DEVALL'S BLUFF, June 8, 1864.
CAPTAIN: In compliance with General Orders, No. 14, headquarters District of Little Rock,
I have the honor to report that the Eighth Missouri Cavalry arrived here from Little Red River
last night, being relieved by battalion Ninth Iowa Cavalry. On the evening of the 6th instant a
detachment of 25 men of the Eighth Missouri Cavalry had a skirmish with a party of 40 of
Shelby's cavalry, at Bealer's Ferry, on Little Red River. Our loss, 1 man killed, wounded.
Enemy's loss, 1 killed, 1 lieutenant and 4 men taken prisoners. Enemy routed, pursuing them 4
miles. Shelby's forces reported between Batesville and Jacksonport. No troops have arrived or
left the post to-day. No news of importance.
Colonel, Commanding Post.
Capt. C. H. DYER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Helena, Ark., June 27, 1864.
GENERAL: On the 22d instant the little garrison of 50 men, commanded by Capt. J. R. C.
Hunter, of the Twelfth Iowa Infantry, at the mouth of White River was attacked by the enemy,
300 strong, about daybreak, who had crossed the Arkansas River in small boats in the night, and,
after an action of thirty minutes, was handsomely repulsed, with a loss to us of 1 killed and 4
wounded. The enemy's loss was about 30 killed and wounded; 5 of the latter, 1 an officer, falling
into our hands. The little garrison was slightly intrenched in a hastily erected stockade. The gunboat
Lexington was the only one present. She opened fire on the enemy in the woods after the
repulse. Our force was too small to pursue, and as there was but one gun-boat, the orders of her
commander forbade her leaving the station and preventing the enemy retreating across the
Arkansas River. Captain Hunter and his little garrison deserve the highest credit. As soon as I
was informed of the above facts, Capt. S. L. Phelps, U.S. Navy, being at Helena at the time, and
with his assistance, I embarked 800 troops on my two ferry-boats and his gun-boat Hastings, and
proceeded to the mouth of White River, and ascended White River to the Cut-off, hoping the
enemy had not left the island; thence to the Arkansas River and up it 10 miles, where I
ascertained the attacking force was commanded by Colonel Lawther, Tenth Missouri Cavalry, C.
S. Army, and that they had crossed back on the 22d. My information led me to believe that
General Marmaduke's force was between me and the post of Arkansas, and that I was not strong
enough to successfully attack him if I could find him. Captain Phelps objected to going farther
up the river, as the banks of the river were such that the enemy, if in force equal to ours, could
readily get out of our way, or attack us exposed in our crowded small-boats. I returned to the
mouth of White River, and issued the inclosed order, which strikes at the root of the evil. This
order is simply enforcing principles to which I have before called your attention.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Maj. Gen. F. STEELE,
Commanding Department of Arkansas
Helena, Ark., June 29, 1864.
SIR: General Shelby, C. S. Army, is in force at Clarendon, 51 miles from here, on the east
side of White River.
On the 24th instant he captured the gun-boat No. 26 (Queen City), commanded by Captain
Hickey, and after removing her nine guns and all her ammunition and stores, destroyed her. He is
now fortifying Clarendon, and has successfully blockaded White River, and cut General Steele's
line of communication both by land and water. Col. A. S. Dobbin, commanding a cavalry
brigade, variously estimated at from 1,000 to 2,000 men, is west of Big Creek, a deep and narrow
stream, 18 miles from here, on the Clarendon road. He has 20 seamen, captured from the Queen
City, whom he offered to exchange with me. Shelby's force is estimated at from 2,500 to 3,000.
All the country is hostile. The conscription will take every able-bodied man in the district. I have
but 289 cavalry for the field. I have no light artillery. I have two guns without caissons, manned
by black troops. On the 22d instant the enemy, 300 strong, attacked my little garrison of 50 men,
commanded by Capt. J. R. C. Hunter, of the Twelfth Iowa Volunteers, in a stockade at the mouth
of White River. He killed and wounded 30 of their men, taking 5 of their wounded prisoners, and
gallantly repulsed the attack with a loss of 1 killed and 4 wounded. On this information, and that
Marmaduke's force was near by, on the south side of the Arkansas River, I took a force of 800
men, and, in co-operation with Capt. S. L. Phelps, U.S. Navy, with one gun-boat, proceeded to
the mouth of White River, and up the Arkansas 30 miles, where we learned that Marmaduke,
with sixteen pieces of artillery and a considerable force, estimated at 6,000, was within 10 miles
of us, on Red Fork Bayou. Not being in force sufficient to attack him, we returned. I have
applied to General C. C. Washburn, commanding at Memphis, for re-enforcements of 1,000
good infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and one battery of light artillery. My messenger has just
returned with his answer. He has no light artillery (which is for me indispensable), no cavalry,
but offers me one regiment of 100-days' men if I need them.
I have sent all the information I have to General Canby, but fear he has gone to New Orleans,
and perhaps to communicate with Admiral Farragut near Mobile. My dispatches cannot go
forward to General Steele. I therefore judge best to communicate all of the above facts to you.
Captain Phelps, U.S. Navy, passed up to-day to obtain an iron-clad to reopen White River, and I
have no doubt he will communicate most of the above facts to the Navy Department in advance
of this letter.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Secretary of War.
HEADQUARTERS, Mouth of White River, June 22, 1864.
GENERAL: The enemy this morning, 300 strong, attacked us, but we are not theirs. Five of
their killed and wounded fell into our hands. One of my men was killed and 3 severely wounded.
The enemy consisted of the Tenth Missouri Cavalry and was commanded by Colonel Lawther.
They crossed the Arkansas River about midnight, leaving their horses on the opposite side, and
marched here in the night, arriving about 4 a.m. They were apparently panic-stricken when they
retreated, but I had no men to send in pursuit. It is my candid opinion that we killed and
wounded fully as many of the enemy as I have men. We do not know that they have left the
island, but are prepared for them should they make another attack. You will see the necessity of
sending re-enforcements immediately. Two hundred cavalry is the least number that will secure
our safety. I do not know that they carried off any of the negroes, as was their evident design.
They killed 1. The wounded are being taken care of by the naval surgeon.
Hoping that you will take prompt action in sending re-enforcements, I remain, very
respectfully, your obedient servant,
Captain, Commanding Post.
P. S.--Since writing the above a scout has come in reporting the enemy coming across the
Arkansas River in force. I shall do my very best and leave the island as a last resort. The gunboat
did good execution after the rebs left.
Captain, Commanding Post.
JUNE 23--5 p.m.
A refugee that was captured yesterday has just returned. He reports that the enemy were 600
strong, and that their loss was 24, killed and wounded, including 1 lieutenant, who is now in our
hands. I had but 48 effective men in the engagement. The rebels thought we were 1,000 strong. It
is my informant's impression that they intend to attack again soon. We must have reenforcements
immediately or leave the island.
Yours, &c.,
Captain, Commanding.
Brigadier-General BUFORD,
Commanding at Helena.
Point Isabel, January 7, 1864.
Brig. Gen. C. P. STONE,
Chief of Staff:
I am detained here by a very furious norther which has prevented any communication with
Brazos. I have been waiting now three days. The St. Mary's is at Brazos and I shall go on her to
Fort Esperanza. I wrote you a dispatch some days ago suggesting the removal of the troops
which are now on the Rio Grande, except a garrison of 500 men, to the Nueces River or in its
vicinity. It will be understood that this recommendation is made solely under the hypothesis that
the commanding general may intend to retain somewhere in this region all the force that is now
Not knowing fully his intentions in this respect,, I did not feel at liberty to suggest the
ordering of all the disposable force here to join the column which will enter State of Texas by
way of Matagorda Bay. I wish to be understood as making the suggestion only under the
supposition that all the troops now on this line will be detained in Southwestern Texas, in which
event they would much more effectually guard the frontier and control its approaches from the
vicinity of the Nueces than by lying along the Rio Grande. In pursuance of this subject I would
further urge that when the force on the Rio Grande in the vicinity of Brownsville is reduced to a
garrison of 500 men this post be immediately abandoned. There is no water here and none to be
procured at a less distance than 20 miles, and all the water for the troops and animals is hauled
that distance. This is attended with great labor and expense, and considerable suffering among
the animals.
The extra number of light craft which is necessary and the labor and expense of lightering all
freight from Brazos Island here would be saved. When a garrison is left at the defenses of
Brownsville and another here, the one here might be cut off from water by a small cavalry force
and the trains running between the posts would be liable to attack at any time by a small secret
party of guerrillas. By building a small shed for a warehouse at Brazos Island, on the piles which
are now there, and keeping an ordinary ferry flat at Boca Chica, the limited amount of stores
necessary for a garrison of 500 men would be cheaply and easily supplied; but the depot should
be furnished with one small steamboat capable of running, in smooth weather, into the mouth of
the river, which could at one trip carry a three months' supply for the troops at Brownsville, and
could at other times be used, when necessary, to carry dispatches or information to Aransas,
Matagorda, or Galveston. The ferry at Boca Chica and a few wagons would suffice to
communicate and supply, in event of long spells of stormy weather or of accident to the boat.
This arrangement would save a garrison at this point, and all that would be necessary at
Brazos Island would be one company of white troops for artillerists and four or five companies
of the Sixteenth Corps d'Afrique. This would be even stronger than is absolutely necessary, as
Brazos Island, with one company at Boca Chica, would be almost secure against the possibility
of an attack from rebels. There is water at Brazos which will answer tolerably well the purposes
of the troops, and good water at the Rio Grande, only 9 miles distant. By the arrangements
suggested above there would be available to leave this line for the interior, or the coast above,
about 2,000 white infantry, two field batteries of four guns each, five or six companies of the
Sixteenth Corps d'Afrique, and the First and Second Regiments of Texas Cavalry, Vidal's
company, and Brauback's company. The latter might be left here if thought best, but it is my
opinion that a sufficient number of the infantry garrison could be mounted to serve all purposes
of scouting. A discreet general officer should be left in command at Brownsville.
I would further suggest the removal of the Twentieth Iowa Infantry from Mustang Island to
Pass Cavallo, and their place to be supplied by one company of white troops as artillerists, and
the five or six companies of the Corps d'Afrique which would move from here. The single
company of Colonel Baker's regiment (Twenty-sixth Corps d'Afrique) which is now at
Brownsville had better be removed from there, as there are no more recruits to be had. The First
Regiment Engineers, Corps d'Afrique, has about completed its work at Brownsville. Its work
here will be about completed in about two weeks. I recommend that two companies be left at
Brazos Island to complete the works, establish the ferry, and build the warehouse and dock, and
the remainder of the regiment be made immediately available elsewhere. With a garrison of 500
men, the defenses at Brownsville are capable of resisting the attack of 5,000 good troops. I ask
that the work be named by you "Fort Montgomery," in memory of the lamented captain of the
First Texas Cavalry, who lost his life at the hands of rebel assassins near that place.
Our recent visit to King's Ranch and the information we have from Monterey, Roma, Eagle
Pass, &c., give us assurance that the only force of rebels between the Nueces and the Rio Grande
is about 100 men, viz, 50 at Eagle Pass and 50 or 60 with Benavides. I have but little doubt that
the notorious rebel chief, John Morgan, has arrived within a day or two at Matamoras from
Havana. I sent the Ninety-first Illinois Infantry about a week ago to visit Salt Lake. It will return
now in a couple of days. There was no special object more important than giving them proper
occupation. I have sent 428 bales of cotton to New Orleans, and what has not been sold and is
now left in General Herron's hands amounts to about 109 bales and 25 sacks at this place, and
about 63 bales which I obtained beyond King's Ranch and ordered in, and which reached
Brownsville yesterday or the day before.
I have supplied Major Carpenter at different times, from sales of cotton, with about $40,000
in coin and $1,000 Treasury notes; Captain Emerson, chief commissary, $2,000 coin; Captain
Routt, assistant quartermaster to General Herron, $9,000 coin and $2,000 Treasury notes. No
attempt has been made for a settlement of whatever understanding there may be regarding the
Mustang, Hale, and Matamoras. If a claim is allowed to be made I have no doubt it will be
exorbitant. I recommend that the boats be immediately appraised by competent steam-boat men
and officers at their value when handed over, and that that amount, together with whatever
reasonable outlay the owners have since made, be paid, with interest at 6 per cent. since we
received them.
Serna has abdicated and Ruiz is Governor at Matamoras, Cortina having agreed to march
against the French at Tampico; the latter, however, has, as usual, violated his agreement and
stopped with his force in some large building on the edge of town, and is now keeping the place
in a ferment by a threatening attitude. It is not without hesitation that I thus fully advance my
views as above, but I do it merely from my stand-point and in frankness, expecting that they will
receive only such attention as the major-general commanding may deem them worth. I have
received no dispatches for nearly three weeks, no mail having come to me by the Saint Mary's. I
hope to hear from you at Esperanza.
I have the honor to remain, with high respect,
N. J. T. DANA,
On board Steamer Saint Mary's, January 9, 1864.
Brig. Gen. C. P. STONE,
Chief of Staff, Department of the Gulf:
GENERAL: The First Division of this corps, except the Forty-second and One hundred and
twentieth Ohio and Seventh and Twenty-second Kentucky Regiments Infantry which are on duty
at Plaquemine, on the Mississippi River, is at Matagorda Island, Tex. The Second Division,
except the Twentieth Iowa Infantry, which is at Aransas Pass, and Thirty-fourth Iowa Infantry,
which is at Matagorda Bay, is at Brownsville, Tex., as also the First Regiment of Engineers,
Corps d'Afrique. The Sixteenth Regiment, Corps d'Afrique, is at Point Isabel, Tex. The Third
Division of this corps is at New Iberia, La.; the Fourth Division is at Matagorda Bay. The
Thirteenth and Fifteenth Maine Regiments Infantry attached to this corps are also at Matagorda
In consequence of the scattered condition of the corps, Lieut. Ben. L. Smith, postmaster of
the corps, was ordered to remain at New Orleans, to sort and direct mail matter to the several
divisions, &c. To avoid the delay that would be occasioned by sending to corps headquarters, I
would respectfully ask an approval of the order, if necessary, allowing Lieutenant Smith to
remain in the city on this duty.
I have the honor to be, general, your most obedient servant.
N. J. T. DANA,
Major-General, Commanding.
JANUARY 13, 1864.
Major-General GRANT, Chattanooga:
GENERAL: Complaints have been received from the Thirty-second Iowa and other
regiments that they have been divided and that parts of the same regiment are now serving in
different departments. It is presumed that this resulted from the exigencies of the service during
the past year and was probably at the time unavoidable. It should, however, be remedied as
promptly as possible by uniting in the same military department the regiments so divided. For
example, six companies of the Thirty-second Iowa are reported at Columbus, Union City, and
Island No. 10, and four companies at Little Rock, Ark. The entire regiment should either be sent
to Arkansas or the four companies there sent to the Department of the Tennessee. As members of
Congress from the districts and States in which the regiments are raised are urgent in their protest
against such division, it is hoped that you will give the matter your early attention.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Pass Cavallo, Tex., January 13, 1864.
I. Brig. Gen. T. E.G. Ransom, U.S. Volunteers, will for the present assume command of the
posts at Decrow's Point and Matagorda Island. He will make all useful regulations, reporting his
orders to these headquarters as soon as issued for approval.
II. Colonel Cobb, commanding Second Engineers, Corps d'Afrique, will assume immediate
command of the post on Matagorda Island, and will make daily reports to Brigadier-General
III. The Twenty-third Iowa Volunteers will proceed to Indianola and report to Brigadier-
General Benton, commanding the First Division.
IV. The Provisional Brigade, composed of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Maine Volunteers,
and Twentieth and Thirty-fourth Iowa Volunteers, is temporarily attached to the Fourth Division,
and will report immediately to Brigadier-General Ransom, commanding.
By order of N. J. T. Dana, major-general of volunteers:
Lieut. Col. and A. A. G., Thirteenth Army Corps.
Omaha City, January 13, 1864.
Company B, Seventh Iowa Cav., Dakota, Nebr. Ter.:
CAPTAIN: The general commanding the district directs me to say that if you have not turned
over to the U.S. Indian agent for the Ponca Indians the ponies and other property taken from the
Indians near Niobrara, as directed in a communication from these headquarters, dated December
12, 1863, you will take the necessary steps to do so immediately. The general is informed that
other property than the ponies, guns, &c., reported, was taken from the Indians, such as buffalo
robes, beaver skins, and other private property. He directs that you collect and return all such
property to Maj. J. B. Hoffman, U.S. agent for the Poncas.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Assistant Adjutant-General
WASHINGTON, D. C., January 14, 1864.
Saint Louis, Mo.:
Has the Thirty-seventh Regiment Iowa Volunteers been removed from Alton yet?
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Saint Louis, Mo., January 14, 1864.
Assistant Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.:
The Thirty-seventh Iowa has not yet left Alton. Snowdrifts have blockaded railroad and river
is frozen up. It will move by day after to-morrow. Tenth Kansas (the regiment which relieves the
Thirty-seventh) is in this city waiting for the Thirty-seventh to get out of quarters.
By order of Maj. Gen. J. M. Schofield, commanding:
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Brownsville, Tex., January 15, 1864.
Chief of Staff:
GENERAL: In accordance with Special Orders, No. --, Department of the Gulf, and Special
Orders, No. 3, headquarters Thirteenth Army Corps, I assumed command of the U.S. troops on
the line of the Rio Grande on January 5, [3,] 1864, Major-General Dana leaving the same day
for Point Isabel, to embark for Pass Cavallo. Col. William McE. Dye, commanding post of
Brownsville, and on company of the Twentieth Iowa Infantry, on provost-guard duty, were also
relieved by General Dana and taken to some point farther up the coast. The troops now
occupying this line are a portion of the Second Division, Thirteenth Army Corps, and their
position is as follows: The First Brigade, under Col. Charles Black, of the Thirty-seventh Illinois,
is camped half a mile above the town in a bend of the river, the location being very favorable in
every respect; the Second Brigade, under Col. H. Bertram, Twentieth Wisconsin, is quartered in
the town; Colonel Bertram also commanding the post of Brownsville.
The cavalry under command of Col. E. J. Davis, First Texas Cavalry, are camped 1 miles
above the town, in the second bend of the river, two companies of the First Engineers, Corps de
Afrique, and two companies of the Sixteenth Regiment, Corps de Afrique, under Major
Hamilton, First Engineers, are camped near the First Brigade, and are working upon the
fortifications; six companies of the First Engineers, Corps de Afrique, and eight companies of the
Sixteenth Regiment, Corps de Afrique, are camped at Point Isabel, under command of Colonel
Hodge, First Engineers; two companies of the First Engineers are camped on Brazos Island.
Before leaving New Orleans, I called upon Maj. D. C. Houston, chief engineer, Department
of the Gulf, for his opinion in regard to the fortifications necessary at Brownsville and at the
Brazos; from him I learned that orders had been issued to repair Fort Brown, and to construct
certain works at Point Isabel and on Brazos Island. I find that Major-General Dana, after
carefully examining the site of Fort Brown and other localities, decided to construct new works
at a point three-fourths of a mile above Brownsville in preference to repairing Fort Brown, for
the following reasons: That the latter work was not large enough to accommodate the garrison
and hold the supplies and public property, should it be necessary, at any time after the main body
of this force was moved, to withdraw from the town and occupy the fort when threatened by a
superior force, and that the supply of water could readily be cut off from Fort Brown by an
enterprising enemy.
The new work situated in the first bend of the river, above Fort Brown, was laid out by Capt.
A. Hoeppner, and consists of several well-built redoubts, connected by rifle-pits, the works
extending across the bend, having a front of 600 yards, and inclosing in the rear at least 100 acres
of ground. I consider the site much the best in this neighborhood, and the work infinitely superior
in every respect to old Fort Brown. There are three guns in position in this work, two 20-pounder
Parrotts and one 24-pounder smooth. Captain Hoeppner, who is now in New Orleans, will
furnish a plan of the work, with proper details, to Major Houston. The works at Point Isabel
consist of a series of rifle-pits, extending from the light-house to a point on the bay 1,000 yards
above, and two small redoubts are also being constructed.
The work on Brazos I have not yet seen, but understand that it is a strong work, facing the
sea, and mounting two heavy guns. There are no regular outposts held as such by our troops,
occasional scouting parties sent north and northwest answering every purpose, the only
organized rebel force west of the Nueces River being that of Col. J. S. Ford. In regard to the
movements of the enemy, I have nothing of special interest to communicate. Advices that seem
to be reliable (and believed by Colonel Davis) state that Col. J. S. Ford is at Laredo, 200 miles
above this on the river, with seven companies, numbering about 400 men, and two pieces of
artillery, the force of Col. Santos Benavides forming a portion of Ford's command. I have spies
near there who will bring in reliable reports within a few days.
This force will not dare to move from its present position, and can only hope to open trade at
that point for a short time. This and 150 men at Eagle Pass are the only rebel troops on the Rio
Grande. If our cavalry was in condition it would be well to make a move against Ford and force
him back from the river, but in its present condition nothing can be done. A few days since a
small rebel scouting party from San Patricio, 20 in number, visited King's Ranch, 120 miles
north of this, but did [not] venture any nearer. Refugees state the number of troops at San
Antonio as 150, and a mere patrol of 50 men at Austin.
Mr. McManus, a man who was sent by General Dana through Mexico to Piedras Negras to
raise a force and operate against rebel trains on the San Antonio and Eagle Pass route, arrived at
Piedras Negras on December 29 and had collected some men. Late advices from Mr. Kimmey,
vice-consul at Monterey, state a rumor had reached there of an order from San Antonio
prohibiting the shipment of any more cotton by the Eagle Pass route and giving it as his opinion
that the operations of McManus had caused it. If he can collect 150 men about him there is no
doubt but that he will effectually close up that road, for he is a desperate man. Should these
rumors prove correct and McManus get a foothold at Eagle Pass it will probably compel Ford to
withdraw from the river. Large quantities of goods have been shipped within the past four weeks
from Matamoras and Monterey into Texas. But the action of Governor Ruiz a few days since had
the effect of stopping further shipments from Matamoras.
Learning that Major-General Banks' letter of November 13, 1863, addressed to L. Pierce, jr.,
consul of the United States at Matamoras, complaining of certain matters, had never been
brought to the attention of the present authorities, I procured a copy, sending it direct to
Governor Ruiz with the inclosed note. The consequence was an immediate proclamation issued
by Ruiz forbidding the sale or shipment from the State of Tamaulipas of contraband of war for
the use of Confederates and threatening severe punishment to any merchants of Matamoras
engaging in this traffic. In regard to the cotton lying at Matamoras, he informed me that he
would look into the matter, and if circumstances would warrant it he would seize all within the
State. His action produced quite a consternation, and no cotton has come within his State since.
From Monterey I learn that Vidauri will probably seize all the Confederate cotton in his State to
make good the loans of Milmo (Vidauri's son-in-law) House to the Confederacy. The matter was
talked of somewhat in Monterey, and the best-informed persons think the seizure will be made.
By these means the traffic between Mexico and Texas can be completely broken up. Recruiting
goes on fairly, the First Texas Cavalry numbering at present 580 men, and the Second Texas
(composed of Mexicans) 350 men. It is thought McManus will bring out a large number of men
for the First Texas from San Antonio and thereabouts. The latest news from Mexico I will
forward in a special communication.
I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,
Major-General, Commanding.
WASHINGTON, D. C., January 16, 1864-10 a.m.
Major-General GRANT,
Nashville, Tenn.:
The State of Iowa is in General Pope's command, and the States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois
in General Heintzelman's command.
Milwaukee, Wis., January 18, 1864.
Brig. Gen. A. SULLY,
Comdg. District of Iowa, Davenport, Iowa:
GENERAL: It is my purpose with the opening of spring to establish the following posts in
the Indian country: First. A post of three companies of infantry and five of cavalry at Devil's
Lake. Second. A post of three companies of infantry and five companies of cavalry on James
River, nearly west of Fort Abercrombie. Third. A post of four companies of infantry and at least
a battalion of cavalry at or near Fort Clarke, on the upper Missouri. Fourth. A post somewhere on
Yellowstone River, southwest or nearly so of Fort Clarke. The garrison of this post will be
determined during the summer campaign.
The post near Fort Clarke had best be as far below that post as is expedient, in view of its
being the depot for the supply of the post at Devil's Lake. Will you please give this subject such
careful examination immediately as is in your power, and report to me as soon as practicable
your views on the subject? The posts at Devil's Lake and on James River will be established by
General Sibley and garrisoned by troops from Minnesota, the post below Fort Clarke by yourself.
If necessary (and I suppose it will be)I will send four infantry companies from here to escort the
steamers carrying up supplies, which companies will constitute the garrison of the post near Fort
As I have hitherto, informed you, the posts at Devil's Lake and on James River will be
supplied, the first from the post near Fort Clarke, the second from the post of Farm Island. You
will be charged with their supply and will accordingly take the necessary steps for that purpose.
In proper time you will be ordered to Saint Louis to arrange for all these matters and for your
expedition in the spring. I will inform you in time of the movement of troops from Minnesota for
the purpose above set forth, and also to complete the campaign against the Minnesota and
Dakota Sioux.
I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,
Major-General, Commanding.
Omaha, Nebr. Ter., January 19, 1864.
Co. B, Seventh Iowa Cav., Comdg. Post, Dakota, Nebr. Ter.:
CAPTAIN: Your favor of the 16th instant is received. The general commanding the district
directs me to say that under existing circumstances it is not deemed safe to send the captured
property out of the District of Nebraska by soldiers for the purpose of turning it over to Maj. J. B.
Hoffman. U.S. Indian agent for the Ponca Indians. The general suggests that some one should
receive it as Major Hoffman's agent at Niobrara, or some other convenient place within this
district, as it would be dangerous to take it on the Ponca Reservation for the purpose of delivery.
If Major Hoffman refuses to receive the property you will turn it over to the acting assistant
quartermaster, lobe accounted for by him and disposed of as may hereafter be directed.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
POST ARANSAS, TEX., January 20, 1864.
Lieut. Col. W. B. SCATES,
Assistant Adjutant-General:
COLONEL: I had the honor in my last report to call attention to the fact that, my men were
much in want of proper clothing, and beg leave to say once more that they are absolutely
suffering for want of the same. Our means of communicating with headquarters are limited, and
consequently cannot send the regimental quartermaster away with any certainty when he could
return. Requisitions have been made out and forwarded, but fail, as yet, to receive any return.
The health of the regiment is excellent, and I have now on the island at this post an aggregate of
360; this is exclusive of Captain Altmann's company, which is doing provost duty at
headquarters of Major-General Dana, and I am expecting daily the convalescents from New
Orleans, as I have taken steps to have them forwarded to the regiment.
Permit me again to state that our tents are worn out, yet we have quite comfortable quarters
for the men, which we built since coming here. I learn that the troops have generally been paid
up to January l, 1864. My regiment has not received any pay since August 31, 1863, and many
are in great need of money, especially the officers, and, if possible, I would urge that the provostmarshal
be directed to pay us before leaving for New Orleans. The fortifications have been
nearly completed several times, and are sufficiently advanced at present so that the guns are in
position and can be used, but the sand out of which they are constructed is so light and dry that
the winds blow it away, and it is almost impossible to keep the works in repair. Captain
Blanchard, of the engineers, has caused large quantities of sea grass to be gathered and placed
upon the works, and sowed oats on them, which seems to prevent the destruction by the wind
very much, and may, with care and attention, obviate the difficulty entirely. We experience
considerable difficulty in procuring firewood, having but two wagons at the post.
My scouts have several times been in Corpus Christi, and find no enemy. Deserters still
continue to come in slowly. I have no doubt that if we were on the mainland very many deserters
would come into our lines, and there is not the least difficulty in taking possession of and holding
Corpus Christi at any time it may be deemed proper.
Major, Comdg. Twentieth Iowa and Post Aransas.
Fort Leavenworth, January 25, 1864.
A. A. G., War Department, Adjutant-General's Office :
COLONEL: I have the honor respectfully to request that the order assigning Maj. John W.
Noble, Third Iowa Cavalry, to duty in this department be rescinded. This regiment is ordered to
Iowa, having re-enlisted as veterans, and Major Noble desires to aid in its reorganization. As his
promotion in the regiment depends somewhat on his being present with his command, I
cheerfully withdraw any claims upon his services, and would be glad if you would issue the
necessary order to restore him to his regiment again.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
POST ARANSAS, TEX., January 28, 1864.
Lieut. Col. W. B. SCATES,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Thirteenth Army Corps:
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL: Since my last report nothing new has transpired; everything
right so far as I can judge. The bastions are completed and the guns, under the efficient charge of
Captain Thomson, of Company C, Twentieth Iowa (who with his company were detailed by me
to take charge of the guns), are now all in proper position. The men are drilled daily at the guns
and have made excellent progress, and the practice at the distance of 1 miles is certainly as
good as the average. The guns have all been thoroughly cleaned and varnished, and are kept in
complete order. The magazines are completed and the ammunition stored in the same. I have
company drill every a.m. and battalion drill every p.m., to which both men and officers have
given prompt attention, and as the acting inspector-general has just completed his work of
inspection and will report officially to you, I need not now remark as to the proficiency in drill,
&c., of the troops, all of which will be reported to you officially.
I do not wish to be considered importunate, but let me once more say to you, my men are
destitute of clothing, and that, too, in its literal sense. Tents we can get along without, so long as
we remain here, as barracks have been put up by me since I came here, which are comfortable,
but clothing we must have, and I do most earnestly request that supplies be forwarded to us as
soon as possible. No paymaster has as yet been here, consequently we have not been paid. But
clothing is what we want. Provisions are plenty and a sufficient supply is now on hand to last
until the 1st of March, and may be longer, as commissary stores are now being discharged from
the steamer Clinton, the amount of which I cannot ascertain for this report, but I shall the first
opportunity send full report.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
Mayor, Commanding Post of Aransas.
P. S.--I am informed by the post quartermaster that he has sufficient provisions for the post
(500 men) for ninety days from this date.
Major, &c.
OMAHA, NEBR. TER., February 3, 1864.
Capt. GEORGE S. HAMPTON, A. A. G., Dist. of Nebraska:
CAPTAIN: On the 20th ultimo I left Omaha, in obedience to instructions from district
headquarters directing me to proceed to Niobrara, and such other points in this district as I might
find it necessary, for the purpose of making a thorough investigation in reference to the
allegations contained in the communication of Maj. J. B. Hoffman, U.S. Indian agent, to the
Governor of Dakota Territory, charging a party of soldiers at Niobrara with criminal conduct
toward some Indians belonging to the Ponca Agency. Arriving at Dakota City on the 22d, I
found that Sergt. Joseph W. West and several other soldiers belonging to Company B, Seventh
Iowa Cavalry, had just returned from Niobrara, where they were stationed at the time of the
alleged troubles complained of by Major Hoffman. I accordingly proceeded to take their
testimony in regard to the matter in question, swearing each one to testify the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth. I examined them separately and apart from each other. Their
testimony is herewith inclosed, marked A.
At Niobrara, where I arrived on the 27th, I found it impossible to find any one among the
citizens who knew anything on the subject. Herewith I inclose the testimony of William G.
Huddlestone, James Young, and Henry Sturgis, marked B. They seem to know but little about
the matter, but their names having been mentioned in connection with these Indian troubles, I
deemed it best to examine them on the subject. Other citizens of that locality, with whom I
conversed, agree in their denunciations of the depredations committed by the Indians. They
appear to be in constant dread, and I am satisfied some of them would desert their farms and
leave the neighborhood were it not for the presence of the soldiers.
The statements of the Indians to Major Hoffman, I am satisfied, are untrue in several
particulars. The soldiers had no wagons with them, either on Bozee Creek or on the Running
Water, nor did they carry off the lodges and provisions of the Indians, as is charged. What really
did take place in those two affairs is only known to the soldiers on the one side and the Indians
on the other. Having satisfied myself that the Indians have falsely testified as to the carrying off
of their lodges and provisions in wagons, I can place but little reliance in their version of the
trouble in question. The testimony of the soldiers, examined as they were separate and apart,
agrees in every essential particular. The impassable state of the roads prevented me from visiting
other points referred to in the documents furnished me. I am satisfied, however, that nothing
could be elicited in addition to the accompanying testimony, except in the examination of more
of the soldiers who took part in the several affairs.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Capt. Co. A, First Batt., Nebraska Vol. Cavalry.
Milwaukee, Wis., February 6, 1864.
Col. J. C. KELTON,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., U.S. Army, Washington, D. C.:
COLONEL: I have the honor to submit, for the consideration of the General-in-Chief, the
following sketch of proposed operations in the Indian country during the coming season: It is my
purpose as soon as the spring opens to establish the following military posts, viz: First. A post of
three companies of infantry and five companies of cavalry at Devil's Lake. Second. A post of
three companies of infantry and five companies of cavalry on James River, nearly west of
Abercrombie. Third. A post of four companies of infantry and a battalion of cavalry on the
Missouri River, near the mouth of Heart River, about 40 miles below the old trading post near
Fort Clarke. Fourth. A post (garrison and place to be determined during the summer) on
Yellowstone River, southwest of Fort Clarke.
Devil's Lake is in the center of the Yanktonais country, is supplied abundantly with timber, is
surrounded by fine meadows, and receives tribute from many clear streams. This lake has been
the rendezvous of this powerful tribe of Sioux Indians, and its occupation by a sufficient force
will hold them completely in check by occupying their principal place of refuge. All of the
Minnesota (Sisseton) Sioux having been driven from the upper Minnesota and lower Red River
by last summer's campaign, are now in the Yanktonais country, and with that tribe have wintered
at Devil's Lake.
The post at this point will therefore cover the whole valley of the lower Red River. The post
on James River, west of Fort Abercrombie, covers the lower valley of that river and the valley of
the upper Minnesota, and interposes between the Yanktonais Sioux and the Minnesota and Iowa
frontier. These two posts, with the post at Fort Pierre, on the Missouri River, form a line of posts
covering at a considerable distance the entire valley of Red River and the frontier of Iowa and
Minnesota. They are located in the very heart of the Indian country and amongst their most
valuable hunting grounds. To the northwest of this line the Indians have retreated, and have
remained since the campaign of last summer without an attempt to commit hostilities, and I think
without the purpose of committing any. It is the intention to keep them northwest of this line.
The post near old Fort Clarke, on the Missouri River, is placed there for several reasons.
First, it protects to a considerable extent the navigation of the upper Missouri; second, in
conjunction with Fort Pierre, lower down on the river, it interposes between the Uncpapas, Teton
Sioux, west of the Missouri River, and the Minnesota and Dakota Sioux, and renders combined
hostilities very difficult; third, it furnishes a safe point on the Missouri River at which emigrants
to the gold mines of Idaho, of whom many thousands will set out this summer, can complete
their preparations and commence their journey across the plains, and, fourth, it is the depot for
the supply of the post at Devil's Lake, from which it will be distant about 100 miles. It is
proposed to keep nearly all the cavalry horses and draft animals belonging to the post at Devil's
Lake at the post near Fort Clarke during the winter. Supplies of all kinds can be delivered there
at small expense by steamer during the months of June and July. The post on James River will be
in like manner supplied from the Missouri River at Fort Pierre, the cavalry horses and draft
animals being kept during winter at Fort Pierre. I shall have trails opened between the post near
Fort Clarke and at the posts at Devil's Lake and on James River at once. The route of emigrants
to the mines of Idaho, setting out from Minnesota, will be by way of the post on James River to
the post on Missouri River near Fort Clarke, and thence by way of the Yellowstone.
The post on the upper Yellowstone will be established by General Sully during the summer,
if he thinks it practicable and judicious, but will not be more than 150 miles west of the post near
Fort Clarke. Whilst the infantry companies which are to garrison these posts are marching to and
establishing them, the regiment of Minnesota Mounted Rangers, with one or two mountain
howitzers, will scour the whole region east of the Missouri, and drive all the fragments of Indian
bands to the northwest of the line of posts. The Indians will be attacked and beaten, or notified,
under the penalty of immediate and active hostilities, that they must not venture behind the line
on any pretext. The whole region east of the Missouri and north of the line of posts will be
traversed by this cavalry force as thoroughly as possible during the summer. In like manner,
whilst the post near Fort Clarke, on the Missouri River, is being established by its infantry
garrison, General Sully, with a regiment and battalion of cavalry, will make an expedition from
Fort Pierre, by way of the Black Hills and the upper Yellowstone, through the country of the
Uncpapa Sioux, and will, if practicable, locate the post on the upper Yellowstone.
An examination of the maps will exhibit better than I could explain the important results of
these expeditions and of the establishment of these posts, in forcing the whole of the Yanktonais
Sisseton Sioux, who have endangered the frontiers of Iowa and Minnesota and obstructed the
navigation of the Red River of the North, to the northwest of the line of posts through Dakota,
and to such a distance as to insure entire security hereafter, in opening to emigration and
settlement all of Dakota east and south of James River, and in furnishing a direct and much safer
route for emigrants to Idaho. The wonderful accounts of gold found in that Territory have greatly
inflamed the minds of the people throughout the Northwest, and a very heavy emigration will
begin in the spring. Of course there will be much suffering and perhaps not unfrequent massacres
of the emigrants by Indians. Such people are proverbially careless and imprudent, but,
notwithstanding, the Government will be held responsible for any repetition of the sufferings
which marked the early overland travel to California.
To accomplish the purposes herein stated, the following forces (now in the department.) will
be used, viz: One regiment of infantry and the regiment of mounted rangers in Minnesota. This
force will furnish garrisons for the posts at Devil's Lake and on James River, and the small
garrisons at Forts Ridgely, Abercrombie, and Ripley. About eight companies of infantry, a
regiment of cavalry (the Sixth Iowa), and another battalion of cavalry for a few months of the
summer will be required by General Sully for the occupation of the post below Fort Clarke, and
for his expedition by way of the Black Hills to the upper Yellowstone and Missouri Rivers. This
force (except the last battalion of cavalry) is now in this department.
In all, the necessary troops will consist of two regiments infantry and two regiments and a
battalion of mounted men. The battalion of mounted men is only needed for temporary service
and can be borrowed for a few months from Nebraska, especially as its movements will be
against the Sioux, who endanger the overland route through that Territory. The establishment of
these posts, together with active operations of the whole cavalry force during the summer, will, I
doubt not, effectually put an end to Indian hostilities on the frontier of Iowa and Minnesota, and
accomplish all the purposes set forth in this communication. The posts will be built by the troops
from material on the ground, without any necessity for appropriations, and will no doubt soon
become permanent settlements along the emigrant route. The stay of the troops will only be
temporary, as the country behind and around the posts will soon be settled. The results of these
proposed operations are so important, and the force needed is so small, that I do not doubt the
Government need only be satisfied that the operations are feasible to accord a ready and willing
assent to the plan.
I submit it for consideration as embodying my well-considered views on the subject. It is for
me to state that all the forces on duty in this department consist of three infantry regiments and
two cavalry regiments. I propose to send one of the infantry regiments south early in the spring,
and retain the others to execute these proposed operations. I have thought it well to append to
this letter a communication to the War Department in relation to the policy to be pursued toward
these Indians, which I have the honor to request be submitted to the Secretary of War for his
action, with such indorsement as the General-in-Chief may think judicious.
I have the honor to be, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Major-General, Commanding.
Matagorda Peninsula, Tex., February 8, 1864.
Commanding Post at Indianola :
I presume General Benton will have left Indianola before this reaches there, leaving you in
command. I wish you to preserve great vigilance and use every precaution against surprise or
attack; do not weaken your picket-line or reduce its distance from the post, and scout as much as
safety and your disposable means will admit; make frequent reports in detail, and give me always
your suggestions. General Benton will, of course, leave all the papers and records pertaining to
the division and post. The habit officers of this command have indulged in of carrying off papers
and records with them cannot be permitted. You will receive all the orders and communications
and indorsements I have sent General Benton and be governed by them. I wish you to send down
the ordnance officer of the division as soon as possible, to draw from the ordnance depot here all
the guns, equipments, and ammunition sufficient to equip the division and to have at your post at
least 100 rounds to the man.
Hasten forward the defenses as rapidly as possible to completion. The battery on the neck of
these faces is explained in my correspondence with General Benton. The work laid out and partly
completed by Mr. J. T. Baker, engineer, on the shell mound in rear of the hospital, is ridiculous
in the extreme. It fronts the wrong way and is enfiladed from the probable approach of the enemy
on the plain; the labor thus far is lost and even worse than lost--the site is nearly spoiled. I
explained to General Benton yesterday the way in which this work may be remedied, and
instructed him to explain it to you; there was no necessity at all for a bastion work there, and the
battery to be inclosed merely wanted to cover four guns, and fire toward the plain and the neck,
sweeping both approaches. A straight line fronting the bridge and a flank at nearly a right angle
to it facing the neck would perfect the condition. The northern face of the battery near the wharf
should be so lengthened as to cover the rear of it from a fire of a gun-boat which might take up a
position near the old ruined dock farthest to the westward.
A court-martial for the trial of Colonel Glasgow, of the Twenty-third Iowa, will be ordered
from these headquarters as soon as papers which General Benton was ordered to forward are
received here.
I have the honor to remain, with respect, your obedient servant.
N. J. T. DANA,
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANS., February 12, 1864.
Major-General CURTIS,
Fort Smith:
Returned via Lawrence. Quiet on border. Excitement allayed. Our troops vigilant;
bushwhackers put on defensive. Bring 2 clerks from Eighteenth Iowa. Hope you will strengthen
your escort. Guerrillas harassed and may swing around south of Fort Scott.
Colonel and Chief of Staff.
Fort Leavenworth, February 13, 1864.
SIR: The following letter is received from War Department:
Washington, D. C., February 4, 1864.
Maj. Gen. S. R. CURTIS,
Commanding Department of Kansas, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.:
SIR: In reply to your letter of the 25th ultimo I am directed to inform you that this will be
authority to relieve Maj. John W. Noble, Third Iowa Cavalry, from his present duties, and order
him to rejoin his regiment.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
In accordance with the foregoing authority you are hereby directed to rejoin your regiment.
Very respectfully,
Colonel and Chief of Staff.
New Orleans, La., February 16, 1864.
Brig. Gen. C. P. STONE,
Chief' of Staff, Department of the Gulf:
SIR: In obedience to letter of instructions from Department headquarters--
to visit the principal points on the coast of Texas occupied by my corps to satisfy myself by
personal examination of the safety of the positions occupied, and further directing that if these
positions can be securely held by a smaller force than is now there you (I) will please promptly
report the fact; if re-enforcements of troops or vessels of war should seem to you (me) to be
required you (I) will please report the amount and nature of re-enforcements necessary--
I beg to make the following report: I visited Decrow's Point, where I found a division
(Ransom's); Fort Esperanza, where I found two battalions of black troops; aggregate present,
839; and Indianola, where is also a division (Benton's). I recommend that De-crow's Point be for
the present abandoned; the garrison at Matagorda Island be increased to 2,000 infantry, one 100-
pounder Parrott and two 30-pounder Parrotts, and 150 cavalry; that the garrison at Indianola
should be increased by 3,000 infantry, 500 cavalry, eight 32-pounder howitzers (brass), and four
20-pounder Parrotts.
The artillery are with 400 rounds of ammunition and complete implements, equipments, and
carriages. Indianola I recommend should be held, if it is intended to begin active operations in
Texas this season. Should it, however, be abandoned, the garrison of infantry at Fort Esperanza
or Matagorda Island should be increased to 3,500 men. There should always be two light-draught
gun-boats inside the Bay of Matagorda. A capable engineer officer is much needed for the
works on this bay. The citizen, Mr. Baker, was unfit for such duty, throwing away labor in
ridiculous, untenable earth pens. I ordered him to report to Major Houston.
The troops at the points on this bay are in fine health and condition, and General Dana
reports that--
The want of cavalry to keep the enemy's mounted force from my communications and the
fear of an order to abandon our friends at those places and the adjoining districts have alone
prevented my occupying Victoria and Texana, and from collecting all that there is between the
Guadalupe and Colorado Rivers.
I visited the force (one regiment, the Twentieth Iowa Infantry, and two small companies
Corps d'Afrique) at Aransas Pass (Mustang Island). Found them in excellent health, but in want
of pay, clothing, and ammunition, all of which have been asked for from these headquarters by
requisitions upon the department staff. Should that post be continued the artillery should be
increased by four 24-pounder howitzers (brass, smooth) and eight or ten Coehorn mortars, so that
an enemy approaching under cover of the sand-hills, among which the fort stands, could be
reached by shells. The black troops there and at all the points on this coast should be armed.
At Brownsville, Tex., I consider the garrison ample, except in cavalry. Were the so-called
cavalry there mounted, armed, equipped, and paid, they would more than suffice, but the colonel
commanding the cavalry brigade reports that not more than 200 of his horses are fit for
immediate service on account of want of forage, and that these would not stand a long trip. The
country is barren of forage of all sorts and the horses rapidly dying. Between 300 and 400 of the
horses purchased from the Mexicans under the contract made by Colonel Holabird have already
died, being lean, undersized Mustang ponies when delivered, and having had hard work and but
little forage since.
The order to send part of this cavalry force (200) to General Dana has just been to-day
received by me. I do not deem it safe to leave General Herron on such an extensive frontier of
arid plains without any efficient cavalry, which I would do if I ordered the 200 horses fit for the
field to General Dana. I, therefore, shall await further directions in regard to this matter. Should
the force at Brownsville be intended to operate on the enemy's communications between that
frontier and the habitable part of Texas, east of the Nueces, from which cotton comes, and to
which supplies are being sent daily from Eagle Pass, a mounted force should be kept with
General Herron of 800, by sending horses to him and proper arms, clothing, and equipments for
the men.
The mounted Mexicans are unreliable, except to steal horses, drive cattle, and give
information to the enemy when captured. They should all be put in the quartermaster's
department as vaqueros. Should, however, it be deemed advisable to keep a force on the Rio
Grande simply to hold possession of the town of Brownsville and cover its own communications
it would require in addition to the African troops now thereabouts a brigade of infantry, a battery
of artillery with siege guns enough for the works, and five companies of cavalry for outposts and
vedette duties. General Herron asks for the following artillery for the works being constructed:
Sixteen guns and howitzers of 24 and 32 pounds.
There are four forts to arm, some of which are very extensive. My instructions to General
Herron (copy of which is hereby inclosed) directs him to repair old Fort Brown. Should his force
be reduced to a single brigade, he should be provided with supplies of provisions and
ammunition sufficient to enable himself to maintain his forces against any attempt to besiege him
until he could be relieved. The field-works at Point Isabel are the only works I examined, which
appeared well planned and well constructed. The garrison there should have a company of
cavalry for vedette duty. In case the new route via Boca Chica is opened and found to work well,
then the garrison at Point Isabel can be reduced to one company of infantry, one of cavalry, and
signal men and machinery enough to keep the garrison at Brazos informed day and night of any
approach of the enemy.
The lights at Ship Island Shoal, Pass Cavallo, Aransas, and Brazos should be restored, and a
communication to the Light-House Board on the subject would, I think, be attended to. Reports
from commanding officers and staff officers are inclosed, giving information useful at
I respectfully call attention to the report of Colonel Davis, of the cavalry. My medical
inspector's report, just received, will be copied and sent in as soon as practicable. An order was
issued at Brownsville directing General Herron to collect the small-pox cases among the citizens
and isolate them in a separate hospital, so as to prevent the further spread of that disease.
I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. O. C. ORD,
Major-General, Commanding Corps.
Milwaukee Wis., February 16, 1864.
Brig. Gen. A. SULLY,
Davenport, Iowa:
GENERAL: I am directed by the major-general commanding to advise you that he will
expect to see you here on the 24th instant to meet General Sibley.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
Omaha, Nebr. Ter., February 19, 1864.
Governor of Nebraska:
DEAR SIR: Your favor of to-day, directed to Brigadier-General McKean, commanding this
district, inclosing a telegraphic dispatch from citizens of Brownsville, Nemaha County, in this
Territory, praying that troops may be stationed in Nemaha and Richardson Counties to protect
them from bands of thieves and outlaws infesting that part of the country, is received, and in the
temporary absence of General McKean I take the liberty of replying to say that' it is the intention
of General McKean as soon as he returns from Fort Leavenworth to send detachments of
Company C, Seventh Iowa Cavalry (now stationed at Nebraska City), to Brownsville and Falls
City for the protection of the citizens of those places and vicinity. Such a detail would have been
made by the general before he went away had he supposed that there was any necessity for it at
that time. As soon as the general returns, which will be in the course of a week or ten days, such
a disposition will be made of the small force in this district as will afford protection to the lives
and property of the citizens at the points required. Such instructions will be given to the
commanding officers at Nebraska City as will afford temporary relief, and immediately on the
general's return permanent arrangements will be made.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
New Orleans, La., February 22, 1864.
1. The squadron of the Eighteenth New York Cavalry under command of Major Byrne, lately
arrived from the North on the steamer Empire City, will be reported to Brigadier-General Lee,
chief of cavalry.
2. The Fourth Iowa Battery, Capt. P. H. Goode, just arrived from the North on the steamer
Illinois, will be reported to Brig. Gen. Richard Arnold, chief of artillery.
By command of Major-General Banks:
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Batesville, Ark., March 1, 1864.
Maj. W. D. GREEN,
A. A. G., 7th A. C. and Dept. of Ark., Little Rock, Ark.:
MAJOR: E. A. Dunham, first lieutenant Squadron M, First Iowa Cavalry, reported here in
the evening of 28th instant without written orders, but with verbal instructions to proceed via
Jacksonport to east side of Black River and procure beef-cattle for the use of Seventh Army
Corps. Finding the country between Searcy and Jacksonport pretty thickly infested with armed
rebels, he came here, and, as his command consists of only 95 men, I have considered it
inadequate to meet the enemy's forces east of Black River. I should have reenforced him and sent
him through, but I have out now several parties, and my garrison is only just enough for defense.
I requested Lieutenant Dunham to await the return of some of my detachments, but he thinks it
best to return, and I write this to protect him from blame in not crossing Black River, for his
force would undoubtedly be captured, the enemy mustering 700 men on that side, with all the
available crossings strictly picketed.
I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Colonel First Nebraska Cavalry, Comdg. District.
Fort Leavenworth, Kans., March 1, 1864.
His Excellency W. M. STONE,
Governor of the State of Iowa:
GOVERNOR: I am in receipt of your proclamation of the 10th, and your note asking my cooperation
to prevent persons from running away from the draft on the pretext of going to the new
gold mines. I have referred the matter to the honorable the Secretary of War for instructions.
They are not only coming from Iowa into my department, but I have information from most of
the States east of the Missouri as far as Ohio of a coming tide. The news from Idaho is almost
fabulous, and it is hard to tell whether love of gold or fear of the draft has the longest end of the
I hope your appeal will touch the patriotism of Iowa citizens to remind them of their duty,
and secure Iowa from a reproach of running away from a call to duty; but the subject as to my
command involve' such a vast number of persons who are engaged in outfits, and would require
such extensive police regulations to regulate, that I deem it necessary to ask instructions before I
issue orders that I have not troops to carry out. Some say the Idaho mines, although very rich, are
very narrow in dimensions. If this be so our friends will have to fall back as they did from Pike's
Peak, with a rush and a howl. I am expecting trouble in my department arising from this gold
influx, but will do all I can to keep matters level. I have just returned from an 800 miles' march
through the Indian and Arkansas country, which will explain my delay in answering your favor.
Truly, Governor, your friend and servant,
Indianola, Tex., March 2, 1864.
I. So much of Special Orders, No. 43, from these headquarters, as orders the Eighteenth
Indiana Volunteers to be ready to move with all its camp and garrison equipage at six hours'
notice is hereby rescinded.
II. The Forty-ninth Indiana Volunteers, Col. James Keigwin commanding, will immediately
embark on board the steamer Planter, with all their camp and garrison equipage.
III. The following-named enlisted men are detailed temporarily as scouts, and will report at
once to Captain Armstrong, commanding Texas Scouts, but in case Captain Armstrong's
command be separated from the division they will at once return to their regiments: Sergt.
George W. Brown, Company B, Twenty-second Iowa Volunteers; Private Joseph L. Carter,
Company I, Twenty-first Iowa Volunteers.
By command of Brigadier-General Warren:
Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General
Vicksburg, Miss., March 6, 1864.
VI. In obedience to Special Field Orders, No. 24, current series, from the headquarters
Department of the Tennessee, the following regiments and batteries of the Sixteenth Army Corps
are designated for the Red River expedition under the command of Brig. Gen. A. J. Smith:
From the First Division: Forty-seventh Illinois Volunteers, Eighth Wisconsin Volunteers,
Fifth Minnesota Volunteers, Thirty-fifth Iowa Volunteers, Thirty-third Missouri Volunteers,
Second Iowa Battery.
From the Third Division: Fifty-eighth Illinois Volunteers, Eighty-ninth Indiana Volunteers,
One hundred and nineteenth Illinois Volunteers, Fourteenth Iowa Volunteers, Twenty-seventh
Iowa Volunteers, Thirty-second Iowa Volunteers, One hundred and seventy-eighth New York
Volunteers, One hundred and seventeenth Illinois Volunteers, Forty-ninth Illinois Volunteers,
Twenty-fourth Missouri Volunteers, Third Indiana Battery.
Two wagons and two ambulances to each regiment, one wagon for each battery, and one
wagon to each headquarters only will be taken. The remaining wagons, surplus stores, and
baggage, with the sick, will be left, with a competent officer in command; an officer of the
quartermaster's department, with sufficient surgeons, will also be left under proper orders, and a
camp will be designated by Brigadier-General Smith near Vicksburg.
Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Mower will report for orders to Brig. Gen. A. J. Smith, commanding
expedition. Brig. Gen. J. M. Tuttle will turn over the records and property of the division
headquarters to Brig. Gen. J. A. Mower, and will report in person at Memphis Tenn., to the
general commanding corps, for assignment to duty.
By order of Maj. Gen. S. A. Hurlbut:
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Vicksburg, Miss., March 10, 1864.
The Red River expedition will leave Vicksburg to-day at about 3 p.m. The signal for getting
up steam will be one gun from these headquarters one hour before starting. The signal for
starting will be five whistles from these headquarters on steamer Clara Bell, to be repeated by the
boats carrying-division and brigade commanders. Upon the signal for starting being given, the
boats will swing out into the stream, each general commanding leading his command, in the
following order: First Division, Sixteenth Army Corps; Third Division, Sixteenth Army Corps;
General Kilby Smith's division, Seventeenth Army Corps; the boats moving in the order laid
down in the inclosed list.
The following signals are established for the running of the boats during the expedition: For
starting or hailing, five whistles; for closing up, four whistles; for landing, three whistles. In
landing, the divisions must be kept together.
By order of Brig. Gen. A. J. Smith:
Assistant Adjutant-General.
First, Clara Bell; second, Des Moines: third, Mars, Forty-seventh Illinois; fourth, Hamilton,
Thirty-third Missouri; fifth, Baltic, Fifth Minnesota and Thirty-fifth Iowa; sixth, Chouteau,
Eighty-ninth Indiana, Ninth [Indiana] Battery; seventh, Adriatic, Fifty-eighth and One hundred
and nineteenth Illinois; eighth, J. H. Lacy; ninth, Southwester, Thirty-second Iowa; tenth, W. L.
Ewing, Fourteenth Iowa, Third [Indiana] Battery; eleventh, Sioux City, Twenty-fourth Missouri;
twelfth, Diadem, Twenty-seventh Iowa; thirteenth, Tutt, One hundred and seventeenth Illinois;
fourteenth. Liberty, Forty-ninth Illinois; fifteenth, Emerald, One hundred and seventy-eighth
New York; sixteenth, Hastings; seventeenth, Autocrat; eighteenth, Diana; nineteenth, Raine.
Matagorda Island, Tex., March 11, 1864.
Brigadier-General WARREN,
Commanding at Indianola, Tex.:
GENERAL: By direction of Major-General Dana I inclose you Special Orders, No. 53, from
headquarters. These orders are inclosed for your information, with the understanding that the
movements of the troops from Indianola, already ordered and arranged for by you, takes place
just the same under your guidance and direction, and to enable you to detail some regiment from
General Lawler's brigade to take the place of the Twenty-third Iowa Volunteers or Ninety-ninth
Illinois Volunteers, detailed from your (First) brigade for duty at McHenry Bayou or the
The general further wishes you to send down the clerks, with the books and papers pertaining
to division headquarters, at the same time with the staff officers. The number of our general
orders is left blank for you to fill.
I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Little Rock, Ark., March 12, 1864.
The general commanding directs me to say that in case the division should be ordered on a
march the following instructions will be observed: The troops will go in light marching order.
Each man will carry in his knapsack his blanket, poncho, one shirt, one pair of stockings, two
days' rations in his haversack, and 40 rounds of ammunition. One wagon will be allowed to each
regiment for transportation of cooking utensils, &c., and one wagon for brigade headquarters.
Such men as are not able to march will be left in camp and one commissioned officer of each
regiment will be placed in charge of the camp. Lieutenant-Colonel Mackey, Thirty-third Iowa
Infantry, whose health don't permit him to march, will remain in charge of the whole camp of the
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General.
Milwaukee, Wis., March 14, 1864.
Maj. Gen. S. R. CURTIS,
Comdg. Dept. of Kansas, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.:
General Sully will move from the upper Missouri with a considerable force against the
Uncpapas and other hostile bands of Sioux as soon as the grass is sufficiently advanced to subsist
his animals. He needs another battalion of cavalry and I have none in this department. One
battalion of the Seventh Iowa Cavalry is now with him. The remaining two battalions I sent to
your department at the request of General Schofield when he was in command. They are, I
think, on the Nebraska frontier. As the expedition of General Sully is directed against the hostile
Sioux along the northern frontier of Nebraska, I have the honor to request that you will, if
possible, return to me one battalion of the Seventh Iowa Cavalry or the battalion of the Second
Nebraska Cavalry now in service in your department.
I only wish the services of that battalion for the summer, and it will be returned to you, if you
wish, at the termination of Sully's summer campaign, or sooner if possible. As the results of this
expedition are directly connected with the security of the northern frontier of Nebraska, and with
the safety of the overland route via Kearny and Laramie, the troops I ask will serve, no doubt, as
useful a purpose with him as at their present stations. Will you please inform me, at your earliest
convenience, whether you can let me have them? If you can comply with my request, the
battalion should repair to Fort Randall or Sioux City by the 1st May, and report to General Sully.
It will be a great favor to me and of benefit to the public interests if you can comply with this
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Off Fort De Russy, March 15, 1864.
Maj. Gen. W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Department of the Tennessee:
DEAR GENERAL: I have only time to write you a few lines to say that so far things are
working well and we are in possession of Fort De Russy, which was taken by General Smith
with slight resistance; 250 prisoners and 10 heavy guns fell into our hands. The Eastport and
Neosho got up in time to fire a few shot, one of which passed over the fort and came near using
up an Iowa regiment, and the troops moved on so quick that Captain Phelps had to desist for fear
of killing our own men. As soon as the fort fell (Walker escaped with 5,000 men), I sent the gunboats
ahead to cut them off and harass them until the army could follow. The gunboats are in
Alexandria before this. The army were too tired to move last night, having performed a march of
30 miles, and they had to stop to get on board the transports again, which they are doing now. I
am in hopes General Smith will be able to throw his troops between the rebels and Alexandria
and catch the retreating rebels.
