1
OFFICIAL ARMY RECORDS
1864-4
HEADQUARTERS THIRD IOWA CAVALRY,
Memphis, Tenn., June 15, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to report, through you to my immediate commander, that, in pursuance
of orders, I left camp on the 1st instant with 510 men, fully mounted, armed, and equipped,
commanded by twenty-five officers, and accompanied by two ambulances and three wagons,
uniting with the rest of the Second Brigade on the Germantown road about six miles from
Memphis. We advanced to Collierville the same day, encamping there at sundown amid a great
rain-storm, the first of an almost continuous shower for the rest of six days. Our march from
thence to La Fayette, Salem, Ruckersville, and Ripley, from the 3d to 7th, was uninterrupted save
by the rains and the necessity of searching in all directions for forage. From there on, from other
causes, however, much of the marching was required to be done by night, and the camps
necessarily taken wherever chance decided.
On the afternoon of the 7th, when we had advanced about two miles beyond Ripley, and
while the brigade was going into camp, Company C, of this regiment, was ordered to the front,
by the brigade commander, for forage, and an expectedly became engaged with an enemy of
very considerable strength, and which I have reason to believe was a column of rebel cavalry
hastening to join the main force, which we met on the 10th. Captain Wilson and Lieutenant
Lynch, of Company C, at once charged the enemy gallantly with their company-first mounted
and then dismounted, and drove in the squadrons which had been sent against them. On coming
in sight of the main body, my men formed a line and alone maintained the fight until re-enforced
by squadrons of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry and Companies E and F of this regiment, under
Captains Spencer and Crail, respectively. It having been determined by the general commanding
division not to give battle at this time, Company C was ordered to retire, and a portion of the line
on the right of Companies E and F retiring they also were withdrawn, after having been under a
severe fire for half an hour. A new line was formed half a mile nearer camp, and maintained until
after dark, when all the line returning to camp, the enemy passed, seemingly more desirous to
unite with his own army than to annoy us at that time. The loss of my companies here was:
Company C, 1 horse wounded; Company E, 1 man wounded, 3 horses killed and 2 horses
wounded; Company F, 1 man killed and 1 horse killed. In all, 1 man killed, 1 man wounded, 4
horses killed and 3 horses wounded.
After this, on the 8th and 9th, we advanced with the rest of the cavalry toward Guntown or
Baldwyn. The want of sufficient forage began to affect our horses very perceptibly, and the
difficulty in obtaining the small amount in the country about us was now increased by the
presence of the enemy. On the morning of the 9th a foraging party of this command was fired
into by a guerrilla band concealed in the brush. Private George W. Rhoads, Company B, mortally
wounded. He died the same day, and was buried on the line of march. His horse, equipments, and
arms were saved. The last forage of any kind whatever this command received or obtained was at
Stubbs' plantation on the evening of the 9th. On the morning of the 10th we left camp at about 7
a.m., this regiment following immediately after the wagons and led horses, &c., of the First
Brigade Cavalry, which brigade had the advance. At about six miles from Stubbs' plantation we
crossed a swamp, or bayou, very difficult of passage, and which was not bridged. A man on
horseback found great difficulty in getting over, and one horse of this command was suffocated
in the mud. When approaching Brice's Cross-Roads, at 11 a.m., this command went into line of
battle, by battalion, on the right of the main road, and
soon after the artillery opened in front. We
2
then advanced beyond Brice's (such, I understand, is the name of the corners near the field of
battle) the distance of about 500 yards, and, as ordered, I placed one battalion in line, mounted,
on the right of the road (leading to Guntown), and one battalion, also mounted, under Major
Jones, on the left of the road, and sent two squadrons, under Captain Brown, to the front on the
road a mile, as a picket. I at once made communication by patrol with the right flank of the First
Brigade, and soon after the battalion under Major Jones was ordered to close up on Colonel
Waring's right. By this movement my command was separated and the line interrupted until the
gap was filled by a portion of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry. The cavalry was then dismounted and the
horses at once sent to the rear. By pickets and skirmishers I was informed of the advance upon
our front of a heavy column of the enemy, and soon after the battalion under Major Jones,
composed of Companies F, G, H, and I, came under fire and held the enemy in check for from
three-quarters to an hour. Company I, under Captain Stanton, was the most exposed of my
squadrons. The Fourth Iowa Cavalry was also engaged at this time. On the left of this brigade the
enemy was driven back three different times, and several of his officers were killed while urging
their men forward; two are known to have fallen on the field. Occasional firing occurred also on
the right wing of my command, and they were also subjected at this time to a severe shelling
from the rebel batteries. The bombs exploded among my men, but fortunately inflicted no
permanent injury, although several men were temporarily disabled from the dirt and rubbish
thrown upon them. My chief trumpeter's horse was here shot from under him, and I lost his
services for the rest of the expedition. The First Brigade was at this time retired from their
position and this necessitated a similar movement by my squadrons on the left, who at once,
however, formed another line with the Fourth Iowa Cavalry. At this juncture my whole
command was relieved by regiments of infantry, and were retiring when the infantry became
engaged. We formed a new line immediately in their rear rather than in appearance leave them in
an emergency. After the order being received for us to retire to our horses, this regiment did so in
the best order, mounting by companies and forming a column of squadrons. The contest in the
field and in line lasted but a short time after this, and the enemy was hotly pressing his victory.
The infantry was filing past us in great numbers, the train was turned to the rear, and it became
necessary for us to take a second position, mounted, to protect the retreating column. A column
of squadrons was again formed facing the enemy, who failed to attack with small-arms, but
finally opened upon this regiment a heavy cannonade of round shot and shell. These fell around
my men, wounding a number, but causing not the least disorder. By order we moved farther to
the rear, something near half a mile, and again formed in squadrons faced to the enemy, who
kept at a distance and used the artillery only. Our own artillery was being retired and did not
protect us, and after holding our position for some time we were ordered to retire, which we did
in the best order, not an officer or soldier being out of his place. Night soon closed in and we
rested at Stubbs' plantation for the first time. The greatest difficulty was found in recrossing the
bayou, or swamp, in our rear, and in it were caught most of the artillery and trains of the army.
Arriving at Stubbs' plantation, on our camping-ground of the night previous, we rested from
about 11 p.m. to 2 a.m., when we again moved toward Ripley, holding the rear. After daylight
two squadrons were sent by me to the rear a mile, and a line formed by battalion to support them,
when the few infantry who had not already past us were brought up and sent forward. Just after
this the enemy began to assail us with great determination, and it was only by the greatest energy
and courage my squadrons, Companies L, M, and A united, under Captain Brown, and Company
B, under Captain De Huff, were able to hold the bridge leading to Ripley. They did so, however,
until relieved by the Fourth Iowa Cavalry, who now took the rear. In this defense Company L
had 1 man wounded, Company A 1 man wounded, and Company B 3 horses shot. My regiment
now accompanied General Grierson to Ripley, by his
personal orders. Arriving at Ripley, the
3
distance of about a mile, I found the infantry filling the streets of the town, some moving one
way and some another, and at once was notified that the enemy was about to attack on the left
and to prepare for him. I formed in a column of squadrons, faced to the rear immediately, and at
the same time was ordered to support the Fourth Iowa Cavalry, then in action. Deploying a
battalion into line, I ordered it to the rear, and at the same time pushed another battalion in
column to hold the road of retreat for the other troops. My advance in line was under severe fire
and over fields broken by high fences and deep ditches, but officers and men were cool and kept
a good and steady line. The enemy was checked and the position held until his object attained
General Grierson ordered me to retire. To retire at this point was a matter of no little difficulty,
for the enemy, having no resistance elsewhere, were flanking us as well as pressing from the
rear. Their fire was redoubled as we moved again upon the road. I, in this stand, lost Lieutenant
Miller, Company D, who fell mortally wounded, bravely fighting and facing the foe, also
Corporal Gilchrist, Company C, killed, with other wounded mentioned in accompanying report. I
think it can be claimed with justice that by this effort of my command much relief was given to
our fellow-soldiers of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry, and to the infantry regiments who were retiring
from Ripley, and I have the satisfaction of knowing that the enemy did not escape without
punishment. His flag was seen to fall three times under our fire, and many of his men were killed
and wounded. The column passing on without stopping, my orders required me to continue on,
making such resistance as possible to hold the enemy in check. To hold the rear of a rapidly
retreating column against a superior and assailing enemy now became the task of my regiment,
and resulted in considerable loss to us. Companies I and K were thrown to the rear and taken
command of by Major Jones. A column of the enemy advancing through the surrounding
thickets came upon them while they were gallantly holding another regiment at bay, charging
them suddenly; after much resistance, by overpowering numbers, captured most of those who are
reported in the accompanying tables. Some squadrons of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry aided my
command at this time, and may have shared in the loss. The enemy, mounted on much freshet
horses than ours, felt confident of capturing or routing the whole column. The confusion he was
able to create was slight and of short duration; platoon after platoon was thrown out right and left
along our road, and facing to the rear presented front to the rebels. The nature of the ground
aided, as the road led along a ridge with hills and gullies on either hand. This method of defense
was continued throughout the morning and afternoon. A cavalry force of our men and an infantry
command finally appeared in our rear and gave my regiment temporary relief, but the enemy still
pressing, the cavalry failed to hold their place, and a portion of the infantry [was] thrown into
confusion and captured. Colonel Thomas, commanding the infantry, applied to me for relief, and
I immediately formed another battalion line, supporting it with several squadrons placed at
advantageous points. The infantry left passed through my line, and I was once more contending
with the advance of the enemy. The duty was severe, and, in view of what had already been
performed, somewhat unexpected, but as it had been assumed to help them it was persevered in
without complaint as long as strength was left to resist. I was finally relieved by the Fourth Iowa
Cavalry, and they by the Second New Jersey. After this this command was not again under fire.
The rest of this day the column advanced without food or rest, except a short halt at evening,
when, the enemy approaching, the column was again put in motion and the march continued
through the night and next morning to La Fayette. Halting here until noon we proceeded to
Collierville, where we met re-enforcements and obtained some forage. At dark we were again
marched in advance of the First Brigade, the infantry following in rear to Germantown, at which
point the First Brigade took the advance and proceeded to camp. We followed soon after,
marching all night and bivouacking at White's Station at daylight. Here this regiment was
required to furnish 100 of the best of its already
exhausted horses to return on duty to
4
Collierville; with the remainder I arrived here the same day at sunset. The 100 men detached
have since come in.
I refer to the accompanying tables for a more definite statement of my losses in this most
unfortunate expedition, in which my command labored so hard and fought so well.
My officers and men behaved universally so well that I cannot make much distinction among
them, but for their aid in getting a new line to face the enemy at one particular emergency I deem
Captain Curkendall and Lieutenant McKee worthy of particular notice. Major Jones was
constantly at his post and did all a brave and good officer could. If occasion offers I hope to
bring the merits of others of these brave men more prominently forward than I can do now.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN W. NOBLE,
Lieutenant-Colonel.
Lieut. A. HODGE,
Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., Second Brigade, Cavalry Division.
HEADQUARTERS FOURTH IOWA CAVALRY,
Memphis, Tenn., July 4, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the Fourth Iowa
Cavalry Regiment in an expedition commanded by General Sturgis, from Memphis, Tenn., to
Guntown (or Tishomingo Creek):
The regiment marched from Memphis June 1, 1864. June 7 had a heavy skirmish at Ripley,
Miss.; lost 1 man prisoner and several slightly wounded. June 9 camped at Stubbs' plantation.
June 10 marched at 4 a.m. At 11 a.m. the advance encountered the enemy, under command of
General Forrest, near Tishomingo Creek. The infantry and artillery were five or six miles in the
rear. I was ordered to take the regiment to the front dismounted. I formed my line near Brice's
Cross-Roads. The enemy was in very thick brush. I could not tell the exact position of the
enemy's line. My line was not parallel with that of the enemy, but at an angle of nearly 45
degrees, the left being near the enemy. I had moved forward but a short distance when the enemy
fired a volley into Company C, on the left, by which Lieutenant Dillon and many others of the
company were severely wounded. The left of the regiment was obliged to fall back. I then
formed the regiment from the right parallel with the enemy's front. As I heard the enemy
advancing through the brush I ordered the regiment to lie close to the ground. They charged us
twice in this position, but were driven back with heavy loss. We lay here about two hours within
sixty yards of the enemy, the brush being so thick that we could not see them. The infantry now
came up, but they had been so hurried through the heat that only a small part of the command
was able to keep up. On their arrival I was ordered back to the horses, and the regiment mounted
and formed in close column, squadron front, waiting orders. I soon saw our men coming in full
retreat, the enemy close in their rear. The enemy had captured two pieces of artillery, which had
been sent forward, and turned them on us, and I was now in range of their fire, and entirely cut
off from the ford above the bridge by the retreating teams, which had for some cause continued
to move toward the front. The bridge was blockaded with broken-down teams, and the steep
banks of the creek in my immediate rear rendered it impossible to cross with horses. I ordered
the men to dismount and rush for a little eminence in our front, and never have I seen a military
command executed as quickly; every man saw the situation and acted accordingly. We held the
entire force of the enemy from this point for more than thirty minutes. The bridge was cleared
and every horse crossed over the creek, while we kept up a continual fire on the enemy, keeping
them back till all our infantry that was in sight had crossed the creek and we were nearly
surrounded. The regiment then retreated across the creek
and mounted the horses. Everything
5
now seemed in confusion. I formed the regiment in close column. The Third and Fourth Iowa
Cavalry were all the troops I saw intact. The other troops were rushing past in confusion. I soon
received orders from Colonel Winslow, commanding our brigade, to pass the retreating column
as fast as possible until I reached its head, and then stop every man. I did not succeed in passing
all the troops until we arrived at Stubbs' plantation, where I formed my men and commenced
halting the troops. I soon received orders to let them all pass. The Third and Fourth Cavalry
remained at this place until about 3 a.m. June 11, when most of the troops had passed. The
artillery and wagons had mostly been abandoned some miles back in a bad swamp. Soon after
moving out the enemy came up, and we had a hard fight all the way back, the enemy charging
our rear often. At Ripley the enemy came in on different roads and made a great effort to break
our rear by repeated charges. The regiment was all engaged in Ripley. I formed a line across the
town and fell back slowly and in good order, although we were pressed hard at some points.
When we came to the timber on the north side of the town six companies took the road leading
north. We came in on this road when we were advancing. The other six companies followed the
command which took the road leading west from town. Soon after leaving Ripley the enemy
succeeded in breaking through some companies of the Third and Fourth by a charge on the flank
through the timber, but were soon checked by Companies D and G of the Fourth, commanded by
Captain Abraham and Lieutenant Keck. Had not the enemy been checked at this point we must
have lost the most of our command. Our rear companies rushed past the column in great
confusion, followed by the enemy, who were yelling like demons. When I saw the rear give way
I pushed forward until I found a place where I could form two companies, but it was with the
greatest difficulty that the line could be held against our own troops, which were rushing past in
such disorder. The enemy came on with colors flying, and but few yards in rear of our men. The
two companies met them with a volley, their colors went down, men and horses were piled upon
each other, the road was blockaded; never did I see men and officers stand a charge more
gallantly than did these two companies. Two of their number fell dead, but the lesson taught the
enemy was a good one, for they were very careful how they again charged our rear. The day was
very hot. The soldiers had eaten nothing since the morning of the 10th. They had been marched
up five or six miles on the double-quick to the fight, and were soon defeated and turned on the
retreat. They were without rations; many had thrown away or destroyed their arms, and all the
infantry near the rear had reduced their clothing as much as possible, hoping to keep in advance
of the rear guard; but the general in command was leading the retreat so rapidly that I was
obliged to leave hundreds every mile who were unable longer to keep up. Our horses, too, were
fast giving out, and I could not get more than ten men from a company with horses able to
overtake the command after stopping to check the advancing rebels. With such a small force it
was not safe to remain far from the main column, so about 2 p.m. I started for the front. We were
then leaving men very fast, who could keep up with ordinary marching, but were unable to keep
up while marching as fast as we were. I asked General Sturgis if he would not march the column
slower, as it was impossible to keep a well-organized rear guard while it was marching so
rapidly, as we were losing all our infantry who were unable to keep up. The general ordered a
halt, and we had a little rest. It was near night, and Colonel Kargé, commanding Second New
Jersey Cavalry, was sent to take the rear, but he soon sent word that the enemy were pressing
him, and the march was at once resumed and continued all night.
We arrived at Collierville, Tenn., about 10 a.m. of June 12. To this place the railroad was in
running order and 2,000 troops had arrived there from Memphis with supplies for men and
horses. The dismounted men and what infantry had succeeded in getting through were taken to
Memphis on the cars. About 12 o'clock the six companies which were cut off at Ripley came in,
under command of Captain Woods, and reported that the
enemy had not troubled them after
6
leaving Ripley. We considered ourselves perfectly safe here with the re-enforcement of fresh
troops from Memphis, but the general did not so consider it. Soon after sundown we received
orders to march. We left Collierville about 9 p.m., and arrived at White's Station, seventeen
miles, before daylight. This was the third night without sleep, and my men and horses were very
tired. About sunrise I received orders to send 250 men back to Collierville to protect a train
which was going to Collierville for a lot of our infantry who had come in soon after we left. I
sent all the men and horses that were able to go, under command of Captain Huff, of Company
A.
I have no means at the present time of knowing the exact number of killed, wounded, and
missing in my command, but it was heavy.
I am sorry to have to say that the officers and men of my command have no confidence in the
general commanding the expedition.
I should be happy to mention in this report the names of all the officers and men who are
entitled to special notice, but in so doing I should have to name most of my command. The
battalion commanders, Captain Woods, Captain Dee, and Captain Abraham deserve much credit
for their personal bravery on the field before the retreat, and the prompt manner in which they
handled their commands in guarding the rear after the retreat; also Lieutenant Woodruff, acting
adjutant of the regiment, for his promptness in clearing the bridge over Tishomingo Creek and
removing our horses from immediate danger.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. R. PIERCE,
Major, Commanding Regiment.
N. B. BAKER,
Adjutant-General of Iowa.
MEMPHIS, TENN. July 2, 1864--2 p.m.
The Board met pursuant to adjournment.
The members of the Board and the recorder present.
The proceedings of yesterday's session Were read and approved.
The examination of Brig. Geo. S. D. STURGIS continued.
By the PRESIDENT:
Question. On assuming command did you announce your staff in orders, and who composed
it?
Answer. I did, sir. It was composed of Capt. W. C, Rawolle, additional aide-de-camp and
acting assistant adjutant-general; Capt. W. S, Belden, Second Iowa Cavalry, aide-de-camp;
Lieut. E. Calkins, Seventh Indiana Cavalry, aide-de-camp; Lieut. S. Oakford, Nineteenth
Pennsylvania Cavalry, aide-de-camp.
Question. Were you furnished with a roster of your brigade and regimental officers?
Answer. No, sir; I was not.
Question. Did you require and did you receive daily reports from your regimental and
brigade commanders of the condition of the command?
Answer. No, sir; I did not. I made my headquarters habitually with Colonel McMillen, who
commanded the infantry, and much of the detail of the campaign was transacted verbally; and if I
had it wouldn't have been practicable to get them, and I didn't want them.
Question. How many wagons composed the train, how was the train made up, and under
whose charge was it?
