixth Provisional Enrolled

Missouri Militia, only one squadron of the Eighth Cavalry Missouri State Militia, being in front

as body guard. Company F and -- did good service and acted with coolness and bravery.

On the 20th of October I was relieved from the command of the Third Brigade by General

Sanborn, and took command of my regiment. At the battle of Independence, October 22, the

Eighth Cavalry Missouri State Militia was dismounted and marched to the right of the city as a

reserve, and was not engaged during the fight. On the 23d of October, after the enemy had been

driven from the crossing of the Big Blue and formed on a prairie ridge west of the stream, my

regiment was ordered to move forward until we found the enemy's lines and halt until the army

came up. About 2 p.m. Major Suess, of Major-General Pleasonton's staff, ordered me, in

command of my own and the Sixth Regiment Cavalry Missouri State Militia, to charge the

enemy's line near a house on a prairie ridge, which was done under a most terrific [fire] from a

section of the enemy's artillery in position near the above-named house, and a heavy fire of

musketry from the enemy's line formed for the protection of the artillery. The enemy's force was

much larger than ours, but gave way, and we gained the ridge with a loss of about 25 men. Rebel

officers captured gave it as a reason for retreating that they supposed our army was moving to

their left to cut them off from the force on the Harrisonville road. This charge prevented the

33

rebels from using their artillery against the main force of our army on our right. The officers and

men of my regiment did their duty well and acted bravely on this occasion. On the 24th of

October I was ordered, about 11 p.m., to move my regiment and the Sixth Cavalry Missouri State

Militia forward until I found the enemy. When near the Marais des Cygnes, a branch of the

Osage, my advance was fired on by the enemy's pickets, who were found to be encamped on the

stream at a village called Trading Post. I halted the command and about 3 a.m. October 25 was

ordered to drive in the enemy's pickets and to attack them. I moved forward and found a strong

skirmish line formed on a mound in their rear, which I immediately attacked, and, after a spirited

contest, drove them beyond the mound. At the dawn of day we found the enemy in strong force

near the ford of the creek, and, in conjunction with the Fourth Iowa Cavalry, attacked and drove

them across the stream; this was the commencement of the battle of the Osage, October 25,

1864. After the battle was over my regiment was placed in charge of the prisoners, and delivered

them at Fort Scott about daylight October 26. On the 28th of October, 1864, we reached

Newtonia, Mo., where we found Major-General Blunt's command engaged with the enemy. I

was ordered to move my command forward rapidly and form on the left of General Blunt's

command, and aided in checking the advance of the enemy and finally driving him from the

field. From Newtonia we marched to Springfield, Mo., at which place we arrived October 31,

1864.

The following are the losses sustained by the regiment in the different engagements: In the

battle on the Moreau, October 7, 1864, 1 noncommissioned officer and 1 private killed, 1 captain

and 14 enlisted men wounded. At the Big Blue, October 23, 1864, 1 captain and 8 enlisted men

wounded. At the Marais des Cygnes, October 25, 1 enlisted man wounded. The enemy admit a

loss of 1 major and 15 men killed and 1 lieutenant-colonel and 25 men wounded at the Moreau.

The damage inflicted at other engagements estimated with losses sustained by them in the

battles.

In conclusion, I desire to return my thanks and that of my entire command to Brigadier-

General Sanborn, commanding, for his uniform kindness and the deep interest he manifested for

our welfare during the arduous campaign; and also to express our gratitude to his staff for their

attention on all occasions.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. J. GRAVELY,

Colonel Eighth Cavalry Missouri State Militia.

Capt. WILLIAM T. KITTREDGE,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Dist. of Southwest Missouri.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF NORTH MISSOURI,

Glasgow, Mo., September 27, 1864.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that on Monday, the 19th instant, I left Saint Joseph

with Companies B and M; Ninth Cavalry Missouri State Militia; Companies C and D,

Seventeenth Illinois Cavalry, and a section of mountain howitzers, Company C, Second Missouri

Artillery. I moved to Macon by railroad, and on the morning of the 21st marched from Macon,

my force having been augmented by Companies C and E, Ninth Cavalry Missouri State Militia. I

camped near Huntsville on the night of the 21st and moved thence to Roanoke, where I divided

the command, sending a portion direct to Fayette under Lieutenant-Colonel Draper, Ninth

Cavalry Missouri State Militia, and marched with the balance of the command to this post. I had

in the meantime ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Matthews, Third Cavalry Missouri State Militia, to

move his entire command from Sturgeon to Rocheport, and there establish his headquarters, and

directed Lieutenant-Colonel Stauber, Forty-second Missouri Volunteer Infantry, to move from

34

Macon to Sturgeon with three companies. I also ordered General Douglass to move from Mexico

toward Rocheport, with 200 of the First Iowa Cavalry Volunteers. The best information I could

obtain indicated that the guerrillas, under Perkins, Quantrill, Thrailkill, Todd, Anderson,

Holtzclaw, Davis, and others, were concentrating in the Perche Hills on or about the line

separating Howard and Boone Counties. I made dispositions accordingly and as secretly as

possible, and moved upon the haunts of the villains from Fayette, Glasgow, Sturgeon, and

Mexico. The guerrillas were routed from their camps and found to be about 400 strong, under

Quantrill and Perkins. On Friday evening, the 23d instant, a portion of the train of the Third

Cavalry Missouri State Militia was surprised by the guerrillas ten miles northeasterly from

Rocheport, and twelve men were brutally murdered after they had surrendered. Some of our dead

were thrown upon the burning wagons which the fiends destroyed and their bodies were partially

consumed. Our troops made but a slight resistance and fled panic-stricken from the field. They

were outnumbered by the bushwhackers four to one. Perkins, the guerrilla chief, is reported

severely wounded at this engagement. His pocket-book and papers were found scattered on the

ground of the massacre. Had Lieutenant-Colonel Matthews moved his command together we

should have been spared this disaster; although General Douglass reports to me that the colonel

ought not to be censured for his action in the premises. The guerrillas immediately scattered in

every direction. Major Leonard, Ninth Cavalry Missouri State Militia, who was moving from

Fayette to Roche-port, came upon a gang of these guerrillas, and killed 6 of them, capturing 32

horses and 30 revolvers. Our only casualty was 1 wounded. Among the dead bushwhackers was

a Captain Bissett, recently a terror in Platte and Clay Counties.

On Saturday morning the guerrillas from different points concentrated upon Fayette and

charged into the town at 10.30 a.m., yelling like demons, their advance being clad in Federal

uniform. They were properly welcomed by the small force in garrison and most handsomely

whipped after three unsuccessful attempts to dislodge our troops. Thirteen of the villains were

killed outright and -- so severely wounded that they died on Saturday night. One rebel captain,

name not known, was among the dead. Their wounded numbered 30, judging from the carriages

stolen to remove them. We are daily learning of the death of some one of the wounded. Our loss

was 1 killed and 2 wounded. I had on the same day ordered Major King, Thirteenth Cavalry

Missouri Volunteers, from this post to Fayette, with 200 well-appointed men. He arrived at

Fayette two hours after the discomfited rascals had left in the direction of Roanoke, and pushed

on after them without delay. On Sunday, the 25th instant, the brigands sat down in the front of

Huntsville, and in the name of Colonel Perkins and the Southern Confederacy demanded a

surrender. The militia stationed at Huntsville, under Lieutenant-Colonel Denny, showed fight,

and, Major King being close after the villains, they moved toward Renick, tearing down the

telegraph wires by the mile. Major King pursued them as rapidly as possible with his jaded

horses, and at last advices, 1.30 p.m. Monday, the 26th, was very near them at Middle Grove, in

Monroe County. Several stragglers from the guerrillas have been captured and summarily

mustered out. Lieutenant-Colonel Draper, with a detachment of the Ninth Cavalry Missouri State

Militia, moved from Fayette toward Renick on the 26th instant, General Douglass, with the Iowa

troops, toward Sturgeon, scouting through the Perche Hills, and' will unite or co-operate with

Major King. In several small skirmishes with the bushwhackers on Saturday and Sunday our

troops were successful in killing the buskwhackers. No better region than this could be selected

for guerrilla warfare. The topography of the country and the hearts and consciences of the people

are adapted to the hellish work. There is scarcely a family but what has its representative in

either Price's invading force or in the corps de bush. Men and women of wealth and position give

their entire influence and aid to the knights of the bush. The hand of the Government must be

35

laid heavily upon them. I shall remain in this section and on the North Missouri Railroad until

affairs are in a better condition.

I expect a full report of the Keytesville disaster to-day. Cowardice and treason combined

caused the loss of Keytesville and the brutal murder of Mr. Carman, one of the best of citizens,

and of William Young, an aged loyalist, serving faithfully as a Federal scout himself and had

three sons in the Union army. The fiends murder none but radical Union men, while

conservatives of undoubted loyalty are spared in property and person. The radicals are hunted

from their homes, and their substance appropriated and destroyed. Our troops being chiefly from

the radical portion of the community, it is with great difficulty they are restrained from

depredations upon the class favored by the bushwhackers. I will promptly and vigorously urge

the people to a response to your admirable General Orders, No. 176. You have struck the

keynote. Let the masses rise up in their strength and give an exhibition of their devotion to

loyalty and the Union, and Price will never again invade Missouri with his thieving horde. I am

placing every county court-house in as safe condition as possible, but there are so many towns to

protect, so many railway bridges, stations, and trains constantly exposed to attack, capture, and

destruction by the fiends, that we must expect serious trouble in that direction. I will keep you

posted daily of movements in the district.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CLINTON B. FISK,

Brigadier-General.

Maj. Gen. W. S. ROSECRANS,

Commanding Dept. of the Missouri, Saint Louis, Mo.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF NORTH MISSOURI,

Macon, December 8, 1864.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report that on the 30th day of September last, being then at

Glasgow, Howard County, I received a telegram from the major-general commanding, directing

me to move to Jefferson City with all possible dispatch. The troops of my command were at that

date scattered through the counties lying between the Hannibal and Saint Joseph Railroad and the

Missouri River, fighting the hordes of fiendish guerrillas who, under Anderson, Todd, Thrailkill,

Perkins, and Holtzclaw, were making a pathway of blood across the district, plundering and

burning the property of Union citizens, and destroying railway trains, depot buildings, and

bridges. Seventy commissioned officers from Price's army had already been sent into North

Missouri to gather up the recruits that had been enlisted in the rebel service during the summer.