Everything is working smoothly; the army and navy hobnob together nicely, and though I
should like to have had you here personally, yet I think no one could have done better than
General Smith has thus far. Had General Banks been up to time not a rebel would have escaped.
This has been an unpleasant expedition to the rebels: their loss in munitions of war has been
heavy, as the forts are full of everything. There is no trouble in subsisting an army in this
country; plenty abounds.
Very respectfully and truly, yours,
WASHINGTON, D. C., March 15, 1864.
Major-General POPE,
Orders were issued some days ago to provost-marshal in regard to the enlistment of scouts by
General Sully. Does Brackett's Minnesota Battalion, formed out of the Fifth Iowa Cavalry,
constitute any part of your intended Indian expedition? It appears from papers in the War
Department that it was intended to be sent South. Please answer.
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
MILWAUKEE, March 16, 1864.
(Received 2 p.m.)
Major-General HALLECK:
Either Brackett's battalion or one battalion of Seventh Iowa or Second Nebraska Cavalry will
be needed for the summer only. Have written to General Curtis to know whether he can spare
one of these battalions for the summer; will return it to him in the autumn. Will telegraph as soon
as I hear from him.
Little Rock, March 18, 1864.
Lieut. Gen. U.S. GRANT,
Nashville, Tenn.:
I respectfully request that the following veterans be ordered to return as soon as possible for
the defense of the line of the Arkansas: Twelfth Michigan Infantry, Tenth Illinois Cavalry, Third
Iowa Cavalry, nine companies Fifty-fourth Illinois Infantry, Twenty-fifth Ohio Battery, Third
Iowa Battery, Battery K, First Missouri Light Artillery: two companies Sixty-second Illinois
Infantry, two companies Ninth Wisconsin Infantry, four companies Third Minnesota Infantry,
two companies Eighteenth Illinois Infantry, one company Forty-third Illinois Infantry.
Pine Bluff is now threatened by a considerable force, 1,500 of Dockery's brigade, which are
Vicksburg and Port Hudson paroled prisoners.
Very respectfully,
Major-General, Commanding.
Fort Leavenworth, March 18, 1864.
Maj. Gen. J. G. BLUNT,
Fort Smith, Ark.:
DEAR GENERAL: Yours of the 2d, desiring Captain Insley to be assigned to your
command, is duly received. He expressed some desire to be at Fort Smith when I first came to
the department, but I understood him to prefer his present position. I think he is the best man for
the chief, and your supplies much, very much, depend on his efforts. I have put him at that work
first of all things, by sending him with special instructions to Saint Louis, where he has started
stores by steamers, and also giving him orders to start trains for Fort Gibson. All these matters
are better carried out under one head, with depot quartermasters at posts. I am in great need of
more good quartermasters, and have so reported to the Quartermaster-General, who will
probably send a corps to report soon.
Your dispatches and communications on the subject of troops seem to give up the point
which I took first. I have insisted that the words in my orders, "including the military post of Fort
Smith," makes the city of Fort Smith, and troops guarding it, part of the Department of Kansas,
and I had so presented the matter at Washington for the determination of the Department. For
that reason I directed you to use the words in my order, so the matter should be left open as to
where the department lines would fall and where troops belong. You used the words of Order
No. 1, but in the same dispatch say, "the troops are all in the Department of Arkansas," which
statement of yours will, I fear, be taken as conclusive by showing that Steele rightfully
commands all in the neighborhood of Fort Smith.
They also seem to stand firm at Washington on the old unexplained order, although I have
urged every possible reason upon every branch of the Government. Chipman, too, is using every
effort to procure more troops for my department, backed by the Kansas and other
Representatives. If, however, they adhere to the idea that nothing is meant by Fort Smith, make
the point that troops west of the Arkansas line on the 1st of January, the day my order is dated,
should be returned to my command. Mr. McDonald thinks the Sixth, Twelfth, Fourteenth, and
the First African were west of the Arkansas line on that day, and some batteries also. Your
dispatch of this morning says "the Eighteenth Iowa and Second Kansas Battery were in the
Department of Kansas on the 1st of January."
This again seems to waive the main points as to where the department lines fall, again
seeming to give it up that Fort Smith is not in the Department of Kansas. But without deciding
that point I have telegraphed again, and hope you will inquire carefully and report fully the exact
locations of troops and headquarters of troops, not in reference to department lines, which are
equivocal, but in relation to geographical lines on the 1st day of January, 1864. Be careful,
pending the question in Washington, not to give any orders to troops not clearly belonging to my
department, the Indian lines as the divide, since, as you perceive, General Thayer had full control
before either you or I reached that part of the department. The order to return troops must now
come from Washington.
If you get no telegraph informing you of a favorable determination as to the question of
department lines before this letter reaches you you will at once change headquarters of your
district to Fort Gibson, which will be more central as to lines and the troops we have, and we
must do the very best we can with what remains. There must be a force about 40 miles above
Fort Gibson, permanently located and properly fortified. I also hope to have a succession of posts
located on the military road from Fort Scott to Fort Gibson. Things seem quiet, but secret
organizations in Missouri seem to threaten a coming storm. The summer campaign looks a little
doubtful everywhere. Hope and hope ever. Keep me fully advised.
Truly, yours,
Pass Cavallo, Tex., March 20, 1864.
Capt. B. WILSON,
Assistant Adjutant-General:
SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report in relation to the progress of the work on
the fortifications now being constructed on this island: On the 18th instant two regiments from
the First and two from the Second Brigade, First Division, reported at the second line of
fortifications for duty. These regiments, the designation and numbers of which I did not learn, as
I had not yet a regularly organized system of reports, were worked by reliefs; and estimating
their full strength present to be 800 men, would give 400 constantly employed. The rapidity with
which they threw up the works and the progress made this day were very satisfactory.
On account of the wanton destruction of profiles and the pulling up of stakes, much labor has
been necessary to re-run the lines, to lay out the works anew, and to construct profiles. I have
depended mainly on the officers of the Second Engineers, Corps d'Afrique, to attend to this part
of the work. Fortunately there was no delay occasioned to the working party by this destruction.
The Second Engineers, Corps d'Afrique, were not employed on the works in the forenoon of this
day, as all inspection had been ordered. They were employed in the afternoon as usual, 35 men
on battery at north end of island, 93 men on Fort Esperanza, and 197 men on first line of fieldworks.
The works in first line are being pushed forward rapidly for the number of men engaged. The
work on Fort Esperanza, I regret to say, does not progress so rapidly as I would desire. The cause
of this delay is that I have been unable to procure a sufficient number of teams to draw the sods
for revetments. I have had no teams for this purpose to-day. On the 19th instant the Twentysecond
and Twenty-third Iowa Volunteer Infantry, from First Brigade, reported on right of
second line for duty. The Twenty-second Iowa reported 12 officers and 275 men for duty; the
Twenty-third Iowa 11 commissioned officers and 170 enlisted men. These regiments work by
reliefs, one wing at the same time, and half of this day they were employed on center lunette; 500
men will complete this lunette in one day. The Thirty-fourth Iowa and One hundred and
fourteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Second Brigade, reported at left of second line; the Thirtyfourth
8 officers and 128 enlisted men, and the One hundred and fourteenth Ohio 7
commissioned officers and 200 enlisted men. These regiments worked all day, and by reliefs of
one-half at the same time.
The total number of men, exclusive of those employed on sodding on this line, amounted to
773. The work on the left, as well as that on the right of the line, progresses rapidly. A
detachment from the Thirty-fourth Iowa, consisting of 3 commissioned officers and 65 enlisted
men, were engaged in sodding the redoubt on the extreme left; one face of the interior slope and
nearly the whole of the exterior slope of the same face was revetted. Two commissioned officers
and 40 enlisted men from the Twenty-third Iowa were employed on extreme right of the line,
covering the lunette preparatory to revetting. On account of some misunderstanding in relation to
teams, none of this work was sodded to-day. This detachment worked only half day.
I require some bread boxes, or shingles, which would be preferable, for pickets to hold the
sods in place; also barrels to revet sally-ports. It is also necessary that I should have some more
carpenter's tools. One level is required for each sodding party. These things I am not supplied
with in sufficient numbers. With a force of 200 good men I can press the revetment of this entire
line rapidly to completion. The line has been again run and the works staked out, and I will have
by 12 o'clock to-day sufficient profiles set to work 3,000 men to advantage, with which force,
had I tools enough for them, I could have this entire line ready to sod in two days. The Second
Engineers were employed only in the forenoon of this day, and in the following order: Seventy
men on Fort Esperanza, 199 on first line of field-works, and 36 at battery on north end of island.
No teams reported at Fort Esperanza to-day, causing much delay, as the sodding is now the
principal part which has to be done. The battery will be completed at 12 o'clock to-morrow
(Monday). I have to-day all the carpenters of the Second Engineers at work making profiles.
Have sent 6 officers to lower line to set them up and attend to such other work as may be
required to be done there in order to be ready to-morrow.
Have six teams drawing sods into Fort Esperanza to-day.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Colonel and Chief Engineer.
Fort Leavenworth, March 20, 1864.
Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Yours of the 12th instant, speaking of mine of the 28th ultimo as conveying "implied
censures," which "fall on the President" and not on you, because I speak of words in the order
creating this department as "entirely void of military meaning," is just received. I protest,
general, that I did not so express myself. I said that the construction reported by General Thayer
left these words "entirely void of military meaning ;" but I have constantly insisted this is not a
right military construction.
I did and do say that, with such a construction of the words "the military post of Fort Smith"
as leaves only a stone inclosure in my command, without troops in it, surrounded by a town,
troops, and progressing forts, all not belonging to the command of the inclosure, and all
commanding it, then the 200 feet square so located has no military meaning or importance and
should be eliminated from my order as worse than surplusage. In presenting these stubborn facts
in my plain vernacular I mean neither disrespect nor "censures ;" I go on the supposition they
were not so understood, and suppose on proper presentation the ambiguity will be remedied.
I am not to be commander of Fort Smith in orders and have no power to command it by
construction. That is the dilemma I desired might be removed. If I have not plainly presented the
matter before have I done it now? If there is the slightest disrespect implied before I withdraw it
now. I concur with you that the status of troops was fixed when the order was promulgated on
the 1st January, and I have strictly complied with that idea, allowing no orders to issue when
even doubts arose, because I had submitted the doubts to you and to the honorable Secretary who
issued the order.
Troops that were in the Indian Territory, and therefore unquestionably in this department, on
the 1st of January, have gone east into Arkansas for convenience of forage. I have not ordered
these, but asked you by telegraph to have them directed to report to me, avoiding all possible
complications. General Blunt telegraphs that the Eighteenth Iowa, Second Kansas Battery,
Companies B, K, L, and M of the Fourteenth Kansas, and Third Indian are thus situated in
Arkansas now, that were within the Indian Territory then. You can order them; I cannot, and will
not. I present the interests of my department earnestly and anxiously, but with no spirit of
complaint or "censure." I do the best I can to carry out your purposes and orders with whatever
force I have, but also present dangers that arise from shifts and changes incident to removals.
I am sure you will perceive the reasonable surprise which I expressed at finding on my return
to these headquarters a construction given to the words "Fort Smith," and the order removing the
Ninth Kansas, which strips me of all the efficient troops on the very troublesome border of my
command. It was not so much who did it, or how it was done, that I cared for. It was and is the
simple facts which I wished to present early and earnestly, so as they may be properly remedied
before a renewal of raids may torture the people and disgrace the annals of history. I have
presented the matters plainly and I think fully. I ought to do so feelingly, for I have seen and
sorely felt the ravages that have been perpetrated in this department. I considered it my duty to
you and to all that I should present all matters that seem to endanger my command, believing that
you and the honorable Secretary would desire to know and remedy difficulties as soon and
certainly as you could. With this view, in midwinter, and in face of some danger, I visited all the
exposed and controverted points of my command, and I hope my personal observations enable
me to present matters with more accuracy and force without imputations on you or others. I
certainly desire to do so. Although others must, as you say, determine finally on a modification
of orders relating to department lines, you cannot be insensible to the important influence you
exert in securing changes. If you are, I am not, and I cannot therefore expect you to dismiss or
defer the subject.
I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,
Milwaukee, Wis., March 23, 1864.
Brig. Gen. A. SULLY,
Commanding District of Iowa:
GENERAL: As I was unable to get from the Department of Kansas the battalion of cavalry
which I proposed to send you, I applied to the War Department and procured an order
transferring Brackett's battalion of Minnesota cavalry to this department. This battalion will be
sent you from Minnesota with a force hitherto directed to be sent to you from that district. I
inclose also a letter from the General-in-Chief, and my reply, concerning the protection of
emigrants by way of Laramie and the establishment of military posts on the Yellowstone and
Powder Rivers. The first post is provided for in your instructions.
If the Yellowstone be practicable for boats to the mouth of Big Horn, perhaps it will be better
to locate the post at that point. The post on Powder River you must judge of when you have
examined the country. Whatever you can do toward giving protection to emigrants either from
Laramie or any other point within your district, without obstructing or jeopardizing the success
of your campaign and establishment of military posts, I need not ask that you extend to them. I
feel sure that you will give every assistance in your power to all emigrants who need it.
Everything you have asked has been procured for you, and it is hoped that your success will be
complete. Do not hesitate as to the number of friendly Indians you employ; secure the services of
as many as you can use with profit.
I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,
Major-General, Commanding.
Milwaukee, Wis., March 25, 1864.
Brig. Gen. A. SULLY,
Commanding District of Iowa:
GENERAL: I received yesterday your letter of the 21st. In reply, it is only necessary to say
that you will see from General Halleck's indorsement that I am authorized to employ (not enlist)
such Indians as I may think judicious for service in your campaign. If you remember, we had a
conversation on the subject when you were here, and you suggested substantially the plan you
now do in your letter, in which I fully agree with you. My idea is to employ as many Shawnees
and Delawares, as well as other Indians who are available, giving them the blankets, &c., as you
suggest, as also what rations they absolutely need, and promising them all the spoils of the
campaign. I think in this way you can get for little or nothing some of the very best fighting
Indian material on the frontier.
You have my authority to do this to the extent you think judicious. We must by all means
make a clean sweep of hostile Indians this summer, as far at least as the "Crow country," and you
must employ all the friendly Indians who may be useful for this purpose. I have no doubt you
can get many of the Rees and Mandans simply for the privilege of accompanying you in this war
and sharing the spoils. This whole matter I leave to your discretion, with the understanding that I
will authorize and support every arrangement you think judicious. We must end Indian hostilities
this season. I have applied for an engineer officer to report to you with necessary surveying
instruments by the 25th April at Sioux City. Brackett's battalion is assigned to you. I have
ordered it to accompany the troops Sibley sends from Minnesota. Do you wish it to go sooner?
Very truly, yours,
Major-General, Commanding.
Milwaukee, Wis., March 25, 1864.
Brig. Gen. A. SULLY,
Commanding District of Iowa:
GENERAL: I would suggest to you, in employing Delawares and Shawnees, that you send
up and secure Black Beaver, who is now somewhere in Kansas. I would also suggest to you the
propriety of giving orders that no boats be allowed to pass above Fort Pierre until you think it
safe. I send in this connection an extract from a letter just received from General Sibley, which
bears upon the subject in another view. It is always to be understood that no treaties be permitted
to be made with the Indians by anybody except yourself, and that the terms be such as are
contained in the instructions hitherto sent from these headquarters. I will if possible prevent the
shipment of any annuities by the Indian Department for the hostile Indians.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
Major-General, Commanding.
Fort Leavenworth, March 27, 1864.
(Care of General Canby, Washington, D. C.):
DEAR COLONEL: I have just received yours of the 20th. Of course non-action at
Washington is equivalent to deciding the Fort Smith matter against this department. You will
perceive Halleck has evaded the issue and referred the papers, as he says, to the Secretary of War
and the Lieutenant-General. So the Secretary and President referred the matter to the General-in-
Chief. In this way time and pretext arises for moving the troops out of my reach. I have just
received the inclosed telegram from General Blunt, which speaks for itself. It is now nearly three
months since Orders, No. 1, was issued, and I have most respectfully and constantly urged the
determination of a patent ambiguity in it as to the meaning of the military post of Fort Smith.
I am sorry the issue was a little changed by asking the attachment of a portion of Arkansas,
although I myself suggested this as an easy way of avoiding controversies as to the military post
of Fort Smith. But clearly these words require some explanation, and somebody at headquarters
ought to resolve such a question in less than three months. So far I have received answers from
General Halleck only, of false issues, not in the least connected with the main point, or harsh
reproaches for what I had not done in the premises, while I protest that I have only respectfully
and earnestly presented the necessity of an explanatory determination of words within my first
order. Fort Smith is nearer the Red River than Little Rock, and I do not see how a movement On
Red River via Little Rock is likely to be availing to General Banks, whose troops had moved up
the lower Red River ten days before General Thayer left Fort Smith for Little Rock. If half the
forces at Little Rock had moved west, then the Fort Smith forces could have united in an easy
occupation of the upper Red River Valley at Fulton or elsewhere.
I will not believe General Grant is going to have an evasive dilemma style of giving
instructions. I hope he will have somebody ready to act for him decisively and unequivocally.
That is the idea of a military, concentrated will. If we ever secure this in our army we will gain a
position of vast advantage over past efforts in this regard. I was once associated with General
Grant in a movement on Frederick, in Southeast Missouri. In connection I heard of the attack on
Belmont, when some of our Iowa troops were pretty badly cut to pieces, and at first got more
kicks than compliments from Illinois letter writers. Telegraphed Grant asking who it was that got
up the Belmont movement, and also as to the behavior of Iowa troops. He said the Iowa troops
were all right and he took all the responsibility of the Belmont movement. I liked the style of his
dispatch; it was just to others and to himself. It was also prompt. I hope that indicates his
character. But he has too much on his hands to take up detail, and must depend on staff officers
to determine such matters as mine. It is no trifling matter, however, and deserves consideration,
which I hope you will press on him.
Truly, yours,
FORT LEAVENWORTH, March 28, 1864.
(Received 4 a.m., 29th.)
Major-General HALLECK:
General Blunt telegraphs:
FORT SMITH, March 26, 1864.
General Thayer, with Eighteenth Iowa, Twelfth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Kansas, First and
Second Colored, Rabb's battery, and all the Arkansas troops, have gone by General Steele's
orders toward Little Rock. I turned over such transportation as he required to move with
yesterday. In his march, 35 miles east of here, he overtook a train of ninety wagons I sent out for
forage, and by a brilliant piece of strategy succeeded in capturing and taking it off. Your
attention is called to the irregular and discourteous conduct of General Thayer, and also to the
fact that among the troops moved away are those which were unquestionably in this department
when the department was created, and the same that I requested you to have returned to my
Pass Cavallo, Tex., March 29, 1864.
Capt. B. WILSON,
Assistant Adjutant-General:
SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report, for the information of the major-general
commanding, relative to work on fortifications: On Monday, 28th instant, four regiments from
the First Brigade were employed on exterior line, working 875 men. The Second Brigade did not
work to-day; the wind was too high to allow them to work to advantage, and no sodding could
possibly be done. On the 29th instant four regiments (785 men) from the First Brigade were
employed on right of this line. The work assigned this brigade is-now complete, with the
exception of making the revetments.
Four regiments from Second Brigade were engaged to-day on left of exterior line, working
915 men. It will take the Second Brigade nearly one day to have their portion of the line ready
for sodding. This is owing to the fact that the sand or soil is lighter at this end of the line than at
the other, and is more subject to the action of the winds. The Thirty-fourth Iowa Infantry and six
companies of the Eighteenth Indiana Volunteers were engaged sodding. On interior line, 231
men from the Second Engineers on 28th instant and 230 on 29th. Ninety-six men were engaged
on the works at Fort Esperanza on the 28th, and same number on 29th.
What with high winds, scarcity of timber, and want of teams, the progress of the work has
been considerably delayed for the past two days. I would respectfully request that Lieutenant
Sheeks, acting assistant quartermaster, be instructed to turn over to me what wood (perhaps 1
cord) he may have on hand suitable for pickets, for sodding; also that Captain Patterson turn over
what plank and scantling he has suitable for platforms, to make entrance ways to bombproof and
for pin timber.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Colonel and Chief Engineer.
Alexandria, La., March 30, 1864.
Maj. Gen. J. A. McCLERNAND,
Commanding Forces in Texas:
GENERAL: By direction of the major-general commanding I have the honor to acknowledge
the receipt of your communication of the 24th instant, in regard to the attack upon a wood party
from the Twentieth Iowa Volunteers at Corpus Christi, and to say that it is entirely satisfactory to
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Milwaukee, Wis., March 31, 1864.
Brig. Gen. A. SULLY, Commanding District of Iowa:
GENERAL: Your letter of the 28th instant is received. The arrangements and dispositions
you propose are approved, but I am somewhat doubtful about your permitting single boats to
ascend the Missouri above Pierre without satisfactory information from above. Of that you must
be the judge. I am unwilling also that your stay in the Yellowstone country should be prolonged
so much as to render it doubtful whether you can reach the post at Long Lake in time to assure
yourself that the post at Devil's Lake is in a fair way of supply. It is probable, however, that you
can give such definite instructions before you leave the Missouri as will render the matter
Of course it is my purpose to have the posts established on James River, Fox Lake, and
Devil's Lake, as specified in the instructions sent you. Brackett's battalion I will send you as soon
as it is possible to supply them properly. They will be mounted on Canadian ponies, as will also
the entire regiment of Minnesota cavalry. It is probable that some of the mounted infantry sent
you will also be thus mounted. You can, of course, make such changes of the mount of these
troops as you think judicious. I agree with you and wrote to General Halleck that the post on
Powder River can best be located and supplied from Laramie. Idaho is not in this department
according to the order organizing it, nor is it likely that our military operations will extend much,
if at all, into that Territory. I am instructed, however, to disregard department lines in my
operations and dispositions. The post on Yellowstone ought not to be above the head of
navigation on that river, but as near as practicable to it.
The selection of a reservation at or near Fort Union I think judicious. I will let you know as
soon as I can just when Brackett's battalion can move from Minnesota. In all this matter,
however, general, one thing is of paramount importance, and must be held steadily in view, and
that is that the power of the Indians must be broken before we can hope for a permanent
settlement of the Indian question in your district, and that is the point to be made certain. I have
every confidence that you fully appreciate the whole matter and will act accordingly. Everything
you desire and every aid in my power to give you, you shall have. It is of the last importance to
the Government, as well as to ourselves, that this whole Indian question, as far as this military
department is concerned, should be settled this season.
I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,
Major-General, Commanding.
DEVALL'S BLUFF, April 2, 1864.
Capt. E. D. MASON:
At 5 o'clock yesterday morning I left the transport Dove at Augusta with my small force,
consisting of 170 men of Third Minnesota Infantry, under immediate command of Maj. E. W.
Foster, and 45 men of Eighth Missouri Cavalry, under immediate command of Capt. L. J.
Matthews. About 3 miles from the village we met and charged upon two different parties of
McRae's men, who, after a little resistance, fled beyond our means of pursuit on roads leading
from the Jacksonport road. General McRae himself was with one of the parties and narrowly
escaped capture by our cavalry. We moved on till 12 miles from Augusta, when, finding no
prospects of engaging them in a fair fight, after resting we started back to our transports. In an
hour and a half quite a large force of McRae's men, mounted, attempted to charge upon us, but
were repulsed handsomely, and we again resumed our march. When we had got 2 miles farther,
at Fitzhugh's woods, we were attacked by McRae's combined force of fighting men, numbering
from 400 to 600. The combat lasted two hours and a half and was sharp. Every officer and man
in my command acted like a hero. It was thus, after most resolute bravery and great coolness, we
made them give up the contest.
We moved in perfect order 6 miles to Augusta without interference, our colors unfurled and
our men singing "Down with the traitor." Our loss was only 4 killed and 18 wounded of the
infantry and 1 killed of the cavalry. The enemy's loss was upward of 100 killed and wounded.
We captured several prisoners. I am sure the moral effect of the expedition is greatly on our side.
Shall leave for Little Rock on first train.
The telegraph line was working to Fort Smith to-day, the first time since the 26th instant.
Judson, who is in command of District of the Frontier, is having some trouble about the
transportation. I have furnished General Kimball with copies of telegrams from General
Halleck; also copy of yours to General Thayer. Captain Carr has received a dispatch from
Colonel Myers saying the two quartermasters at Fort Smith are in the Department of Arkansas,
and has given them the necessary orders so that there may be no more controversy.
Nothing has been heard of the Ninth Kansas Cavalry. The bushwhackers are quite active in
the vicinity of Ozark, Clarksville, and Dardanelle. I think General Kimball will send part of the
Third Arkansas to Dardanelle, with a field officer to command that post. One battalion, 400 men,
of the Twelfth Michigan Infantry, under Colonel Graves, arrived day before yesterday; the
second battalion will be here to-day or to-morrow. Colonel Graves will have 950 men when they
get here.
Colonel Townsend, assistant adjutant-general at Washington, telegraphs under date of April
1 that the Fifty-fourth Illinois will be retained in that State for a few days. There can be no doubt
but that the Third Iowa has gone to Vicksburg. Colonel Ryan, who returned from the North night
before last, says a large number of Western troops are being sent to the Potomac. I sent a copy of
Colonel Clayton's dispatch to General Halleck.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
P. S.--Nothing new to-day. The prisoners from Pine Bluff have just arrived. It is rumored that
McRae is about to make a raid on Devall's Bluff. I think Geiger is prepared for him.
April 4, 1864---10 p.m.
Lieut. Col. O. D. GREENE,
Assistant Adjutant-General:
SIR: Lieutenant Martin has just arrived, bringing detailed instructions from you. General
Rosecrans had given me the same orders verbally, but I am glad to receive them in writing. We
did not reach Hannibal until near daybreak this morning, but moved out speedily and I think
without attracting attention. If people here should estimate our numbers, they have all sorts of
impressions regarding us; that we are an advance of a larger force; that we are bound westward;
that we are veterans returning to Iowa, &c. I have found here some Union men who are reliable
and will probably be of service.
Is it not well for me, in preventing the number of my command from being known, to
underrate their numbers? I think it much easier to disperse or hinder the organization of these
bands than it is to catch them and do them justice. Is it not best to encourage them a little? From
what I have learned to-day, I cannot believe their strength to be such(at least at present) that the
adoption of the above policy would endanger our interests. After a day or two, which I wish to
improve in horseshoeing, had I not better shift my location or detach a part temporarily--
something to render my movements uncertain and to divert attention from the real object? I trust,
sir, that you will have no reason to complain of our discipline; I think most of the inhabitants are
disposed to co-operate in the suppression of these guerrillas, and surely it becomes us to set them
no examples of lawlessness. I telegraphed to General Fisk immediately upon arriving here, but as
yet have received no communication from him, and understand that he is on the way to Saint
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant.
Major Ninth Iowa Cavalry, Commanding Detachment.
WASHINGTON, D. C., April 4, 1864.
Major-General POPE,
Milwaukee :
Lieutenant-General Grant desires to know if there is not a cavalry regiment in Iowa available
for duty in another department. Please state the particular regiments intended for Indian
Major-General and Chief of Staff.
MILWAUKEE, WIS., April 5, 1864.
(Received 4.30 a.m., 6th.)
Major-General HALLECK:
The only Iowa regiment on duty in this department is the Sixth Cavalry, which is stationed
on the upper Missouri, at Forts Pierre and Randall. It constitutes nearly the entire force under
General Sully in that region, and will form part of his Indian expedition. There may be in Iowa
veteran regiments on furlough, or new regiments, complete or incomplete, but it is not necessary
to say that such troops are not under my command.
WASHINGTON, D. C., April 6, 1864.
Major-General POPE,
Milwaukee :
GENERAL: I have just received your telegram in answer to inquiry about Iowa cavalry
regiment. There have been numerous unsuccessful efforts by members of Congress to get the
Sixth Iowa Cavalry out of your department, and I presume that the same parties had represented
to General Grant that there was a regiment available belonging to that State which they desired to
have sent South. For some reason or other they do not wish this regiment to go into the Indian
campaign, and hence their efforts to get it out of your command.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Five miles South of Elkin's Ferry, Camp No. 9,
April 7, 1864.
Brig. Gen. N. KIMBALL,
Comdg. U.S. Forces along the Line of the Arkansas, &c. :
GENERAL: We have been delayed a week by the failure of Thayer to make a junction with
us and our failure to ascertain where he was. We were under the necessity of going 50 miles out
of our way on account of bad roads. We have had two severe skirmishes with Marmaduke in
front and Shelby in rear, and have lost in all something over 80 in killed, wounded, and missing,
4 officers slightly wounded. General Rice was in the thickest of both fights. In the fight with
Marmaduke a piece of his scalp was taken away by a canister-shot, and upon retiring from the
field he presented a very sanguinary appearance, his wound having bled profusely. Shelby
charged our artillery three times in the most gallant style, and the Fiftieth Indiana distinguished
themselves in repulsing him. In a dispatch to Marmaduke, Shelby acknowledged to have failed
and to have suffered severely in both men and horses. One of his captains was killed. It is
possible that his loss was near 100 men. At the time this fight was going on in rear the First
[Iowa] Cavalry was engaged with Marmaduke's advance near the village of Antoine and drove
them across the Little Missouri. My column had at this time turned off the military road toward
Elkin's Ferry. As the First Iowa had encountered Marmaduke's artillery posted in a commanding
position, I sent orders for them to fall back and join the column, which they did with the loss of 1
man mortally wounded. General Carr pushed on and got possession of Elkin's Ford, on Little
Our left flank was also attacked by cavalry at Okolona, but the rebels were repulsed without
loss on our side.
The next morning early the enemy's pickets were discovered in our front on the south side of
the river. Up to this time nothing had been heard of Thayer, although I had sent several scouts
and two squadrons of the Third Arkansas Cavalry to communicate with him. One of the Third
Arkansas men, having become separated from his command after they had been beyond Mount
Ida, returned, bringing news about Thayer. It is supposed that the squadrons under Captain
Turner have returned to Little Rock. Yesterday a messenger sent by Major Green brought us the
first intelligence of Thayer. Instead of taking the Caddo Gap road, as agreed upon, he went to
Hot Springs, having turned off his road above Mount Ida. It is expected that he will join us tomorrow.
He is entirely out of rations, and our delay has caused a consumption of the supplies
which might have lasted us to Shreveport. I am now confident of having sufficient force to walk
over the rebels whenever they may meet us this side of Shreveport. I shall therefore move
straight on Camden after striking the prairie, and while supplies are reaching me from Little
Rock or Pine Bluff will endeavor to clear your front, so that you will not be troubled with any
considerable rebel force. I have sent a letter of instructions to Major Green and directed him to
consult with you before issuing the order. I am very sorry that there should have been any
misunderstanding between you and Major Green. Colonel Andrews knows very well that I am
opposed to disgracing gentlemen by putting them in jail for no crime. The gentlemen who were
confined should first have applied to you for their release; if they had done so I presume there
would have been no trouble about it. Major Green did not receive instructions from me to give
orders, as a dernier ressort, in such cases, but I do not wish him to interfere with your
prerogatives. I will write him a note, and I hope that everything will go on smoothly in future.
Your letters by former courier were received at Arkadelphia. It was not deemed safe to send back
at that time. I hope we shall soon be able to communicate without interruption.
Very respectfully,
I omitted to tell you about the fight with Marmaduke. I suppose he attempted to get
possession of the ford. His attack was fierce with artillery, cavalry, and dismounted men, but he
was repulsed with the loss of 1 captain killed, 2 officers prisoners (1 of his staff ), 6 men killed,
and a good many wounded. I hope McRae will leave now. If he does not he should be visited
again. I should like to hear from you as often as it may be practicable.
ENGINEER'S OFFICE, Pass Cavallo, April 9, 1864.
Assistant Adjutant-General:
SIR: I have the honor to respectfully submit the following report relative to progress on
defenses for the 8th and 9th instant: Ninety men from the First Brigade, First Division, of whom
Captain Voorhees, Twenty-first Iowa Infantry, was in charge, were employed on second lunette
on exterior line on the 8th instant. Four teams reported at this work to-day. At redoubt on left of
same line 42 men reported; these were from the Second Brigade, First Division. This party were
relieved immediately, as no teams reported. Very good revetments are being made at both of
these works, but the progress is very slow, as we are able to employ only a very small number of
men on this long line. The wind is destroying rapidly that portion of the line and the works where
revetments are not yet made. Eighty-two men from the First Brigade, First Division, were
employed the 9th instant on second lunette half day. Two teams reported at this work and none at
the left of the line. No men were employed at redoubts on this line. I employ very nearly 100
men daily at Fort Esperanza. Worked only half day on this fort the 9th instant, Saturday. Two
hundred and thirty-five men were employed at interior line on the 8th, and 236 half day on the
9th instant.
The progress on interior line is very satisfactory, as the work is being done systematically
and well. The earth is well rammed in layers of about 1 foot each. Lunettes A and B of this line
are nearly complete. In lunette A the revetments are complete, and two platforms (earthen) have
been made. One remains to be finished. Lunette B is nearly all sodded. The ground of the
cremaillere line has been broken nearly the whole length of this line. I have made the profile of
this line strong. The width of parapet, horizontal distance, 11 feet; command, 8 feet. The earth-
work of the platforms of the left battery at McHenry Bayou is complete, and I am waiting for
material with which to construct platforms. Six teams report daily at Fort Esperanza and a 2-
mule team at interior line to draw sods.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Colonel in Charge.
Saint Louis, Mo., April 9, 1864.
Assistant Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.:
Dispatch received ordering Ninth Iowa Cavalry to Little Rock, Ark. If it is not urgently
necessary to send them at once, I recommend a delay of a few days to enable board of
examination to finish the examination of the officers. The regiment came here perfectly new, and
has been kept here for discipline, drill, and to get rid of incompetent officers.
Little Rock, Ark., April 11, 1864.
Major-General STEELE,
Commanding Department:
GENERAL: Yours of the 7th, from Elkin's Ferry, is received. I rejoice at your success, and
do most sincerely hope that you may drive the enemy before you and gain victories in every
engagement. I am rejoiced that the Fiftieth Indiana has sustained its reputation and the honor of
our flag and the State; and, general, I know that they will continue to do so. They can be relied
upon in any emergency. They will never falter, nor will they be defeated. Sorry to hear of
General Rice's sanguinary mishap; hope he may escape in future. General, I regret that I am not
with you. I would rather be your orderly than be here. I am doing the best I can under the
circumstances. I regret that you have deemed it necessary to give confidential instructions to
your assistant adjutant-general, dernier resort. I will do nothing except what is right, demanded
by the circumstances or the good of the public service, and I will act as my judgment and the
requirements of the service dictate and demand. I will treat all citizens with due kindness, and
administer affairs for their good and for the advancement of our cause and the good of the
The trains with supplies are dispatched with the utmost promptness. I sent forward all the
troops belonging to the commands with you. I have trouble with General Blunt; he has seized
and holds all the transportation at Fort Smith. I have directed Colonel Judson to take it by force,
if necessary. The rebels are thick near Fort Smith and above Dardanelle. Outpost at Roseville
was attacked a few days ago, but the enemy was repulsed with loss. The forces at Clarksville
were also attacked, but repulsed the enemy. The force of rebels on the south side of the river are
Texans and Missourians, under command of some brigadier-general of Texas. I send with the
train a detachment of Third Iowa Cavalry.
Lieutenant-Colonel Caldwell, of that regiment, is here with an order from the War
Department, for all men of the Third Iowa in this command, as also is Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart,
of Tenth Illinois, to go to Nashville. I hope that the officers and men of the Third Iowa and Tenth
Illinois may be returned with the train. The Fifty-fourth Illinois has been detained in Illinois by
order of General Grant for a few days.
Four companies of the Third Minnesota have been detailed at Cairo by General Brayman. I
have not more than force enough to defend this post and the railroad and the depot at Devall's
Bluff. My cavalry is nothing. More force is needed at Fort Smith and points between this and
Fort Smith. I will visit McRae again, and, I think, will get him. I have closed all the liquor shops
and forbid the sale of liquors, and ordered all gamblers, loafers, and other persons having no
proper means of support, and who are non-residents, to leave the boundaries of my commands.
The Legislature assembled to-day, but there was not a quorum; there will be in a day or two.
Major Green and I will have no misunderstanding, nor will I have any with any of your staff
officers remaining here. I will do my duty and allow no one to interfere. I am made responsible
for the welfare of this command and the safety of all here, and I will govern myself accordingly.
I would prefer to be in the field, and ask you to relieve me from this command if my course
is not acceptable. I cannot feel satisfied that it is necessary for a staff officer to have confidential
instructions to issue orders as dernier resort, or control or countermand my orders. If I do wrong,
I am willing to be reproved and have my conduct investigated. I am either capable of
commanding and worthy of confidence or I am not. If not I wish to be relieved. Brigadier-
General West is here, under orders to report to you. Inclosed you will find copies of order from
these headquarters; also communications from Major Green and my reply. I find it necessary to
control the issuing of passes, and absolutely necessary to prohibit the sale of liquors and send
away all loafers and gamblers, and will, if permitted, protect all citizens, preserve the peace,
promote the welfare of the people, and advance the cause of the country. No one will have cause
to complain except such as are dangerous, and who should not be allowed to [remain] with or
near the armies. The classes I have enumerated in general orders. I sincerely wish that success
may continue to attend you and the army, and that the rebels may be completely annihilated.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Little Rock, Ark., April 11, 1864.
Lieutenant-Colonel BLACK,
Commanding Detachment:
You will send the detachment of the Third Iowa Cavalry with the train. They will return from
the front with the train on its return. Have them report to the officer commanding the escort to
the train.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Saint Louis, Mo., April 11, 1864.
General RAWLINS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.
If the General-in-Chief accedes to my views of allowing two good disciplined regiments of
cavalry from without the State for this department, ask him to please let me have the Second
Iowa and Third Michigan. The Seventh Kansas is a good fighting regiment, but would be less
likely to answer our purpose here.
Saint Loomis, Mo., April 11, 1865.
10. The Ninth Iowa Cavalry, Colonel Trumbull, will proceed by rail to Rolla, Mo., and
march thence, via Springfield, Mo., to Little Rock, Ark., and report for duty to Major-General
Steele. At Springfield, Colonel Trumbull will report to Brigadier-General Sanborn, commanding
District of Southwest Missouri, for instructions and orders to enable him on his march to cooperate
with troops of that district and in Northwest Arkansas, in extirpating bands of guerrillas
in that section of the country. General Sanborn will not give orders which will materially delay
the regiment in reporting at Little Rock, unless the exigencies of the service at the time should
require it. Colonel Trumbull will make the usual requisitions on proper staff officers for
transportation, supplies, &c.
By command of Major-General Rosecrans:
Assistant Adjutant-General
Little Rock, April 12, 1864.
GENERAL: Messengers with dispatches from you dated the 7th instant arrived yesterday
evening at 4 o'clock. Your directions concerning the forwarding of supplies have been and are
being complied with as fast as possible. Upon consultation with General Kimball it was thought
best to start the train from Pine Bluff, and rendered almost imperatively so from the fact that
Captain Cantine reported large amounts of stores, such as were ordered, had been shipped to
Pine Bluff in anticipation of that place being made your base of supplies, and that there was not a
sufficient amount of stores at Little Rock to load the teams as required. I gave Captain Manly
orders to take from the transportation at this place all that the required, and directed him to
decide what amount should remain behind. He reported at 12 o'clock yesterday that his entire
train, consisting of 123 wagons, was on the road to Pine Bluff.
The steamer Chippewa is loaded with quartermaster's stores and ammunition, and left for
Pine Bluff at to-day and will reach that place some time to-morrow morning. The wagon train
will arrive to-morrow night and will begin to load immediately. The wagons should all be loaded
and on the road at 12 o'clock on the 14th. Lieutenant-Colonel Mackey, of the Thirty-third Iowa,
is in command of the escort, consisting of something over 600 men belonging to the regiments of
General Salomon's division (left behind, and that have arrived since the troops left), and about
250 dismounted cavalry belonging to regiments in General Carr's division. Colonel Clayton is
ordered to furnish from 100 to 200 cavalry to accompany Colonel Mackey; also to turn over to
the train every wagon he can possibly spare, and if necessary to press teams from the country in
the vicinity of Pine Bluff. I have done and will do everything I possibly can to hurry the supplies
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Assistant Adjutant-General
MILWAUKEE, WIS., April 14, 1864.
Brigadier-General SULLY,
Davenport, Iowa:
The three companies infantry will leave here Tuesday afternoon; arrive in Saint Louis
Wednesday morning. When will you be in Saint Louis?
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
April 16, 1864---10.30. a.m. (Received 8.25 a.m., 17th.)
Maj. Gen. W. S. ROSECRANS,
Saint Louis, Mo.:
Send the Twelfth Missouri, Ninth Iowa, and Thirteenth Illinois Cavalry to Cairo without
delay. You may replace as many of them as you may require about Saint Louis from other parts
of your command.
Camden, Ark., April 17, 1864.
Col. F. H. MANTER, Chief of Staff:
COLONEL: I have the honor to report that in obedience to instructions from department
headquarters the Thirty-sixth Regiment Iowa Volunteer Infantry has been detailed to occupy and
run Mr. Britton's mill, under the direction of Captain Thompson, commissary of subsistence. I
have sent a staff officer to the bayou, who reports that the bridge is passable for infantry and the
bayou fordable for teams. I would respectfully suggest that one company of cavalry be ordered to
report to Colonel Kittredge, commanding Thirty-sixth Iowa Volunteer Infantry, for picket and
orderly duty at the mill, to keep up connection and be properly advised of any intention of the
enemy on the mill. The regiment will march at 7 a.m. to-morrow. The pioneer corps will repair
the bridge to-morrow for the use of trains.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
SAINT Louis, April 17, 1864--11 a.m.
(Received 12.25 p.m., 18th.)
Lieutenant-General GRANT:
By having authority to use the dismounted cavalry at depot for guard at Saint Louis, and
Ninth Iowa Cavalry ordered to Little Rock, can send two regiments of infantry and one of
cavalry, and Seventeenth Illinois Cavalry, Colonel Beveridge, now at Saint Charles, Ill., for
which I am an applicant. The rebels wish to stop and prevent planting in West Kentucky and
Tennessee. The intention of the rebels in Northern Arkansas, and of the guerrillas, with a
powerful armed secret organization here, is to do the same in Missouri, and the time of the
advent of their operations is at hand, for which reason no move of troops from the interior to
increase the feelings of insecurity here should, if possible, be made until planting is over.
Please, if you approve, send orders at once about using the Ninth Iowa and Seventeenth Illinois
Cavalry, and as to the dismounted cavalry from the depot.
SAINT LOUIS, Mo., April 17, 1864--5.30 p.m.
Lieutenant-General GRANT,
The Ninth Iowa will be sent as ordered. The Twelfth Missouri and Thirteenth Illinois Cavalry
can follow, but they are not mounted, nor have we any other mounted troops within 120 miles of
Saint Louis. Judging from the last news of the rebels going south from Fort Pillow, and the tenor
of your dispatch, I shall await your orders before sending forward foot troops.
Saint Louis, Mo., April 17, 1864.
Superintendent Pacific Railroad, Seventh Street Depot:
Please stop the Ninth Iowa Cavalry, now between here and Rolla, immediately and return
them to Saint Louis on the next train.
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Saint Louis, Mo., April 17, 1864.
General GUITAR,
Rolla, Mo:
Direct Colonel Trumbull, Ninth Iowa, to report to Captain Grimes for railroad transportation
to this city as soon as practicable.
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Saint Louis, Mo., April 17, 1864.
General GUITAR,
Rolla, Mo.:
If the Ninth Iowa Cavalry has started for Springfield send courier to turn it back at once.
Special train will be at Rolla by to-morrow morning to bring the regiment back here for special
service. Do everything-.necessary to get the regiment back here with greatest dispatch. Reply by
Assistant Adjutant-General.
CULPEPER, April 18, 1864--7 p.m.
(Received 19th.)
Major-General ROSECRANS,
Commanding Department of the Missouri:
You can use dismounted cavalry for guards at depots. Retain the Ninth Iowa and send the
two regiments of infantry and any other troops you can to Cairo without delay.
Lieutenant-General, Commanding
Milwaukee, Wis., April 18, 1864.
Brig. Gen. A. SULLY,
Commanding District of Iowa:
GENERAL: Late information from the upper Missouri River would seem to indicate that the
Uncpapa and other Teton Sioux will cross to the north side of the Missouri and endeavor to
effect there a junction with the Yanktonais on or near the James River. In case you find this
information true, you had probably better select your point of junction with the forces going to
you from Minnesota, somewhere east of the Missouri River, perhaps on the James River.
You will be able to decide in time, and as soon as you do, if any other point be selected than
the mouth of Bordache Creek, notify General Sibley at once, as well as myself, by telegraph
from Council Bluffs, as also by letter. General Davidson issued his order about the horses at Des
Moines under a misapprehension, and has revoked it handsomely, and with an offer of any
assistance in his power in fitting you out. Will you please return him my thanks.
Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,
Major-General, Commanding.
MILWAUKEE, WIS., April 18, 1864.
Brig. Gen. A. SULLY,
Davenport, Iowa:
The three companies Thirtieth Wisconsin left this morning. Will be at Saint Louis to-morrow
(Tuesday) morning. Telegraph at once to proper officer in Saint Louis to meet and make
provision for them.
Major-General, Commanding.
Camden, Ark., April 19, 1864.
III. The Twenty-ninth Regiment Iowa Volunteer Infantry, Fiftieth Regiment Indiana
Volunteer Infantry, and Forty-third Illinois Volunteer Infantry, one section of artillery, and the
pioneer corps, all under command of Col. Thomas H. Benton, jr., Twenty-ninth Iowa Volunteer
Infantry, are hereby designated for an expedition to meet our supply train, and will march
immediately on the Mount Elba road. Some cavalry will be attached to the command. Col.
Thomas H. Benton, jr., will report to Maj. Gen. F. Steele for instructions immediately.
By order of Brig. Gen. F. Salomon
Assistant Adjutant-General.
WASHINGTON, April 19, 1864--3. p.m.
Lieutenant-General GRANT:
The Iowa delegation in House of Representatives and Senators Wilkinson and Washburne
urge strenuously the withdrawal of all infantry force from the Northwestern Department as
needless and expensive there, while the troops would be useful in active service, which they are
anxious to be engaged in. As you have the subject under consideration it is proper to apprise you
of these opinions. They affirm that 1, 500 or 2,000 is the whole force needed in that department.
Omaha, Nebr. Ter., April 22, 1864.
Seventh Iowa Cav., Comdg. Post, Dakota City, Nebr. Ter.:
Your communication of the 21st instant, concerning the murder of Doctor Bentz and
apprehended Indian difficulties, has been laid before the general commanding. He does not
consider that the circumstances attending the murder of Doctor Bentz, as stated by you, are
indicative of any intention of the Indians to commence depredations and outrages; in fact, there
seems to be nothing that would indicate that the Indians had anything to do with the murder.
You will, of course, investigate the matter so far as may be in your power, and if it is
ascertained that the deed was perpetrated by Indians, measures must be taken for their
punishment and for the prevention of further outrages by them. Keep the general commanding
fully and promptly advised of any movements or language of the Indians that may indicate
hostile intentions on their part.
The general commanding directs that in sending detachments to various points care must be
taken that the several detachments be sufficiently strong and be in proper communication with
each other to prevent any of them from being overpowered in any probable emergency.
Company A, Seventh Iowa Cavalry, has been ordered to-day to proceed to your post. The
company is now at Brownsville.
I am, captain, your very obedient servant.
Assistant Adjutant-General.
New, Orleans, La., April 23, 1864.
Colonel SLACK,
Commanding Forty-seventh Indiana Infantry.
It is desirable that so much of your command as can be embarked on the Starlight should take
their place on that boat in the fleet upon the appointed signal, which is the firing of three guns
from the flag-boat Emma. The remainder of your command and of the Thirty fourth Iowa will
embark on the Universe as soon as practicable and follow the fleet up the Mississippi and Red
Rivers until they overtake it. An active and efficient officer should be left to hasten the
embarkation of the remaining troops and voyage of the Universe.
Yours, respectfully,
Major-General, Commanding Thirteenth Army Corps.
Saint Louis, Mo., April 25, 1864.
Keokuk, Iowa:
You will proceed immediately to Clark County, Mo., and exert yourself to prevent a
threatened collision between the Seventh Missouri, or any other troops, and the citizens of that
Alexandria, La., April 26, 1864.
Chief of Staff, Department of the Gulf:
GENERAL: I have the honor to report my arrival at this station with the following troops:
16th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry 480
34th Regiment Iowa Volunteer Infantry 367
47th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry 650
49th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry 404
69th Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry 422
114th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry 345
Aggregate present 2,668
1st Wisconsin Battery, six rifled guns 94
The steamer Universe, with part of the Thirty-fourth Iowa and part of the Forty-seventh
Indiana and five guns of the First Wisconsin Battery, has not actually arrived but is not far
Brig. Gen. M. K. Lawler is in immediate command. The infantry have 150 rounds of
ammunition to the man and the chests of the artillery carriages are full. The force has land
transportation and camp equipage for field service and is supplied with rations and forage to the
28th instant. I have brought along in the hands of my quartermaster 40 teams and wagons
complete, for an ordnance or general supply train for my command; also 12 ambulances and
teams complete, 500 shovels, 144 chopping axes, and 96 pickaxes. The quartermaster has forage
for these teams for ten or twelve days. My medical director has brought a small stock of assorted
medical stores.
I am, &c.,
Major-General, Commanding.
WASHINGTON, D. C., April 27, 1864--10.30 a.m.
Brig. Gen. J. W. DAVIDSON,
Saint Louis, Mo.:
The Third Iowa Cavalry will be prepared for the field and sent to Memphis.
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
FORT LEAVENWORTH, April 28, 1864.
Brig. Gen. R. B. MITCHELL,
Colonel Collins' dispatch received. We may send out one proper escort from Laramie to new
mines. Immigration large enough to defend itself. We cannot control it. I am in great need of
troops. Send two companies to Fort Riley; E and D, Seventh Iowa, could move overland; also
send A and C to this place forthwith.
Little Rock, Ark., April 30, 1864.
Lieut. Col. S. F. COOPER,
Fortieth Iowa:
COLONEL : The approach of the enemy and order to form line of battle will be signalized
by the firing of three guns from Fort Steele. Upon hearing this signal, you will form your
command on the road west of the cemetery, near Fort Steele.
I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Saint Paul, Minn., April 30, 1864.
Brig. Gen. A. SULLY,
District of Iowa, Sioux City:
GENERAL: I have received dispatches from Fort Abercrombie, dated 23d instant. My
scouts, who had been absent several weeks and visited the region of the James River, report that
they had held communication with different Indians from the Missouri camps, and the
information they obtained corroborated previous reports as to the hostile disposition of the
Yanktonais, who were encamped near the mouth of Heart River, on the north side, to the number
of 700 lodges.
They expect to be joined by 250 or 300 lodges of Isanti Sioux, and the disaffected of other
bands, and to combine with the Tetons, who, to the number of 1,000 lodges, are between Heart
River and Fort Clark. They claim that there will be a concentration of 2,500 lodges to give battle
to the troops, should they attempt to penetrate their country, and mean time to attack all steamers
attempting to ascend the river or overland parties of emigrants. All accounts agree that their
intended point of junction is near the mouth of Heart River. Some of the Sisseton head men have
arrived at Fort Abercrombie and given their assent to the only terms upon which they will be
allowed peace.
Those desirous of a restoration of friendly relations with the Government will number
probably 200 or 250 lodges, and they have been directed to go to Devil's Lake, where a place
will be assigned them, and where they will receive protection from hostile Indians by the military
authorities. I am busily engaged in preparations for the march of the column to join you on Bois
Cache or Bordache Creek, and although the season is backward I think the grass will subsist the
animals by the 1st of June, when the detachment will move from the designated point on the
upper Minnesota River. Brackett's battalion has received my orders to march to Sioux City from
Fort Snelling 2d proximo, and will probably reach Sioux City by 15th, as I informed you in a
previous dispatch.
Brigadier-General, Commanding
Camp 22, May 2, 1864.
I. The command will march to-morrow at 6 a.m., in the following order:
First. Third Division, Seventh Army Corps: (1) Advance guard, (2) pioneer corps, (3) three
cannons captured from the enemy, escorted by one company of the Second Kansas Volunteers,
African descent, and one company of the Twenty-ninth Iowa Volunteer Infantry; (4)prisoners
captured from the enemy, (5) First Brigade, (6) detachment of Second Brigade, (7) Third
Second. Frontier Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. J. M. Thayer. Third. Detachment
dismounted cavalry.
Fourth. Train with sick and wounded and brigade and division trains.
Fifth. Rear guard furnished by Brigadier-General Thayer.
II. All horses and mules led or mounted by sick or wounded will march with the train.
By order of Brig. Gen. F. Salomon:
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Saint Paul, Minn., May 2, 1864.
Commanding Brackett's Battalion, Fort Snelling:
MAJOR: You will take up your line of march for Sioux City, Iowa, this day, with your
command, and proceed with all practicable expedition, so as to reach that point by 15th instant, if
possible. Upon your arrival you will at once report for orders to Brigadier-General Sully,
commanding the District of Iowa. Your route will be by way of Spirit Lake, where you will find
forage for your horses, and, also at points between there and Sioux City.
By command of Brigadier-General Sibley:
I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Saint Louis, May 3, 1864.
Maj. E. T. ENSIGN,
Ninth Iowa Cavalry:
MAJOR: You will proceed with the two companies under your command, by the steam-boat
furnished for the purpose and now at the levee, to Hannibal, Mo., at which point you will
disembark your command under cover of night, and leave the vicinity of the town with the
utmost secrecy and dispatch. You will take especial pains to prevent the members of your
command from becoming known. You will take the road to Palmyra, and move to the immediate
vicinity of that point. You will establish your headquarters, report your position by telegraph to
General Fisk, commanding the district, under whose immediate orders you are to act.
Your special motive is to destroy the bands of guerrillas supposed to be collecting in small
squads in that vicinity--the whole force, when collected, supposed to- be from Quantrill's band.
The general commanding desires me to say that your duties are of a delicate and responsible
nature, requiring you to exercise great energy, vigilance, and care in their performance. He will
confidently rely upon you and the officers under your command to see that your men are held
well in hand, kept in good discipline, and that no peaceable inhabitants shall suffer from their
presence. At the same time he expects of you that, in the exercise of a sound judgment and
discretion, you will act with the utmost rigor of the laws of war in all your dealings with
undoubted guerrillas. Should you not find General Fisk at Hannibal telegraph him at Saint
Assistant Adjutant-General.
OMAHA, NEBR. TER., May 3, 1864.
Capt. E. B. MURPHY,
Company A, Seventh Iowa Cavalry:
You will proceed with your command to Dakota, Nebr. Ter. On your arrival at that post you
will make your headquarters at that post, distributing Company A at important points within
supporting distance of that post. Company B, on account of being acquainted with the country,
will be sent above, occupying such points as may be deemed best suited to exert a controlling
influence over the Indians. The policy should be to prevent disturbance arising between the
various Indian tribes, and great care should be taken to prevent soldiers or other parties from
committing outrages upon the Indians. The shooting of Indians for trivial or supposed offenses
by soldiers must not be allowed under any circumstances, and every effort used to allay any illfeeling
that may exist. You will make frequent reports to these headquarters.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Brigadier-General, U.S. Volunteers.
Milwaukee, Wis., May 3, 1864.
General A. SULLY,
Commanding, &c., Sioux City, Iowa:
GENERAL: I send inclosed letter from General Sibley, with report of Major Brown, in
charge of scouts on Cheyenne River and Coteau des Prairies. You will see that most of the
Minnesota Sioux have surrendered and will be located at Devil's Lake, near the military post.
Major Brown's report corroborates the concentration of the Yanktonais, Uncpapa, Blackfeet, and
other Teton Sioux on the upper Missouri, where I earnestly hope you will find them ready for
battle. A few details about the final disposition of the forces sent you from Minnesota I desire to
give you here. General Sibley will send the whole of the Eighth Regiment Minnesota Volunteer
Infantry (mounted), eight companies of the Second Minnesota Cavalry, and Brackett's battalion
of cavalry, numbering in all about 1,000 men. At the conclusion of your field operations, or as
long before as you think judicious, I wish these forces to be distributed as follows:
Four companies of the Second Minnesota Cavalry, with three companies of the Eighth
Minnesota Infantry (mounted), I wish sent to the post at Devil's Lake. They can go from Long
Lake in charge of a train of supplies, if you think it necessary, as it probably will be. The
remaining four companies of Second Minnesota Cavalry and the remaining companies of the
Eighth Minnesota Infantry (mounted) will proceed to post on James River, where the cavalry
companies and three of the infantry companies will take post, the remaining infantry companies
repairing to Camp Pope, on the Minnesota, to report by letter to General Sibley. Brackett's
cavalry is assigned to your district, and will be disposed of at your discretion. It is possible that
you will find it judicious to use the force herein ordered to the post on James River to escort
provision trains to the post on Devil's Lake. If so, they can proceed from there down James River
to their station. The other company of cavalry for each of the posts (James River and Devil's
Lake) will be sent from Minnesota.
As six companies of the Thirtieth Wisconsin Infantry are sent to your district, I was obliged
to send the colonel of the regiment with them. He is (like Colonel Nelson) a poor soldier, though
otherwise a clever, respectable man. Have no hesitation in selecting the very best officers,
without regard to rank, to command the posts at Long Lake and on the Yellowstone, sending
officers senior to them down the river to points where they will be less dangerous. Communicate
frequently with me, as I desire to be kept advised of your movements and progress constantly.
I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,
Major-General, Commanding.
Brownsville, Tex., April 8, 1864.
I. The Twentieth Iowa Infantry, having been reassigned to this command, is hereby made a
part of the First Brigade, and will be at once taken up on all returns and reports in accordance
II. Col. William McE. Dye is hereby assigned to the command of the First Brigade, and will
relieve Lieutenant-Colonel Hudnutt, who will turn over all books and papers relating to the
brigade to Colonel Dye, and assume command of his regiment.
III. Hereafter no sutlers will establish depots or stores for the sale of goods outside of the
lines of the command to which they are attached without special authority from these
By command of Major-General Herron:
Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General.
Fort De Russy, May 9, 1864--p. m.