Answer. The supply train was composed of 181 wagons, and some of the regiments were
furnished with two wagons to a regiment and others with
none. Those of the regiments who
7
arrived just previous to the departure of the expedition left without wagons, as the brigade
commander, Colonel Wilkin, reported to me, and I formed an estimate of the number of wagons
along the road at about 250. There may have been a few more or less. To get rid of as many of
them as possible, I distributed five days' rations, one day's march beyond Ripley, and sent back
forty-one wagons. Lieutenant Shattuck, acting quartermaster, had charge of the supply train. He
was a very well-meaning man, I presume, but not a man of much force of character, and on that
account, and because he complained of not being very strong, I allowed him to return to
Memphis with the forty-one wagons, and I directed Lieutenant Stratton, commissary of
subsistence, to take charge of the train in his stead. Lieutenant Stratton was a stranger to me,
though I thought him a man of some executive ability from what I had seen of him on the former
trip, but I don't think I made much improvement by the exchange. During the retreat I placed the
whole wagon train in charge of Captain Buckland, of Colonel McMillen's staff, telling him that I
hardly hoped to save the train, but if I could he was the only man that I knew of that could do it.
Question. Were foraging parties sent out by your order, or by subordinate commanders?
Answer. They may have been sent out by subordinate commanders independently of my
orders, but I ordered that it should be done.
Question. Were they accompanied by cavalry?
Answer. They consisted entirely of cavalry and of mounted men not cavalry.
Question. While on the march was your column protected by flankers of mounted men?
Answer. No, sir; except by foraging parties on the march down; they were deemed sufficient
protection. On the retreat flankers moved on the flanks of the column.
Question. When and where did Colonel Karge rejoin your command?
Answer. He rejoined on the 8th of June, at Ripley, a brigade which I had left at Ripley until
he should come up.
Question. What was Grierson's effective force at the commencement of the engagement?
Answer. About 3,000 men.
Question. On arriving at the scene of the engagement did you consider the line chosen by
General Grierson the best that could have been selected?
Answer. I did not consider that General Grierson had the privilege of selecting any position,
as we were going to meet the enemy, and this was where we found him. There was nothing left
but to attack him wherever he should show himself, for if we stopped our animals would starve,
and this I had told to my brigade commanders two nights before. Apart from the fact that the
enemy occupied the position, it was in my opinion the best position at least within ten miles,
because it was at the cross-roads which we must pass or retreat, and I deemed it easier to hold the
cross-roads than to take them from the enemy.
Question. Was the ground on which you found General Grierson engaged clear or wooded,
even or rough country?
Answer. It was uneven, hardly amounting to what would be called a rough country, and
densely wooded for about three-quarters of a mile in front on all the roads, beyond which was an
open belt extending across all the roads for about a quarter of a mile. The enemy occupied the
wood beyond the open belt and we the wood on this side, so that our position was pretty strong,
except that it could be easily turned.
Question. How far from General Grierson's line was the head of your infantry column when
you first heard that he was engaged?
Answer. I presume it was four miles and a half from the head of the cavalry column and two
miles from its rear when the cavalry was attacked.
Question. In what order was the infantry marching at that
time?
8
Answer. Marching in the usual order; but on that day Colonel Hoge's (the Second) brigade
was in the advance; Colonel Wilkin's brigade next; Colonel Bouton's (the colored brigade) was
last, and with the wagons. The infantry column and the wagon train I estimated as ordinarily
occupying about four miles of road.
Question. How long was the infantry column at the time of the engagement, and was it well
closed up?
Answer. My remembrance is that when I asked Colonel McMillen at this time how he was
getting along he replied that his column was well closed up and the column occupied about four
miles and a half.
Question. What was the character of the ground at the head of the infantry column at the time
of the attack?
Answer. It was wooded and level, with open fields occasionally. There were no swamps nor
springs in the immediate vicinity.
Question. Were the enemy in motion when the collision first occurred with Grierson, or did
he find them waiting for him?
Answer. My impression is that he found them waiting for him, but the reports which I have
submitted to-day at headquarters will explain that better than I can.
Question. What was the condition of the roads at that time?
Answer. The roads were heavy on account of the rains, and bad for the wagons. All the low
places in the roads being rendered worse by the rains, but for marching they were generally
pretty fair.
Question. Were the men brought into action on the double-quick, or in what time did they
march into action, and in what condition?
Answer. They did not come into action on the double-quick, and I had specially ordered that
they should not come up on the double-quick, because the day was very oppressive, though I
repeatedly sent word to Colonel McMillen to make all haste. They marched into action in
ordinary time. The infantry looked in good spirits, and we gave three cheers as they came up. I
can hardly say how long they had marched without resting. They were two hours or two hours
and a half in making the four miles, and I do not know what time was given them for resting.
Question. Did you investigate General Grierson's complaint that he was short of
ammunition?
Answer. I did not; there was no possible time for it. I knew subsequently that regiments of
cavalry had almost their full number of rounds of ammunition. For instance, the Second New
Jersey Cavalry, which had been engaged on the left, the Fourth Missouri, also the Third Iowa,
which regiments on this account did the principal work in guarding the rear on the retreat.
Question. Did General Grierson retire from the fight with or without your order?
Answer. General Grierson importuned me a great deal, while his cavalry was engaged, to
hurry up the infantry, as his men were tired and exhausted, having been fighting since 10 o clock.
I told him repeatedly that we must hold that position; that we could do it, and that the infantry
would be up any moment, and that he must have patience. He retired, with my sanction, as soon
as replaced by the infantry for the purpose of getting his command together. As I said yesterday,
the cavalry on the left (Colonel Waring's) retired. I do not know by whose orders.
Question. What became of Colonel Waring's cavalry after that?
Answer. At the next place I saw it it was in the open field near the bridge, where the
reorganization was supposed to be going on.
Question. What order did you make for the safety of the trains
Answer. When I went to the rear to provide, amongst other things, for the safety of the train,
the train had been reported to me, on inquiry, to be one
mile and a half in rear, and on arriving at
9
the bridge, about a half to three-quarters of a mile in rear of the line, I met the head of the train,
to my surprise. The whole column appeared to have made a general move to get up. I then
directed an aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Calkins, to see that the train was turned around and held
ready to move to the rear in case that it became necessary.
Question. When the retreat actually took place did or did not the train obstruct the retreat?
Answer. It did not obstruct the retreat proper, nor would it have done so on ordinary roads
and in ordinary weather. But the road became jammed with those flying from the field, the
teamsters became panic-stricken, and the moment they had any trouble with the wagons they
jumped down and cut out a mule and let the wagon stand, which soon blocked the road. I had
strong hopes, and ordered it parked on the first open ground that could be found beyond the
white house, a mile and a half in rear of the battle-field, and where I hoped to be able to make a
stand, with a view to issuing rations and ammunition and then destroying the train, thinking we
could hold the enemy in check until night and then do it. But the enemy pushed us so hard that I
was obliged to move the train on again, with the hope of parking it farther on that night. This was
the main train; at this time some of the wagons were stuck near the battle-field.
Question. How far from the line of battle was the train captured?
Answer. It was not captured at all in a proper sense of the word. It was left standing, a wagon
here and a wagon there, or wherever the teamsters would desert it, for ten miles, especially in the
bottom of the Hatchie, which was a very bad place.
Question. Did or did not your train fall into the hands of the enemy?
Answer. I presume it did, as we did not bring it away. Many of the wagons were burned by
orders. I ordered that they should be burned wherever they obstructed the road.
Question. How many wagons did you return to Memphis?
Answer. None that I know of; I think none.
Question. During the retreat to Collierville were the regiments restored to good order, or did
they retreat in confusion?
Answer. No, sir; the regiments were restored to order at Ripley by 7 o'clock the next
morning. The brigades were reorganized and restored to a respectable condition.
Question. Were you closely pursued on the retreat, and with what results?
Answer. The column moved out of Ripley on the retreat, on the Salem road, at 7 o'clock on
the morning of the 11th, preceded by the cavalry. I moved out myself to the infantry. All was
quiet in the rear as far as we could hear. When we had got half a mile probably from town we
began to hear the firing of the enemy at the rear, but it was distant and desultory and the column
moved on in good order. The rear of the infantry column was pretty heavily attacked at Ripley,
as I learned afterward by the report of officers. From time to time the word came to me that the
rear was being strongly pressed, and I would re-enforce it with such companies or parts of
regiments as I could find had ammunition, and once they pressed so strongly that I ordered a
brigade of infantry to form line, which was not done, however, because Colonel McMillen
reported, after trying, that he found it impossible to do so for the want of ammunition. All that
we could do therefore to protect thereat was to keep the column so moving that the enemy could
not accumulate upon it.
Question. How many guns did you lose?
Answer. Fourteen in all. We had sixteen guns and four mountain howitzers. I think the
ammunition train was lost in a body with the exception of one wagon.
Question. On what day of the month did you personally arrive at Memphis?
Answer. I think on the night of the 13th.
By Brigadier-General BUCKLAND:
10
Question. Did you organize a pioneer corps, or was there one connected with your
expedition?
Answer. One was organized by Colonel McMillen, at my request, from the Ninth Minnesota,
where I learned there was a company of artisans especially suitable for that duty.
Question. Did you know before you reached Collierville, on the retreat, that a portion of the
infantry column had left Ripley by a different road from that which you took
Answer. I did not; but on leaving Ripley I requested Colonel McMillen to leave a staff
officer, which he did, to intercept Colonel Wilkin in case he should arrive, as we did not know
what had become of him, and direct him on the road the column had taken. He did not see
Colonel Wilkin, and until he (Wilkin) arrived at White's Station we were at a loss to know what
had become of him.
Question. When the infantry went into the engagement did they form on the same line that
had just been occupied by the cavalry?
Answer. Colonel McMillen was directed to relieve the cavalry, and the exact part of the
woods that the cavalry occupied at that time, whether on the farther edge of the timber or farther
this way, I cannot tell.
By the PRESIDENT:
Question. Was the force of which you were placed in command, in your opinion, efficiently
organized, with proper proportions of different arms of the service, also with respect to arms,
ammunition, supplies, and transportation?
Answer. I think so, with the exception of the forage, and with that, probably, the best was
done that could have been done.
Question. In your opinion was there anything in the manner of the organization of the
expedition calculated to impair its chances of success?
Answer. The command was made up of old troops and newly arrived troops and
detachments, all of which went to make up 8,000 in numbers, but which, from the very manner
in which it was made up, was not therefore really equal to anything like 8,000 men.
Question. What is your estimate of the force of the enemy in cavalry, infantry, and artillery?
Answer. From the opinions of my principal officers and from information received from
ladies of intelligence (rebel ladies) on our return I think the enemy had about 20,000 men.
Question. General, at the time you were first advised that General Grierson was engaged by
the enemy what was the nature of the ground on which the head of the infantry column stood?
Answer. It was a level farm, with woods and open fields; no peculiarities about it at all that I
can remember.
Question. Was there any obstacle at that point to the safe formation of a line of battle?
Answer. No, sir; nothing.
Question. In the circumstances in which your army was then placed did you consider it safer
to attack the enemy in his own position than to await his attack in a position chosen by yourself?
Answer. That is what I thought at that time. When I received information from General
Grierson of the skirmish I had no idea that we had anything in front but the enemy's cavalry. All
of my information led to that conclusion, and General Grierson himself supposed them to be only
600 strong after he had been fighting them some time. So I did not think of forming a line of
battle at all, but supposed the cavalry could drive the enemy away without trouble. It was only
after receiving the last message from General Grierson, while on the way up to him, asking me
for a brigade of infantry, that I thought at all of looking at the ground with a view to taking
positions in case we should be driven back. When I made up my mind at Ripley not to return, but
to go forward, then I determined to attack the enemy wherever I could find him, because if I
stopped I was ruined. My animals would be exhausted, and
the only hope was to get as rapidly as
11
possible to Tupelo, where there was corn, and if I formed line of battle, on receiving word from
General Grierson, and the enemy had not chosen to attack me, I would have been forced to have
attacked him under precisely the same circumstances, with my animals still more reduced.
Question. When you first came up to General Grierson, from what you could see and from
the firing, how many of the enemy did there appear to be in your front?
Answer. It didn't impress me as being a large force, judging from the firing, and I really felt
that when the infantry got up we could hold our own with them.
Question. Did you have scouts in front in the course of the expedition, and did you receive
information from them concerning the enemy's force and movements?
Answer. The scouts were unable to bring me any information because the enemy were
hanging so continually about, so I depended more upon the information I had started with, and
keeping my command together and ready for any emergency, than upon any information I could
pick up. I was informed before leaving Memphis that I would find no enemy north of Okolona in
force, and would encounter no considerable force until I got in the vicinity of Columbus or
Macon, if even there. As this information was acquired through regularly organized spies and
scouts I felt that it was the best information I could act upon. I therefore acted upon that in the
absence of any other.
Question. On what day did you receive from the ladies you mention information that the
enemy's force consisted of 20,000 men?
Answer. I think it was at Collierville on the 12th; this was on my return.
Question. What, in your opinion, was the real cause of the disaster at Brice's Cross-Roads?
Answer. I think the disaster was the result of undertaking an altogether impracticable
expedition. Whatever number of men make up an expedition the enemy are perfectly acquainted
with the details of it in thirty-six hours after it leaves Memphis, and as we have to travel at least
100 miles over a desert we are forced to arrive in a manner broken down and with the animals
weakened, to reach a point where the enemy can concentrate as much force as he pleases by
railroad, and where he can put himself in position and destroy you in detail in spite of all you can
do. If you go forward he will overwhelm you with numbers; if you do not you starve, and if you
go back he will destroy you, because you have to retreat over a desert.
The Board then adjourned at 5.30 o'clock to meet at 2 p.m. Monday, the 4th of July.
M. BRAYMAN,
Brigadier-General Volunteers, President.
JAMES O. PIERCE,
Major and Asst. Adjt. Gen. Volunteers, Recorder.
MEMPHIS, TENN., July 7, 1864--2 p.m.
The Board met pursuant to adjournment.
Present, Brigadier-General Buckland, Col. J. B. Moore, and the recorder.
Absent, Colonel Kappner, sick, and excused from appearing by the Board.
The minutes of the preceding meeting read and approved.
Col. D. C. THOMAS duly sworn and examined.
By the PRESIDENT:
Question. State, your name, rank, and regiment. How long have you been in the service, and
what position did you hold on the late expedition?
Answer. De Witt C. Thomas; colonel Ninety-third Indiana Infantry Volunteers; I have been
in the service a few days over three years; I commanded my regiment a large portion of the time
on the late expedition. On the retreat from Ripley to Collierville I commanded the largest part of
the First Brigade, that part which came in on the Salem
road.
12
Question. In your opinion, were there any unnecessary delays on the march of the expedition
from the railroad near La Fayette to Ripley?
Answer. I only recollect of one that I thought was unnecessary. This was at La-mar on the
second day out from La Fayette. We staid there one whole day. This day the weather was clear
all day. A portion of the train did not arrive until 7 o'clock on the morning of this day, having
camped the night before some two or three miles back.
Question. After leaving Ripley, was there much difficulty in getting the trains along at any
place, except Hatchie bottom?
Answer. There was one other place, about four miles beyond Ripley, where the road crossed
a creek, over which the crossing was very bad, where we were delayed some three or four hours
on the second day out from Ripley. This bad place was about one mile beyond our camp of the
previous night and about eleven miles from the Hatchie bottom.
Question. Was anything done toward repairing this bad place before the column reached it?
Answer. There was some dirt and brush thrown in, which made the road worse than it was
before. We were delayed there three or four hours until some plank were procured and the bridge
recovered.
Question. How far was your camp of that night (the 9th)from the Hatchie bottom?
Answer. It was about two miles this side. We got into camp pretty late that night.
Question. What time did you march on the morning of the 10th?
Answer. We started about 6 o'clock.
Question. What was the extent of very bad road in the Hatchie bottom?
Answer. It was a quarter of a mile over the worst part of the road; seventy or eighty rods, as
near as I could judge.
Question. Was this a continuous mud-hole, or was it broken?
Answer. It appeared to be a sort of a quicksand, with soft places where the mud was deeper
and softer than in others. I judge of the length of this had road from the fact that on the retreat
there were two pieces of artillery, two caissons, four am-balances, and, I think, an army wagon,
with their teams all stuck in this bottom, and they did not extend half way across it.
Question. Was the column delayed in crossing the Hatchie bottom?
Answer. It was not, though I learned afterward that the train had an awful time getting
through there.
Question. Had anything been done toward improving this piece of road when you passed it?
Answer. There were a few brush in one place, and that is all I noticed. No one was working
there then.
Question. What is the distance from the camp at Stubbs' to Brice's Cross-Roads?
Answer. I call it between eleven and twelve miles. Mr. Stubbs told me, as we returned, that it
was thirteen miles.
Question. Where were you when you first received orders to advance and go into action?
Answer. Some two or two and a half miles this side from the cross-roads.
Question. How long had your regiment then marched without resting?
Answer. We had marched about one mile and a half--about an hours time. We were marching
slow on account of the heat.
Question. Did you halt after that before going into battle?
Answer. We halted once about 100 yards this side of the cross-roads for the men to examine
their pieces and lead. We halted about five minutes at that time. The men were very much
exhausted. One officer of my regiment was sunstruck while standing there, and from the remarks
of my officers at least forty men must have fallen out from exhaustion before reaching there. At
that time we were ordered forward Captain Buckland, of
Colonel McMillens staff, ordered me to
13
move forward at a double-quick, as our advance had been attacked by the enemy and their left
had been turned. I ordered our men to take a long, quick step in order to keep up with the
regiment next in advance. To do this the left of my regiment was obliged to move at a doublequick.
Question. State the orders you received and what occurred after that?
Answer. I followed the One hundred and fourteenth Illinois up to the cross-roads, but did not
receive any orders till reaching there, when Colonel McMillen met me and assigned my regiment
to a position directly on the right of the Guntown road, my left resting on the road about 300
yards in advance of the cross-roads. I occupied the extreme right of the infantry line. I relieved
the Third Iowa Cavalry. Colonel Noble, of the Third Iowa, remarked as he passed out that he had
received no fire there at all, but that I would have a hot time of it pretty soon. We threw out three
companies of skirmishers, two forward and one to the right. In a few minutes my company of
skirmishers on the left was pressed so hard that they fell back to the line. I then discovered that
the enemy were working around to my left. I sent my adjutant to observe the distance between
me and the One hundred and fourteenth Illinois. He reported it to be 150 yards. About fifteen
minutes after getting into position I discovered the enemy advancing in solid line directly upon
me, overlapping my line considerably at each end, and driving back my skirmishers and partly
turning my right. First I was in doubt as to whether they were the enemy or not, from hearing my
lieutenant-colonel order the men not to fire as they were our own men, and because the majority
of them wore blue coats and pants. My first impression was that they were some of our own
cavalry, and in consequence they had opened fire and given us a volley before I knew who they
were. My lieutenant-colonel was mortally wounded and my adjutant killed at this time, and my
other losses were heavy. I immediately opened fire and drove the enemy back a little, but they
were turning my right and left flanks so that I was obliged to retire, each wing forming a convex
line. I then fell back in line fighting for fifty yards, and reformed my line. I charged on the
enemy, and they drove me back. I fell back gradually to the crossroads, fighting all the while,
and having reform my line eleven times, as the enemy, having a longer line, was continually
turning both my flanks. At the cross-roads the Ninth Minnesota came to my assistance on my
right, and together we drove the enemy back till I had regained my original position. The enemy
then fell back and I saw nothing of them in my front for a few minutes. I staid there a quarter of
an hour, resting my men. I was then ordered back, I should say, at about 4 o'clock, to take a
position on the left and rear of the Second Brigade, on the left of the main road about a quarter of
a mile back from the cross-roads. I was then attacked in force, and was ordered to fall back to the
rear of the fence at the road. At this time the Ninety-fifth Ohio was there; also a detachment of
the Tenth Missouri Cavalry, dismounted. While we were in that position we were attacked and
drove them back. At this time Adjutant Abel, of Colonel McMillen's staff, ordered me to fall
back in as good order as possible, the enemy then coming in on our rear from the right. The road
approaching Brice's Cross-Roads bears nearly to the east until it crosses the creeks and just
beyond it it turns toward the south, so that the enemy threatened to cut off our retreat by coming
in on our right. I retired across the field and over the bottom, across the inside of the angle made
by the road (it was about three-quarters of a mile), till I struck the road again on a little ridge this
side of the creek, where I found a colored regiment in position.