Colonel Peery, of Carroll County, chief of the rebel recruiting party, was killed by Colonel

Shanklin, Thirtieth Enrolled Missouri Militia, on the 28th of September; three of his officers

shared his fate. Official papers taken from their dead bodies indicated their mission. Immediately

upon receiving orders to move to Jefferson City I dispatched messengers to the several

detachments of my available troops, ordering them to proceed direct to Jefferson City without

delay. Detachments of the Third and Ninth Cavalry Missouri State Militia, Seventeenth Illinois

Cavalry Volunteers, First Iowa Cavalry Volunteers, Thirty-ninth, Forty-third, and Forty-ninth

Missouri Volunteer Infantry, and one section of Company C (small howitzers), Second Missouri

Artillery, were thus ordered. Telegraph lines being destroyed and mail lines almost altogether

interrupted, orders were dispatched by messengers, who in many instances were captured by the

enemy. I arrived in Jefferson City on the night of October 3, with 200 men of my command.

During the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th other detachments of my troops arrived, aggregating 1,800, of

whom 1,000 were composed of companies of unorganized infantry regiments who had never

been drilled an hour. I found on my arrival at Jefferson City that Brigadier-General Brown

36

occupied the city and held the country to the Osage River, his force all told being 3,000, one-half

of whom were unorganized infantry volunteers, Enrolled Missouri Militia, and citizen guards. I

did not assume immediate command on arrival at Jefferson City, as telegrams from the majorgeneral

commanding indicated that himself or other officers ranking myself would speedily

arrive. I therefore directed my troops to report to General Brown for orders and devoted my

personal attention to the concentration of troops from my district at Jefferson City, and pushing

them to the work in the trenches or to the front as rapidly as possible.

On the morning of the 6th Generals McNeil and Sanborn reported from Rolla--the former

with 1,000 cavalry and eight pieces of artillery, the latter with 1,400 cavalry. The major-general

commanding telegraphed me on the 6th to assume command of the combined forces at Jefferson

City. I immediately organized the force into four brigades, under Generals Brown, McNeil, and

Sanborn, and Col. Franklin W. Hickox, Enrolled Missouri Militia. The effective strength of the

fragments of commands thus hastily thrown together from different districts of the department,

including Enrolled Missouri Militia and loyal citizens, was, of officers and men, 7,200. Generals

McNeil and Sanborn, who had for many days been in immediate proximity to the enemy,

informed me that Price's army numbered not less than 20,000 men, and that he could put 15,000

well appointed veterans and more than twenty pieces of artillery into action. The major-general

commanding had previously ordered that the State capital must be successfully defended at all

hazards. A force of 1,500, under Colonel Philips, Seventh Cavalry Missouri State Militia, was

fighting the advance of Price's army on the Osage when I assumed command. The enemy were at

that time crossing the Osage River in force at Prince's, Bolton's, and other fords, covering a space

of about eight miles in width on the routes leading to the State capital. General Sanborn's

mounted troops were resisting the advance of the enemy on the road leading from the Fair-

Ground to the Moreau and Osage. The force at the front were ordered to vigorously contest the

passage of the Osage and Moreau, and when driven to fall back fighting to the city and withdraw

to the intrenchments. General McNeil's brigade was assigned to the right, General Brown's to the

left, and General Sanborn's to the center, within our fortified lines. Colonel Hickox's brigade was

posted as a reserve. All troops not ordered to the front and the citizens of the city were busily

engaged digging rifle-pits and preparing for the best possible defense of the State capital. On the

morning of the 7th the enemy had driven our advanced lines back to the Moreau and appeared in

heavy force on its east bank, his main column on the Bolton road, and drove our troops steadily

to the Fair-Ground. Our force was all withdrawn to the intrenchments at 1 p.m. The enemy

pushed his lines to the front of our left and center and opened on our fortified lines with his

artillery from a wooded height at the left of the Fair. Ground. Thurber's battery, on the left of our

line, and Sutter's, in the center, both of the Second Missouri Artillery, simultaneously poured

their well-directed shots into the enemy's artillery, dismounting one of his pieces at the first fire.

After an exchange of a few shots, and an inspection of our earth-works, the enemy withdrew his

artillery, retired his lines, and moved his columns toward our right, with the evident design of

investing the city. During the night of the 7th our entire command were busily engaged

strengthening our earthworks, digging additional rifle-pits, and preparing to receive an assault at

any point on our line. The movements of the enemy during the night indicated his preparation to

mass his force to assault our right.

At daylight on the morning of the 8th he appeared in force in front of McNeil, but withdrew

before advancing near our earth-works. As the enemy retired and a reconnaissance to the Moreau

revealed the fact that his entire army had passed to our right, the mounted troops of Sanborn's

brigade were thrown upon his rear, killing many and capturing a large number of men and arms.

At 8 a.m. all the mounted troops of the command were ordered in pursuit of the enemy with five

days' field rations in their haversacks and 140 rounds of ammunition.

37

The capital of the State had been saved from the polluting presence of her traitorous sons in

arms. One of the chief objects of Price's invasion of Missouri, the seizure and occupancy of her

political capital for the purpose of holding elections and the transaction of other business by the

itinerating traitors who style themselves the State and legislative departments of Missouri, was,

by the courage, industry, and determination of our small force at Jefferson City, defeated; a

substantial success had been gained, and the soldiers who through one of the severest of

equinoctial storms made long and forced marches to the capital, many of them leaving their own

homes to certain destruction by the guerrillas, and the citizens who so cheerfully and earnestly

seized spade or musket for its defense, deserve and will receive the gratitude of the loyalists of

Missouri. I have the honor to bear full and hearty testimony to the conduct of all officers and

men and citizens for their faithful service.

The reports of Generals Brown, McNeil, and Sanborn, forwarded direct to department

headquarters, will give tabular statements of losses in killed and wounded,. and list of prisoners

lost and captured.

At 10.30 a.m. on the morning of the 8th Major-General Pleasonton arrived at Jefferson City,

and in obedience to orders from the major-general commanding assumed command.

I have the honor to be, colonel, with great respect, your obedient servant,

CLINTON B. FISK,

Brigadier-General.

Col. JOHN V. DU BOIS,

Chief of Staff, Dept. of the Missouri, Saint Louis.

ROCHEPORT, September 24, 1864.

Colonel Matthews' escort of eighty men for baggage train was surprised late yesterday

evening seven miles northeast from this place. Twelve of his men were killed on the ground and

quite a number are yet missing. The entire train, consisting of quartermaster and commissary

stores and all his ammunition, was captured. The rebels were said to be commanded by the two

Todds, Anderson, and Gooch, numbering 300 men. On receiving news of the fight, I sent the

First Iowa and part of the Third Missouri to the scene of action. They arrived in the night and

remained on the ground, and Colonel Draper having arrived I ordered him out at 3 o'clock this

morning with 250 men, making the whole Federal force about 350. The rebels moved west into

Howard County toward the river. We are out of commissary supplies send us some by first boat.

J. B. DOUGLASS,

Brigadier-General.

Brigadier-General FISK.

FAYETTE, September 25, 1864--11 a.m.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that I left Rocheport this morning with 550 men,

consisting of the First Iowa, Seventeenth Illinois, Third and Ninth Missouri State Militia. After

seeing your letter to Colonel Matthews, in which you stated that you would leave Glasgow and

move toward Rocheport, I determined to remain here until I heard from you, but later news

received just before night, in which it was reported that this place had been captured by

Thrailkill, Todd, Anderson & Co., and was in their possession, I determined to move early this

morning with my entire force and give them battle; but on my arrival here I was happily

disappointed in the result of the engagement of yesterday, and from what little information I have

been able to gather up our troops acted bravely and well, losing 1 man killed and 2 wounded.

There are five dead rebels on the ground besides others said to be carried off, and quite a large

number wounded. I will remain here until I hear from you, unless I can learn of some movement

38

of the rebels which it is important to meet at once. I would be happy to receive orders from you

by return messenger. My command are anxious to meet the enemy and get revenge for the

wanton massacre of the Third Missouri State Militia. Colonel Matthews should not be censured

for the disaster, as he had taken, as he thought, all necessary precautions to insure its safe arrival,

and on my arrival at Rocheport, and learning from Colonel Matthews that his baggage train

would be in that day, I ordered him to send out thirty cavalry to meet them, and they had just met

them when the fight took place. The rebels burned all the train except the commissary and

ammunition wagons, which, strange to say, were not destroyed, and we now have them in our

possession. We lost 12 men killed, the bodies of whom have been found, and 3 negroes

(teamsters). All the soldiers were shot in the head, showing that they had been murdered after

being captured. Captain Roberts and Captain McFaden are yet out, and fears are entertained that

they have been killed. I would like to have the fifty men of First Iowa Cavalry to join me before

leaving this part of the county.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. DOUGLASS,

Brigadier-General.

P. S.--I have the pocketbook of Colonel Perkins, found on the battleground of the disaster to

Third Missouri State Militia, and I am inclined to think he was mortally wounded.

J. B. D.,

Brigadier-General.

Brig. Gen. C. B. FISK,

Glasgow, Mo.