Major-General MCCLERNAND:
GENERAL: I send Lieutenant-Colonel Warmoth's letter. Am here with four transports and
1,000 men (Twenty-third Iowa and left wing of Twenty-second). Am expecting Thirty-fifth
Wisconsin, 900; Thirty-third Illinois, 500; and Twenty-second Iowa (right wing). No facilities
for getting up troops. Transports here loaded with forage. I am liable to attack here at any
moment, but wait orders. I ought to have 2,600 men here to-night.
HANNIBAL, MO., May 9, 1864.
Commanding Department, Saint Louis, Mo.:
H.: T. is provided for and at work. There is no doubt of the wisdom of your conclusion and
the necessity of your late action. Can you not give me all of the Ninth Iowa Cavalry for this
district? I shall need them. I shall go to Lewis and Clark Counties to-day. Shall be here tomorrow
and at Macon Wednesday.
MILWAUKEE, May 9, 1864.
Major-General HALLECK:
Company G, Thirtieth Wisconsin, is the only force I have in the whole State of Iowa; it is
stationed at Davenport, guarding 300 Sioux warriors, condemned, to whom 90 others are to be
added in a few days. Of course it cannot be spared.
WASHINGTON, May 11, 1864--3.45 p.m.
(Received 14th.)
Maj. Gen. E. R. S. CANBY, Cairo, Ill.:
General Grant designated particular regiments in the Department of Missouri to be sent down
the Mississippi, but I do not know what they were. It is hardly to be presumed that General
Rosecrans obeyed the order. The Indiana militia are ordered to Nashville; five regiments of
Illinois to Columbus, and five to Memphis. The Iowa militia, as fast as organized, will be sent to
Helena, or any other point you may designate. There are nine companies of the Thirteenth
Illinois Cavalry at Alton without horses. They can act as infantry. Order them where you please,
and I will telegraph to Governor Yates that they obey your orders. Please ascertain from him
about his militia, and use them as you deem best. The Ninth Iowa Cavalry was ordered some
time ago from Saint Louis to Little Rock. I cannot ascertain whether it has started. Ask General
Rosecrans and hurry it up. Grant has had very severe fighting, but is still successful.
Major-General, Chief of Staff.
WASHINGTON, D. C., May 11, 1864--8.15 p.m.
(Received 3 a.m., 12th.)
Major-General ROSECRANS,
Saint Louis:
The Ninth Iowa Cavalry will be sent immediately to Little Rock to report to General Steele,
no matter what orders have heretofore been given to you. You will report daily to the Adjutant-
General of the Army the position of this regiment till it leaves your department.
Major-General and Chief of Staff.
SAINT Louis, Mo., May 11, 1864.
(Received 12.15 p.m.)
Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Chief of Staff:
Major-General Rosecrans is absent for a few days in Cincinnati. Your dispatch received
relative to the Ninth Iowa Cavalry. The regiment, except two companies, is at Jefferson
Barracks, and I have ordered it to proceed immediately to General Steele. The two absent
companies now in Callaway County will be hurried forward.
Major-General, Commanding.
SAINT Louis, Mo., May 11, 1864.
(Received 6 p.m.)
Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Chief of Staff:
The Ninth Iowa Cavalry is in camp, Jefferson Barracks, Mo. General Rosecrans informs me
that he detains it here by special telegraphic authority from General Grant.
Fort Riley, Kans., May 12, 1864.
Lieut. D. J. CRAIGIE,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Northern District of Kansas:
SIR: In accordance with Special Orders, No. 66, headquarters Fort Kearny, Nebr., dated May
3, I marched my command, Company H, Seventh Iowa Cavalry, by shortest route to this post and
assumed command.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Captain Company H, Seventh Iowa Cavalry.
Little Rock, Ark., May 13, 1864.
I. The following troops are constituted the garrison of Little Rock, and will relieve the
present garrison at 8 a.m. to-morrow: Forty-third Indiana Infantry Volunteers, Thirty-sixth Iowa
Infantry Volunteers, Second Missouri Cavalry Volunteers (Merrill's Horse). The senior officer
present for duty will command the post and report direct to the district commander. The
regiments will furnish to their brigade and division headquarters all returns and reports that their
commanders may require. Upon being relieved, Col. Daniel Anderson, First Iowa Cavalry, and
the troops composing his command will report to their division commanders.
II. The detachments of the Seventh Missouri and Thirteenth Illinois Cavalry now on duty
here will proceed to Pine Bluff and report to Col. Powell Clayton, to whose brigade they are
assigned by Special Orders, No. 100, headquarters Department of Arkansas. Seventh Army
Corps, May 11, 1864. All transportation in possession of the above detachment will be turned
over to the post quartermaster at Little Rock, Ark.
By order of Brig. Gen. E. A. Carr:
Milwaukee, Wis., May 13, 1864.
Brig. Gen. A. SULLY, Sioux City, Iowa:
GENERAL: I transmit inclosed, for your information and guidance, copy of letters just
received from General Sibley, giving details concerning the movements of the column which
marches from Minnesota to join you, together with the quantity of supplies they will carry, and
setting forth the necessity of having supplies for them in time upon the Missouri River. I regret
very much to learn that the Missouri is so low and so little apparent prospect of an immediate
rise. It is believed, however, that the spring rise from the mountains has not yet come down, and
that in time for your movement the river will be in good condition. It is not doubted that under
any circumstances (after the experience of last year) you will be prepared to carry out your
operations. In the event of the river still continuing too low for navigation, in time for you to
send your stores up to Long Lake, some other mode than that heretofore indicated must be
adopted for the supply of the post at Devil's Lake. It will not be difficult, however, to supply that
post by train from Minnesota, provided timely notification be given.
You must endeavor by wagon or otherwise to send forward the supplies needed at the post
near mouth of Long Lake, as it is quite essential that that post be established and supplied this
season. Please write me immediately on these subjects and let me know the present and
prospective condition of the Missouri; also what you propose in case there is no hope of
navigation above Fort Pierre. Be careful to notify me in time by telegraph from Council Bluffs,
in case you cannot send up sufficient supplies to Long Lake for the garrison at Devil's Lake, as I
must have time enough to contract for sending the supplies by way of Abercrombie. It is
earnestly hoped that the provisions herein suggested may point to a state of things which will not
occur, but after our experience of last season we must be prepared for the worst.
I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant.
Major-General, Commanding.
Fort Riley, Kans., May 16, 1864.
Brig. Gen. T. A. DAVIES,
Commanding District of North Kansas:
In compliance with Special Orders, No. --, dated Cottonwood Springs, Kans., May 1, 1864, I
have the honor to report that I have marched my company to Fort Riley, Kans., and assumed
command of said post.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Capt. Co. G, Seventh Iowa Vol. Cav., Comdg. Post.
LITTLE ROCK, May 17, 1864.
Maj. Gen. E. R. S. CANBY:
GENERAL: The enemy is reported to have bridges on the Saline at Jenkins' Ferry, Mount
Elba, and Long View, and a considerable force of infantry at these points. They are probably
there to cover the movements of their cavalry, which is crossing the Arkansas in detachments.
They will probably concentrate and make a raid on the railroad between here and Devall's Bluff.
I could easily prevent this but for the want of cavalry and cavalry horses. More than one-half of
my cavalry are dismounted. Part of my veteran regiment, Third Iowa, has been delayed at
Memphis; 600 of them are here.
I desire that they may be ordered here immediately. We have about 1,000,000 rations here.
Very respectfully,
Little Rock, May 17, 1864.
Maj. Gen. C. C. WASHBURN, Comdg. Sixteenth A. C., Memphis:
GENERAL: The enemy's cavalry is reported crossing the Arkansas in detachments, probably
for the purpose of concentrating and making a raid upon the railroad between here and Devall's
Bluff. For want of sufficient cavalry and cavalry horses I cannot catch them or prevent their
crossing. Shelby was near Lewisburg yesterday and had a fight or a sharp skirmish with the
Third Arkansas Cavalry. McRae will probably cross White River and join Shelby and Company;
if you could send a cavalry force down Crowley's Ridge and disperse his force--about 800 or
1,000--and follow up to Clarendon and Cotton Plant, it would be of great assistance to me. Why
is that detachment of the Third Iowa Cavalry veterans delayed at Memphis? They belong to my
corps and about 600 of them are here. We have a force at Jacksonport; they have supplies.
Little Rock, Ark., May 18, 1864.
I. The detachment of the Third Iowa Cavalry will report for duty to Brig. Gen. F. Salomon,
commanding First Division.
II. The Eighteenth Illinois Infantry and the Fifth Ohio Battery, now at Pine Bluff, will
immediately take up their line of march for Little Rock, crossing to the north side of the
Arkansas River. The train taken to Pine Bluff by Lieut. W. P. Haines, acting assistant
quartermaster, will come up under escort of the troops.
VIII. Battery K, First Missouri Light Artillery, Capt. J. Marr commanding, will report to
Brig. Gen. J. R. West, commanding Second Division, for duty.
By command of Brig. Gen. E. A. Carr:
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Fort Riley, Kans., May 18, 1864.
Brig. Gen. T. A. DAVIES,
Commanding District of North Kansas:
In compliance with instructions turned over to me by Capt. O. F. Dunlap, Fifteenth Kansas
Volunteer Cavalry, late commanding officer at this post, I have the honor to submit the
following information of interest to the general commanding the district: I assumed command on
the 14th instant. A detachment of 20 soldiers, in charge of First Lieutenant Van Antwerp,
Company L, Eleventh Kansas Cavalry Volunteers, having previously, at the request of the civil
authorities of Davis County, been detailed to assist in arresting citizens charged with murder,
returned to this post on the 15th, with 17 citizen prisoners, which were this morning turned over
to the civil authorities for trial. I received intelligence to-day that Indians had been committing
depredations in the county west of this post. The facts are sufficiently set forth in a copy of an
affidavit herewith inclosed. I have sent Lieutenant Clark, Company H, Seventh Iowa Cavalry,
and Lieutenant Van Antwerp, Company L, Eleventh Kansas Volunteer Cavalry, with 30 men, to
investigate the matter, and as soon as they report, will advise you of anything of interest that may
have transpired.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Capt. Company G, Seventh Iowa Vol. Cav., Comdg. Post.
MEMPHIS, TENN., May 19, 1864.
Maj. Gen. F. STEELE:
Your dispatch of the 17th is received. I am informed of very considerable re-enforcements on
the way to you from Saint Louis, which I trust will put you all right without the co-operation you
ask from me. I shall be glad to co-operate always, but I have been informed that Forrest has
returned to West Tennessee with increased force. I want all my cavalry here to watch and take
care of him; besides, as soon as I can I am ordered to make a cavalry raid into Mississippi. The
Third Iowa was ordered to report here to me; I know not why, except that they knew that my
wants were great. The Third Michigan Cavalry, which belongs to this corps, has been ordered to
report to you.
I am, general, your obedient servant,
LITTLE ROCK, May 19, 1864.
Col. W. F. GEIGER,
Commanding, Devall's Bluff:
The battalion of the Ninth Iowa Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Knight commanding, is ordered
to report to you for duty until the arrival of the remainder of the regiment.
By order of Maj. Gen. F. Steele:
Assistant Adjutant-General.
MILWAUKEE, WIS., May 20, 1864.
Brigadier-General SULLY,
Sioux City, Iowa, via Council Bluffs:
The troops to join you from Minnesota will march between May 25 and June 1 for Bordache
Creek, from the upper Minnesota River, with thirty days' rations. You must meet them in time
with supplies or bring them to a point where they can be supplied in time.
Mouth of White River, Ark., May 21, 1864.
Maj. W. H. MORGAN,
Assistant Adjutant-General, District of West Tennessee:
MAJOR: In accordance with special orders from your headquarters of May 15, 1864.
I reported at this post, and would now respectfully make the following report concerning the
condition of affairs here: I found, on communicating with Lieutenant-Commander Prichett, that
the troops had been ordered here in compliance with request made by Captain Prichett to General
Canby, and that the captain had applied for two companies, while the general ordered 200 men.
There are three trade stores and an extensive Government wood-yard here. I can see no need of
troops here, except a force sufficient to act as detectives and pickets and prevent abuses by the
parties in trade here. This, Captain Prichett tells me, was the object in ordering the troops here.
I have six companies here (200 muskets), while I cannot use to advantage more than two. My
rank entitles me to the command of the post, and to this the naval officers object, claiming this to
be a naval station, and subject entirely to their control. Being the senior officer present I shall,
unless otherwise ordered, insist on taking command of and regulating all affairs on shore at this
post. My two largest companies (80 muskets) would be an ample force to do all duty required
here, and if left subject to orders of the naval officer here everything would move smoothly. The
location here is a very poor one. Many of my men are already sick. I would therefore respectfully
request that, if consistent with your views, I may be ordered to report to my regiment with four
companies, leaving my two largest companies here, subject to orders of Lieutenant-Commander
Prichett. Excuse my addressing you direct, but being cut off, and believing this to be for the
interest of the service, I address headquarters direct.
I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Comdg. Detach. Twelfth Iowa.
May 21, 1864.
Lieut. W. T. CLARKE, Aide-de-Camp, Saint Joseph, Mo.:
LIEUTENANT: Your communication under date 14th instant is just to hand. You can assure
the general commanding that no effort has been, or shall be, spared on my part to maintain good
order and the supremacy of the civil and military law. A few isolated cases, such as alluded to,
have occurred in this county, which I deprecate, but, so far as my information extends, was not
participated in by members of the U.S. Army, a large number of whom disapprove of such
The spirit of taking matters into their own hands almost became epidemic, during the
administrations of Generals Schofield and Guitar, amongst the truly loyal element in this section.
But since the appointment of Generals Rosecrans and Fisk a better spirit prevails. They now feel
they have generals in sympathy with them in their efforts to restore order and the supremacy of
the civil law. Possessing as they do the confidence of the loyal men of this portion of the State. I
apprehend that there will be but little further cause for complaint.
Complaints have frequently been made by the most disloyal persons, upon the most trifling
pretext, many of whom are returned rebels from the armies south, many from Gratiot Street
Prison, and almost all of whom have taken the oath of allegiance several times. The same class
of men have sought and succeeded in filling appointments, by petition and otherwise, with semiloyal
men and men weak enough to be molded to their purposes, their official position giving
them influence, until, for a time, it appeared that to hold securely almost any place a man should
be semi-rebel. Nearly all the wealthy and influential business men of this section are rebels.
Their former good reputation has had its influence since the rebellion broke out, to the detriment
of the loyal element. Could some judicious, intelligent, and discreet person be stationed here
with a small detail, in executing the militia law of the State and as aid to Major Hiatt, I believe
the objects of the commanding general would be fully accomplished.
This place appears to be one of the principal points for ingress and egress for disloyal persons
to and from Illinois and Iowa. Many of the worst class of our citizens have taken refuge in
Illinois and Iowa, and almost hold possession of the counties of Lee, in Iowa, and Hancock, in
Illinois. I am credibly informed that powder, shot, &c., is purchased both in Iowa and Illinois and
brought into this State; one individual supposes as much as 50 kegs per week. That the Knights
of the Golden Circle exist, and are well organized, throughout all this section I have no doubt.
You can assure the general commanding that no effort shall be spared on my part to effect the
object desired, until our glorious Union, in her full proportion, shall stand forth the beacon light
of the world, the home of the oppressed of all nations.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WASHINGTON, D. C., May 23, 1864--5 p.m.
General J. W. DAVIDSON,
Saint Louis:
Mount the Second Iowa and send it to the field.
Major-General and Chief of Staff.
COTTONWOOD, May 23, 1864.
Is there any of your command out after the Cheyennes? Reports here are that a whole
company are engaged fighting 180 miles south of this post; nearly all killed.
Major Seventh Iowa Cavalry, Commanding Post.
The colonel commanding directs that if you have not heard anything from Lieutenant Eayre's
command you will send out a party, say, of about 30 men, to ascertain his whereabouts. Report at
once what you know of Lieutenant Eayre's command and such action as may be taken.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
DEVALL'S BLUFF, May 24, 1864.
Brigadier-General CARR:
Colonel Trumbull, of the Ninth Iowa Cavalry, is senior officer at this post. Captain Howland
is in command of the Third U.S. Cavalry. The scout went to Des Arc in charge of a major of the
Ninth Iowa. When within a few miles of Des Arc they lost the trail in the night, the rebels
scattering in all directions, each taking different roads and each taking a portion of the stock.
They brought back 4 prisoners and about 40 head of stock. The mules are continually being
picked up. Captain Loring will make a full report. I have already turned over the command of the
post to Colonel Trumbull, of the Ninth Iowa Cavalry. He will furnish the guard at the remount
Lieutenant-Colonel 126th Illinois Infy. Vols.
Milwaukee, Wis., May 25, 1864.
Brig. Gen. A. SULLY,
Commanding District of Iowa:
GENERAL: I again invite your attention to my letter to you of the 13th instant and to my
telegram of the 20th instant, in relation to the movement of the force to be sent from Minnesota
to join you at the mouth of Bordache Creek. General Sibley will dispatch this force from the
upper Minnesota River by the 30th of this month, with thirty days' rations. You must provide for
their supply at Bordache Creek or elsewhere at the expiration of this time.
If you are not able to get stores to Bordache Creek in time, send the necessary orders to this
force to proceed to some point lower down on the Missouri River where you can supply them.
When they march from the upper Minnesota they pass out of General Sibley's jurisdiction, and
will of course depend upon you, to whom they are ordered to report, for their supply after the
expiration of the thirty days for which they are provided. The unusual and excessive drought on
the plains west of Minnesota has put back the spring, and it is doubtful whether grass will be
sufficiently advanced by June 1 to supply the animals. I have directed General Sibley in this
event to delay the march of the troops for eight or ten days. If he makes this change in their
movements you will be duly notified.
I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,
Major-General, Commanding.
DEVALL'S BLUFF, May 26, 1864.
Capt. C. H. DYER,
Assistant Adjutant-General:
I have sent the expedition ordered this morning. The Ninth Iowa Cavalry is nearly all out on
scout or picket duty.
Colonel, Commanding.
Milwaukee, Wis., May 26, 1864.
Brig. Gen. A. SULLY,
Commanding District of Iowa:
GENERAL: I transmit inclosed copy of a letter to General Sibley, which, as you will
perceive, somewhat diminishes the force to join you from Minnesota. Sibley will send you 1,100
mounted men, beside Brackett's battalion and the artillery. At least 1,500 men will join you from
Minnesota. With this force joined to what you have in your own district you will be obliged to
conduct your operations. If you think it absolutely essential, call on the Governor of Iowa to send
four or five companies of the new National Guard or militia which he is raising to the frontier of
Iowa, to such points as you wish to guard. This will render it unnecessary for you to leave any
more of your original force behind than you had first proposed.
It may, and I suppose will be necessary to close the campaign, as far as Colonel Thomas'
forces are concerned, somewhat sooner than we had expected, in order that he may have time to
send the garrison destined for Devil's Lake, and establish that post before winter sets in. If you
do not hear from me to the contrary please consider the above a part of your instructions. In case
you can get stores up to the mouth of Long Lake so as to establish the post there, the forces
destined for Devil's Lake can escort their supplies to that point, and be in good time to house
themselves for the winter.
In the event you are not able to do more than accumulate at Long Lake the supplies necessary
for the post to be established at that point you must notify me as soon as possible, and I will then
try to have the necessary supplies sent to Devil's Lake from Minnesota. You will understand,
general, that it is on all accounts desirable that the necessary stores for Devil's Lake be
accumulated by you at Long Lake, as it will be exceedingly difficult and expensive to send them
from Minnesota. I regret that the absolute necessities of the service South have somewhat
cramped our summer operations, but we must do the best we can, and make up by additional zeal
and activity for what we lose in force.
I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,
Major-general, Commanding.
New Orleans, La., May 28, 1864.
7. The Fourteenth Maine Volunteers will at once proceed from Baton Rouge to Morganza,
where it will be reported to Brig. Gen. W. H. Emory, to join General Nickerson's First Brigade,
Second Division, Nineteenth Army Corps. The quartermaster's department will furnish the
necessary transportation.
8. The five companies of the Twenty-second Iowa Volunteers now in New Orleans will at
once proceed to Baton Rouge, and be reported for duty to Brig. Gen. W. P. Benton, commanding
that post. The quartermaster's department will furnish the necessary transportation.
By command of Major-General Banks:
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Little Rock, Ark., May 28, 1864.
Lieut. Col. G. MEYERS, Commanding Post:
COLONEL: The brigadier-general commanding directs that you send the party of the Ninth
Iowa Cavalry which arrived from Devall's Bluff with the mules north to Quitman, and from there
to Searcy, and from there to Devall's Bluff. Quitman is about 50 miles north from here, Searcy is
about 40 miles east of there and about 40 miles from the Bluff. You will instruct the
commanding officer, if he hears of any reliable and important move of the enemy, to report the
facts at once to these headquarters.
There is a force of ours under Colonel Geiger at Springfield, about 25 miles west of Quitman.
They may be at Quitman Monday night, or at least some of them. There was also four squadrons
from the Ninth Iowa started from the Bluff the 26th, toward Searcy. The men must be provided
with five days' rations and march as soon to-morrow morning as obtained. You will furnish
guides from the Third Arkansas Cavalry. A part of one battalion is encamped near you.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Vicksburg, Miss., May 29, 1864.
Maj. Gen. C. C. WASHBURN,
Comdg. District of West Tennessee, Memphis, Tenn.:
GENERAL: I am instructed by the commanding general to acknowledge the receipt of the
communication of Lieutenant-Colonel Stibbs, commanding detachment of Twelfth Iowa at the
mouth of White River, together with your indorsement thereon, and to inform you in reply that
the force sent to the mouth of the White River was intended as a guard at that place, and in
sufficient force to act against small parties of guerrillas in that neighborhood if they should
intend to harass the transports carrying troops and supplies that had been ordered to General
Steele. On learning from Captain Prichett that the troops and supplies were passing up without
molestation, and that White River was sufficiently patrolled by gun-boats, orders were given to
reduce the force at the mouth of White River.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Captain, Assistant Adjutant-General.
Morganza, La., May 29, 1864.
This command will move to-morrow morning at 4 o'clock promptly, in the following order:
First, First Division, Thirteenth Corps; second, Third Division, Thirteenth Corps; third, Sharpe's
brigade, Nineteenth Corps. The First Wisconsin Battery will march and serve with Colonel
Keigwin's brigade, First Division, and the battery from the Nineteenth Corps with Colonel
Sharpe's brigade. The pioneer corps will march in rear of the advance regiment of the division to
which they belong. Ambulances will follow the regiments.
The batteries will move in the center of the brigades to which they are temporarily attached.
One wagon for every two regiments of the First and Third Divisions, Thirteenth Corps, will be
allowed to haul extra ammunition, of which 100 rounds, instead of 60, per man will be taken.
The One hundred and twentieth Ohio Volunteers, Twenty-second Iowa Volunteers, and Second
Ohio Battery will remain behind to guard the camp. Colonel Sharpe, commanding the brigade of
the Nineteenth Corps, will report to Brig. Gen. G. F. McGinnis and will act under his orders
during the expedition.
By command of Brig. Gen. M. K. Lawler:
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Little Rock, Ark., May 29, 1864.
Commanding, Devall's Bluff:
The Ninth Iowa Cavalry must continue to do scouting as far as it is able. There are no horses
for the Third Michigan Cavalry. Your quartermaster must make arrangements for shoeing.
By order of Brig. Gen. E. A. Carr:
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Helena, Ark., May 30, 1864.
Lieut. Col. J. H. STIBBS,
Comdg. Bart. Twelfth Iowa, Mouth of White River:
SIR: I have just received the following order:
May 25, 1864.
Brig. Gen. N. B. BUFORD,
Commanding, &c., Helena, Ark.:
SIR: The major-general commanding requests that you will reduce the force now stationed at
the mouth of White River to 50 men.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
First Lieutenant and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
In compliance with it you will detail the captain most fitted to be left in a separate command
with delicate duties to perform, with one or more lieutenants and 50 men, with rations up to the
16th of June, camp and garrison equipage, and 100 rounds of ammunition to the man, and
embark in the first steam-boat you can obtain with all the remainder of your command for
Memphis, where you will report to Maj. Gen. C. C. Washburn. I see by your morning report of
the 28th that some of your companies are so small that you may have to detail two companies, or
one company and part of another, to meet the requirements of this order. You will use your
sound discretion in the selection, leaving the first and second in command both calculated for a
separate command. I inclose instructions for the officer you leave in command. You will please
report to me as you pass this place.
Your obedient servant,
Helena, May 30, 1864.
Instructions for the captain of the Twelfth Iowa, in command at the mouth of White River:
1. You will co-operate with the naval commanders in your vicinity in defending the post and
protecting the loyal citizens and freedmen who are engaged in supplying fuel for the steamboats.
2. You will maintain a rigid discipline with your troops and good order among all classes of
persons on land at your post.
3. You will co-operate with the naval commanders in preventing supplies from going to the
enemy on either side of the river.
4. You will make your camp compact, place it near the river, and render it as defensible as
possible with your small force.
5. You will make me weekly, tri-monthly, and monthly reports.
6. You will send a non-commissioned officer to this post, with proper requisitions for rations
in time to be supplied semi-monthly.
7. You will protect all the freedmen within your lines and report to me all cases where their
lawful [rights] are withheld or any outrages or wrongs done to them.
8. You will obtain as far as possible information of the enemy's force or movements in your
vicinity and report to me by letter.
9. As you are placed at the mouth of White River by General Canby's order, on his arrival at
your post you will apply to him for special instructions as to how far you shall supervise the
trade permits granted by the Treasury agents.
10. As it is notorious that the enemy have been supplied with arms and stores by traders and
smugglers, who pretend to be loyal but who are traitors, you will co-operate with the navy in
arresting any such persons.
11. For further instructions you will be governed by the Rules and Articles of War, the Army
Regulations, and the General Orders of The Department of Arkansas and the Division of West
Your obedient servant,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Saint Louis, Mo., May 30, 1864.
Arsenal, Saint Louis, Mo.:
The Forty-fifth Iowa is here en route to Steele. Their transportation will be ready for them at
4 p.m. to-day. They have no ammunition. Issue such quantity to the colonel as you approve, and
the requisition will be approved afterward at these headquarters.
By order, &c.:
Assistant Adjutant-General.
MILWAUKEE, Wis., May 30, 1864.
(Received 3.45 p.m.)
Major-General HALLECK, Washington:
There are four companies of Thirtieth Wisconsin Volunteers, viz, three in Wisconsin and one
in Iowa, kept there to protect draft and furnish military aid asked. If Veteran Reserve Corps in
this department be placed under my command I can send these four companies to the field. If this
arrangement be approved please designate point for four companies to report.
Little Rock, Ark., May 31, 1864.
Capt. C. H. DYER,
Assistant Adjutant-General, &c.
CAPTAIN: In acknowledgment and reply to your indorsement on telegram from Colonel
Wood, of this date, I have the honor to state that a party consisting of 300 infantry and 100
cavalry, the whole under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Patterson, Twenty-ninth Iowa
Infantry, started down the river at about 1 p.m., provided with three days' rations.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Little Rock, Ark., June 1, 1864.
2. The Third U.S. Cavalry will proceed by easy marches to Little Rock and report to district
headquarters, reporting daily its whereabouts by telegraph.
3. The Ninth Iowa Cavalry will encamp south of the railroad, on Bayou Two Prairies, near
Ashley's Station, 8 miles east of Brownsville, to move in a day or two. The camp near Ashley's
Station will not be emcumbered impedimenta, but will be kept ready to move at a moment's
4. The One hundred and sixth Illinois Infantry will proceed by railroad to Devall's Bluff and
report to the commanding officer, and will move in a day or two.
5. The detachment of the Thirteenth Illinois Cavalry now at Devall's Bluff will proceed to
Pine Bluff and join its brigade, marching near the railroad till it crosses Bayou Meto, and taking
the best road from there, reporting to these headquarters daily its whereabouts by telegraph or
messenger, except the day before it reaches Pine Bluff.
6. The Third U.S. Cavalry, Ninth Iowa Cavalry, First Nebraska Cavalry, and Eleventh
Missouri Cavalry will report direct to these headquarters.
By command of Brig. Gen. E. A. Carr:
Assistant Adjutant-General.
CAMP, SIOUX CITY, IOWA, June 1, 1864.
His Excellency WILLIAM M. STONE,
Governor of Iowa:
SIR: A letter I received from General Pope last night informs me that it has been necessary
for the War Department to order some of the troops from Minnesota to Arkansas, owing to the
late disasters in that State and Louisiana; and thus the force ordered to meet me from Minnesota
must be greatly reduced. And he also proposes, if I think it necessary, to call on you for four or
five companies of the new national guard as a protection to the frontier, whereby I will be
enabled to take with me most of the troops I intended as a protection to the frontier of Iowa and
These troops, if furnished me, would necessarily arrive so late that before that time I would
be far up the country; therefore I should be obliged to leave a cavalry force on the frontier before
starting. I have no infantry as a guard at different points and I cannot increase my force by your
sending me these troops: but if you could send two companies, to be stationed at Fort Randall, I
could send the cavalry I have stationed there out on the James River, where they could do good
service in breaking up small encampments of hostile Indians. Should you be able to send them,
send me a telegraph informing me when they will start. My troops have mostly left here, and I
shall follow in a few days.
With much respect, your obedient servant,
Saint Paul, Minn., June 1, 1864.
Brigadier-General SULLY,
Sioux City, Iowa:
Your dispatch of 30th just received. Thomas will be ordered to direct his march to Swan
Lake after crossing James River. Be sure to communicate with him and send guides to assist him.
He will march from Ridgely on morning of 6th. Scouts will be sent down Nicollet's trail to meet
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
MILWAUKEE, WIS., June 1, 1864.
Davenport, Iowa:
Send company Thirtieth Wisconsin to Saint Paul, Minn., to report to General Sibley, as soon
as relieved by Captain Judd's company, Veteran Reserve Corps, which is ordered to report to you
for duty.
Major-General, Commanding.
Little Rock, Ark., June 2, 1864.
Capt. C. H. DYER,
Assistant Adjutant-General:
Lieutenant-Colonel Patterson, Twenty-ninth Iowa Volunteer Infantry, who went in command
of the expedition sent down and across the river, has returned and reports that, after thoroughly
scouting the country in all directions, he is satisfied that there are not to exceed 50 armed men of
the enemy between the railroad and the river, and that all reports to the contrary are
exaggerations. The colonel was unable to meet with any of Steele's men. He learned, however,
that 27 of them, which is the largest number seen at any one time, left Elkin's place early
Tuesday morning and went to Clear Lake. He would have followed them thither, but the party
from Brownsville with whom he communicated went that way. The colonel has been instructed
to make out a full report of the expedition, which as soon as received will be forwarded.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Little Rock, Ark., June 2, 1864.
Comdg. Ninth Iowa Cavalry, Devall's Bluff:
The general directs me to congratulate you upon the success of Company A, of your
regiment, at Aberdeen. You will send one battalion of your command, with ten days' rations, to
re-enforce Colonel Geiger, on the Little Red River, above Searcy, to move early on the morning
of 4th of June.
By command of Brig. Gen. E. A. Carr:
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
Little Rock, Ark., June 3, 1864.
The Forty-third Indiana Infantry, Col. W. E. McLean commanding, having been ordered
home on veteran furlough, is relieved from duty at the post of Little Rock, and Colonel McLean
will turn over the command to Col. C. W. Kittredge, Thirty-sixth Iowa Infantry. The brigadiergeneral
commanding takes this opportunity to express his obligations to Colonel McLean for his
promptness and efficiency while in command of the post,, and for the decided improvement in
the order and cleanliness of the city while under his administration.
By command of Brig. Gen. E. A. Carr:
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Little Rock, Ark., June 3, 1864.
Colonel GEIGER,
Commanding Eighth Missouri Cavalry, Devall's Bluff:
As soon as your regiment returns encamp it on Bayou Two Prairies, south of the railroad,
near Ashley's Station. All the cavalry encamped there will be under your command for the
present. When the battalion of the Ninth Iowa relieves your command along Little Red, the
detachment of the Tenth Illinois will move direct to its regiment at Little Rock, and your
regiment will go direct to camp near Ashley's Station, or by way of Devall's Bluff, as you may
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Little Rock, Ark., June 3, 1864.
Capt. C. H. DYER,
Assistant Adjutant-General, District of Little Rock:
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to inclose telegram just received from Colonel Geiger. This rain
and the rise reported in Red River effectually stop Shelby from crossing at present. Shall Colonel
Geiger return in person to his command, or shall he communicate his orders to the officer of the
Ninth Iowa, at Devall's Bluff, who is to go out and relieve him? The detachment of Tenth Illinois
will leave here to-morrow morning. Has the general commanding any new instructions to give?
I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
LITTLE ROCK, June 3, 1864.
Devall's Bluff:
You will remain in person at Devall's Bluff. The district commander directs me to express
disapprobation of your having left your command. It is to be regretted that your really valuable
services on your last scout should merit anything else but praise; you should not have left your
command and incurred censure. Communicate with the detachment commander of the Ninth
Iowa Cavalry at Devall's Bluff, who is ordered to relieve your men. Give him the instructions
under which you acted, with the additional one that he must keep a scout on the north side of the
Little Red. He must send news daily direct to General Carr, commanding District of Little Rock.
Direct the office,' whom you left in command of your troops on the Little Red, as soon as he is
relieved by the Ninth Iowa Cavalry, to send the Tenth Illinois Cavalry men to their regiment at
the railroad depot opposite here, and to march the Eighth Missouri to Ashley's Station on the
railroad, where it is contemplated to encamp your regiment and the Ninth Iowa. You must
provide rations for your men when they reach Ashley's. Report by telegraph that you have
complied with these instructions. If you wish me to take charge of your stallion, send him over
by the cars.
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Little Rock, Ark., June 3, 1864.
Commanding Tenth Illinois Cavalry:
COLONEL: With the command that you have been instructed by Colonel Mizner,
commanding Huntersville, to hold in readiness, you will march to-morrow morning to
Lewisburg; thence you will proceed to the headwaters of the Little Red, in the vicinity of
Clinton, and keep your command scouting in such strength of detachments as prudence may
The main object of your expedition is to watch Shelby, last heard from at Batesville, and to
give timely notice of any movement on his part.
A detachment of the Ninth Iowa Cavalry will be moving in the vicinity of Searcy, lower
down the Little Red, and you can communicate with them and act together, if necessary, under
the Sixty-second Article of War. You must forage upon the country and subsist off of it to all
possible extent, giving receipts for property taken, to be paid for upon proof of loyalty by
owners. After leaving Lewisburg you will send a daily report to that point, to be telegraphed to
General E. A. Carr, commanding District of Little Rock.
I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
TOPEKA, KANS., June 3, 1864.
Brig. Gen. T. J. MCKEAN,
Commanding District of South Kansas:
GENERAL: I have the honor to report to you the arrival of my company at this place as per
Special Orders, No. 102, dated headquarters Department of Kansas, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.,
May 18, 1864.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Captain, Comdg. Company G, Seventh Iowa Cavalry.
MILWAUKEE, WIS., June 3, 1864.
Davenport, Iowa :
General Sibley will send 80 Indian prisoners, men, women, and children, to be confined at
Camp Kearny. Please make preparation to receive them.
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
Little Rock, Ark., June 4, 1864.
Comdg. Ninth Iowa Cavalry, Devall's Bluff:
SIR: You will not move your camp to Ashley's Station to-morrow if it rains. Wait for a clear
day. You will send the battalion to re-enforce Geiger's command to-morrow, as heretofore
By command of Brig. Gen. E. A. Carr:
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
DEVALL'S BLUFF, June 7, 1864.
Capt. C. H. DYER:
A messenger has just arrived from my regiment. He left there day before yesterday evening.
The detachment of the Ninth Iowa Cavalry had not reached there up to that time. I sent guides
with them that I brought through with me. Major Teed, whom I left in command, was out of
rations, and expected yesterday, unless relieved by Ninth Iowa, to fall back as far as Austin, for
the purpose of obtaining rations front Brownsville. They have nothing new from Shelby.
Respectfully, &c.,
Colonel, Commanding Third Brigade.
Saint Joseph, Mo., June 8, 1864.
Assistant Provost-Marshal, Keokuk, Iowa:
DEAR SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 2d
instant, this day at hand. I am pleased to learn of the improved condition of affairs in your
district. I shall visit the northeast as soon as I can conveniently and safely absent myself from
headquarters. We are just now having considerable trouble in this section, and my personal
presence is more needed here than elsewhere. The detail of militia will soon be made, with
headquarters at Alexandria, and the officer in command will be instructed to receive and execute
orders from yourself. I shall write Colonel Sanderson, provost-marshal-general, this day,
recommending that you be authorized to employ the assistant you name. The preventive policy is
the best one. Pursue it with vigor.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Little Rock, Ark., June 9, 1864.
Tenth Illinois Cav., Clinton, Ark., via Lewisburg:
There is a battalion of the Ninth Iowa Cavalry near Searcy.
By order of Brig. Gen. E. A. Carr:
Assistant Adjutant-General.
WASHINGTON, D. C., June 10, 1864--12.25 p.m.
Major-General ROSECRANS,
Commanding Department of the Missouri:
On the 16th of May orders were given to send an Iowa or Illinois regiment to Missouri, to
replace the Ninth Minnesota, and June 3 General Heintzelman was directed to send two Illinois
regiments to Saint Louis. General Heintzelman's attention will be again directed to send two
regiments to Saint Louis immediately.
Major-General and Chief of Staff.
SAINT LOUIS, June 10, 1864.
(Received 1.05 a.m., 11th.)
Major-General HALLECK:
From want of orders here, possibly, that Iowa regiment went down the river two weeks since.
Can't you send me some Veteran Reserves for prison guards and a few officers fit for assistant
provost-marshals? You must know from experience the nature of the troops, how difficult it is to
get officers to fill these positions, important to the welfare of the people and the interests of the
Helena, Ark., June 12, 1864.
Maj. Gen. C. C. WASHBURN,
Commanding District of West Tennessee:
DEAR SIR: I send my assistant adjutant-general, Capt. T. C. Meatyard, to you. I have
complied with your request in returning to Memphis the detachment of 200 men of the Sixth
Tennessee Cavalry, dismounted.
By General Steele's order I am this day sending him one company, recruited and mounted at
this post, of the Fourth Arkansas Cavalry and two of my best colored companies. A short time
ago, by his orders, I sent him two companies of the Ninth Wisconsin. I feel certain that he would
not have ordered my force to be thus reduced did he not think I had received other troops from
I have official papers here which induced me to think the Sixth Minnesota and the Fourth
Iowa were to be here. I have not enough troops for the daily duties of the post and its defense. Of
white troops I have only 238 infantry and 287 cavalry. Inclosed I send you General Canby's
order, No. 6, to hold reserves to act in the case of the river being blockaded below. I send
Captain Meatyard to you to request that you give me some good troops. Could you not send me
the Twelfth Iowa Veterans? I have 50 men of that regiment at the mouth of White River. There
may be a necessity of my sending a force to the relief of that place at any moment. I commend
Captain Meatyard to your kind consideration as an officer of merit.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
New Orleans, La., June 13, 1864.
3. The detachment of the Third Iowa Cavalry now serving in the Department of Arkansas
will proceed, as soon as transportation can be procured, to Memphis, Tenn., and report to Maj.
Gen. C. C. Washburn, commanding that district.
The quartermaster's department will furnish transportation.
By order of Maj. Gen. E. R. S. Canby
Capt. and A. D. C., Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
Little Rock, Ark., June 13, 1864.
Colonel GEIGER,
Commanding, Ashley's Station:
COLONEL: The brigadier-general commanding directs that you send a battalion of the Ninth
Iowa Cavalry, provided with ten days' rations, to relieve the one now on scout to Little Red
River; the battalion now out to return to camp as soon as relieved.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Bayou Two Prairies, June 13, 1864.
Capt. C. H. DYER,
Assistant Adjutant-General:
Major Ensign, with battalion of Ninth Iowa Cavalry, has just returned from Searcy. He
reports Shelby as being at Augusta; that a detachment of his command is at Grand Glaize. He
brings no news of importance.
Respectfully, &c.,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.
Little Rock, Ark., June 13, 1864.
Col. J. K. MIZNER,
Devall's Bluff:
Shelby is reported at Augusta, with detachment at Grand Glaize. Send party of 150 or 200
cavalry up on this side of river to gain information and cut off his scouts. Battalion of Ninth
Iowa going toward Searcy to-morrow. Push your defenses, particularly the felling of trees.
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
LITTLE ROCK, ARK., June 14, 1864.
Colonel GEIGER,
Commanding, Bayou Two Prairies:
All accounts agree that Shelby is moving down the east side of White River. Move with your
regiment toward Clarendon, and keep this side of White River well scouted. Send daily reports.
Let one battalion of the Ninth Iowa go toward Searcy and two stay at the camp.
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
FORT LARNED, KANS:, June 15, 1864.
Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of Kansas:
I have the honor to report, after making all necessary arrangements for the defense of Saline,
I moved with 40 men for Smoky Fork Crossing, where I arrived on the evening of the 9th;
distance, 35 miles. I found the ranch entirely deserted. This being one of the most important and
dangerous points on the road, as it is thought the Denver mail will now travel this route, I
proceeded on the following morning to erect a block-house from timbers which I found already
cut, and which were already hewed on two sides, but it was found necessary to hew the other two
sides on account of the crookedness of the logs. On the 13th, having one story of the building up,
left it with instructions, in charge of Lieutenant Ellsworth, of the Seventh Iowa Cavalry, to
finish, and escorted the stage to Walnut Fork, a distance of 40 miles, and camped at a point
where the road intersects the old Santa Fé road, and where the Leavenworth and Kansas City
mails are due at the same time. I found this ranch entirely deserted, and the owner, who is here,
says some of his stock was run off by the Cheyennes. This is an important point, and distant from
Larned 45 miles. I intend to build a block-house here on my return.
By delaying the first stage until the next arrives, our escort will answer for both stages to
Larned. Arrived at Fort Larned on the evening of the 14th, during a very heavy thunder storm,
and found the commander of the post with about half the garrison on a scout after Indians, but
they got no Indians but plenty of buffalo. Captain Parmetar, of the Twelfth Kansas Infantry, in
command here, is reported by every officer and man that I have heard speak of him as a
confirmed drunkard. Fort Larned is only a fort in name, as there are no defenses. An attempt has
been made to throw up breast-works around it, or one-third of it, as the Pawnee Creek, on which
it is built, defends the other two-thirds. This breast-work averages about 20 inches high, with the
ditch on the inner side. The huts are built of adobe, of a very inferior quality, the sod being
sandy, and they are covered by little crooked poles, with dirt and grass thrown on the same, and I
do assure you the sight presented in the huts occupied for quartermaster and commissary stores
was awful. The water had been streaming down amongst the corn, flour, beans, and everything
else, and by this rain alone over 100 sacks of flour were ruined; besides, I saw over 1,000
bushels of corn, according to Lieutenant Crocker's (the assistant quartermaster) estimate, which
was ruined. He assures me that over $5,000 worth has been lost in the last twelve months. I think
this loss might have been materially lessened by proper attention of officers responsible, and I
think the men's time could be much better employed in the erection of stone buildings, instead of
going every few days on fruitless scouts, as there is good building stone within 3 miles of the
It is my opinion that these scouts tend to run horses down, with no prospect whatever of
meeting the Indians; and that the commanders of these little posts should be instructed to adhere
to their escort duties, improving their defenses, and to drill, and if the Indians are to be fought a
sufficient force should be sent to crush them out. I have had several accounts of the battle or
skirmish that took place between the Colorado troops, and the Cheyennes. Fifteen wagons were
purchased on the streets of Denver City, and Lieutenant Eayre, with two mountain howitzers and
84 men, all told, went in search of Indians, with instructions to burn bridges and kill Cheyennes
whenever and wherever found. With his 84 men and only 15 wagons he wandered off out of his
district, within 50 miles of this place. The Indians, finding his command well scattered, his
wagons being behind without any rear guard, artillery in the center 1 miles from them, and the
cavalry 1 mile in advance, made an attack, killing 3 instantly and wounding 3 others, 1 dying two
days afterward, the Colorado troops retreating to this place. Lieutenant Burton, who was in the
fight, is my authority.
I have met La-hor-san, a venerable Indian chief of the Kiowa tribe, who professes (and no
doubt is in earnest)great friendship for the whites: he has about a dozen lodges with him, and
they are principally old men, women, and children. He exercises great influence with his tribe,
and it is thought will yet prevent many from joining the Cheyennes, as he is very eloquent and
earnest in his appeals to them. He asked many questions as to where I carne from and what was
my business. I told him, through an interpreter, that the great general commanding all this
country was much pleased with him, and that he was known far and wide as a great and good
chief. The old man is mourning for a near relative, and has lately cut off one of his fingers, and
burned his fine lodge, 19 fine robes, and a wagon, and killed 3 horses, besides destroying other
favorite things. I next visited the principal chief of the Arapahoes, Little Raven, and went into his
lodge, which, together with its contents, was a great curiosity, and could it be transported just as
it is, would be a valuable accession to one of our sanitary fairs. Little Raven and Thunder Stone
jointly presented me with a bow and quiver of arrows, the quiver being made out of a panther
skin. I told him it was customary in our country to give a lock of their hair to friends; he laughed
and replied that all the money I could give him would not tempt him to give me a particle of it.
In regard to these Indian difficulties, I think if great caution is not exercised on our part there
will be a bloody war. It should be our policy to try and conciliate them, guard our mails and
trains well to prevent theft, and stop these scouting parties that are roaming over the country who
do not know one tribe from another, and who will kill anything in the shape of an Indian. It will
require but few murders on the part of our troops to unite all these warlike tribes of the plains,
who have been at peace for years and intermarried amongst one another. I do wish that some
prudent, good man could be placed in command of the troops along the roads from Smoky Fork,
on the Leavenworth road, to Walnut Creek, and from Cow Creek through to Fort Lyon, on the
Kansas City or old Santa Fé road.
The arrangements I have made in regard to escorting the mails are as follows: The officer at
Saline, who has 20 men, will escort to Smoky Hill Fork, and wait for return mail. The officer at
Smoky Hill Fork, who has 40 men, will escort to Walnut Creek, and wait for return mail. Officer
at Walnut Creek will require the Kansas City or Leavenworth mail to await the arrival of the one
behind time, and escort to Fort Larned; he will have 40 men at this point. The officer at Fort
Larned, there being but one mail from this point, will escort to Fort Lyon, and wait return mail;
this escort passes the eastern boundary mail guarded by Fort Lyon troops. This arrangement
gives both escorts nearly a week to rest, the one at Lyon and the other at Larned. I have made no
arrangement from Walnut Creek to Council Grove, but intend Council Grove to furnish escort to
that point and back. In regard to the numerous individual and Government trains passing, the
commanding officers of posts at the commencement of the Indian country should require both
inward and outward bound trains to wait until a number are collected, so that they might be able
to defend themselves.
The inclosed is a copy of orders given to commanders of posts to govern escorts. I found
something of this kind absolutely necessary to prevent escorts from running their horses down
after buffalo, also as a check to the several stage companies, who care not a cent how many
Government horses are broken down so they keep up their reputation for speed and promptness.
And in conclusion allow me to recommend for the benefit of the Government that a one-story
stone house be built at this point for commissary and quartermaster's stores, also one for a
hospital; for could you but see the miserable excuse for a hospital that our sick soldiers are
obliged to stay in, I know the heart of the general commanding would be moved to compassion. I
further, as a duty, must report the sutler, Jesse H. Crane, appointed by Government, as selling
whisky without stint, contrary to act of Congress, which says, "A sutler shall not sell intoxicating
spirits." He is also reported by many as selling revolvers to the Indians.
I have the honor to be, very truly, your obedient servant,
Major and Inspector-General.
Ten miles south of Searcy, Ark., June 16, 1864--6 a.m.
(Via Brownsville.)
Capt. C. H. DYER,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Little Rock, Ark.:
SIR: I arrived here last night. Shelby is reported near Jackson-port. Thirty of Kirke's and
Shelby's men passed here yesterday morning going toward West Point. Chased 10 of McCoy's
band out of Austin as we came through. Will reach Searcy and scout some in that vicinity to-day.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
Major, Commanding, &c.
Near Searcy, June 17, 1864--6 a.m. (Via Brownsville.)
Capt. C. H. DYER,
Assistant Adjutant-General:
SIR: The most reliable intelligence says Shelby is near Augusta. Straggling bands of his men
have been in here recently. Twelve passed through Searcy day before yesterday. He has, it is
said, organized the bands that have infested this section as bushwhackers. I will send a party to
West Point to-day, and another up the Little Red a few miles.
Major, Commanding.
Fort Riley, Kans., June 17, 1864.
Lieut. D. J. CRAIGIE,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General:
LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to inform you that since my last letter nothing of
importance has transpired at this post, with the exception of the sending away a detachment of
Company H, Seventh Iowa Cavalry, to Salina and Smoky Hill, and a detachment of Company L,
Eleventh Kansas Cavalry, to Council Grove, Kans. I sent them out in obedience to an order from
General Curtis, ordering one company to Salina and one to Council Grove, but as there were but
two companies at the post I only sent those of the companies who were mounted.
I have to report that Company H, Seventh Iowa, are in need of at least 20 horses, and that
requisitions have been sent in before leaving Fort Kearny; also that Company L, of the Eleventh
Kansas, are not properly armed or equipped, and not horses enough to mount one-half of the
men. The fault is not with the company commanders, as they have sent in requisitions for
everything necessary to have their commands properly armed and equipped. I have now 14 men
at this post, who in case of attack could make a defense. However, I do not anticipate any trouble
in this country either from rebels or Indians.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Captain, Seventh Iowa Cavalry, Commanding Post.
Near Austin, June 19, 1864--3 p.m.
Capt. C. H. DYER,
Assistant Adjutant-General:
SIR: Shelby's men have been crossing Little Red River in small detachments at night, for five
or six days past. They cross at West Point and the fords above Searcy.
The largest squad of which I have definite information numbered about 40 men; another 30,
and several smaller; several squads went in the direction of Hickory Plains. Fearing that they
were concentrating there, I sent a scouting party in that direction yesterday. They could not cross
the Cypress, but learned that Shelby's men were near Hickory Plains in large force; they could
not ascertain the number. This morning a citizen sent me word that he was in their camp
yesterday, and that they had 1,500 men and six pieces of artillery, and designed moving on the
The country in the region of Searcy and West Point, is full of small squads moving down for
some purpose. Two companies are located west of Little Red, between Searcy and West Point.
Several squads moved down from the direction of Peach Orchard Gap, passing between Bayou
Des Arc and Bull Creek. One of my scouting parties had a skirmish with about 30 of Shelby's
men day before yesterday, between Searcy and West Point, and run them into the swamps,
killing I horse and wounding a man. We lost 1 horse and equipments. I sent my dispatch
yesterday under the escort of the scouting party to Hickory Plains, and as they could not cross the
Cypress, they had to return. I moved down here to-day and shall make a reconnaissance tomorrow
to ascertain the location and force of the enemy if they are at the place represented.
Major, Commanding.
BROWNSVILLE, June 19, 1864.
Capt. C. H. DYER,
Assistant Adjutant-General:
I have just returned from a scout to Little Red River. Was with Major Drummond, Ninth
Iowa, last night. Have no information later than that which he has sent.
Captain, Twenty-second Ohio.
Little Rock, Ark., June 19, 1864.
Commanding Ninth Iowa Cavalry, Prairie Bayou:
COLONEL: You will send out one battalion of your regiment to take the place of Colonel
Geiger's command below Clarendon, on this side of White River. This battalion will thoroughly
scout the country up and down White River, and get all possible information from the east side.
It will take advantage of the prairie as far as possible to graze animals. It will also procure forage
and provisions from Devall's Bluff from time to time by steam-boat. It will send daily reports to
these headquarters direct. It will destroy all gangs of bushwhackers.
By command of Brig. Gen. E. A. Carr:
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
Helena, Ark., June 19, 1864.
Maj. Gen. E. R. S: CANBY,
Commanding Division of West Mississippi:
SIR: By your order I have an infantry force of 50 men of the Twelfth Iowa, commanded by
Capt. J. R. C. Hunter, at the mouth of White River. He reported to me on the lath instant that
Price and Marmaduke's forces were on the south side of the Arkansas River, 12 miles from him.
He was employing his whole force and 50 negroes (the wood-choppers) in felling timber and
fortifying his position. He states that his position has been reconnoitered by small squads of the
enemy's cavalry, the pickets fired on, and I negro killed and 5 negroes carried off. I this day send
him orders to continue to fortify his position, to co-operate with the gun-boats, and to take refuge
on board, if attacked by an overwhelming force.
But the root of the evil is in the trade stores. For several months there have been three trade
stores, allowed to obtain each $5,000 per month, and the steam-boat Panola was, until I ordered
her away, at Napoleon with permits to sell $20,000 per month. All these supplies go to the
enemy. I respectfully suggest that these trade stores be closed up and ordered with all their goods
as far north as Cairo. The fact is patent, nearly all the trade goes to the enemy. This post would
have been captured long ago had it not been for the interest of the enemy to let it remain and get
supplies. The wood-choppers can be supplied with rations, the contractors paying for them. I
restrict trade to the narrowest limits at this place, but as the Treasury agents license these stores,
they have made it to the interest of every one of them to evade my orders. Why should any trade
store be allowed in Arkansas? The new civil machinery is not allowed to go into operation
except within the picket-lines of the military posts in Arkansas.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Capt. J. R. C. HUNTER,
Twelfth Iowa Vols., Comdg., Mouth of White River:
SIR: Your dispatch of the 18th is received. I this day send you seven days' rations for 50
men, to be issued to the negroes you have employed in constructing your defenses. I commend
you for your decision in taking energetic measures. You will use all the resources on the land to
defend your post. You will compel the aid of every man within your reach in case of an
emergency. You will request the commander of the gun-boat to place himself in such position as
to render you aid and afford you a safe retreat on his boat, in case you are attacked with
overwhelming force.
You and he will take such measures as to prevent the enemy from capturing the provisions
and clothing in the warehouses of the wood contractors or the trade stores. If the emergency
justifies it, you will compel them to ship their articles on some of the steam-boats, and, in the last
extremity, destroy them. You will restrict the trade to the narrowest limits. Captain Prichett
wrote me that the surgeon of the Tyler would give your command medicines and attendance.
You can apply also, with perfect assurance of assistance, to Captain Phelps. I have written to
General Canby this day of your situation, and trust he will take steps for your relief. Write me
and send me a diagram of your position, and that of the gun-boats and the trade stores.
Your obedient servant,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Morganza, La., June 20, 1864.
Chief of Staff, Gulf Department, New Orleans, La.:
GENERAL: I have been informed, though unofficially, that the troops of my division at this
point are to be attached to the Nineteenth Corps, an arrangement which will be very satisfactory
to me, and, as I believe, to the officers and soldiers of my command generally. I wish, however,
in this connection, to call your attention to the fact that there is but one brigade, the Second, of
my division here.
The composition of the First Division, in accordance with the last orders from Thirteenth
Corps headquarters, is as follows:
First Brigade: Eleventh Wisconsin Veteran Volunteers, Eighth Indiana Veterans, Twentyfirst
Iowa Volunteers, Twenty-third Iowa Volunteers, and Thirty-third Illinois Veteran
Volunteers, Eighteenth Indiana Veterans, Twenty-second Iowa Volunteers, Ninety-ninth Illinois
Second Brigade: Sixteenth Ohio Volunteers, Forty-second Ohio Volunteers, One hundred
and fourteenth Ohio Volunteers, One hundred and twentieth Ohio Volunteers, Seventh Kentucky
Volunteers, Twenty-second Kentucky Volunteers, and Forty-ninth and Sixty-ninth Indiana
The regiments of the Second Brigade, with the Twenty-third Iowa, of the First Brigade, and
the Thirty-seventh Illinois, of the Second, Herron's division, in all 3,500 men, are here, but the
Forty-ninth Indiana Volunteers has just been ordered to New Orleans preparatory to being
furloughed home. As to batteries, the First Wisconsin Battery also goes to New Orleans, while
the other, the Second Ohio Battery, is unfit for the field in consequence of worn-out guns. Thus I
will be left with only 3,000 infantry for the field and no battery.
The First Brigade is virtually broken up, is no longer under my control, being distributed at
various points in the department--at Brashear City the Eleventh Wisconsin and Thirty-third
Illinois Veterans, at Baton Rouge the Twenty-second and Twenty-first Iowa Volunteers, at
Carrollton the Eighth Indiana Veterans and Ninety-ninth Illinois. The Eighteenth Indiana is at
home and the Twenty-third Iowa here. I do not know if any of the first six regiments mentioned
can be spared from their present positions, but if they can, I respectfully but most earnestly
request that a sufficient number of them be sent me to make two brigades of 2,300 men each, and
that the batteries which belong to the division be also ordered to report to me. The division
would then be somewhere near 5,000 strong. If time and your convictions of duty will allow,
permit me to request immediate attention to the subject of this communication.
I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant.
HICKORY PLAINS, June 21, 1864.
A. A. G., 2d Div., 7th Army Corps, Little Rock, Ark.:
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to state that I arrived here with my command at 11 o'clock this
a.m. I found the Ninth Iowa Cavalry here, Colonel Trumbull in command, and reported to him.
Rebel General Shelby has not been in this part of the country. I would respectfully request that
my command be returned to Little Rock, as I will be destitute of rations before this reaches you.
I am, most respectfully, your obedient servant,
Captain, Comdg. Detach. Tenth Illinois Cavalry.
HICKORY PLAINS, ARK., June 21, 1864.
Capt. C. H. DYER,
Assistant Adjutant-General, District of Little Rock:
In the dispatch of yesterday from district headquarters, ordering me to move to this place, I
am charged with behaving very badly in not sending in reports, and falling back without fighting.
This charge does me very great injustice, and I desire and demand an investigation of my
conduct, and hope that it may be made as early as possible. I sent in daily reports as required in
the order under which I was acting. One of these reports failed to reach you, for reasons
explained in my dispatch of the 19th instant.
The report that Shelby was collecting a force here, or near here, was not received by me until
late in the night of the 18th, and as I determined to march for this point at daylight next morning,
for the purpose of ascertaining if the report Was-correct, nothing was to be gained by sending
special messengers before my arrival at Austin, by which time I hoped to get more definite
information. Arriving near Austin I met one of my detachments returning from Brownsville, and
was informed by one of my sergeants that he had met a Rev. Mr. Talcott, who desired him to go
to me immediately, with the information that Shelby was near here with 1,500 men and six
pieces of artillery. My command being too much exhausted to reach Hickory Plains that night, I
halted soon after receiving this message and reported the facts as I had received them, stating in
my dispatch that I would move here the next day and ascertain if the reports were correct, and
was in the act of doing so next morning when I received your dispatch of the 20th, and advanced
immediately to the place where the rebel camp was reported to be.