The Board adjourned at 6 p.m. to meet at 2 p.m. to-morrow.
MEMPHIS, TENN., July 8, 1864-2 p.m.
The Board met pursuant to adjournment.
Present, the members of the Board and the recorder.
Examination of Col. D. C. THOMAS continued.
14
By the PRESIDENT:
Question. Did you form a line on that ridge?
Answer. No, sir; we did not. We formed a line three-quarters of a mile this side of there, on
the ridge to the left of the white house. I do not know by whose directions. Colonel Wilkin wan
the first I noticed forming there. It was formed by the First Brigade.
Question. How soon after you arrived there were you attacked by the enemy?
Answer. I don't think it was over three minutes.
Question. How much of a stand did you make there?
Answer. We staid there about half an hour. Some of my drummer boys were burning wagons
and cutting loose the mules at that place. One section of Mueller's battery was in position there
on the right by the white house, supported by the Seventy-second Ohio. We were fighting nearly
all of the time we were there. We were again flanked by the enemy, both right and left.
Question. When you retired from that position did you do so with or without orders?
Answer. We retired without orders, and there were no commanding officers in sight to give
us orders.
Question. At the time you fell back from that position where were the colored troops?
Answer. These troops were falling back at the time I saw them. Getting back at this time was
a regular stampede; there appeared to be no system about it at all. Up to this time the troops had
been kept in pretty good order.
Question. Was there any cavalry in line on the flanks when you were in this last position?
Answer. There were none; I could have seen them if they had been very near. Back of where
our line was formed was open ground.
Question. When you were flanked by the enemy at this position did they also come up in
force in the center?
Answer. They did, but not in such force as on the flanks. I think we could have held this last
position if we could have been supported on the flanks.
Question. Did you make any other stand between that point and Ripley?
Answer. My regiment did not.
Question. Do you think it was possible to have got the artillery and train through the Hatchie
bottom?
Answer. It would have been impossible without cutting a new road. I think a new road might
have been cut. A citizen acquainted with that locality, who is now acting us a guide for Major-
General Smith on his present expedition, informed me since we returned that there was another
and a better road crossing the creek a few rods above where we crossed.
Question. How many rounds of ammunition did your men have when they went into the
fight?
Answer. They had forty-five rounds. When I started from Memphis we had fifty rounds. On
the morning of the 10th a citizen, General Sturgis' guide, remarked to me, in a laughing manner,
that we would smell a fight before night, as the enemy were in strong force in our front. Shortly
after, I asked General Sturgis if there was any enemy in our front, when he replied there was not
any in front. I, however, had time that morning to have the cartridge-boxes inspected, and I
ascertained from that that my men had forty-five rounds.
Question. State what you learned from the people on the road in regard to the position and
strength of the enemy.
Answer. At Ripley, going out, a lady whom I took to be a very intelligent person, Mrs.
Faulkner, wife of Colonel Faulkner, of the rebel service, informed me, in laughing manner, in
answer to my question as to where Forrest was, that Forrest had gone away from there with two
divisions to re-enforce Johnston, but had returned again
and that we would have plenty to do in a
15
few days. I asked her if she knew of the number of men that Forrest had, and she said he had
some 28,000. On my return she had breakfast prepared, and she called me in and I took breakfast
with her. She wanted to know if I did not find her words very nearly correct.
Question. Did you inform General Sturgis of this matter?
Answer. I did, on the afternoon of the same day that I heard it. He and I both treated the
matter lightly.
Question. What efforts were made, if any, to procure forage during the expedition?
Answer. I never knew of any arrangements being made about forage. What forage we got
was picked up by the drivers of the teams, and the quartermaster-sergeant. When we abandoned
our teams, there was in our wagons enough forage to feed our horses two nights. At the white
house, two miles this side of the battleground, I saw plenty of forage. There was plenty also at
Stubbs' ; old corn, and blades of fodder. Between Ripley and La Fayette there was no forage.
There appeared to be plenty between Ripley and the cross-roads.
Question. State any facts not already stated, which in your opinion had an influence in
causing the disaster at Brice's Cross-Roads.
Answer. I think the commencement of the disaster was caused by the men being so much
exhausted. In the second place, by the commanding officers of the expedition leaving the field
without giving any instructions to brigade and regimental commanders. Third, if on falling back
had all been notified to form line at the first frame house this side of the cross-roads, and if the
cavalry had been halted and used upon the flanks, there would have been an opportunity of
saving a portion of the ammunition, and giving the train time to retreat. This line could have
been held till dark. The infantry lost a great many prisoners, because they were in the rear,
without any ammunition, from Ripley, coming this way. The cavalry were engaged at Ripley,
which protected the retreat of the infantry for about a mile from there. The cavalry were then
driven by the enemy, and went to the front of the infantry. In consequence of this the rebels
charged in on my command, which was a part of the First Brigade, and the men being very much
exhausted and out of ammunition, I lost a great many prisoners. I then requested Lieutenant-
Colonel Noble, of the Third Iowa Cavalry, to station his companies in such manner as to protect
my rear, which he accordingly did, and I went and reported this matter to General Sturgis. I
asked him who had command of the cavalry that, was protecting the rear? He answered that it
didn't make much difference; there would be a hell of a stampede soon, or words to that effect. I
replied that there was no necessity of a stampede; that I had taken the responsibility of ordering
Lieutenant-Colonel Noble, with the Third Iowa Cavalry, to protect the rear, which he was then
doing. General Sturgis remarked that I must be mistaken, as the Third Iowa was in the front. I
assured him to the contrary, as I had just placed them in the rear. He then informed me that
Colonel Winslow had charge of the rear, and he sent for him, again assuring me that it was not
necessary to do anything; that there would be a hell of a stampede, and every man would have to
take care of himself. While his messenger was gone for Colonel Winslow, he said, "Colonel, you
have no command, and I have no command; I propose that we take the Nineteenth Pennsylvania
Cavalry, and take some by-road and make our escape." Colonels McMillen, Hoge, and Bouton
were there; also Lieutenant-Colonel Eaton. General Sturgis asked Colonel McMillen what he
thought about it; to which he replied, that he was willing to do whatever I said. I told him that I
didn't consider there was any danger of a stampede if the matter was properly managed, and
expressed my determination to stay with my men. When Colonel Winslow reported, General
Sturgis said to him, "I thought you were in charge of the rear, to which he replied, that he had
been the night before, but didn't understand that he was to be that day. General Sturgis then
asked him if any of the cavalry had ammunition; to which he replied, that the Second New Jersey
and a part of the Ninth Illinois had. General Sturgis then
told him to place those regiments in the
16
rear, which was done, and Colonel Karge's Second New Jersey Cavalry took charge of the rear.
After that we had no trouble to speak of, nor any danger of a stampede.
Question. At what time were the men placed on short rations, and what measures were taken
to procure a supply of meat or other provisions?
Answer. On the 7th of the month, at Ripley, the rations were reduced to one-half rations of
bread and one-quarter rations of meat. The brigade commanders organized foraging parties. The
foraging party of our brigade (the First) secured some eight or nine beef-cattle; among them
three or four large steers. Citizens who owned the cattle made application to have them released.
General Sturgis released the cattle. After that, General Sturgis issued orders that there should be
no foraging. If any man was caught foraging his colonel or commanding officer should be held
responsible, and would be reported to Washington for dismissal. This order was issued on the
morning of the 8th.
Question. Do you know of any general officer or brigade commander having been
intoxicated at any time during the expedition?
Answer. Not after we left La Fayette.
Question. Did you see any of the above-named officers drink any intoxicating liquors on the
day of the battle?
Answer. I saw General Sturgis and Colonel McMillen take a drink of whisky before
breakfast. I saw no other instances during the day.
Question. Did you see any of the officers above referred to intoxicated at La Fayette or
before reaching there? and if so, name them.
Answer. I saw one officer whom I thought was intoxicated at the point where we
disembarked from the cars. This was Colonel McMillen. He was then commanding the First
Brigade, to which my regiment was attached.
Question. To what degree was he intoxicated, and was it so as to unfit him for duty?
Answer. He was so much so that to prevent exposure I got his aides-de-camp to get him to a
house and place him in bed that night, and I took command of the brigade until the next morning.
Question. While Colonel McMillen was in this condition was he in a position to be observed
by other officers and the men of the command?
Answer. He was, at one time. In attempting to get from the cars he fell to the ground and had
to be assisted to rise.
At 6 p.m. the Board adjourned to meet at 2 p.m. to-morrow.
MEMPHIS, TENN., July 9, 1864--2 p.m.
The Board met pursuant to adjournment.
Present, all the members, together with the recorder.
The minutes of the preceding session were read and approved.
Lieutenant-Colonel KING duly sworn and examined.
By the PRESIDENT:
Question. State your name, rank, and regiment. How long have you been in the service, and
what position did you occupy on the late expedition under General Sturgis?
Answer. John F. King; lieutenant-colonel One hundred and fourteenth Illinois Infantry
Volunteers; I have been in the service since September, 1862; on the late expedition I
commanded my regiment.
Question. In your opinion were there any unnecessary delays on the march of the expedition?
Answer. From the information I gained from those connected with the train, I think the
expedition could have reached Brice's Cross-Roads two days sooner than it did, if we had been
supplied with forage.
17
Question. State what you know in regard to the supply of forage for the expedition.
Answer. All I know is from the complaints I heard made. Captain Fitch, commanding Battery
E, First Illinois Light Artillery, told me at Ripley, on the morning of the 8th, that his animals
could not go on without forage. I also heard Captain Mueller, of Mueller's battery, make similar
complaints at the same time and place. I saw but very little forage along the road. I saw some
growing corn and wheat along the road, but not much. Forage for my teams was obtained by my
quartermaster sending a man out to pick up a sack of corn occasionally. This I said nothing
about, for I understood it to be in violation of General Sturgis' orders.
Question. State at what time you marched on the morning of the 10th of June, and give the
incidents of that day's march.
Answer. I moved out from Stubbs' plantation about 8 o'clock in the morning. I was attached
to the First Brigade. The Ninety-fifth Ohio had the right of the brigade. Captain Fitch's battery
with four guns was next, and Captain Mueller's battery with two guns next, and I followed the
batteries. The rest of the brigade was in this order: Ninety-third Indiana, Ninth Minnesota,
Seventy-second Ohio. When we reached the white house belonging to Doctor Ames (which I
think was about three miles from Brice's Cross-Roads) we then received orders. Captain
Buckland, of Colonel McMillen's staff, told me that they were fighting in front, and said that
Colonel McMillen would give a hundred dollars to have his brigade up there, and ordered me to
keep well closed up to the battery. My regiment being a little behind I ordered them to doublequick,
which they did for about 300 yards at that time. I kept on to the battle-ground, marching in
quick time and double-quick in about equal proportion. While marching from Ames' to Brice's
Cross-Roads, I saw a great many men who had fallen out by the way on account of the heat.
Many of them said that they belonged to Colonel Hoge's brigade. When I formed my first line of
battle, I think 100 men had fallen out, over one-quarter of my command. I halted at the crossroads
not over two minutes, and halted again about 100 yards beyond there on the Guntown road,
just long enough to form line, and then went right into the position assigned me by Colonel
McMillen. My men had loaded about half a mile back from the cross-roads. The position
assigned me was to the left of the Guntown road and about 300 yards in advance of the crossroads,
my right resting about 150 yards from the Guntown road and my line running parallel to
the Baldwyn road. On the left I could see no troops. The brush was very thick where my line was
formed, and on all sides of us. I relieved a line of dismounted cavalry. I don't know what troops
they were. I advanced my line about fifty yards beyond where they were. As I was going into this
position, Colonel McMillen informed me that there were two lines of our troops in my front, and
instructed me to be careful about firing on that account. I relieved, as I understood it, one of
those lines. I was informed at this time by a cavalry staff officer that there was a line of
skirmishers in my front, and he also told me to be careful about firing. I gave instructions to all
my line not to fire, as we had skirmishers in front. At this time I heard several of my men say
that they were scrunch exhausted that they could not lead. It turned out that there was no line of
skirmishers in front. While in that position my officers and myself could occasionally see men
moving in our front, some of them dressed in blue clothes and some in butternut. Some of my
officers and men persisted in wanting to fire, saying that if they were our men they had no
business to be wearing butternut clothes. Some of my men did fire, in violation of orders, but
only a few shots. In a few minutes a rebel line advanced in plain sight, and I then opened fire. At
the same time they opened heavily on us. The firing between the two lines continued as much as
ten or twelve rounds, and I had a number of men wounded, and some killed. The enemy then fell
back. They advanced again, and I repulsed them the second time. Soon after this they
commenced to flank me on the right, so I swung back the right, and gave them a volley which
repulsed them. They then commenced to turn the left; the
firing commenced again on my right
18
and in my rear. I then gave the order to fall back, and we formed a second line. The firing was
still coming in on my flanks, and I fell back again, firing occasionally until we got to the crossroads.
At this time my men were in considerable confusion and very much exhausted. I here
formed about thirty yards in front of the artillery, which was in position, by Colonel McMillen's
orders. When I formed there there were quite a number of troops on my left. A number of the
men told me that they belonged to the Eighty-first Illinois. The artillery was in position in rear
of the Baldwyn road; I think there were two sections; one piece was firing down the Guntown
road. My regiment extended across the Guntown road and in front of a gun, so that I had to break
files on the right each time that the gun was fired. After they had fired a few rounds the Ninetythird
Indiana fell back and took a position on my right, and were immediately moved by the
flank to the left and rear of Brice's house. After this time I received no orders. The artillery
limbered to the rear; I do not know by whose orders. One section of what I supposed to be
Captain Chapman's battery moved off to my right and down the Pontotoc road. The troops at this
time all seemed to be falling back. I fell back to the right of the Guntown road, in order to protect
this section of artillery. I formed my regiment about sixty yards to the right of the Guntown road
and in rear of the Pontotoc road and my right resting on the latter. The enemy were then coming
in line by Brice's house, skirmishers £u advance, in superior numbers to mine. All of the rest of
our troops had fallen back, from all that I could see. I there gave the enemy two or three rounds. I
again fell back some sixty yards and formed, my right resting some 100 yards in rear of the
Pontotoc road. I fired probably a couple of rounds, and I again fell back some eighty or ninety
yards and was in the act of forming again my sixth line, when Captain Johnson said to me, "If we
remain here five minutes longer we are all gone up." I then moved by the left flank behind a rail
fence, thickly interspersed with vines, bushes, &c., in the nearest direction to the Ripley road,
crossing the Tishomingo, west of the bridge. I fell back within a quarter of a mile of Ames'. I
there struck the main column as it was falling back. I moved down to the road and there saw
General Sturgis, Colonel McMillen, and Colonel Wilkin. I here received orders from Colonel
Wilkin to form on the left of the Ninth Minnesota, it forming east of the road, its right resting on
the road. We held this new position until we were ordered to fall back. We fell back from 300 to
500 yards, and formed again to the west of the road immediately in the edge of the timber, there
being an open field in our front. The colored troops formed in our front in the open field were
very heavily pressed. The colored troops fell back to our rear. We repulsed the enemy, and held
this position some fifteen minutes. It was then after sundown. At the time I saw General Sturgis,
Colonel McMillen, and Colonel Wilkin together at the white house, Colonel McMillen told
Colonel Wilkin to hold the rear until it got dusk, and he would go ahead and reorganize and form
a line on a chosen position to protect us. By order of Colonel Wilkin we then moved to the
Hatchie Swamp. Finding the road blockaded with artillery, ambulances, and wagons stuck in the
mud and receiving no orders in regard to the disposition of the train, we remained here until
between 12 and 1 o'clock at night, when the artillery, ambulances, and train were abandoned, by
whose orders I know not. Colonel Wilkin heard of a ridge road, a better and shorter road to
Ripley, and we started in on it about 600 yards the other side of the Hatchie Swamp. It was a
dark road and the night was dark, and Colonel Wilkin was fearful of getting lost, so we returned
to the other. We proceeded to Ripley, arriving at Ripley at 7.30 or 8 o'clock the next morning.
One battalion of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry covered our retreat for three miles before we got to
Ripley, and also until we arrived at Ripley. We remained in Ripley a short time, trying to find
General Sturgis or Colonel McMillen or some of their staff for the purpose of getting orders, but
none of them were there. We took, on leaving Ripley, the right-hand road, which led in the
direction of La Grange, while the rest of the infantry and cavalry had taken the left-hand road,
leading through Salem. As we were leaving Ripley there
were two regiments of colored troops
19
formed in line on our left. A portion of the cavalry (I think the Fourth Iowa) passed us, saying
that we must look out for ourselves, that they could not protect the rear any longer, as they were
out of ammunition. We marched that day and evening until 11 o'clock, and we then bivouacked
until morning. During that night the Fifty-fifth U.S. Colored Troops, under Captain Reeve, came
up and joined us. From there to Collierville we came across the country roads, passing Davis'
Mills, and had fighting more or less all the time, arriving at Collierville about 9 or 10 o'clock on
the morning of the 13th. We remained there until noon.
Question. Were there any rebel forces at Ripley when you passed through?
Answer. There were. They were fighting with our cavalry. Colonel Wilkin proposed to stop
there, reorganize, and fight them, but could get no orders, and so we went on. We heard at
Collierville that the rebel General Buford and his staff had been in that town that morning. When
the cars met us, two or three miles this side of Collierville, we were then fighting with the rebel
cavalry.
Question. How many rounds of ammunition did the troops in your column have when they
arrived at Ripley on the retreat?
Answer. I would say six or eight rounds. When Captain Reeve came up with the Fifty-fifth
U.S. Colored Troops his men had from forty to fifty rounds. Some of the troops threw away a
good many cartridge-boxes, and my men picked them up.
Question. What, in your opinion, was the cause of the disaster at Brice's Cross-Roads?
Answer. First, exhaustion of the men; second, the bad management of the commanding
officers; third, the superior number of the enemy, and I do not think our lines were properly
connected in our first line of battle, which gave the enemy an opportunity to flank our regiments
and break our lines.
Question. Do you know of any general officer or brigade or regimental commander having
been intoxicated during the expedition?
Answer. I do not.
At 6 p.m. the Board adjourned till 2 p.m. 11th of July, 1864.
MEMPHIS, TENN., July 25, 1864--2.30 p.m.
The Board met pursuant to adjournment. Present, all of the members and the recorder.
The minutes of the two preceding sessions were read and approved.
Col. E. F. WINSLOW duly sworn and examined.
By the PRESIDENT:
Question. State your name, rank, and regiment; the length of time you have been in the
service, and the position you occupied on the late expedition under General Sturgis.
Answer. E. F. Winslow; colonel Fourth Iowa Cavalry; I have been in the service since
November 23, 1861; on the late expedition I commanded the Second Brigade of the Cavalry
Division.
Question. How were you supplied with forage on the expedition?
Answer. We had very little. We often had to march farther to secure forage after we got into
camp than we had marched during the day. After we left the railroad we did not have over half
rations.
Question. At what point did you first hear of the enemy being in force in your front?
Answer. My command met at Ripley what was reported to be Bell's brigade, and skirmished
with them. It was just at sundown, and they retired in the night. This was on the 7th of June.
Question. Did you learn anything more in reference to the enemy before you got to Brice's
Cross Roads?
Answer. I did not.
20
Question. At what time in the day did you encounter the enemy at Brice's Cross-Roads?
Answer. My command was ordered into position at 12 o'clock.
Question. Had there been any fighting by Waring's brigade previous to that?
Answer. There had been. I heard Waring's guns for about an hour previous to that.