HEADQUARTERS SAINT LOUIS DISTRICT,

Saint Louis, October 20, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the night of the 24th of September the major-general

commanding, having learned that Price's army had entered the department by way of Poplar

Bluffs and Bloomfield, ordered me to take a brigade of the Second Division, Sixteenth Army

Corps, which was then at Jefferson Barracks, and patrol and garrison the Iron Mountain

Railroad, reporting to Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith, who was to follow next day with the other brigades

of the division. At De Soto, leaving the rest of the brigade to await further orders from General

Smith, I went on with the Fourteenth Iowa Infantry, strengthening the garrisons at all the bridges

and making temporary headquarters at Mineral Point. From each station where there was

cavalry I sent scouting parties east and south, which returned by Monday morning, reporting no

enemy north of Fredericktown. They brought, however, apparently credible rumors that Price

was at Fredericktown with all his army. At 10 Monday morning I took Companies B, C, D, E,

and H, Fourteenth Iowa Infantry, under Captain Campbell, and went to Pilot Knob. Maj. James

Wilson, Third Missouri State Militia Cavalry, then commanded the Third Sub-District of this

district, with headquarters at that post. He had under orders withdrawn his outposts from

Patterson, Centreville, Fredericktown, and Farmington, and collected at Pilot Knob all the

available force of his sub-district, except bridge guards. The force there present consisted of

Companies A, F, E, G, H, and I, Forty-seventh Missouri Infantry, and Captain Lindsay's

company, Fiftieth Missouri Infantry, which were raw troops, with an aggregate of 489 officers

and men for duty, and Companies A, C, D, H, I, and K, Third Missouri State Militia Cavalry;

Company L, Second Missouri State Militia Cavalry; Company G, First Missouri State Militia

Infantry, and Captain Montgomery's battery, which, with the detachment of the Fourteenth Iowa,

made an aggregate of old troops for duty of 562. My instructions from Major-General Rosecrans

were to have Major Wilson endeavor to hold Pilot Knob against any mere detachment of the

39

enemy, but to evacuate if Price's main army should move against it. The village of Pilot Knob,

which is the terminus of the railroad and the depot for supply of the lower outposts, is eighty-six

miles south of Saint Louis. It lies in a plain of about 1,000 acres, encircled by Cedar and Rock

Mountains on the north, Pilot Knob on the east, and Shepherd's Mountain, stretching around the

valley, on the south and west. Each hill is from 500 to 600 feet in height, and rises abruptly from

the valley, with the sides toward it covered with rocks, gnarled oaks, and undergrowth. The

southern and western slopes of Shepherd's Mountain are accessible, and several roads lead over

them to "the coalings" on its summit. Stout's Creek flows along the base of Shepherd's Mountain

and through a gap between it and Pilot Knob into a larger valley of several thousands of acres,

encircled by a chain of hills, in the northern end of which and about a mile from the town of Pilot

Knob is the flourishing village of Ironton. Through this gap runs the road from Pilot Knob to

Fredericktown, passing out of the larger valley by the "Shut-in," a gap four miles southeast of

Pilot Knob. The two valleys are called Arcadia.

Fort Davidson is a hexagonal work, mounting four 32-pounder siege guns and three 24-

pounder howitzers en barbette. It lies about 300 yards from the base of the knob and 1,000 from

the gap. From the fort to the remotest summit of these hills visible from it is not over 1,200

yards, while all parts of the hill-sides toward the fort, except the west end of Shepherd's

Mountain, are in musket-range. The fort was always conceded to be indefensible against any

large army having serviceable artillery. Early last summer I sent competent engineers to select

another site, but such are the difficulties of the position no practicable place could be found any

more defensible. I therefore had the roads leading up the hills obstructed, cleared the nearest hillsides

of timber, and put the fort in a thorough state of defense by deepening the ditches,

strengthening the parapet, and adding two rifle-pits leading north and south, commanding the

best approaches. On reaching Pilot Knob at noon of Monday, September 26, I found scouting

parties had been sent the night before on all the main roads, but that the party sent toward

Fredericktown had returned after going but six or eight miles. I forthwith sent two companies to

make a thorough reconnaissance toward Fredericktown, and a small scouting party under

Captain Powers to cross the roads leading from the south to that place, and learn of the loyal

people on them as much as possible as to the force of the enemy. Both commands met Price's

advance in Arcadia Valley, near Shut-in Gap, and were forced back into the town of Ironton,

where, with Captain Dinger's company, Forty- seventh Missouri, then on duty there, they made a

stand. I re-enforced them with the detachment of the Fourteenth Iowa, Captain Campbell

commanding, and a section of Montgomery's battery, Lieutenant Simonton commanding, and all

my available cavalry, placing the whole under command of Major Wilson, with orders to drive

the enemy, if possible, through Shut-in Gap. He drove them to the gap, but was unable to hold

them there, and was being forced back gradually when night and a rain-storm suspended the

engagement. By midnight it was evident that the enemy were in strong force, as their column

could be heard coming into the valley in steady procession, and their encampment grew

extensive. We still did not know positively that Price's main army was there, though all our

information was decidedly to that effect. But the advantages of delaying the enemy two or three

days in his march northward and of making a stubborn fight before retreating were so great, even

though the defense should be unsuccessful and much of the garrison be lost, that I resolved to

stand fast and take the chances. I immediately forwarded up the railroad all the quartermaster and

commissary stores not needed in the fort, and all the rolling-stock, and started the quartermaster's

wagons empty. Details were set at work constructing in the fort six platformed barbettes for the

field artillery, four pieces of which were taken into it. Lieut. David Murphy, Forty-seventh

Missouri Volunteers, a most gallant officer and experienced artillerist, was assigned to duty on

my staff as aide- de- camp and given general control of the artillery. Major-General Smith,

40

whose immediate command was at De Soto and Mineral Point, was kept fully advised by

telegraph of my information, movements, and purposes, until 11 o'clock Tuesday forenoon,

when the line went down.

At daylight Tuesday the enemy forced Wilson back through Arcadia Valley to the gap

between Shepherd's Mountain and Pilot Knob. While they were trying to force the gap I ordered

the detachment of the Fourteenth Iowa to take position on the east end of Shepherd's Mountain,

and ordered Wilson to fall back with his cavalry along the side of Pilot Knob, thus commanding

the gap from both sides and opening a clear range from the fort. Wilson soon sent me word that

the enemy were displaying a flag of truce. I knew it was a trick to effect a safe passage of the gap

while parleying about a surrender, and therefore ordered him to renew the fight at once. A long

and obstinate struggle followed in which the enemy lost considerably in an unsuccessful effort to

pass the defile. During an hour of comparative quiet which followed they threw a force around

Shepherd's Mountain and approached from the west, but that approach was too greatly exposed

and they were driven from it by our artillery, aided by two companies of skirmishers. An hour

more and my troops were summarily ejected from the points commanding the gap, the enemy

following them along the hill-sides in strong force. When they had well advanced we opened on

them with all our guns and drove them back in disorder and with heavy loss. We retook the gap,

were again forced from it, and again with artillery drove them from the hill-sides. They got two

pieces in position on the east end of Shepherd's Mountain commanding a part of the side of Pilot

Knob, which being equally commanded from the fort became neutral ground. We still held with

skirmishers the sides of Shepherd's Mountain except the gap, and the side of Pilot Knob not

raked by their artillery. After an hour of lull, lines of the enemy were seen at exposed points on

the summits of the two hills moving down; and almost before we could open fire on them

another white flag was raised on a rock near the summit of Shepherd's Mountain where a group

of officers had been taking observations under shelter. With the opening of a brisk cannonade on

the group the flag was hauled down. The design was plainly to suspend the firing so that their

forces might approach to the assault in safety. I now ordered into the fort the section of artillery

operating outside, but the horses stampeded and could not be got in. The section remained under

cover of our fire, however, and was brought in before dark. Here the enemy opened on us with

two guns from the summit of Shepherd's Mountain at about 800 yards, and two from the side at a

less distance. The guns were well covered and we could not silence them, the two nearest getting

and keeping our range exactly. The division on Shepherd's Mountain was Marmaduke's, which,

on the withdrawal of the white flag and the opening of their artillery, moved rapidly down to the

assault, his line greatly broken by the rugged and steep descent, and by our fire, which told with

marked effect upon them. On reaching the plain the most of the assaulting force took cover in the

deep bed of the creek, from which they opened and kept up an incessant fire. About 100 ventured

on to the assault but fell or were driven back before they reached the ditch. Almost

simultaneously with the movement of Marmaduke's division, that of General Fagan moved over

Pilot Knob in stronger force, and less disturbed by our fire sweeping back in disorder or cutting

off our companies which held the town and part of the mountain sides. His lines were greatly

broken by the houses and fences of the skirt of the town, but were hastily reformed by him and

by General Cabell, who led the assault, and swept upon the plain in handsome style, yelling and

on the double-quick. We opened on them when at 600 yards from the fort with musketry from

the ramparts and from the long line of the north rifle-pits, and with canister from seven pieces of

artillery. They rushed on most gallantly, but were broken, confused, and swept down by our

rapid and well-directed fire until the advance reached the ditch, when the attacking forces fled in

dismay, leaving apparently almost half their comrades dead or wounded on the plain. Pending

the assaults the enemy threw a large cavalry force around the west end of Shepherd's Mountain

41

to occupy the road north of us to Mineral Point. As they moved along the base of Cedar

Mountain just after the last assault was repulsed, a sortie was made from the north ditch by

which they were routed and lost considerably. A half hour of ineffective musketry and artillery

firing ended the engagement with the approach of night.

An examination of prisoners that evening convinced me that Price was there with about

12,000 men and ten pieces of artillery, Shelby's division with eight pieces having gone from

Fredericktown to Farmington. I had found myself unable with my force intact to hold the

mountain sides so as to prevent his planting artillery there. My command was now reduced onefourth

in effective strength, as I had lost 75 killed and wounded and in our possession, and

double that number missing. I knew that the next morning the enemy having possession of the

mountain tops and sides would place all his artillery in position to command the fort, which

would make it certainly untenable. That morning, at the time when telegraphic communication

ended, two infantry regiments of Major-General Smith's command were at Mineral Point,

twenty-three miles north of us, and four miles east of Potosi. I thought they were probably there

still and that by getting a good start we could effect a junction with them and fall back or stand as

the movement and force of the enemy might permit. I therefore determined to evacuate that

night. The chief danger was that the preparations for the retreat might be observed and the

garrison cut to pieces or captured in the confusion incident to the exit. The works of the iron

company at the north base of Pilot Knob had been fired by the enemy and the immense pile of

charcoal adjacent to the works glowed and flamed all night, making the valley as light as

noonday. Moreover, I learned Colonel Slay-back's command held the Mineral Point road just

north of the town, leaving the Potosi road the only exit not certainly in the possession of the

enemy. But, with all its dangers, the policy of retreat was clearly best, and preparations for it

began at midnight. I had Colonel Fletcher arrange for having the magazine (which was large and

filled with every variety of ammunition) blown up in two hours after we left, or as soon as our

exit should be discovered by the enemy. We took possession of the town and valley and drove

from them all straggling rebels. The garrison was then aroused, knapsacks packed, haversacks,

and cartridge-boxes well supplied and everything destructible, which we could not take away and

the enemy might use, placed near or on the magazine. At 3 o'clock Colonel Fletcher silently led

the infantry out of the sally port around the ditch, and through the north rifle pit, forming them

under cover of a deep shadow at the end of the pit. The drawbridge was then covered with tents

to muffle the sound, and the cavalry and battery marching out formed column with the infantry

and took a by-way to the Potosi road. We left Slayback's camp on our right and another rebel

camp near the road on our left, both unapprised of our movement. The body of the rebel army

was at Ironton and thinking us sufficiently hemmed in were busy making fascines and scaling

ladders for an assault in the morning. They even failed to take the hint when the magazine, an

hour before daylight, shook the hills with its explosion. At sunrise I started Captain Hills, Tenth

Kansas, acting aide-de-camp, with ten men to Mineral Point to acquaint the command there of

my approach and request it to march and join me. On starting, they, with our advance, fell upon

about twenty-five rebels in the town of Caledonia and routed them, killing one. We then learned

that our forces had fallen back from Mineral Point and that Shelby had taken Potosi the evening

before, and I therefore at once left the Potosi road and took that through Webster toward Rolla.