What has been termed my "falling back without fighting" was a rapid march, by the only
practicable or possible route, to Hickory Plains, where the enemy was reported and supposed to
be, from Searcy, where there was no enemy to fight at that time. I came here for the purpose of
seeing if the enemy was here and engaging him, unless I should find him in overwhelming force.
I could not cross the Cypress on the direct route to Hickory Plains, and the route by Austin was
the only way I could reach this point and be able to give you reliable intelligence. Reports which
called for the concentration of a heavy cavalry force at this point certainly justify this movement
on my part.
Hoping that my conduct will be investigated immediately, I remain, your obedient servant,
Major Ninth Iowa Cavalry.
June 22, 1864--12 m. (Via Brownsville.)
Capt. C. H. DYER,
Assistant Adjutant-General:
I start northward in half an hour. I am out of forage and provisions and shall have to get
along the best way I can. I sent the detachment of the Eleventh Missouri back to the Bluff, and I
have ordered the detachment of the Tenth Illinois to Little Rock. In consequence of the scarcity
of provisions and the bad condition of the horses' feet I have also ordered about one-third of the
Ninth Iowa to Bayou Two Prairies. This will leave me about 400 men, which I consider
sufficient to clear this country to Little Rock.
Colonel, Commanding.
Helena, June 23, 1864.
Maj. Gen. E. R. S. CANBY,
Commanding Division of West Mississippi:
SIR: I have received an addition to my white troops. This day the Sixth Minnesota Infantry
reported to me. The morning reports show the following aggregates for duty:
15th Illinois Cavalry 310
35th Missouri Infantry 267
47th Iowa Infantry (100-days' men) 741
6th Minnesota Infantry 815
Total 2,133
The Forty-seventh Iowa (100-days' men) are recruits, not well drilled, and are going through
the usual trials of camp life, many of them being attacked with measles, dysentery, and 4 with
smallpox. Many of them are youths from sixteen to eighteen years of age. The officers appear
well and would make a good regiment of it if their enlistment had been longer. The Sixth
Minnesota have been two years in the service in Minnesota and appear strong and healthy. My
tri-monthly report will show you the number of colored troops at this post. They are in a good
state of discipline.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
LITTLE ROCK, ARK., June 24, 1864.
Col. J. K. MIZNER,
Commanding, Devall's Bluff:
I propose to move to Clarendon with about 2,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and a battery, with
five days' rations. Have boats enough ready to embark them to-morrow forenoon. Have the One
hundred and twenty-sixth and One hundred and sixth and the battery at your post ready by 10
o'clock to-morrow forenoon. Let me know the condition of the battery as to men, horses, and
material. Make ready all the ambulances at your post to go with the expedition. Send
accompanying dispatch to Colonel Geiger, at Bayou Two Prairies, Ashley's Station, by the train
which will be ordered to Brownsville to-night, after the Sixty-first Illinois. Send only a small
scout, say 25 men, down the river on this side. Have all your mounted men, except small pickets,
ready to go to Clarendon with the expedition.
I have heard from Searcy to-day; there is nothing there only a rumor that Shelby was crossing
at Des Arc, which is evidently a blind. There are two battalions Ninth Iowa at Searcy, who will
cover your post as they come in. Have boats enough to take 2,000 horses and the battery, which I
would prefer not to take apart; probably it can be distributed on different boats.
Brigadier- General, Commanding.
LITTLE ROCK, June 24, 1864.
Colonel GEIGER,
Commanding Camp, Bayou Two Prairies:
COLONEL: March with all your mounted men, including Ninth Iowa Cavalry, to Devall's
Bluff to take boats for Clarendon. Shelby captured a tin-clad this morning, and, I have no doubt,
was there with his whole force. I am going with 2,000 infantry and all the cavalry I can raise, and
battery. Shelby has four heavy guns. You will want five or six days' rations. If you have not got
them can draw them at the Bluff, and plenty of ammunition. Be at the Bluff as early as possible.
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Camp Near Searcy, Ark., June 24, 1864.
Capt. C. H. DYER, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Little Rock:
SIR: I arrived here last night. There are no rebel forces up here. I have not much doubt that
they have all gone to join Shelby. The current rumor among the citizens at Searcy is that Shelby
broke camp at Augusta on Sunday, and that on Tuesday he commenced crossing the White River
at Des Arc for a demonstration against Brownsville or Devall's Bluff.
Colonel, Commanding.
LITTLE ROCK, ARK., June 26, 1864.
Commanding Ninth Iowa Cavalry:
Before the general left here he directed me to order your command to Devall's Bluff. You
will therefore proceed to Devall's Bluff and report to the commanding officer.
Assistant Adjutant-General.
OMAHA, NEBR. TER., June 26, 1864.
A. A. G., Dept. of Kansas, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.:
Sioux attacked a party cutting hay near Pawnee Agency on night of 24th; killed and wounded
4 persons. Captain David, Seventh Iowa Cavalry, is in pursuit with his company. I start west tomorrow,
and shall probably get after the Indians somewhere on my line.
Helena, Ark., June 27, 1864.
Maj. Gen. C. C. WASHBURN,
Commanding District of West Tennessee :
GENERAL: I have just received, under flag of truce from Colonel Dobbin, a communication
requesting the exchange of prisoners in my hands for some of the officers and men of the gunboat
Queen City (No. 26), which was captured by General Shelby, C. S. Army, on Friday last,
with her officers and crew, at or near Clarendon, on White River. By the same source I learn that
the boat has been burned after the removal of her nine guns, ammunition, stores, &c., to this side
of White River. General, I earnestly request that if it is in your power you send me a battery of
light artillery, of which I have none at all, one regiment of cavalry, and at least l,000 good
infantry. General Shelby is in force, and if you can possibly loan me the troops mentioned, I will
move on him instantly, and not without hope of recapturing the guns, &c., taken from the Queen
City. The movement should be made without delay. It will readily occur to you that the 100-
days' men are not fit for the service required. The Forty-seventh Iowa which you sent me are,
many of them, youths from sixteen to eighteen years old, and also that the light artillery is
indispensable. The rebel pickets to-night are within 18 miles of this place.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
FORT LEAVENWORTH, June 27, 1864.
Brigadier-General MCKEAN,
Paola, Kans.:
Major McKenny has returned and reports from Larned. A stockade and 25 men under
Lieutenant Clark, Seventh Iowa, holds Salina. At Smoky Fork he erected block-house and left
Lieutenant Ellsworth with 40 men. At Walnut Creek, 40 miles this side Larned, commenced
stone fort, and left Captain Dunlap with 45 men, Fifteenth Kansas. At Larned directed a fieldwork
and gave general directions to escort stages. Indians generally quiet, but the Cheyennes
preparing for mischief. Later news of a fight with escort between Larned and Lyon, in which 6
Indians were killed and 2 of our men wounded.
The major thinks some sort of defensive work should be made at or near Cow Creek, on old
Santa Fe road. I had also ordered a block-house at Council Grove, but for want of axes they have
done nothing. Forces coming from Colorado are at Fort Lyon. When they get through to Larned
and Walnut Creek matters there will be strong. A good commander of that region must be
arranged. Captain Parmetar, at Larned, must be immediately disposed of.
New Orleans, La., June 29, 1864--9.45 a.m.
Brigadier-General BENTON, Comdg. at Baton Rouge, La.:
The Third Brigade of the Third Division of the Nineteenth Army Corps, as established by
orders, will be composed of six regiments, viz: The Eighty-third and Ninety-sixth Ohio
Volunteers, Sixty-seventh Indiana, Thirty-fourth Iowa, Seventy-seventh and One hundred and
thirtieth Illinois. Please notify the senior officer of the command enumerated of this organization,
and instruct him to expect orders to move to Morganza with the brigade.
By command of Major-General Reynolds:
Major and Assistant Adjutant-General.
Milwaukee, Wis., June 30, 1864.
Governor of Dakota Territory, Yankton :
GOVERNOR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the
22d instant. General Sully was assigned to the command of the forces in Dakota Territory and
charged with the protection of its frontier settlements. The sole object of his expedition is to
accomplish this purpose. He was ordered to have a sufficient force when he moved against the
Indians to render your frontier secure, and if necessary for that purpose to call upon the Governor
of Iowa for a sufficient number of companies of the 100-days' men to take post at important
points in his rear. I feel sure that General Sully is not a man to neglect so obvious a duty,
especially when it has been presented to him in positive instructions. It is possible that you may
be mistaken as to the extent of the arrangements he has made in that view. I have forwarded to
him a copy of your letter, with directions to assure the safety of your frontier settlements during
his absence in the Indian country.
I think perhaps that you underestimate the force of the hostile bands assembled on the
Missouri below old Fort Clarke. From all information received both from your region of the
country and through Minnesota, by way of Pembina and the head of the Coteau Des Prairies, the
hostile bands are assembled in sufficient force to tax all General Sully's means of campaign. At
all events, by the time this letter reaches you he will have settled the matter definitely and will
have forces to spare, if necessary to send back to your frontier. I am sure you will agree with me,
Governor, in the conviction that, to secure your frontier completely and satisfactorily and with
any hope of permanent results, the power of the Yanktonais and Teton bands of Sioux must be
broken to pieces. This is the object of Sully's expedition, and I trust it will meet with such
success as will assure peace with the Indians of Dakota, which shall be as near final as can be
hoped for any peace with Indians. Whilst securing the frontier settlements it is my object to
establish large posts in the Indian country far beyond the settlements, which, commanding the
buffalo range of the Teton and Yanktonais, will secure peaceful relations hereafter.
These posts are also so located that they furnish a line from east to west through Dakota far
north of your settlements. It is hoped and believed that the campaign of this summer will finally
settle Indian hostilities in your region of the country. Of course, to effect such a success we must
use all the means at our command, and I confidently expect co-operation and whatever aid of
personal influence is at your command to quiet unnecessary apprehension amongst the settlers.
You know as well as I how many unscrupulous persons infest our whole frontier, who live and
thrive by exciting apprehension and alarm among the frontier farmers. It should be, and I am sure
is, our mutual purpose so to conduct matters as best to secure peace on the frontier and to
promote the best interests of your Territory and of the Government. I am sure I have no other
object, and equally sure that I have exercised my best judgment to effect it. I confidently believe
that by a little patience on the part of your citizens and more confidence in the military
authorities, everything will be settled satisfactorily. I will take immediate measures to see that
General Sully's orders to the officers left to guard the frontier are strictly complied with. This
department has been nearly stripped of troops to supply the absolute necessities of our armies in
the South, but whatever I can do with the means at my command to secure your frontier and the
interests of your Territory you may be sure I will always be ready to do cheerfully.
I am, Governor, respectfully, your obedient servant,
Major-General, Commanding.
I have authorized General Sully to employ, arm, and clothe for temporary service at their
respective agencies as many friendly Indians as may be needed for their protection. This was
done at the request of Indian agents.
Barrancas, August 30, 1864.
MAJOR: I have the honor to report that I left Barrancas yesterday morning (29th instant),
with 200 of the Second Maine Cavalry, two companies of the Nineteenth Iowa Infantry, and two
pieces of the First Florida Battery, on the steamers Clinton and Planter, with a view to capture
three new companies of rebel cavalry reported to be at Milton, Fla.
I arrived early in the forenoon at the mouth of the Bayou Mulatte, or Black Bayou, Escambia
Bay, but being unable to enter it with the Clinton (she drawing 8 feet of water) the
disembarkation of the cavalry was delayed till 3 p.m., when I proceeded to Milton, Fla., a
distance of 9 miles, and after rebuilding the destroyed bridge on the Arcadia Creek, I came upon
the enemy, about 100 strong, and consisting of Captain Goldsby's (Alabama) cavalry company
and a new militia infantry company, mounted.
Having received early information of the arrival of two army steamers at Bayou Mulatte, the
enemy had sent his stores on seven wagons in time toward Pollard, and seemed prepared and
decided to accept a fight in the camp at the upper end of the town, but fled, upon our impetuous
charge, in all directions. We pursued them closely for 7 miles, and captured 4 privates of
Goldsby's company and 3 colored men, mounted and armed, with 7 horses and 5 mules with
equipments, and 20 Austrian rifles.
Returning to Milton late in the evening I gave rest and food to men and horses, and started at
I o'clock this morning back to Mulatte Bayou, where I commenced re-embarking at daylight, and
arrived and disembarked here at Barrancas at 6 p.m., without any loss except 1 horse killed after
total exhaustion.
By the fact above stated of the Clinton not being able to pass the mouth of the Bayou
Mulatte, and to approach the landing-place nearer than 2 miles, all chance for surprising the rebel
camp was lost, and as all my future movements into the interior will require a partial
transportation of the troops by water up the different tributaries of the Pensacola Bay or the
Perdido River, I would respectfully request that the steamer Planter, which answers well in these
waters, and the Matamoras, daily expected in New Orleans from Brazos Santiago, be ordered for
duty in this command.
Very respectfully, major, your obedient servant,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
October 20, 1864.
On the 17th instant, I sent the steamer Planter into Blackwater Bay after logs, and with it a
detachment of Nineteenth Iowa (200 men) and a section of the First Florida Battery, all under
Lieutenant-Colonel Spurling, Second Maine Cavalry.
At Battledonge a large number of logs were procured, and as the operations of the day were
nearly concluded a party of about 300 rebels attacked my force, which reserved its fire until
within short range. Lieutenant-Colonel Spurling withdrew with a loss of 1 man (Nineteenth
Iowa) killed, and another (First Florida Battery) slightly wounded. The rebels must have suffered
On the 19th, the Planter went into Escambia Bay, accompanied by 125 men under
Lieutenant-Colonel Spurling, Second Maine Cavalry, and brought away 15,000 new brick and a
lot of doors and window sash. Detailed reports will be forwarded of both these expeditions.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Brevet Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff.
Barrancas, Fla., October 18, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to report that in compliance with Special Orders, No. 245, dated
headquarters District of West Florida, October 17, 1864, I left the wharf at this place on the
morning of the 18th instant at 10 o'clock, on the steamer Planter, with a detachment of 200 men
from the Nineteenth Iowa Volunteers and one section of the First Florida Battery, and proceeded
up the Blackwater within 9 miles of Milton, where I landed, and, after establishing a strong
picket-line, commenced to secure the logs in that vicinity. While thus engaged the enemy
attacked me with a force, I should judge, of 300 men. After a skirmish of two hours the battery
opened upon them, when they fell back out of range. I then succeeded in securing 140 logs, and
returned with a loss of 1 man killed and 1 wounded of the Nineteenth Iowa Volunteers, and 1
man wounded of the First Florida Battery. I could not ascertain what damage we did to the
I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,
Lieutenant-Colonel Second Maine Cavalry.
Bvt. Brig. Gen. J. BAILEY,
Commanding District of West Florida.
Barrancas, October 25 [28], 1864.
MAJOR: An expedition of 700 men (100 Second Maine Cavalry, mounted, 100 First Florida
Cavalry, dismounted, 200 Nineteenth Iowa, and 300 colored troops), under Lieutenant-Colonel
Spurling, Second Maine Cavalry, to Blackwater Bay, which left here on the 25th instant,
returned to-day.
The rebels were driven through Milton by the cavalry, and 8 captured, besides 5 or 6 known
to have been killed or wounded. My plans were to catch the whole gang of Confederates, about
100 strong, but failed, through a misconception of orders on the part of one of the detachment
commanders. Eight cribs of Confederate lumber, containing over 85,000 feet, seasoned (1 inch
or 1 inches thick, and 5 or 6 inches wide), 15,000 feet besides of seasoned lumber, and 130 logs
were the proceeds of the expedition.
No casualties in my force. A detailed report will be sent.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Brevet Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Barrancas, Fla., October 31, 1864.
GENERAL: I have the honor respectfully to submit the following report:
Pursuant to orders from headquarters District of West Florida, I embarked on the morning of
the 25th October, on steam transport at Barrancas, in charge of a force consisting of a
detachment of the Second Maine Veteran Cavalry of 100 men, 100 dismounted men of the First
Florida Cavalry, and a detachment of the Nineteenth Iowa Infantry, Twenty-fifth, Eighty-second,
and Eighty-sixth U.S. Colored Infantry, and Company M (Captain Roberts), Second Maine
Cavalry, dismounted for battery purposes, and in charge of two howitzers, the whole amounting
in the aggregate to over 700 men.
Captain Stearns, of the Eighty-second Colored Infantry, was placed in charge of one of the
transports, Lizzie Davis, with 200 infantry, with orders to proceed up the Blackwater River, to
land a force 8 miles below Pierce's Mill, and distant from Milton 13 miles, to raft logs, which are
numerous along the shore, and by other and all his actions endeavor to draw the enemy upon the
narrow point of land or peninsula formed by Escambia Bay on the west and East Bay and
Blackwater River on the east. I proceeded with the other transport, the Planter, to Pensacola,
remaining there till late in the afternoon; from thence up Escambia Bay, and late in the night
landed 300 infantry, under charge of Major Mudgett, of the Eighty-sixth Colored Infantry, at
Bayou -------, a point on the east side of Escambia Bay, opposite Pierce's Mill, with orders that
he should march to the head of the bayou and remain there till he should hear cannonading on the
other side of the narrow point of land, when he would deploy his force across to Pierce's Mill,
thus cutting off the retreat of the enemy, whom I expected, and had good reason to believe,
Captain Stearns would succeed in drawing into the trap which I had prepared for them, inasmuch
as they had in considerable force on former occasions attacked me while I was engaged in
procuring logs at points 7 or 8 miles below the mill. After landing Major Mudgett I proceeded
back with the Planter, and on the following morning, having rounded the point of the peninsula,
was on my way up East Bay or Blackwater River.
I did not find the other transport, the Lizzie Davis, 8 miles below the mill. It soon became
apparent that Captain Stearns had failed to conform to my orders. Instead of landing as he was
directed, he had gone 6 or 7 miles too far, and some time elapsed before I found the Lizzie Davis
anchored in a small cove a mile or two from the mill. Thus the enemy was not induced to come
far down upon the point of land as I designed, and as would have been the case had my orders
been fully carried out, and as my report will clearly show. On coming up with the Lizzie Davis, I
directed Captain Lincoln, of the Second Maine Cavalry, to relieve Captain Stearns of his
command, to land with all possible dispatch the 200 men on board, and march direct to Milton.
By 11 a.m., Captain Lincoln had landed the troops from the Lizzie Davis. I proceeded with the
Planter to Pierce's Mill and landed the cavalry and battery, which I had been holding in reserve,
and immediately moved toward Milton, soon coming upon Captain Lincoln, whom I found
engaged with a force of the enemy's cavalry. It seems that Captain Lincoln, after landing, before
he had hardly taken up the march, was met by a considerable force of cavalry, with which he
became engaged. He drove the enemy to the mill, and beyond it on the Milton road, where they
made a stand under cover of some old buildings. On my arrival at this point the firing was quite
rapid, and a brisk skirmish was going on. I immediately charged with the detachment of cavalry
which I had brought up, and drove the rebels from the old buildings. They fled in wild confusion
on the Milton road. At a bridge they attempted to make a stand, but all to no purpose. I pursued
them through Milton and out on the Pollard road, a distance of over 8 miles, capturing 9
prisoners and wounding quite a number. Their rout was complete. Their arms and equipments,
and everything that could impede flight, were thrown away.
There were no casualties in my own force. The enemy's force consisted of a detachment of
between 70 and 80 of the Eighth Mississippi Cavalry and a small force of militia.
Having kept up the pursuit as long as it was prudent, my horses becoming exhausted, and it
growing late in the day, I returned to Milton, and leaving the cavalry to hold the place, went back
to the Planter, which I ordered to be moved up to a place called Bagdad, less than 2 miles from
Milton, and here I secured quite a large amount of lumber; about 85,000 feet. I dispatched a
courier to Major Mudgett, with orders for him to move his force from the bayou to Pierce's Mill,
and hold himself in readiness to embark at that point on the following morning.
On the following morning the pickets were taken in, and the Planter moved up the river to
Milton, thus exploding, if not the torpedoes, the idea and belief that they are planted in the river
to obstruct its passage by boats. Here several flat-boats were secured, and the ferry across the
river completely demolished. Quite an amount of commissary and quartermaster's property was
found, among which was about 200 bushels of corn and meal and considerable ham and beef,
and since there was no means of transportation by which it could be got to the boat it was
destroyed. Considerable surplus ordnance, accouterments, and horse equipments were' also
destroyed. Several horses and mules were captured. Having brought off or destroyed everything
that could be of use to the enemy, and having accomplished all that circumstances could admit
of, I returned to Barrancas with my whole force, where I arrived on the morning of the 28th.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.
Bvt. Brig. Gen. J. BAILEY,
Commanding District of West Florida.
November 8, 1864.
Respectfully forwarded to Major-General Granger, commanding District of West Florida and
South Alabama. Lieutenant-Colonel Spurling is deserving a very great deal of credit for his
management of this and other expeditions. I find him a most invaluable officer.
Brevet Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Hilton Head, S. C., September 5, 1864.
Comdg. Confederate Forces, Dept. of S. C., Ga., and Fla.:
GENERAL: I am informed by an officer recently arrived from Charleston that James Pike, of
the Fourth Ohio Cavalry, and Charles R. Gray, of Fifth Iowa Cavalry, are held by you in close
confinement at the jail tower in Charleston, and kept upon a prison diet of mush and water. Also
that these men have been informed that they are held and are to be tried as spies. I further learn
that they were captured on or about June 5 last, near the Hiwassee River, in Southeastern
Tennessee or the northwestern part of South Carolina, and that, when taken, they were wearing
our uniform and had arms in their hands. If their claim in this respect is true, they are entitled to
be treated as prisoners of war. I respectfully ask you to have their case investigated and extend to
them the treatment usually accorded to prisoners of war among civilized nations.
I am, very respectfully, yours,
Major-General, Commanding.
Hilton Head, S. C., September 5, 1864.
Comdg. Confederate Forces, Dept. of S. C., Ga., and Fla.:
GENERAL: I am informed by an officer recently arrived from Charleston that James Pike, of
the Fourth Ohio Cavalry, and Charles R. Gray, of Fifth Iowa Cavalry, are held by you in close
confinement at the jail tower in Charleston, and kept upon a prison diet of mush and water. Also
that these men have been informed that they are held and are to be tried as spies. I further learn
that they were captured on or about June 5 last, near the Hiwassee River, in Southeastern
Tennessee or the northwestern part of South Carolina, and that, when taken, they were wearing
our uniform and had arms in their hands. If their claim in this respect is true, they are entitled to
be treated as prisoners of war. I respectfully ask you to have their case investigated and extend to
them the treatment usually accorded to prisoners of war among civilized nations.
I am, very respectfully, yours,
Major-General, Commanding.
DES MOINES, IOWA, May 11, 1864.
The thanks of a grateful people are due to General Grant and his heroic army for their gallant
conduct and splendid achievements, and to the War Department for the able and cordial support
he has received at all times in his plans and movements against the enemy.
WASHINGTON, May 12, 1864.
Lieutenant-General GRANT, Commanding, &c.:
GENERAL: One officer and some hundred or more men, deserters, have arrived here with
the wounded, under pretense of wounds, which on examination is found to be false. They are
unquestionably cowardly deserters, and deserve the death penalty. The Secretary of War has
directed that the officer be placed in irons and the men under strong guard and sent back to your
headquarters to be disposed of as you may deem proper. He directs me to say that he advises and
authorizes you to have these deserters tried by a drum-head court, and if guilty, executed without
delay as an example. Prompt and severe punishment is deemed necessary to prevent straggling
and desertion. A considerable number of our deserters are said to be on the Rappahannock,
robbing for subsistence, and waiting to get through our lines or to be picked up by rebel cavalry.
Some are said to have reached the Potomac and' crossed into Maryland. Your action in this
matter, whatever it may be, will be sanctioned by the War Department.
I hope to be able to send you 10,000 re-enforcements by to-morrow night, and 3,000 or 4,000
more in a few days. I have ordered everything from the Rappahannock Station, inside of Bull
Run, which will be our outer line. This will enable me to send you some 1,500 men from there.
A battery of artillery and some companies of invalids have been ordered to Belle Plain as guards
for depot and supplies. When you break off communication with that place, and the wounded are
all withdrawn, the depot will be broken up and removed to such place as you may direct. Heard
from Sherman to yesterday. His operations delayed by non-arrival of Stoneman's cavalry. No
general engagement yet. Buzzard Roost found too strong, and he will now attempt to turn it.
Nothing new from Butler.
Steele returned to Little Rock on the 2d badly cut up. General Rosecrans, after repeated
orders, still retains the Ninth Iowa Cavalry. General Canby has been authorized by Secretary of
War to take troops from Department of Missouri. Ohio militia is organizing pretty rapidly, but
not a regiment yet raised in Indiana, Illinois, or Iowa. No recent news from Banks. By last
accounts his army was nearly in a state of mutiny. He abandoned Admiral Porter in his retreat
and many of the gun-boats were destroyed or lost. The enemy did not pursue, except in small
detachments, Kirby Smith's main force being sent to re-enforce Price against Steele.
Yours, truly,
Major-General and Chief of Staff.
P. S.--This will be sent by the escort of deserters.
H. W. H.
July 3.--The division commenced embarking at Morganza, La.. and proceeded to Algiers,
La., where it again embarked under sealed orders and reported at Fort Monroe. During the month
the division was much scattered, a portion of it being at James River, reporting to Major-General
Hancock, and the balance in the Department of Washington.
Alterations in the Second Brigade since last return: The Thirteenth Connecticut Volunteers,
absent on veteran furlough, reported in the column of loss. The Ninetieth New York transferred
to First Division. The Eleventh Indiana and Twenty-second Iowa assigned to Second Brigade of
this division.
WASHINGTON, D. C., July 5, 1864.
The militia regiment at Davenport will be ordered to Rock Island, and the Veteran Reserve
Corps regiment at that place will be ordered to Washington via Pittsburg.
Major-General and Chief of Staff.
Jonesborough, Ga., September 6, 1864:.
MAJOR: I have the honor to transmit you the following report of the operations of the
Seventh Indiana Battery in this campaign:
At 8 o'clock on the morning of May 6, 1864, the battery moved out from Ringgold, Ga., with
the Third Division, Fourteenth Army Corps, on the Dalton road, and early in the afternoon
camped near Tunnel Hill. From the 7th to 12th nothing of note occurred except a few changes of
camp. May 12, moved to the right, and passing through Snake Creek Gap, camped after a march
of twenty miles. May 14, in obedience to your orders, four guns were placed on the line in front
of the regular brigade, First Division, Fourteenth Army Corps. Two guns had an enfilading fire
on the enemy, to the left, and one section aided in silencing two guns in front. Lieutenant Pound
and section was sent per order of Captain Estep, division chief artillery, half a mile to the left,
and took position on a commanding ridge, directing his fire mainly at a rebel battery in his front.
During the night of the 14th the enemy was heard erecting works, but, expecting orders to
change position, no preparations were made for defense until just before daylight. No orders
coming, I moved Lieutenant Repp's section 400 yards to the left, and placed Lieutenant Fislar's
section behind a little crest, and employed what little time we had before day in putting up a
protection to shield the gunners. It was found almost impossible to work the guns on account of
the nearness to the enemy's sharpshooters, but a random fire was kept up until we were relieved.
Late in the forenoon Captain Estep ordered me to withdraw, which was done as speedily as
possible. For seventy-five yards Lieutenant Fislar's section was exposed to a flank fire of
musketry, but the move was so unexpected that most of the men were under cover before the
heaviest fire was opened. Sergeant Hoffman was severely wounded, and 2 horses shot in this
operation. Lieutenants Repp and Pound came out with their sections and the battery moved with
the division several miles to the right, and one section relieved two guns of some Iowa battery,
and fired several shots at the rebel works, but elicited no reply. On the 16th marched and crossed
the Coosa River at Resaca at midnight, and parked for the men to breakfast while the division
was coming up; passed through Calhoun and camped for the night three miles south. On the 19th
camped near Cassville, where we remained until the 23d, when we took up the route of march,
fording the Etowah at Island Ford, and after ten miles' march, camped on Island Creek; two days
passed without a move. Marched to Burnt Hickory Valley on the 26th. At noon on the 28th
moved four miles to the front, returning the next day to Burnt Hickory. June 1, reporting
Lieutenant Repp's section to General Turchin, who remained as train guard, marched ten miles to
the front. June 3, advanced the battery to the line of Colonel Este's brigade, and during this and
the succeeding day kept up a desultory fire on the rebel skirmishers, driving them from houses,
and in conjunction with the Nineteenth Indiana Battery repelled several attempted advances of -
the enemy. Marched on the 6th and camped near Acworth. Rested three days and moved on the
10th, and finding the enemy on Pine Mountain one section was put in position per order of
General Baird, and during this and the following day shelled the mountain. June 11, withdrew
from this position and remained quiet until the 15th, when we advanced several miles, and that
night built works on our division line and put the battery in position. Early in the morning of the
16th General Palmer ordered the woods and valley in my front to be shelled, and on the
afternoon of that day General Thomas sent orders to open a vigorous fire on a nest of
sharpshooters that prevented an advance, which was accordingly done; during the night of the
16th threw up an advanced work, and the next day occupying it, assisted our troops to advance
by dislodging their skirmishers. Late in the afternoon of the 18th I got two guns into position on
the right of Battery I, First Ohio Artillery, and opened fire on a rebel fort 1,300 yards distant,
which was feebly replied to. Moved forward on the 19th, and in the afternoon took position in
front of Kenesaw Mountain, by order of General Palmer. The side of the mountain occupied by
sharpshooters was shelled, and late in the day I directed the fire on a battery off to our right.
During the next two days fired occasional shots, and in the afternoon of the 23d moved into
position on the line occupied by the Third Brigade, Third Division, Fourteenth Army Corps, in
front of Little Kenesaw Mountain. I immediately commenced strengthening the works, and while
so occupied was much annoyed by an enfilade fire from a rebel battery. Early in the forenoon of
the next day the enemy's batteries on the mountain and along the line concentrated a terrific fire
on the batteries in front of the Third Division, and for an hour the cannonade was very heavy.
My bugler, Asa D. Broody, was here severely wounded in the head by a piece of shell, and
Privates Gibbens and Boyd slightly hurt by bullets. Our division was relieved on the night of the
25th by the Fifteenth Corps, and on the morning of the 26th General McPherson directed me to
open a heavy fire on the batteries in range previous to a charge his corps would make at 8
o'clock. His order was obeyed until the advance of his line made it unsafe to fire. Remained in
this position, firing more or less every day, until I was relieved on the night of July 1, by one of
General Osterhaus' batteries, when I reported back to my division and was put in position at
daylight by Captain Estep. Exchanged a number of shots during the day with the enemy.
Marched on the 3d and camped two miles south of Marietta. July 5, moved again, and toward
noon General Baird ordered my battery up the mountain overlooking Vining's Station, and here
we shelled the rear guard of the enemy just crossing the Chattahoochee. Before dark withdrew
and went into camp, where we remained four days. Built works on the night of the 9th, but the
enemy evacuating, moved into position commanding the ford. July 18, crossed the
Chattahoochee and camped four miles south. Moved at 7 o'clock on the morning of the 19th, and
after two miles' march found the enemy posted just across Peach Tree Creek. In accordance with
your order, took position on a ridge near the skirmish line, and kept up a fire until dark. Private
Ramp was very severely wounded by a musket-ball. Marched July 22 and took position within
two miles of Atlanta, where we remained twelve days. Fired at intervals during this period,
directing most of our shots at the city and the rebel works in front. August 4, moved three miles
to the right, and, by your order, took position in front of General Baird's division, from which
point we did not open until the 6th. Made several demonstrations at times by order of General
Baird. Sergeant Kitzmiller, Corpl. McPheeters, and Privates Watson and Mann were wounded in
this position on the 7th, 2 of them by shells and 2 by musketry. Remained here until the night of
the 26th, when we withdrew under the fire of the rebel batteries, and marched several miles to
the right. From the 27th to the evening of the 30th short marches were made, and nothing of
interest occurred. On the morning of the 31st moved out to the line with Colonel Walker's
brigade, Third Division, and threw a number of shells at a large rebel wagon train, which soon
changed its course, and passed out of view. September 1, moved forward with General Baird's
division, and, nearing the battle-field, was halted by Major Lowrie, assistant adjutant-general,
Third Division, and held ourselves in readiness to move until after dark, when we went into
camp for the night, by order of Major Lowrie. September 2, moved into Jonesborough, where we
are now located.
I take pleasure in according to the officers and men of my command much credit for their
excellent conduct during this arduous and memorable campaign.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant.
Captain, Commanding Seventh Indiana Battery.
Chief of Artillery, Fourteenth Army Corps.
Chattanooga, Tenn., September 11, 1864.
SIR: Pursuant to instructions of the 4th instant from the major-general commanding
Department of the Cumberland, received the 11th instant, I have the honor to report that, in
obedience to orders from the major-general commanding Military Division of the Mississippi, I
assumed command of the district of the Etowah on the 15th of June last. A roster of the troops of
my command at that time, and stations where posted, is herewith respectfully submitted. The
main duty of my command was to keep open railroad communication with the army in the front.
On the 18th of June I directed Colonel Watkins, commanding Third Brigade, First Cavalry
Division, then stationed at Wauhatchie, to proceed with his mounted force to La Fayette, Ga.,
and patrol the country in that vicinity, then much infested by guerrillas, who were annoying our
communications to the front. On the 24th, at daylight, Colonel Watkins was attacked at La
Fayette by rebel cavalry, some 2,000 strong, under General Pillow, who, after having been
refused a surrender of the place and forces, attempted to surround and capture them. Our forces,
numbering about 400, immediately took refuge in the court-house and adjacent buildings, from
which they kept up a well-directed fire, and were enabled to repel every assault of the enemy.
After five hours' severe fighting, in which the enemy lost heavily without having gained any
material advantage, Colonel Croxton, commanding Fourth Kentucky Mounted Infantry, whom I
had ordered the day previous to proceed to the front by way of Ship's Gap, arrived, and
immediately attacking the enemy caused him to make a hasty retreat in the direction of Alpine,
leaving his dead and many of his wounded in our hands. Our forces pursued a short distance. The
enemy's loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners is estimated at 300, about 80 of whom were
prisoners, among them several officers. Our loss does not exceed 60. The conduct of all is
reported as being highly commendable. So soon as I could learn the results of the affairs at La
Fayette I ordered pursuit, but owing to the condition of Colonel Watkins' horses, and Colonel
Croxton having started for the front before the order could reach him, it could not be executed
with any hope of overtaking the enemy. Had an immediate pursuit been made, I have no doubt
but that it would have been attended with good results. I respectfully transmit herewith the
official reports of Colonels Watkins and Croxton. On the 28th of June my force was increased by
Brigadier-General Smith's command, the Third Division, Fifteenth Army Corps, headquarters at
Kingston, Ga., and occupying the railroad from Tilton to Cartersville, and soon after to
Allatoona, the forces at that station and Etowah being ordered out of my district. With the
exception of the capturing and partly burning of a train near Tilton on the 6th of July, and a
temporary break of track at that place, no raid or military demonstration of importance was made
within the district by the enemy until about the 14th of August, when, early in the morning of
that day, the enemy's cavalry, in considerable numbers, attacked a herd of cattle near Calhoun,
Ga., dispersing a portion of the guard and driving off a large number of cattle, some portion of
which were recaptured by Colonel Faulkner, who pursued the attacking party on the first receipt
of the news. At 3 p.m. that day I received information that rebel General Wheeler, with a strong
force, was moving toward Dalton. I immediately ordered such troops as I thought I could safely
spare from the garrison at Chattanooga to be held in readiness to move on the receipt of orders.
At the same time I ordered sufficient railroad transportation to be put in readiness to
accommodate 2,000 men. At 6 p.m. I received the further intelligence that a demand had been
made by Wheeler for the surrender of Dalton, which had been refused. I at once ordered the
loading of the troops, but owing to several trains running in wild from Dalton, I did not reach the
bridge north of that place until after midnight, when, being told by a cavalry officer direct from
near Dalton that our forces had been overpowered and captured, I awaited daylight before
proceeding farther. At daylight I advanced my command; soon became engaged with the
enemy's skirmishers. About this time I heard firing in Dalton, and learning that the garrison was
still holding out, I moved forward rapidly and soon cleared the town of the enemy, but being
without cavalry I could not pursue. I remained at Dalton until the following day, when learning
that the enemy had no further design on the place, and fearing that he would attempt to destroy
the bridges over the Chickamauga, I started for Chattanooga, where I arrived on the 17th instant.
The enemy's loss at Dalton could not have been less than 200. He left 33 dead and 57 badly
wounded on the field. My loss was 1 officer and 8 men killed, 1 officer and 29 men wounded, 1
officer and 23 men missing; total, 63. The troops engaged were Second Missouri, Twenty-ninth,
Fifty-first, and Sixty-eighth Indiana, One hundred and eighth Ohio, Seventy-eighth
Pennsylvania, and Fourteenth U.S. Colored Troops; in all, 1,800 effective. I was much pleased
with the conduct of my entire command. Colonel Laiboldt, Second Missouri Volunteers,
commanding Dalton, is entitled to especial credit for his stubborn and spirited defense of the
place previous to being re-enforced. For more detailed accounts I beg to refer to the
accompanying sub-reports. The same day, August 14, the enemy caused the surrender of a small
garrison (detachment Seventeenth Iowa) at a block-house between Dalton and Tilton, and
destroyed some railroad track between those stations. I have ordered, through General Smith, to
whose command the Seventeenth Iowa belongs, an investigation and report of the facts attending
the surrender, but have not yet received the report. I am inclined to the belief that the surrender
was made without a pretext for its necessity.
At 1 o clock on the 16th the enemy, some 500 strong, attacked a small garrison at Graysville,
but soon withdrew beyond the reach of musketry, and after tearing up some half a mile of track,
retired by way of Parker's Gap. The enemy had now left our line of communication to the front
and were moving toward Knoxville. They had not captured an engine or car. The entire damage
to the road cut the evening of the 14th was repaired on Thursday, the 8th [18th], and to this date
has hardly been interrupted for a moment. I am clearly of the opinion that Wheeler's command
was not less than 6,000 strong, moving in detachments of from 1,000 to 3,000 men within
supporting distance of each other. The force that attacked Dalton, I think numbered 3,000. On
the 17th a detachment, several hundred strong, was diverted from the line of march taken by the
enemy and menaced Cleveland, but did no damage other than destroy several hundred yards of
railroad track. I inclose the official report of Col. H. G. Gibson, commanding at that place, and
with him keenly regret the casualties in his command, inasmuch as I am informed that they were
wholly the result of the premature explosion of one of our own shell, but whether from
inexperience in handling or from defective construction of the shell I am unable to state. I think
Colonel Gibson has forgotten to mention this fact in his report. On the 22d, learning from scouts
that Wheeler was between the Hiwassee and Little Tennessee Rivers, and that those streams
were not fordable at that time, I determined to try and force him to an engagement or to flee to
the mountains toward North Carolina. I therefore ordered the Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry,
then at Dalton, together with a detachment of the Sixteenth Kentucky, then at Cleveland, to
patrol the Hiwassee as far up as the base of the mountain, and guard all practicable fords, at the
same time communicating a wish to General Ammen that he should guard the Little Tennessee
to the same purpose. The next day, August 23, I proceeded to Calhoun, Tenn., taking such troops
as I could spare from the garrison at Chattanooga and Cleveland, with a detachment of General
Smith's command, some 1,500 strong, giving me a total of at least 3,600 men. I moved in the
direction taken by Wheeler as far as Madisonville, when, learning that he had crossed the Little
Tennessee, and that his advance was beyond the Holston, I returned to Chattanooga, where I
arrived the evening of the 28th. The enemy had destroyed a large amount of railroad track
between Calhoun and Loudon; he had attacked and captured a portion of a gang of workmen
employed by the quartermaster's department in getting out logs for the Government near Sale
Creek, together with some 50 teams in use there, and had robbed the country generally; friends
and foes seemed to suffer alike, but not an engine or car had yet been destroyed. After my arrival
here, learning that Wheeler was moving toward Middle Tennessee, by way of Sparta and
Pikeville, on the 31st of August I sent the Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry, some 600 strong, to the
Sequatchie Valley, with instructions to pursue the enemy, and prevent small detachments from
being diverted from the main body for the purpose of destroying the railroad; at the same time, at
the request of General Rousseau for assistance, I sent four regiments, 300 strong each, to occupy
the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad from Bridgeport to Tullahoma. The regiment sent to
Cowan barely had time to unload from the cars before it was engaged with the advance of 500
rebel cavalry, who, finding a force at Cowan and the tunnel, moved north and destroyed some
railroad track near Decherd. On the 1st instant, having received reports that the enemy were
demonstrating upon our lines of communication with Nashville with some prospect of success, I
moved by rail to Murfreesborough, taking with me, including the four regiments placed on the
Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad the day previous by me, 3,500 men and one section of
artillery, making a total now from my command in the District of Tennessee nearly 4,200 strong.
Of my operations in that district I will forward a report as soon as one can be made.
I am deeply indebted to the officers of my command for their prompt and energetic discharge
of all duties required of them, and to the men for their readiness to respond to all orders and their
uncomplaining endurance of the most excessive fatigue.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Atlanta, Ga., September 13, 1864.
GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the cavalry
during the recent campaign from Chattanooga, resulting in the capture of Atlanta, Ga.:
After the battle of Chickamauga and pursuit of Wheeler and Roddey, in their attacks upon
our trains and lines of communication in the months of September and October, and the battle of
Mission Ridge, in November, 1863, the cavalry of the department, consisting of two divisions
and unassigned regiments of cavalry and mounted infantry, was very much scattered and reduced
in effective mounted force.
The First and Second Brigades of the First Division were actively engaged during the months
of December, 1863, January and February, 1864, in East Tennessee, men and horses exposed to
cold, with but little shelter and subsistence. The Third Brigade, First Division, occupied
Rossville, Ga., as an outpost. The Second Division occupied a line from Washington, on the
Tennessee River, to Mooresville, Ala.; also Calhoun, on East Tennessee railroad. The Fourth
U.S. Cavalry and Seventy-second Indiana Mounted Infantry detached to Mississippi, under the
command of Brig. Gen. W. S. Smith, U.S. Volunteers. Many of the regiments and detachments
of regiments, re-enlisted as veteran volunteers, went to their homes, which caused delay in
concentrating, mounting, arming and equipping them for the commencement of the recent
On the 1st of April the cavalry and mounted infantry of the department was reorganized,
consisting of four divisions, of three brigades each, and one battery to a division, the divisions
commanded, respectively, by Brig. Gen. E. M. McCook, Brig. Gen. K. Garrard, Brig. Gen. J.
Kilpatrick, and Brig. Gen. A. C. Gillem, with the Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Col. W. J.
Palmer, unassigned. This organization required regiments to be moved before others could be
withdrawn from stations occupied.
The First and Second Brigades, First Division, were concentrated at Cleveland, Tenn.; the
Third Brigade, but partially mounted, at Wauhatchie; the Second Division at Columbia, Tenn.;
the Third Division at Ringgold, Ga., and the Fourth Division, but partially mounted, occupied the
line of the railroads from Nashville, Tenn., to Decatur and Bridgeport, Ala.
The First Division marched from Cleveland, Tenn., for Dalton, Ga., covering the front and
left flank of the Fourth Corps, Army of the Cumberland, and afterward that of the Twenty-third
Corps, Army of the Ohio, near Varnell's Station, until relieved by Major-General Stoneman's
cavalry. On the 11th of May the division marched to Ray's Gap, west of Dalton, and on the
evacuation of that place marched with the Fourth Corps upon Resaca. The First and Third
Brigades. Second Division, marched from Columbia, Tenn., for La Fayette and Villanow, Ga.,
under orders from the major-general commanding the Military Division of the Mississippi, and
to the right and rear of the Army of the Tennessee. The general direction of its march, also the
details of the same, I am unable to give, not having the orders received by General Garrard. The
Second Brigade, Second Division, marched with Seventeenth Army Corps from Pulaski, Tenn.,
and Decatur, Ala., via Rome, Ga., joining the armies at Allatoona, Ga. The Third Division
marched from Ringgold, Ga., covering the front and right flank of the Twentieth Corps, Army of
the Cumberland, and afterward that of the Army of the Tennessee, on its march through Snake
Creek Gap upon Resaca, Ga., covering its right flank by detachments and pickets along the right
bank of the Oostenaula River, until the rebel army evacuated Dalton and concentrated at Resaca.
After the battle, which resulted in the retreat of the enemy from Resaca, the First Division
crossed the Oostenaula at Free Bridge, marched to Cassville, Ga., covering the front and left
flank of the Twentieth Corps. The Second Division crossed the Oostenaula at Lays Ferry, for
Rome, Ga., to strike the railroad between there and Kingston, Ga., marching on the right flank of
the Army of the Tennessee. The Third Division crossed the Oostenaula at Lay's Ferry, covering
the front of the Army of the Tennessee and keeping up communications with the Army of the
Cumberland on the left.
After the battle near Cassville, which resulted in the retreat of the enemy across the Etowah
River to Allatoona, Ga., the First and Third Divisions were concentrated on Two-Run Creek,
near Cassville, Ga., until the dispositions were made for pursuit.
The First Division crossed the Etowah at Island Ford, marched via Euharlee to Stilesborough
as the advance of the Army of the Cumberland, thence to Burnt Hickory and Burnt Church, on
the Marietta road, near its intersection with the Acworth and Dallas road, covering the left flank
of the Twenty-third Corps. The Second Division crossed the Etowah at Gillem's Bridge,
marching via Van Wert to Dallas, Ga., and covering the front and right flank of the Army of the
The Third Division, under the command of Col. W. W. Lowe, General Kilpatrick being
absent wounded, was left at Kingston to guard the line of the Etowah River, with orders to
obstruct all fords, hold Gillem's Bridge, but remove the planks from flooring to prevent its use by
the enemy, and destroy all other bridges which could possibly be used by them. The division was
subsequently assigned to stations as follows: Third Brigade at Calhoun, Ga., headquarters with
remainder of division at Cartersville, Ga., with orders to patrol the line of railroad and scout from
Cartersville to Spring Place, Ga.
The Second Division marched, via Burnt Hickory and near Stilesborough, on south side of
Etowah River, to Allatoona, and this movement of the cavalry, in conjunction with that of Major-
General Stoneman's cavalry of the Army of the Ohio, for Allatoona direct, contributed to cause
the retreat of the enemy from Dallas and New Hope Church to Kenesaw Mountain.
The First Division was posted on the right of the Twenty-third Corps, and near Lost
Mountain, which was the extreme right of the armies. The Second Division was posted on the
left of the Army of the Tennessee, the extreme left of the armies.
On the retreat of the enemy from Kenesaw to the Chattahoochee, the First Division marched
via Powder Springs to Rottenwood Creek, a tributary of the Chattahoochee, and on west side, to
co-operate, if necessary, with the Second Division, posted at Roswell, Ga.
On the retreat of the enemy to east side of the Chattahoochee and Peach Tree Creek, the First
Division was posted from Vining's Station to Turner's Ferry. The Second Division forced and
held the crossing of the Chattahoochee at Roswell, covering the front and left flank of the Army
of the Tennessee, breaking the Georgia railroad near Stone Mountain, and, on the 22d, making a
successful raid upon that railroad by destroying two bridges and five wagon-road bridges, the
track, a number of cars, a quantity of stores, capturing a number of horses and prisoners, and
returning with the loss of only 2 men; it also marched as a support to Major-General Stone-man,
commanding cavalry of the Army of the Ohio, on a raid on the Atlanta and Macon Railroad.
After waiting two days at Flat Rock, by the orders of General Stoneman, and in the absence of
further instructions, the Second Division returned to its camp, after engaging two divisions of the
enemy's cavalry.
After the battle of the 20th July, and the retreat of the enemy upon Atlanta, the First Division
crossed the Chattahoochee, and was posted on Proctor's Creek, covering by pickets the Mason
and Turner's Ferry road. The Second Division was posted on left and rear of Army of the
Tennessee, picketing the roads from Decatur to Roswell.
On the 27th July the effective force of the First Division, with the effective force of the Fifth
Iowa, Eighth Indiana, Second Kentucky Cavalry, of the Third Division, and Fourth Tennessee
Cavalry, of the Fourth Division, forming the greater part of the command which had recently
arrived from the raid on the West Point and Montgomery Railroad, under command of Major-
General Rousseau, made a raid on the Atlanta and West Point and Atlanta and Macon Railroads,
destroying large numbers of wagons, stores, and cars, with partial damage to the railroad track.
This force encountered a greatly superior force of the enemy, and, after severe fighting, returned,
with considerable loss of men, horses, and arms, and 2 pieces of artillery reported destroyed,
inflicting, however, considerable damage upon the enemy.
The First Division was ordered to occupy the station of the Third Division, and the latter,
under command of General Kilpatrick, ordered from the District of the Etowah to west side of
Chattahoochee, from Turner's Ferry to Sweet Water Creek, and afterward posted at Sandtown,
picketing to Camp Creek. A reconnaissance was made by the Third Division to Fairburn, on the
Atlanta and West Point Railroad, developing only a small force of the enemy's cavalry, not
disposed to offer much resistance. After destroying a portion of the track, some public buildings
and stores, the command returned to its camp with but little loss.
On the 18th of August the Third Division, with First and Second Brigades of Second
Division, commanded respectively, by Colonel Minty and Brigadier-General Long, with two
sections of the battery attached to the division, made an attack on the Atlanta and Macon
Railroad, marching from Sandtown, crossing Atlanta and West Point Railroad at or near
Fairburn, to the Macon road at Jonesborough and Lovejoy's Station. A detachment of the
command, under Lieutenant-Colonel Klein, struck the road at or near Bear Creek Station. The
enemy concentrated a superior force of cavalry, with infantry and artillery, which prevented the
deliberate destruction of the railroad. After severe fighting, in which there is reason to believe
the enemy suffered severely, the command returned to the army via McDonough, White House,
Latimar's, and Decatur, making a complete circuit of the rebel army. On 24th of August Third
Brigade, Second Division, destroyed portion of railroad between Decatur and Stone Mountain.
On the 25th day of August, in the movement of the armies upon the Atlanta and Macon Railroad
at Jonesborough, Ga., the Second Division covered the withdrawal of the Fourth Corps, and also
that of the Twentieth Corps, in the movement of the latter to the railroad bridge across the
Chattahoochee River, leaving one brigade to cover the front of the Twentieth Corps from Pace's
Ferry, on the Chattahoochee, to Sandtown. The other two brigades covered the rear and left flank
of the Twenty-third Corps, conforming to its movements. The Third Division, leaving its
dismounted men to hold the bridges over the Chattahoochee at Sandtown, and support the
Eighteenth Indiana Battery, of the First Division, but temporarily assigned to duty with the
command occupying Sandtown, covered the front and right flank of the Army of the Tennessee
to Fairburn and down Flint River to Glass' Bridge, on road to Lovejoy's Station.
The entire cavalry command, during the winter of 1863 and 1864, has performed service in a
country affording but a limited supply of forage, particularly long forage: for the want of this,
and on account of the lateness of the season for grazing, the animals suffered. During the time
the army depended for its supplies on its wagon transportation, the cavalry did not have
transportation sufficient to haul its forage, and had to depend on the country, affording at that
time corn of short growth and green wheat, the latter preventing starvation, but rather weakening
than strengthening the animals. In withdrawing the armies from Lovejoy's Station to Atlanta the
Second Division covered the rear and right flank of the Twenty-third Corps; the Third Division
the rear and left flank of the Army of the Tennessee. On account of their absence on duty, from
wounds, or as prisoners of war, for the details of the operations of the several regiments,
brigades, batteries, and divisions, as also of individual services, I refer to the reports of the
several commanders heretofore briefly stated, and others to be forwarded when received. The
Third Brigade, First Division, Col. L. D. Watkins, Sixth Kentucky Cavalry, but partially
mounted on horses from a convalescent camp established near Chattanooga, and occupying La
Fayette, Ga., was attacked by a largely superior force under the rebel General Gideon J. Pillow
and handsomely repulsed, with great loss to the rebels in killed, wounded, and prisoners. General
(then Colonel) Croxton's Fourth Kentucky Mounted Infantry's timely arrival contributed much to
the retreat of Pillow.
In closing this report, I can say with pride that the cavalry of the Army of the Cumberland
has performed its duty cheerfully, executing every order given by or through me, skirmishing
almost daily, and in many instances the skirmishes assuming the proportions of a sharp fight.
The services rendered by Col. O. H. La Grange, First Wisconsin Cavalry, commanding
Second Brigade; and Col. L. D. Watkins, Sixth Kentucky Cavalry, commanding Third Brigade,
First Division; Col. A. O. Miller, Seventy-second Indiana Mounted Infantry, commanding Third
Brigade, Second Division, entitle them to promotion by brevet or otherwise. Capt. J. B.
Mcintyre, commanding Fourth U.S. Cavalry, is worthy of promotion, and I recommend that he
be appointed a brigadier-general, being a cavalry officer of several years' service. My personal
staff, and that of the cavalry command, have promptly performed the various duties assigned
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Brig. Gen. and Chief of Cavalry, Dept. of the Cumberland.
Brig. Gen. W. D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant General, Dept. of the Cumberland.
In the Field, May 20, 1864--4.30 a.m.
GENERAL: I have the honor to report that yesterday I was ordered to march on Cassville. I
got within four miles of the place, skirmishing nearly all the way, driving them back. The
advance developed the fact that the enemy were in heavy force in front of Cassville. One
division of them (Stevenson's) advanced on me in line of battle. I was compelled to withdraw. In
the afternoon General Stoneman ordered me to advance with my division and attack. There was
nothing but infantry in my front. I drove them from two lines of rifle-pits. The Second Indiana in
a saber charge captured one entire company of Eighteenth Alabama. Part of the Eighth Iowa in a
charge also killed and captured a number of the enemy. My artillery knocked one of the enemy's
guns and one of their caissons all to pieces, which they left on the field. The prisoners inform me
that I was fighting Stevenson's division in the morning and Stewart's in the afternoon. All the
prisoners taken are infantry. We captured two of their ammunition wagons and a quantity of
flour, corn, and bacon. Both men and horses of my division need rest. They have been in the
saddle from eighteen to twenty hours each day since the 2d of this month.
Our loss in killed and wounded was 34 or 35.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Colonel, Commanding.
In the Field, May 28, 1864--8.45 a.m.
SIR: I have the honor to state, in reply to your request, that the following are the brigade and
regimental commanders to the brigades of my division now with me. I cannot furnish names of
regimental commanders without access to my books:
First Brigade, Col. J. B. Dorr, Eighth Iowa, commanding; Eighth Iowa, Lieutenant-Colonel
Barner; First Tennessee, Lieut. Col. James P. Brownlow; Second Michigan, Major Scranton.
Second Brigade, Lieut. Col. Horace P. Lamson, Fourth Indiana, commanding; Second
Indiana, Maj. David A. Briggs: Fourth Indiana, Maj. George H. Purdy; First Wisconsin, Capt.
Levi Howland.
About an hour and a half ago the enemy made an attack all along my line, the most stubborn
and persistent one I have seen them make during this campaign. They are all fighting,
dismounted, in the timber, and I can't tell whether they are infantry or cavalry. I judge them to be
dismounted cavalry, however, as there are two divisions in our front, and one brigade on our left
and rear at the creek, near the junction of the Acworth and Allatoona roads. Should a serious
attack be made with infantry, I regard my force as totally inadequate to hold a position of such
importance as I believe this to be. Stoneman, I think, is someplace on my right. My line is
formed on the Marietta road, facing due southeast. I shall hold this road as long as I can, and not
be controlled in my movements by the movements of our infantry. I believe the general
commanding does not appreciate the importance of it, with all their cavalry in our front. If this
road is left open, or they force a passage through my lines, as they are now attempting to do, they
will have uninterrupted access to all our trains, hospitals, and the rear of our whole infantry line.
When we get through with this skirmish I will send you the result. Colonel Brownlow sent word
to General King that they were pressing our line pretty hard. He replied that he could expect no
infantry re-enforcements in any emergency. I hope there may be no necessity for asking any.
Should there be, I will transmit my request through the proper channels, in order that, as at
Dandridge, I may receive them after the need has passed.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Colonel, Commanding.
Lieut. D. F. How,
Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., Cav. Command, Dept. Cumberland.
Near Chattahoochee River Railroad Bridge, August 7, 1864.
GENERAL: I received Special Field Orders, No. 42, Division of the Mississippi, July 25,
1864, the following extract from which was intended for my direction:
General McCook's and Colonel Harrison's cavalry will move rapidly on Fayetteville and the
railroad beyond, breaking it if possible. General McCook will command the joint cavalry
command, his own and Colonel Harrison's, but will use Colonel Harrison's fatigued command as
a reserve, and his own to reach the road and break it. The railroad, when reached, must be
substantially destroyed for a space of from two to five miles, telegraph wires pulled down as far
as possible and hid in water or destroyed. The cavalry will, unless otherwise ordered, move out
at daylight of Wednesday, the 27th instant, and aim to reach and break the railroad during the
day or night of the 28th, and having accomplished this work will return to their proper flanks of
the army.
I have the honor to report that I obeyed this order implicitly, and accomplished all that it
contemplated or directed. For full particulars of the details of the expedition I refer you to the
accompanying reports of brigade and regimental commanders. A brief summary of results is as
follows: Two and a half miles of the Atlanta and West Point Railroad and telegraph destroyed
near Palmetto; the same amount of Macon and Western Railroad and five miles of telegraph
destroyed at Lovejoy's Station; 1,160 wagons burned; 2,000 mules killed or disabled; 1,000 bales
cotton destroyed; 1,000 sacks of corn; 300 sacks of flour, and large quantities of bacon and
tobacco. I take these figures from reports of subordinate commanders and have every confidence
in their correctness. Of course I could not visit the whole ground personally. The number of
wagons destroyed is larger than I had supposed, the number of mules smaller.
No serious opposition was met until we commenced our return. Wherever an inferior force of
the enemy attempted to retard our advance, we charged through their line. No skirmishing was
permitted. After cutting the Macon railroad at Lovejoy's Station, I found that General Wheeler's
command was between me and the point(McDonough) where I had expected to communicate
with General Stoneman After consultation with my brigade commanders, I determined to return
to the Chattahoochee by way of Newnan. Two miles from the railroad, Jackson's division
attacked us and were repulsed. We then marched toward Newnan, on an obscure road, burning a
cavalry supply train we met. Near Newnan the railroad and telegraph were cut in three places. At
Brown's Mill, between there and the river, I was surrounded by an overwhelming force; Roddey,
Wheeler, and Jackson were all there with cavalry, and a large infantry force besides. I attacked at
once, hoping to break their line and reach the Franklin road and the river. In this attack the whole
right of their line was broken and demoralized. Ross' Texan brigade was destroyed, all his men
and horses captured or killed, and General Ross himself a prisoner; but fresh troops came to fill
their places, and after putting every soldier I had into the fight, even to my escort, I found I could
not hold the advantage gained, or get through their line in any ordinary manner. I then ordered
Colonel Croxton, commanding my First Brigade, and Lieutenant-Colonel Torrey, commanding
my Second Brigade, to cut their way through, strike some road leading south, and endeavor to
reach the Chattahoochee at the nearest point and cross. Both of these officers were lost in this
attempt. The reports of Majors Purdy and Root, who succeeded to their commands, will show
you how well their brigades accomplished my design. Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, Eighth Indiana,
with his own regiment, the Fifth Iowa, and part of the Second Indiana and Fourth Tennessee,
remained with me, cut a way through in, the midst of a most terrible fire, and crossed the river at
Philpot’s Ferry, below Franklin. Lieutenant Miller, commanding a section of the Eighteenth
Indiana Battery, by my orders destroyed his guns, caissons, and carriages, cut the Karness to
pieces, mounted the cannoneers on the artillery horses, and accompanied me. They all got
through safely. Colonel Brownlow, First Tennessee, and Major Star, Second Kentucky, also
brought detachments through.