Question. Describe the position of your first line of battle, and the character of the ground.
Answer. I sent the Tenth Missouri and Seventh Illinois Cavalry on the right-hand or Pontotoc
road. They were mounted. The Third Iowa Cavalry and two battalions of the Fourth Iowa
Cavalry were dismounted and placed in position across the Guntown road, their left connecting
with Colonel Waring's right, and their right about fifty yards south of the Guntown road. The
ground was somewhat undulating, but thickly covered with small oak timber. There was no
cleared land immediately in front of my line. I could not see the enemy until we got very close to
them, where was open ground about a quarter of a mile in front of our line.
Question. How long did you maintain your position on that line?
Answer. I should judge it to be three-quarters of an hour. Colonel Waring's brigade then fell
back about 400 yards, and I was obliged to withdraw my line on the left to connect with his.
Before I discovered that Colonel Waring had fallen back the enemy had got between his line and
the left of mine, and I lost some 8 or 10 men wounded in consequence. We held this last line for
an hour or an hour and a half until relieved by the infantry.
Question. Were you attacked by the enemy in much force before the infantry came up?
Answer. Not in sufficient force to drive us from our position. I could not tell how strong the
enemy was, because we could not see any of them.
Question. What orders did you receive, and what did you do after the infantry came up?
Answer. Just before the infantry arrived I received information from General Grierson that
the infantry Was arriving. When the head of their column came in sight I received orders from
General Grierson to withdraw my men and mount them. I waited in person until two infantry
regiments had arrived and had taken positions which I pointed out to them, directing the Third
and Fourth Iowa to retire and mount as speedily as possible. I went to the rear and reported to
General Sturgis, who was about 200 yards in the rear of Brice's house, and told him what I had
done. He said that was right, and that the cavalry had already done all the infantry labor which he
should require of them, and wished them then to perform their legitimate duty on the flanks,
where they belonged. I then went to the front. My men were just withdrawing from the bushes
and there was no firing. Colonel McMillen was present superintending the movements of the
infantry. When my men had got about twenty yards in rear of the infantry line the enemy and our
men commenced firing very fiercely. I directed my men to remain in position where they where,
and informed Colonel McMillen that I would not withdraw them until further orders, as he was
evidently severely attacked. I sent an aide to General Sturgis, informing him of the circumstances
and asking further instructions, and received orders to retire at once and mount my men. I again
went and reported to General Sturgis and General Grierson, who were together. They asked if
my men were retiring, and seemed impatient for them to come. Presently they came out and I
mounted them as soon as possible. General Sturgis then asked me if I could send any men to the
right. I told him that I had two regiments there already. He wished to know if they could help the
infantry. I told him that I could dismount 150 men with carbines if he said so. He instructed me
to do so, and I immediately caused it to be done, instructing them to hold that position as long as
possible. Four companies of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry had been sent back to the train before the
infantry came up, by order of General Grierson. The Third Iowa Cavalry was mounted and
formed in a field on the south of the road, about one-third of a mile in rear of creek. About this
time General Sturgis came up to where I was, and remarked that Colonel McMillen was driving
the enemy. He then rode off. This was about a mile in rear
of the cross-roads. Two minutes after
21
General Sturgis left one of the enemy's shells struck within fifty feet of where I was. I then
discovered that our infantry had been driven back. In a few minutes afterward everything
commenced going by me to the rear--artillery, train, ambulances, and men--all mixed up
together. I then went back to the creek to see what had become of my command. I found that the
Fourth Iowa Cavalry had dismounted and occupied a little hill near the bridge, to protect the
withdrawal of their horses across the creek, which done they mounted and followed the Third
Iowa. At the time I got back to the creek the most of our forces had fallen back this side of the
creek in a great deal of confusion. Finding that the army was retiring in this manner, I directed
the head of my column to proceed slowly to the rear, on a line parallel with the retreating
column. I proceeded back to a point about one mile and a half from the creek and formed my
command in form of squadron on the south side of the road in a field. The enemy soon
commenced to shall us, and I was then directed by General Grierson to move according to my
own discretion, which I did. I reported to General Sturgis about four miles this side of the creek.
I reported my command in good shape and asked for orders. He directed me to go to Stubbs' and
stop the retreating column, which I did. General Sturgis arrived there a few minutes after I did
and told me to open the lines and direct everybody to push for Ripley as fast as possible. I
remarked to him that that would oblige the abandonment of the train and all the artillery, which
could not be got through the swamp. He said that the artillery and train had already gone to hell,
and that if they got through the swamp they could not eventually be saved, because there was no
forage for the animals. He requested me to take the rear of the column and remain there until the
larger part of it had passed by. I halted my command from 9 till 2.30 o'clock and then took the
rear of the column to Ripley.
Question. In your opinion, could the retreating column have been rallied at that point and the
trains and artillery saved?
Answer. I think they could, and think that was the only place where it could have been done.
Question. What efforts were made to make a stand at Ripley?
Answer. I was in the rear, and had considerable fighting with the enemy. Two negro
regiments were also in position. The balance of the column had passed by before we got there,
and I don't know where they went to.
Question. To what causes do you attribute the defeat of our forces at Brice's Cross-Roads?
Answer. I think that the main cause was the exhaustion of the infantry when it arrived on the
field of battle. I think the position was a good one for infantry but not for artillery. I think there
was a far better position about two miles this side of the creek, where, if the infantry had been
halted and the cavalry had fallen back to the creek, we undoubtedly would have beaten them. I
do not think that over three-fifths of the infantry got into the fight on account of exhaustion.
Question. Do you know of any general officer or brigade or regimental commander being
intoxicated on the day of the battle?
Answer. I do not.
Question. What conversation had you with General Sturgis after the retreat had commenced
about trying to stop it?
Answer. About four miles this side of the creek I expressed to General Sturgis some surprise
that there had not been an attempt made to stop the rout. He said that himself and other officers
within his reach had made every exertion to reorganize the command, but that the troops were
without discipline, and, although good soldiers when successful, when unsuccessful they were
perfectly worthless. He said that they were nothing but a mob.
Question. Did you see any infantry that appeared to be organized during the retreat on the
night of the 10th?
Answer. No, sir; I did not.
22
Question. How near to the cross-roads was the train brought up during the fight?
Answer. I think the main part of the train was brought up within three-quarters of a mile of
the cross-roads, and a large portion of it was brought up nearly if not quite to the cross-roads.
Question. Was that a proper position for the train under the circumstances?
Answer. I do not think it was a proper position under any circumstances. I think that was one
cause of losing the train.
Question. From Ripley to Collierville what part of the column were you in?
Answer. I was at the rear all of the time.
Question. How far did the enemy follow you this side of Ripley?
Answer. They followed us in force about five miles. At that point they made a dash on us and
took a good many prisoners. After that they only followed us with a few men.
Question. Did you receive any orders from General Sturgis about conducting the rear after
leaving Stubbs' plantation?
Answer. I never received any orders from him, either in person or otherwise, in regard to any
movement whatever after leaving Stubbs'. The only time that I saw General Sturgis was about
ten miles this side of Ripley as he was passing to the front. He then gave me no orders.
Question. At what time did you arrive at Collierville on the retreat, and what time did you
leave there, and what were the reasons for leaving at that time?
Answer. We arrived there at noon on the 12th and left at dark. Two thousand fresh infantry
arrived there about 3 o'clock in the afternoon on the cars from Memphis, the train also bringing
ammunition, forage, and rations. I was informed by Generals Sturgis and Grierson that we would
remain there all night, for the purpose of resting and covering the retreat of such infantry as
might be coming in. The command moved by order of General Sturgis about dark to White's
Station, seventeen miles, reaching there about daylight; in consequence of which movement 200
horses of my command were rendered unserviceable. I know of no reason for that march. Two
hundred and fifty of my command were ordered back to Collierville the next morning to protect
the retreat of such infantry as might come in.
At 6 p.m. the Board adjourned to meet at 2 p.m. to-morrow.
COLLIERVILLE, July 2, 1864.
GENERAL: I have the honor to report that at 3 this a.m. I sent out a detachment of twenty
men from the Seventh Indiana Cavalry southward on the Byhalia road, at a point at about ten
miles south of my camp. They were attacked by a force of rebel cavalry, variously estimated at
from 100 to 300 men, who drove in our cavalry to within one mile and a half of my camp. As
soon as I was informed of the enemy's approach I moved out with 250 of my regiment to a
bridge one mile and a half from camp, where I halted and sent out a small detachment of the
Seventh Indiana Cavalry, under command of Capt. John M. Moore, with the design to draw them
into an ambush. Upon the advance of the cavalry the enemy retreated in haste in the direction of
Byhalia. It is my opinion that with 200 good cavalry the enemy could be bagged.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D. B. HENDERSON,
Colonel, Commanding.
Major-General WASHBURN.
HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Memphis, Tenn., July 27, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by my division on
the late expedition to Tupelo, Miss.:
23
I left La Grange on the morning of the 5th instant with my command, which was composed
of the following brigades and batteries: First Brigade, Colonel McMillen, Ninety-fifth Ohio
Volunteer Infantry; Second Brigade, Colonel Wilkin, Ninth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry; Third
Brigade, Colonel Woods, Twelfth Iowa Volunteer Infantry; Fourth Brigade, Colonel Ward,
Fourteenth Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry (this brigade was a detachment from the Seventeenth
Army Corps, temporarily assigned to my command); Second Iowa Battery, Lieutenant Reed
commanding; First Illinois, Company E (one section), Lieutenant Cram, and a battery (four
Rodman's) belonging to Company M, First Missouri, but manned by Captain Mueller's company,
Sixth Indiana Battery. We arrived at Pontotoc on the 12th instant, and on the morning of the 13th
moved toward Tupelo. The colonel commanding brigade of colored troops, which was in rear of
my division, about nine miles of Tupelo, sent word to me that he was threatened by a large force
of the enemy. I directed Colonel Ward, whose brigade had been marching on the right flank of
the train, to place one regiment in the rear so that he might be better able to render assistance to
the negro brigade. At the same time I ordered Colonel Woods to place two of his largest
regiments on the right flank of the train. The column proceeded in this manner some three miles,
when an attack was suddenly made on the train for nearly its entire length. The attacking force,
as I have since learned, consisted of four brigades of cavalry. This attack was soon repulsed,
Colonel Ward's brigade taking the chief part in the fight and capturing a rebel flag. As soon as
the enemy was repulsed I again started the column on, keeping the wagons ahead of the main
column, when, finding that the enemy were moving rapidly at some distance on my right flank
toward my front, I proceeded toward the head of the column for the purpose of making
arrangements to protect the wagon train. I had just arrived at the head of the Ninth Minnesota,
which had been sent forward to protect the train, when a furious attack was made on the column
a short distance to the rear. I immediately halted that regiment and faced it toward the enemy,
and directed skirmishers to be deployed. At the same time the balance of the brigade was halted
by Colonel McMillen and faced toward the enemy, and the order given to charge. The enemy
was driven in confusion. I then brought up the Eleventh Missouri to Colonel McMillen's support,
but before they arrived in position the rebels had disappeared and the fight was over. Colonel
McMillen and his command displayed great gallantry in so quickly repulsing this attack. As soon
as our wounded had been picked up I again moved on and arrived at the camp about dark.
The next morning the general commanding the expedition indicated to me the position he
wished my division to occupy, and I placed the troops of my command as follows: Colonel
Woods' brigade on the left, its left resting on the Pontotoc road and connecting with the right of
the Third Division; Colonel Ward's brigade on the right of Colonel Woods'; Colonel McMillen's
brigade on the right of Ward's, and Colonel Wilkin's brigade in reserve. The Second Iowa
Battery was placed on the left of Colonel Ward's brigade, and commanded the Pontotoc road and
the open field on the right of that road. Captain Mueller's battery was placed on the right of
Colonel Ward's brigade and the section of Company E, First Illinois Battery, on the right of
Colonel McMillen's brigade. The enemy commenced the attack at about 7.30 o'clock in the
morning, coming down in line of battle along our front and opposite our left, moving in an
irregular mass. I directed the fire to be retained until they approached quite near, and then opened
on them with shell, canister, and musketry. The fight continued for about two hours and a half,
when, finding that they would not approach any nearer ore' lines, I ordered the Third Brigade to
charge on them. This was very gallantly done, and the enemy driven from the field with heavy
loss. I had two field officers and several men sunstruck during the charge, and the enemy, having
fallen back to their led horses, disappeared from our front. I did not attempt to pursue them any
farther, as my command was well nigh exhausted with the
march of nineteen miles and the
24
fighting of the day before; in fact, it would have been useless to pursue mounted infantry with
troops on foot under any circumstances.
On the morning of the 15th the enemy again appeared in our front. I awaited their attack, but
finding that they were not disposed to approach within musket shot, with the exception of their
skirmishers, I moved upon them and drove them about two miles, when they again took to their
horses and fled. I then followed the Third Division, which had already moved out on the
Ellistown road. A brigade of cavalry formed the rear guard. I arrived at the camp on Old Town
Creek, and was there met by a staff officer of the general commanding the expedition, who
directed that my division should pass by the Third and encamp in advance of them. Just as my
rear brigade had crossed the creek and passed through the bottom on the north side of it, several
shells were suddenly dropped into the camp by the enemy, who, it seems, had driven in our
cavalry the moment the infantry had crossed the creek. I was directed by Major-General Smith to
take a brigade and drive the enemy back. I moved the First Brigade immediately back, forming
them in line of battle. I attacked the enemy and drove them about two miles. Colonel McMillen's
brigade behaved most gallantly, and were led by him, he riding in advance of them and cheering
them on. After the enemy had been driven, I withdrew my troops and ordered them into camp,
leaving the position to be held by Colonel Moore, commanding the Third Division.
I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of both officers and men in the several engagements.
I regret to have to report the loss of Colonel Wilkin, of the Ninth Minnesota, commanding
Second Brigade, who, although he had been with the command but a short time had already
endeared himself to both officers and men by his high-toned bearing and gentlemanly conduct.
I inclose herewith a sketch of the battle-field and reports of brigade commanders.
A list of casualties has already been forwarded to you.
I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOS. A. MOWER,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Capt. J. HOUGH,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Right Wing, Sixteenth Army Corps.
HDQRS. FIRST BRIG., FIRST DIV., 16TH ARMY CORPS,
Memphis, Tenn., July 24, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following statement of the part taken by this
command in the late expedition to Tupelo, Miss., under Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith, commanding
Right Wing, Sixteenth Army Corps:
The troops were embarked on cars at the depot of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad on
the morning of the 22d of June, and proceeded to Grissom's Bridge, where they camped for the
night, and the following day marched to Moscow, where they remained several days, and moved
to La Grange. On the 5th instant we left the latter place, camping for the night at Davis' Mills,
and the following day took up the line of march in a southeasterly direction toward the Mobile
and Ohio Railroad, reaching the vicinity of Pontotoc, Miss., without incident worthy of note, on
the morning of the 11th instant. Here the enemy was supposed to be in some force, and this
brigade was deployed, with its left resting on the main road, and moved for some distance in line.
Ascertaining that the enemy had abandoned the place, and that General Grierson was already in
possession of Pontotoc, the brigade was moved by the left flank through the town and camped on
a small stream near it, where it remained until the morning of the 13th instant, when we again
moved in the direction of Tupelo. During the afternoon of this day I was furiously assailed near
Camargo Cross-Roads, on the right flank, taking my troops by surprise. The Seventy-second and
Ninety-fifth Ohio and One hundred and fourteenth Illinois
Infantry were quickly formed in line,
25
gallantly charging the enemy and driving him in confusion from the field. In this engagement (as
I afterward learned with the whole of Bell's rebel brigade) I was promptly assisted by the Second
Iowa Battery, Lieutenant Reed commanding, whose promptness and gallantry cannot be too
highly praised. I am also indebted to Colonel Wilkin, then commanding the Second Brigade, for
prompt assistance in sending to my relief the Ninth Minnesota Infantry, who did effective
service. The officers and men of that portion of my command engaged deserve commendation
for the gallantry with which they met the enemy and the handsome manner in which he was
repulsed and driven. My loss in this affair was about 35 officers and men killed and wounded.
The brigade then moved to Harrisonburg, near Tupelo, and camped for the night.
The next morning, the 14th instant, the troops were under arms at 3 a.m., my brigade in
reserve on the extreme right and rear of our position, and, with the exception of the Tenth
Minnesota Infantry, it was not engaged in the battle on that day.
On the morning of the 15th the regiments composing the brigade were moved about the field
into various positions, and although at times subjected to a heavy artillery fire from the enemy,
were not brought into immediate contact with him.
In the movement northward from Tupelo, on the 15th instant, my brigade had the rear of the
entire infantry column, and was the last to leave the battle-field. We marched some five miles
without molestation to Town Creek, where we found the train parked and the column halted.
The rear regiment of my brigade had just crossed the creek, when a sharp attack was made upon
the cavalry rear guard, which was driven hastily and in confusion from the field and through my
ranks, the enemy advancing rapidly in large force, planting a battery, the shell from which
reached the train. I at once formed the Seventy-second Ohio, Ninety-fifth Ohio, One hundred and
fourteenth Illinois, and Ninety-third Indiana Infantry in line, put Battery E into position, and by
direction of Brig. Gen. J. A. Mower, commanding division, charged the enemy, who was then
within close range, driving the cavalry in great confusion before him. The Tenth Minnesota
Infantry, being in advance, did not reach the point of formation in time to charge with us, but
afterward joined us on the field. Notwithstanding the confusion occasioned by a large number of
led horses and demoralized cavalrymen passing through my ranks, the heavy artillery fire of the
enemy, and a stampeded train, my line did not for a moment falter, but more as rapidly and
regularly forward as the nature of the ground over which we passed would permit. Getting
through the cavalry and seeing nothing but the enemy before us, the order to charge was given,
and, with a loud cheer, my men dashed forward, driving the enemy, who was in superior force
and commanding position, from the field.
I cannot praise too highly the conduct of the officers and men of the regiments making the
charge. They all nobly and bravely performed their duty. Capt. B. C. Berry, commanding One
hundred and fourteenth Illinois Infantry, received a wound which compelled him to retire from
the field. Maj. Eugene A. Rawson, commanding Seventy-second Ohio Veteran Infantry, received
a wound from which he has since died. In the death of Major Rawson the army and the country
have sustained an irreparable loss. Young, accomplished, and possessed of that chivalrous nature
which leads to deeds of high daring, he gave promise of rising to positions of honor and
usefulness. The idol of his regiment and beloved by this entire command, his death has caused a
void which will never be filled. He fell at the head of his command in the fierce tempest of
battle, leaving an example worthy the emulation of the bravest, and a name which his country
and friends will be honored in cherishing. To Capt. S. N. Shoup, who succeeded Captain Berry
in command of the One hundred and fourteenth Illinois Infantry, and Captain Snyder, who
assumed command of the Seventy-second Ohio Infantry after Major Rawson was wounded, too
much praise cannot be awarded for their personal gallantry and the able, effective manner in
which they handled their commands. Capt. James Kilbourne,
Ninety-fifth Ohio Infantry, on the
26
skirmish line, and Capt. S. Elliott, Ninety-third Indiana Infantry, were conspicuous for their
efficiency and daring.
From this time until we reached our camps at Memphis, on the 22d instant, nothing of special
interest occurred. The march home was fatiguing, owing to the heat, dust, and scanty supply of
water and provisions.
Capt. J. Fernald, Seventy-second Ohio Infantry, picket officer; Lieut. O. H. Abel, acting
assistant adjutant-general; Lieuts. J. Barber, Ninety-fifth Ohio Infantry, and T. Livings, Ninetythird
Indiana Infantry, aides-de-camp; Lieutenant Hosmer, One hundred and thirteenth Illinois
Infantry, acting assistant inspector-general, composing the staff of this brigade, deserve special
mention for their uniform devotion to duty and the coolness and bravery with which they
conducted themselves in action. It affords me pleasure to recommend them for favorable notice,
and as officers worthy of promotion.