I afterward learned that after his repulse Tuesday Price ordered Shelby's division down from

Potosi to Pilot Knob, to take part in a second attack, and that the squad we routed at Caledonia

was Shelby's advance. He waited several hours with his division to give us battle two miles north

of Caledonia, thus giving us a good start on the Webster road before pursuing. Marmaduke's

division left Pilot Knob at 8 that morning to overtake us and joined Shelby in the pursuit at

Caledonia. At sundown we reached Webster, thirty-one miles from Pilot Knob, and rested until

42

midnight. From information received there I determined to go to Harrison, Leasburg, on the

southwest branch of the Pacific Railroad, because part of Colonel Warmoth's militia regiment

was there, but especially because the road to Rolla was one on which we could be easily

surrounded by a superior cavalry force, while that to Harrison led nearly all the way along a

sharp spur of the Ozark range, separating the waters of the Huzza and the Courtois, and through

the gorge of the Huzza, walled in with untraversable cliffs, to Rolla was fifty-five miles, to

Harrison thirty-five. I here sent Captain Hills, with ten men in advance, to Franklin with

instructions to telegraph thence to the major-general commanding at Saint Louis and to General

McNeil at Rolla of our movements and to arrange means for securing our safe and speedy

withdrawal from Harrison to Rolla or Saint Louis.

The night was intensely dark and stormy and we groped our way with great effort and little

progress. We had just reached the ridge at 8 Thursday morning, when the enemy charged on our

rear guard and drove it upon the column. I placed the detachment of the Fourteenth Iowa

Infantry, Company H, Forty-seventh Missouri, Companies C, D, and K, Third Missouri State

Militia Cavalry, and Lieutenant Smiley's section of artillery, in the rear, all under the command

of Major Williams, Tenth Kansas, acting aide-de-camp, and; with occasional halts to rake the

woods with grape and canister, we made a good and successful march, the enemy almost

constantly engaged with our rear guard, but unable to break through or flank it until we came

within four miles of Harrison. There the road debouches on a high sweep of gently rolling

woodland and from that out we fought hard for every step we gained. The refugees, men,

women, and children, white and black, who clung to the command, nearly sacrificed it by their

panics. I had to throw out the available fighting force, infantry and cavalry, as advance and rear

guard and flankers, leaving in the body of the column the affrighted non-combatants, and two

sections of artillery not often brought into action on the retreat. Repeated and stubborn efforts

were made to bring us to a stand, and could they have forced a halt of an hour they would have

enveloped and taken us, but our halts, though frequent, were brief, and were only to unlimber the

artillery, stagger the pursuers with a few rounds, and move on. We reached Harrison just after

dark, having made the march of sixty-six miles in thirty-nine hours. We found Warmoth's militia

gone. This station is thirty-five miles from Rolla, forty-five from Franklin, and eighty-two from

Saint Louis. The position is naturally strong, being on the crest of a ridge, with no timber to

obstruct the range for 200 yards on either side. A cut for the railroad track gave shelter for the

horses. A large number of ties were there, of which the militia had made breast-works, and the

adjacent buildings were well situated for purposes of defense. My command had just time to

form and the artillery to unlimber, when an assault was made, but aided by darkness and our rude

defenses we repulsed it. Just then the eastern train arrived with military stores for Rolla, and cars

enough to move my command. We got the command aboard and were about to start for Saint

Louis, with the cavalry and artillery horses moving on a parallel road, when the nearest stations

north and south of us were seen in flames. The command was at once taken off the cars and the

night spent in fortifying.

At daybreak Friday the enemy appeared in force and prepared apparently for an assault. They

kept up a demonstration through the day, accompanied with a heavy fire of skirmishers, which

was well replied to from our defenses. Having less than thirty rounds to the gun we used our

artillery but little, reserving it for the moment of assault, or the emergencies of a farther retreat.

The day passed in instant expectation of an attack in force and in unremitting labor on the

defenses, which were extended and strengthened, so they grew formidable. Friday night another

assault was repulsed and the night passed in snatches of rest, amid hourly and most harassing

alarms. Hearing nothing of re-enforcements I at midnight dispatched a citizen messenger to Rolla

to ask help from there, and Lieutenant-Colonel Maupin to Franklin, to advise the general

43

commanding of my condition and to endeavor to bring some mounted militia from Franklin

County to my aid if nothing better could be done, my now total want of service-able cavalry and

the exhausted condition of my infantry having made a farther retreat an extremely hazardous

undertaking. The citizen got to Rolla, but Lieutenant-Colonel Maupin and Captain Schenck, and

Lieutenant Fletcher, who accompanied him, could not accomplish their errand and barely

escaped capture. Saturday morning the enemy appeared in increased force, thoroughly

reconnoitered our position, and made every disposition for assault, but the forenoon passed in an

incessant fire with their skirmishers and constant expectation of an attack in force. I think our

thorough readiness and plain purpose to fight it out made him feel we would cost more than our

worth. He drew off at 2 p.m. and at 4 Lieutenant-Colonel Beveridge, Seventeenth Illinois

Cavalry, with 500 men of his command, came to our rescue from General McNeil at Rolla.

Strong cavalry pickets were at once posted on four roads occupied by the enemy north of our

encampment, and were pushed out more than a mile. At midnight, leaving a hundred men to

occupy Harrison and re-enforce the pickets if necessary, and to destroy the few stores left in the

train unissued, I withdrew my command and marched for Rolla. On arriving at Saint James,

twelve miles from Rolla, at noon Sunday, the infantry were sent to that post by railroad. Next

day I turned over my infantry and cavalry, worn out with toil and watching, to General McNeil,

to garrison Rolla, whereupon he marched with his cavalry and that of General Sanborn and my

battery to the defense of Jefferson City. Tuesday I got an escort of forty men and passing in the

rear of the enemy reached Saint Louis with the members of my staff Wednesday night.

Our loss at Pilot Knob was about 200 killed, wounded, and missing, and in the several

engagements on the retreat to Rolla about 150. Of the missing the most were cut off in

detachments and escaped capture, so that our actual loss was about 150 killed and wounded, and

50 captured and paroled. Among our severely wounded were Lieut. Smith Thompson,

Fourteenth Iowa; Lieut. John Fessler, First Infantry Missouri State Militia, and Lieut. John

Braden, Fourteenth Iowa Infantry, since dead; Maj. James Wilson, Third Cavalry Missouri State

Militia, after being wounded was captured on Pilot Knob, and subsequently with six of his

gallant men was brutally murdered by order of a rebel field officer of the day. The rebel loss at

Pilot Knob, killed and wounded, exceeded 1,500, as is shown by the inclosed letter of T. W.

Johnson, surgeon in charge of our hospital there, and also by corroborative testimony gathered

since our reoccupation of the post. In the rebel hospital at Ironton, on the 12th instant, we found

Colonel Thomas, chief of General Fagan's staff, 3 majors, 7 captains, 12 lieutenants, and 204

enlisted men, representing seventeen regiments and four batteries, all dangerously and nearly all

mortally wounded. The rest of the rebel wounded who were not able to follow the army were

sent south by General Price, under escort of Colonel Rains' regiment. As to the loss of the enemy

in the pursuit and at Harrison I have no knowledge.

To the officers commanding the several detachments, to wit, Col. Thomas C. Fletcher, Fortyseventh

Missouri Infantry; Capt. William J. Campbell, Fourteenth Iowa Infantry; Capt. William

C. F. Montgomery, Second Missouri Artillery; Lieut. John Fessler, First Infantry Missouri State

Militia; Capt. Robert L. Lindsay, Fiftieth Missouri Infantry; Capt. A. P. Wright, Second Cavalry

Missouri State Militia, and also to Maj. H. H. Williams, Tenth Kansas; Capt. Charles S. Hills,

Tenth Kansas; Capt. H. B. Milks, Third Cavalry Missouri State Militia; Lieut. David Murphy,

Forty-seventh Missouri Infantry, and Surg. S. D. Carpenter, of my staff, I am indebted for an

intelligent and thorough discharge of duty which contributed largely to our success. Nearly an

hundred citizens of Pilot Knob and Ironton (among whom were General McCormick, Colonel

Lindsay, Captain Leeper, Major Emerson, and other well known gentlemen), organized and

commanded by Capt. P. F. Lonergan, First Infantry Missouri State Militia., fought and worked

well. A colored man named Charles Thurston, organized and commanded a company of negroes,

44

who eagerly bore their share of labor and danger. I owe it to the cherished memory of Major

Wilson, to add in conclusion an honorable mention of his name, not only because of the nerve

and skill with which for two days preceding the assault he embarrassed and delayed the

overwhelming forces of the enemy, but also because of his long and useful service in this district

unblemished by a fault.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOMAS EWING, JR.,

Brigadier-General.

Col. J. V. DU BOIS,

Chief of Staff, Headquarters Dept. of the Missouri.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 189.

HDQRS. DEPT. OF THE MISSOURI,

Saint Louis, Mo., October 6, 1864.

With pride and pleasure the commanding general notices the gallant conduct of Brig. Gen.

Thomas Ewing, jr., and his command, in the defense of Pilot Knob, and in the subsequent retreat

to Rolla. With scarcely 1,000 effective men they repulsed the attacks of Price's invading army,

and successfully retreated with their battery a distance of 100 miles, in the face of a pursuing and

assailing cavalry force of five times their number. Such conduct deserves imitation, particularly

when contrasted with the cowardly conduct of the troops at Osage bridge. The general

commanding presents his hearty thanks and congratulations to Col. Thomas C. Fletcher, Fortyseventh

Missouri Volunteers; Maj. James Wilson, Third Cavalry Missouri State Militia; Capt.