My whole loss, killed, wounded, and missing, will not exceed 500. In a supplementary report
I will furnish the names.
Among the many other brave men who fell are Major Paine, First Wisconsin; Captain Hess,
Second Indiana; Lieutenants Loomis, Horton, and Cobb, Eighth Iowa, killed. Colonel Dorr,
Eighth Iowa; Lieutenant-Colonel Torrey, First Wisconsin, commanding Second Brigade; Major
Austin, Fourth Indiana; and Captain Kessler, Second Indiana, wounded; and Colonel Croxton,
Colonel Harrison, and Captain Sutherland, assistant adjutant-general, missing. Colonel Harrison,
Colonel Croxton, Colonel Dorr, Lieutenant-Colonel Torrey, and Major Paine are gone. The
country has lost in them their most faithful servants; and their men, the gallant leaders who so
often have led them to victory. Brave comrades, kind friends, and true soldiers as they were, their
vacant places in our ranks cannot be filled, and the whole command mourns their loss.
Some of the men of the Second and Eighth Indiana remained in stockades on the river bank
to cover our crossing, and fought until their last cartridge was exhausted. Not one of them
escaped. They cheerfully sacrificed themselves to insure the safety of their comrades. History
contains no nobler example of devotion, or names more worthy to be handed down to posterity
as heroes.
I would especially mention Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, Eighth Indiana; Major Baird, Fifth
Iowa; Major Presdee, Second Indiana; Major Root, Eighth Iowa; and Lieutenant Hill, of my
staff, for gallantry and efficiency. Colonel Brownlow and Major Purdy I have already spoken of.
Their services in the field were valuable. I would respectfully request that the services of
Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, Eighth Indiana, receive some recognition at the hands of the general
commanding, Captain Le Roy, assistant adjutant-general; Captain Mitchell, Captain Goulding,
and Lieutenant Cunningham, of my staff, Lieutenant Miller, of the battery, and Major Briggs,
commanding the noble Second Indiana, through all the sleepless nights, exhausting marches, and
hard fighting, were indefatigable, untiring, and brave.
After crossing the Chattahoochee, I marched to Wedowee, Ala., exchanging our worn-out
stock and remounting our dismounted men from the plantations along the road, and would have
marched to Talladega, destroyed the iron-works and returned by way of Rome, but for
information received in a dispatch, addressed to the rebel General Clanton, which was
intercepted by my scouts. I changed my course and returned through Buchanan, Draketown, &c.,
to Marietta, finding many Union citizens on the route.
I am satisfied that the injury inflicted on the rebels is much greater than any we suffered. We
lost no material captured. Our artillery was abandoned deliberately, after being totally destroyed,
and our ambulances were left because filled with wounded, and humanity required that they
should remain uninjured. Our whole loss, as I before stated, does not exceed 500 killed,
wounded, and missing. It is not improper here to refer to the fact that the rebel papers
acknowledged a loss of from 800 to 900, and severely censure their generals for not having, with
their vastly superior force, entirely destroyed my whole command.
Before going into action on the 30th of July, we had 72 commissioned officers and 350 other
prisoners, mostly belonging to the rebel quartermaster's and commissary's departments, taken in
and about Fayetteville, that we had marched with us from that place. During the engagement we
captured as many more and three stand of colors. It was with the most extreme reluctance and
regret that the force of circumstances or rather the force of the enemy, compelled me to abandon
the prisoners within nine miles of the river. One stand of the colors I brought off.
I regard the raid as a brilliant success, and had the forces of General Stoneman been able to
unite with mine near McDonough, as I understood was contemplated by the general commanding
the military division, I think we might have successfully carried our arms wherever desired, and
accomplished more magnificent results than any raid in the history of this war.
I conclude my report by expressing gratitude to the kind Providence which enabled me,
through the gallantry of my brave men and faithful officers, to extricate my command from the
perils which surrounded it, and to bring them back, not only in safety, but crowned with success.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant.
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.
Brig. Gen. W. L. ELLIOTT,
Chief of Cavalry.
In the Field, July 18, 1864.
The scouting party ordered to Turner's Ferry has just returned. I found a strong picket-line
on opposite side of the Chattahoochee, evidently cavalry, which seem to have recently taken
their present position. The earth-work about one mile and a half from Fort McCook is
constructed for six guns. No guns visible. No boat of any description found upon the river. No
party of the enemy has crossed the river except six or eight footmen belonging to Cheatham's
division, of whom 2 were captured by Major Carter, in command of dismounted cavalry, at
Turner's Ferry, and from which probably originated the report that the enemy had crossed
between the mouth of Peach Tree Creek and Turner's Ferry. Major Carter has 500 dismounted
cavalry at Turner's Ferry, and pickets the river from that point to the mouth of Nickajack.
I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,
Colonel, Commanding.
Captain LE ROY,
Assistant Adjutant-General, First Division.
Kingston, Ga., August 20, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the part taken by my command in the late raid as
On the morning of the 27th ultimo my brigade, consisting of the Eighth Iowa Cavalry,
Colonel Dorr; the First Tennessee, Colonel Brownlow; and the Fourth Kentucky Mounted
Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly, and reporting in the aggregate 940 officers and men, moved
in advance across the pontoon bridge at Turner's Ferry, and south toward Campbellton, reaching
that point at 3 p.m. A company sent in advance, under Captain Goulding, division provostmarshal,
found the enemy upon either bank of the river at Campbellton, and also at a ferry, three
miles above. We halted here to await the arrival of the pontoon train, which reached us at 3 a.m.
on the 28th. We moved at once to Smith's Ferry, six miles south of Campbellton, reaching it at
daylight, capturing a rebel scout on the western, and finding no force on the eastern, bank of the
river. By direction of the general commanding the division, I began crossing the brigade,
dismounted, in a single bateau, capable of transporting four men, and by 12 m., when the
pontoon train arrived, had crossed nearly the whole of my brigade. At 3 p.m. the bridge had been
thrown over, and the Second Brigade having crossed and moved in advance on the Palmetto
road, the horses of my command were brought over; the brigade mounted and followed the
Second about two miles, when we took a road to the right, the First Tennessee in advance,
pressing on rapidly, encountering only a small squad of the enemy, and reaching Palmetto at
sundown simultaneously with the Second Brigade. Here we were busily engaged for two hours
in destroying the railroad and telegraph line. We then moved, following the Second Brigade, on
the Fayetteville road, reaching that place at daylight on the 29th.
For five miles west of the town the road upon either side was lined with the enemy's trains,
which were taken possession of by details from the advance brigade. At sunrise we left
Fayetteville, my brigade in the advance, on the road to Lovejoy's Station. Colonel Brownlow, of
the First Tennessee, had the advance, supported by a battalion of the Eighth Iowa, under
command of Major Root, until we reached Flint River, four miles from Fayetteville. We
continued to find the rebel trains. The quartermasters in charge, with the teamsters and guards,
were captured by the advance, and the wagons left for the rear guard to burn. A few who escaped
from the train had hurried on and fired the bridge over Flint River, when Colonel Brownlow
came up and captured the party and saved the bridge. At 7 a.m. we struck the railroad half a mile
north of Lovejoy's Station, and immediately cut the telegraph line and began to destroy the track.
Here we remained until 2 p.m., when the command moved back on the road we came, my
brigade in the rear, the regiments marching left in front. About a mile from the railroad the
column in front had turned square to the left, taking a road that led in a southwestern direction
toward Newnan. Just as the advance of my brigade reached this road a brigade of rebels appeared
in front and began firing on us. I saw it was impossible to get away without fighting, and
accordingly ordered Colonel Dorr, of the Eighth Iowa, to charge down the road and drive them
back and hold them until I could get the other regiments in line. With the advance battalion of his
regiment Colonel Dorr dashed against the head of the enemy's column, drove it back with
confusion, and was only checked by the enemy's troops in rear, which were promptly deployed
on either side of the road. It gave me time, however, to get the remainder of the Eighth Iowa and
First Tennessee in position, and covering the road we were to hold, I intended the Fourth
Kentucky to pass on and take position farther on the road and to cover it while I withdrew the
other regiments.
The enemy, however, attacked us immediately with such force and vigor that I found it
necessary to put the Fourth Kentucky, except two companies, in on the right of the First
Tennessee, which I did, so as to strike the left of the enemy's line in flank. Just at this time an
orderly, sent to inform the general commanding the division, returned, stating that the enemy
were moving on our road between my brigade and the one in advance. I ordered two companies
of the Fourth Kentucky, under Captain Hudnall, to move up the road, communicate with the
column, and hold the road open. At the same time I ordered the whole line to move forward and
drive the enemy from our front and be ready to withdraw promptly. The line moved and the
enemy were driven back, though not without considerable loss to us in killed and wounded. The
whole of the brigade was rapidly withdrawn and proceeded on the road, except two companies of
the Fourth Kentucky, who were deployed to push the enemy and cover the movement. In the
mean time Captain Hudnall, assisted by the Second Brigade, had driven the enemy off the road,
which the Second Brigade covered until mine passed, except the two companies of the Fourth
Kentucky, who had been left in the rear, and by some unaccountable means they appear to have
taken the wrong road or been intercepted and failed to join the column. Two miles farther on we
crossed Flint River, when my brigade allowed the Second to pass it and again took the rear. It
was now dark, and immediately in my front moved the train of pack-mules, preceded by several
hundred prisoners and their guard. From that time until midnight we made but little progress, as
the road in front was continually blockaded by the column in my immediate front. I repeatedly
sent my staff officers, and went twice myself, ahead to see if I could hurry up those in front. The
road was a narrow, devious path, crossing innumerable ditches and bogs, and I was led to believe
that these obstacles were the cause of delay to the rear of the column. In one of these expeditions
I came upon Lieutenant Hill, of the division staff, who informed me that the head of the column
was eight or nine miles in advance, and that he had been left by the general to hurry me up. I
simply pointed to the train of pack-mules passing and waited the arrival of the advance of my
brigade, which was pressing on their rear. A few miles farther on we came to the bridge over
White Water, where I found Captain Le Roy, assistant adjutant-general, who stated he was
directed by the general commanding the division to call on me for a company to remain with him
until daylight and then to burn the bridge. Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly was directed to furnish the
company. About two miles farther on I found Captain Mitchell, acting inspector-general, who
had been left by the general to hurry me up. He rode with me a few hundred yards, when we
found the road completely blockaded. Captain Mitchell went ahead to discover and remedy, if
possible, the difficulty, and I have since learned from him that he found the pack-train in front so
sound asleep that nothing short of his saber could arouse them. After a long time, and wheel it
was nearly daylight, my front was cleared and the pack-train dashed off at a gallop. I followed at
the same gait and repeatedly sent my two staff officers and orderlies to the rear to impress upon
the regimental commanders the importance of keeping closed up, as I apprehended that the
enemy would strike us in flank by some of the many roads that tapped the one we traveled from
the north. We had galloped on for about seven miles when a messenger from Colonel Kelly
informed me that he had been attacked in rear. The next moment a number of men of the Fourth
Kentucky who had escaped, galloped up, reported the regiment completely surrounded, and the
enemy pursuing the rest of the brigade, and the report of their carbines in my immediate rear
confirmed the truth of this report. The First Tennessee was placed in position, covering the road
where it crossed a small stream, with directions to destroy the bridge and cover the rear from that
point to Newnan, about ten miles. The rear was covered without difficulty by that regiment,
assisted by detachments from the Eighth Iowa.
I promptly advised the general of the condition of affairs in the rear, to which he replied that
I must hold the enemy in check, as he was apprehending an attack in front. At Newnan Colonel
Harrison's brigade took the rear, and we followed the artillery in rear of the Second Brigade.
Several miles southwest of Newnan, the general commanding the division rode back to the head
of my brigade, advised me that the enemy were in front and on our right flank, and directed me
to put my command in position, covering a road leading to the right. The regiments were
wheeled right into line, the Eighth Iowa on the left, the First Tennessee on the right, and what of
the Fourth Kentucky was there in the center, The whole dismounted and moved forward 100
yards. Skirmishing began and continued some time in front of my right and of the brigade on the
right; the latter were ordered forward, the enemy soon driven off, and I was ordered to mount my
brigade and move on. The general commanding the division informed me that the rebels were on
the road in front and between us and the advanced brigade. He directed me to send a regiment
down the road to open communication. The Eighth Iowa, Major Root commanding, moved on
passing the pack train and prisoners, and charging in column of fours down the road, which led
through an almost impenetrable forest. The enemy had planted himself across this road and
determined to hold it. The Eighth Iowa dashed upon them and drove them out, captured a
number of prisoners and a large number of horses, and finally forced their way through. The
enemy, however, who were dismounted and hidden in the dense woods on either side of the road
closed upon the flanks of the charging column, severing and driving it either way.
The First Tennessee had been sent out to reconnoiter a right-hand road. The Fourth
Kentucky, many of whom had no ammunition, were thrown into the woods on the right of the
road, and General McCook, who was on the ground, ordered up a detachment of the Second
Indiana on the left. This checked the enemy, who, though repeatedly attempting it, never
emerged from the woods, but held tenaciously to his position there. Afterward the First
Tennessee came up, and was placed in position on the left and in rear of the line so as to cover
that flank. Shortly afterward a part of Colonel Harrison's brigade came up, relieved mine, and
tried to make its way through, but failed. In the mean time the enemy was appearing on all sides,
and, as far as I could tell, we were completely surrounded. After Colonel Harrison's brigade had
failed to open the road I proposed to the general commanding the division that I would take my
brigade, or what was left, and try and find my way out. He consented, and the regiments were
ordered to prepare for the movement. Colonel Dorr, who had been severely wounded the day
previous, left the ambulance and gathered up the remnant of his gallant regiment. I rode out with
Colonel Brownlow to a large open field through which I proposed to move and across which ran
an impassable ditch. After some time I found a bridge by which it could be crossed, and ordered
him to bring on his regiment, and sent an officer to bring on the remaining two. We had just
crossed the bridge when the enemy made a furious attack on our lines just where I had left
Colonel Dorr, with the Eighth Iowa Cavalry, and apprehending some difficulty in his getting out
in the confusion, I halted the First Tennessee on a high ridge in the open ground beyond the
ravine and formed it in line facing the enemy. In a short time the enemy were repulsed and the
firing ceased. I saw the Fourth Kentucky coming up, followed by what I supposed was the
Eighth Iowa, and immediately ordered Colonel Brownlow to move.
Passing through the woods, crossing the main road, either end of which was in possession of
the enemy, we came to a road leading toward the river. Here Colonel Brownlow was directed to
move on, while I halted with three orderlies to see that the Eighth Iowa followed. One of the
orderlies I sent back to inform General McCook that we were out and the road clear. While I was
waiting here, expecting the arrival of the Eighth Iowa, the rebels, who seemed to have discovered
our movement, appeared on the road in rear of the part of my command that had passed. I
determined to ride back, hurry up the Eighth Iowa, and, if possible, drive them off, but on
reaching the main road I had crossed found it occupied by the enemy. I determined then, if
possible, to join Brownlow, but after repeated attempts failed and found myself with my two
orderlies alone, our horses, which had not been unsaddled since leaving camp, exhausted, and the
enemy Occupying all the roads that led to the river. On the following night one of the orderlies
was killed by a rebel sentinel. With the other I succeeded, after a good (teal of delay and
annoyance, in reaching our lines at Sweet Water Town on the 12th instant. I am informed by
Captain Hudnall, Fourth Kentucky, who made his escape, that the bridge over White Water,
though torn up and fired, was not burned. The enemy dashed up, drove the company away,
extinguished the fire, repaired the bridge, and attacked the rear of the Fourth Kentucky at dawn.
They pressed them hard, and drew company after company into the fight, until finally the whole
regiment was dismounted and thrown across the road in favorable position, where they repulsed
the repeated assaults of the enemy, made with great spirit and in largely superior force. While
they engaged the whole line, the enemy sent a force around either flank, who came in between
the regiment and their horses, and they found themselves dismounted, surrounded, and their
ammunition exhausted. The men who were holding horses nearly all escaped and joined the
column, but of the rest only a few succeeded in making their way through the country. I regret
beyond expression the loss of so many of those who have been my comrades so long. Perhaps if
they had trusted more to their heels and less to their carbines the casualty list on our side and the
enemy's, too, would have been considerably abridged. The firing in rear was not heard by me or
any of the brigade, the sound being drowned in that made by our horses moving at the gallop.
When I did discover the state of affairs, the plain question was, not how to rescue the Fourth
Kentucky, but rather how to save the remainder of my brigade from a similar catastrophe and
protect the rear of the column.
I desire, before closing this report, to record my appreciation of the gallant conduct of
Colonel Dorr and Major Root, Eighth Iowa; Colonel Brownlow, First Tennessee; Lieutenant-
Colonel Kelly, Fourth Kentucky, and their subordinates. Whatever of disaster occurred was by
the inevitable fortune of war or chargeable to some other hand, and was not for any want of
fidelity or gallantry on the part of the officers or men under my command.
In reference to that everlasting train of pack-mules, on which, I confess a disposition to
charge a good deal, I think I ought to say that no pack animals started with my brigade, because I
understood distinctly from the general commanding the division that nobody was expected to go
except soldiers to fight and officers to command them. Some were along, however, belonging to
whom I know not, and they formed a nucleus around which gathered every man who could find a
mule to lead or ride, and who was impelled either by a desire to save his horse or shirk the
performance of his duty.
A list of casualties, I learn, has already been furnished, which, though not even
approximately correct, will serve for the present until more authentic and definite information
can be had concerning the fate of the missing. I regret to record the loss of Captain Sutherland,
assistant adjutant-general, who is still missing. In the brief intercourse of a fortnight he had won
my confidence and esteem by his intelligent and earnest performance of his duty.
I have the honor, captain, to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Col. Fourth Kentucky, Comdg. First Brig., First Div.
Captain Le ROY,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Cavalry Division.
Marietta, Ga, August 5, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of this brigade on
the late raid, commencing July 27, 1864, and ending August 3, 1864:
In obedience to orders, July 27, 1864, we left camp at Mason's Church, crossed the
Chattahoochee River at Turner's Ferry, and, in advance of the division, moved down the north
bank of the river to a point twelve miles below Campbellton; recrossed the Chattahoochee at 9
a.m. on the 28th with but little opposition, and moved to Palmetto, on the West Point railroad,
which we reached at sunset. Captured the mail, destroyed the telegraph wire, burned the depot,
containing several bales of cotton, a large quantity of salt and flour, and at 9 p.m. moved to
Fayetteville, which was reached at daylight on the 29th, where we destroyed the mail, 20 boxes
of tobacco, 3,000 sacks, and 4 barrels of whisky. At 5 a.m. we moved in the direction of
Lovejoy's Station, on the Macon and Atlanta Railroad. Between these points we captured over
500 wagons, which were left for the rear guard to destroy. On reaching the railroad Major Thornburgh,
First Tennessee Cavalry, and Major Root, Eighth Iowa Cavalry, were ordered to the
station to destroy the cars and other government property, consisting of $300,000 worth of cotton
and salt and $100,000 worth of tobacco, which they did most effectually, besides destroying the
track for more than one mile. Having completed our work we moved, in the rear of the division,
on the road leading to Moore's Bridge over the Chattahoochee, via Newnan, on the West Point
railroad. We had moved but one mile on this road when we were cut off from the division and
attacked on the right flank by Armstrong's rebel brigade, which, after fighting three hours, was
handsomely repulsed with a loss of two companies of the Fourth Kentucky Mounted Infantry.
Colonel Dorr, of the Eighth Iowa, wounded; Adjutant Horton, Lieutenant Loomis, Eighth Iowa,
and Lieutenant Roberts, First Tennessee Cavalry, killed.
On the 30th the Fourth Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly commanding, being the rear
guard, was attacked by Humes' division, and after repulsing five desperate charges of the enemy
were overpowered and the majority captured. After moving northwest and in the rear of the town
(Newnan) the command was surrounded by a large force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, which
we fought till 5 p.m., when Colonel Croxton,' commanding the brigade, received orders from
General McCook to cut his way out and move south in the direction of La Grange. Colonel
Croxton moved in the direction indicated, but soon became lost from his brigade, when I
assumed command and moved in the direction of the river, which was reached at Rotherwood at
1 a.m. on the 31st. I immediately commenced to cross the brigade, but having only two small
canoes the work was very slow, and I had crossed [but 250 of the command when I was attacked
from both sides, the enemy having crossed above me, and the remainder killed, wounded, and
captured. I believe more would have escaped if the brigade had moved in the direction suggested
by General McCook.
It is impossible at present to state the loss of the command, as stragglers are coming in daily,
and many now missing will come in before the end of the week.
I embrace this opportunity of tendering the thanks of the First Brigade to General McCook
for the brave and masterly manner in which he led us on this daring expedition, and did such
good service in behalf of the Division of the Mississippi.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Colonel, Commanding.
Assistant Adjutant-General.
In the Field, August 5, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor of reporting the part taken by the Eighth Iowa Cavalry in the late raid.
The command started from camp July 27, crossing the Chattahoochee River to the west side,
moving southwest below Campbellton, recrossing the river on the morning of the 28th, thence
moving eastwardly, striking the Atlanta and West Point Railroad at Palmetto. Here the regiment
received orders to move south along the railroad and destroy it, which was done effectually for
one mile and a half. Then the command moved east, striking the Atlanta and Macon Railroad at
Lovejoy's Station on the morning of the 29th. On the way the command captured and burned, as
near as I could judge, about 200 wagons, a train of 60, loaded with officers' baggage. The mules
belonging to the train were sabered, as it was impossible to bring them along, also a large
number of prisoners, mostly officers, were taken and turned over to the provost-guard. At
Lovejoy's Station a detachment of the Eighth Iowa burned part of a train loaded with government
stores, consisting of tobacco, lard, and arms. The tobacco was estimated by the citizens to be
worth $120,000. The depot, water-tank, and road was destroyed for two miles by my command.
Receiving orders at 10 o'clock to move, the command started on the return; when a short distance
from the railroad the column was attacked by Ross' Texan brigade, and the First Brigade cut off;
Colonel Croxton ordered the Eighth Iowa to charge through and open communication. The
regiment charged with revolvers, and a desperate hand-to-hand fight ensued. Twice the regiment
charged and was repulsed. Here Colonel Dorr was wounded, and Lieutenant Horton, acting
adjutant, killed; also a number of non-commissioned officers and privates wounded and
captured. At this time General McCook came up with the Second Brigade, who charged and
drove the enemy, when the command joined him and proceeded on toward the river at a rapid
rate, marching all night.
At daylight, the morning of the 30th, the rebels attacked the Fourth Kentucky, which was
acting as rear guard, and captured two companies. The command moved on; succeeded in
reaching Newnan, where we found a large cavalry force in our front and flanks; also two
brigades of infantry, numbering 2,500 men, so reported by prisoners taken by my command.
Here the command was ordered to strip for fight. The Eighth Iowa, was ordered out as
skirmishers, and, if possible, to find the enemy's lines. Pushing forward, I found the enemy had
nearly encircled us, their lines running around in a horseshoe shape, and the only place left open
was to the south. At this time the fighting had become general all along the lines, the enemy
charging and was repulsed several times to my knowledge. At this time I received orders to
mount my command and charge down a road leading to the river. Advancing cautiously until in
sight of the enemy the charge was sounded. The command found themselves confronted with
Ross' Texan brigade; charging through their lines, driving them back, clear through and past
where their horses were held, capturing at least 500 horses of the brigade. Here a part of the
Eighth Iowa charging on a squad of officers who were fighting desperately, capturing and killing
all who were in the road, and they, being examined, proved to be General Ross and another,
Lieutenant Williams; I sent them forward to General McCook, but learned that they never
reached him, as they must have been recaptured at the time the Eighth Iowa was engaged. The
fighting all along the line was terrific. As my orders were from the general-commanding to cut
my way through and clear the road, my command lost largely in killed and wounded, as I found
myself surrounded several times and cut through at least three times, holding the road for at least
one hour; but the number of the enemy being at least five to one, I was compelled to fall back
and try to get out the best I could. The enemy's dead and wounded lay in heaps all along the
road, and could not have been less than 100. In this charge I lost Lieutenant Loomis and
Lieutenant Cobb and 10 privates killed. In trying to return to the command I found myself cut off
by the enemy's infantry. I then moved in another direction, meeting the enemy in force on all
sides. I ordered the officers left to cut their way through to the command. Myself with two
officers and ten privates attempted to get out the best we could, which we accomplished, meeting
the command under General McCook cutting its way out. Proceeding to the river, and crossing
on the morning of the 31st, we then marched the 1st and 2d a and arriving the 3d at Marietta.
It is out of my power at present to give the casualties of the regiment, but will furnish it as
soon as possible. I would beg leave to call to the notice of the general commanding Captain
Dance and Lieutenant Morrow for their daring and bravery whilst under fire and in the masterly
manner of handling their commands, but it is useless to distinguish, for all did nobly. The
enlisted men fought like tigers.
Respectfully submitted,
Major, Commanding Eighth Iowa Cavalry.
Brig. Gen. E. M. McCook,
Commanding First Division, Dept. of the Cumberland.
Chattahoochee Bridge, Ga., August 9, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to make the following report to the general commanding the division of
the part taken by the Fourth Kentucky Veteran Volunteer Mounted Infantry in the recent raid
upon the enemy's communications in the rear of Atlanta. Of course it would be impossible for
me to give anything like a detailed account, as I was entirely unadvised as to the character of the
orders received from time to time by Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly, commanding the regiment;
therefore, I can report but little outside of what transpired under my personal observation.
The operations until we reached the Macon railroad are of but minor importance so far as this
regiment is concerned, as we were most of the time in rear of some other command. When the
command started on the return, the Fourth Kentucky was left as rear guard. For some reason
unknown to me, the regiment was not closed up immediately upon the column. When we had
advanced, I suppose, half a mile from the railroad, the enemy attacked the Eighth Iowa, in our
immediate front. We were marching left in front. Immediately filed to the right and formed on
left into line facing the enemy, who were in strong force in woods and on an eminence. Each
company dismounted and went into action as soon as they could form their line. This order I
received from Lieut. Col. Robert M. Kelly personally. The whole regiment (except Companies I
and K, who were on picket) now became engaged with the enemy, charged, and drove them from
their position, across some fields, to woods beyond. In this position the firing was very heavy for
two hours. The regiment had advanced during the time too far to the enemy's left. He advanced
his right, and cut us off entirely from the rest of the command. At this moment Companies I and
K arrived upon the field, and by a gallant charge upon the enemy's right again opened
communication with the rest of the command. By order now of Lieut. Col. R. M. Kelly the right
companies fell back, mounted, passed round the enemy's right, and joined the command, except
Companies D and H, commanded, respectively, by Lieut. Charles T. Swoope and Captain
Merrill, who unfortunately fell into the enemy's hands. Lieutenant Swoope must have
misunderstood the order to fall back; I do not think it ever reached Captain Merrill, as I am
informed he refused to retire until positive orders should come for him to withdraw. Besides the
prisoners, we lost in the action 4 killed and 12 wounded. Lieut. C. V. Ray, Company H, is
supposed to have been killed. The enemy's loss was equal to or more than our own, as they were
seen carrying away several, besides 3 or 4 that were either killed or wounded, trying to rescue
one that was wounded in our immediate front. The regiment now followed the column, acting as
rear guard. This was on Friday, July 29; the command marched during the whole night
At 1.30 a.m. on the morning of July 30, Company C, under my immediate command, was
ordered to remain at and destroy the bridge over what I learned was White River. The column
had not passed more than thirty minutes when the advance of the enemy appeared at the bridge.
A few shots were passed, when the enemy retired for a few moments, during which time the
bridge was torn up and set on fire. The enemy appeared again soon in strong force, and after a
spirited contest for the possession of the bridge, we were forced to withdraw. Some three miles, I
suppose, from there, we joined the regiment under Lieut. Col. R. M. Kelly. I learned from him
that he had orders from Col. John T. Croxton, commanding First Brigade, to remain and hold
that position until daylight. I informed him there was a strong force following us, and to be
prepared. He had strong barricades constructed across the road, and Companies A and I, under
command, respectively, of Captains Jacobs and W. B. Riggs, all under command of Capt. James
I. Hudnall, were dismounted to hold them. About 3 a.m. the enemy attacked us in strong force,
and made several charges to take the barricade, but were each time successfully repulsed. The
other companies of the regiment were immediately mounted and deployed on each side of the
road near the barricade. Finding they could not drive those that held the barricade, they
attempted to flank us on our right. After repeated unsuccessful attempts to turn our right, they
massed upon our left.. The firing now was very severe. They made two distinct efforts to drive in
our left; finding themselves again unable to succeed, they deployed still farther to their right,
passed entirely round our left, and formed their line parallel with the road. Capt. W. B. Riggs,
who had command of Companies C and I, on the right, at this moment ordered those companies
to the left under the command, respectively, of myself and Lieut. James McDermott. It was now
evident from the swift and rapid movements and formations of the enemy that we were fighting a
very superior force. Their right now charged and took the road some 200 yards in rear of the
advance position we held upon the road, cutting off nearly the whole regiment. We had been
fighting now nearly two hours and our ammunition was nearly exhausted, as we had expended
half we had in the fight the previous evening. Each man had started on the raid with 100 rounds,
and when we had fought until it was all expended, all further defense was impossible. But there
was no cowardly nor organized surrender; each man fought until he was entirely overpowered by
the enemy. Exclusive of those taken prisoners, I have no way to ascertain our loss either killed or
wounded. That of the enemy must have been pretty heavy, as they established a hospital on the
ground, and were there all day on the 30th and till nearly daylight of the 31st burying the dead
and attending to the wounded, as I am informed by some of our men who lay hid upon the field
until the following morning and then made their escape. Those that remained of the regiment
followed on and joined the command near Newnan Station. In the fight near this place on the
p.m. of the 31st, Capt. James H. West, who now had the command of the remainder of the
regiment by direct orders from Col. John T. Croxton, commanding brigade, took all the men of
the regiment who had any ammunition left, and made one charge and expended the last round
remaining from the fight in the morning.
I do not think it would be out of place here to speak of the utter worthlessness of the Ballard
rifle, used by six companies of our regiment. A great many became entirely useless during the
action; some bursted from firing; others became useless by the springs, which threw out the old
cartridge, getting out of fix.
Capt. James H. West started from the battle-field, with the remainder of the regiment, with
Colonel Brownlow. He fell into the hands of the enemy at the river, with nearly all of the men
that were with him.
1 left the battle-field with about 30 men and 2 officers--Lieutenants McDermott, Company I,
and Hoch, Company G--with the general commanding the division, and arrived at Marietta on
the 3d instant, being absent eight days, having started on the morning of the 27th ultimo. Of the
24 officers who went out with us, 17 are missing.
The loss among the enlisted men has been reported to the provost-marshal.
The officers did all they could for the safety of the command.
I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
First Lieutenant Company C, Commanding Regiment.
Captain LE ROY,
Assistant Adjutant-General, First Division.
Camp Crooks, Ga., September 13, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command
during the recent campaign, commencing with the advance across Taylor's Ridge and battle of
Resaca, and ending with the defeat of the rebel army and fall of Atlanta:
The command left its encampment at Ringgold. Ga., at 3 a.m., May 7, 1864, crossed Taylor's
Ridge, through Nickajack Trace, forced back the rebel cavalry, covering and masking the
movements of the Twentieth Corps, Major-General Hooker commanding, of the Army of the
Cumberland, and encamped near Trickum Post-Office May 7, 1864. May 8, 1864, moved to
Villanow, and opened communication with the Army of the Tennessee, Major-General
McPherson commanding. Received orders and reported, with my command, to Major-General
McPherson, on south side of Stony Face Ridge, at the entrance of Snake Creek Gap. Made
reconnaissances, and scouted the country during the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th of May; led the
advance of the Army of the Tennessee in the attack on Resaca, drove the enemy's cavalry and
infantry skirmish line back behind his works, masking the movements of our infantry until the
force of the enemy was too great to contend with longer, when I was relieved by the infantry,
and the command took post, on the evening of May 13, on the right of our army, then in line of
battle before Resaca.
I have every reason to believe that the operations of the division from May 7 up to this date
gave general satisfaction, and in the spirited engagement with the enemy's cavalry and infantry
before Resaca, May 13, not only individual officers but the entire division won the respect of the
grand army of invasion. I reluctantly, on the evening of the 13th, resigned the command of the
division, and proceeded to my home in the East to recover from wounds received during the day.
The command devolved on Colonel Murray, and afterward on Colonel Lowe, whose reports will
fully set forth the operations of the command during my absence. I returned July 23, and
resumed command of my division with my headquarters at Cartersville, with orders to protect
and guard the railroad from the Etowah to Tunnel Hill. I found the command greatly improved,
and learned that it had been doing good service.
I left Cartersville August 3, 1864, and encamped near Sandtown, on the Chattahoochee. On
the 15th crossed the Chattahoochee, took up position on the south side, fortified, and remained in
camp until 5 p.m. 15th, when, with Colonel Garrard's brigade, I crossed Camp Creek, tore up
portions of the railroad below Sideling, and destroyed the depot at Fairburn containing
government stores. On my return scouted the country between Fairburn and the enemy's position
at Sandtown. I left my camp at Sandtown on the evening of the 18th instant with the Third
Cavalry Division, and two brigades of the Second and two batteries of artillery, numbering 4,500
men, to attack and destroy the enemy's communications. Pickets from the Sixth Texas were met
and driven across Camp Creek, and the regiment routed from its camp a mile beyond at 10
o'clock in the evening, and at 12.30 a.m. General Ross' brigade, 1,100 strong, was driven from
my front in direction of East Point, and held from the road by the Second Brigade, Third
Division (Lieutenant-Colonel Jones), while the entire command passed. The West Point railroad
was reached, and a portion of the track destroyed at daylight. Here General Ross attacked my
rear. He was repulsed, and I moved on the Fayetteville road, where I again found him in my
front. He slowly retired in the direction of Jonesborough, and crossed Flint River at 2 p.m.,
destroying the bridge. Under cover of my artillery Colonels Minty and Long, commanding
detachments from their brigades, crossed the river and drove the enemy from his rifle-pits. The
bridge was repaired, and the entire command crossed and occupied Jonesborough at 5 p.m.,
driving the enemy's cavalry in confusion from the town. I now learned that the telegraph and
railroad had been destroyed at Bear Creek Station at 11 a.m. by a portion of my command, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Klein, and that General Armstrong had passed through Jonesborough in that
direction at 1 p.m. For six hours my entire command was engaged destroying the road. At 11
o'clock in the evening Colonel Murray's division was attacked one mile below the town and
driven back. I now suspended operations upon the road and attacked the enemy and drove him
one mile and a half. Fearing an attack from the direction of Atlanta, I moved before daylight, in
direction of Covington, five miles, and halted and allowed the enemy to come up; left one
brigade to engage his attention, and moved rapidly in direction of McDonough, six miles, thence
across the country to the Fayetteville road, and reached the railroad one mile above Lovejoy's
Station at 11 a.m. on the 20th instant. On attempting to move on the station I encountered a
brigade of infantry--was repulsed; I and my command only saved by the prompt and daring
[bravery] of Colonels Minty and Long, and Captain Estes, my assistant adjutant-general.
The enemy were finally checked and driven back with heavy loss. We captured 1 battle-flag.
At this moment a staff officer from Colonel Murray informed me that a large force of cavalry,
with artillery, had attacked his rear. In twenty minutes I found that I was completely enveloped
by cavalry and infantry, with artillery. I decided at once to ride over the enemy's cavalry and
retire on the McDonough road. A large number of my people were dismounted, fighting on foot,
and it took some time to mount them and form my command for the charge. During the delay the
enemy constructed long lines of barricades on every side. Those in front of his cavalry were very
formidable. Pioneers were sent in advance of the charging columns to remove obstructions.
Colonel Minty, with his command in three columns, charged, broke, and rode over the enemy's
left. Colonel Murray, with his regiments, broke his center, and in a moment General Jackson's
division, 4,000 strong, was running in great confusion. It was the most perfect rout any cavalry
has sustained during the war. We captured 4 guns (3 were destroyed and 1 brought off); 3 battleflags
were taken; his ambulances, wagons, and ordnance train captured, and destroyed as far as
possible; many prisoners were taken, and his killed and wounded is known to be large. My
command was quickly reformed, thrown into position, fought successfully the enemy's infantry
for one hour and forty minutes, and only retired when it was found that we had left only
sufficient ammunition to make sure our retreat. We swam Cotton Indian Creek and crossed
South River on the morning of the 21st, and reached our lines near Decatur, by way of Lithonia,
without molestation, at 2 p.m. August 22. We effectively destroyed four miles of the Macon
road, from Jonesborough to Bear Creek Station, a distance of ten miles. One train of cars was
fully, and a second partially, destroyed. We brought into camp 1 gun, 3 battle-flags, and a large
number of fresh horses and mules and about 50 prisoners. My entire loss in killed, wounded, and
missing will not exceed 300 men. Two hundred of this number were killed and wounded. Only
the dangerously wounded were left with the enemy.
While it is most difficult to single out instances of gallantry, I cannot close this report
without mentioning to the favorable consideration of the major-general commanding, the
following named officers whose gallant conduct attracted my attention on so many occasions:
Colonel Minty, commanding two brigades from the Second Cavalry Division, for his untiring
energy throughout the march, and the consummate skill displayed at the moment when we were
repulsed at Lovejoy's Station, and the subsequent gallant ride of his command over the enemy's
barricades, deserves immediate promotion. Colonel Long was equally distinguished, and well
deserves the promotion he has received. He was twice wounded, and yet remained on the field.
Captain Estes, my assistant adjutant-general, and my two aides, Lieutenants Wilson and
Northrop, deserve every consideration for the great service rendered me throughout the
expedition. Colonel Murray, commanding division, and the brigades of Colonels Jones and King
were greatly distinguished at the charge of Love-joy's Station Officers were never more gallant,
and skillful; men were never more brave. They well deserve a success so great.
August 25, I moved with my command to Stevens' Cross-Roads, one mile and a half beyond
Union Church; went into camp, covering the entire country in the front and the right flank of the
Army of the Tennessee, which had made its first day's march with the grand army in its
movement upon the enemy's communications. At 6 a.m., August 26, the command moved in
advance of, and upon the right flank of, the Army of the Tennessee, masking its movements,
drove the enemy's cavalry, under Brigadier-General Ross, to and beyond the railroad, and went
into camp, August 27, on the right of the army and near Fairburn. In the movement upon the
Macon railroad at Jonesborough my command had the advance, and, with the assistance of two
regiments of infantry, the Second and Seventh Iowa Regiments, Majors [Hamill and Mahon]
commanding, steadily forced the enemy back to within three miles of Renfroe Place, the cavalry
moving on the right flank up to this point. Here the Ninety-second Illinois Mounted Infantry,
under the direction of Captain Estes, my assistant adjutant-general, pushed in ahead of the
infantry, rushed the enemy back to and across Flint River, saved the bridge, crossed and took
possession of the rifle-pits beyond, a brigade of infantry having been thrown across, and pushed
up the hill in direction of the station to the left of Jonesborough. I rapidly crossed three regiments
of cavalry, moved in, and drove the enemy from the high hills on the right, while Captain Estes,
with the Ninety-second Illinois, made a daring but unsuccessful attempt to reach the railroad.
This attack, made as night was closing in, and although with considerable loss, yet resulted most
favorably to the success of the operations during the night and the following morning. The
brigade of infantry having been pushed in well toward the station far on the left of Jonesborough,
this determined attack of cavalry, dismounted, a mile to the right, with considerable skirmishing
between, forced the enemy to believe that a heavy force of infantry had crossed, and there waited
instead of making an attack, which might have proved disastrous. My cavalry was relieved by
infantry during the night, recrossed Flint River the following morning, and moved to Anthony's
Bridge, one mile and half below. The bridge having been burned, was quickly rebuilt, and a
portion of the command passed over and was pushed well in upon the enemy's flank and rear in
the direction of the railroad. During the day a daring and successful attempt was made by
Captain Qualman (Third Indiana Cavalry), with a portion of the Third Indiana Cavalry, to reach
the railroad and telegraph. A section of the road was torn up and one mile of telegraph wire was
brought away, with the loss of 1 man killed. At 3.30 p.m. of the same day (August 31) the enemy
made a determined attack upon the infantry on my left. It seemed to be the intention of the
enemy to break or turn our right flank. At first he entirely ignored my command. This I
determined he should not do. Five regiments of cavalry, dismounted, were in position behind
barricades directly in the flanks of the charging column. My artillery was in a most favorable
position. I directed the artillery to commence firing on the advancing column of the enemy, and
the cavalry upon the opposite side of the river to meet and attack him. This attack was
determined and gallantly made. The enemy was forced to turn and meet it. He moved down in
heavy columns, twice charged and was twice repulsed, but finally forced my people to retire
from their rail barricades and across the river. A portion of the enemy succeeded in crossing,
were met by the Ninety-second Illinois Mounted Infantry dismounted, and repulsed. We held the
bridge until relieved by the infantry under General Blair in the afternoon of the following day,
when we moved to Glass' Bridge below Lovejoy's Station, repaired the bridge, which had been
burned by the enemy, crossed, and maintained our position upon the opposite side for two days,
constantly annoying the enemy's flank and rear, repulsing with loss every attack he made, and
formed a junction with the right of the infantry of the Army of the Tennessee near Lovejoy’s
Station, September 3; we remained in this position until 11 o'clock September 5, and then moved
back, first to Anthony's Bridge, then to Red Oak, and finally to Sandtown, having covered the
rear and flank of the Army of the Tennessee in its retrogade movement from Lovejoy's Station to
its present position.
Accompanying this report will be found a tabulated list of the casualties of this command
during the campaign, as well as of prisoners and property captured.
Before closing my report, I desire to assure the chief of cavalry that the officers and men of
my command have endeavored to zealously and faithfully discharge every duty assigned them,
and I only hope that he and those my seniors in rank are as well satisfied with my conduct and
operations as I am with the efforts of my command.
Respectfully submitted.
Brigadier-General, U.S. Vols., Commanding.
Capt. J. E. JACOBS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
ADAIRSVILLE, June 4, 1864.
One of my scouting parties came in last night with 11 prisoners, quite a number of horses and
mules and arms, and 3 rebel wagons. No disturbance along the railroad. The part of Wheeler's
force that started up went back immediately after crossing the river.
Colonel, Commanding.
Brigadier-General ELLIOTT,
Chief of Cavalry, Department of the Cumberland.
Camp Crooks, near East Point, Ga., September 8, 1864.
I have the honor to make the following report of the First Brigade, Third Cavalry Division,
during the time it was under my command, for the campaign ending September 8, 1864:
By order from your headquarters at Sandtown August 26, 1864, I was placed in command of
the First Brigade, Third Cavalry Division. At 11.45 p.m. the command was reported ready to
move, and received orders accordingly. At the head of the column, as it moved out, was
Lieutenant-Colonel Klein, Third Indiana Cavalry, who, by virtue of rank, assumed command of
the First Brigade. At New Hope Church, August 29, 10 a.m., Lieutenant-Colonel Klein reported
himself sick, and the command of the First Brigade devolved on me. At 12 m. the brigade moved
down the Fayetteville road one mile to the support of the Second Brigade and into position on
the left, erecting barricades fronting the Jonesborough road. Reconnaissances and patrols
discovered the enemy's cavalry in our immediate front in small force of observation only. At 5
p.m. the First Brigade returned to New Hope Church and occupied our former barricades erected
on the 28th. No casualties. August 30, 6 a.m., moved out, First Brigade in advance. Passing
through our barricades of yesterday afternoon on the Jonesborough road, and two miles beyond,
encountered the enemy in some force behind barricades, from which they were soon driven. In
the mean time our infantry had come up, on the right of which the First Brigade was formed in
line. Moving forward in extension of the line and front of the infantry, and seeking an occasion
(without success, owing to the nature of the ground) to turn the enemy's left and charge them, we
continued skirmishing until the junction with the main Jonesborough road was reached, where
the brigade formed in column again and moved forward in rear of the division. At Camp Creek
the brigade moved forward under a concentrated nervous flank artillery fire, highly creditable to
its discipline and firmness. One man from the Third Indiana Cavalry was slightly wounded in the
leg. Bivouacked at Flint River. August 31, 3 a.m., moved one mile to the rear; 6 a.m., sent an
officer and twenty men to open communication with the Army of the Cumberland, heard north of
us; 11 a.m., moved down to the crossing at Flint River due west of Jonesborough. At 1 p.m.
Captains Qualman, Company K, and Young, Company H, Third Indiana, with 100 picked men,
were sent to cut the railroad a few miles below here. The balance of the First, with the Second
Brigade, commenced barricading, and prepared to hold the opposite side of Flint River. At 2.30
p.m. a demonstration was ordered by Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, Eighth Indiana Cavalry,
commanding Second Brigade, in favor of Captains Qualman and Young. Fifty-seven men, the
remaining mounted effective force of the Fifth Regiment Iowa Cavalry from the Rousseau and
McCook raids, rode gallantly out, led by Captain Choumee, Company F, Lieutenant Wing,
Company B, and Lieutenant McGuire, to receive the enemy's fire and attract his attention by a
feint charge, moving on under fire from the enemy's skirmishers until they received a volley
from the rebels in line behind a close fence on their right flank. They returned with a loss of
Lieutenant Maguire killed instantly and 2 men wounded. A few moments past 3 p.m. our
barricades were not as yet completed, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, with the Third and Eighth
Indiana in the advance barricade, and myself with the Fifth Iowa and Tenth Ohio in the rear one,
when the rebels attacked and soon developed a force that was speedily enveloping the command.
The rear barricade was held till all were in from the front, when the ammunition was out and our
whole force retired across the river, remounted and formed. In this last engagement the brigade
lost 1 killed, 6 wounded, and 7 missing. At 6 p.m. Captains Qualman and Young returned with
their command, having fully accomplished their object, and although constantly skirmishing with
the enemy, without casualty. Barricaded and bivouacked for the night near former camp.
September 1, returned to the same crossing of Flint River and barricaded effectively on this
side. At 11 a.m. First Brigade moved one mile to the rear, joining the Second on the Fayetteville
road. Barricaded and bivouacked for the night. No casualties. September 2, 6 a.m., moved south
toward Lovejoy's; First Brigade in the rear; 12 m., halted near Glass' Bridge, over Flint River.
Withdrew the brigade behind a small hill to avoid the enemy's shell, which were falling in the
command. At 7 p.m. barricaded to the rear and bivouacked for the night. No casualties.
September 3, at 3 p.m. the brigade moved across Glass' Bridge and barricaded, resting on the
right of the Army of the Tennessee. Bivouacked for the night. No casualties. September 4, lay
quiet in our barricades; slight skirmishing on the picket-lines. At 4 p.m. was appointed division
officer of the day. Perfected and strengthened the picket-lines. No casualties. September 5, at 10
a.m. drove in the rebel pickets. The brigade is detailed to cover the rear of the Army of the
Tennessee as it retires. At 7 p.m. the forces were all properly disposed, and remained in position
until after midnight. No casualties. September 6, the column of the First Brigade, under my
immediate supervision, reached Jonesborough in rear of the Fifteenth Corps and Fourth Corps,
Department of the Cumberland, about 4 a.m. That column of the brigade under Major Gaddis,
Third Indiana Cavalry, reached Jonesborough in rear of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps
about 6 a.m. Crossed Flint River due west of Jonesborough, and went into camp one mile farther
west; barricaded and bivouacked for the night. At 11 p.m. sent one company to reconnoiter
Renfroe Place and remain there. No casualties. September 7, at 5 a.m. brigade moved to Renfroe
Place, covering the flank of the Army of the Tennessee until it passed by. Was relieved by Third
Brigade at 10 a.m., and moved on to Shoal Creek Church. At 3 p.m. moved to the railroad, one
mile from Red Oak. Bivouacked for the night. No casualties. September 8, moved to the vicinity
of Mount Gilead Church.
Total loss in the brigade: 1 second lieutenant killed, 1 enlisted man killed, 11 wounded, and 6
missing; total loss, 19.
To the officers and men of the First Brigade I express with sincere pleasure my hearty
appreciation of the courage and intelligence with which all movements and duties required were
performed, and take this opportunity of returning my thanks for the assistance rendered me by
the ready execution of all orders.
To Lieutenant Watson, acting assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Ritchie, acting aidede-
camp, both of the Fifth Iowa, I am under obligations for their untiring energy and exertions.
The gallant and successful undertaking of Captains Qualman and Young, Third Indiana Cavalry,
is worthy of more than a passing notice, and the unfaltering manner in which the officers and
men of the Fifth Iowa Cavalry marched out, knowingly, to face the unequal chance for life or
death, that they might insure the safety of their comrades, demands my special mention.
Respectfully, your most obedient,
Major, Comdg. First Brigade, Third Cavalry Division.
Captain ESTES,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Third Cavalry Division.
Report of casualties in First Brigade, Third Cavalry Division, from August 26, 1864, to
September 8, 1864: Commissioned officers--killed, 1. Enlisted men--wounded, 8; missing, 9.
Rebels--killed, 41; wounded, 140; missing, 4. Captured horses, 1; mules, 5; wagons, 1; destroyed
Major Fifth Iowa Cavalry, Commanding.
CAMP CROOKS, GA., September 8, 1864.
September 9, 1864.
SIR: In accordance with your order of September 5, I very respectfully transmit the following
campaign report of Fifth Iowa Cavalry: On the 26th of August p.m. we started from Sandtown
with an effective force of three commissioned officers and eighty-two enlisted men, and on the
27th of August our regiment was on picket duty eight miles south of Sandtown. Charles Parker,
Company L, left the command without permission and went back to Sandtown. On the 28th we
marched forward to the West Point and Montgomery Railroad, found the rebels there, and the
regiment was ordered in line of battle on the south side of said railroad; then went back in
bivouac one mile north of said railroad. On 29th sent back to Sandtown our broken down horses
and the following-named men: J. W. Patterson, Company A: Private James O. Gorman,
Company C; Privates John M. Harris, Pukley, and Lindymood, of Company H. We were ordered
again across the railroad, where we built barricades and formed line of battle, staying till 5 p.m.;
hence we returned back to camp. The 30th we started and found the rebels two miles from camp;
driving them before us to within one mile of Jonesborough, we went in bivouac there. On 31st
we left early in the morning, going in a southerly direction and halted on Flint River. I then was
ordered to cross said river and report with the regiment to Colonel Jones; Eighth Indiana
Cavalry, for orders. Colonel Jones ordered me to go with the regiment up the road in an easterly
direction toward the Atlanta and Macon Railroad, and as soon as I should find the enemy in
sufficient numbers to make a feint charge upon them so as to draw their fire and thus be able to
estimate their strength. Proceeding from there about 400 yards, and while the column was
moving in a lane, the advance guard was fired upon by the rebels. We steadily kept advancing
and about a minute after the first shots being fired the rebels opened on us with such a withering
musket fire from the right flank that I found it necessary to retreat without attempting a feint
charge. I immediately gave the command "fours," "right about," "gallop," "march." This
movement, owing to the narrowness of the lane and the many obstinate mules on which onefourth
of the men were mounted, was executed with some confusion. Said musket fire was
poured into us from a tight fence at the distance of 150 yards across an open field. In this
reconnoiter the following named were killed and wounded: Second Lieutenant Maguire, of
Company L, mortally wounded, who expired half an hour afterward; Private Cousins, Company
E, wounded and sent to field hospital, and Private Rose, of Company D, wounded and sent to
field hospital. Immediately after my return I was ordered to recross Flint River, and after having
done so I was ordered by you to send Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to assist in finishing some breast-works,
upon which I ordered Lieut. James H. Wing, of Company B, to take charge of those men and
report accordingly. Two minutes after the men were sent back for their carbines to be ready to
receive the enemy's charge. You ordered me to take the led horses under cover behind a hill in
our immediate rear. In coming on the assigned ground with the led horses I was ordered by an
officer, whom I supposed to be on General Kilpatrick's staff, to move with the led horses into the
road and to close up, which I did. We fell back for one mile and a quarter, where we were
ordered to halt. Immediately after thus halting part of the skirmishers came back and remounted
their horses, and the regiment was ordered to form line of battle.
The following-named men were reported to me as wounded and missing: First Sergeant
Seavey, Company H, wounded and missing; Private Graybill, Company B, missing; Private
Murphy, Company C, wounded and missing; Private Cochran, Company H, wounded and
missing, and Private Massie, Company M, missing.
On the 1st of September we built barricade half a mile west of Flint River. At 12 o'clock
midday we moved two miles south, where we built other barricades, and stood under arms over
night. Private Bocket, Company E, sent to hospital from there, he being sick. The 2d we left said
bivouac at 6 a.m. and moved farther south on the west side of Flint River, two platoons being
sent out as skirmishers. After a lively skirmish we were ordered back half a mile, there remaining
under arms through the night. On the 3d of September the regiment was ordered out at 1 p.m.;
proceeded across Flint River five miles east. Building barricades there, we remained under arms
during the night. On the 4th we rested under arms. Private Rufie, Company M, Private Adams,
Company C, and Sergeant Graham, Company A, were sent back to the wagon train. On 5th, at 3
p.m., we marched two miles east, and halted for two hours; then we marched two miles
northeast, and halted from 8 to 11 p.m., when we marched toward Jonesborough, covering the
rear of the Army of the Tennessee. On the 6th we entered Jonesborough at 3 a.m.; left at 6 a.m.
and went four miles west across Flint River; built barricades and remained there under arms
through the night. On the 7th we left at 5 o'clock in the morning, marched about eight miles in a
northerly direction and went into camp. On the 8th we left camp at 6 p.m., marched about nine
miles in a northeastern direction, halting seven miles east of Sandtown. Eight horses and mules
were lost in action on the 31st day of August.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Captain Company F, Fifth Iowa Cavalry.
Maj. J. M. YOUNG,
Commanding First Brigade, Third Cavalry Division.
Near Marietta, August 4, 1864.
SIR: It is very difficult for me to make a coherent report of operations of the last ten days, as
during that time I have had three distinct commands, involving as many distinct reports.
The evening of the 26th ultimo found me in command of the effective mounted strength of
the Eighth Indiana Cavalry, numbering 366 officers and enlisted men. We had just returned from
the long and fatiguing Rousseau expedition, and both men and animals were sadly jaded. At 6
p.m. of the evening above named we broke camp to march to Vining's Station, fifteen miles
distant, to obtain supplies preparatory to joining General McCook for another raid. Owing to the
extreme darkness and the carelessness of some person unknown, the column was broken and my
command got lost; it was nearly daylight before we succeeded in extricating ourselves from the
labyrinth of roads and reach Vining's Station. Supplying ourselves as soon as possible, we joined
General McCook's command about 10 a.m. of the 27th, and marched through the day and until 2
a.m. of the next day in the rear of the pontoon train. After a rest of two hours we resumed our
march. Nothing of interest occurred until we arrived at Palmetto, a station on the Atlanta and
West Point Railroad, which we aided in destroying. At Riverton Ferry the Ninth Ohio being
detached, I was ordered to the command of a brigade, consisting of the Eighth Indiana and
Second Kentucky. Late in the evening the command moved from Palmetto toward the Macon
road, via Fayetteville. My command aided in the destruction of several large wagon trains which
had been surprised in their encampments. At Fayetteville my command was placed in the rear,
with the Eighth Indiana as rear guard. Many more wagons and a vast amount of baggage was
destroyed by the command. At an early hour we reached the Macon road, and the Second
Kentucky, Major Star commanding, was detailed to aid in tearing up the track, and performed its
part with its usual energy. Company A, Eighth Indiana, was detailed, under command of Captain
Reeves, acting assistant adjutant-general, to destroy the telegraph. They cut down all the poles,
and cut into small pieces and carried away the wire for over four miles. The command got about
three hours' rest during the day. In the afternoon the retrograde movement commenced in the
direction of Newnan.
Late in the afternoon report came up from the rear that Colonel Croxton had been cut off
from the main body and a severe fight was going on. I was ordered to go with the Eighth Indiana
and open communication with Colonel Croxton, but before I could reach the scene of action the
fight was over and Colonel Croxton had joined the command. The march was continued all day
and all night, and I must say that the physical powers of the men were pushed to the very verge
of human endurance. Five days and nights of almost constant duty in the saddle, added to the
fourteen days' rapid marching with Rousseau, would shake even the most robust constitution.
Men fell asleep on their horses, and the most persistent efforts of their officers could not keep
them awake. Two companies of the Eighth Indiana, viz, Company D, Captain Stanley, and
Company E, Captain Boyer, were detailed as advance guard during the night, and I think their
conduct during the time is worthy of all praise. Fired on at almost every turn of the road, they
charged repeatedly through the darkness without knowing or caring whether their foe numbered
1 man or 1,000. They routed and destroyed many wagon camps, and also routed a detachment of
Harvey's scouts. Early the next morning these two companies charged and took the city of
Newnan, routing over six times their number of infantry, and I am reliably informed that over
300 of them laid down their arms and fled to the country, reporting that Newnan was taken. Two
railroad trains lay close by loaded with soldiers going to Atlanta. These quickly formed and
drove our gallant squadron from the town. As our men retired, they were fired on from windows,
from cellar-doors, and from housetops; yet, strange to say, we had but 2 men wounded and those
but slightly.
At Newnan I was ordered to cover the rear with the Eighth Indiana, and from this time I
exercised no command over the Second Kentucky. We had some very severe skirmishing with a
rebel brigade of cavalry, which was pressing our rear, but we repelled their every attack very
easily. About 11 o'clock word was brought me that a heavy fight was going on with our advance
about three miles southwest of Newnan, and I was ordered to so dispose the Eighth Indiana (the
only force left in my command) as to cover the rear and left flank of the column, and to guard
those points at all hazards. I immediately disposed of my force to accomplish the desired result,
and easily held the enemy in check with light skirmishing for several hours, although I was
informed by prisoners and citizens that an entire division of rebel cavalry was threatening me,
and indeed their force was plainly visible skirting the timber in a front of nearly two miles,
completely enveloping the right, left, and rear of the column.