My casualties are as follows: 1 commissioned officer killed, 6 wounded; 15 enlisted men
killed, 71 wounded, and 5 missing in action, a detailed report of which has already been
forwarded.
I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. L. McMILLEN,
Colonel Ninety-fifth Ohio Infantry, Commanding.
Capt. J. B. SAMPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
HEADQUARTERS 114TH ILLINOIS VOLUNTEERS,
Memphis, Tenn., July 23, 1864.
COLONEL: In obedience to your order of the 22d, I have the honor to submit the following
statement of the part taken by my regiment in the late expedition to and from Tupelo:
We left Memphis, Tenn., on the 25th of June and arrived at La Grange on the 27th, nothing
worthy of note transpiring on the way. On the 5th of July we again moved onward, making easy
marches. We arrived at Pontotoc on the 11th, my men being greatly improved in both health and
spirits. On the morning of the 13th we again took up the line of march toward Tupelo, my
regiment being in the rear of the brigade. About noon the brigade was halted until the entire
wagon train had moved past, when we again moved forward, my regiment being placed in the
rear of the Second Iowa Battery, with orders from you to support it. The brigade receiving a
spirited attack on the right flank, and the battery in imminent peril, the advance of the enemy
being within a few rods, my regiment was formed in the rear of the battery, the men forming in
fine order and good time. The farther advance of the enemy was checked by the time I had my
line formed by the energetic action of the battery itself. We were then ordered forward to the
support of the Seventy-second and Ninety-fifth Ohio Regiments, who were hotly pressed by the
enemy. Arriving on the ground we were ordered, in connection with the other two regiments, to
charge, which was done in gallant style, and the enemy was driven from the field, our loss being
3 killed and 10 wounded. We then moved forward until near Tupelo, where we went into camp
for the night. During the operations of the 14th my regiment was not brought into action, but was
held in reserve. Being somewhat exposed to the enemy's artillery we lost, by the explosion of
one of their shells, 2 men killed and 1 wounded severely. During the operations of the morning
of the 15th my regiment was not brought into immediate action, but, upon leaving the ground
with the Ninety-third Indiana, composed the rear guard of the infantry force. About 5 o'clock in
the afternoon an assault was made by the enemy on the rear of the column. Our brigade, except
the Tenth Minnesota, was ordered to charge them, which was done, and the enemy, who had a
largely superior force, was driven back near a mile in
perfect rout. During this charge my
27
regiment, occupying an exposed position in the line, suffered severely, 7 men being killed and 15
wounded; most of them very severely wounded. I was here myself wounded, and for the balance
of the expedition the command devolved upon Capt. Samuel N. Shoup, after which the regiment
was not engaged in any operations of particular note.
In conclusion, I wish to bear testimony to the gallant bearing of both officers and men.
Although the personal bravery and efficiency of many is worthy of special mention, yet where all
so nobly did their duty to particularize would be unjust.
I have the honor to remain, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
B. C. BERRY,
Captain, Commanding.
Col. W. L. MCMILLEN,
Comdg. First Brigade, First Division, Sixteenth Army Corps.
HEADQUARTERS NINETY-THIRD INDIANA VOLUNTEERS,
Memphis, Tenn., July 25, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the Ninety-third
Regiment in the late expedition:
On the morning of the 22d of June left Memphis by railroad to Grissom's Bridge and
encamped. On 23d marched to Moscow. Left Moscow 28th; marched to La Grange, Tenn. Left
La Grange on the 5th of July, marching in a southerly direction, passing through Ripley, and
arrived at Pontotoc on July 12 in the morning and encamped.
On the morning of the 13th resumed our march in a northeasterly direction. In the afternoon,
hearing heavy firing in our rear, my regiment being in advance of the brigade, we were ordered
forward to guard Third Division train. Two companies detailed to guard our brigade train
marched about five miles, when we found Third Division in line of battle. Here parked the train;
reported to Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith for orders. Ordered to form line in support of Third Indiana
Battery on the extreme right of the line, where we remained until daylight of the 14th, when
ordered by General Mower to move in rear of the Sixth Indiana Battery, with my left resting on
the road. We remained in this position until ordered by Colonel McMillen to support
Waterhouse's battery, where we remained about one hour under a heavy fire of the enemy; then
ordered by Colonel McMillen across the road, on the extreme right of the road, where we
remained until the fire of the enemy ceased, without a chance to fire a gun at the enemy. In the
afternoon we were ordered, with the Tenth Minnesota, under the command of Lieutenant-
Colonel Jennison, to guard the train. We took our position south of the train in the woods; sent
two companies on picket and remained during the night of the 14th.
On the morning of the 15th the enemy advanced and skirmishing commenced by our pickets,
under command of Lieutenant Noel, Company I, supported on the right by the Ninth Illinois
Cavalry, when the enemy were driven back; when ordered by Colonel McMillen to change our
position to that occupied by us in the morning, where we formed on the right of the Second
Brigade, with orders, if heavy firing was heard in our front, to move and support Waterhouse's
battery, where we remained until ordered to the extreme front, and took our position on the left
of the brigade, when we fixed bayonets and ordered, in case the enemy charged our lines, to
move across the road, and hold the road at all hazards. Sent two companies out as skirmishers,
under command of Capt. William Lamb, Company K, when the enemy opened fire on us with
shell, without doing any damage, when I was ordered to withdraw from the field. Captain Berry,
commanding One hundred and fourteenth Illinois, and myself were ordered to protect the rear,
my regiment being in the extreme rear, three companies marching in rear of Waterhouse's
battery, the remainder of my regiment marching in two
ranks on each side of the battery, in
28
which position we continued until we arrived at Old Town Creek, my men overmuch fatigued, it
being very hot and dusty. The first intimation we had of the enemy was a shell bursting in the
rear of our regiment, when we immediately formed in the forks of the road, the Fourth Iowa
Cavalry falling back and passing through our line, saying that they did not fight on foot, when
we were ordered forward, crossing Old Town Creek four times before meeting the enemy, which
we found on the right of the road in a stubble field, when we were ordered to charge, which we
did, driving the enemy before us, passing over the enemy's dead and wounded on the field. Being
considerably in advance of the line, I discovered the enemy on our left flank and in front of the
One hundred and fourteenth Illinois. I ordered an oblique fire to the left, the enemy falling back
on the road, posting themselves behind a fence in our front, when we charged them and drove
them from their position, killing and wounding numbers of them and taking a few prisoners,
which were taken charge of by the Third Iowa Cavalry, the enemy retreating in utter confusion,
breaking their guns, pursued by our regiment until ordered to halt by General Mower, at the crest
of the hill, no enemy to be seen----our loss being 6 men slightly wounded and 6 sunstruck--when
we were ordered into camp by Colonel McMillen, where we arrived at dark, both officers and
men being worn down with fatigue, all having done their duty well.
On the morning of the 16th took up line of march for La Grange, by the way of Salem,
nothing of importance occurring. We arrived at La Grange on the 21st and took the cars for
Memphis in the afternoon. Arrived at Memphis on the 22d.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
C. A. HUBBARD,
Captain, Comdg. Ninety-third Indiana Volunteer Infantry.
Col. W. L. MCMILLEN,
Comdg. First Brig., First Division, Sixteenth Army Corps.
HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., FIRST DIV., 16TH ARMY CORPS,
Memphis, Tenn., July 22, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of operations of this brigade during
the late expedition:
The brigade left La Grange, Tenn., on the 5th instant, then being under command of Col.
Alexander Wilkin, Ninth Minnesota Infantry Volunteers, and continued on during the very hot
weather.
On the 13th instant, while on the march from Pontotoc to Tupelo, word was brought forward
to Colonel Wilkin that the rear had been attacked, and that the enemy were passing by our
brigade and occasionally firing upon it and the brigade teams from a cross-road. He immediately
deployed the Eleventh Missouri Volunteers and Forty-seventh Illinois Volunteers, and with them
held the road until the train had passed. Meantime, the remainder of the brigade had been formed
in line of battle, on an open field to the left of the road and facing to the rear. This done under
orders from General Mower, and shortly after moved back on the road some distance, and
remained until the train had all passed, when we were ordered to proceed on the march. After
going about a mile and a half or two miles we heard heavy firing in the front, and soon learned
that the First Brigade had been attacked. We pushed ahead, passing the ambulances containing
wounded brought up from the rear. The Second Iowa Battery had been in the advance, and were
now playing upon the rebels as rapidly as their guns could be loaded, and, as afterward
ascertained, did good execution. Orders soon came for one regiment of the Second Brigade to
enter the wood on the right of the First Brigade. The Ninth Minnesota formed line and entered
the wood through a corn-field, but before they had taken their position a force was seen coming
around between us and the First Brigade, and so much
dressed like our own men our fire was
29
reserved some time, as it was impossible to distinguish them. Satisfied that they were rebels,
Colonel Wilkin directed the Ninth to fire, and so completely surprised were the enemy that they
fled in the utmost confusion, leaving many killed and wounded on the field. The Forty-seventh
Illinois was now brought up, formed on the right of the Ninth Minnesota, and together advanced
until the halt was ordered and they returned. The detachment of the Fifth Minnesota and Eighth
Wisconsin had been ordered to support the Second Iowa Battery, and did so until word was
brought from the First Brigade that they needed assistance, when they were sent ahead, and
rejoined us on the march. They were not placed forward, as the enemy had retreated when they
were brought up. The Eleventh Missouri Infantry were held back as a reserve until General
Mower ordered them into the woods in rear of the Ninth Minnesota and Forty-seventh Illinois,
but by the time they had taken their position these regiments were retiring, and the Eleventh was
ordered to join them.
Nothing further occurred until the next day, when the battle of Harrisburg was fought. The
Second Brigade was held as a reserve, and formed in two lines immediately in rear of the Fourth
Brigade and in a valley. We were, while there, under a heavy fire from the guns of the enemy,
their shell, canister, &c., passing over the advanced forces and exploding around us. The Fortyseventh
Illinois and Eleventh Missouri were ordered out on the right of the train to protect it
from an attack on that side, and remained in that position until the following day. It was after
placing these two regiments in position that Colonel Wilkin went forward to attend to the half of
the brigade, and was killed upon reaching the right of his line, a minie-ball passing through his
body from the left side to the right. Upon hearing of his death, I assumed command of the
brigade, and after throwing out skirmishers in front of the corral, and my line on the right of the
teams, I rode forward in time to take out the Ninth Minnesota and detachments of Fifth
Minnesota and Eighth Wisconsin, when the rebels were driven back. We remained in our
position that night, a night attack being expected. The Second Iowa Battery, Lieutenant Reed
commanding, had been placed in an exposed position during the entire battle, but had kept up
their fire and held their position during the hottest of the firing in a manner most praiseworthy
and highly commendable.
The morning of the 15th, while making preparations to march, the enemy were seen to be
advancing, and, by order of General Mower, the Fifth Minnesota and Eighth Wisconsin and
Ninth Minnesota were thrown out to the earth-works on the left of the Third Brigade, the
detachments occupying the works, while the Ninth was thrown to the left and rear of them,
protecting the left flank. Our skirmishers on the extreme left were not driven in, but were under
very heavy fire. Those immediately in front were driven in and some sharp firing was kept up
until the charge was ordered, when the rebels fled and only an occasional shot was fired.
Meantime, the remainder of the brigade had been ordered forward and placed in position with the
brigade. One section of the Second Iowa Battery was brought forward also, and shelled the
rebels in their retreat. After remaining here some time, we were ordered to take up the line of
march; nothing further occurred during our march to La Grange.
The behavior of both officers and men of this brigade was soldierly, and all orders were
obeyed cheerfully and promptly. Much praise is due to them, and especially to the Second Iowa
Battery, Lieutenant Reed commanding, for the manner in which his battery was handled and with
good effect during the entire engagement.
Killed, wounded, and missing, 35.
I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN D. McCLURE,
Colonel, Comdg. Second Brig., First Div., Sixteenth Army Corps.
Capt. J. B. SAMPLE,
30
Asst. Adjt. Gen., First Division, Sixteenth Army Corps.
HDQRS. THIRD BRIG., FIRST DIV., 16TH ARMY CORPS,
Memphis, Tenn. July 23, 1864.
I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Third Brigade in the
late expedition in Mississippi:
This brigade moved from La Grange, Tenn., with the Right Wing of the Sixteenth Army
Corps, on the morning of the 5th day of July, and entered Pontotoc, Miss., on the evening of the
11th of July, and again marched from that place on the morning of the 13th of July. Up to this
time had not been engaged with the enemy.
On the afternoon of the 13th of July we were on the march from Pontotoc to Tupelo in the
following order: The Thirty-fifth Iowa in advance, and immediately behind the brigade train of
the Second Brigade; the Thirty-third Missouri in front of the supply train, the Seventh Minnesota
and Twelfth Iowa on the flanks of the train. At 3 p.m. a volley was fired into the brigade train of
the Second Brigade and immediately in front of the Thirty-fifth Iowa. That regiment was
immediately formed in line of battle and skirmishers thrown forward, but the force which fired
from this point, and which seems to have been a small one, fled. Soon after this first volley the
enemy opened in heavy force on the right flank of the Seventh Minnesota and Twelfth Iowa,
who soon became hotly engaged with the enemy. After a sharp fight we not only repulsed the
enemy, but drove him from the field. During this action Surg. L. B. Smith, of the Seventh
Minnesota, an excellent officer, was killed. The Seventh Minnesota had I officer killed and 14
men wounded. In the Twelfth Iowa Capt. C. L. Sumbardo, a good officer, was wounded, and that
regiment had also 1 man killed, 11 men wounded, and 1 man missing. The same day the Thirtythird
Missouri had 2 men wounded. Total loss this day, 1 officer killed, 1 officer wounded, 1
man killed and 27 men wounded and 1 man missing.
On the morning of the 14th of July this army had taken a position near Tupelo, Miss. The
brigade was disposed in the following order: On the right the Thirty-fifth Iowa, then the Thirtythird
Missouri, then the Twelfth Iowa, the left of the Twelfth Iowa resting on the Pontotoc road.
The Seventh Minnesota was placed in reserve in rear of the line. At 9 o'clock the enemy in heavy
force advanced upon our line, and attacked us warmly with artillery and musketry. Our men
without any wavering returned the fire. A fierce engagement was kept up for three hours, when
our whole brigade charged the enemy, driving him from the field and getting possession of his
killed and wounded, who lay thick upon the field. We also captured at this time several
prisoners, and 1 stand of colors, which fell into the hands of the Thirty-third Missouri. We
remained in our advanced position until it became evident the enemy was not likely to attack
soon again, when we returned to our original position. During this attack the Twelfth Iowa
exhausted their ammunition. The Seventh Minnesota relieved them until in turn the ammunition
of the Seventh Minnesota became exhausted. During this action the Twelfth Iowa had an
excellent officer, Lieut. A. A. Burdick, killed. The Twelfth Iowa lost during the day 6 men killed
and 39 men wounded. The Seventh Minnesota lost 7 men killed, 1 officer wounded, and 33 men
wounded. The Thirty-third Missouri lost 1 officer wounded, 1 man killed, and 17 men wounded.
The Thirty-fifth Iowa lost 3 men killed and 33 men wounded.
On the morning of the 15th of July the Thirty-third Missouri and Seventh Minnesota were in
line on the right of the Pontotoc road, the Twelfth Iowa and Thirty-fifth Iowa on the left of said
road, all behind temporary breast-works. In this position the brigade was ordered to remain
concealed and to reserve their fire until the enemy arrived to within fifty yards of our lines. The
enemy advancing opened a warm fire on us, but at length it becoming evident that he would not
charge our lines or advance to the prescribed distance, a
charge was ordered by the general
31
commanding the division. The men charged with a will, when the enemy fled precipitately.
During the action we lost from the Twelfth Iowa, 1 man killed and 2 men wounded; in Seventh
Minnesota, 1 officer killed and 4 men wounded; in the Thirty-third Missouri, 1 man killed and 14
men wounded; in the Thirty-fifth Iowa, 1 man killed. The heat was intense and there were some
cases of sunstroke.
During these various actions the regimental commanders, Colonel Hill, Thirty-fifth Iowa;
Colonel Marshall, Seventh Minnesota; Lieuten-ant-Colonel Heath, Thirty-third Missouri; and
Lieutenant-Colonel Stibbs, Twelfth Iowa Volunteers, displayed the utmost coolness and bravery,
and discharged all their duties with alacrity. In this they were well sustained by the field and line
officers of their command, whilst the men proved themselves worthy of the highest praise for
their heroic conduct. Acting Brigade Surg. S. W. Huff was very faithful and efficient in his
duties with the wounded.
I return my thanks to the members of my staff, Lieuts. H. Hoover. N. E. Duncan, R. M. Reed,
and L. F. Creitz for the aid they rendered me in the performance of their duties, though at times I
was deficient in aid on the field in consequence of staff officers being physically unable to
perform the needed services.
During these various actions the brigade lost: Officers--killed, 3; wounded, 3. Enlisted men--
killed, 21; wounded, 167; missing, 3. Total loss, 197.
At 2 p.m. of the 15th of July the brigade moved out on the Ellistown road, going into camp at
5 p.m., about six miles from the battle-field. With no further engagement with the enemy we
arrived at La Grange, Tenn., July 21, 1864.
Besides this loss in the above actions the following casualties occurred during the expedition:
July 8, in Thirty-third Missouri, 1 enlisted man wounded by accident (since died); in Thirty-fifth
Iowa, 1 enlisted man wounded by accident; July 20, in Seventh Minnesota, 1 man wounded by
accident, and 1 man missing on the march since July 11.
Respectfully submitted.
J. J. WOODS,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.
Capt. J. B. SAMPLE,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., First Division, Sixteenth Army Corps.
HDQRS. TWELFTH IOWA INFANTRY VETERAN VOLS.,
La Grange, Tenn, July 21, 1864.
LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to make the following report of the action taken by the
Twelfth Regiment Iowa Infantry Veteran Volunteers in the actions near Tupelo, Miss., on the
13th, 14th, and 15th instant:
On the 13th instant, at about 2 p.m., while marching as guard for the supply train and support
for Mueller's Sixth Indiana Battery, we were heavily attacked on our right flank by Mabry's
Mississippi brigade, at a point on the road where the timber and underbrush were so dense as to
make it almost impossible to maneuver the men. Having learned by my flankers the point at
which the enemy were striking, I moved my command so as to meet their front fairly, and then as
nearly as possible concealed my men in the brush and awaited the attack. We allowed the enemy
to advance without firing a shot until within twenty paces, when we suddenly poured a sweeping
volley full in their ranks. This threw them into confusion, and after a sharp fight of twenty
minutes we drove them from our front with heavy loss. Their colors were left on the ground, but
we failed to secure them as we were compelled to march to support the battery. They were
subsequently picked up by the Fourteenth Wisconsin Infantry. Our loss during this action was 1
man killed, 1 officer and 11 men wounded, and 1 man
missing.