Robert L. Lindsay, Fiftieth Missouri Volunteers; Capt. William J. Campbell, Company K,

Fourteenth Iowa Volunteers; Capt. W. C. F. Montgomery, Second Missouri Artillery; Capt. A. P.

Wright, Second Cavalry Missouri State Militia; Lieut. John Fessler, First Infantry Missouri State

Militia, and the officers and men under their command. They have deserved well of their

country. The general commanding desires also publicly to recognize the courage and efficiency

of Lieut. Col. Amos W. Maupin, Forty-seventh Missouri Volunteers; Maj. H. H. Williams, Tenth

Kansas Volunteers; Capt. Charles S. Hills, Tenth Kansas Volunteers; Capt. H. B. Milks, Third

Cavalry Missouri State Militia; Capt. P. F. Lonergan, First Infantry Missouri State Militia; and

First Lieut. David Murphy, adjutant Forty-seventh Missouri Volunteers. Under such

commanders Federal troops should always march to victory.

By command of Major-General Rosecrans:

FRANK ENO,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

BATTLE OF THE OSAGE; OCTOBER 25, 1864.

Mine Creek, a branch of the Osage, and the Osage at this point, are small streams several

miles apart, both skirted with timber and surrounded by open prairie country. After the affair of

Trading Post, considerable delay and consequent separation of troops had occurred at the

crossing of the Marais des Cygnes. While General Sanborn halted to breakfast his brigade

General Pleasonton led the advance, consisting mainly of Colonels Benteen's and Philips'

brigades, in rapid farther pursuit of the enemy. About three miles from Trading Post the enemy

formed on the north side of Mine Creek and made stubborn resistance. The brigade of Colonel

Philips, composed of Missouri troops, came into line of battle and commenced firing at long

range, his men displaying good discipline and great gallantry. Colonel Ben-teen, whose brigade

comprised Iowa, Indiana, and other troops, came up on the left of this line. Meantime the heavy

roar of cannon induced me to hurry forward my own escort, with two little howitzers and other

45

artillery, at the utmost speed. Colonel Benteen met some of my staff officers on his arrival at the

left, who suggested an immediate cavalry charge. The colonel had already resolved on this

movement, and only waited for the same order to be communicated to Colonel Philips. Major

Weed conveyed the order to Colonel Philips. Colonel Benteen's brigade came into line in a

moment and dashed against the enemy's right, outflanking and surrounding it, gaining position

on and beyond the creek. Colonel Philips also, with his brigade, moved quickly upon the enemy,

so as to surround or overpower a large detachment of them, who immediately surrendered as

prisoners of war (among them were two rebel generals, Marmaduke and Cabell), killing another

(General Graham), and many colonels and other officers, and taking altogether 500 or 600 men.

General Pleasonton, being in command of the advance, had directed the general movement and

took an active part in the field. General Lane, Colonel Blair, Colonel Crawford, Colonel Roberts,

Major Weed, Major McKenny, Major Hunt, and Major Curtis, of my volunteer and regular staff,

and Captain Hinton and others of General Blunt's staff, were also very active in the field on this

occasion, which occupied perhaps thirty minutes.

I directed Colonel Blair, who presented General Marmaduke to me as a prisoner of war, to

turn him over to Lieutenant-Colonel Sears, Eighteenth U.S. Colored Troops, whom I directed to

act as provost-marshal and take charge of the prisoners. I also detailed a regiment of Missouri

troops to take charge of them, soon after informing General Sanborn and General Pleasonton of

the detail. All this transpired as we moved forward, crossing Mine Creek, and while the advance

was still skirmishing with the enemy. The rear brigades were also coming up at full speed and

the enemy again forming on a hill about a mile in front. This point he soon abandoned, and we

halted to form and close up our extended lines. After our rear brigades came near the whole force

advanced with caution in two lines, our skirmishers pressing the enemy beyond the ridge which

divides Mine Creek and Osage. He now formed on the Osage, and the rear of our troops still

being far behind, although I had repeatedly sent orders to hurry them up, I mentioned the matter

to General Pleasonton as somewhat remarkable. He told me General McNeil seemed

insubordinate or neglectful of his orders and did not come forward as directed. His brigade being

in front of General Blunt's division any delay by General McNeil also delayed all the Kansas

troops. I then sent my adjutant, Major Chariot, with a special order, which brought forward the

brigade of General McNeil at the utmost speed of his horses. On reporting to me the general said

his delay was no fault of his, and it was evident General Pleasonton's orders had never reached

him, which caused some misunderstanding. And he further assured me that I would find him

ready to obey all orders as promptly as possible. I directed him to deploy as quick as possible

and take the advance, which he did with great success. I also told him to continue to report to

General Pleasonton, who commanded the division. Before this occurred, the skirmish line

reporting to me as broken down from fatigue, General Sanborn, at my instance, had changed

them by placing Colonel Cloud, of my staff, with some of the Second Kansas Volunteers, on this

duty. Entering fields and forests Colonel Cloud continued the skirmishing to the valley of the

Osage and beyond the stream. Meantime General McNeil, with his brigade, soon broke the lines

of the rebels that had extended for miles on the heights beyond the Osage, and after about an

hour's fighting in corn-fields and timber, where our troops manifested great gallantry in repeated

charges, the enemy again broke in great disorder, scattering arms, utensils, wagons, and all kinds

of equipments over the field. General Blunt's division came up rapidly about the close of this

battle of the Osage and began to deploy, but the flight of the enemy was so rapid I could not get

all the troops in line before it was necessary to resume the march in column. All this conflict

between Mine Creek and Osage, and including the fighting at both streams, occupied some two

hours or more, and as the accompanying map will show you, extended over several miles of

onward march.

46

Being mostly a prairie country the troops of both armies were in full view, and the rapid

onward movement of the whole force presented the most extensive, beautiful, and animated view

of hostile armies I have ever witnessed. Spread over vast prairies, some moving at full speed in

column, some in double lines, and others as skirmishers, groups striving in utmost efforts, and

shifting as occasion required, while the great clouds of living masses moved steadily southward,

presented a picture of prairie scenery such as neither man nor pencil can delineate.

I present extracts from the reports of my comrades who mingled bravely in the great

panorama, showing some of the details of this eventful struggle.

Colonel Blair, now acting on my staff, after detailing his movements at or near Marais des

Cygnes, [says]:

I here fell in with Major Weed, of your staff, and Surgeon Walgamott, and we advanced in

front of the left of our line. On an eminence in rear of where their last line of battle was formed

we came across an abandoned wagon, the first I had seen since the burning ones south of their

camp. Finding a lot of books, letters, and papers of various kinds in the wagon we stopped a few

minutes to make a hasty examination of the contents, and on resuming our forward movement I

observed that the brigade on our right was some distance past us although we were still in

advance of the one on our end of the line. Arriving on the table-land, which forms the summit

level between the Marais des Cygnes and Osage, we again saw the enemy's line, and at this time

it was evident he was in full force, although his whole line was not visible, his right being behind

the brow of a hill which descended into Mine Creek. Meanwhile the gallant brigade on our right

was steadily advancing, with skirmishers well out, though brought to a check, apparently

unsupported, in the face of this overwhelming force. The artillery was playing with great rapidity

and considerable effect. I looked at the enemy's line, close, serried, and vomiting fire; I looked at

the dauntless little brigade which was unflinching and steadfast in its front, and then turned to the

rear, and it seemed a fearful distance to the head of the supporting column. I called Major Weed's

attention to the situation, and he galloped to the rear to hurry forward re-enforcements, as it was

evident here the battle was to be fought and the desperate issue joined on which the fate of the

south tier of Kansas at least depended. Advancing alone to see if possible how far the right

extended behind the cover of the hill, the bursting in the air and the tearing up of the earth soon

satisfied me that they were firing canister at an enemy that they supposed was advancing on their

right and hidden from view by the acclivity immediately in their front. This conviction on their

part, I am satisfied, saved the brigade on our right, as a rapid and vigorous advance at that time

would either have overwhelmed or utterly put it to rout. I moved to the right to get out of the

sweep of the canister and then advanced till their extreme right was developed to view, and then

rode rapidly to the rear with a tolerably full understanding of the situation. Meeting Colonel

Crawford but a short distance back I explained matters to him very hastily, told him they had

commenced canister-firing, and urged him to go back and hurry up the troops, as he was

acquainted with most of the brigade officers of General Pleasonton's division and I had no

acquaintance whatever with any of them. He agreed to do so and again started to the rear. I then

moved off to the brigade on our right, and when I arrived there found it engaged at long range

and halted for our other troops to come up in line. The enemy's artillery was playing on this line

with fearful effect and we had nothing but musketry to reply, but the men were steady and selfpossessed

and perfectly easy under the fire. I don't know how long it was before the other

brigade came up. To me it seemed a long time, and I had ridden from this brigade back toward

the enemy's right once or twice before it came up. When it did come on line the whole command

advanced to short range, and for a time the fire was incessant and terrific. Both lines seemed like

walls of adamant---one could not advance; the other would not recede. The crash of musketry,

the scream of shell, the hissing sound of canister and balls, mingled with the shouts of the

47

soldiers and the cries of the wounded, set off, too, by the walls of fire in front and girdles of steel

behind, which marked both lines, formed a scene more easily remembered than described.