Late in the afternoon I was ordered to report in person to General McCook, who informed me
that Colonel Harrison was missing and that [I] should succeed to his command; that our position
was completely enveloped by a vastly superior force of the enemy, and he announced his
intention of breaking through the enemy's lines in two columns, one of which was to be led by
Colonel Croxton, who was to go out first, the other to be led by myself, and to leave the field
last. He also ordered me to get my troops well in hand preparatory to such a movement and await
his orders. On my return from headquarters I found that my troops had been ordered away from
where I left them by some unauthorized party, and that a stampede of the mule trains and led
horses of all commands had taken place, and that my command was in danger of being carried
off the ground by the mob, but by the energetic co-operation of the officers I succeeded in
extricating the Eighth Indiana, Fifth Iowa, and a large part of the Fourth Tennessee from the
rabble. I immediately ordered Major Baird, with a detachment of the Fifth Iowa, to reconnoiter a
narrow wood in which the enemy had not as yet showed himself. He soon reported that he had
discovered an obscure road, but could not ascertain where it led to. I determined to attempt this
road and trust to Providence in finding a guide. I therefore had a bridge built across a ravine
close by, and quietly massed my command and awaited my orders. About 6 p.m. General
McCook joined my column with portions of the Second and Fourth Indiana, and ordered the
advance. We moved out at a brisk trot, and so well were our forces in hand, and so sudden the
movement, that nearly one-half of the Eighth Indiana (which was in advance) got through the
lines without receiving a shot, and, although the remainder of the column ran the gauntlet of a
heavy fire of musketry, yet, strange to say, but 1 man was wounded, although the enemy was in
some places near enough to almost touch the horses. We soon found a negro, who directed us on
the road to Corinth. At New River we found that the plank had been torn up, but we hastily
repaired it with rails and passed safely over, and destroyed the bridge. At Corinth we turned to
the right to Philpot's Ferry, which we reached about 11 p.m. I sent from here two companies, K
and I, Captains Mitchell, and Scott, to destroy the only remaining bridge across New River. Our
forces had but just completed the destruction of the bridge ere the enemy appeared in force on
the opposite side of the river. This handsome work gave us five hours' freedom from the enemy.
While we were building the raft, Captain Reeves, from information received from negroes, found
perhaps the only ferry-boat remaining on the river above West Point. On this we succeeded in
crossing all the men and most of the horses. Several attempts were made to swim the animals,
but they were so thoroughly exhausted that the attempt had to be abandoned. Soon after daylight
we were attacked by Jackson's division of cavalry, and were compelled to leave 15 men and
about 200 horses and mules in his hands. The most of the animals were unserviceable.
Our direction on leaving the river was northeast to Rock Mills. At this point information was
received that Anderson's brigade was crossing the river in pursuit, and as our dismounted men
from previous exhaustion, from being mostly barefooted and not accustomed to walking, were
unable to keep up with the column, they were ordered to march directly eastward for our lines,
keeping themselves under shelter of the woods and mountains, while the main column would
move directly north toward Rome and attract pursuit in that direction. We marched thence
through Wedowee, Tallapoosa, Arbacoochee, Buchanan, Draketown, &c., by easy marches to
Marietta, where we arrived on the evening of August 3.
The results of the expedition may be summed up as follows: This command helped destroy 2
railroads; destroyed over 300 wagons (this only includes wagons destroyed by Eighth Indiana
and Second Kentucky), with a vast amount of stores, capturing a large number of prisoners,
mules, and horses, most of whom, however, were subsequently abandoned.
Our loss is about 200 horses and mules, and if the dismounted men succeed in reaching our
lines(of which I have but little doubt) our loss in men will not exceed 100 killed, wounded, and
missing. Among the prisoners lost was Colonel Harrison, one of the bravest officers and best
men in the service. His loss to us at this juncture is a severe one. Doctors Finley, Second
Kentucky, and Waterman and Gray, Eighth Indiana, voluntarily remained in the hands of the
enemy to care for our wounded. Of those left in the hands of the enemy it is impossible, at this
writing, to state the exact number killed and wounded.
My thanks are due to all the regimental commanders for their energetic co-operation and
prompt obedience to my commands. I also desire to call attention to the very valuable services
rendered by Captain Reeves, acting assistant adjutant-general. He is one of the most energetic
and valuable officers in the army, and well merits promotion, and would do honor to any position
in which he might be placed. Of an iron constitution, vast energy, and dauntless courage, he
made himself indispensable to the command. He was always with the advance guard, procuring
guides and information which materially aided in bringing off the command. Captains Boyer and
Stanley also proved themselves of the material of which good officers are made. I desire also to
call attention to the services of Major Star, Second Kentucky, Majors Herring and Graham,
Eighth Indiana, and Major Baird, Fifth Iowa.
Very respectfully,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Comdg. Harrison's Brigade Cavalry.
Captain LE ROY,
Assistant Adjutant-General, First Cavalry Division.
September 9, 1864.
For a history of operations of Tenth Ohio Cavalry up to the time I assumed command of this
brigade, I refer you to the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Sanderson, a copy of which is herewith
I left Nashville, Tenn., July 9, 1864, in command of the Eighth Indiana Cavalry. Was
mounted at Decatur, Ala., on the 10th, on artillery horses and horses drawn from the Second
Tennessee Cavalry, and was also equipped at second-hand with horse equipments drawn from
Second Tennessee Cavalry. My command left behind all its camp and garrison equipage, taking
only a gum blanket to the man. Left Decatur, Ala., on the Rousseau raid, with 613 officers and
men. Fought and whipped General Clanton's brigade of rebel cavalry at Jackson's Ford, on the
Coosa River, killing 1 officer (Clanton's assistant adjutant-general) and 20 men, wounded a large
number, took 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 3 lieutenants, and 20 men prisoners of war (prisoners
were paroled by General Rousseau). Fought and whipped a force sent out from Montgomery at
Chehaw Station and aided in destroying 33 miles of railroad. Returned to Marietta, Ga., July 22,
having traveled nearly 500 miles, with both men and animals sadly jaded. The first of the above
engagements was fought by the Eighth Indiana Cavalry alone; the second it was aided by a
detachment of Fifth Iowa Cavalry. The Second Kentucky Cavalry accompanied the expedition,
but, so far as I know, were not engaged.
Remained two days at Marietta, and then relieved Colonel Adams' command at mouth of
Sweet Water. Remained two days, and then joined General E. M. McCook for another raid. In
this raid I was in command of a temporary brigade, composed of Second Kentucky Cavalry and
Eighth Indiana Cavalry. Aided in the destruction of West Point railroad at Palmetto, several large
wagon trains at and near Fayetteville, the Macon road at Lovejoy's, and Company A, Eighth
Indiana, destroyed over 1 mile of telegraph at Lovejoy's. On the return, after crossing Glass'
Bridge, across Flint River, Companies D and E, Eighth Indiana, were detailed as advance guard
for a night march, during which they charged and routed Harvey's scouts and destroyed several
wagon trains, and at daylight charged and took the town of Newnan, but were not supported, and
were obliged to yield the advantages so bravely earned. July 31, my command was divided--the
Second Kentucky Cavalry reported to Colonel Harrison direct for orders, while I held the rear of
the column with the Eighth Indiana. Fought Jackson's cavalry all day, but easily held him at bay.
About 11 p.m. received notice from General McCook that Colonel Harrison was captured and
that I was in command of his division. Ordered me to form the command for a charge. The
Second Kentucky Cavalry had already broken through the enemy's lines, and were making their
way into the Federal lines. Immediately organized Fifth Iowa, Eighth Indiana, and Fourth
Tennessee, with stragglers from all other regiments of the command, and reported for orders. At
this time my command was the only organized force left on the field. Charged the enemy about 5
p.m., broke his line, and brought off nearly 1,200 men. Crossed the Chattahoochee at Philpot's
Ferry, with a loss of 3 men wounded, and several horses belonging to the Fifth Iowa Cavalry.
Arrived at Marietta, Ga., August 4, thoroughly exhausted. For five days and nights the
command got neither rest nor sleep, except such as could be obtained in the saddle or while the
horses were feeding. August 6, I joined Third Cavalry Division, and assumed command of
Second Brigade at Sweet Water bridge. August 18, my brigade, consisting of Eighth Indiana,
Major Herring; Second Kentucky, Major Star, and Tenth Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Sanderson,
numbering in all 900 officers and men, marched with the division from Sandtown at dark. From
Stevens' Cross-Roads my brigade had the advance, and the Tenth Ohio Cavalry struck the
enemy's pickets about two miles from Stevens', driving them for some distance. I sent forward
the Eighth Indiana dismounted, who, in conjunction with the Tenth Ohio, quickly dislodged the
enemy, driving him down a cross-road leading to Camp Creek, and there held him until the entire
column passed, then resumed our march as rear guard. About daylight the column in my front
and my own command were suddenly attacked on the left flank. I immediately formed my
command for action and moved against the enemy. All were soon hotly engaged, when, to my
surprise, the force at my right disappeared and the enemy had taken advantage of the break in the
line and had cut me off from the main body of the command. I immediately ordered my
command withdrawn, and charged through to our forces in column of fours. Lost several
valuable horses and had several men wounded. Nothing of note occurred until we arrived at
At dark on the evening of the 19th I received orders from Colonel Murray, commanding
division, to move through the town, take up position, and await orders. Remained just outside the
south limits of the town until 9 o'clock, when I received orders to move down the railroad toward
Griffin, clear the front and flanks of the Third Brigade, which was detailed to tear up the railroad
track. Moved down the road about a half mile, when I suddenly found myself confronted by a
strong force of the enemy posted behind barricades. My advance guard was checked, and then
driven back. I dismounted the Eighth Indiana and Second Kentucky, with the Tenth Ohio on the
right and in the road mounted, and the Third Kentucky dismounted on the left, and charged the
barricade, but was unable to dislodge the enemy. It was dark, and we could only ascertain the
position of the enemy by the line of his fire, which enveloped the Second Kentucky and Eighth
Indiana in front and both flanks at point-blank range. Under orders from Colonel Murray, I
withdrew my command, and joined the column on the McDonough road. Marched all night, and
early next morning overtook the rear of the column, skirmishing lightly with the enemy. About 9
a.m. of the 20th arrived to within two miles of Lovejoy's, and found the head of the column
heavily engaged with the enemy, while I was vigorously attacked in rear by Ross' and
Armstrong's cavalry. The rear guard, under direction of Captain Lyon, acting inspector-general
on my staff, barricaded the road and held the enemy in check long enough for me to form my
command on an advantageous position and barricade it. Captain Beebe's battery was placed in
position, covered by a barricade, and my command dismounted, was placed in line along a crest,
and immediately were engaged with the enemy, easily holding him off. About noon was
informed by Colonel Murray that our forces were to charge the enemy in rear, and I was ordered
to mount my command and charge the road directly to the rear. Within three minutes from the
time I received the orders my command was mounted and commenced the charge, with Eighth
Indiana in advance, Second Kentucky and Tenth Ohio. Two companies, E and F, Eighth Indiana,
charged and captured 1 piece of artillery, driving the gunners from the piece. Captain Lyon, of
my staff, had his horse shot while at the piece. We were unable to bring it off, as the enemy was
not yet dislodged from our front. Three men were left with it, however, and remained with it
until brought off. Moved back with the division to Sandtown. On the evening of the 26th of
August Major Young reported to me with the First Brigade, and acted under my orders until
September 7. At 11.45 p.m. August 26, in obedience to orders, I moved out, and occupied a
position near Camp Creek. On the 27th advanced to Stevens' Cross-Roads, and sent Captain
Qualman, with 100 men, by Fairburn, to rejoin the column at or near Red Oak. He met some
resistance, but, charging with the saber, drove everything before him, and rejoined the column at
Ann [New] Hope Church. The Tenth Ohio was skirmishing heavily at this point all day, losing
some horses and a few men wounded. On the 28th moved out on Fayetteville road two miles, to
cover operations of infantry on the railroad.
On the 29th my command had the advance, and struck the enemy near ---- Church, in force
behind barricades. The infantry was pushed forward, and Major Young was formed on their
right, with orders to charge the enemy in flank, or take any advantage the enemy might give him.
One piece of artillery was placed on the left of the infantry, with the Second Kentucky as
support. The enemy was quickly dislodged. At this place fell one of the noblest young spirits of
our army; Lieut. Henry Crooks, ordnance officer on my staff, fell pierced through the head by
the "swift messenger of death." He was a young man of great promise, of fine talents, great
energy, and correct habits, a model soldier, a thorough gentleman, and a man of unflinching and
uncompromising integrity. He fell in the discharge of his duty, the soldier's death. "Death loves a
shining mark," says the poet, and seldom has the "unerring shaft "reached a nobler heart. On the
31st I was ordered to cross Flint River below Jonesborough, at Whaley's Bridge, attract the
enemy's attention, and send a detachment around his left and endeavor to reach the Macon
railroad. Crossed the river without opposition, and built barricades within three-quarters of a
mile of Jonesborough, at the same time sending 100 men of Third Indiana, under command of
Captain Qualman, to strike the railroad. I left one section of artillery (Lieutenant Clark) in
position at Whaley's house, on the northwest side of the river, supported by two squadrons of
Tenth Ohio. Dismounting the balance of my command, numbering about 450 men, I moved
across the river and placed them in the barricades, with one company Tenth Ohio (Captain
Paisley), mounted, on my right flank as vedettes. Led horses were left in rear of the battery under
cover of a hill, which ran parallel with the river-bank. The position of my dismounted men was
as follows: Third Indiana on the right, Eighth Indiana and Second Kentucky in the center, one
company of Eighth Indiana and three companies of Tenth Ohio on the left, with three companies
of Tenth Ohio and Fifth Iowa (mounted) in reserve behind a second barricade. In this position we
awaited the enemy's advance, but waited in vain. At length I sent the Fifth Iowa to the front to
reconnoiter the enemy's position. They soon encountered a strong force in our immediate front,
and retired with the loss of 1 officer killed and 1 man wounded. About 4 p.m., the enemy having
massed Cleburne's division in our front, made a vigorous assault on my position. I repulsed his
first charge and punished him severely, but quickly reforming, he charged me again in such
numbers as to completely envelop my position. Ammunition being nearly exhausted, I withdrew
to the second barricade, under a terrible fire of artillery and musketry. The enemy had two full
batteries bearing on my position. If I had had ammunition I could have held the second position,
but it would have been at a heavy sacrifice; but being without ammunition, and learning that my
led horses had been moved to the rear by order of General Kilpatrick, I withdrew to the north
side of the river. The enemy did not pursue in force. About 6 p.m. Captain Qualman returned,
having torn up several rods of the Macon railroad, and destroyed the telegraph. Thus I had
carried out my orders in letter and spirit, although I have to confess that I had engaged the more
serious attention of the enemy than I had bargained for or than was agreeable. The behavior of
officers and men was admirable. During the remainder of the operations my command was
principally engaged in reconnoitering and petty skirmishing.
On the 8th of September arrived in camp at this place, where the Eighth Indiana and Second
Kentucky found their baggage the first time for two months.
I cannot close this report without calling attention to the gallant conduct of Maj. Thomas
Graham and Capt. Thomas N. Baker, Eighth Indiana, in the fight with General Clanton on the
Rousseau raid; to Major Herring, Captains Reeves, Stanley, and Boyer, Eighth Indiana: Major
Star, and Captain Park, Second Kentucky, on the McCook raid; and Lieutenant-Colonel
Sanderson, Major Thayer, Captain Norton, and Lieut. J. M. Harkness, Tenth Ohio; Majors
Herring, Graham, and Gordon, Eighth Indiana: Major Star and Captain Park, Second Kentucky,
for gallantry on Kilpatrick's raid.
My thanks are also due Major Young, commanding First Brigade; Captain Qualman, Third
Indiana; Major Thayer and Captain Paisley, Tenth Ohio Volunteer Cavalry; Majors Herring and
Graham, Eighth Indiana; Captain Park and Lieutenant Nall, Second Kentucky, for soldierly
conduct in the fight with Cleburne's division ;August 31 Captain Park was wounded in the
discharge of his duty, as commanding officer of detachment Second Kentucky; is a brave,
dashing officer.
I also respectfully call attention to the fact that many of the Eighth Indiana were serving
overtime, and, to my knowledge, not a murmur or complaint. On the contrary, they refused to go
to the rear.
To the members of my staff I owe a debt of gratitude for the promptness and zeal with which
they executed my every order. Captain Lyon, acting inspector-general; Lieutenants Norvell,
Stillwell, and Winters, aides, and the lamented Lieutenant Crooks, proved themselves competent
staff officers. Captain Lyon and Lieutenant Stillwell will soon retire from the service, and I can
truly say that the army will lose two of its finest officers, and the Second Brigade will regret their
loss from our ranks, but extend to them our warmest wishes for their success in civil life.
Doctor Thompson, brigade surgeon, was very prompt in caring for the sick and wounded of
my command, and has the thanks of all officers and men of the brigade.
Have not been furnished with list of casualties of First Brigade. My command is thoroughly
exhausted and sadly in need of rest.
Lieut. Col., Eighth Indiana, Commanding Brigade.
Captain ESTES,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Cavalry Division.
Nashville, Tenn., August 10, 1864.
GENERAL: I respectfully submit the following report of the expedition for the destruction of
that part of the West Point and Montgomery Railroad between Opelika and Chehaw Station,
On the 30th ultimo [June] I received instructions from Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman, copies of
which accompany this report, to take 2,500 good cavalry, and go myself or send a good officer in
command, and destroy the West Point and Montgomery Railroad from a point opposite Tuskegee
to Opelika. On so hazardous an undertaking I greatly desired to have with me officers and men
whom I knew to be of tried courage and efficiency to insure the success of the expedition. I
selected portions of the Eighth Indiana Cavalry, Colonel Harrison; Second. Kentucky, Colonel
Watts; Fourth Tennessee, Major Stephens; Ninth Ohio, Colonel Hamilton, and the Fifth Iowa,
Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick. Most of these troops, except the Fourth Tennessee, were
dismounted, and much difficulty was found in obtaining horses, and I was forced to take horses
from other regiments. I also took with me a section of 10-pounder Parrott guns of the First
Michigan Artillery, under Lieutenant Wightman. The command was brigaded; Colonel Harrison
assigned to the First Brigade and Colonel Hamilton to the Second, but this organization was
changed in a day or two, and Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick assigned to the command of the Second
Brigade on account of the very small number of officers in Colonel Hamilton's regiment, which
rendered it necessary to give his personal attention to it. Capt. Alfred Matthias, Fifth Iowa
Cavalry, was appointed provost-marshal; Lieutenant Frey, of the Ninth Ohio, and Lieutenant
Langdon, of the Fifth Iowa, were appointed quartermaster and assistant quartermaster, and
Doctor Waterman, of the Eighth Indiana, was appointed surgeon for the expedition. I took with
me Capt. T. C. Williams, Nineteenth U.S. Infantry, as assistant adjutant-general; Capt. Ed.
Ruger, Thirteenth Wisconsin Infantry, as topographical engineer, and Capt. T. A. Elkin, Fifth
Kentucky Cavalry, as aide-de-camp. The regiments designated for the expedition did not all
reach Decatur until the evening of the 9th of July. Orders were given to be in readiness to start
next morning, but owing to difficulty in getting the pack train ready the command was not
prepared to move until 1 o'clock on the 10th. Taking the direction indicated in the instructions
received from Major-General Sherman, I proceeded to Somerville, seventeen miles from
Decatur, and halted for the night. Crossing Sand Mountain on the 11th and passing through
Blountsville and over Strait Mountain on the 12th, I halted the main command at night five miles
from Ashville, sending Capt. Thomas A. Elkin, of my staff, and Major Stephens, with the Fourth
Tennessee Cavalry, forward to that place to secure any supplies the enemy might have stored
there. They took possession of the town and found a sufficient supply of corn for the animals of
the command; and also a quantity of commissary stores, which were issued to the men next day.
On the evening of the 13th I reached the Coosa River at Greens-port, and found a ferry-boat
on the opposite side which was secured and brought over by a detail of men who, under the
directions of Captain Elkin, swam across for that purpose. I immediately ordered a squad of
sharpshooters to be placed in some buildings on the opposite side of the river, and a detachment
of 200 men to be thrown across to protect the crossing at the ferry and at the ford at Ten Islands,
four miles below, as I had information that a small force of rebels was on that side of the river. A
portion of the Eighth Indiana Cavalry, under command of Major Graham, was accordingly sent
by Colonel Harrison, and effected a crossing without opposition. Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick was
also ordered to cross the artillery forming a part of his brigade, which was accomplished in the
night, and the command bivouacked until morning. Before reaching the river, the rear of the
column was fired into by a party of guerrillas, and I regret to say that Capt. William Curl, an
efficient officer of the Fifth Iowa Cavalry, was killed, and Capt. J. C. Wilcox, of the same
regiment, severely, but not dangerously, wounded. I here ordered a thorough inspection of the
command to be made, and about 300 horses being reported in unfit condition for the service
required, they were sent, together with the ineffective men, to Guntersville, forty miles distant, at
which point the detachment crossed the Tennessee River, and reached our lines in safety. The
effective force of the command was now reduced to less than 2,300 men.
On the morning of the 14th I proceeded with the main body of the command to cross at a
ford at Ten Islands, four miles below Greensport. At the same time Major Graham, who had
crossed with his detachment at the ferry, was ordered to proceed down the east side of the river
to the same ford. Immediately after leaving the ferry he met the enemy in considerable force,
posted to prevent his advance, and heavy skirmishing ensued. The enemy appearing to have a
strong position a re-enforcement of 100 men was sent across the ferry to Major Graham, and
afterward Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, of the Eighth Indiana, also crossed with the remaining part
of his regiment, half a mile below the ferry, at a ford pointed out by a negro who guided an
orderly across with dispatches from Major Graham. Major Graham in the mean time pressed
vigorously upon the enemy, and succeeded in routing them before the arrival of the reenforcements
sent to his support. Whilst the skirmishing was going on the main portion of the
command marched to the ford, and on attempting to cross the advance was met by a severe fire
from the enemy posted on the east bank, sheltered behind rocks and trees. Lieutenant-Colonel
Patrick deployed the Fifth Iowa and Fourth Tennessee on two islands, from which they kept up a
vigorous fire, and held the positions until Major Graham succeeded in driving the enemy from
the road leading from the ferry toward the ford, and causing a precipitate retreat of the force
opposing our passage of the ford. The enemy's force consisted of the Sixth and Eighth Alabama
Cavalry, with militia, under command of Brigadier-General Clanton. Their loss, as nearly as
could be ascertained, was 15 killed, 40 wounded, and 8 taken prisoners. General Clanton's acting
adjutant-general, Captain Abercrombie, and a Captain Moore were among the killed, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Lary and Major McWhorter, of the Sixth Alabama, were captured. The only
casualty in my command was the wounding of 1 man of the Eighth Indiana Cavalry. Major
Graham and his command behaved with great gallantry and fought effectively, as the enemy's
loss testified. I learned from guides that the ford we crossed was the one by which General
Jackson effected the passage of the Coosa on his march to Talladega during his campaign against
the Creek Indians in 1813. Five miles beyond the Coosa River an extensive iron furnace, which
was furnishing valuable material to the enemy, was destroyed, under the direction of Capt. E.
Ruger, of my staff. Owing to the heat of the weather and the character of the roads, the artillery
was unable to move with the necessary rapidity, and I accordingly ordered one of the guns to be
dismounted, the trunions broken off, and the carriage and caisson destroyed, which was
effectually done, and the horses attached to the remaining gun and caisson.
On the 15th I reached Talladega, where about 100,000 rations of sugar and salt, 20,000
rations of flour and bacon, and a quantity of other commissary stores were captured. The
command was supplied with what was required, and the remainder destroyed. Two gun factories,
several railroad cars, and the railroad depot were also destroyed. The latter contained a large
quantity of leather, with grain, sacks, flour, wheat, salt, and cotton. One hundred and forty-three
rebel soldiers were found in the hospital at Talladega, and were paroled. The railroad bridge
across the Coosa River, twenty miles from Talladega, might have been reached and destroyed
during the night, being defended, as I learned, by but a small force, and I was strongly inclined to
destroy it, as I had been to destroy several iron furnaces not far from my route, but adhering to a
determination, formed before starting, to proceed as rapidly as possible to the accomplishment
of the main object of the expedition, and not deeming it prudent to detach any portion of my
small command, I decided to proceed without delay. After first moving about ten miles in a
direction to threaten the bridge, and direct the attention of the enemy to that point, I proceeded in
the direction of Montgomery, creating the impression that I intended moving on that city.
On the evening of the 16th I reached the Tallapoosa River, at Stowe's Ferry. The pack-mules
and artillery were ferried over on a boat, the main portion of the command crossing at an old ford
half a mile above. The ford was rough, and so deep as to swim the horses part of the distance.
Nearly the entire night was occupied in getting all across, and the men were much exhausted and
needed rest, but, being within a day's march of the railroad, I deemed it important to press
forward. The route pursued was still toward Montgomery, but, after following it for some time, I
diverged to the left, and, marching through Dadeville, proceeded directly to Loachapoka, on the
West Point and Montgomery Railroad, twelve miles south of Opelika. The command reached
Loachapoka about sunset on the evening of the 17th. A short time was given to the men for rest.
After experimenting upon means for destroying the road, working details were made, and, under
the efficient command of Col. T. J. Harrison, the track for several miles was completely
destroyed. The character of the superstructure of the road and the kind of timber used in its
construction greatly facilitated the work. The cross-ties were of pitch pine, and into these were
sunken stringers of the same kind of wood, and a light bar of iron spiked on the top through holes
in a projection or flange. The wedges by which the string timbers were fastened into the crossties
were readily driven out, and from 50 to 100 feet of the track raised from the ties at once by
the use of fence rails as levers. The rails and timbers from one side of the road were placed upon
those on the other, and fence rails and other combustible material piled on them, and fire applied.
The dry pine burned so readily and produced such an intense heat that the iron was warped and
rendered worthless, and the ties burned off where the track rested on them, making the
destruction complete. A large quantity of commissary and quartermaster's stores were found in
the railroad depot at Loachapoka, and were destroyed. The depot took fire accidentally from the
materials burning on the track and endangered the town, but by great exertions the fire was
prevented from spreading beyond the railroad buildings.
On the morning of the 18th I sent Colonel Hamilton with his regiment (the Ninth Ohio
Cavalry) to destroy the road toward West Point. He executed the order with energy and
perseverance. His command was fired upon by parties of the enemy, but drove them off and
continued the work, destroying some six miles of the road, extending three miles north of
Auburn, at which station a large amount of lumber and other material and supplies were burned.
A locomotive on the way from Opelika toward Auburn was also captured with the engineer and
two other railroad employés, and the locomotive destroyed. Colonel Hamilton's services were
highly valuable in aiding the main object of the expedition. At the same time Major Baird, of the
Fifth Iowa, was sent with a detachment of his regiment and of the Fourth Tennessee Cavalry to
Chehaw Station, twelve miles south of Loachapoka, to commence destroying the road there and
work back northward whilst Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, with the Eighth Indiana, proceeded to
Notasulga, six miles from Loachapoka, to commence near that station and work forward to form
a junction with Major Baird. Lieutenant-Colonel Watts, of the Second Kentucky Cavalry,
proceeded along the line of railroad from Loachapoka to Notasulga, destroying that portion of
the road (six miles) in a most thorough manner. The alacrity with which Lieutenant-Colonel
Watts and the officers and men of his regiment entered upon this duty, and the effectual manner
in which they performed it, came under my personal observation and deserves honorable
mention. Lieutenant-Colonel Jones performed the duty assigned to him promptly and thoroughly,
and had destroyed a considerable portion of the track, when information reached me from Major
Baird that he had met a superior force of the enemy near Chehaw Station. Directed Colonel
Harrison to send the Eighth Indiana forward to his support, which was promptly done, Colonel
Harrison himself proceeding forward with the regiment, and an advance was again made. The
enemy stubbornly contested the ground, but were driven back by Major Baird until they gained
shelter in a ravine, where they maintained their position until a detachment of the Eighth Indiana,
sent by Colonel Harrison, turned their left flank and gained their rear, pouring in a heavy fire
from their Spencer rifles, whilst Major Baird assailed them in front, when they fell back in
confusion, leaving about 40 dead and a large number of wounded on the field. Official reports of
our casualties have not been received, but the loss was small, not exceeding 3 killed and 8 or 10
wounded. This loss was principally sustained by the detachment of the Fifth Iowa, under
command of Major Baird, which was directly in front of the enemy, and behaved gallantly.
Camp Watts, a camp for convalescents and conscripts on the railroad near Notasulga, having
temporary buildings for 2,000 or 3,000 men, was destroyed, except the hospital, in which there
were about 100 patients. A number of tents and a quantity of quartermaster's and commissary
stores were also burned. I then returned to Loachapoka, and proceeded toward Opelika,
overtaking Colonel Hamilton, three miles beyond Auburn, where the command halted until
morning, without water or forage; the men were much fatigued with their exhausting labors.
On the morning of the 19th Colonel Harrison was ordered to proceed with the Eighth Indiana
and Second Kentucky along the railroad to Opelika; Colonel Hamilton, with the Ninth Ohio, to
march to a point on the Columbus railroad two miles from its junction with the West Point and
Montgomery Railroad at Opelika, each to destroy the roads to the junction. Lieutenant-Colonel
Patrick, with the Fifth Iowa and Fourth Tennessee, was ordered to destroy the railroad and depot
at Opelika and the track toward West Point. These orders were all executed promptly. About
20,000 pounds of bacon, 10,000 pounds of sugar, 12,000 pounds of flour, and other commissary
stores were obtained and issued to the command or destroyed. Six cars, loaded with leather,
nails, shovels, and other articles were burned on the track, and a turn-table and Y destroyed. The
whole length of railroad destroyed was over 30 miles, including a number of trestle bridges, a
water-tank at Notasulga, the station buildings, &c., at Opelika, Auburn, Loachapoka, Notasulga,
and considerable amounts of supplies and materials at each of those points, of which exact
details cannot be given. The work of destruction began about 10 o'clock on the evening of the
17th, and was concluded about 10 o'clock in the forenoon of the 19th, the whole time being
thirty-six hours, with short intervals of rest. About a mile from Opelika I halted the command for
a few hours' rest, which they greatly needed. In the afternoon I started on the return march with
the intention of endeavoring to reach Marietta, and marched through La Fayette, halting at
midnight about twenty-five miles from Opelika.
On the 20th the command marched thirty-five miles, and on the 21st about the same distance,
passing through Carrollton and Villa Rica.
On the 22d I reached Marietta and reported by telegraph to Major-General Sherman. No
force of the enemy was encountered on the return march.
About 400 mules were brought in by the command, and several hundred able-bodied negroes
accompanied it to Marietta. Besides the prisoners paroled in the hospitals already mentioned, 61
were captured at different places on the route, including 2 lieutenant-colonels, 1 major, 2
captains, and 2 lieutenants. They were released on parole, except 2 captured at Villa Rica, who
were brought in.
I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of the officers and men of the command. They
exhibited throughout the entire march a high degree of fortitude and endurance, and a constant
desire to meet the enemy.
To the brigade commanders, Col. Thomas J. Harrison, of the Eight Indiana Cavalry, and
Lieut. Col. M. T. Patrick, of the Fifth Iowa Cavalry, I am greatly indebted for the able and
efficient manner in which they discharged the duties devolving upon them, and the cool courage
and soldierly bearing exhibited by them at all times, and cheerfully call the attention of my
superior officers to the marked efficiency they displayed on the occasion.
I am also much indebted to Capt. T. C. Williams and Capt. T. A. Elkin, Lieutenant Frey,
Lieutenant Langdon, Captain Matthias, Captain Ruger, and to Doctor Waterman, for patient
endurance of hardships, and for invaluable services cheerfully rendered.
It is no disparagement to others to call especial attention to the efficient services of Captain
Ruger, who took and maintained his position at the head of the advance guard, in charge of the
guides, and who conducted the column, and whose services were almost indispensable to me.
I wish to make favorable mention also of a Mr. James C. McBurney, of Georgia, a volunteer
aide-de-camp, who rendered important service.
Respectfully submitted.
Brig. Gen. W. D. WHIPPLE,
A. A. G. and Chief of Staff, Dept. of the Cumberland.
Near East Point, Ga., September 10, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of so much of the battle of July 22,
in front of Atlanta, as took place after the command of the Army of the Tennessee devolved upon
me, in consequence of the unfortunate death of Major-General McPherson. To properly
understand the action after I assumed command, the disposition of the troops, together with the
occurrences up to that time, are essential. I may, therefore, not improperly state them:
On the morning of July 22 the Army of the Tennessee was the left of the army, and occupied
a position extending across the Atlanta and Augusta- Railroad, about a mile and a half from the
enemy's works on that side of Atlanta. The troops were disposed as follows: The Second
Division of the Sixteenth Corps was in position on the extreme right, connecting with the left of
the Twenty-third Corps. The Fifteenth Army Corps, connecting with Sweeny's division, was in
position with the First Division, Brig. Gen. C. R. Woods, on the right, the Second Division,
General M. L. Smith, in the center, and the Fourth Division, General Harrow, on the left. The
extreme left of the line was held by the Seventeenth Corps, disposed as follows: The Third
Division, General Leggett, on the right, and the Fourth Division, General Giles A. Smith, on the
left. The Third Division, General Leggert, occupied a hill, a military position of great
importance, and the Fourth Division was in position on a continuation of the ridge along the
McDonough road, with its left flank refused toward the east. The First Brigade, Fourth Division,
Sixteenth Army Corps, General Fuller, was in reserve to the Seventeenth Corps. The Second
Cavalry Division, General Garrard, which had been covering the left flank and the trains of the
command at Decatur, having been sent on an expedition to Covington, the Second Brigade of the
Fourth Division of the Sixteenth Army Corps, commanded by Colonel Sprague, was posted at
Decatur, three miles to our rear and right, to cover the supply trains. The position occupied by
the army was intrenched, and crossed the Augusta railroad at the connection of the First and
Second Divisions of the Fifteenth Corps. At an early hour in the morning it was discovered that
the enemy had abandoned their line of works in our front, and fallen back to their main
intrenchments about Atlanta. Our lines were at once advanced, the rebel pickets readily driven
in, and the line which the rebels had held the evening before was occupied. By order of General
McPherson, the troops at once commenced to reverse the works. The Fifteenth Corps was moved
up to the rebel line in the same position, by divisions, as it held the previous day. Of the
Seventeenth Corps only the skirmish line was advanced. The main force remained on the hill and
the ridge along the McDonough road, a prolongation of the line of the Fifteenth Corps, two
regiments of Colonel Hall's brigade, the extreme left of General Smith's division, being refused.
Soon after the occupation of this line, General McPherson ordered General Dodge to withdraw
General Sweeny's division, of the Sixteenth Corps, from the right and mass it in the rear of a new
position, to be selected for the Seventeenth Corps. The division moved along a road parallel to
the railroad, and bivouacked about three-quarters of a mile in rear of the Seventeenth Corps.
General McPherson also ordered General Dodge to put a brigade of his Fourth Division or the
left of the position assigned to the Seventeenth Corps. The brigade had not yet moved when the
attack was made.
The interval between the Fifteenth and Twenty-third Corps, made by the withdrawal of
Sweeny's division, was filled by moving up the right of the Fifteenth and left of the Twenty-third
Corps. Very soon after 12 o'clock the pickets of General Giles A. Smith's division, of the
Seventeenth Corps, which had been thrown out a mile and a half in rear of his line and in front of
General Sweeny's division, of the Sixteenth Corps, were attacked. Skirmishers were thrown out
by General Sweeny, who at once found the enemy advancing toward the Sixteenth Corps. The
enemy had moved a heavy force into the woods on the left flank and rear of the Seventeenth
Corps, with the evident intention of striking the left of the Seventeenth Corps, and at the same
time throwing a heavy column in its rear. At the time the firing commenced General McPherson
was near the Fifteenth Corps. Upon hearing the fire he rode rapidly toward the left of the army. I
rode at the same time in that direction, but learning from an officer, whom I met, that an attack
was being made in force, I returned to my corps. A short time afterward Lieutenant-Colonel
Strong brought me an order from General McPherson to send a brigade to fill the interval
between the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps. I sent the Third Brigade, of the First Division,
Colonel Wangelin commanding. In the mean time General McPherson had reached the field of
operations. In riding across the interval to Giles A. Smith's division, General McPherson was
killed by the enemy's skirmishers. The rebel force, Hardee's corps, advancing rapidly, forced
back the pickets of Giles A. Smith's division, and struck the left flank exactly perpendicularly to
his line of battle. At the same time a heavy fire was opened from batteries posted on a ridge in
their rear, the fire being- directed upon the rear of the Seventeenth Corps. Simultaneously with
this attack the enemy emerged from the timber, in front and to the right of the Sixteenth Corps, in
three columns. It was evident that the movement was intended to strike the Seventeenth Corps on
the flank and rear at the same time, and that the rebel commander was not aware of the presence
of General Sweeny's division in that part of the field. General Dodge had at the first skirmishing
put his Second Division, with two batteries of artillery, into line of battle, with Fuller's brigade
on its right. The enemy moved upon the rear and right of the command of General Dodge. This
movement exposed the flank of the enemy's column. General Dodge at once pushed forward two
regiments, the Twelfth Illinois and Eighty-first Ohio, that delivered so destructive a fire on the
enemy's flank that his column gave way. A charge was made, and the enemy fell back to the
woods. General Dodge then withdrew his line a short distance to the rear. Colonel Wangelin's
brigade, of the Fifteenth Corps, about this time came up on the double-quick, and was at once
engaged with the head of a column of the enemy through the interval between the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Corps, with the evident intention of striking the Seventeenth Corps in the rear of
Leggett's division. Wangelin, although his brigade was small, threw it into line of battle, and,
moving under a heavy fire, steadily pushed the enemy back and gained a slight elevation of
ground,. and constructed a breast-work of rails. The Second Brigade, of the Fourth Division,
Fifteenth Corps, was on the right of General Leggett's division, of the Seventeenth Corps. Being
satisfied, from the direction of the firing, that the enemy was pushing a column through the
interval before mentioned, as well as by the movement of wagons and artillery from that
direction, General Walcutt, commanding the brigade, changed his front to the left rear. The
brigade was scarcely in position when a force of the enemy appeared in its front. The brigade
became at once engaged, and repulsed the advancing line. The enemy reformed and attacked the
division of General Leggett. This gave General Walcutt an enfilading fire upon them, which he
made very effective by opening fire from a section of 24-pounder howitzers, belonging to the
Seventeenth Corps. A 20-pounder Parrott, belonging to the Seventeenth Corps, which had been
abandoned, was retaken by the Forty-sixth Ohio, under heavy fire. The division of Gen. Giles A.
Smith, attacked on the flank and rear, was at once moved to the opposite side of their works. Its
flank was partially driven in, and the enemy, by the rapidity of his assault and the heavy force
with which it was made, swept away 2 guns and several hundred prisoners. General Smith,
although his flank was developed by the rebel mass thrown upon it, and in great danger from the
heavy columns thrown upon his rear, succeeded in forming his men on the reverse of his works,
and, in conjunction with the operations of General Dodge, General Walcutt, and Colonel
Wangelin, in checking the advance of the enemy. The attacking columns of the enemy advanced
as far around as the rear of General Leggett's line. The division was at once placed on the outside
of the works, and received and checked the assault successfully.
About this time, 1 o'clock, I received information of the death of Major-General McPherson,
and an order from General Sherman, whose headquarters were at the Howard house, to assume
command of the Army of the Tennessee. This order was verbal, and accompanied by the
assurance that I could call upon General Schofield for so many re-enforcements as might be
needed. Turning over the command of the Fifteenth Corps, which was not then engaged, to Brig.
Gen. Morgan L. Smith, I rode rapidly in the direction of the firing to our left and its rear. When I
reached that part of the field the firing had considerably diminished, the enemy having fallen
back a short distance to reform his lines. General Leggett's division, of the Seventeenth Corps,
held the Bald Hill. General Giles A. Smith also held the greater part of his position on the
extreme left. Both divisions had been attacked from the rear, and had fought from the outside of
their works, and were at that time busily engaged in reversing them in anticipation of another
attack from the same direction. Between the left of the Seventeenth Corps and the right of the
brigade of the Fourth Division, Sixteenth Corps, General Dodge's right, there was an interval of
fully a mile in width. The greater portion of this interval was heavily timbered, and afforded an
excellent cover for the movements of the enemy's troops. It was occupied by no troops whatever,
except Colonel Wangelin's brigade, of the Fifteenth Corps which I moved, as I came into the
field, to an elevated position in the rear of the center of the Fourth Division, of the Seventeenth
Corps, about midway between Bald Hill and General Dodge's command. It was partly covered
by the brigade of General Walcutt. After repulsing the first rebel attack General Dodge had
retired his position somewhat, had thrown back his right and left flanks, and sent an urgent
request for re-enforcements to cover his left flank. I ordered General M. L. Smith to send him
Colonel Martin's brigade, of the Second Division, of the Fifteenth Corps. His position was in rear
of Leggett's division, facing at right angles to his line of battle, and with both flanks refused. The
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps had already suffered considerably, 2 guns of the Seventeenth
Corps and 6 guns of the Sixteenth Corps and several hundred prisoners having been captured.
They had received the attack of the heavy determined columns of Hardee's corps, made under the
most unfortunate and dangerous circumstances, but had, by the unsurpassed bravery of the men
and the great skill and resources of their immediate commanders, main-rained the integrity of
their lines.
The character and strength of the first assault upon our position had fully developed the
tactics of General Hood. The most important position in the then field of operations was the Bald
Hill, occupied by the Third Division, of the Seventeenth Corps. It commanded the whole field
occupied by the lines, and covered all ground on which were the trains of the Army of the
Tennessee. I therefore gave General Blair, commanding the Seventeenth Corps, the most
positive and emphatic orders to hold the hill at whatever cost. It was apparent, also, that our most
imminent danger was from the great interval between the Seventeenth and Sixteenth Corps. In
order to close it, and at the same time adjust our lines in such manner that the Bald Hill might be
held, I ordered General Blair, as soon as it could be done with safety, to bring his Fourth
Division back to such a line that its right should connect with Leggett's left, and the left of the
division with Colonel Wangelin's brigade. I also ordered General Dodge to swing his right, or
refused line, up, so as to connect with the left of Wangelin's brigade. Before these movements
could be executed the enemy had reformed, under cover of the woods and in the rear of the
works which the Seventeenth Corps had constructed the day before, and made a second assault
upon the Seventeenth Corps, which, after a severe struggle, was repulsed. Repeated attempts
were made to drive the Seventeenth Corps from the position it held in the rear of the works, but
each was repulsed. Another attack was made upon the Third Division by a fresh column, moving
from the southeast in such direction as to threaten General Smith's right and rear as he then
faced. Smith formed two lines perpendicular to his works to receive the assault. The enemy
struck Colonel Hall's line on the front and right, in a solid column, three lines deep, and forced
him back into the works. Colonel Potts' brigade, however, held its ground, and the enemy finally
fell back in considerable disorder. It was now about 3 in the afternoon, as I recollect. For two
hours the different assaults upon the position of the Seventeenth Corps, principally made upon
General Giles A. Smith's division, had been unsuccessful in so far as carrying it. The enemy,
however, was in possession of the flank, and, perhaps, 200 yards of the main line, and it had
been impossible to move the Fourth Division as I had ordered. Up to this time the Fifteenth
Corps had not been attacked; the whole efforts of the enemy had been directed against the left of
the Army of the Tennessee. At 3.30 the enemy made an attack upon the Second Division of the
Fifteenth Corps. It was ascertained by the provost-marshals from prisoners captured, and
Confederate reports subsequently made, that the attack upon the front of the Fifteenth Corps,
and, shortly afterward, upon the front of the Seventeenth Corps, was made by the corps
heretofore commanded by General Hood, and at that time under command of General Cheatham.
The enemy advanced from the direction of their main works about Atlanta in columns of
regiments. The attacking columns moved rapidly upon the Second Division, commanded by
General Lightburn. The first assault was repulsed. Their lines, however, were rapidly reformed,
and the assault renewed repeatedly, but without success. The withdrawal of Colonel Martin's
brigade from the Second Division, to re-enforce the Sixteenth Corps, made an interval between
the right of the Second and left of the First Division, which was held by a thin line of
skirmishers. Wangelin's brigade had been withdrawn from the First Division, so that there were
no reserves to the corps. At this point was a deep cut of the railroad, on the right of which four
guns of Battery A, First Illinois Artillery, were in position, and firing by the right oblique at the
broken line of the enemy. Under the smoke of Battery A a rebel column marched rapidly by the
flank up the main dirt road and through the deep cut of the railroad and were in rear of our lines
before the officers or men were aware of their intention. The division at once fell back, the
greater part halting in a ravine between the two lines, some, however, retreating to the old line.
Battery A and the 20-pounder guns of Battery H, First Illinois Artillery, were left in the hands of
the enemy. The officers and men of both batteries fought with the greatest gallantry, serving their
guns while they were surrounded by the enemy. At that time I was giving orders to General
Dodge, having just ridden to his left, where General Cox's division, of the Twenty-third Corps,
for which I had asked, had gone into position, covering the Decatur road. The command of
General Dodge was not engaged. Captain Wheeler, of my staff, informed me of the disaster to
the Fifteenth Corps. I ordered Colonel Martin to move at double-quick back to his division, and
also ordered General Dodge to send a brigade of the Sixteenth Corps to the assistance of the right
of our line, at the same time directing him that in the event he needed support, to call upon
General Cox, commanding the division of the Twenty-third Corps on his left. The Second
Brigade of the Second Division of the Sixteenth Corps, Colonel Mersy commanding, moved
promptly out, and I conducted it to the rear of the old works of the Second Division of the
Fifteenth Army Corps, where it deployed on the right of the railroad. When I arrived, General
Morgan L. Smith and General Lightburn were reforming the lines of the Second Division, in a
ravine between the two lines of works. I ordered General Smith, so soon as he could reform his
lines, to retake the position and the batteries which had been lost. General Woods, commanding
the First Division, which was on the right of the Second Division, finding his position untenable,
the enemy occupying a position 300 or 400 yards to his left and rear, threw back his left and rear,
forming a line facing the enemy's flank, his right resting at the Howard house. At the same time,
Major Landgraeber, chief of artillery of the First Division, who had six guns in position, moved
them into the open field and opened fire upon the enemy, compelling him to seek shelter, killing
the horses of De Gress' battery, and preventing the enemy from removing the guns. General
Woods then moved his First Brigade forward, attacking the enemy in flank and rear, and his
Second Brigade attacking in flank and front. At the same time the Second Division, followed at a
short distance by Colonel Mersy's brigade, advanced upon the enemy's front. The movement was
successful. Woods' division striking the enemy's flank, it began to break, and soon afterward the
Second Division charging his front, the line of works, De Gress' battery, and 2 guns of Battery A
were recaptured. General Woods swung his left around, and the whole line of the First and
Second Divisions was reoccupied with no opposition, except a fierce assault upon the Fourth
Iowa, which was repulsed.
While this was occurring on the center and right of the Fifteenth Corps, the enemy appeared
in the rear of Colonel Williams' (First) brigade, of the Fourth Division. Being threatened in front
and rear, Colonel Williams retired his brigade to the lines held in the morning. Colonel Oliver
withdrew the Third Brigade. Major Hotaling, of my staff, ordered General Harrow to retake the
position which had been abandoned. The line was reoccupied about the same time with the
reoccupation of the works of the Second Division. It was now nearly 5 o'clock, and, with the
exception of two regiments' front on the extreme left, the whole of the main line of the Army of
the Tennessee was in its possession, notwithstanding the repeated and desperate assaults of the
enemy. His last and final efforts were made upon the Fourth Division of the Seventeenth Corps.
His assault is described by the officers engaged as the fiercest and most persistent engagement of
the day. The attack was made from the east. The enemy formed in, and moved through, the
woods, which covered their approach at some points within twenty yards of our breast-works.
The men again fought from the reverse of their works. Under a most destructive fire from the
Fourth Division and two detached regiments from the Third Division, the enemy moved directly
up to our works, and a deadly battle took place. "Regimental commanders, with their colors, with
such men as would follow them, would not infrequently occupy one side of the works, and our
men the other. Many individual acts of heroism occurred. The flags of opposing regiments would
meet on the opposite sides of the same work, and would be flaunted by their respective bearers in
each other's faces: men were bayoneted across the works, and officers, with their swords, fought
hand to hand with men with bayonets." The colonel of the Forty-fifth Alabama was pulled by his
coat collar over the works and made a prisoner. This terrible contest lasted for three-quarters of
an hour, and the division still held nearly the whole of its ground. About 6 another force
advanced from the direction of Atlanta. General Smith had Scarcely changed position to the east
side of his works, when the enemy opened upon his left and rear a heavy fire of musketry and
artillery, and he was compelled to abandon another portion of his works. Falling back a short
distance, he formed a line perpendicular to his line of works. The column moving from the west
enfiladed this line, and he was compelled to swing his right still farther back. General Leggett
moved out his Second Brigade in a line parallel to that which General Smith then held. Colonel
Wangelin's brigade, of the First Division of the Fifteenth Corps, moved forward, and a new line
was formed with the Second Brigade of the Third Division, Seventeenth Corps, on the right, the
Fourth Division of the Seventeenth Corps the center, and the Third Brigade of the First Division
of the Fifteenth Corps on the left. This was the line which I had indicated in my orders to
General Blair. It extended to the crest of Bald Hill, which two regiments of the Seventeenth
Corps, the Eleventh Iowa and Sixteenth Wisconsin, held behind an angle of the works, the
enemy holding the same works a little below, four of their colors planted within a stone's throw
of the colors of the Eleventh Iowa. Upon this line the enemy made an attack in very heavy force.
The battle was very severe. Colonel Wangelin moved his left around, advanced upon the enemy's
flank, and gave the enemy a decided check. The battle at this point closed after dark, and our
troops held the field. The enemy retired in the night, after removing the greater part of their
wounded. Their dead were left on the field.
General Hood's tactics seem to have been to concentrate during the afternoon and night of the
21st the corps of Hardee and Cheatham near the position of the Army of the Tennessee, and at an
early hour in the morning to withdraw from the works in its front to his main intrenchments, and,
while the Army of the Tennessee was being advanced to his abandoned line, and before the
works could be reversed, to attack our left and rear with one corps, and with the other one right
from the front. That he did not succeed was due, in my judgment, to the lateness of the hour at
which the attack was made, a lack of concert in his movements, the opportune presence of a
portion of the Sixteenth Corps in the rear of the left of our line, but more than all these to the
splendid bravery and tenacity of the men and the ability and skill of the officers of the Army of
the Tennessee.
Very soon after the battle commenced Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson was killed by the
enemy's infantry. General McPherson fell in command of the Army of the Tennessee on the field
of battle. He was an earnest patriot, a brave and accomplished officer, in all his intercourse with
others a true gentleman, and held in the highest degree the confidence and esteem of the officers
and men of his command. He met the death of a patriot soldier, universally lamented by those he
commanded and by the nation whose Government and flag he gave his life to defend.
During the progress of the battle the Second Brigade of the Fourth Division of the Sixteenth
Corps, commanded by Col. J. W. Sprague, which had been stationed at Decatur to protect the
trains of the army, was attacked by a considerable force of the enemy. The brigade made a
successful fight against great odds of numbers, and saved the trains. As I was not upon the
ground, I beg leave to refer to the report of Colonel Sprague, herewith forwarded, for the details
of his operations. To the general officers in command of the different corps I am very greatly
indebted. They all fought their troops with signal ability and skill.
After I had assumed command of the army the officers of General McPherson's staff reported
to me for duty. I am under very great obligations to them. They gave me valuable information as
to the position of the troops, and rendered important assistance.
The discrepancy between this aggregate of casualties and that which was transmitted
immediately after the battle is explained by the fact that the loss of Colonel Sprague's brigade, of
the Sixteenth, was not included in the reported loss of the Sixteenth Army Corps. We also lost 12
pieces of artillery, viz: Fifteenth Army Corps, 4 guns; Sixteenth Army Corps, 6 guns;
Seventeenth Army Corps, 2 guns. The discrepancy of 2 guns between this number and that
reported after the battle is accounted for by the 2 guns lost by the Seventeenth Corps which were
not reported to me at that time. For other and fuller details of the casualties, I beg leave to refer
to the reports of corps commanders, herewith forwarded.
The loss of the enemy was very severe, including a general officer, Major-General Walker,
and a number of field and line officers. We captured 18 stand of colors, something over 5,000
stand of small [arms], and in addition to a large number of wounded left on the field, including
33 officers of rank, 1,017 prisoners. The corps commanders reported, by my orders, the dead in
their respective fronts. We have buried and delivered to the enemy, under a flag of truce sent in
by them, in front of the Seventeenth Corps, 1,000. The number of their dead in front of the
Fourth Division of the same corps, not then occupied by our troops, General Blair reported,
would swell the number of their dead on-his front to 2,000. The number of dead buried in front
of the Fifteenth Corps at the time the report was made was 460, and the commanding officer
reported at least as many more yet unburied. The number of dead buried in front of the Sixteenth
Corps was 422. They also reported in the hands of the corps over 1,000 wounded.
Accompanying this report is a sketch of the field of battle, showing the principal positions.
During the night I re-enforced that portion of the Seventeenth Corps which occupied Bald Hill.
Before morning the enemy withdrew from the small part of the field which they held on our left.
General Cox's division, of the Twenty-third Corps, which was stationed on the Decatur road,
was relieved in the morning. Although the division was not engaged, I am under obligations to
General Schofield for the promptness with which he responded to my request for reenforcements.
Subsequently, by order of General Sherman, the Augusta railroad, from Decatur to
our picket-line, was thoroughly destroyed by the First Division of the Fifteenth Army Corps; a
refused intrenched line was constructed by the pioneers of the Fifteenth Corps, extending from
the left of the line, held by the Twenty-third Corps, and, in pursuance of orders from
headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, I withdrew the Army of the Tennessee the
night of the 26th, and moved it along the rear of the center and right of the army to a position
across Proctor's Creek. After putting the army in position that night I was relieved by Maj. Gen.
O. O. Howard. I call your attention to the accompanying map of the field of battle, and the
consolidated report of casualties.
I have the honor to remain, your obedient servant,
Major-General, Comdg. Dept. and Army of the Tennessee.
Capt. L. M. DAYTON,
East Point, Ga., September 28, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to submit the following preliminary report of the medical service on
the campaign which has terminated with the capture of Atlanta:
The troops of the Fifteenth and Left Wing of the Sixteenth Army Corps, numbering 23,000,
after having been quietly encamped during the winter at Larkinsville, Huntsville, Athens, and
Decatur, were put in motion about the last days of April for Chattanooga, where they arrived
about the let of May. Before starting on this march supplies of medicines, hospital stores, &c.,
had been drawn for six months. By a general order, one 6-mule wagon had been allowed to each
regiment for transportation of medical supplies, and to be used for this purpose exclusively. In
this wagon were carried also the hospital tents, of which there were an average of one and a half
to a regiment. Abundant supplies of all kinds had been brought to Huntsville early in April by
Asst. Surg. J. W. Brewer, U.S. Army, medical purveyor. No vegetables had been issued during
the winter to the three divisions of the Fifteenth Corps stationed about Larkinsville, and in
consequence quite a number of these men were suffering from scurvy, appearing, however,
generally in a mild form. The troops at Huntsville and Athens got vegetables from the country,
and scurvy did not make its appearance among them. The sick and those unable to march, from
the whole command, were left at Huntsville, in buildings and field hospitals already prepared for
this purpose, and under the supervision of Dr. G. F. French, U.S. Volunteers, a zealous and
efficient officer. On assembling at Chattanooga the Army of the Tennessee was at once marched
through Ship's Gap, Villanow, and Snake Creek Gap to the vicinity of Resaca, a village on the
Atlanta railroad, where it crosses the Oostenaula River. The enemy at this time occupied Dalton,
with the Army of the Cumberland in their front, and that of the Ohio on their right flank. It will
be seen that the Army of the Tennessee threatened his rear. On the 9th of May our army emerged
from the Snake Creek Cañon into the Sugar Valley, about six miles from Resaca. An
unsuccessful effort was made that afternoon to reach the railroad. This having failed, the whole
army went into camp in Sugar Valley, about five miles from Resaca. During the 10th, 11th, and
12th the Twentieth, Fourteenth, and Twenty-third Corps had made a junction with General
McPherson. On the 13th there was a grand advance of our whole force on Resaca, Army of the
Tennessee on the right. A series of battles and skirmishes ensued on afternoon of 13th, and on
14th very obstinate fighting; enemy strongly posted behind intrenchments. Sunday, 15th, passed
off very quietly; during night enemy evacuated, burning the railroad bridge behind them.
The field hospitals were formed for each division by assembling together the hospital tents of
the regiments, and having them pitched under the supervision of a medical officer detailed for
that duty. The hospitals of the Fifteenth Corps--three in number--were about a mile in rear of our
line; that of Sixteenth Corps somewhat nearer. Three of the best surgeons in each division were
selected to perform all operations, as well as to decide upon the necessity or propriety of the
operation. To each of these three were detailed two assistants. The number of wounded received
into hospital during the two or three days' operations here was 794. The uneven nature of the
ground offered protection to the ambulances very near to the front, and the stretcher-bearers were
so prompt in bearing off the wounded, that there were very few instances of men remaining on
the field more than an hour or two after being wounded. They were laid on very comfortable
beds, made by strewing the tents thickly with pine leaves and spreading blankets over these.
There were abundant supplies of all important articles, and, altogether, all who came to the
hospital were made very comfortable. On the 16th this army formed the right column in the
pursuit of the retreating rebels. All the hospitals were ordered to be concentrated near the village,
and sufficient force left for their protection. On my application, a commissary was appointed to
remain and provide for the hospitals until all wounded were sent back to the rear. A surgeon in
charge, and one to each fifty patients, were left, and all others ordered to rejoin their commands.
Medical supplies to last for the few days these hospitals were expected to be kept up were left,
but several days' delay beyond the time thought requisite for their removal having occurred,
several articles of supplies became exhausted, and were replenished with a good deal of
reluctance, as I was informed, from the purveyor of the Army of the Cumberland.