32
On the morning of the 14th instant, at Tupelo, in accordance with instructions from your
headquarters, I posted my command on the right of the Pontotoc road, forming the extreme left
of the First Division, and was supported by the Seventh Minnesota Infantry. In front of and
running parallel with our line was a heavy rail fence, which we threw down in such a manner as
to form a good protection against small-arms. My regiment was the first to receive the enemy's
attack, and we held our position, under a heavy fire, for about two hours, when our ammunition
became exhausted; we were ordered to the rear, and our place taken by the Seventh Minnesota
Infantry. Companies E and H having been furnished with ammunition were allowed to remain at
the front, and were thus kept constantly engaged during the entire action. After a rest of about
forty-five minutes, and receiving a fresh supply of ammunition, we again moved forward and
took position in front, where we remained until ordered to charge, when we moved forward on
the double-quick, driving the enemy from our front and capturing a number of prisoners. Our
loss during the day was 1 officer and 6 men killed and 39 men wounded. We consumed during
the engagement over 100 rounds of ammunition per man. The men of my command behaved
nobly, and as an evidence of the cool, deliberate, and accurate manner in which our fire was
delivered, t would refer you to the great number of the enemy's dead that were strewn in front of
the line occupied by my regiment. Lieut. A. A. Burdick, acting regimental quartermaster, who
was killed, had been ordered to the rear with his train; but after seeing his wagons properly
parked, he came to the front and volunteered to assist in bringing forward ammunition. While
thus engaged he was struck by a shell and instantly killed.
On the morning of the 15th instant my regiment was assigned a position to the left of the
Pontotoc road, and formed the left center of the brigade line. We had a substantial breast-work of
cotton bales formed in our front, which served as an admirable protection against the enemy's
sharpshooters. We took full part in the fight and charge of the day, losing 1 man killed and 3
wounded.
Our loss during the three days' fighting was 1 officer and 8 men killed, 1 officer and 54 men
wounded, and 1 man missing.
My command numbered in the first day's fight 295 muskets, on the second day 250, and on
the third day about 200.
I cannot consistently make particular mention of any members of the regiment as every man
was at his post and all conducted themselves in a creditable manner.
I inclose herewith a list of the casualties for the three days.
I am, lieutenant, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNO. H. STIBBS,
Lieut. Col., Comdg. Twelfth Iowa Veteran Volunteer Infty.
Lieut. H. HOOVER,
Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., Third Brig., First Div., 16th Army Corps.
HEADQUARTERS THIRTY-FIFTH IOWA INFANTRY,
La Grange, Tenn., July 21, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor of submitting the following report of the operations of the Thirty-fifth
Regiment Iowa Volunteer Infantry for July 13, 14, and 15:
The regiment being in the advance of the brigade on the 13th, I was ordered to guard the
Second Brigade teams. At 4.30 p.m. we received a volley of musketry from the enemy on our
right flank. I immediately halted the regiment and formed in line of battle, and sent forward a
line of skirmishers some 500 yards in advance of the regiment. The enemy had retreated. After
waiting some fifteen minutes I returned to the road and started on with the tram. I was
immediately ordered by General Mower to fall back and
occupy my former position in the
33
timber. In a few minutes I was ordered to move down the road about half a mile. Soon after I
received orders to move up the road as guard to the Sixth Indiana Battery. No casualties during
the day.
On the 14th I was ordered to take position on the right of the brigade to support the Second
Iowa Battery; we occupied this position until 9.30 a.m., when we received a severe fire from the
enemy. Then I received orders to advance in line of battle on the enemy. After advancing some
500 yards we halted, where we found many dead and wounded rebels, also a large number of
arms, which we destroyed. At 10.15 a.m. I received orders to move off by the left flank and retire
to our former position, leaving companies K and C as skirmishers. Killed, 4; wounded, 22.
On the 15th I received orders to take a position on the left of the Twelfth Iowa in rear of a
barricade thrown up by the Third Division. Remained in this position till 9.30 a.m., when we
were ordered to fix bayonets and charge the enemy, which was done in earnest by the men and
officers, but no enemy was found in force. After advancing some three-quarters of a mile I was
ordered to halt and rest the men. At 11 a.m. I was ordered to retire and take my regular position
in the brigade. Killed, 1; wounded, 10. The following is the list of casualties for the 13th, 14th,
and 15th of July, 1864.
Your obedient servant,
S. G. HILL,
Colonel, Commanding Regiment.
Lieut. HENRY HOOVER,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. SEVENTH REGT. MINNESOTA INFANTRY VOLS.,
La Grange, Tenn., July 22, 1864.
LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part performed by the
Seventh Regiment Minnesota Infantry Volunteers in late actions near Tupelo, Miss.:
About 3 p.m. on the 13th the enemy attacked the right flank of our column on the Pontotoc
and Tupelo road. The Seventh Minnesota was engaged successfully in repelling this attack. We
were marching by the left flank on the right of the road, covering the supply train. The left two
companies, Captains Kennedy and Stevens, opposite head of supply train, kept on with the train
as it was hurried forward. The remaining eight companies were formed in line near the road,
taking cover momentarily behind a fence, and opened fire on the enemy. Captain O'Donnell, of
General Mower's staff, rode up and ordered the regiment to advance and drive the enemy back.
This was promptly done, the line charging at double-quick across an old field. The ground was in
part covered by bushes that marked the course of a dry brook. We dislodged the enemy on the
left from cover of this copse and on the right from a hill that commanded the road, and drove him
out of range of the road into the woods beyond the field. Captain O'Donnell at one time ordered
the right of the line to fall back, but subsequently advanced it again. We held our advanced
position until the train passed and we were ordered to return and move on to Tupelo. The enemy
had entirely withdrawn from our front before we returned to road. The regiment and the service
sustained a heavy loss in the death of Surg. Lucius B. Smith, who was instantly killed by the first
volley from the enemy. We lost 14 men wounded in this affair.
On the morning of the 14th, when the battle opened at Harrisburg, my regiment, except two
companies, was placed in the second line, in the edge of the woods on the west front of our camp
or army position. My right two companies (Captain Banks and Lieutenant Hoag) were placed in
the first line, on the left of Twelfth Iowa, the left of both lines resting on the Pontotoc and Tupelo
road, the right joining the Thirty-third Missouri and Thirty-fifth Iowa (which lay at right angles
fronting north-northwest). With the Twelfth Iowa Captain
Banks' and Lieutenant Hoag's
34
companies were advanced to the fence, on rise of ground a few rods in front of original position,
and engaged the enemy, who in heavy force and with terrible fire was advancing upon us. These
companies fought throughout the day with the gallant Twelfth Iowa. When the ammunition of
the first line was exhausted my eight companies (the second line)advanced and relieved them.
Many of the noble boys of the Twelfth Iowa remained on the line, whose fire, added to my full
line, swelled the volume of musketry on our side. Within fifteen minutes after my line opened
fire that of the enemy perceptibly slackened, but did not for a moment intermit during the full
hour that we fought them. My men went in with forty rounds of ammunition. When this began to
fail I got up a fresh supply. The miserable quality of the powder caused the guns to foul, so that
many became unserviceable, the balls sticking half way down. We had fired fifty to sixty rounds
when the Twelfth Iowa and my two right companies in turn relieved us. We retired not over five
rods. Soon after we charged forward across the field with the Twelfth Iowa, the latter obliquing
to the left, my line to the right. The enemy's dead were strewn thick on the field before us. His
line had fallen back, and after we had advanced a third of a mile, and remained perhaps an hour,
we returned. We built a better breast-work, which did us good service the next day, out of the old
fence behind which we had fought. Two companies, B and F, were sent out in our front half a
mile as a picket. These were relieved at night by Companies D, A, and C. The remaining
companies occupied the line of breast-works the remainder of the day and night of the 14th and
during the attack of the 15th, constituting the first line of our brigade. When the enemy drove in
our cavalry the morning of 15th and advanced upon us we were ordered to fix bayonets and
reserve fire until the enemy should get within fifty yards, then to rise up, fire, and charge upon
him. The enemy came to the crest of the ridge, 200 yards in front of us, from under cover of
which and the woods on our right and the trees bordering the road on our left, for about threequarters
of an hour, he poured a heavy fire upon us. The men lay close to the ground behind our
low breast-works and were protected. It became evident that the enemy would not advance
farther, and we were ordered, with the entire brigade, to charge out on him. This was done with a
shout, but the enemy got out of the way faster than we could pursue. The line halted half a mile
out, and Companies E and I of my regiment advanced as skirmishers. Lieutenant Hardy,
commanding Company E, a most gallant fellow, was killed in this skirmish line. The enemy had
withdrawn, and we were ordered to join the column that had then taken up the line of march on
the return. The regiment was not again under fire. The fire of my right companies, E and I, cut
down a flag of the enemy that was picked up by the Thirty-third Missouri, the latter first passing
over the ground to my right where the flag lay.
I gladly testify to the firmness and courage of every officer and man of the regiment. My
acknowledgments are specially due Lieutenant-Colonel Bradley, Major Burt, and Adjutant
Trader (the latter disabled by sunstroke in the charge on 14th) for gallant and efficient service on
the field. Surgeons Ames and Mattock were active and faithful in performance of their
appropriate duties. Regimental Quartermaster Bolcorn brought forward ammunition, rendering
every necessary service in his line. Chaplain Edwards was diligent in caring for the wounded.
A report of casualties has heretofore been furnished you, viz, 2 officers and 7 men killed, 52
enlisted men wounded (1 since died), and 1 missing in action. On outward march, July 11,1 man
was missing, and on return march, July 20, 1 man severely wounded by accidental discharge of
gun, making total casualties on expedition 64.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. R. MARSHALL,
Colonel, Commanding Seventh Minnesota Infantry.
Lieut. H. HOOVER,
Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., Third Brig., First Div, 16th Army
Corps.
35
HEADQUARTERS THIRTY-THIRD MISSOURI VOLUNTEERS,
La Grange, Tenn., July 21, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the Thirty-third
Missouri Infantry in the skirmish of the 13th instant and the battles of the 14th and 15th instant,
at and near Tupelo, Miss.:
On the morning of the 13th the regiment was ordered to move in rear of Thirty-fifth Iowa,
and was followed by the Seventh Minnesota and Twelfth Iowa, the two latter being disposed
upon the flank of the general supply train. During the forenoon the train of Third Brigade was
ordered to move between the Thirty-fifth Iowa and Thirty-third Missouri, and I received orders
to hold my regiment in readiness to repel an attack of the enemy upon the right flank. Shortly
afterward an attack was made upon the Thirty-fifth Iowa in front of me, and that regiment
charged the enemy at once, driving him from the position he had assumed. Immediately
afterward another body of the enemy attacked the Seventh Minnesota and Twelfth Iowa directly
in my rear, but not apparently in great force. I immediately ordered Company C, Captain
Campbell, out to skirmish the woods upon the right flank, and while arranging to meet an attack
on my line, or to move back to support, if necessary, the regiments of the brigade engaged, I
received orders from Colonel Woods, commanding brigade, to move forward at once with the
train, this order being succeeded directly by an order to move double-quick and get the train as
far on as possible. I had moved less than half a mile when orders overtook me to halt by the
roadside and allow the train to pass, this order being succeeded by another to move back doublequick
to the aid of the brigade. This last order was countermanded before there was time to
execute it, and I was again ordered to move forward. Arriving at a line of battle composed of
troops of the Second Brigade, I was ordered by General Mower, commanding division, to move
into position on the right of Second Brigade. Afterward, when the column again moved forward,
I was ordered to report back to Third Brigade. No further attack was made during the march
upon my portion of the line. Casualties reported this day: Wounded, 1; missing, 1; total, 2.
On the morning of 14th instant, at about 7 o'clock, I received orders to form the regiment in
rear of Seventh Minnesota, at right angles with the line of that regiment, and act as a reserve. At
about 8 o'clock the enemy made a general attack upon our lines, moving a strong line to attack a
commanding position on my right, held by the Fourth Brigade, evidently designing to turn our
right and gain possession of the main road in our rear. My line was at right angles with the line
of Fourth Brigade, and completely enfiladed the advancing force of the enemy, which was
permitted to come within short range, when I opened fire from cover simultaneously with Fourth
Brigade, my men lying flat upon the ground and suffering but slight loss. The enemy was
effectually broken by the concentrated fire, and fled in confusion, our fire following them for
from 500 to 700 yards. In a very few minutes a new and much stronger line was observed
forming in front of the same position, and notwithstanding this line was within short range of our
artillery and constantly shelled from the time it was developed, it completed its formation and
advanced to the assault in gallant style. As before, our musketry fire was held until the enemy
came to within 200 or 300 yards, when several volleys were delivered with excellent effect,
followed by a general charge of our entire line. The enemy's last line was destroyed, and he
retreated in the greatest confusion, leaving his dead and wounded on the field. In this charge
Capt. William J. McKee, commanding Company D, was ordered to deploy his company as
skirmishers to cover a gap left between the Twelfth Iowa and Thirty-third Missouri, and came
upon a party of the enemy's sharpshooters, whom he charged and drove from cover, killing and
wounding several of them, and capturing a rebel color (supposed
to have belonged to the Sixth
36
Mississippi), which the enemy were endeavoring to recover from the hand of their dead color
bearer. Casualties of the regiment: Killed, 1; wounded, 18; total, 19.
On the morning of the 15th I received orders to form the same front as on the 14th, but about
100 yards to the left of my previous position, and to reserve fire until the enemy arrived within
fifty yards. At about 9.30 a.m. the cavalry, who had been skirmishing in our front, retired to the
rear of our lines, followed by the enemy's skirmishers, who took advantageous positions at 75
and 100 yards, and kept up a continual fire upon such of our men as were exposed, their main
line advancing to position for a charge under their cover. At this moment a heavy volley from the
Fourth Brigade, which occupied the same position to my line as on the previous day, gave
warning of our strength and position to the enemy, who immediately commenced to withdraw
his main line, at the same time advancing his skirmishers, who opened a hotter fire than before.
Perceiving that the main line would not come to within the prescribed distance (fifty yards), I
immediately ordered three sharpshooters from each company of the regiment to reply to the
enemy's skirmishers (whose fire had already killed and wounded 7 of my men), and thus
succeeded in a few moments in silencing and driving them back, killing and wounding more than
double the number I had lost. As the enemy's skirmishers retired a general charge of our line was
ordered, and the enemy driven from the field in great confusion, after suffering heavy loss.
Casualties in the regiment: Killed, 1; wounded, 14; total, 15 (2 wounded since died).
Recapitulation: Killed, 2; wounded, 33; missing, 1; total, 36.
I desired especially to commend the indomitable cheerfulness and gallantry of both officers
and men during the entire expedition, enduring the hardships of a most fatiguing march, five
days of the time upon one-third rations, and making charges upon double-quick for several
hundred yards under a broiling midday sun. Their gallantry in battle also deserves especial
mention, for they faithfully obeyed every order, not least among which was that to reserve their
fire when their comrades were falling among them from the cowardly fire of the enemy's lurking
sharpshooters. Every officer present did his whole duty.
In order that credit may fall where it is due, I give the name and command of each: Maj.
George W. Van Beek, Adjt. S. Edward Day, Surg. A. T. Bartlett, operating surgeon at division
hospital; Asst. Surg. M. Kile, on duty with Thirty-fifth Iowa; Quartermaster L. Armstrong, in
charge of train and ammunition; A. J. Campbell, captain Company C, commanding company;
William J. McKee, captain Company D, commanding company; George H. Tracy, captain
Company I, commanding company; Elias S. Schenck, captain Company K, commanding
company; Henry Rose, captain Company H, commanding company; Henry H. Knowlton, first
lieutenant Company K, commanding Company B; Henry Cochran, first lieutenant Company H,
commanding Company A; Thomas Rutledge, first lieutenant Company G, commanding
company; Charles L. Draper, first lieutenant Company E, commanding company; Edgar L.
Allen, second lieutenant Company F, commanding company; Isaac S. Coe, first lieutenant
Company I, slightly wounded on 14th instant, but rejoined his company before the charge was
made; Commissary Sergt. J. William Wells, active in supplying ammunition. Every noncommissioned
officer and private present with the regiment during the battles did good and
meritorious service. Several cases of sunstroke occurred during the battles of 14th and 15th,
which prostrated the sufferers during the remainder of the march.
For a full list of casualties, I would refer you to the list sent in immediately after the fights.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
WM. H. HEATH,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Regiment.
Lieut. HENRY HOOVER,
Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., Third Brigade, First Division.
37
HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Memphis, Tenn. July 30, 1864.
MAJOR: I have the honor to make the following report of the action, marches, and part taken
by the troops of the Third Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, in the late expedition to Tupelo;
Miss.:
In compliance with orders from the general commanding Right Wing, Sixteenth Army Corps,
as fast as the troops of the division were paid, I moved them by rail to Moscow, Tenn., and
encamped near the river. On the 27th of June the command was marched to La Grange, Tenn., a
distance of eleven miles, and agreeable to orders encamped near Wolf River, at which place we
remained till the evening of 5th of July, when the command was marched to Davis' Mills, a
distance of six miles, starting early on the morning of the 6th instant, preceded by the First
Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, for Pontotoc, Miss. While there the command was almost
constantly kept under arms on account of the enemy firing upon the pickets. Left Pontotoc,
Miss., for Tupelo on the 13th instant. Upon arriving at Tupelo, Miss., First and Third Brigades,
commanded, respectively, by Col. C. D. Murray, of the Eighty-ninth Indiana Infantry
Volunteers, and Col. E. H. Wolfe, of the Fifty-second Indiana Infantry, were encamped in line
of battle on the left of the Tupelo road, the Second Brigade, commanded by Col. James I.
Gilbert, of the Twenty-seventh Iowa Infantry Volunteers, being encamped in the rear and on the
left flank of the supply train as guard for the train.
On the morning of the 14th of July, heavy firing having been heard on the picket-posts, I
ordered a line of skirmishers to be formed in front of my command. At 7 a.m., after drawing in
our skirmishers, the enemy appeared in considerable force in front of the First Brigade, Third
Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, commanded by Col. C. D. Murray, of the Eighty-ninth Indiana
Infantry Volunteers, with the unmistakable intention of capturing the batteries and driving our
line of battle in perfect disorder. The enemy were permitted to advance in solid columns upon
our line through an open field. Our lines being concealed from their view by the brow of the hill,
we were not discovered until the enemy had reached a point about twenty paces distant, when the
troops of the First Brigade, Third Division, Sixteenth Army Corps (composed of the One
hundred and twenty-second Illinois Infantry Volunteers, commanded by Col. J. I. Rinaker; the
Eighty-ninth Indiana Infantry Volunteers, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Craven; the Fiftyeighth
Illinois Infantry Volunteers, commanded by Captain Heelan the Twenty-first Missouri
Infantry Volunteers, commanded by Lieut. Col. Edwin Moore; the One hundred and nineteenth
Illinois Infantry Volunteers, commanded by Col. Thomas J. Kinney), sprang to their feet, and,
with a yell like that of demons, rushed forward, pouring into the ranks of the advancing foe a
desperate volley of musketry, causing them to flee in the utmost disorder, exclaiming, "My God!
my God!" The Third Indiana Battery, commanded by Lieutenant Burns, which was posted on the
right of the First Brigade, and Battery G. Second Illinois Light Artillery, together with the Fiftysecond
Indiana Infantry Volunteers, and the One hundred and seventy-eighth New York Infantry
Volunteers, commanded by Col. E. H. Wolfe, of the Fifty-second Indiana Infantry Volunteers,
did admirable execution by the right and left oblique firing, causing the enemy to beat a hasty
retreat in the utmost confusion. For about three hours the enemy kept shelling my lines, but was
vigorously replied to by the batteries above mentioned, and with the effect of silencing one of his
batteries, and compelling another to move out of range, which rendered their fire comparatively
harmless. After pursuing the retreating enemy to the foot of the hill in front of our position, my
lines halted, and for a few moments continued firing upon the scattered fugitives. They were
then, after all resistance had ceased on the part of the enemy, ordered to march back to their
original position in line of battle, which they did in
good order. Too much praise cannot be
38
awarded to Col. J. I. Rinaker and the officers and men of the One hundred and twenty-second
Illinois Infantry Volunteers for the gallant manner in which they met the fire of the advancing
foe. The above-named regiment being posted on the right of the First Brigade, Third Division,
Sixteenth Army Corps, and immediately on the left of the First Division, Sixteenth Army Corps,
by cross-firing on the columns advancing in front of the First Division, Sixteenth Army Corps,
dealt a deadly and murderous fire. For the balance of the day the enemy left us undisturbed until
10 p.m., when, after driving in our pickets, a considerable force of the enemy came charging in
on the left of the Third Brigade, evidently with the design of driving us from our eminence. The
One hundred and seventeenth Illinois Infantry Volunteers, commanded by Col. R. M. Moore, of
the Third Brigade, by order of Col. E. H. Wolfe, commanding brigade, moved by the left
oblique, and in this attack bore a most important part, and to them due credit should be awarded
for the prompt manner in which they met and repulsed the enemy on that occasion. The Second
Brigade, commanded by Col. James I. Gilbert (composed of the Fourteenth Iowa Infantry
Volunteers, commanded by Capt. William J. Campbell; the Twenty-fourth Missouri Infantry
Volunteers, commanded by Maj. R. W. Fyan; the Twenty-seventh Iowa Infantry, commanded by
Capt. Amos Haslip; and the Thirty-second Iowa Infantry Volunteers, commanded by Maj.