During this terrible conflict I passed along the whole line and met your gallant staff officers

everywhere, counseling, encouraging, exhorting, and commanding, and the tenor of the whole

was " Charge!" It was evident that our only safety was in a successful charge by which we might

capture the guns. At length the movement commenced, slowly at first but increasing in velocity

until it swept on resistless as an avalanche. A rush, a scramble, and all was over. The guns were

captured, the enemy broken and flying to the rear, while our victorious squadrons were in almost

breathless pursuit. So rapidly was this accomplished that when our left pushed forward into a

field on the south side of the ravine the shell from our own artillery was crashing right into their

midst. I was to the right of this, but so close that I could see this result, and also see Captain

Hinton, of General Blunt's staff, in the midst of our victorious line. Pushing rapidly forward I

witnessed the capture of Major-General Marmaduke by Corpl. James Dunlavy, of Company D,

Third Iowa Cavalry. Marmaduke was endeavoring to rally his men and Dunlavy was galloping

toward him, occasionally firing at him. Marmaduke evidently mistook him for one of his own

men and started toward him, reproving him for firing on his friends. At least I so judged from

what I could see and hear, and so the boy afterward told me. The boy stopped and coolly waited

until Marmaduke got within twenty or thirty rods of him, then covered him with his carbine and

ordered him to dismount and surrender or he would fire. Marmaduke dismounted and his horse

galloped off. Seeing that I was an officer the boy proposed to turn him over to me, but I declined

being bothered with a prisoner. General Marmaduke then said: "Sir, you are an officer. I claim

protection at your hands. I am a general officer--General Marmaduke." I then took charge of him

and informed him that I would protect him until delivered to you as a prisoner of war, at which

he seemed very much relieved. The boy then spoke up and said, "Colonel, remember I took him

prisoner; I am James Dunlavy, corporal of Company D, Third Iowa Cavalry." I told the boy (who

was severely wounded in the right forearm, but who still grasped his pistol with vigor and

energy) to come along also, and he should have the honor of being introduced to you as the

captor of Marmaduke. On the way General Marmaduke complained of being dismounted, and

Dunlavy promptly apologized, saying, " If I had known you were a general officer I should have

allowed you to remain on horseback." Marmaduke then informed me that he was very faint and

weak and could not walk much farther. Meeting a soldier with a led horse I took charge of him

and mounted my prisoner. Soon after this I met Major McKenny, of your staff, and proffered to

turn the prisoner over to him, but he was too intent on getting to the front to be troubled with

him. On my way back I saw one or two general officers, but preferred delivering my prisoner to

the commanding general of the Army of the Border, and you will remember that I accordingly

placed him in your own hands, at the same time introducing his captor, giving his full name,

company, and regiment. This is the true, unvarnished story of the capture of Marmaduke, about

which there has been so much misrepresentation in the newspapers.

Having rid myself of this responsibility, I again hurried to the front. When I overtook the

advance I found it halted at the foot of the precipitous mounds descending into the Osage Valley.

Leaving Colonel Cloud, of your staff, here, Captain Hinton and myself pushed forward on to the

skirmish line, away in the advance, almost as far as we could see over the smooth prairie, and on

arriving there we could plainly see the rebel column moving straight in the direction of Fort

Scott. At the same time a smaller column was effecting a junction with it and came from a point

to our right higher up the Osage, and which was most probably the force engaged by Colonel

Moonlight near Fort Lincoln. The column in our front moved off and disappeared from sight,

while our own line still remained stationary in our rear. I picked up an orderly from the skirmish

line, who belonged to the Second Kansas Cavalry, and sent him back with a message to Colonel

48

Cloud, requesting him to get General Pleasonton to move forward, as I feared for Fort Scott, and

at the same time got a citizen who had come forward with us to make a detour to the right and try

to reach Fort Scott with a verbal message for the commanding officer to hold out to the last if the

enemy struck him, as we were immediately upon his rear. Minutes passed and still our line did

not move. I grew impatient and sent another man of the Second Kansas with a second message to

Colonel Cloud, requesting him to see you and tall you that the enemy was moving in a direct line

toward Fort Scott, and that to save it something must be done immediately. I feared that some

one unacquainted with the topography of the country had led you to believe that the enemy was

diverging to the east, as I knew at that time he was not. At length my suspense was ended, and

the line began to move, and from this on there was no unnecessary delay. Simultaneously the

skirmish line also advanced. I waited until General Pleasonton came up (he being with the

advance), explained to him the topography of the country, the direction the enemy had taken, my

fears for Fort Scott, its situation, amount of stores, &c., and then hurried forward again to the

skirmish line.

It is proper to say here that the delay at the mound spoken of and subsequently on the summit

was only sufficient for General McNeil's brigade to come up and take the advance, which

seemed absolutely necessary to relieve the weary troops that had before acted in front. Fort Scott

was Colonel Blair's home and his regular post, and a few moments seemed to him a long period,

besides Colonel Cloud was then in the advance by my orders, leading the skirmishers, and could

not have received Colonel Blair's reports.

The movement was then rapid and continuous till the skirmish line was checked near the

verge of the Osage timber. The woods seemed alive with rebel soldiers but in rapid motion. The

skirmishers kept up occasional firing at them until the advance brigade came up and we all

charged rapidly down into the timber, but the enemy disappeared before our arrival. Colonel

Cloud was in the charge, with about sixty veterans of the Second Kansas Cavalry. He halted in

the timber to rest his horses for a few minutes and I passed on with the advance brigade, which I

think was Brigadier-General McNeil's. At all events it was commanded by a general officer. We

followed down the stream some distance, crossed at the ford, and just as we were emerging from

the timber on the south side the head of the column was fired on by the enemy's skirmishers. We

soon dislodged them, however, and pushed on toward a corn-field on the left of the road. The

head of the column was here checked by a heavy fire from the field, and it was evident another

battle was to be fought. Accordingly the general (McNeil) formed his brigade in close column of

companies, and made them a little speech while forming to the effect that it made no difference

whether there was 1,000 or 10,000 men in that field, he wanted them to ride right over them. The

men responded with a yell, the dismounted skirmishers tore down the fence in the face of a

galling fire, and the column swept through it like a tornado. In the rear of the corn-field another

line was formed on the prairie, the right resting on a skirt of timber fringing a small stream, while

the advance of the brigade, rapidly deploying into line, charged and broke them at the first onset.

A third line of battle was formed still farther to the rear, in a low basin, where there had been an

evident intention to encamp, which was surrounded by a semicircle of hills, where they held us at

bay under a severe fire for about twenty minutes or more, and until the whole brigade formed in

line and charged. Before this impetuous charge they were again broken, and as I passed through

their temporary halting place there was abundant evidence of the haste they were in, in the

broken wagons, dismounted forges, fragmentary mess-chests, and smashed crockery with which

the ground was strewn. The chase this time continued about a mile to the top of the hill south of

the valley of the Osage, and on getting view of the enemy from the summit of the hill I was

gratified to observe that he was bearing very palpably to the east, them giving me my first

reasonable hope that Fort Scott might be spared. I noticed, too, with increased satisfaction, that

49

we were at least a mile east of the wire road and that for the first time the enemy's direction was

turned from this place. Satisfied that I could render no further service, I determined to come

directly here (Fort Scott) to see to a certainty whether the post which was my special care was

safe or not, and to satisfy those cravings of hunger which, though persistently ignored for three

days and nights, would still, despite of resolutions, occasionally become clamorous.

I refrain from adding the glowing compliments properly bestowed on others of my staff by

Colonel Blair, although he and they deserve all he has written, for undoubtedly much of the

success of this day's operations is due to their unceasing and extraordinary efforts.

Col. W. F. Cloud, acting on my staff, with a small detachment of his own regiment (Second

Kansas), reports these battles as follows:

Accompanied by a small detachment of Kansas Cavalry (the Second), commanded by

Sergeant Peck, I moved forward in the space between our extreme right and the left, giving such

orders and encouragement to our forces as seemed necessary. In this order we came to a rebel

battery, the men of which had ceased to fight from fear, at which a rebel colonel (Jeffers)

surrendered to me, claiming protection for himself and men. Giving such directions as seemed

proper for guarding the prisoners, I moved to another part of the field, assisting in arresting

prisoners and securing several pieces of artillery abandoned by the rebels in their retreat through

the brush and creek. Seeing General Pleasonton upon the field near to a section of artillery, I

moved forward and reported facts as directed, and then observing that he was directing the fire of

our artillery upon a detachment of our own troops I so informed him, but was rebuked. Still

persisting in my statements, I had them confirmed by an officer from the detachment under fire,

whose assurances were united with my own and prevailed upon the general to give the order to

cease firing, saying at the same time, "You should carry your colors upon the battle-field." At the

order of General Sanborn the Second Kansas Cavalry was moved forward as skirmishers, some

mounted, some dismounted, and drove the enemy out of the woods and across the river. Here the

enemy had another line formed, and our troops were ordered forward, the Second Kansas

remaining in its position on the right, and in this order, pressing forward, we reached from right

to left in the form of a crescent, which placed us in the advance of the center. When the rebels

retreated from our steadily advancing army, my command had the advance from the

advantageous formation of the ground, and leading in this manner pursued the enemy for the

distance of three miles in a continuous charge until compelled to halt from sheer exhaustion of

the horses, many of them falling under their riders.

Colonel Cloud was very active during the campaign, and his immediate connection with the

capture of Colonel Jeffers and the battery of rebel guns at Mine Creek and leading the

skirmishers at the Osage, are distinguished achievements which ought to secure his promotion.

Major Weed, of my staff, additional aide-de-camp and commissary of musters of my

department, also participated in this day's fight, and reports his detached services as follows:

I remained with the major-general commanding until Philips' brigade had crossed the stream

at Trading Post, when I was ordered over with a message to General Pleasonton, and after

delivering it proceeded to the front with Colonel Blair and Maj. R. H. Hunt. Three miles south of

Trading Post, with Mine Creek in their rear, we found the entire fighting force of the enemy

(Shelby's division excepted) drawn up in line of battle. As only one brigade of our own troops

had come up, I rode a short distance back on a road running parallel with and to the left of the

one on which Philips' brigade had marched, and very soon met Lieutenant-Colonel Benteen at

the head of his brigade, and informed him of the position of the enemy. He pushed rapidly

forward, and on coming in sight of the rebel line at once formed his brigade for a charge. I then

started to return to the troops already on the field, to urge upon the commanding officer a charge

at the same moment with that of Benteen. Before reaching the command, however, I was

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accosted by an officer who pointed to the right center regiment of Philips' brigade, and asked me

to take that regiment into action, and to tell the men their colonel would soon be with them. He

then rode off at a rapid pace in a northwesterly direction, probably on some urgent mission. I at

once rode to the head of the regiment indicated, gave the message to all the officers, and to

lessen as much as possible the depressing effect of the commanding officer's absence upon the

men, charged with and in advance of them. As they came near enough to the enemy's line to

open fire I crossed their front and took position in the line on the right, where, in conjunction

with Maj. R. H. Hunt, I did what I could to encourage and urge it forward. After the enemy's line

had been broken and his whole force put to flight, I rode to the left of our line and assisted in

gathering together and sending to the rear a large number of prisoners who had been captured

with the artillery taken by Benteen's brigade. While engaged in this duty I heard of the capture of

General Marmaduke, and some twenty minutes later, meeting General Pleasonton, who was just

coming to the field, I informed him of the fact also telling him that Marmaduke had already been

sent to the rear. I then, at his request, took several squads of our men who had been separated

from their commands during the charge and proceeded to pick up prisoners, who were scattered

over every part of the battle-ground, some under guard and many making their way to the rear

without guards and no guides except their own fears. After having performed this duty, I

reported to the commanding general (who had already crossed Mine Creek) and was directed to

proceed to the rear and urge forward the division of Major-General Blunt and the brigade of

General McNeil with all possible speed. These troops had been delayed by the breaking down of

some transportation wagons at the most difficult point of crossing, and some time elapsed before

the road could be opened. I returned to the front with General McNeil and Major Chariot, and on

arriving there reported to and remained with the commanding general until nearly sundown.