Before going further, it may be well to state how it happened that we were dependent on this
army for supplies. During the winter and spring, and up to within ten days of receiving orders to
march, Huntsville, it was thought, would be the base of operations for the Army of the
Tennessee, and, therefore, all stores had been ordered to this point. The order to march to
Chattanooga was so sudden that time was not given to have these, or a portion of them in charge
of a purveyor, sent to the field. Immediate steps were taken to supply this want, by ordering
Assistant Surgeon Brewer, medical purveyor, to the field. He joined us with full supplies of all
kinds, about the 1st of June, near Acworth. This was in good time to relieve the wounded from
the battle of Dallas, which was fought on the 25th of May. From Resaca to Dallas the march
occupied ten days, attended with more or less skirmishing every day. The weather was fine,
roads good, a pleasing country, and water excellent, and marches generally easy. As a result of
all this the health of the men improved vastly in this time, and many who began the campaign so
debilitated as to be scarcely able to walk, were now able to march all day. The arrangement of
the field hospitals it will not be necessary to detail here again. The battle of the 28th, and the
minor operations before and after it, sent to the field hospitals 614 wounded men. A large
number of the rebel wounded fell into the hands of our surgeons on the 28th. On the 31st Army
of the Tennessee ordered to withdraw and move five miles farther to the left. All wounded were
moved day before to proper locations in rear of new position. Rebel wounded left in care of their
friends in the town of Dallas.
On 5th of June Army of the Tennessee ordered to extreme left, enemy having run away night
before. All wounded to be put into ambulances again and removed to Acworth, a distance of
twelve miles. Here the hospitals were again established, and wounded made as comfortable as
practicable in the field. Two days after this orders were received to remove all wounded and sick
behind fortifications of Allatoona Pass. A good site was found about two miles behind Allatoona,
and the hospitals of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Corps removed the same afternoon. The distance
was about seven miles. This proved an unusually convenient place for hospital. It was near an
extensive smelting furnace and foundry. A number of caldrons were found, and placed in
furnaces for purposes of making soup, washing, &c. The division organization of the field
hospital was not kept up here, but the several division hospitals consolidated into a corps
hospital, and this placed under charge of a surgeon supposed to have some aptness for
administrative and executive duties. That of the Fifteenth Army Corps, under charge of Surg. A.
Goslin, Forty-eighth Illinois Infantry Volunteers, became a model in its way, and men have
probably never made better recoveries than here during the six weeks the hospital was kept up.
That of the Sixteenth Army Corps was under charge of Dr. C. Thornton, surgeon Fifth Ohio
Volunteer Cavalry, and was not nearly so well managed. While at Acworth General McPherson's
forces were increased by the arrival of the Seventeenth Army Corps from Vicksburg. It
numbered 10,350 men. These troops had marched from Decatur, on the Tennessee River, to
Rome, Ga., and then via Kingston, Cartersville, &c. Their sick having been left at different
hospitals on the way, they arrived without any incumbrance to retard their activity in the field.
From June 10 to July 17 was probably the most trying and harassing period of the campaign to
the soldiers. The army was then in front of Kenesaw Mountain, with the rebel army strongly
intrenched in our front; our men were almost constantly in trenches, with daily reconnassainces,
resulting in heavy skirmishes, and occasionally a very considerable battle. The weather was very
hot, and it rained day and night for two or three weeks. On the 27th of June an unsuccessful
assault on the enemy's line resulted in adding 600 wounded men to our hospitals.
It was now determined to move the Army of the Tennessee from its position on the extreme
left to the extreme right. Wounded again ordered to be sent to the rear. Some three or four weeks
before this I had established a large hospital in Rome, Ga., which was now in condition to
accommodate about 1,500 men. It was under charge of Surg. G. F. French, U.S. Volunteers, who
had been ordered from Huntsville, with all supplies, bedding, &c., that could be brought from
there. To this point all the wounded were sent in box-cars, the hospital train being then
monopolized by the Army of the Cumberland. Soon after dark on the night of the 2d of July the
move toward the right began. Our trains had been moving in that direction all day. From the top
of Kenesaw the enemy could look down on everything going on along our front, as if looking on
a map. It was probably this threatened flank movement that caused them to evacuate this
stronghold during the night. At sunrise on the following morning the flags of a portion of the
Fifteenth Corps were waving on the top of Kenesaw. The rebels had abandoned this entire line
and Marietta, and had taken a strong position near the railroad bridge on the Chattahoochee. The
march was resumed early in the morning on the road leading toward Turner's Ferry. Rebels were
found intrenched some two or three miles from the river, but not in very strong force. They were
driven from all their advanced works the following day, and the army drawn close around the left
flank of their new position. After some days' reconnoitering this was found too strong to carry by
assault, and again the Army of the Tennessee was ordered to move through Marietta to Roswell
Factory, on the river, thirteen miles above the railroad bridge, being now on the extreme left.
After three days' stay at Roswell, during which a substantial bridge had been built across the
river, the several corps, on the 17th of July, moved across the river and took the road leading to
Decatur. On the night of the 14th occurred one of the most terrific thunderstorms that I have ever
seen; some 4 or 5 men were killed, and about 30 more or less paralyzed. In many cases stacks of
arms were struck, and the guns broken and destroyed. On the 20th Decatur, a town six miles
from Atlanta, east, was entered, after severe skirmishing. On the 22d occurred the severest battle
of the campaign. This began in an attack by the rebel forces on our intrenchments, stretching
across the railroad, about three miles east of Atlanta. The battle lasted from about 12 o'clock
noon until near sunset, when the rebels were everywhere repulsed. In the early part of the action
General McPherson was killed by a ball through the chest, while riding near the front. Thus
prematurely fell an officer pre-eminent for his genius and attainments as a soldier, and as a man
peculiarly beloved by all who had the good fortune to know him. It was a determined effort on
the part of the rebel general to turn our flank. While the attack in front and on the flank was
going on, another force moved from the direction of Decatur, threatening our rear. All our field
hospitals came under fire at different times during the day and had to be removed. The number of
wounded was about 2,060, all of whom, in addition to 500 rebel wounded, were brought to
hospital before 10 o'clock that night. There was no want of important supplies of every kind.
On the 23d, owing to a projected change of line, all our hospitals were ordered farther to our
right. On the 25th they were again ordered to be removed to the rear of the position occupied by
the Army of the Cumberland--still farther to the right. Of course, all these moves were annoying,
as well as injurious to many of the wounded, and retarded the proper fitting up of bunks, as well
as other hospital conveniences. From these hospitals all wounded were transferred, in a few days,
in ambulances to Marietta, a distance of twenty miles, and from that point to Rome by railroad.
On the 27th of July the movement round to the right flank was completed. On the 28th, while
getting into the new position, the rebels made a very determined attack on the Fifteenth Army
Corps, which formed the right of our line. An attack, three or four times renewed, and lasting
about five hours, resulted in a repulse to the enemy at all points, with 650 killed and about 5,000
wounded. During the engagement our troops threw up barricades, and were thus protected very
much. Number of wounded, 540--mostly of the Fifteenth Corps. All the wounded, including 80
rebels, were in the division hospitals before 12 o'clock at night. The hospitals were first
established within less than half a mile of our line of battle, but, being in range of enemy's shells,
had to be removed farther to the rear. Three days after the battle--known as that of Ezra Church--
all the wounded were sent to the corps hospitals in Marietta, fifteen miles distant. These hospitals
had been moved from Allatoona Pass to this place early in July. From the battle of the 28th of
July to August 26 the usual daily casualties of a siege occurred; the wounded being cared for in
the division hospitals about a mile in the rear of the trenches. On the 26th began the grand move
of the whole army to the right, with a view of cutting the West Point and Macon roads. It is
unnecessary to speak of the manner in which this was accomplished. The Army of the Tennessee
was on the right, and two days' march brought it to the West Point railroad at Red Oak. The 28th
was spent in destroying the road, and march resumed on the 29th by two roads running parallel
and passing through Renfroe Place to Jonesborough. Considerable skirmishing occurred during
the day between our advance and the rebel cavalry, but very few casualties occurred, and in the
evening our cavalry (dismounted) had forced the bridge across Flint River, and the advance of
the Fifteenth Corps passed over immediately, and, driving the rebels from their barricades on the
other shore, pursued them up the heights between the river and the town of Jonesborough, and
held their position until the entire Fifteenth and Sixteenth Corps came up, and before morning
were intrenched within a few hundred yards of the town and at one point close enough to
command the railroad. On the 31st an attack was made upon our lines, but was easily repulsed,
with loss on our side of about 100. The hospitals of the Fifteenth Corps were established near the
bridge on this occasion, but during the action two of them had to be removed across the river.
This was the corps chiefly engaged.
On the 1st of September the enemy in front of the Army of the Tennessee stood on the
defensive. In the afternoon a vigorous, gallant, and well-sustained attack was made by the
Fourteenth Army Corps, under command of General J. C. Davis, on that part of the enemy's lines
to our left. Although stubbornly resisted, 2 lines of the enemy's rifle trenches were taken, about
1,000 prisoners captured, a battery of 4 guns, besides a heavy loss in killed and wounded. Under
cover of darkness the rebel army retreated. Next morning we were ordered to pursue. Late in the
afternoon, however, General Sherman learned that Atlanta had been evacuated and was in
possession of our troops, and orders were given to rest for two or three days, and then return by
easy marches to Atlanta, where the army arrived on the 8th of September. All our wounded were
brought back in ambulances, and, on reaching Atlanta, sent to the hospitals in Marietta.
Thus happily terminated a campaign of more than four months' duration, conducted under
extraordinary difficulties, and no less remarkable for its numerous bloody engagements and daily
skirmishes than for the cheerful endurance of the soldiers under frequent and long-continued
hardships. It should have been stated in the proper place that after the death of General
McPherson the command of the Army of the Tennessee devolved upon General J. A. Logan,
who continued in command until the 27th, when General Howard was placed in command--an
officer whose brilliant military record during the war has been rendered still more illustrious by
the extremely important successes won by the Army of the Tennessee while under his command.
But no less important than success, in attaching the soldiers of the army to him, is the constant
interest which he manifests for their physical and moral welfare.
The Army of the Tennessee had been operating for two years on the Mississippi River, where
all necessary provisions in the way of hospitals existed, but when ordered on this campaign these
hospitals were not available, and all those at Nashville and Chattanooga belonged to the Army of
the Cumberland. The hospitals established at Huntsville were ordered to be abandoned, as the
town was to be garrisoned by troops from the Army of the Cumberland. About this time a
temporary camp hospital was established in the vicinity of Chattanooga, under the charge of
Surg. R. Niccolls, U. S. Volunteers, and with it were placed several hundred men, who were
unable to march from being foot-sore or fatigued, and also many who were sick were sent back
from Kingston. About the 1st of June measures were taken to establish the main hospital at
Rome. I learned from General Sherman that this point would be protected, and from the people
that it was celebrated for its salubrity. It was organized by Surg. G. F. French, assisted by Asst.
Surg. C. F. Marsh, Twenty-fifth Iowa, and a number of contract surgeons. Buildings were used at
first, and afterward tents and buildings. About the 20th of June the field hospital at Chattanooga
with medical officers and all remaining patients were brought to Rome. All the iron bedsteads,
mattresses, and other hospital furniture used at Huntsville, together with everything of this kind
in the hands of Doctor Brewer, the medical purveyor, were sent there in the beginning. These
made in all about 1,600 beds, and were afterward increased to 3,000 by making bunks. The
number in hospital never exceeded at any one time 2,750. For two or three weeks some difficulty
was experienced in getting proper food for the sick. Doctor French, the surgeon in charge,
reported that fruit and fowls, cows, and vegetables of all kinds were abundant in the country, but
that the general in command (Vandever), for some unaccountable reason, refused to co-operate
with him in getting these much-needed supplies, or rather, that he would not allow them to be
taken. What are the sufferings of sick men to a hackneyed and effete politician, when he finds
himself unable to alleviate them without incurring the displeasure of ladies(?) who have
remained in pleasant quarters while their husbands, sons, &c., are in the rebel army? It were as
unreasonable to expect the Ethiopian to change his skin as for a man like this to be influenced by
the instincts of a soldier. After the establishment of this hospital no sick or wounded were sent
farther to the rear. All were treated here and in the corps hospitals in Marietta. There were three
of these, one for each corps. That of the Fifteenth was entirely under canvas, and, for
completeness of arrangement in kitchen, laundry, and comfort of the sick, soon became a model.
It was under the charge of Doctor Goslin. The hospital of the Seventeenth Corps was partly in
the military college building and partly in tents on the grounds around it. The Sixteenth Corps
hospital was altogether in buildings, and was the least comfortable of the three. These at one time
contained an aggregate of about 3,000 patients. In a subsequent and fuller report I hope to show
that the wounded treated in these hospitals did quite as well and better than in the more
elaborately fitted-up buildings farther to the rear. During the campaign 625 wounded and over
3,000 sick were taken into hospitals at Rome, Marietta, and division hospitals in the field.
The Army of the Cumberland, having been operating on this line at different points ever
since the war began, had numerous hospitals at its command in Nashville and Chattanooga, and,
having until recently a monopoly of the hospital trains, was enabled to send its sick and wounded
to the rear rapidly, and was not perplexed with the establishment of hospitals for large numbers
of men, with scanty materials and often incompetent or inexperienced men. And yet, forgetting
all these circumstances, I have understood I was much censured by a medical inspector at Resaca
for not having such well-regulated general hospitals in the rear as the Army of the Cumberland.
The regiments were well supplied on leaving Huntsville. About the 1st of June Doctor
Brewer arrived at Big Shanty with a large stock of everything in the way of supplies. These were
at once issued to the surgeons in chief of divisions, who receipted for them and expended them
in the division hospitals. Among these were 2,500 shirts and drawers. After making these issues
the remaining supplies were loaded into a supply train, and on the march moved with the other
supply trains. This arrangement was kept up until the taking of Marietta. The supplies were then
taken from the train and put in store, and issued in the usual way. They were always in reach of
the army, and were left here until the capture of Atlanta. Doctor Brewer deserves much credit for
the manner in which his supplies were kept up and the promptness with which they were issued.
In many articles the standard supply table was departed from, where it was believed to be for the
benefit of the wounded or sick, but the aggregate of medicines used by this army for six months
past will be found, I think, much below the quantities allowed by the supply table.
Of the regimental medical officers of this army I wish to speak a word or two of
commendation. After any battle in which great numbers are wounded, of course the work is very
hard until all are made comfortable. Usually these battles are far apart, with weeks of intervening
rest, but here is a campaign lasting four months, with several severe engagements, and scarcely a
single day without skirmishing more or less severe. After each engagement a number of the
regimental medical officers had to be detached to attend the wounded sent to hospital. It often
happened, owing to movements and the rapidity with which battles followed each other, that
each division would have two or three different field hospitals at the same time miles apart. Of
course, while these continued, it left fewer and fewer men to do the work in the front. With but
very few exceptions they devoted themselves faithfully, and even heroically, to the work before
them. Three of the most competent among them died of diseases contracted at the field hospitals,
and probably due to overwork. One was killed while with his regiment in the trenches, and 2
others severely wounded. It is perhaps complimentary to the medical corps of the army that they
are expected to perform the most arduous, and often painful and disagreeable, offices from no
other motive than a sense of duty. In the line, and all the other staff departments which require
the presence of its members in the field, the prospect of promotion is held out as an additional
stimulus to insure the faithful performance of duty. But surgeons are moved by the same
influences that operate on other officers, and if the Government would institute some system of
promotion, such as exists in the medical departments in other civilized countries, this branch of
its work would be more cheerfully done, and many of the best men who enter the service would
find it to their interest to remain, and would not, as now, be constantly availing themselves of
every opportunity to quit a service that not only offers no promotion, but which in its
administration allows favorites to retain snug places in cities, where the work is light and pay
greater than in the field.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Surgeon, U.S. Army, Medical Director, Dept. of the Tenn.
Major-General HOWARD,
Comdg. Department and Army of the Tennessee.
Near Atlanta, Ga., July 31, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the artillery
of the Army of the Tennessee, during the action of the 22d instant:
The attack commenced on our extreme left and near about 12 m., at which time the following
batteries of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Army Corps were in position from right to left, viz:
Battery F, Second Missouri, two 3-inch guns and two 12-pounder howitzers; Fourth Ohio
Battery, four light 12-pounder guns and two 12-pounder howitzers; Battery H, First Illinois, four
20-pounder Parrotts. To the front and right of large brick house on the north side of the railroad,
Battery A, First Illinois, six light 12-pounders, four of which were advanced in front of the line;
Battery F, First Illinois, six light 12-pounders, was about 400 yards south of the railroad, and the
First Iowa Battery, four 10-pounder Parrotts, on the high hill about 800 yards south of Battery F,
First Illinois. On the right of the Seventeenth Corps, and covering the right flank, was Battery D,
First Illinois, four 24-pounder howitzers. Immediately on the left of this last-named battery was
the Third Ohio Battery, four 20-pounder Parrotts, covering one of the large forts near Atlanta.
Battery H, First Michigan, of six 3-inch guns; Battery F, Second Illinois, four light 12-pounders.
Battery F, Second U.S. Artillery, attached to Sixteenth Corps, was stationed on our extreme left,
covering that flank. When the assault commenced in the rear, this battery was applied for and
ordered to report to Major Ross, chief of artillery of the Sixteenth Army Corps, and while en
route for the rear was captured while passing along the only road leading from its former
position. The Fourteenth Ohio Battery and Battery H, First Missouri, were placed in position
with the Sixteenth Army Corps, facing to the left and rear. The officers and men of these
batteries are entitled to great praise for their noble conduct upon this occasion. These batteries
were engaged about two hours, and expended effectively 1,119 rounds of ammunition. During
the engagement one section of Battery C, First Michigan, was engaged at Decatur, but, in
consequence of the suddenness of the attack, lost their battery wagon and 1 transportation
wagon. The enemy, after hard fighting, were driven from the field.
About an hour after the attack in the rear upon the Sixteenth Corps, the enemy made a furious
assault along the entire front and left of Seventeenth Corps, capturing 1 section of Battery F,
Second Illinois, with First Lieut. W. H. Powell commanding. The entire support of this battery
was captured, and a withdrawal under the circumstances was simply impossible. About this time
the Third Ohio Battery was ordered to withdraw their 20-pounder Parrotts, and, with the
remaining section of Company F, Second Illinois, were placed in position in the rear of the
Fifteenth Corps. Battery D, First Illinois, and Battery H, First Michigan, did well, and remained
upon the hill which had cost us so much, and which was the key to our entire position. During
the attack upon the left and rear, Battery F, First Illinois, was faced to the left, and the First Iowa
Battery to the left and rear; also two 12-pounder howitzers of the Second Missouri Battery were
placed in position with Battery F, First Illinois, all supported by the Fourth Division of the
Fifteenth Corps. In a short time after the above formation was completed the attack was made on
the Seventeenth Corps, in which these guns, particularly the First Iowa, rendered important
service. About 1.30 p.m. the enemy attacked the left center of the Second Division of the
Fifteenth Army Corps, forcing the infantry back, and capturing Battery H and 4 guns of Battery
A, First Illinois. While the enemy was making this assault, the guns of the First Division were
turned upon the assaulting column and did great execution. The chiefs of artillery of the different
corps--Major Maurice, of the Fifteenth, Major Ross, of the Sixteenth, and Major Cheney, of the
Seventeenth Army Corps--deserve great credit for the able management of the artillery of their
respective corps, but more particularly are we indebted to the artillery officers and men of the
Sixteenth Army Corps, as the safety of the entire command depended in a great measure upon
their firmness and bravery. Honorable mention is made of the following officers and men:
Captain Welker, chief of artillery of Second Division, Sixteenth Army Corps; Captain Griffiths,
chief of artillery of Fourth Division, Fifteenth Army Corps; Captain De Gress, of Battery H, First
Illinois; Lieutenant Smyth, Battery A, First Illinois; First Sergt. John L. Bascom, Battery H, First
Missouri; Sergt. Seth Calhoun, same battery, who, though wounded through the neck and arm,
did not leave the field. Both of these sergeants displayed great courage and coolness, and are
commended for promotion. Accompanying please find reports of casualties, losses, and return
showing the expenditure of ammunition during the month of July.
Capt. and Chief of Artillery, Dept. and Army of the Tenn.
A. A. G., Artillery Headquarters, Mil. Div. Miss.
[East Point, Ga., September 13, 1864.]
COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the Fifteenth
Army Corps in the Georgia campaign, from May 1, 1864, to 1 p.m. during the battle of July 22,
1864, before Atlanta, at which time, by the death of Major-General McPherson, the command of
the Department and Army of the Tennessee devolved upon me, and from the evening of July 27,
when I again assumed command of the corps, to the 8th of September, when the campaign ended
and my command went into camp at East Point, Ga., six miles south-southwest of Atlanta.
My immediate command consisted of the First Division, Brig. Gen. P. Joseph Osterhaus,
afterward Brig. Gen. Charles R. Woods, afterward Maj. Gen. P. Joseph Osterhaus, commanding;
Second Division, Brig. Gen. Morgan L. Smith, afterward Brig. Gen. W. B. Hazen, commanding;
and the Fourth Division, Brig. Gen. William Harrow, commanding. Accompanying the report is
a general map of our route and camps during the campaign, and plans in detail, numbered in
regular succession, of the most important of our positions in which battles were fought. The
operations of the Third Division, Brig. Gen. John E. Smith commanding, which was left in North
Alabama, and which has since been guarding railroads and lines of communication, will be given
in a separate report. In pursuance of instructions dated April 28, 1864, from the major-general
commanding the Department and Army of the Tennessee, Osterhaus', Morgan L. Smith's, and
Harrow's divisions broke up their winter camps along the line of the Memphis and Charleston
Railroad, in North Alabama, May 1, 1864, and marched by the wagon road, which runs
substantially with the railroad, via Stevenson and Bridgeport, to Chattanooga, arriving during the
night of the 5th and morning of the 6th of May. The roads generally were very bad, and streams
high. All obstacles were promptly overcome by the pioneers and men of Harrow's division,
under the general supervision of Captain Klostermann, acting chief engineer Grocer of the corps.
Near Chattanooga camps were established, in which were deposited all surplus baggage, camp
and garrison equipage, and the transportation of the command was-placed on the campaign
footing. My command rested on the night of the 6th at Gordon's Mills, and marched on the 7th in
the direction of Villanow, camping at the western entrance of Gordon's Springs Gap. On the 8th
marched through Villanow, and camped at the west end of Snake Creek Gap of the Chattoogata
Mountain. On the 9th, leaving the entire transportation, except fifteen ammunition wagons to
each division, with Col. Reuben Williams' brigade, of Harrow's division, as a guard, and to hold
the gap, the command marched through the gap in the direction of Resaca in light fighting trim,
in rear of the Left Wing of the Sixteenth Corps, in compliance with Special Field Orders, No. 3,
headquarters Department and Army of the Tennessee, dated May 8, 1864. At the crossroads, two
miles southwest from Resaca, by direction of the major-general commanding the Army of the
Tennessee, I halted my command, and disposed it as a support to the forces of General Dodge,
which were moving against Resaca. The movement not being successful, I fell back in the
evening, by order, to Sugar Valley, taking a defensive position at the intersection of the Dalton
and Rome and Resaca roads; General M. L. Smith's division being on my right, its right resting
about a quarter of a mile south of the Resaca road, the line of battle crossing that road and about
a quarter of a mile north of it, retiring until the formation was nearly parallel with our line of
communication--the Resaca and Villanow road. Osterhaus' division connected with its left, and
continued the line substantially in the same direction. Harrow's division was in reserve. In
connection with the forces of General Dodge, this disposition covered the eastern approach to
Snake Creek Gap. On the 10th skirmishing was kept up with the enemy's light troops during the
entire day. Indications going to show that the enemy contemplated an attack in overwhelming
force, a new defensive line was selected, nearer the mouth of the gap, in a stronger natural
In compliance with Special Field Orders, No. 5, headquarters Department and Army of the
Tennessee, I commenced withdrawing my command about 3 a.m. of the 11th, and by 6 a.m. had
occupied the new position on the left of the Resaca road, the right of M. L. Smith's division
resting on the road, Osterhaus in the center, connecting with him, and Harrow on the left. The
pickets were withdrawn soon after the troops without loss. The 11th was occupied in completing
the works. On the 12th I moved General M. L. Smith's division toward Resaca, to the
intersection of the Dalton and Rome road, as a support to Kilpatrick's cavalry, the whole
movement being a reconnaissance in force with a view of developing the force and position of
the enemy in our immediate front. On the morning of May 13, in pursuance of Special Field
Orders, No. 7, headquarters Department and Army of the Tennessee, the divisions of Osterhaus
and Harrow moved out of their works and advanced on the Resaca road to the cross-roads, two
miles from Resaca, where I deployed them into line of battle on the left of Morgan L. Smith's
division. The line being perfected at about 1 p.m. the command, preceded by a strong line of
skirmishers, commenced steadily driving the enemy toward Resaca, over broken and irregular
ground, with heavy growths of timber and underbrush, with occasional small cleared fields. The
enemy's skirmish fire was rapid and effective, but he made no decided stand until our line
debouched from the woods into a wide extent of cleared fields, along the farther edge of which,
at a distance of about 700 yards, extended a range of commanding hills, which bounded the
valley of the Oostenaula River on the west, but their particular direction was that of Camp Creek,
a small stream whose banks they fringed. The enemy having taken position on those hills, their
infantry firing from behind slight barricades and pits, and having opened artillery with some
effect, some pieces of the First and Fourth Divisions were placed in position, and the rebel
battery promptly silenced. I then moved forward the entire line, which advanced steadily, and
resistingly drove the enemy from his position and carried the Camp Creek hills. The crests
immediately on the right and left of the road overlooked the enemy's forts, the town of Resaca,
and the railroad and bridge over the Oostenaula River. I caused artillery to be placed in position
on these crests, and opened vigorously, causing considerable confusion and interrupting the
passage of railroad trains. My lines were formed in the most advantageous positions, using,
wherever practicable, the crests of the Camp Creek hills, General M. L. Smith's division, being
on our right of the Resaca road, and extending across it, with Osterhaus on his left. Harrow's
division, at first in the reserve, was afterward deployed farther to the left to fill up a gap caused
by the withdrawal of troops of the Twentieth Corps. Here, during the rest of the day, Col.
Reuben Williams' brigade, of Harrow's division, was engaged constantly, with heavy and
continuous skirmishing, with considerable loss. Captain Griffiths, First Iowa Battery, and chief
of artillery Fourth Division, placed his guns in position in an open field, directly exposed to the
fire of the enemy's artillery, and engaged them during the afternoon, with damaging effect,
entirely disabling two of the enemy's guns, which were left on the field when he evacuated. The
line rested at night in the position described, the skirmishers advanced well forward, generally
holding the line of Camp Creek. Slight rifle-pits were thrown up by the troops for their
protection, and works built for the batteries by the pioneers, a strong show of artillery having
been developed in the heavy forts of the enemy. The position of my command at Resaca is
shown in the accompanying plan, No. 1. On the morning of the 14th sharp skirmishing and
heavy artillery exchanges were renewed. During the morning the several brigades of Harrow's
division were removed from their positions on the left and stationed in rear of M. L. Smith's and
Osterhaus' divisions as reserves. Appearances indicating that a severe battle was in progress
upon the extreme left of our army, I caused a feint attack to be made, and continued for some
time lively demonstrations to deter the enemy from sending re-enforcements from our front.
General Osterhaus took advantage of the feint to attack the enemy's skirmishers in the heavily
wooded valley near the road. This was done in the most gallant manner. The bridge over Camp
Creek was carried, and the Twelfth Missouri Infantry thrown forward into the woods previously
occupied by the enemy, thus forming a living têtê-de-pont, which in the ensuing movement
proved of great value. Directly in front of M. L. Smith's division, and at a distance varying from
one-half to three-quarters of a mile from it, a series of low, irregular hills extended from the
Oostenaula due north as far as the Resaca road. They were occupied by the enemy in force, and
were partially fortified. This position, if in our possession, would bring us within three-eighths of
a mile of the enemy's nearest fort, and within half a mile of the railroad bridge, thus practically
cutting the railroad. To gain this position had been the work intended for the next day, and a
number of bridges were to have been thrown over Camp Creek on the night of the 14th instant to
facilitate the passage of troops, but the continuous artillery and musketry fire on the left, and the
necessity for us to make a further diversion, precipitated the movement, and at 5.30 p.m. of the
14th the assaulting column crossed Camp Creek as best they could, some over the bridge, others
on logs, and others wading, with their arms and equipments held over their heads. The assaulting
force consisted of Brig. Gen. Charles R. Woods' brigade, of the First Division; the Third
Missouri Infantry, of the Third Brigade, being substituted for the Twenty-sixth Iowa Infantry,
which, being engaged as skirmishers, was unavailable, on the left, and Brig. Gen. Giles A.
Smiths brigade, of the Second Division, on the right. Both brigades were formed in double lines,
and in front and on the left of Woods' brigade the Twelfth Missouri Infantry, disposed as
skirmishers, accompanied the assaulting columns. The average distance to the objective point
was about one-third of a mile, over a marshy bottom, nearly clear of standing timber, but full of
fallen tree trunks and thickets, and intersected with miry sloughs. At ten minutes before 6 p.m.
the advance sounded, and the lines of gallant men started at the double-quick over the difficult
ground, followed by the cheers of their fellow soldiers on the Camp Creek hills, and met by a
storm of lead and iron from the enemy. The rebel infantry poured in from the hills in front a
close, destructive, and well-directed fire. The artillery from their forts opened in one continuous
roar. The direction of most of their artillery fire was at first diagonally across the lines, the angle
growing less as the storming column advanced, until it nearly enfiladed them. Their practice was
excellent, the bursting of shells directly over the devoted lines seemed continuous, but neither
thicket, nor slough, nor shot, nor shell, distracted for a moment the attention of the stormers from
their objective point. Lines temporarily disarranged were reorganized without slackening the
speed, until, without firing a shot, they, at the point of the bayonet, planted their colors on the
summits of the conquered hills. Under the soldierly and efficient direction of their brigade
commanders the troops were at once disposed in the most advantageous positions for holding the
ground, and for protection from the artillery fire still furiously kept up. Pioneers and intrenching
tools were sent over, and work was immediately commenced making rifle-pits. The indications
being that additional troops had been brought up by the enemy, and that an attempt would be
made to retake the hills, the vigilant brigade commanders kept their troops ready for every
emergency, and the line of skirmishers well advanced and on the alert. The indications proved
true, and about 7.30 o'clock in the evening the skirmishers came in, and shortly after them a large
force of the enemy, in column of regiments, advanced to the assault. They were met by a
withering fire, which, at first, they received steadily, soon shook, and finally broke their lines and
forced them to retire and reform. It being evident that their lines were of greater extent than ours,
and that their next attack would endanger our flanks, General Lightburn's brigade, of the Second
Division, was sent to their assistance. This brigade responded in the most prompt and gallant
manner. From the Camp Creek hills they had seen the progress of the engagement; had noted the
first repulse of the enemy, and as the red flame from the muskets (showing plainly through the
night) defined exactly the position of the opposing forces, they had seen the lines of the enemy
gradually closing around and in rear of our flanks, every man felt he would be needed, and
without orders prepared to go; so that when the orders came it needed but the word, and the
gallant brigade was wading Camp Creek waist deep, and in some places neck deep, and off at the
double-quick. General Light-burn reached General Giles A. Smith's position with astonishing
quickness, and, forming on his right, the united lines poured a fire on the enemy which swept
them entirely from that front, defeated and disheartened. About the time General Lightburn's
brigade was sent over, two regiments of the Sixteenth Corps, the Twenty-fifth Wisconsin and
Thirty-fifth New Jersey Infantry, were sent over by General McPherson, to re-enforce General
Woods in the position where they were most needed, and gallantly did their duty, until, about 10
p.m., the last body of the enemy retired, broken and disheartened, from the field. It was evident
to the meanest comprehension among the rebels that night that the men who double-quicked
across to their hills that afternoon had come to stay. Skirmishers were thrown well out, and the
men intrenched during the night.
The loss in my command, to include this date, was 102 killed, 512 wounded, and 14 missing;
aggregate, 628. We captured 92 prisoners. The loss of the enemy in my front in killed and
wounded is estimated at 1,500.
During the entire day of the 15th skirmishing and artillery firing was kept up, with more or
less vigor. I caused artillery to be placed in the most advantageous situations in the position
captured the previous day, and the railroad bridge and the town were thus held entirely at our
mercy. During the night of the 15th and 16th the enemy evacuated his entire line, and retreated
southward, his extreme left at Resaca being of necessity held to the last. Although the sound of
the heavy firing on the extreme left of our line, continuing late into the night, did not make it
appear as if an immediate evacuation were probable, the skirmish lines in front of my command
were strengthened, and were directed to press the enemy constantly at all points during the night.
At about daylight in the morning the skirmishers of Smith's and Osterhaus' divisions entered
Resaca, driving the enemy's rear guard across the Oostenaula, and preventing them from
destroying the common road bridge. The railroad bridge, however, could not be saved, and was
completely burned up.
Anticipating orders to follow in pursuit on the main south road, I at once commenced moving
my command across the river, several of my advance regiments having crossed the bridge, when,
in compliance with directions from Major-General McPherson, I halted the command until
further orders. Special Field Orders, No. 11, Department and Army of the Tennessee, arriving
soon after, in compliance therewith, I moved my command on the Rome road, crossing the
Oostenaula at Lay's Ferry, from which point I followed General Dodge's command. Learning
that he was attacked by the enemy about three miles from the ferry, at his request for assistance, I
double-quicked Osterhaus' division to his support, and deployed it on the crest of the hills, on the
south side of the road, in the most favorable position to resist an attack, and held the other two
divisions in reserve. It soon became certain that no serious attack need be anticipated, and every
evidence going to show that the enemy had retired, the command was moved forward in the
direction of McGuire's, about a mile east of which I went into camp. On the morning of the 18th
my command was placed in the advance, and was continued in that position until our arrival at
Dallas. A small force of the enemy's cavalry, with a battery of artillery, harassed our front, but
without materially impeding us. At Adairsville I moved in a southwesterly direction, by a byroad
to Woodland, on the Kingston and Rome road, camping in line of battle, with Smith's
division in reserve. On the morning of the 19th heavy cannonading being heard in the direction
of Kingston, it was deemed proper to park the train at Woodland, leaving a regiment to guard it. I
then moved cautiously on the Kingston road, with Osterhaus' division in advance, followed by
Smith's and Harrow's divisions. We reached Kingston, however, without opposition that
afternoon, and camped on the Etowah River.
While examining the surrounding country by my direction, Maj. C. J. Stolbrand, chief of
artillery of the corps, a gallant and untiring officer, was captured by a squad of the enemy's
The command rested at this point until the morning of the 23d, by which time twenty days'
supplies had been procured. On the 23d I moved nearly south, on Van Wert road, crossing the
Etowah River at Wooley's Bridge, and camping at night on the Euharlee Creek, making a
distance of eighteen miles. May 24, I marched through Van Wert toward Dallas, a distance of
eight miles. May 25, advanced to Pumpkin Vine Creek, camping in line of battle. Hearing heavy
firing in the direction of Dallas, and learning from deserters and others that the enemy were near
that place in heavy force, commanded by Johnston in person, I moved my command forward
cautiously on the 26th, with a strong advance guard and flankers. General Dodge's command
advanced on my left. The cavalry force, assisted by my artillery, having, after a spirited skirmish,
driven away the enemy's light troops, which were confronting us, on the west side of Dallas, we
entered and marched through the town, taking the Powder Springs road to the eastward. At the
distance of two miles beyond the town the enemy was found by our skirmishers in heavy force,
occupying strong field-works. I caused their line to be felt of sharply, and by night had
developed its general position, the general course of-which was north-northeast and southsouthwest,
extending across the Powder Springs and Marietta roads, with their flanks well
advanced. I immediately placed my command in position, as shown in accompanying plan (No.
2), Harrow's division being on the right, extending just across the Villa Rica road, Morgan L.
Smith in the center, crossing the Marietta road, and Osterhaus on the left, connecting with
General Dodge's command. Our right was afterward joined by the mounted infantry of Wilder's
brigade. In this position I caused the most favorable line of works practicable to be thrown up
during the night. On the 27th heavy skirmishing and artillery firing was kept up during the entire
day. In the afternoon a strong demonstration was made by the enemy upon General Harrow's
front, which was checked promptly by his troops. The 28th opened with rapid skirmishing,
which continued until 3.30 o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy (afterward ascertained to be
Hardee's entire command, estimated by prisoners to be 25,000) made determined assaults, in
columns of regiments, on the most assailable positions along our entire front. The first assault
was on Harrow, and was made directly down the line of the Villa Rica road, the weakest point in
our whole position. The road there runs directly up the backbone of a ridge, which curved
continuously to our right and constantly increased in height. It had been considered impracticable
to carry our line far enough forward across this ridge to overcome this objectionable point,
without weakening it too much elsewhere in thus adding to its length. The enemy at this point
approached within 150 yards, without either having been seen or exposed to our fire. His assault
was made in columns of regiments, and with the utmost dash and confidence. Three guns of the
First Iowa Battery, which had been run out on the skirmish line, were temporarily surrounded by
the enemy. They cannot be said, however, to have been in his possession, as the few who
attempted to lay hands on them were shot down. The fighting at this point was close and deadly.
As line upon line of the enemy debouched upon the open plateau, within eighty yards of our
works, they were met by a front and flank fire from brave men, who stood unflinchingly to their
guns, under the orders of their efficient officers. Colonel Walcutt, commanding the brigade
engaged, stood on the parapet, amid the storm of bullets, ruling the fight. Line after line was sent
back broken to their works, and in half an hour the assault was over, their dead and wounded
only occupying the ground on which they advanced. The assault on Smith's division commenced
a few minutes after that on Harrow, and that on Osterhaus a short time later still. The nature of
the ground on these fronts being less favorable for the enemy than that on Harrow's front, they
were repulsed very handsomely, and with great loss, though they held on for some time
tenaciously, but uselessly. Their dead and severely wounded were mostly left on the field. The
engagement, from first to last, lasted about one hour, our troops in many places following the
enemy, in their retreat, to their works.
My losses were as follows: Killed, 30; wounded, 295; missing, 54; aggregate, 379. We
captured 97 prisoners. The loss of the enemy was estimated at 2,000. We buried of the enemy's
dead in my front over 300 bodies.
In compliance with Special Field Orders, No. 23, Department and Army of the Tennessee, on
the evening of May 29 I commenced withdrawing the right of my command from the works, the
intention of the movement being to change the position of the Army of the Tennessee and of
General Garrard's command to the left, to connect with the Army of the Cumberland, from which
we had been separated by a gap of several miles. Part of the troops on my extreme right had been
withdrawn, when the enemy demonstrated heavily along the entire front, making it necessary to
return all the troops to the trenches again. During the whole night these demonstrations were
continued at intervals. At several points, especially on the left of Osterhaus, there was evidence
that their feints were intended to be turned into real attacks upon the discovery of any evidence
of weakness in our lines. From 11 p.m. until about 3 a.m. the musketry fire on both sides was
more or less vigorously sustained, and our intended movement was not accomplished. No further
change was attempted until the 1st of June, when at daylight I again commenced withdrawing,
beginning with the right of my line (previously a retired line had been constructed by the
pioneers of the corps), crossing the road near the eastern edge of Dallas. In this line I placed the
troops and batteries until the skirmishers were withdrawn, and everything was in readiness for
the complete withdrawal. It was afterwards discovered that this maneuver completely deceived
the enemy for the time as to our intentions. This temporary line of works crossed the Villa Rica
road perpendicularly about half a mile from Dallas, and commanded the large, open field in
which the Villa Rica and Marietta roads intersected. The withdrawal was effected speedily and
without loss, the column passing through the defensive works above mentioned, followed closely
by the enemy's skirmishers, who, seeing the works and hearing from them, were deceived into
the belief, as it was afterward learned, that the new line was to be permanently held. As soon as it
was evident that the enemy was not prepared to follow and attack I moved my command
through Dallas, over the Pumpkin Vine road, and a by-road leading to the main Marietta road to
the rear of General Hooker's command, which I relieved at once with my troops. The position of
the troops while at this point is shown in plan No. 3. Harrow's division was on the right, M. L.
Smith's in the center, with Colonel Williamson's brigade, of Osterhaus' division, on the left, the
other two brigades of Osterhaus being in reserve, one behind the right and the other behind the
left of my line.
From the 1st to the 5th of June skirmishing was continuous. Wherever at all possible my
lines were pushed nearer the enemy's. By daylight on the morning of June 5 the enemy had
evacuated his works and retreated. On the 5th of June, in accordance with Special Field Orders,
No. 30, Department and Army of the Tennessee, I moved my command on two roads, running
nearly parallel with and to the rear of our lines, to Burnt Church, and thence to Acworth, arriving
at the latter place on the morning of the 6th. Passing through the town, I moved on the Marietta
road about two miles out, and disposed of my troops to command the road and the adjacent open
country, Harrow on the right, Morgan L. Smith in the center, and Osterhaus on the left, and
remained in this position until June 10. At 6 a.m. of June 10, as directed in Special Field Orders,
No. 34, Department and Army of the Tennessee, I moved in the advance on the Marietta road,
carrying ten days' subsistence, with about 150 rounds of small-arm ammunition per man. Smith's
division had the advance, followed by divisions of Harrow and Osterhaus, respectively. The
infantry skirmishers of the enemy were found posted about one mile south of Big Shanty Station
behind slight rail piles, from which they were soon dislodged by our artillery. It was soon evident
that the enemy intended making a decided stand, and that they had a formidable line of works in
front of Kenesaw Mountain. This line was developed crossing the Marietta road at the distance
of two miles and a half from Big Shanty. On the east and west of the road the course of the main
line was not determined for several days, the enemy keeping his wings well advanced, and
erecting several lines of temporary works, retiring afterward from one to another of them as he
was pressed by our troops. On the 11th light skirmishing continued during the day, and on the
12th I advanced Osterhaus' division one mile, driving the enemy into their main line of works, in
our immediate front. The position of these works, and of our subsequent movements in front of
Kenesaw, is shown in the accompanying plan, No. 4. I caused a line of works to be thrown up
within as short a distance as practicable of the enemy, and occupied them with the troops of
General Osterhaus. His batteries shelled the enemy vigorously, eliciting comparatively feeble
and ineffective response. On the 13th the enemy was reported to be moving with the apparent
intention of turning the left flank of the Army of the Tennessee, formed by the Seventeenth
Corps. By direction of General McPherson, I moved M. L. Smith's division by the left flank to
the rear of General Blair, to support him, if necessary. On the 14th the position of my command
remained unchanged. Skirmishers and artillery, were constantly engaged. On the 15th I moved
General Harrow's command, by direction of General McPherson, to the extreme left of the Army
of the Tennessee, and formed it perpendicular to the main line of General Blair's command, thus
placing it directly across the right flank of the enemy, Walcutt's brigade being in the first line and
the brigades of Col. Reuben Williams and Colonel Oliver in the second. The division charged
gallantly against the enemy, driving him from his position in confusion, killing and wounding
many and capturing about 350 prisoners, 22 of whom were commissioned officers. My loss was
45 killed and wounded. The object of the attack having been accomplished, the division was
withdrawn in the evening to the rear of the Seventeenth Corps. From June 16 to 18 my lines were
advanced wherever practicable, the skirmish and artillery fire being sharp and continuous. On the
night of June 18 and 19 the enemy abandoned his line, and retired to a second line about two
miles in the rear. His line in our immediate front was on the crest of Kenesaw Mountain proper,
his skirmish line being at the foot of the mountain. On the 19th of June I advanced my line to
near the base of the mountain, and intrenched. On the 20th I remained in that position, with
skirmishers and artillery constantly engaged. From the 20th to the 25th the position of my
command remained unchanged, with severe skirmishing and artillery practice along my entire
line. The enemy shelled my position from the summit of Kenesaw Mountain continually, doing
but little damage.
During the interval between the 20th and 25th I continued to push forward the skirmishers up
the side of the mountain, driving those of the enemy before us. On the 24th I attempted to gain
the summit of the mountain with a double line of skirmishers, the opinion of my division
commanders being that the position was only held by a strong skirmish line of the enemy. The
skirmishers advanced in good order, at each step meeting with strong resistance, until they had
reached within 200 yards of the crest, where they found a farther advance could not be made
without being re-enforced. Not having an order to advance my line, I caused my skirmishers to
be withdrawn to a position nearer the main line, protected by skirmish pits. This advance proved
the enemy to be still in possession of the mountain in force. During these operations, Osterhaus'
(First) division held position on the right, connecting with Dodge's command, and Smith's
(Second) division on the left, connecting with Blair's command, and Harrow's (Fourth) division
was the reserve of my line. All my troops were protected by earth-works. On the 25th, in
accordance with Special Field Orders, No. 50, from Department and Army of the Tennessee, to
relieve the command of Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis' division, of the Fourteenth Corps, I sent
General Harrow's (Fourth) division, at 8 p.m. of that day, to the right of the Left Wing of the
Sixteenth Army Corps, with orders to comply with the requirements of the order referred to. The
movement was executed successfully, and without loss, though the situation of Davis' division
was very close to the main line of the enemy's works. On the 26th, by authority of Special Field
Orders, No. 51, from Department and Army of the Tennessee, I moved the remainder of my
command, Brigadier-Generals Osterhaus' and M. L. Smith's divisions, to the right, and relieved
the remaining troops of the Fourteenth Corps in position. The movement was executed by the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps, relieving my troops in line in the afternoon of the 26th, when I
ordered them to fall back quietly, under cover of the woods, to a position where they remained
until after dark, when I moved them by the right flank to the place designated in the order. The
distance to march was three miles, and the hour for starting was 8 p.m. At daylight of the 27th
the order was successfully executed, my troops having relieved those of the Fourteenth Army
Corps, directly under the guns of the enemy, on Little Kenesaw Mountain. This movement again
brought my command together, with Osterhaus' division on the right and Harrow's division on
the left, with Smith's division in reserve.
In pursuance of instructions contained in Special Field Orders, No. 51, Department and Army
of the Tennessee, I organized the division of Brig. Gen. M. L. Smith, consisting of Brig. Gen. J.
A. J. Lightburn's and Brig. Gen. Giles A. Smith's brigades, and Col. C. C. Walcutt's brigade, of
the Fourth Division, General Harrow commanding, into an assaulting column, under command
of General M. L. Smith, with orders to be ready at 8 o'clock precisely, on the morning of the
27th, to assault the enemy's works on the south and west slope of Little Kenesaw Mountain. The
column for assault being formed, I directed it at 8 o clock precisely to move forward.
Immediately after uncovering themselves, they became engaged. The advance was continued in
two lines, steadily, in the face of a destructive fire from three batteries of about twelve pieces,
throwing shot and shell, and from a musketry fire from the sharpshooters of the enemy, situated
below the enemy's first line of rifle-pits and also from the rifle-pits. After a most stubborn and
destructive resistance, my attacking column succeeded in taking and holding two lines of the
enemy's rifle-pits, and advanced toward the succeeding works of the enemy, situated just below
the crest of the mountain. It soon became evident that the works could not be approached by
assault, on account of a steep declivity of rocks twenty and twenty-five feet in height, and the
nature of the ground, which was of the most rugged and craggy character, exposing at times
small bodies of my troops to the concentrated fire of the enemy. Commanding officers state most
positively that the position could not be gained in two hours, without any opposing force. After
vainly attempting to carry the works for some time, and finding that so many gallant men were
being uselessly slain, I ordered them to retire to the last line of works captured, and placed them
in a defensible condition for occupancy. The pioneer corps of the command were at once sent to
General Smith for this purpose. No less than seven commanding officers of regiments were
killed or disabled in this assault. Among the killed was the gallant Lieutenant-Colonel Barnhill,
of the Fortieth Illinois Volunteers, who was killed instantly at the head of his gallant regiment,
within thirty feet of the enemy's last line. Near night-fall the enemy on the right of my line,
situated in the captured works, advanced from their works and attacked General Lightburn's
command. After a short but severe engagement they were compelled to retire precipitately, and
leave their dead and wounded on the ground, when they could not gain possession of them. After
this affair the enemy remained quiet, and little firing was heard during the night.
In this assault we captured 87 prisoners, including 3 commissioned officers. My casualties
were 80 killed, 506 wounded, 17 missing; aggregate. 603 out of the three brigades which
constituted the assaulting column.
The night of the 27th was occupied in strengthening the position taken in the day. The 28th,
29th and 30th of June and 1st of July passed without any event of importance occurring, the
usual picket and artillery firing being constantly kept up on both sides. The different positions
occupied by my command from June 10 to June 30 will be observed by referring to map No. 4,
where they are marked A, B, C, D, E, and F. In accordance to Special Field Orders, No. 56,
Department and Army of the Tennessee, dated July 1, I sent the division of Brig. Gen. Morgan L.
Smith, at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 2d, by a road leading in rear of the army, to the
Sandtown road, and thence by the Sandtown road to the support of General Schofield, whose
headquarters were at Cheney's house, at the intersection of the Marietta and Powder Springs and
Sandtown roads. On the 2d of July, by virtue of Special Field Orders, No. 57, Department and
Army of the Tennessee, of that date, I was directed to pull out of the position held by the First
and Fourth Divisions of my command, as soon as the left of the column of Maj. Gen. G. M.
Dodge had filed out, and march to the Sandtown road, thence down it, following Major-General
Dodge's command, to the forks of the road leading to Ruff's Mill and Widow Mitchell's, where I
was to halt and act as a reserve. While the general movements were being performed by the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps, before daylight, my skirmishers, through their vigilance,
discovered the enemy's evacuation of Kenesaw Mountain, and advanced and took possession of
the crest of that mountain at daylight. I was then verbally directed by Major-General McPherson
to move my command (the First and Fourth Divisions) by the left flank, passing Kenesaw
Mountain, and to enter Marietta on the south side of the mountain. I caused the advance to be
made rapidly, with skirmishers thrown well forward, and on the flanks of my command, and
entered Marietta before the cavalry, which had previously been ordered, had arrived. We
captured 200 prisoners before reaching Marietta. At that place I disposed my command in the
most advantageous position, covering the town, and remained in camp until 9 a.m. of the 4th
July, when, by direction of Major-General Sherman, dated on the morning of July 4, I proceeded
with my command, leaving the Twenty-fifth Iowa, Colonel Stone commanding, as provost-guard
in the town, by way of Cheney's house, and reported to Major-General McPherson on the right of
the army. South of Cheney's house, on the Sandtown road, I was joined by the Second Division
of my command. On the 5th and 6th slight advances were made. On the 7th I occupied the line
held by the Twentieth Army Corps on Nickajack Creek, very near the banks of the
Chattahoochee River, relieving the troops of that command with the troops of my entire
command. I placed General Harrow's (Fourth) division on the right, connecting with the left of
the Seventeenth Army Corps, General Osterhaus (First) division in the center, and General
Morgan L. Smith's (Second) division on the left, connecting with the right of the Cumberland
Army. (See map No. 5.) This position was maintained, with occasional skirmishing and artillery
practice, by my command until the 12th, when, in pursuance of Special Field Orders, No. 66,
Department and Army of the Tennessee, I started my troops at 5 p.m. to the bridge across the
Chattahoochee, near Roswell Factory, and moved by way of Marietta, camping a few miles
south of that place, on the night of the 12th. My troops passed through Marietta on the morning
of the 13th, and the advanced division of my command reached Roswell that evening. The other
two divisions I directed to camp a short distance from Roswell, and on the 15th, in accordance
with special instructions from Major-General McPherson, commanding department, I moved my
command across the Chattahoochee, on the bridge which had just been completed, and took a
position on the left of General Dodge's command, already in position.
On the 17th of July, in pursuance of Special Field Orders, No. 69, Department and Army of
the Tennessee, dated July 16, I moved from the position just referred to, at 5.30 o clock, in
advance of the Left Wing, Sixteenth Army Corps, on the road leading to Cross Keys, until I
reached Providence Church, when I moved on a left-hand road (called sometimes the Decatur
road) until I reached Nancy's Creek, where I took up position on each side of the road in line of
battle. At this point slight skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry took place, and they were driven
by my skirmishers across the creek. On the morning of the 18th at 5 o'clock, under Special Field
Orders, No. 70, Department and Army of the Tennessee, I started my command on the Decatur
road and moved to the Widow Rainey's, thence on the Stone Mountain road, by Blake's Mill, to
Bowman's [Browning's?] Court-House, at the intersection of the Stone Mountain and
Lawrenceville and Decatur roads, where I was directed to hold my command in readiness to
assist Brigadier-General Garrard, if he should require it, in his efforts to break the Decatur
railroad. Subsequently to the issuing of the order referred to, Major-General McPherson directed
me to move, with a part of my command, directly to the railroad, if possible, and break it that
day. I accordingly moved forward, with a part of the Second Division, and struck the railroad
near Stone Mountain, and effectually destroyed it for a considerable distance. Maj. John R.
Hotaling, senior aide-de-camp on my staff, with my escort company, numbering seventy men,
was sent out to protect the right flank of this detachment of my command while it was moving in
the direction of the road. While out he conceived the idea of penetrating to the road with this
little force and destroy what part of it he could between the point the infantry were to strike it
and Decatur. He moved accordingly, struck the road, and burned two culverts and destroyed a
considerable portion of the track. He is entitled to much credit for this fearless action, as he
inflicted considerable damage to the enemy, and at the same time protected the body of troops
from surprise which was moving against the road. After rendering the destruction of the road at
the point where I struck it as complete as possible under the circumstances, I moved my
command to the vicinity of Harrison's [Henderson's?] Mill, and placed them in position for the
In pursuance of Special Field Orders, No. 71, from Department and Army of the Tennessee, I
moved at 5 o'clock July 19, in light fighting order, on the Decatur road, in the direction of
Decatur, under orders to strike the railroad at the nearest point on my route and tear up the track,
burn the ties, and make the destruction complete and effectual, my command struck the railroad
at the town of Decatur, six miles east of Atlanta, and commenced the work of destruction, which
in every respect fully complied with the tenor of my instructions. My command bivouacked on
the north side of Decatur on the night of July 19. In accordance with Special Field Orders, No.
72, from Department and Army of the Tennessee, dated July 19, I moved my command at 5 a.m.
July 20 on the direct road to Atlanta, leaving all my wagons, except my ammunition wagons and
ambulances, in the vicinity and to the north of Decatur. The division of General Morgan L.
Smith had the advance, and soon after the head of the column had moved out of Decatur, his
skirmishers met those of the enemy and drove them steadily before them. The enemy would
occasionally use artillery from commanding positions on the road, which in no wise impeded my
advance. In the afternoon Captain De Gress, commanding Company H, First Illinois Light
Artillery (20-pounder Parrott guns), having secured a position from which he could see a part of
the city, apparently two miles and a half distant, immediately placed his battery in position and
directed his fire toward the place. Several of his shots were observed by the signal officer of the
corps to strike some buildings in the town. These were acknowledged to be the first shots from
the army which had entered the city of Atlanta. At night I placed my command in position for
defense across the railroad, fronting Atlanta, at the supposed distance of two miles and a half
from the city. During the night a temporary defensive line was constructed, and I caused a few
pieces of artillery to be placed in position. Almost the entire divisions of Generals Harrow and
Woods (late Osterhaus) were held in reserve. The 21st was passed in slight advances and
demonstrations on the enemy to enable General Blair's command to join me on the left, and
General Dodge's command to join me on the right.
During the day I brought into position Harrow's and Woods' divisions on the right and left of
Smith's division, respectively, holding a necessary reserve from each division. My command was
now in position across the Decatur railroad with the center of my command, Morgan L. Smith's
division, crossing the road. The situation of my command will be seen by reference to map No.
6, herewith inclosed. The position was strengthened by earth-works, head-logs, &c., during the
night of the 21st. On the morning of the 22d it was discovered that the enemy had abandoned his
line of works in our immediate front, and I advanced a portion of my command at once and took
possession of the line, and directed General Smith to advance a section of artillery to a position
in front of the abandoned line, which I pointed out to him on the Atlanta road near the railroad,
and to advance with it two regiments of infantry to support it. This disposition was hardly
completed before I received a written communication from Major-General McPherson, dated at
6 a.m. July 22, informing me that it was the supposition of General Sherman that the enemy had
given up Atlanta and were retiring in the direction of East Point, and directing me to put my
command in pursuit, passing to the south and east of Atlanta. This order was not put in
execution, from the fact that the enemy about this time commenced demonstrations in my front,
Which led me to believe that he had not abandoned Atlanta. At about 10 a.m. this belief was
confirmed by a report that the enemy were moving in heavy force around the left flank of the
army, formed by General Blair's (Seventeenth) corps, with evident intention of striking us in
flank and rear. As soon as the report reached him, General McPherson rode at once toward the
left of the army to ascertain correctly the truth of the report, parting with me in the vicinity of the
white house on the railroad. The enemy soon developed his intentions by making a most
desperate attack on the rear and flank of the Seventeenth Army Corps. In the midst of the first
onset of the enemy, news was brought me of the probable death of General McPherson, which
was soon confirmed. In a few moments, I was directed by verbal orders of General Sherman,
commanding the armies, to at once assume command of the army, assuring me at the same time
that whatever assistance I might need would be furnished me. Acting upon these instructions, I
turned over the Fifteenth Army Corps, then slightly engaged, to Brig. Gen. Morgan L. Smith,
commander of the Second Division, and assumed command of the Department and Army of the
Tennessee, as directed.
I respectfully refer you to the report of division commanders, herewith inclosed, for
particulars of the engagement of the corps while I had the honor to command the department,
inasmuch as I find that General Smith failed to make report of the action and subsequent
operations of the corps while under his command. These reports show that the command
maintained in every respect its well-earned reputation for gallantry, and nobly sustained under
the guidance of General Smith and division commanders Generals Woods, Lightburn, and
Harrow, commanding First, Second, and Fourth Divisions, respectively, the valor of Federal
arms. About 3 o'clock in the afternoon the enemy by a most desperate assault broke our line and
captured the battery of De Gress on the right of the Second Division. As soon as I learned the
fact I, as department commander, ordered that it be retaken at all hazards, and General Woods,
commanding First Division, at once disposed his command for that purpose. In the mean time
the guns of another battery were turned on the horses of the captured battery for the purpose of
preventing the enemy from removing the guns. This was effectual and General Woods soon led
the advance, which retook the guns and the position our troops were compelled to abandon.
General Woods displayed in this action the greatest judgment and skill. For the particulars of the
recapture of the battery, I refer you to General Woods' report, herewith inclosed. At another
point of the lines, situated immediately across the rail and dirt roads, the enemy made a sudden
and desperate assault, compelling a portion of the Second Division to give way, and captured 2
guns of Battery A, First Illinois Light Artillery, which they succeeded in carrying away, although
under the personal direction of General Smith, the line was almost immediately retaken. The
reason the enemy gained an advantage over this part of my line may be explained by the fact that
I was compelled to weaken that portion of the line by the withdrawal of Colonel Martin's brigade
to fulfill a request to furnish General Dodge re-enforcements, who was at this time severely
engaged with the enemy on the left flank and rear of the army. The division of General Harrow,
during this time, was desperately engaged with the enemy. He caused some of his guns to be
reversed so as to bear upon the enemy coming up in rear of the Seventeenth Corps. General
Harrow's dispositions during the day entitle him to much credit. The fighting along the entire line
of the corps was of the most desperate character, often being hand-to-hand. The troops could not
have acted more gallantly or behaved better.