Jonathan Hutchison), being held in reserve, were not engaged until about 10 p.m., when heavy
skirmishing was heard on the left of the Third Brigade. The brigade was pushed forward in quick
time, and deployed under a severe fire of the enemy, driving them and occupying the original
position, said position being held for the remainder of the night.
On the 15th instant, at 10 a.m., I was ordered to abandon my position and move my
command on the Tupelo road in the direction of Ellistown. In the afternoon, while halting west
of Old Town Creek, the enemy appeared, and taking possession of a commanding position,
commenced shelling our train. I immediately ordered Col. James I. Gilbert with his brigade to
recross the creek, which order was promptly obeyed. The line scaled a fence, waded a stream,
nearly waist deep, of water and mud, through the thick brush and timber; waded a second stream,
as deep as the first, to the edge of a large field of growing corn, where they came in full sight of
the rebel line, which, with its battle-flags waving in the sunlight, was boldly and firmly
advancing, pouring in a destructive fire. The day being very hot, many of the men dropped by
sunstroke, but by vigorous exertions of the gallant brigade commander, James I. Gilbert, the
enemy was driven from his position with a loss of many killed and wounded. The Third Brigade,
commanded by Col. E. H. Wolfe, of the Fifty-second Indiana Infantry Volunteers, was ordered
across the creek to the support of the Second Brigade, where it took position on a ridge and on
the right of the Second Brigade, where it remained until 6 o'clock next morning. The enemy not
reappearing, I was ordered to withdraw my command and take my position in the column en
route for Ellistown.
On the 17th instant left camp near Ellistown for La Grange, arriving there on the 21st instant,
passing through New Albany and Salem. On the 22d instant I was ordered to proceed to
Collierville, where my command took the cars for Memphis, Tenn., arriving the same day,
distance marched by the command being 276 miles.
To all officers and men of the command I desire to return my heartfelt thanks for the able
manner and soldierly conduct exhibited during this expedition. To Col. C. D. Murray,
commanding First Brigade; Col. James I. Gilbert, commanding Second Brigade; and Col. E. H.
Wolfe, commanding Third Brigade, I have to express my warmest thanks and admiration for the
gallantry displayed on the field and on the march. To Lieut. James B. Comstock, acting assistant
adjutant-general of the Third Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, specially I would say he has my
heartfelt thanks for the heroic manner in which he conducted himself; ever present in the thickest
of the fight, rendering all the assistance in his power to
effect the object of the day. To Lieut.
39
Charles H. Sweeney, Lieut. Henry C. Raymond, and Lieutenant Dustin, of my personal staff, I
tender my sincere thanks for the able manner in which they discharged their duties.
A list of the casualties of my command has been furnished to the major-general
commanding.
I have the honor to be, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D. MOORE,
Colonel Twenty-first Missouri Infty. Vols., Commanding Division.
Maj. JOHN HOUGH,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Right Wing, Sixteenth Army Corps.
HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., THIRD DIV., 16TH ARMY CORPS,
Memphis, Tenn., July 24, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the Second Brigade in
the late battle with the enemy, on the 14th instant, near Tupelo, Miss.:
About 6 o'clock on the morning of the 14th I was notified by the general commanding that
the infantry of my brigade, consisting of the Fourteenth Regiment Iowa Volunteer Infantry,
commanded by Capt. William J. Campbell; the Twenty-fourth Missouri Volunteer Infantry,
commanded by Maj. Robert W. Fyan; the Twenty-seventh Regiment Iowa Volunteer Infantry,
commanded by Capt. Amos M. Haslip; and the Thirty-second Regiment Iowa Volunteer
Infantry, commanded by Maj. Jonathan Hutchison, would be held in reserve, and upon it would
devolve the duty of protecting the train parked on the left of the Pontotoc and Tupelo road. The
Third Indiana Battery, Lieut. R. Burns commanding, had been already ordered into position in
the front. My line was formed upon the left flank of the train, in the following order, from right
to left: Twenty-fourth Missouri, Twenty-seventh, Fourteenth, and Thirty-second Iowa. I
immediately ordered the regiment on the left to change front to the rear, cautioning the others to
be prepared for the same movement, and threw out a heavy line of skirmishers, extending from
the flank entirely to the rear of my line and the train. About 7 a.m. I was ordered by Colonel
Moore, commanding Third Division, to send forward two regiments of my command to support
the right of his division, then heavily pressed by the enemy. I immediately sent forward the
Twenty-fourth Missouri and Twenty-seventh Iowa, under command of Major Fyan of the
Twenty-fourth Missouri. About 8 a.m. I was ordered by General Smith to move the residue of
my command across the Tupelo road and form line upon the right flank of the Eleventh Missouri
which was promptly executed under quite a severe artillery fire from the enemy. This position
was held until 12 m., when I was ordered to move across the field and hold my command in
support of the left of the front line. At 5.30 p.m. a column of the enemy was reported advancing
upon our left, and I was ordered to deploy my brigade upon the extreme left of the front line. I
immediately executed this order, occupying an excellent position just behind the crest of a high
hill, which commanded the whole field; I threw out a line of skirmishers upon the next hill in
advance. Just after sunset, no enemy appearing, I was ordered to leave a heavy picket and
withdraw the main line into camp half a mile to the rear. About 9 o'clock in the evening my
pickets commenced skirmishing with the enemy. Without awaiting orders, I immediately ordered
the command under arms, and rode out to ascertain the strength of the attack. Finding the pickets
were driven in and that a heavy column of the enemy were advancing to force our position on the
line, I ordered up my command in quick time, deployed under a severe musketry fire from the
enemy, marched rapidly forward, driving the enemy, and occupied our original position upon the
left of the advanced line. This position was held during the night without further attack.
On the morning of the 15th my command was withdrawn and ordered to take up the line of
march on the Ripley road.
40
The officers and men throughout the entire command conducted themselves in a highly
creditable manner. I desire especially to mention the excellent service of the Third Indiana
Battery. Lieutenant Burns with his command, consisting of four guns (two 12-pounder
Napoleons and two 6-pounder James rifled), was posted in front of the First Brigade, Third
Division. About 6 o'clock in the morning, when the enemy first appeared in heavy force, the
battery shelled them with much effect. Soon afterward one gun, a 6-pounder James rifled, under
charge of Lieut. Philip McPherson, was ordered into position upon the right of the First Brigade.
The enemy now advanced in strong force and charged our lines in that part of the field, when all
four pieces from the battery opened upon them with great rapidity, and, as the field proves, with
telling effect. Lieutenant McPherson was seriously wounded whilst performing his duty at his
post. Lieutenant Burns, commanding the battery, cannot receive too much praise for his good
conduct on the field.
Appended is the list of casualties.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
JAMES I. GILBERT,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.
Lieut. JAMES B. COMSTOCK,
Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., Third Division, Sixteenth Army
HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., THIRD DIV., 16TH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, near La Grange, Tenn., July 22, 1864.
SIR: In relation to the part taken by the Second Brigade in the late engagement at Old Town
Creek, Miss., on the 15th instant, I have the honor to make the following report:
We had camped on the north side of Old Town Creek, when, about 5 p.m., the enemy
attacked the rear of the column, and from a high hill, some three-quarters of a mile upon the
opposite side of the creek, commenced shelling our camp. I received orders to move out the
infantry of my command, consisting of the Fourteenth Iowa, Capt. William J. Campbell
commanding; Twenty-seventh Iowa, Capt. Amos M. Haslip commanding; Thirty-second Iowa,
Maj. Jonathan Hutchison commanding; and Twenty-fourth Missouri, Maj. R. W. Fyan
commanding, to meet him. I immediately marched out upon the road leading back toward the
creek, and was ordered to deploy my command upon the right of the Thirty-third Regiment
Wisconsin Infantry, in a field of growing corn upon the right of the Tupelo road. I had hardly
deployed the Fourteenth and Twenty-seventh Iowa Infantry, when I received orders to move
forward in line in double-quick time. Sending a staff officer to bring forward the other two
regiments, I threw out a line of skirmishers in front, and obeyed the order with all possible
promptitude. The line scaled the fence, waded a stream nearly waist deep in water and mud,
through the thick brush and timber; waded the second stream, as deep as the first, and on through
the belt of timber to the edge of a large field of growing corn, where it came in full sight of the
rebel line, which, with its battle-flags waving in the sunlight, was boldly and firmly advancing,
pouring in a destructive fire. I at once withdrew the skirmishers to the main line, and ordered it to
fire and advance. The whole line poured in a volley, raised a shout, scaled the fence, and pressed
steadily forward in the open field, firing as they advanced. The ground was rough and ascending;
the day was very hot. By the time the line had reached the center of the field many had dropped
on the ground from heat and exhaustion, unable to rise; not a few had been borne back wounded.
The ranks had been somewhat thinned, and the rebel line in front, in excellent position, yet held
firm and kept up a continuous and severe fire. Perceiving that I might be easily flanked upon the
right should my line be much farther advanced, I sent a staff officer to find out where and why
the other two regiments of my command had been detained,
and to bring them forward on the
41
right with all possible dispatch. By this time the enemy began to waver and fall back, when our
men raised another cheer and pushed onward up the hill, firing rapidly, and, the field proved, as
we advanced over it, with excellent effect. The enemy failed to reform his line, but kept up quite
a sharp fire until driven over the hill. My line steadily advanced to the farther side of the field,
over another fence, up through the broken timber to the crest of the hill, when the firing ceased,
and I ordered the line to halt. Skirmishers were thrown out, and the exhausted but triumphant line
permitted to sit down and rest. The other two regiments now came up, who were deployed upon
the right, breaking somewhat to the rear. The enemy were driven beyond sight and no more
firing occurred, except a few desultory shots from the pickets. I held this position until sundown,
when I was ordered to move to the left and some 500 yards to the rear, where I lay all night, the
left of my line resting across the Tupelo road. About sunrise next morning it was reported that
the enemy was moving in upon the left, when I moved again to the left and formed line about
200 yards from and nearly parallel to the Tupelo road. No enemy, however, appeared, except a
few pickets, and about 6.30 a.m. I was ordered to move my command across the creek and take
up the line of march upon the Tupelo road. The enemy left 17 dead bodies upon that part of the
field over which my two regiments passed.
I have to express my warmest thanks and admiration to both officers and men of the
Fourteenth and Twenty-seventh Iowa for the gallantry which they displayed throughout the long
charge up hill, under a severe fire, driving the enemy with heavy loss nearly three-quarters of a
mile from a strong covered position; and to Lieutenant Donnan, of my staff, especially, I would
say he has my heartfelt thanks for the heroic manner in which he conducted himself, ever present
in the thickest of the fight, rendering all the assistance in his power to effect the grand object
which was so well achieved.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
JAMES I. GILBERT,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.
Lieut. JAMES B. COMSTOCK,
Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., Third Division, 16th Army Corps.
HDQRS. FOURTEENTH IOWA VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
Camp near Memphis, Tenn., July 30, 1864.
COLONEL." I have the honor to report the part taken by the Fourteenth Iowa Volunteer
Infantry in the battles of Tupelo and [Old] Town Creek, Miss., on the 14th and 15th days of July,
1864, with a list of casualties which occurred during the two engagements.
At the battle of Tupelo, on the 14th instant, my regiment being with the brigade which had
been assigned to duty as train guard, therefore, was not in the engagement during the day, but
being in range of the rebel guns my loss was 1 man killed and 2 wounded. At dark we had gone
into camp in the edge of a swamp near where we had been stationed during the day. In a few
minutes after the rebels made an advance, my regiment was ordered out with the rest of the
brigade to help drive them off, which was soon done. During this advance my loss was 1 man
wounded. We formed line where part of our troops had been stationed during the day, and
remained until morning without further annoyance.
On the 15th instant we marched from the battle-field at Tupelo to [Old] Town Creek, eight or
ten miles distant, and were about going into camp when the rebels made a rush forward, driving
our rearguard of cavalry into the camp of infantry, then planted a battery and at once commenced
shelling our camp. In a few minutes I received orders to have my regiment formed for immediate
action. This being done, the brigade was moved out and formed into line of battle in a swamp,
and then advanced, wading [Old] Town Creek, which was
about two feet deep. After passing
42
through the swamp and creek we reached a corn-field, and there met the enemy. Our boys moved
forward with a yell, which gave the rebels such a shock that their lines were at once broken, and
their men so terrified that their officers could not rally them to make a stand, although trying it
several times. The rebels were driven off in about half an hour, and the field left in our
possession. During this engagement many of my men, who were already much fatigued by the
march of the day and the excessive hot sun, were overcome with heat and dropped out of ranks,
the charge being over three-quarters of a mile in length and through a corn-field, but nearly all
came up and joined their respective companies as soon as circumstances would permit.
In this engagement the regiment lost 2 killed and 15 wounded, making a total loss in the two
days' battle of 3 killed and 18 wounded.
The officers and men of this regiment who were in each engagement have my warmest
thanks for the manner in which they conducted themselves during the battles and on the march
during the whole expedition. It is hard to compliment without doing injustice to some where
every one is trying to do his duty.
The following is a list of casualties.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. J. CAMPBELL,
Captain, Commanding Fourteenth Iowa Volunteer Infantry.
Col. JAMES I. GILBERT,
Comdg. Second Brigade, Third Division, 16th Army Corps.
HDQRS. TWENTY-SEVENTH REGT. IOWA VOL. INFANTRY,
In the Field, near La Grange, Tenn., July 21, 1864.
LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to report the part taken by the Twenty-seventh Regiment
Iowa Volunteer Infantry in the engagement at Tupelo, Miss., July 14, 1864.
At 7 a.m. the regiment was ordered to the front to report to Major Fyan, Twenty-fourth
Missouri Infantry. I had moved up, reported, and taken position in line of battle immediately in
the rear of the advance line, when I was ordered by Colonel Moore, commanding division, to
move by the right flank to support the right. I immediately complied with the order. We
remained in this position a half hour, when I was ordered by General Smith to move to the rear to
support the left. I moved to comply with the order, and when back a quarter of a mile was met by
an officer of Colonel Moore's staff, who halted my command and ordered me to move to the
right of the wagon train. About 1 p.m. I moved with the brigade to the left of the wagon train,
where we remained until 4 p.m., when I was ordered by Colonel Gilbert, commanding brigade,
to move to the support of the left of the advance line. In this new position we remained until
sunset, when I moved again to the left of the train and camped in line of battle. At 9 p.m. I
moved in the right center of the brigade to our former position, left advance line, where we
remained during the night of the 14th. The men made the fight bravely and well.
The following is a list of casualties.
A.M. HASLIP,
Captain Company A, Commanding Regiment.
Lieut. W. G. DONNAN,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
-----
HDQRS. TWENTY-SEVENTH REGT. IOWA VOL. INFANTRY,
In the Field, La Grange, Tenn., July 21, 1864.
43
LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the
Twenty-seventh Regiment Iowa Volunteer Infantry in the engagement at Old Town Creek, Miss,
July 15, 1864:
We had encamped for the night after a fatiguing march from Tupelo, Miss. The enemy
approached on the Tupelo road, following and skirmishing with the main column. When near
Old Town Creek they (the enemy) commenced shelling our camp. We were ordered out and
formed in line of battle. We waded the waist-deep creek and on the double-quick crossed a cornfield,
driving the enemy in stronger force and from a good position, under a scorching sun, for
over a mile. Reaching the hill from which he had shelled our camp we were halted and soon
received re-enforcement of two regiments on our right. My position during the engagement was
the extreme right of the Second Brigade, commanded by Col. James I. Gilbert.
I cannot too highly speak of the courage and discipline of both officers and men, who after
having hardly any rest the night before and marching all day still showed that discipline when
called upon which is so essential to the good of the service.
I append the following list of casualties.
AMOS M. HASLIP,
Captain Company A, Commanding Regiment.
Lieut. W. G. DONNAN,
Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen, 2d Brig, 3d Div, 16th Army Corps.
HEADQUARTERS THIRTY-SECOND IOWA INFANTRY,
La Grange, Tenn., July 21, 1864.
SIR: In relation to the part taken by my command in the action of the 14th instant, at Tupelo,
Miss., I have the honor to report that at 6 a.m. I formed my command in line of battle, on the left
of the Fourteenth Iowa Infantry. Shortly after I received orders to change front, faced to the rear,
throwing a line of skirmishers about 100 yards in advance, covering the right and front of my
line. The enemy having pressed our line in front (the Twenty-seventh Iowa and Twenty-fourth
Missouri Infantry), we moved forward to its support, leaving the Fourteenth and Thirty-second
Iowa Infantry on the line where first stationed, the enemy shelling us very severely. At 7.30 a.
In., the enemy threatening our left, I received orders to move by the left flank across the Tupelo
road, and form on the right of the Eleventh Missouri infantry, the Fourteenth Iowa Infantry
forming on my right. This order was executed under a heavy fire of artillery. At 8.30 a.m. I was
ordered to rejoin my brigade, which was stationed on the extreme right of the original line
occupied by my command. At 5 p.m. I was ordered to the front, taking position on the extreme
left of our line, and on the left of the Fourteenth Iowa Infantry. Skirmishers were thrown out,
covering the front of my regiment. Considerable skirmishing was kept up along our line until
dusk, when our main line was withdrawn to the rear. At 8 p.m. the skirmishers were partially
driven from their position by an advancing line of the enemy, when my regiment was ordered to
form on its original position, occupied previously at 5 p.m., on the left of the Fourteenth Iowa
Infantry, which it did under a galling fire of musketry, driving the enemy from his position in
front of our line. We continued to hold the position until the morning of the 15th instant, when
we were withdrawn, preparatory to marching.
The officers and men conducted themselves in a creditable manner. I herewith inclose a list
of casualties.
JONATHAN HUTCHISON,
Major, Commanding Thirty-second Iowa Infantry.
Lieut. WILLIAM G. DONNAN,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Second Brigade.
44
HEADQUARTERS THIRTY-SECOND IOWA INFANTRY,
La Grange, Tenn., July 21, 1864.
SIR: In relation to the part sustained by my command in the engagement at Old Town Creek
on the 15th instant, I have the honor to report that during the march between Tupelo and Old
Town Creek my command was put in charge of part of the train, moving with them and going
into camp at 4 p.m. on Old Town Creek. At 5 p.m., the First Division having passed in advance,
the enemy obtained possession of a position that commanded our camp. They planted a battery
and immediately commenced shelling us, the shells striking with accuracy and precision. I was
ordered to move out by the right flank, crossing Old Town Creek, formed in line of battle and
moved forward, taking position on the right of the Fourteenth Iowa Infantry, who, in connection
with the Twenty-seventh Iowa Infantry, had changed the battery and had taken position on the
ridge, which position was held till the morning of the 16th instant, when we moved forward with
the command.
The officers and men conducted themselves with characteristic courage.