Maj. S. S. Curtis, Second Colorado, and an aide-de-camp on my staff, after the close of the

fight at the Marais des Cygnes, went forward with General Pleasonton, and reports as follows

concerning matters at the battle of Osage:

I overtook General Pleasonton and rode with him for some distance. When about three miles

from Marais des Cygnes we commenced to hear firing at the front, and General Pleasonton sent

orders back for McNeil and Sanborn to hurry forward with all practicable dispatch, while we

pushed forward at a trot and canter. When we first heard the firing Benteen's brigade was on a

parallel road to the one we were on and to our right. He immediately put his command on the

gallop and we fell to the rear of his column, as the roads soon came together. Benteen's brigade

broke into regimental columns as they approached the battle-field, and as they came up on the

left of Philips' brigade went forward into line and right on into the charge. The enemy was

cannonading Philips' brigade when we came into sight, but the musketry firing had nearly

ceased. General. Pleasont requested me to take his escort company and support a section of a

battery which just then came up. General Pleasonton went forward, and I directed the lieutenant

to post his guns on a small elevation and shell the enemy's right where the artillery was posted.

But two shots were fired when I heard the yells raised by Benteen's brigade and saw the enemy's

line breaking. I immediately ordered the guns forward to a better position, and had just got them

in position when General Sanborn rode up and directed the lieutenant to fire upon some troops

on the south side of Mine Creek, and on our extreme left. I felt doubtful as to whether they were

rebels or our own troops, but a second thought made me conclude they were rebels. Four shots

were fired at them when I saw by their falling back to our lines that they must be our own men. I

rode forward to the guns to stop their firing, when Generals Sanborn and Pleasonton both rode

up and ordered them to cease. At this time the enemy's cannonading on our right had not yet

ceased. The enemy by this time being in full retreat, with the exception of their extreme left,

which could scarcely be reached with artillery from where we were without danger to our

51

command, and directly in front of us, our troops were immediately on the heels of the retreating

rebels. I told the lieutenant in charge of the guns to follow as fast as he could, while I, with the

escort company, pushed forward to rejoin General Pleasonton. A short distance before reaching

the creek I found Major Weed, who told me of the capture of General Marmaduke. I pushed on

and told General Pleasonton, and just as I did so General Cabell was brought up a prisoner. At

this time we could see a second rebel line forming on top of the hill ahead of us, and our troops

being scattered in pursuit General Pleasonton sent orders for them to halt and reform. I assisted

in reforming the line and sending prisoners to the rear until General Pleasonton again ordered an

advance, when I advanced with him. I waited on the hill until General Curtis came up and rode

with him to the banks of the next stream, when I rode up to the summit of the hill to the right of

the road to obtain, if possible, a view of the charge being made by McNeil's brigade, which had

taken the advance through the timber on Little Osage.

General Pleasonton, as commander of the advance division, acted with great coolness and

propriety throughout this battle of the Osage, and if our battery fired on a portion of Colonel

Benteen's troops after they crossed the creek my son, Major Curtis, clearly exonerates General

Pleasonton from directing the matter, which was one of those incidents of battle which often

occur. Colonel Benteen and his brigade evidently took the lead in the movement which captured

the prisoners and guns at Mine Creek and deserves the greatest applause for personal gallantry.

Brigadier-General McNeil concluded the matter on the height beyond the Osage with great

success and courage. Nearly all these troops being of General Pleasonton's division and under his

general supervision, he also deserves the gratitude of the country. General Blunt's division,

crowding forward and augmenting the power and force which overcame the enemy, is equally

deserving of the honors of the day. We were everywhere successful, and the following officers of

my staff, although some of them have been already named, deserve special commendation for

their unceasing toil and extraordinary gallantry at this battle of the Osage: Hon. J. H. Lane, Col.

C. W. Blair, Col. W. F. Cloud, Col. S. J. Crawford, Maj. T. I. McKenny, Maj. C. S. Chariot, Maj.

R. H. Hunt, and Maj. S. S. Curtis. Captain Hinton, and others of General Blunt's staff, also took

an active part. The reports of Major McKenny and Major Hunt are especially interesting, but the

extracts here made seem to cover the entire field and facts, and I refer to theirs and others here

submitted as well deserving of general perpetuity.

General Sanborn commanded the district about Fort Scott and Newtonia where Price's forces

were foraging and burning and murdering, and if not driven out would also have returned on my

department with his marauding bands of guerrillas, bushwhackers, and "deserters," which I

desired to have as far from my lines as Texas. Having now promulgated your order so as to bring

the forces back to the pursuit, immediately returned to Newtonia, and on the next day, October

31, I moved toward Cassville as far as Gadfly, where I ascertained that Price had moved with his

main force toward Pineville and resumed his position on what is known as the State Line road. I

therefore turned due south and camped near Keetsville, making short marches to allow my

expected re-enforcements to come up. On the morning of November 1 Lieutenant Colonel

Benteen joined me at the ruins of Keetsville with his brigade, about 1,800 strong. This force was

composed of portions of the Tenth Missouri, Third and Fourth Iowa Cavalry, and some Indiana

cavalry, all veteran volunteers, many of whom had served with me in my campaign of 1862

through this same country and shared in the glory of our struggles at Keetsville, Cross Timbers,

Sugar Creek, and Pea Ridge. This brigade was the best equipped, disciplined, and commanded

force in the field, and I now had about 3,000 men with sufficient artillery also so arranged by

doubling teams as to move with the usual speed of cavalry forces. I moved forward and camped

near Pea Ridge, Ark., where, as I telegraphed you, I expected McNeil would overtake me. This

52

force not arriving I remained the 2d, during which period I received a re-enforcement of fifty

men from Cassville, forwarded by Major Melton, who commanded the post. I also ascertained

that my couriers sent to Generals McNeil and Sanborn did not overtake them till they were near

Springfield, and being near they had gone to get supplies, &c. Still I hoped they would overtake

me, but determined to proceed and press the foe with my 3,000 against their boasted 30,000. I

sent prisoners taken on the road to General Rosecrans with the following note:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE BORDER,

In the Field, Camp near Pea Ridge, Ark., November 2, 1864.

Major-General ROSECRANS:

Understanding that you have ordered most of your prisoners to Saint Louis, I send you those

taken since. I have waited the return of some more of your troops for the pursuit of Price, but

will proceed cautiously with what I have, hoping to deter the enemy from besieging taking the

posts in Western Arkansas and to rid the country of Price's desperate hordes.

I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,

S. R. CURTIS,

Major-General

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT,

Fort Leavenworth, November 10, 1864.

COLONEL: In obedience to your request, I have the honor to submit a statement of different

conversations held with Major-General Rosecrans and officers of his staff, October 26 and 27,

1864.

In obedience to an order of Major-General Curtis, a copy of which is hereunto annexed,

under date of 21st of October, 1864, I left the line of Big Blue at midnight and proceeded to

Kansas City with my assistants and immediately called out the citizens and militia to work upon

the lines of fortification there. The battle of Westport commenced at daylight of Sunday, October

23, and the enemy commenced his retreat at about 12 m. of this date. I should here state that on

Saturday night at 12 o'clock, in a conversation with General Curtis I understood him to say that

he had no precise knowledge as to where Major-Generals Rosecrans and Pleasonton were, and

in his general conversation and directions to me appeared to depend entirely on his own force to

keep the enemy in check. I at this time proposed to Major-General Curtis to take a small steam

ferry-boat lying at the levee, Kansas City and run down the Missouri River until 1 could hear

from or see some of the forces of Major-General Rosecrans and carry such dispatches and

information as to our situation from General Curtis to General Rosecrans as might be proper. At

first General Curtis approved the plan, but finally gave it up as being too hazardous, not knowing

where to find, or rather not having any information as to where General Rosecrans could be

found. I did not know that our forces had the best of the fighting until Sunday night at dark,

when ascertaining that Price's forces had retreated and were being closely pressed by Generals

Curtis, Blunt, and Pleasonton, I began to collect my tools from the trenches and prepare to follow

on and catch up with the advance of our troops. My duty in collecting the Government property,

for which I was accountable, kept me in Kansas City until Monday morning, October 24. at 10

o'clock, at which time I took the road with my assistants, and, accompanied by Colonel

Ellithorpe, editor of Leavenworth Conservative, we reached Little Santa Fe the same day at

about 2 o'clock; distance, nineteen miles south of Kansas City. Here, as I was entering the town

from the north, I met the advance guard of Major-General Rosecrans entering the town from the

east or northeast, coming from the direction of Hickman Mills, General Rosecrans in person

being some two miles in the rear of his advance. I halted until the general came up, and after

seeing him for a few minutes he informed me that he should encamp there for the night, as he

53

informed me his maxim was " to camp early and start early." He at the same time pressed me to

remain with him until such time as we should catch the column of General Curtis, stating that he

was anxious to push on before daylight and should undoubtedly catch General Curtis before the

next night (Tuesday); that he earnestly desired to see me after he had his supper to obtain such

information as I was possessed of as to the movement of both forces from Lexington to the

present time. A few moments after, Captain Hoeleke, engineer officer on the staff of General

Rosecrans, came to me to procure maps of the country between Fort Scott and our present

position, stating that the general desired to have him (Captain H.) make copies of the maps at

once as General Rosecrans had no maps or guides for that section of country. I very cheerfully

gave him full maps of the country and all the information I was possessed of. At about 7 o'clock

that evening I was told by an officer that General Rosecrans desired to see me. I went

immediately to his quarters and found him at supper. I waited until he came out, when he desired

me to give him a free statement of what General Curtis had been doing. I did so as nearly and

correctly as I could. After finishing my statements the general turned around to his chief of staff

(Colonel Du Bois, I think, was his name, although I was not introduced to any of General

Rosecrans' staff) and said to the colonel:

Old Curtis appears to be trying to drive Price right back into Missouri.

The colonel's reply was:

Yes; he is getting things beautifully muddled up.

I said to the general:

General, you do not suppose that General Curtis would open a clear road for Price to go

straight through Kansas?

General R. turned quickly toward me and said:

But you know nothing about it.

One of the officers, I think Colonel Du Bois, said General Curtis was a "regular old muddlehead."

Captain Hoelcke made the remark that--

The old general was not what he used to be when he knew him; he was getting old and

childish.

There appeared to be a general feeling between all the staff officers of General Rosecrans

against General Curtis. During the interview, General Rosecrans turned to me and said:

My dear sir, I have had the greatest difficulty in getting General Curtis to believe that Price

was in Missouri at all. I have sent him dispatch after dispatch, telegram after telegram, to the

effect that Price, with his whole army, was in Missouri, and that he must be on the lookout for

him, as it was Price's intention to go to Kansas. In answer, I received from General Curtis a

dispatch that the idea of Price, with 3,000 men being in the State of Missouri, was monstrous.

General Rosecrans then turned to Colonel Du Bois and said:

And now, colonel, I guess the old man finds that Price is no fiction ; that he is a reality, eh?

The colonel replied:

I should think he did.

Again General Rosecrans said to me:

I have been over persuaded by that man (having reference to Major-General Curtis) against

my own military judgment to send all my troops via Kansas City. It was my wish to send them

farther south, but the constant cry of Kansas City, Kansas City, induced me to order my troops

there, with the beautiful result of losing the whole thing. Hereafter when I listen to another man

and take his advice I shall be a bigger fool than he is.

Again:

I understand, sir, that Jim Lane is running this border ruffian institution, and actually in

command of the whole machine.

54

I told General Rosecrans that General Lane was certainly at the front and doing his duty as a

common soldier as were many other Kansas men, but as to his having command of any portion

of the troops it was not so. General R. said:

Oh, yes, I understand the whole thing, sir, much better than you possibly can do; I understand

and know Jim Lane thoroughly.

A moment after he said to me:

Lieutenant, you are not as much of a Fremont man as when you were on his staff.

I told him I was not. Shortly afterward I went to my own quarters. The column took up the

line of march next morning at 7 o'clock, marched until 12 m., making about twenty miles, when

a halt was ordered for an hour. I then asked the general what time he intended to camp. His reply

was, "Very soon." I ventured to reply that such marching would not catch General Curtis. His

reply was:

My dear sir, when you get to be a general remember to start early and camp early, and when

you do find your enemy you will be able to fight him with fresh men and fresh horses. You will

see that I will have to finish this thing up yet with my infantry--slow but sure. I have the finest

body of infantry in the world, and I shall catch Price with them after all the cavalry are used up.

Such racing cannot last over forty-eight hours longer, and then comes my turn.

About 1.30 the column took up the line of march again, and at 3 p.m. halted for camp.

Finding that if I continued with General Rosecrans my chance of ever rejoining my own

command was exceedingly poor I decided upon pushing on and letting General Rosecrans come

up with his infantry in his own way. Calling my men together I started on. General Rosecrans

was sitting on a log at the side of the road, and asked me where I was going. I told him my place

was with my command, and I thought I would not be able to reach it if I remained with him. He

jumped up from the stump or log and in a very angry manner said, "Go on, then." There I left

him, nor saw nor heard of him afterward. Some five miles farther on my road south I saw coming

from the northeast a column of cavalry approaching the road I was then on, moving south. Upon

looking at them through my glass I saw a large white flag flying from a lance staff. We waited

for them to come up, when I had a conversation with the officer in command. It proved to be a

company of the Third Iowa Cavalry, under command of a first lieutenant, carrying a flag of

truce, and from forty to fifty prisoners of war, captured at or near Lexington. The lieutenant

informed me he carried orders from General Rosecrans to take these prisoners into the lines of

Price. I informed him that General Rosecrans was only about five miles back, camped, at which

he seemed much surprised, and dismounting his men and prisoners, rode back to see General

Rosecrans and get further orders. I marched on, leaving the command and prisoners dismounted

on the road. The circumstance at the time struck me as very strange that prisoners should be sent

into Price's lines under a flag of truce upon the field of battle.

This, colonel, is a full and correct statement of affairs and conversations held with General

Rosecrans. I could not fail to see plainly that a bitter feeling existed between General Rosecrans

and his staff toward General Curtis. His actions were spoken of in a very sneering manner; that

every move made by General Curtis was made wrong and in a "bungling manner," or, in the

language of Colonel Du Bois, "beautifully muddled up." My first impression was (after

ascertaining that General Rosecrans was hostile in feeling toward General Curtis) to leave

General Rosecrans at once, but I deemed it my duty to ascertain, as nearly as possible, what the

precise difficulty was, so that if disaster should befall General Curtis through any lack of cooperation

on the part of General Rosecrans I might, perhaps, be able in part to account for such

lack. After mature deliberation, coupled with such information as I could glean from casual

remarks from different officers connected apparently closely with General Rosecrans, it is my

firm conviction that the plan of General Rosecrans was to have Price whip the few raw,

55

undisciplined troops of General Curtis and then crush Price himself (which it strikes me he could

have done at any time after Price had entered Missouri), carrying off the palm of victory himself

at the fearful cost of sacrificing the whole Kansas frontier.

It is a fearful thing to accuse a man, hitherto honored and respected as Major-General

Rosecrans has been and is now, of being a traitor to his flag; yet his lack of co-operation, his

tardy pursuit, cast a black shadow upon all his former services, and true, loyal men will see only

a desire on his part to hand the State of Missouri over to our enemy without a blow being struck

for its defense. I was informed by an officer at Fort Scott that Major-General Smith,

commanding the infantry force, had repeatedly urged upon General Pleasonton the necessity of

attacking Price and bringing him to bay, so as to allow General Smith to get up with his infantry

and artillery force and bring on a general engagement. This General Pleasonton neglected to

obey, and finally a fifth order was sent to General Pleasonton to the effect that if General

Pleasonton did not attack Price at once he (General Smith) would be obliged to send General

Pleasonton to the rear. If, colonel, this is the case (and the orders of General Smith can be readily

obtained) there has been a criminal neglect upon the part of General Rosecrans and General

Pleasonton to attack and defeat Price.

I am, colonel, your obedient servant,

GEO. T. ROBINSON,

Lieutenant and Chief Engineer, Department of Kansas.

Lieutenant-Colonel STARK,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Dept. of Kans., Leavenworth, Kans.

HDQRS. SUB-DISTRICT No. 2, SOUTH KANSAS,

Fort Scott, Kans., January 1, 1865.

SIR: As volunteer aide-de-camp on your staff, I have the honor to transmit herewith,

according to your direction, a brief report of events of the 25th of October last, all of which I saw

and part of which I was.

On the march of the night before from West Point down, my brigade occupied the rear of the

column, and when the column halted, and no word was sent to the rear to bivouac, I supposed

that the advance had come to the timber of the Marais des Cygnes, and was clearing the

obstructions which all thought the enemy would create to oppose our forward movement.

Accordingly, we waited patiently, standing by our horses' heads, without fire, food, or forage.

Toward morning, becoming chilled by the rain and cold night air, I mounted my horse, and,

accompanied by an orderly, rode forward in search of fire. About midway up the column I found

a fire, and had scarcely succeeded in warming any benumbed limbs when the sound of artillery

called my attention to the front. I immediately started forward, and as soon as it was light enough

to distinguish objects, I saw by the broken and slippery condition of the roads that it was

impossible for the rear to get over the river till a late hour in the morning, and, sending my

orderly back with directions to Lieutenant Beam, my assistant adjutant-general, to keep the

brigade closed up to the main column, I hurried to the front to see if I could be of any service in

some other capacity. At the same time, if a general battle was imminent in which all our troops

would be engaged, I would have the advantage of observing the ground before the arrival of my

force, and be ready to take command of them in action. Ascending the high mound overlooking

the stream, I saw the skirmish line about midway from its base to the timber pushing steadily to

the front. I immediately started forward to overtake them, having been joined in the meantime by

Sergeant-Major Rebstein, of my brigade, and just as I entered the timber I was met by Maj. R. H.

Hunt, chief of artillery on your staff, who announced that there was neither enemy nor

obstructions on the north bank of the river. Pushing forward, I joined the skirmishers just as they

56

received the fire of the enemy's skirmish line on the south bank. The skirmish line here waited

till the advance regiment came up, which, I think, was the First [Second?] Arkansas Cavalry.

With it came also Col. S. J. Crawford, of your volunteer staff, and Capt. R. J. Hinton, aide-decamp,

serving on the staff of Major-General Blunt. On crossing the river we found, to our

surprise, no obstructions, save two trees which had been felled in the road, and which were

rapidly removed by the advancing troops.

Emerging from the timber, I observed a body of men about half a mile distant on our left

flank, drawn up in line in front of a farm fence. Some discussion arose as to whether this was the

enemy or a portion of our own troops who might have crossed below the main ford. I informed

the officer who seemed to be in command that I was satisfied there was no ford so close below

the main one, and called his attention to the further fact that the line displayed no guidons--a sure

sign in my estimation that they were the enemy. The question was settled by the charge being

sounded, and, half way to the enemy's line, we flushed his skirmishers, concealed in the high

grass, under the brow of a gentle declivity, who fired a hasty volley and retreated on the main

line, which moved off by the left flank at full speed, our flying squadrons in rapid pursuit. This

line of battle was formed facing the west, and about one mile and a half farther on another line

was formed facing the north, strengthened by two rifled guns and one small smooth-bore, the

right of the line resting on a skirt of timber which ran up a small ravine from the main river, and

the left on a knoll, on the summit of which was a log cabin. Here the artillery played pretty

fiercely, but they fired mostly with solid shot, seeming to reserve their shell as if it were scarce,

although the screaming of the shell through the air was by no means unfrequent. At this point

(Colonel Crawford and Captain Hinton still being with me) I sent Sergeant-Major Rebstein back