JONATHAN HUTCHISON,
Major, Commanding Thirty-second Regiment Iowa Infantry.
Lieut. W. G. DONNAN,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Second Brigade.
HDQRS. TWENTY-FOURTH MISSOURI VOL. INFANTRY,
La Grange, Tenn, July 21, 1864.
In compliance with orders received this date, I beg leave to hand you the following report of
the part taken by the Twenty-fourth Missouri Volunteer Infantry in the battle of the 15th instant:
On the afternoon of the 15th instant, when encamped about seven miles north of Tupelo, the
enemy threw into our camp, unexpectedly, shells. By order of Colonel Gilbert, our brigade
commander, my regiment was immediately formed in line and marched toward the enemy, but
was held with the Thirty-second Iowa in reserve and formed in the rear of the advanced line of
the brigade at the base of a hill perpendicular to the road. We remained in this position a short
time, when we were ordered to advance by Colonel Gilbert. I moved my regiment by the right
flank to the road, marched along the road in direction of the enemy, and were formed in line of
battle about three-quarters of a mile in advance of our former position. At this point we
remained, having had no engagement with the enemy, except an occasional shot by our
skirmishers, until sundown, when we fell back by order of Colonel Gilbert, brigade commander,
one-quarter of a mile and remained in line of battle during the night.
During the above engagement our casualties were none.
No complaint was heard through my regiment, but a desire to meet on the morrow the
already vanquished foe.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. W. FYAN,
Major, Commanding Twenty-fourth Missouri Volunteer Infantry.
Lieut. WILLIAM G. DONNAN,
Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., 2d Brig., 3d Div., 16th Army Corps.
HDQRS. THIRD BRIG., THIRD DIV., 16TH ARMY CORPS,
Memphis, Tenn., July 29, 1864.
45
LIEUTENANT In compliance with orders from headquarters Third Division, Sixteenth
Army Corps, July 28, 1864, I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by
my command during the late expedition to Tupelo, Miss.:
In obedience to Special Orders, No. 63, paragraph VI, headquarters Right Wing, Sixteenth
Army Corps, Memphis, Tenn., June 23, 1864, my command, after having been paid off,
proceeded by train to Moscow, on the 23d. When near La Fayette a party of guerrillas fired into
the train, killing and wounding several. Some of the men who jumped or fell off the cars were
captured and afterward murdered. Their bodies were recovered by a party of the Second Iowa
Cavalry and recognized by Lieutenant McDonald, One hundred and seventy-eighth New York
Volunteers. At Moscow the brigade remained until the 27th, when it took up the line of march
for La Grange, which was reached the same day.
On July 5, at 4 p.m., left La Grange for Pontotoc; arrived there July 11. While there my
command was almost constantly kept under arms on account of the enemy firing at intervals into
the pickets. Left Pontotoc for Tupelo on 13th. Upon arriving there on the same day the command
went into camp, with the exception of the One hundred and seventeenth Illinois, which was
placed in position on a high and commanding ridge on the extreme left of the Third Division.
At daybreak on the morning of the 14th, when our pickets were attacked, my command was
ordered to take position in order of battle on the ridge above referred to, to connect on my right
with the First Brigade, Third Division, and on my left with a brigade of colored troops. At 7 a.m.,
after driving in our skirmishers, the enemy appeared in considerable force in front of the First
Brigade, with the unmistakable intention of carrying the batteries. A well-directed fire from the
right oblique by part of my command (Fifty-second Indiana and One hundred and seventy-eighth
New York Volunteers), and a terrible cross-fire of shell, case, and canister by Battery G, Second
Illinois Artillery, must have contributed considerably in throwing the enemy into confusion and
compelling him to beat a hasty retreat. For about three hours the enemy kept shelling my lines,
but was vigorously replied to by Battery G, Second Illinois Artillery, with the effect of silencing
one of his batteries (smooth-bores) and compelling another one (rifled guns) to move out of our
range, which rendered their fire Comparatively harmless. For the balance of the day the enemy
left us undisturbed until 10 p.m., when, driving in the pickets, a considerable force came
charging in on my left, evidently with the design of driving us from our eminence, the key to the
whole battle-field. The brigade of colored troops and the Second Brigade, Third Division (on left
of colored troops), having left their positions in the evening my command was first to meet the
enemy, whose fire for fifteen or twenty minutes was very determined, but meeting with still
more determination he soon gave way. In this night attack the One hundred and seventeenth
Illinois bore the most conspicuous part, and I accord to this regiment all credit for the prompt
manner in which they met and repulsed the enemy on that occasion.
On the 15th, at 10 a.m., I was ordered to abandon my position and move my command to the
Tupelo road, from where it marched toward Ellistown, escorting the train. In the afternoon, while
halting west of Old Town Creek, the enemy appeared unexpectedly, and, taking possession of a
commanding position, commenced shelling our train. At 5 p.m. my command was ordered to
recross Old Town Creek and take position on a ridge on the right of the Second Brigade, Third
Division, where it remained until next morning at 6 a.m., when, the enemy not reappearing, I was
ordered to withdraw and take my place in the column en route for Ellistown. In the evening of
the same day, while in camp near Ellistown, the enemy attacked our cavalry pickets, and a
section of Battery G, Second Illinois Artillery, being ordered out by Col. David Moore,
commanding Third Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, fired a few rounds at the enemy, with what
effect is unknown. On the 17th left camp near Ellistown for La Grange, arriving there on the
21st, having passed through New Albany and Salem. On the
22d I was ordered to proceed to
46
Collierville, where my command arrived and took the cars on the 23d, leaving for and reaching
Memphis same day. Distance marched from Moscow to Tupelo and back to Collierville, 276
miles.
The casualties on Memphis and Charleston Railroad on June 23, 1864, when the train was
fired into near La Fayette, Tenn., are as follows: Killed, 5; wounded, 2.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. H. WOLFE,
Colonel, Commanding Third Brigade.
Lieut. JAMES B. COMSTOCK,
Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., Third Division, 16th Army Corps.
HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, U. S. COLORED TROOPS,
Memphis, Tenn., July 25, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this brigade in the
late expedition to Tupelo, Miss., under command of Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith:
On the 18th day of June, 1864, I moved from Memphis with the Sixty-first and Sixty eighth
U.S. Colored Infantry, and Battery I, Second U.S. Colored Artillery (Light), by military railroad
to a point four miles west of La Fayette, Tenn., where the troops were disembarked and marched
to La Fayette Station, at which point my command was disposed of so as to guard the railroad
bridges, &c., four miles west and one mile east, and camped at this place until June 28, 1864.
On June 27, 1864, I brought out from Memphis the Fifty-ninth Regiment U. S. Colored
Infantry via railroad to Moscow, Tenn.
I moved with my command to La Grange, Tenn., June 28 and 29, a part being transported by
railroad and the remainder marching. My brigade, as here organized, consisted of the Fifty-ninth
U.S. Colored Infantry, Maj. James C. Foster commanding; Sixty-first U.S. Colored Infantry, Col.
F. A. Kendrick commanding; Sixty-eighth U.S. Colored Infantry, Col. J. B. Jones commanding;
Battery I, Second U.S. Colored Artillery (Light), Capt. Louis B. Smith commanding. Total
strength, 1,835 enlisted men and 64 commissioned officers; total aggregate, exclusive of brigade
staff; 1,899; the men in light marching order, with rubber blankets only, and supplied with forty
rounds of ammunition in boxes.
On the 3d day of July I received my transportation via rail from Memphis, which enabled me
to make a supply train for my brigade of twenty-six wagons, which I loaded with 100 rounds per
man reserved ammunition, nine days' rations, and nine days' grain and forage for stock. In
compliance with orders, I moved with my brigade at 4 p.m., July 5, to Davis' Mills, Miss., six
miles distant, where we went into camp at dark.
July 6, moved at 4 a.m., marching in rear of column, guarding general supply train, in which
order, with very little changes, we marched to Pontotoc, Miss., which point we reached by easy
marches July 11, 1864, passing through Ripley and New Albany.
On the 12th day of July was in camp at Pontotoc, south of town, near the Okolona road.
About 2 p.m. ten or fifteen bushwhackers approached my camp and fired on some men picking
berries, wounding a private belonging to Fifty-ninth U. S. Colored Infantry. Sent company C,
Fifty-ninth U.S. Colored Infantry, commanded by Capt. H. Fox, and drove them off without
casualties.
On July 13 the column moved at 4 a.m., going eastward on Tupelo road. At about 6 o'clock,
in compliance with orders from Captain Hough, I threw forward the Sixty-first U. S. Colored
Infantry to occupy the ridge south of Pontotoc, occupying ground vacated by the Third Division
in moving out, and guarding the approach on Okolona road. A few moments after 7 the advance
of the enemy's column came up on this road, and became
engaged with the advanced guard of
47
the Sixty-first Regiment, consisting of Company A, Captain Jean commanding, but were soon
repulsed with loss of 2 men. The entire column, including supply train, having now gotten under
way, I moved out with my brigade, Colonel Herrick with a portion of the Seventh Kansas.
Cavalry being in rear as rear guard to column. My column was only well out of town before the
cavalry in rear were attacked, apparently in strong force. The rear of my column was about two
miles out from Pontotoc, when Colonel Herrick sent me word that they were coming too fast for
him, and he must have help. Company A, Sixty-first U. S. Colored Infantry, had at this time been
back with the cavalry, skirmishing with the enemy's advance for nearly a mile. Seeing a desirable
location close at hand, I ordered Colonel Kendrick, commanding Sixty-first U. S. Colored
Infantry, to ambush them with two companies, which was done with perfect success, under the
direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Foley, of that regiment. The enemy's column coming within
twelve paces of this ambush received a well-directed volley, which emptied 15 or 20 saddles and
threw his column back in confusion. About a mile farther on I ambushed them again with partial,
but not so complete success. About five miles from Pontotoc, as the rear of my column had
passed down a hill and forded a small stream, he came forward suddenly in heavy force, and
driving the cavalry forward on my flank, planted a battery on the hill and commenced shelling
my column furiously, doing, however, but little damage. I moved forward under this fire until I
gained the ridge on opposite side of bottom, where I put my battery in position and answered
them at about 800 yards range. I threw the Fifty-ninth U. S. Colored Infantry in line on right of
the battery and the Sixty-first on the left, holding the Sixty-eighth in reserve. The enemy
approached this time very slowly, and only engaged it at long range. As the train was moving on
so as to open quite a gap, I sent forward the Sixty-eighth to close on the train, soon followed by
the Sixty-first Regiment and one section of battery, finally withdrawing the other section of the
battery and one wing of the Fifty-ninth Regiment, having the other wing concealed by thick
brush to ambush them as they advanced. The enemy quickly approached this line by moving
forward in heavy force through a corn-field, feeling their way with scattering shots until within
fifteen yards, when they were met by a deadly volley, quickly followed by others, which seemed
to tell on them with terrible effect, throwing them back in confusion. This line was now
withdrawn. In retiring it was fired upon from both flanks, which fire was promptly returned. At
this point I discovered a heavy column of the enemy moving rapidly forward on my right flank,
showing three battle-flags, which information I immediately sent forward by an orderly to
General Mower. About one mile from this ridge I again formed line, but the enemy not coming
to engage me for some time I withdrew all but seven companies of Sixty-first Regiment, which
were advantageously posted, and soon engaged the enemy closely and successfully. At this point
I discovered a column on the left flank. The column on the right also developed greater strength
than before, which information I immediately sent forward to General Mower by my adjutant,
stating that if the train was not moved quickly forward it would be attacked. This message had
scarcely reached General Mower when the attack on train was made. From this point I continued
forming lines and holding the enemy in check, and ambushing him at every favorable point,
using the Fifty-ninth and Sixty-first Regiments, holding the Sixty-eighth in reserve on account of
its being a new regiment and inexperienced in field service, until just dark, when within about
four miles of Tupelo, the Fifty-ninth and Sixty-first had become so fatigued and completely worn
out that I was compelled to put two companies in ambush of Sixty-eighth, relieving them at a
little distance with two more companies. These four companies reserved their fire until the
enemy were close on them, and delivered it with good effect and retired in good order. At this
point I was relieved by Lieutenant-Colonel Burgh, with one battalion of Ninth Illinois Cavalry
and one battalion of Second Iowa Cavalry, who held the enemy in check, so as to allow my
column to move on to camp unmolested except by a few
shells at long range. The rear of my
48
column reached camp about 9 p.m., and went into camp in open field near supply train. Our
casualties, as far as could be ascertained, this day were 1 killed, 7 wounded, and 9 missing. As
my men fell back several times through thickets, deployed as skirmishers under pretty severe
fire, I presume most of the missing were killed, and their fate not known to their comrades.
Fighting in the manner I did, with my men concealed and under cover, I was able to punish the
enemy pretty severely and suffer comparatively no loss. The cavalry in our rear, under Colonel
Herrick, fought with bravery and determination, but was unable to hold the enemy in check when
he came on with such impetuosity and such superiority of numbers.
On July 14, soon after daylight, in compliance with orders from Captain Hough, I formed my
brigade in line on ridge, about 1,200 yards from old field, where supply train was corralled, my
right connecting with the left of Colonel Wolfe's brigade and fronting in a southerly direction.
During the main engagements this day only the extreme right of my main line, consisting of
Sixty-first Regiment, was engaged. My skirmishers' line was vigorously engaged full half the
day. My line was continually under fire from the enemy's artillery during the main engagement,
and suffered considerably from the effect of shells, especially the Sixty-first on the right. Twice
in the afternoon I took forward a portion of Battery I, Second U, S. Colored Artillery (Light), and
shelled the enemy's cavalry and sharpshooters out of the timber in our fronts, where they were
lodged in considerable force. At about 7 p.m. I withdrew my line to a ridge some 700 yards to
our rear, skirting a strip of timber, leaving a heavy skirmish line on the ridge, where my line had
been formed during the day. This line became engaged soon after dark, and at about 9.30 p.m.
was advanced upon by the enemy in force and driven back nearly to the ridge on which my
brigade lay. I immediately threw my brigade forward and charged up the hill, firing, with fixed
bayonets, repulsing the enemy and driving them from our front, and occupied our former line at
about 10 p.m. I should judge the enemy suffered considerable loss from this repulse, as they
were carrying off their killed and wounded with ambulances nearly all night.
On July 15, at about 9 a.m., in compliance with orders, I withdrew to the old field in bottom
where the supply train had been corraled, the line I left being held by cavalry. My brigade was to
follow the Third Division and guard supply train. My train, Battery I, and Fifty-ninth Regiment
had moved out and Sixty-first was just moving when the cavalry was driven from their position
and forced back to the timber. I received orders to bring back the Sixty-first and hold them and
the Sixty-eighth in readiness to meet any movements of the enemy. The enemy still advancing
and driving in the cavalry, I formed Sixty-first and Sixty-eighth Regiments in line next to timber,
and advancing through it in line of battle some 300 to 400 yards, found the enemy occupying
ridge where my line had rested previous to its being attacked the night before. I immediately
charged, firing, with fixed bayonets, forcing the enemy from this ridge and driving them back
800 or 900 yards and beyond my old line, punishing them severely. This charge was made in
splendid style by Sixty-first and four companies of Sixty-eighth. After occupying this position a
short time, I withdrew to ridge near the timber. After about an hour, as the enemy did not again
show themselves in force, I moved out, in compliance with orders, on Ellistown road and
camped on Old Town Creek, some five miles from the battlefield.
On July 16 marched at 5 a.m. in center of column, guarding ambulance and supply train, in
which general order of march we moved to La Grange, Tenn., which point we reached about 6
p.m. July 20, passing near Ellistown, through New Albany and Salem, Miss. Sending my wagon
train and artillery horses by State Line road, and transporting troops by railroad, my brigade
arrived in Memphis on the night of 22d and morning of 23d of July.
I think the officers and men of my command are deserving of credit for the manner in which
they discharged their duties during the entire expedition.
Though not heavily engaged during the
49
main battle of the 14th they faithfully executed every order, and met whatever force opposed
them with a will and determination highly commendable.
I think the work done by my brigade in rear of column, on the 13th, was a severe test of the
soldierly qualities and power of endurance of my men. We moved at 4 a.m., marched about
twenty miles, went into camp at 9 p.m.; were seventeen hours under arms without rest. Some of
my command was under fire over half the time and was in line of battle an average of over ten
times. During the day my column was full three hours under fire of artillery in rear or on flanks,
and moved steadily with men closed in ranks without wavering.
Our casualties were as follows.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
ED. BOUTON,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.
Lieut. CHARLES P. BROWN,
Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., U. S. Colored Troops.
HDQRS. CAVALRY DIVISION, SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Memphis, Tenn., July 25, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that in pursuance of the orders of Maj. Gen. C. C.
Washburn, commanding District of West Tennessee, dated June 18, 1864, I concentrated the
effective portion of my command, numbering about 3,200 men, on the line of the Memphis and
Charleston Railroad, in the vicinity of La Grange, Tenn., about June 28, 1864, subject to the
orders of Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith, commanding Right Wing, Sixteenth Army Corps.
On the 5th instant, leaving one regiment to guard La Grange till troops should come for that
purpose from Memphis, I moved south-easterly toward Ripley, Miss,, my advance guard
repeatedly skirmishing with small parties of rebel cavalry.
I arrived at a point three miles northeast of Ripley on the afternoon of the 7th, when I was
rejoined by the regiment which had been left as guard at La Grange on the 5th. At that point I
found one brigade of the enemy, which was driven from our front in one hour's fighting by one
regiment without loss; the enemy left 4 dead in our hands.
Marching on the next day, the 8th, wherever it was practicable I moved the main portion of
my command upon the left flank of the infantry and was constantly skirmishing with the enemy.
Reaching Pontotoc on the morning of the 11th, we found McCulloch's rebel brigade
occupying the town, with at least a brigade in reserve upon a hill south of the town. While the
enemy were engaging the Seventh Kansas, which formed the advance guard of the infantry, I
moved in upon the east side of town and compelled the enemy to evacuate precipitately and in
some confusion, leaving several dead and wounded in our hands.
The next day we remained at Pontotoc, and I sent the Third Iowa Cavalry, Colonel Noble,
and the Ninth Illinois Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Burgh, upon a reconnaissance, the Third upon
the Houston road and the Ninth upon the Okolona road. Soon after passing the pickets the Ninth
became briskly engaged with Lyon's (rebel) brigade, and drove it about two miles. Our loss in
this engagement was 1 killed and 7 wounded.
On the morning of the 13th we resumed the march toward Tupelo, reaching that point about
noon, having skirmished with and drove the enemy almost the entire distance. During this day
they left 7 dead in our hands.
On the 14th, during the engagement at Tupelo, my command was disposed on the right and
left, one brigade being occupied in picketing, demonstrating, and skirmishing on each flank.
Detachments were employed at times as dismounted
skirmishers in front and center, and the
50
different portions of my command, especially the Ninth Illinois Cavalry, were several times very
sharply engaged by the enemy.
On the 15th, on the march toward Ellistown, while my command was much divided and
employed as advance, flank, and rear guard, the last, composed of parts of three regiments, was
very vigorously attacked near [Old] Town Creek by Buford's division of the enemy. I was with
the rear guard in person, and was following the main column, gradually falling back from one
position to another, when I suddenly discovered, at 5 p.m., that I was closed up upon the wagon
train, which was in park with the command in camp, directly in my front. As I had received no
notification of this halt, the enemy was unfortunately allowed to approach to a good position
within easy artillery range of the train. The rear guard was obliged to fight without room for
maneuvering, and a number of shot and shell were thrown by the enemy directly into the wagon
park. To add to the difficulties of the situation, these troops had previously expended the most of
their ammunition during the constant skirmishing of that day. After nearly a half hour's delay,
however, during which they held their position, they were re-enforced by infantry, when the