The losses of the corps were reported to be on that day, 118 killed, 414 wounded, 535
missing; aggregate, 1,067. The corps captured 481 prisoners, and buried over 400 dead bodies in
front of their line.
At night-fall the Fifteenth Army Corps was in possession of all the ground, and as far
advanced as it had been at any time previous. The troops engaged against the corps on this date
was ascertained to be Hood's old corps, commanded by Cheatham. The position was
strengthened and maintained until the 26th, when General Smith was directed by me from
department headquarters to place General Woods' division in the new line of works, which had
been constructed with a view to the withdrawal of the army, and to follow, with his remaining
troops, the corps of General Blair, to a new position to be taken up, on the extreme right of the
army. As soon as the Second and Fourth Divisions had filed past the works occupied by the First
Division, it was directed to draw out and follow the corps to the new position. General Smith,
with the command, reached the position he was directed to arrive at in proper time on the 27th of
July. On the morning of the 28th of July, having been relieved from the command of the
department by the appointment of General Howard, I reassumed command of my old corps, and
returned General Smith to the command of the Second Division.
I here desire to thank General Smith, and the officers and soldiers under him, while in
command of the corps, for the gallant manner in which they acted during all the time I was
removed from them. General Smith has my especial thanks for the manner in which he
conducted the command.
Immediately after resuming command of the corps, commenced to move it into the position
assigned it, on the right of the Seventeenth Corps, and extreme right of the army, with Woods'
division on the left, Harrow's in the center, and Smith's on the right. My command was thus
moving forward in line of battle when the skirmishers became very actively engaged, and just as
my command had gained the ridge upon which was situated Ezra Chapel, the enemy suddenly
and with the greatest fury assaulted the right and center of my line. The troops had not had a
moment to construct even the rudest defenses. The position we occupied, however, at the
moment of attack was one of the most favorable that could have been chosen by us, it being the
crest of a continuous ridge, in front of the greatest portion of which a good and extensive fire line
was opened. The enemy moved forward rapidly and in good order, evidently intending to and
confidently believing they would break our lines at the first onset, which happily they did not do,
nor even compel a single portion of it to waver, but all stood firm alike, and repelled the assault
handsomely, after about one hour's terrific fighting, in which the enemy's loss was greater than
ours in the ratio of 10 to 1. The enemy soon reformed again, and made a desperate assault, which
was repeated four successive times with like result of the first. During temporary lulls in the
fighting, which did not at any time exceed from three to five minutes, the men would bring
together logs and sticks to shield themselves from the bullets of the enemy in the next assault.
The engagement lasted from 11.30 a.m. until darkness compelled a cessation. The enemy used
one battery of artillery. We used none whatever. It was an open field fight, in which the enemy
exceeded us in numerical strength, and we exceeded him in determination and spirit to continue
the contest. During the engagement I received from Major-General Blair two regiments of
infantry, under command of Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Belknap, and four regiments from
General Dodge, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, in all about 1,000 men. These
troops were received at a time when I much needed them, and under the skillful management of
the officers who commanded them, acted gallantly until the battle was ended.
Major-Generals Blair and Dodge have my warmest thanks for the promptness with which
they sent me the re-enforcements mentioned upon my request. Officers and men behaved alike
gallantly and heroically; they could not have displayed more courage nor determination not to
yield. Had they shown less, they would have been driven from their position, and the enemy
would have become the victors. Brigadier-Generals Woods, M. L. Smith, and Harrow, division
commanders, are entitled to equal credit for gallant conduct and skill in repelling the many and
desperate assaults of the enemy.
My losses were 50 killed, 439 wounded, and 73 missing. Aggregate, 562. General Harrow's
division captured 5 battle-flags from the enemy. Between 1,500 and 2,000 muskets were
captured, and 106 prisoners (not including 73 wounded). Over 600 of the enemy's dead were
buried in my front. A large number were supposed to be carried away during the night, as the
enemy did not withdraw until nearly daylight. The enemy's loss in this battle could not, in my
judgment, have been less than 6,000 or 7,000. Rebel papers subsequently read admit their loss
very heavy, and say the fighting was the most desperate of the campaign.
During the night, by my direction, the strongest defensive line that could be established was
completed, and the next day (the enemy having in the night retired beyond the reach of my fire)
was occupied in burying the enemy's dead and removing the wounded from the field to the
hospitals in the rear.
From prisoners I have learned that the assault was made with Hardee's and Lee's (late
Hood's) corps entire.
From the 29th of July to the 3d of August the command was advanced by swinging the right
around a distance of one mile, intrenching two intermediate lines. The Fourteenth Corps, from
the Cumberland Army, having been sent to the right, I caused the right of Woods' division to
connect with its left, thus straightening my line, which now fronted in the direction of Atlanta,
east-southeast. On the 3d of August General Harrow, wishing to advance his line to the ridge
upon which the enemy's skirmish line was intrenched, organized a portion of his command,
which, under his direction, moved so rapidly forward, and with so little demonstration, that he
surprised the entire line of skirmishers and captured them all. This maneuver was highly
creditable to General Harrow and to the officers and soldiers who were engaged in it. The
number of prisoners captured in this assault, which though very short, was 83. The Second
Division assisted General Harrow in this movement, moving the left of its line in conjunction
with him and capturing that part of the skirmish line in its front, with 5 prisoners. The losses of
the two divisions were, in the aggregate, 92 during the entire day's operations.
After the lines of my command had been straightened, with Brigadier-General Harrow's
(Fourth) division forming the left, and connecting with the right of the Seventeenth Corps,
Brigadier-General Lightburn's division (late M. L. Smith's division) the center, and Brigadier-
General Woods' division the right, connecting with the left of the Fourteenth Army Corps (as
shown in the map, No. 6), only the usual skirmishing and artillery practice was indulged in up to
the 26th of August, except, on the 10th day of August, I directed General Woods to advance his
line on the right, so as to gain possession of the ridge in his front, the last intervening ridge
between his line and that of the enemy. General Woods organized his command accordingly, and
moved forward, engaging the enemy's skirmishers immediately, soon capturing the line, with
about 60 prisoners. His loss was inconsiderable, which was attributable to his skillful
management of the troops assigned to take the position. He made his lodgment secure and
connected with the right of the Second Division, throwing his skirmishers forward in advance of
the line captured. On the 4th of August Brig. Gen. M. L. Smith, commander of the Second
Division, on account of disability arising from a wound received at Chickasaw Bayou, Miss.,
was compelled, by the advice of his medical officer, to apply for leave of absence, which was
granted, and the command of the division then devolved upon General Lightburn, a brave and
good officer, who retained command until the assignment of Brig. Gen. W. B. Hazen August 17,
who is at present the commander; General Lightburn, on the 23d of August, received leave of
absence on account of wound received in the head while in the performance of duty.
On the 15th day of August Maj. Gen. P. J. Osterhaus having returned from leave of absence,
granted on account of disability on the 11th day of July, was directed by me to resume command
of the First Division. Brig. Gen. C. R. Woods was thus relieved from command of his old
brigade. On the 22d of August, by virtue of Special Field Orders, No. 106, from Department and
Army of the Tennessee, Brigadier-General Woods was relieved from duty in my command and
assigned to command the Third Division, Seventeenth Corps. The promotion was well deserved,
though I was sorry to part with so good an officer. During General Osterhaus' absence he was
promoted to his well-earned rank of major-general of volunteers, to fill the vacancy of the
lamented and much loved McPherson. Col. C. C. Walcutt, Forty-sixth Ohio Volunteer Infantry,
commander of a brigade in the Fourth Division, was by the President appointed brigadier-general
of volunteers on the 30th of July for gallant and meritorious conduct during the campaign, and
was assigned to command in the Fourth Division. On the 26th, at 8 p.m., in pursuance of Special
Field Orders, Nos. 101 and 108, from Department and Army of the Tennessee, I withdrew my
command from its position in front of Atlanta, commencing with Major-General Osterhaus'
division on the right, and continuing with Brigadier-Generals Hazen's and Harrow's divisions,
respectively, and moved them across Utoy Creek to the vicinity of Camp Creek, by way of Judge
Wilson's house, thence south by a by-road, reaching Camp Creek early on the morning of the
27th. The pickets of my command on duty in front of Atlanta were not relieved until after the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps had filed out of their works, when all were relieved
simultaneously, under direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Strong, of department staff, and rejoined
their proper commands. The withdrawal of the troops was more successful than we had a right to
anticipate, as it was accomplished with only the loss of 1 man in my command. The First and
Second Divisions were placed in position one mile south of Camp Creek, and the Fourth
Division was held as a reserve. The distance marched during the night was thirteen miles, over
very difficult roads, and in the midst of a disagreeable rain.
After reconnoitering the roads in front to be traveled on the 28th, I started forward at 8 a.m.,
with the division of Osterhaus' in advance, on a neighborhood road directly in my front leading
toward Fairburn, forming the left column of the Army of the Tennessee, behind which the trains
of the army were directed to move. About two miles from the position occupied on the night of
the 27th, we crossed the Campbellton and Atlanta road, and struck the Fairburn road two miles
and a half from the railroad. This road being assigned to the corps of Generals Blair and Dodge, I
was compelled to cut an entire road parallel with the Fairburn road to the railroad, a distance of
three miles. This road was made through dense woods by the pioneers of the First Division,
under the supervision of General Osterhaus and Captain Klostermann, chief engineer of the
corps, and was completed so rapidly that the advance was at no time checked. The head of my
column struck the West Point railroad, two miles north of Fairburn, near Shadna Church, at
noon, and immediately went into position covering the road. The division of Brigadier-General
Hazen coming up immediately, was placed in position on the left of General Osterhaus, and both
divisions intrenched; the division of General Harrow was massed in reserve. I detached one of
the brigades of General Harrow, with orders to destroy the railroad track and telegraph wire,
instructing General Harrow to cause the ties to be burned and the rails to be burned, bent, and so
twisted as to render them entirely useless and irreparable, and to break the telegraph wire n
pieces and conceal it a distance from the road. On the morning of the 29th General Harrow
reported the order fully executed. I made a personal examination of the road, and do not hesitate
to pronounce the destruction most complete. I directed the cuts in the road to be filled up with
dirt and logs, and that percussion-shells be concealed in them in such a manner as to explode
should the enemy attempt to repair the road. The enemy's cavalry was ascertained to be in my
The 29th was passed in position covering the road, and on the 30th at 7 a.m., in accordance
with Special Field Orders, Nos. 112 and 113, from department headquarters, I moved forward on
the direct route toward Jonesborough, crossing Pond Creek and Shoal Creek. About two miles
south of the point of the railroad from which we started a detachment of the Ninth Illinois
Mounted Infantry and Captain Jessup's company, D, Fifth Ohio Cavalry (my escort company),
all under the direction of Captain Cunningham, one of my aides, struck the cavalry vedettes of
the enemy and drove them, with considerable skirmishing, a distance of two miles, where they
had erected strong and extensive barricades south of Pond Creek, behind which they took refuge.
Four men were lost in this advance. The position taken up by the enemy appeared too strong for
this force to advance against, and the skirmishing continued until the head of my column arrived.
The officers mentioned above displayed a great deal of gallantry in the advance mentioned. The
force which they compelled to retire was a strong one and well organized. The head of my
column arrived at the barricade at 10 a.m. The enemy's force consisted of two brigades of
cavalry and a battery of artillery. They were handsomely dislodged, after a sharp little action, by
the combined movements of General Kilpatrick's cavalry, a part of which by this time had
moved to the head of my column, and the skirmishers of General Hazen's division, who that day
had the advance of my command. Thence followed continual skirmishing to Shoal Creek, where
they made another decided stand, using their artillery freely, necessitating the deployment of
General Hazen's advance brigade in line of battle, and the opening of a battery to dislodge them.
The advance then continued to Renfroe Place, which was reached at 3.30 p.m., the place named
in the order for the termination of the march. The absence of water at that point compelled us to
make a farther advance, and we moved forward, by direction of General Howard, to Flint River.
Arriving there, we found the enemy posted beyond the river under cover of a strong barricade
covering the crossing. I at once directed General Hazen to secure the bridge and crossing, and, in
conjunction with two regiments of Kilpatrick's cavalry, he ordered his skirmishers to charge the
position of the enemy. This order was executed promptly and gallantly, the enemy dislodged,
and the crossing secured. I at once crossed my whole command and took position after night on
the most advantageous ground that could be secured, about three-quarters of a mile south of the
river. It was near midnight before the rear of my column, General Osterhaus' division, had
passed beyond the river, yet, at daylight on the morning of the 31st a strong defensive line was
completed and my troops in position for defense. The right of General Hazen's division rested on
the Jonesborough road, about half a mile from the railroad, his line deflecting to the left, and his
pickets, with pickets from Osterhaus' division, extending to the river on the left; Harrow's left
rested on the right of the road, connecting with Hazen's right, his line deflecting to the rear in
like manner of Hazen's line; Harrow's pickets connected with those of a small force of Osterhaus'
division, which held a commanding hill on General Harrow's right flank; General Osterhaus'
pickets, with those of General Kilpatrick's, extended to the river on my right. With the above
noted exception General Osterhaus' division was held in reserve and formed my second line,
which was intrenched. The hill spoken of on the right, which was occupied by the Twenty-fifth
Iowa Volunteers, of Osterhaus' division, commanded the immediate ground between the right of
my line and Flint River, and was a point of great importance, as its possession secured our front
position against any attack on the right flank, which otherwise was much exposed. I caused this
hill to be fortified before daylight of the 31st, and had the regiment spoken of in position. After
daylight on the 31st it was found materially necessary to extend my line on the right so as to
connect with the refused line (erected during the night). A permanent and systematic line was
accordingly formed, requiring almost all of the troops of the Second and Third Brigades of
General Osterhaus' division. During the night and in the morning a number of railroad trains
arrived loaded with troops. These trains could be distinctly seen by the pickets, and the troops
were observed to debark and go into position. General Osterhaus caused two light 12-pounder
Napoleon guns to be placed in front of and within 1,000 yards of the depot. These guns could
also play on the enemy's line in his front. A part of the Ninth Iowa and Twenty-ninth Missouri
Infantry was ordered to support this section. Another section of light 12-pounders was placed in
position in the center of the refused line on the right flank. The enemy resisted these operations
of General Osterhaus with some determination.
Deeming it necessary that the left flank of my command should be more fully supported, I
directed General Osterhaus to send two regiments to report to General Hazen, commanding
Second Division, on the left. At the same time, the two regiments of Osterhaus which covered
our right flank were relieved by a brigade of the Sixteenth Corps. At noon the section of artillery,
posted within 1,000 yards of the depot, opened with telling effect upon the enemy's troops,
although the infantry had not fully completed their extended line. Our position being isolated
from the main army and threatening the enemy's communication, we were exposed greatly, and
liable to attack at any moment. Considering these facts, I caused my lines to be intrenched with
great care, under the supervision of Captain Klostermann, who is one of the most thorough
engineer officers I have met in the service. The positions obtained for all the batteries of the
corps were the best that could have been selected, and division commanders were very active in
their efforts to establish their lines with a view to hold them at all hazards, and inflicting the
severest punishment on the enemy should they attack us. At about 3 p.m. August 31 the enemy
opened artillery in front of my entire line, keeping up continual fire for about fifteen minutes,
when they uncovered their lines and made a sudden and desperate assault on all parts of my line,
approaching at points on the left of General Hazen's line (which was the left of my position)
within thirty paces. The most determined part of the assault was maintained by General Hazen,
the enemy, perhaps, thinking if they could create confusion at that point they could compel my
whole line to retire beyond the river. The assault raged severely in front of Harrow and
Osterhaus, the enemy approaching their lines at the average distance of 50 and 100 paces. The
artillery firing of the enemy had prepared my troops for what followed, and when the assault
commenced every man was in the trenches and ready for the fray. The most terrible and
destructive fire I ever witnessed was directed at the enemy, and in less than one hour he was
compelled to retire discomfited and in confusion. The rebel general, Patton Anderson, and his
staff, rode fearlessly along his lines in front of the Second Division, and did all that a commander
could do to make the assault a success. But few of those who rode with him in that perilous
performance of duty returned from the field. Himself, with many of his staff, were seen to fall by
the unerring and steady fire of my troops. Prisoners, captured subsequently, state that General
Anderson was shot through the abdomen and carried off the field by his troops. I could not help
but admire his gallantry, though an enemy. The enemy made two more assaults, but evidently
with far less spirit and determination than the first. The withering and destructive fire which they
had received in the first onset had dampened their zeal, and destroyed their confidence in being
able to defeat us, and they were, consequently, easily repulsed, though not without severe
punishment being inflicted on them.
The enemy's loss was greater than in any former engagement, except on the 28th of July,
near Atlanta. In front of the Second Division 186 bodies of the enemy were buried between our
picket-lines. General Hazen captured 99 prisoners, not including 79 wounded, and captured 2
stand of colors. General Hazen estimated their wounded at 1,000, though subsequent facts
ascertained places it beyond even that. General Harrow reports 56 prisoners captured, not
including 60 wounded, and the burial of 12 dead bodies. General Osterhaus estimates their loss
in his front at from 400 to 500.
After the enemy had evacuated on the night of the 1st, a staff officer of General Osterhaus
discovered, immediately in rear of the point where the most desperate fighting occurred in his
front, the graves of 131 bodies, which bore evidence of quite recent interment, and who had
evidently been buried with the view to our not discovering them. From the reports of division
commanders I do not hesitate to place their loss at 500 killed and from 3,000 to 5,000 wounded,
with a loss of 241 prisoners, not including the wounded who fell into our hands. This
engagement virtually gave us possession of the railroad at Jonesborough, for it established the
fact that our position, within half a mile of the depot and the town, was secure against successful
assault. After night-fall the enemy remained quiet. My loss in this engagement was only 154 in
killed, wounded, and missing.
The enemy's force in the assault was ascertained from prisoners captured to be the corps of
Hardee and Lee.
On the 1st of September the Fourteenth Corps being ordered to take position on my left, I
was directed to make a demonstration in its favor. I accordingly, at the appointed time, caused all
my artillery to open on the intrenched position of the enemy, and made feints at different points
on my line as if I intended to assault them in their works. These feints, I think, resulted
satisfactorily, as it kept their trenches full in my front, while the Fourteenth Corps charged the
enemy on my left. These demonstrations often, through the day, resulted in slight actions, which
in every instance resulted in our favor. On the night of the 1st of September the enemy evacuated
their position. At daydawn on the morning of the 2d, such had been their watchfulness, the
pickets were in the town and skirmishing with those of the enemy just moving out. A great many
stragglers from the enemy were picked up and sent to our rear. Receiving orders to move
forward on a road leading by the right of the railroad, I placed Harrow's division in advance, and
pursued the enemy, with constant skirmishing, five miles to their intrenched position around
Lovejoy's Station, and took position on the most elevated ground in the enemy's front, only about
from 300 to 500 yards from what appeared their main line, and intrenched Harrow's division on
the right and Osterhaus' on the left, keeping Hazen's in reserve. This position was maintained
until the night of the 5th, when, in pursuance of Special Field Orders, Nos. 110 and 118, from
department headquarters, I withdrew from the position at 8 p.m., and returned that night to my
old position at Jonesborough, where I remained until 7 a.m. September 7, when I again withdrew
and moved to the vicinity of Morrow's Mill, and there occupied the works the enemy had
previously constructed. From this position, at 8 a.m. September 8, I started for East Point, the
present place of encampment, where I arrived about 11 a.m. of the same day, and went into
position, placing Osterhaus" division on the right, Hazen in the center, and Harrow on the left,
connecting on the right with the Left Wing of the Sixteenth Army Corps, covering the Macon
The officers and soldiers of my command have performed the duties of the campaign
willingly and earnestly; in no instance has a disposition other than to face the enemy been
exhibited. Many of my officers have during the campaign fully earned promotion, some of them
have already obtained it, viz, General Osterhaus and General Walcutt, both heretofore
mentioned. My staff officers, one and all, did their duty, and have my hearty thanks for their cooperation
and zeal in assisting me to perform all the duties of the campaign.
I estimate the loss of the enemy in this campaign caused by my command at about 3,000
killed and 15,000 wounded. We have captured from the enemy 2,030 prisoners, 420 wounded,
and received 210 deserters: aggregate, 2,660; 11 stand of colors and about 5,000 stand of smallarms.
My losses, including those had in skirmishes and picket advances not mentioned in the
body of this report, as shown by the nominal lists accompanying this report, are 650 killed, 3,538
wounded, 633 missing; aggregate, 4,824. It is impossible in this report, covering so much time
and so many engagements, to speak of individual acts of heroism and bravery, for they were
many and frequent. I respectfully call your attention to the nominal lists of casualties of each
division, and the reports of division commanders herewith inclosed; also the maps drawn by
Captain Klostermann, which exhibit the different situations of my troops in all the engagements
with the enemy, and the route traveled. The report of my chief of artillery is also inclosed with
the report of my signal detachment, which is commanded by Lieutenant Edge, as brave an officer
as is borne on the rolls of the American Army. He was always prompt and obedient to orders,
and in every advance secured the most prominent position from which he could view the
movements of the enemy, notwithstanding the danger incurred. His reports often served me to
operate successfully against the enemy with precision, when otherwise I might have been in
doubt. I desire to call the attention of the Government to the meritorious services of Brig. Gen.
C. R. Woods, Brig. Gen. Morgan L. Smith, Brig. Gen. William Harrow, Brig. Gen. Giles A.
Smith, and Brig. Gen. W. B. Hazen, and respectfully recommend their promotion. For the
recommendation of officers below the grade of brigadier-general for promotion, I invite attention
to the reports of division commanders, which are approved by me.
The whole distance marched by my command is 387 miles, as shown by the maps herewith
inclosed, not including the separate marches of detached divisions, which added, make 600
miles. It has rendered unfit for service of the enemy nearly 20,000 men--according to just
estimates, 6,000 more than the entire strength of my command when it entered upon the
The medical officers serving on my staff, Surg. E. O. F. Roler, medical director, and Surg.
John M. Woodworth, medical inspector, were unremitting in their efforts to secure the comfort
of the wounded and to cause their wounds to be healed so that they might return to duty. A just
estimate of their services may be had from the fact that over 1,000 wounded men were returned
to duty before the conclusion of the campaign. The duties and business arising in the adjutantgeneral's
department were faithfully and efficiently performed under the direction of Lieut. Col.
R. R. Townes, assistant adjutant-general of the corps, and by Captains Whitehead and Wheeler,
assistant adjutants-general; Majors Stolbrand, Waterhouse, and Maurice, who acted as chiefs of
artillery, respectively--Stolbrand, until captured by the enemy (heretofore mentioned),
Waterhouse, until relieved on the 25th of June, Maurice from that date until the close of the
campaign--fully and efficiently performed the duties assigned them. Maj. Frank C. Gillette,
provost-marshal, in addition to the duties of his office, which, upon such a campaign as the past,
where prisoners are daily to be cared for, performed duty as an aide-de-camp. Capt. L. E. Yorke
performed treble duty of commissary of musters, acting assistant inspector-general, and aide-decamp,
and performed them all in such a manner as to leave no room for criticism. Upon Lieut. L.
B. Mitchell devolved one of the most important duties that rested upon any officer of the
command, that of keeping the command supplied with ammunition. His duty was performed
fully and to my entire satisfaction. At no time did he allow the supply to fall below 140 rounds
per man of small-arm ammunition, and 200 rounds per gun of artillery ammunition. My personal
aides, Maj. John R. Hotaling, Capt. John S. Hoover, Capt. W. B. Pratt, and Captain Cunningham,
performed all the duties, both night and day, with a fearlessness and zeal which elicited my
hearty commendation, often exposing themselves where duty called them to the most imminent
danger. Lieut. Col. J. Condit Smith, chief quartermaster, until he retired from the service on the
30th day of June, performed the duties of his department completely. He was succeeded by Capt.
C. F. Emery, who supplied the command with all it needed promptly and efficiently, and soon
entitled himself to my confidence. Lieut. Col. Charles A. Morton, chief commissary of
subsistence, and Capt. W. A. McLean, assistant chief commissary, never at any time allowed the
command to be fed on half rations, but kept full rations always in the hands of division
commissaries. Fresh beef was furnished by them as often as necessary. Captain Klostermann, my
chief engineer, was untiring in his efforts to establish systematic lines, both offensive and
defensive, to select those most favorable for occupation, and, upon the march, to establish good
and practicable routes. He is a most worthy and efficient officer. Lieut. William H. Barlow,
acting assistant quartermaster at headquarters, performed every duty assigned him with a
promptness which proved efficiency.
Please find accompanying this report the reports of division commanders and lists of
casualties, with reports from Major Maurice, chief of artillery, and Lieutenant Edge, chief signal
officer, and maps and plans by Captain Klosterman, chief engineer.
Major-General, Commanding Fifteenth Army Corps.
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Dept. and Army of the Tennessee.
East Point, Ga., September 13, 1864.
I have the honor to recommend for promotion to the rank of brigadier-generals of volunteers
the following-named officers, for gallant and meritorious services in the field during this
campaign: Col. John M. Oliver, Fifteenth Michigan Volunteer Infantry; Col. Hugo Wangelin,
Twelfth Missouri Volunteer Infantry; Col. Theodore Jones, Thirtieth Ohio Volunteer Infantry;
Col. James A. Williamson, Fourth Iowa Volunteer Infantry; Col. William B. Woods, Seventysixth
Ohio Volunteer Infantry.
Major-General, Commanding Fifteenth Army Corps.
Camp near Kingston, Ga., May 20, 1864.
MAJOR: I have the honor to report on the part taken by my division in the engagements near
Resaca, Ga., which led to the surrender of that fortified place. My command consisted of the
Strength of First Division.
First Brigade, Brigadier-General Woods:
76th Ohio Infantry 526
27th Missouri Infantry 279
26th Iowa Infantry 292
30th Iowa Infantry 331
Total First Brigade 1,428
Second Brigade, Col. J. A. Williamson:
4th Iowa Infantry 322
9th Iowa Infantry 431
25th Iowa Infantry 361
31st Iowa Infantry 315
Total Second Brigade 1,429
Hawing passed the three days, 10th, 11th, and 12th, succeeding the unsuccessful attempt on
Resaca of May 9, near the southeastern end of Snake Creek Gap, the Fifteenth Army Corps
marched on the morning of the 13th instant toward that fortified and strongly re-enforced place.
Your order of march placed me in rear of Second Division. On arriving at the intersection of the
Sugar Valley and Resaca and Dalton and Calhoun Ferry roads, we found the cavalry force of
General Kilpatrick, whose progress was checked by rebel cavalry. In obedience to orders
received, I deployed the First and Second Brigades of my division on both sides of the Resaca
road, unlimbering Battery F, Second Missouri Artillery, action front. The Third Brigade and
Fourth Ohio Battery were formed in second line, by battalions in mass, behind the first line;
Fourth Ohio Battery also in reserve. The sharpshooters, Lieutenant Williams commanding, and a
strong chain of skirmishers from the first line, advanced as close to the enemy's line as the
conformation of the ground and the timber permitted. This position was in alignment with the
Second Division, on my right. The road to Resaca, from the intersection of the Dalton and
Calhoun Ferry road, leads around a series of hills in more or less sudden curves until it strikes
Camp Creek, half a mile west of town. Timber and open fields alternate on both sides of the
road, which, before reaching the creek, runs through a short gap, formed by narrow crested hills.
From these the forts of Resaca are within effective range of rifled ordnance (1,600 to 2,400
yards). On receipt of your order to advance, my skirmishers and sharpshooters opened a lively
fire on the rebels occupying a belt of timber in their front. Following up their fire by a steady
advance, they soon dislodged the rebels, driving them from every position which the terrain
induced them to take, until their rear reached the short gap mentioned above, west of Camp
Creek. The eminences on both sides of the gap were held by a strong line of sharpshooters, and
on the hill on the left a two-gun battery had been established behind some light breast-works. As
soon as my line debouched from a belt of timber to an open field, separating us from the rebel
intrenchments on the hill (distance not over 700 yards), the battery opened a brisk fire of
spherical case and shell. The conformation of the ground on the right of the road afforded
comparatively good cover to my skirmishers and sharpshooters, who not only pushed back the
enemy, but succeeded in approaching the position of the battery so as to expose its flank to our
fire. While this movement on my right (First Brigade) was being executed, one section of 12-
pounder howitzers (Battery F, Second Missouri Artillery) was brought into action against the
rebel battery with the usual alacrity and skill of this command. They immediately found the
range of their opponents, and the enemy very soon had to yield to our superior practice. My
skirmishers and line followed the retrograde movement of the rebels, and took possession of the
hills just evacuated by them. The occupation of these ridges giving us a direct artillery fire on the
town, the Fourth Ohio Battery was placed in position on the right of the road, While the section
of 3-inch ordnance (Battery F, Second Missouri Artillery) was brought into action on the
foremost crest to the left of the road; the First and Second Infantry Brigades were deployed on
the left of the road, their lines conforming to the ridges, so that the bottoms in front, which, as
yet, separated us from the fortifications, were exposed to their fire. The skirmishers advanced to
Camp Creek, which winds around the base of the hills occupied by us. The Third Brigade was
placed in reserve in the open field at the western slope of the hills mentioned. Our artillery
opened with vigor and precision, and the consternation in the doomed town became apparent.
The greatest commotion existed among the troops, and numerous railroad trains were seen to
move southward over the bridge and trestle-work across Oostenaula River. Of course this
became the objective point of fire of our long-range guns, and the Fourth Ohio Battery succeeded
in landing several shots into the trains. At the eastern extremity of the gap, now occupied by our
artillery and infantry, the Resaca road crosses Camp Creek by a bridge. A belt of timber, very
dense, swarmed with rebel sharpshooters, who kept up a very well-directed fire, against which
our skirmishers were hardly able to make headway, as they were compelled to expose
themselves in an open field, while the thicket in front screened the rebel marksmen. Night setting
in, artillery and musketry fire both ceased. The skirmishers of the First and Second Brigades,
who had been under fire all day, were relieved by the Seventeenth and Thirty-second Missouri
Infantry, of the Third Brigade, and the whole command bivouacked in the position gained by the
day's engagement. During the night of the 13th all hands were kept busy intrenching our lines.
Rifle-pits for the infantry and sharpshooters and breast-works for the artillery were constructed,
so that the fire which the enemy opened early on the 14th was returned with great advantage. The
enemy's sharpshooters were compelled by the shell and case-shot from our 12-pounder guns and
howitzers to abandon their shelter in front of the bridge. In consequence of the heavy firing heard
at the north, where our columns were pressing Johnston's retreating army, you ordered me to
make a demonstration along the whole line, opening with all the guns by way of a feint attack. I
availed myself of this opportunity to gain possession of the timber and underbrush in front of the
bridge so hotly contested by the rebels. The Seventeenth and Thirty-second Regiments Missouri
Infantry, deployed as skirmishers, advanced, wading the creek, in front of the First and Second
Brigades, and supported by a second line of skirmishers from these brigades. I then ordered
Colonel Wangelin to throw the Twelfth Regiment Missouri Infantry of his (Third) brigade across
the bridge, and occupy the ground described. Lieut. Col. J. Kaercher executed this order in
splendid style, cleared and held the timber and all the ground in our immediate front and in front
of the troops on my right, thus forming, with his regiment, a point-d'appui for our line of
skirmishers, which was now fairly established beyond the creek. The intensity of the
cannonading to the northward rendered a more decided diversion necessary to prevent the rebels
from re-enforcing their lines north. I received the major-general's order to assault an eminence,
on the east side of the creek and in front of the left wing of Second Division, with one brigade,
which was to co-operate with a brigade from the Second Division. I detailed Brig. Gen. C. R.
Woods to take charge of the assaulting column, which consisted originally of the Seventy-sixth
Ohio Infantry, Twenty-seventh Missouri Infantry, and Thirtieth Iowa Infantry, from First
Brigade, and Third Missouri Infantry, from Third Brigade. At 5.30 p.m. all preparations were
completed, General Woods' column and that of the Second Division were drawn up in two lines,
our artillery ceased firing, and this brilliant column of brave men rushed across the open field
with cheers and flying colors. They nobly dashed through a hail-storm of lead and iron, which
belched forth from all the enemy's batteries and rifle-pits. Reaching the base of the hill, they
climbed the slope, and, running over the crest of the first undulation in the eminence, fairly
effected a lodgment, under cover of a dip in the plateau. The hurrahs of the thousands of
admiring friends followed the onward march of this command. The enemy, at first startled by the
appearance of our lines of steel, rallied again, and for two long hours fought most desperately for
the repossession of the very important position our brave men had gained. We lost heavily, but
General Woods and his men repulsed all attempts on the part of the enemy to dislodge them. (I
refer to the general's report for the splendid and decisive part taken by my command in this
assault.) The severity of the struggle rendering re-enforcements imperative, I at once dispatched
the Twenty-fifth Iowa and Twenty-ninth and Thirty-first Missouri Regiments of Infantry to the
scene of strife. To support the charge of General Woods, the Twelfth Missouri Infantry had been
ordered to rally its left wing on the Resaca road, and to throw its right wing, deployed as
skirmishers, forward to the base of the hill to be assaulted, in order to protect the column against
a flank fire from the enemy's works. The Twelfth executed the order well, but lost considerably
in the gallant strife. Toward night-fall they were relieved by a regiment from another corps.
The pioneers and all available tools were put in requisition during the night to dig rifle-pits,
construct batteries, and to build bridges, and prepare fords across Camp Creek, so that by
daylight the whole command was secured against any coup on the part of the defenders of
Resaca. (I respectfully refer to the accompanying sketch, which shows the relative positions of
the troops of the First Division.) The assaulting party, under General Woods, forming the front
line, the Twelfth and Seventeenth and Thirty-second Regiments of Missouri Infantry were held
in reserve near the bridge. The section of 12-pounder howitzers, in battery near the bridge,
commanded its immediate front and protected the left flank of General Woods; the four 12-
pounder Napoleon guns, in their position in the gap itself, brought the whole field with a horizon
of almost 100 degrees under their fire, while the 3-inch ordnance and 20-pounder Parrotts played
on the town, forts, and railroad. The remaining regiments of infantry were drawn up in line on
the left of these batteries, their skirmishers occupying all the open ground in their front. Our
position was very secure, so much so that the enemy did not even threaten it after his
unsuccessful attempt on the night of the 14th. A slow fire, both of artillery and small-arms, was
kept up all day on the 15th, but the enemy did not give any evidence of offensive intentions, and
after midnight the flames from burning houses and railroad bridges proved that the place was
evacuated. Early on the morning of the 16th I moved into town, followed by the Twelfth
Regiment Missouri Infantry, and occupied the works, driving the enemy, whose rear-guard was
just across Oostenaula River, beyond the range of my section of 12-pounder howitzers.
I inclose the reports of my brigade commanders and of my chief of artillery, also a nominal
list of casualties during these operations, amounting to: Killed--commissioned officers, 2;
enlisted men, 29. Wounded--commissioned officers, 7; enlisted men, 186. Missing--enlisted
men, 8. Total--commissioned officers, 9; enlisted men, 223.
I have to thank my troops for their zeal and bravery. They did their whole duty, grave as it
was, with promptness and alacrity. Brig. Gen. C. R. Woods, commanding First Brigade, Colonel
Wangelin, commanding Third Brigade, and Major Landgraeber, chief of artillery, had occasion
to give renewed evidence of their energy and skill. The officers of my staff were of great
assistance to me, and I feel under many obligations to them.
I am, major, with great respect, your obedient servant,
Brig. Gen. Vols., Comdg. First Div., 15th Army Corps.
Maj. R. R. TOWNES,
A. A. G., Fifteenth Army Corps.
Before Jonesborough, Ga., August 31, 1864.
COLONEL: In compliance with your instructions I have the honor to make the following
preliminary report of the operations of to-day:
About 3 p.m. the enemy opened a galling fire on our position and immediately afterward
made an attack on my lines. Protected by his artillery fire, the enemy approached in solid column
very gallantly, and drove in our skirmishers. The attack was mainly on my right and the brigade
of Sixteenth Corps stationed there, but was gallantly repulsed, the Fourth Ohio Battery behaving
with great bravery, although mostly served by new details from the infantry, who had hardly had
time to become acquainted with their new arm. The enemy, after being repulsed, attacked again
three or four times, though not nearly as determined as the first time, and was on each occasion
driven back, our troops occupying at present nearly the same ground as at the time of the attack.
In pursuance of instructions from major-general commanding army corps, two regiments, the
Twenty-sixth Iowa Infantry and Seventy-sixth Ohio Infantry, were attached to Brigadier-General
Hazen, commanding Second Division, to whom I refer for a report of their action.
A number of prisoners were taken on the right of my line, which during the action were
turned over to, and will be reported by, the Sixteenth Army Corps. I estimate the loss of the
enemy at not less than between 200 and 300 in killed and wounded in front of my line.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Major-General, Commanding.
[Lieut. Col. R. R. TOWNES,
Assistant Adjutant-General.]
List of casualties, August 31, 1864: Killed--enlisted men, 3. Wounded--commissioned
officers, 4; enlisted men, 27. Missing--enlisted men, 1. Aggregate, 35.
East Point, Ga., September 9, 1864.
COLONEL: On the 20th of May I had the honor to report on the part taken by my division in
the operations terminating in the capture of Resaca, Ga., May 16, to which report I beg leave to
We left Resaca, together with the other portions of Fifteenth Army Corps, May 16, and
crossed Oostenaula River same day at Lay's Ferry. Moving thence by way of McGuire's Cross-
Roads, Adairsville, and Woodland, we marched to the north bank of Etowah River, two miles
west of Kingston, where we encamped until the morning of May 23. Crossing Etowah River by
Wooley's Bridge, and passing Euharlee Creek and Van Wert, we struck the enemy's outposts at
Pumpkin Vine Creek, three miles west of Dallas, Ga., on the morning of May 25, 1864. The
following day we advanced toward the last-mentioned place, dislodging the rebel forces, who
held it, after a short skirmish. In pursuing them, however, we came upon the enemy in force, and
well posted in a strongly intrenched position, about one mile southeast of Dallas. In pursuance of
orders from the major-general commanding army corps, I deployed Colonel Williamson's
(Second) brigade on the left of the Second Division, which, being in advance, had already
engaged the enemy. Availing myself of a high ridge almost parallel to the enemy's works, I
directed Colonel Williamson to throw up a line of rifle-pits. During the night the Sixteenth Army
Corps was to connect with the left of Colonel Williamson's line. The First and Third Brigades of
my division were ordered to deploy in reserve in an open field, the Third in rear of Second
Brigade, the First Brigade to the left of the Third. The intermediate ground between the First and
Third Brigades, in reserve, and the Second Brigade, in front, as well as all the ground in front,
was very thick timber; I, therefore, to facilitate communication between the lines, had roads cut
along and between them. The enemy opposed these operations persistently, and attempted
repeatedly, during the evening and night of 26th, to drive Colonel Williamson back, all of which
attempts this officer succeeded in repelling. Before daybreak, however, on the following day
(May 27), he reported large masses of the enemy moving toward his left flank, where the
Sixteenth Corps had not, as yet, made connection. After reconnoitering that part of my position
thoroughly, I ordered Colonel Wangelin, at 5 a.m., to deploy his brigade in two lines on the left
of Colonel Williamson. It was just in time. A very few minutes after the order was given, and its
execution being barely commenced, the rebels attacked on the left flank of Second Brigade,
throwing an enfilading fire into its lines, and compelling them to fall back, in spite of the
desperate resistance of Colonel Williamson's command. At this juncture I arrived on the scene of
attack with the head of the Third Brigade, and immediately ordered the leading regiment
(Twelfth Missouri Infantry) to deploy and throw out skirmishers. Capt. Albert F. Affleck (a hero,
since killed) executed the deployment of the skirmishers under a terrible fire. Lieut. Col. Jacob
Kaercher formed his regiment (Twelfth Missouri) in support of the skirmishers, and at once
advanced. The attacking rebels yielded slowly to the determined advance of the Twelfth
Missouri; the Twenty-ninth and Thirty-first Missouri (Lieutenant-Colonel Gage commanding the
combined battalion) were deployed on the left of the Twelfth Missouri, and, throwing the left of
the line of these regiments well forward, we soon gained all the ground lost at the outset of the
rebel attack, and more, too. I afterward ordered General Woods, with the First Brigade, to relieve
the Second Brigade, which had been under fire ever since we arrived near Dallas; the Second
Brigade then took up the position in reserve formerly held by Third Brigade. The Sixteenth
Army Corps also came up and made close connection with the left of Third Brigade. The lines
were now well established and intrenched; two sections of light 12-pounder guns (Fourth Ohio
Battery, Capt. G. Froehlich's) were placed in battery on the key point of my position, sweeping
its front completely. I refer to the accompanying sketch for the position of my troops. The
ground in front of this line sloped off toward a creek, distant about 250 yards. The bed of this
creek is very deep and abrupt, and, owing to its formation, not only gave complete shelter to the
enemy's sharpshooters, but was wide enough to permit the collection and formation of large
masses of troops without our notice. A constant skirmish fire was kept up on the 27th and up to
the afternoon of the 28th, when about 4.30 p.m. the firing increased considerably. Whilst it was
yet comparatively quiet in my immediate front, the enemy's musketry and artillery fire on the
right of the line of the Fifteenth Army Corps (held by the Fourth Division)was terrific, and
seemed to advance. I at once ordered the Second Brigade (Colonel Williamson), held in reserve,
to fall in. While doing so I received General Logan's orders to march these reserves to the
support of the threatened wing (Fourth Division). Sending word to General Woods to take
command of the First and Third Brigades in case of emergency, I at once led the Second Brigade
on double-quick to the extreme right, arriving just in time to assist our comrades of the Fourth
Division in repelling a fierce assault, deploying on the extreme right of the army corps. Colonel
Williamson, commanding brigade, and the officers commanding regiments, deserve praise for
the prompt and energetic manner in which they executed this maneuver and enabled us to gain
and hold a position forbidding any further attempts on the part of the rebels. The assault was not,
however, restricted to the Fourth Division front, but ran all along the lines of our corps. As soon
as I saw, therefore, that the Second Brigade was well secured, I repaired to my front proper, and
on arrival found the First and Third Brigades and the four 12-pounder gun battery most excitedly
engaged in repelling rebel columns. These had formed in and sallied from the ravine in my front,
mentioned before, and had come up to within fifty yards of my line, but only to be mowed down
by the hundred and to fall back broken and shattered. Numbers of dead and wounded were left to
us to bury and to care for. The behavior of the men and officers on this occasion was brave
beyond description, and it is impossible to mention individual names. The management of the
troops by General Woods and Colonel Wangelin was only such as could be expected from such
brave and experienced officers. The enemy, after this most decisive defeat, was very slow in reestablishing
his skirmish line. Desultory firing continued from the 29th to the 31st of May, only
once assuming greater proportions, when, a little before midnight of 30th, the enemy, probably in
the belief that we were evacuating our lines, made a demonstration, but finding our men all there
and on the alert, desisted from all attempts at a serious attack. On the 1st of June we finally left
the Dallas lines and moved round to relieve troops of the Cumberland Army near New Hope
Church. There we were stationed until June 5, when we found the enemy gone from our front.
The division left same day, and moved to Acworth, on the Atlantic and Western Railroad, and
remained there in camp from June 6 until the morning of June 10. In the morning of the last
mentioned day we advanced farther south and encamped near Big Shanty, a station about three
miles north of Kenesaw Mountain, where the enemy was reported to be strongly intrenched.
Next morning (June 11) I was ordered to make a reconnaissance in force in order to develop
the rebel position. A narrow belt of timber in my front was occupied by the enemy's advanced
pickets. I drove them out, and emerging from the timber we saw the long lines of very substantial
earth-works stretching all along the base of Kenesaw Mountain, while lighter fortifications were
thrown up on the intermediate ridges between the timber and the main line. By order of the
commanding general I deployed my division in two lines, resting on the right of the Marietta dirt
road, along which we were advancing (General Gresham's division, of the Seventeenth Corps,
formed abreast of me on the left of the road). We intrenched the line we occupied along the edge
of the timber, placing batteries at suitable points and connecting on the right with the Sixteenth
Corps. The heavy rains which set in at this time considerably retarded operations, and no
material changes were made in the respective positions of the troops between June 11 and June
13. On that day I received your order to make a feint at noon, and availed myself of that
opportunity to dislodge some rebel infantry intrenched in front of my left (Third Brigade). These
sharpshooters had been annoying the artillerists and infantry in my main works considerably.
While the whole of my line were to advance their skirmishers at the hour indicated, and the
artillery opened on the enemy's works, Colonel Wangelin, commanding Third Brigade, was
ordered to assault the aforesaid rifle-pits in his front. Lieutenant-Colonel Kaercher, Twelfth
Missouri, and Lieutenant-Colonel Gage, Twenty-ninth Missouri, led the attacking party, and
carried the enemy's pits successfully, in spite of the severe musketry and shelling which greeted
them. Colonel Wangelin, without delay, advanced his whole line to the position just gained and
reversed the enemy's works. The Second and First Brigades followed on the right, and thus our
whole line was advanced about 400 yards. This success was won with but small loss on our side.
The gallant Colonel Gage (Twenty-ninth Missouri) and Major Lubbers (Twenty-sixth Iowa)
were both wounded in the shoulder, but have recovered and done good service. This episode was
succeeded by a period of monotony, lasting till June 19. During the night preceding that day my
pickets reported indications of a retrograde movement on the part of the enemy, and kept on the
alert, so that when toward morning the rebel pickets fell back, ours followed them up in musketrange.
We found the strong line of the rebels at the foot of Kenesaw Mountain evacuated, and
our troops occupied the works. In following up the enemy, however, it was found that he had
only fallen back about a mile into a second line of works running all along the crests of the
Kenesaws and on the slopes east and west, thus protecting the town of Marietta, about three
miles in their rear. I was ordered to remain in reserve of the Second Division (which had the
advance), and encamped in the intrenched lines just evacuated by the rebels. On the 20th of June,
in pursuance of orders received, Colonel Williamson's (Second) brigade deployed on the crest of
a hill to the right of the Second Division, where he intrenched himself. This position was in the
direct front of rebel batteries placed on the very summit of Big Kenesaw, and exposed to their
plunging fire. Between the right of Colonel Williamson's line and the railroad, which here runs
through a gap in the mountain, was a considerable interval (the lines of the Sixteenth Corps
commenced on the other side of the railroad), consequently on the 21st of June I ordered General
Woods to occupy said interval with his brigade. In order to resist the artillery fire which the
enemy constantly kept up from his batteries, as well as musketry fire from rifle-pits on the slope
of the mountain, while these lines were being established, I built two casemated batteries for my
rifled guns (two 3-inch Rodman and two 20-pounder Parrotts). Early on the morning of June 23 I
opened fire from these batteries, and with such precision that the mountain batteries were not
only silenced whenever they opened, but were entirely withdrawn on June 25. During the night
of the 26th I was ordered to relieve General Baird's division, of the Fourteenth Corps (some three
miles to the right of my position). This change was preparatory to an assault to be made next day
by the troops of Second and Fourth Divisions at 8 a.m. My skirmishers preceded the assaulting
column and drove the enemy's advanced line back on his main works. The assault on these was
repulsed, although the ground first gained was held and secured.
All subsequent operations in our front were limited to artillery practice and sharpshooting
from June 27 to the morning of July 3. During this time, however, decisive movements were
being executed on the extreme right of General Sherman's army, and advantages gained there
compelled the enemy to give up the Kenesaw position and the town of Marietta, and retire to the
right bank of the Chattahoochee River, where extensive and very strong works had been
prepared. General Logan ordered me to march at once to Marietta, where I arrived at 9 a.m., and
took a defensive position on the left of town. On the morning of the 4th of July we again took up
the line of march for Chattahoochee River, by way of Cheney's house, toward Turner's Ferry.
On July 6 I was ordered to relieve troops of Twentieth Army Corps in front of the rebel
works on Nickajack Creek. Only occasional picket-firing disturbed the quietude of this position,
which we held until the morning of July 10, when the enemy was found to have disappeared
from our front. We remained, however, on Nickajack Creek until 5 p.m. on July 12, when the
whole army corps left, via Marietta, for Roswell Factory, the extreme left of the grand army. We
arrived at this place on the 14th of July, and, crossing Chattahoochee River, threw up and
occupied defensive works on the left bank of that stream.
My health had been for several weeks so much impaired that during this last movement I had
to rely on the assistance of Brig. Gen. C. R. Woods, and finally, on July 17, to avail myself of a
sick leave, which had been granted me some time previous, but which I did not at the time make
use of, as I still entertained some hopes of being able to see the campaign to its close. Renewed
attacks of an old complaint compelled me, however, to leave at the date mentioned, and I beg
leave to refer you to the reports of Brig. Gen. C. R. Woods, who commanded the division during
my absence, for all the operations which occurred until the date of my return to the army. Tomorrow
I hope to be able to forward my report from the time I reassumed command until date.
I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Major-General Vols., Comdg. First Div., 15th Army Corps.
Lieut. Col. R. R. TOWNES,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Fifteenth Army Corps.
In the Field, East Point, Ga., September 10, 1864.
COLONEL: On the 15th day of August I resumed command of this division (having been
temporarily absent on account of sickness), which was at the time intrenched in three lines, some
hundred yards to the right and in front of Ezra Chapel, the scene of combat on July 28, on which
Brig. Gen. C. R. Woods, then commanding the division, has reported. The opposing lines had
been pushed so close together that operations had come to a stand-still, with the exception of a
farther advance on August 22. I availed myself of a demonstration made in our front to dislodge
the rebel sharpshooters from a belt of woods in my immediate front, whence they had kept up a
very annoying fire on us. The move was successful and caused the enemy to fall back on his
main line, while we were enabled to advance our front line and two batteries (ten guns) within
very destructive proximity to the enemy's line. Leaving that position on August 26, we marched
during the night, by way of Utoy Creek, to Parker's place, about four miles west of Fairburn, on
the Atlanta and Montgomery Railroad, where we arrived early on the 27th. After the necessary
reconnaissances of the approaches to said railroad, we advanced at 8 a.m. on the 28th and struck
the railroad at noon near Shadna Church, two miles north of Fairburn. The enemy did not oppose
our advance, and we found only a very small picket on the road; our march was, however,
considerably delayed by the necessity of cutting a road for two miles and a half through the
timber. On arriving at the point indicated the division was at once deployed and intrenchments
thrown up; rebel cavalry was in our immediate front. The night and next day, August 29, was
spent in destroying the track of the railroad, which was done most effectually. The order of
march for August 30 toward Jonesborough, on the Atlanta and Macon Railroad, placed the First
Division in rear of the Fifteenth Corps, and I had, consequently, no part in the skirmishes with
the rebel troops who contested our advance, without success, however. The rear of my command
crossed Flint River after 11 p.m., and the whole division took position as fast as the troops came
in, with orders to intrench at once, as it was evident that the enemy meant to defend
Jonesborough Station. My division formed the second line, Second and Fourth Divisions being
in front, except the Twenty-fifth Regiment Iowa Infantry, of my Second Brigade, who were
posted on the right on an elevated open field. This point was of the greatest importance, as it
secured our front position against any attack on the right flank, which otherwise was much
exposed. I directed the officers in command there to throw up breast-works during the night, and
it is due to their zeal that early in the morning of August 31 we had a strong, substantial line of
rifle-pits commanding the intermediate ground between the right of our line and Flint River. On
the morning of the 31st of August my position, in reserve to the Second and Fourth Divisions,
was materially altered, as I endeavored, under orders from the corps commander, to connect the
extreme right of the first line of our corps (Fourth Division) with the refused line of our right,
erected during the night, by a permanent and systematic line. This was really an extension of the
position in front, and required all the troops of my Second and Third Brigades to make it
sufficiently strong. The enemy were very active during the night and all morning, a number of
railroad trains arriving loaded with troops. The depot being within full view of our skirmish line,
I could after daylight see these troops arrive, debark, and go into position. I, therefore, in order to
prevent these re-enforcements on the part of the enemy, ordered a battery of two light 12-
pounder Napoleon guns to be erected in front of, and within 1,000 yards of, the depot and
surrounding houses; this battery could also play on the enemy's line in my whole front. The site
of this battery was about 200 yards to the right and 120 yards to the rear of my line. I, therefore,
ordered a very strong support of infantry, commanded by Captain Bowman, Ninth Iowa Infantry,
and Lieutenant Eicks, Twenty-ninth Missouri Infantry, to support this section, Lieutenant Haug,
of Fourth Ohio Battery, commanding. Another section of 12-pounder light Napoleon guns,
commanded by Lieutenant Hust, of same battery, was in position in the center of the refused line
on the right flank. In these operations the rebels resisted us with some determination. I was now
ordered to send two of my largest regiments, the Seventy-sixth Ohio and Thirtieth Iowa, of the
First Brigade, to support the left of the first line of our corps, Second Division, while the two
regiments of infantry which covered our right flank were relieved by a brigade from the
Sixteenth Corps. I refer to the annexed plan for the position of my troops. The section
commanded by Lieutenant Haug was ready to open fire about noon, and did so with telling
effect. The infantry, however, had not as yet completed their intrenchments, and at 2.30 p.m.
there was still a considerable gap in the work connecting them with the refused line on the right.
While I was still engaged in pushing forward this part of the work, considerable movement was
observed on the rebel side. Colonel Wangelin, commanding Third Brigade, reported that very
heavy columns of rebel infantry had sallied from their left and advanced in double-quick around
our line of skirmishers, evidently with the intention of passing to our right and rear. The rebels
had to pass over an open field to the right of Colonel Wangelin's front, and this gallant officer
opened a most withering fire on them, but was unable to prevent their flanking maneuver.
Lieutenant Haug's shells exploded with terrible precision among the enemy, but with no better
success. Regardless of this destructive fire, the enemy's columns rushed forward, and I, of
course, directed Lieutenant Haug to withdraw his pieces, while Captain Bowman and Lieutenant
Eicks were ordered to hold their position at all hazards until the guns were withdrawn. These two
officers gallantly held their position while Lieutenant Haug removed his section with admirable
precision; when I brought this party back into our main work, the rebel avalanche was at our very
heels. I placed Lieutenant Haug's section of artillery and the supporting infantry, under Captain
Bowman and. Lieutenant Eicks, in position on the left of the rifle-pits occupied by the Sixteenth
Army Corps and Lieutenant Hust's pieces. They all opened at once a most deadly fire on the
rebels (the artillery with canister), whose front line was now within 100 yards of ours; at the
same time the troops of Colonel Williamson's brigade, who formed the connection with the
refused line, poured their fire into the assaulting column. Here I cannot omit to mention the
splendid conduct of the officers and men of the Fourth Iowa Infantry, who were ordered to
occupy that portion of this connecting line where as yet no breast-works had been thrown up;
they whirled in and held the place most gallantly. The effect of our fire was immediate and
terrible; the enemy's line, compact until now, broke and dispersed in all directions. A number
came over into our lines; the masses, however, fell back into the timber on their right and rear to
find protection from our fire. The enemy formed again several times under cover of this timber,
and attacked again, though very feebly, showing their first repulse to have been a very severe and
decided one. The Twenty-fifth Iowa Infantry (Second Brigade) which was afterward thrown
forward in advance of the Fourth Iowa, completely secured our right, and permitted us to finish
our intrenchments, the enemy slowly retiring before our skirmishers. I take great pleasure in
mentioning those officers who came under my special notice during the sudden and decisive
movements of the day. Colonels Wangelin and Williamson, whose men were mostly engaged,
displayed the same promptness, zeal, and bravery which they exhibited on so many occasions
during the past months. Captain Anderson, acting assistant adjutant-general of Colonel
Williamson, was wounded while bearing orders. Lieutenant Haug, Fourth Ohio Battery, Captain
Bowman, Ninth Iowa Infantry, and Lieutenant Eicks, Twenty-ninth Missouri Infantry, deserve
praise for their faithful obedience to orders under most trying circumstances. Lieut. H. E.
Williams commanding pioneer corps, was wounded, I fear mortally, while assisting me, with his
wonted contempt of danger, in bringing off Lieutenant Haug's guns. During the following night
and on the morning of September 1 we strengthened our lines as well as possible, keeping up a
lively fire from our skirmish line, which we pushed forward vigorously. Lieutenant Hust's
section of 12-pounder light Napoleon guns was relieved by four pieces of Battery F, Second
Missouri Artillery, in the center of the refused line, and placed in position on Colonel Wangelin's
front. The section had just been placed in position, and had hardly opened fire, when Lieutenant
Hust was killed by a rebel sharpshooter. He was a brave and in every respect [an] exemplary
officer. In the afternoon I received your orders to make a spirited demonstration in my front, to
prevent the enemy from re-enforcing his right, which was threatened by our troops advancing
along the railroad from Rough and Ready, the impression made on the rebels becoming more and
more visible as the firing approached from the north. My skirmish line was re-enforced and
pushed forward gallantly, while the shells from the artillery kept the rebels close behind their
works. At about 4 p.m. I ordered Colonel Wangelin to follow the skirmishers with a strong
reserve. Colonel Gage, of the Twenty-ninth Missouri Infantry, was the first man over our riflepits;
Lieutenant-Colonel Simpson, of the Thirty-first Missouri, and Major Seay, of the Thirtysecond
Missouri, followed, and with their regiments, altogether under 200 men, advanced on the
rebels, drove them from their advanced pits, and established a new line far in advance of our old
skirmish line, and in close proximity to the rebels. Before night all guns which could be brought
to bear on the place opened fire, by direction of the commanding general, as it was supposed the
rebels were about to leave the town, which was being rapidly inclosed by our troops. During the
night the rebels did evacuate Jonesborough. At 3 a.m. my men were in town, and had evidence of
the terrible execution of our last day's fire. We prepared for immediate march and pursued the
enemy four miles, when he took refuge behind earth-works previously prepared. We advanced
and intrenched a line along the crest of a range of hills, within from 300 to 500 yards of the
enemy's works; there we remained until the night of September 5, when we commenced our
retrograde movement toward Atlanta, which had been evacuated on the 1st instant and was in
possession of our troops 2d instant. The list of casualties has already been forwarded to you. Its
numbers give ample evidence of the bravery and patriotism of our troops, and for the campaign
commencing May 9 foots up as follows: Commissioned officers--killed, 8; wounded, 47;
missing, 2; total, 57. Enlisted men--killed, 121; wounded, 676; missing, 35; total, 832.
Aggregate--killed, 129; wounded, 723; missing, 37; total, 889.
I am, colonel, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
Maj. Gen., U.S. Vols., Comdg. 1st Div., 15th Army Corps.
Near Atlanta, Ga., August 5, 1864.
COLONEL: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by this division
in the battles of the 22d and 28th of July: Early in the morning of the 22d of July the division
moved forward into the works abandoned by the rebels the night previous, and took position on
the left of the Twenty-third Army Corps, the right resting at the Howard house. About 11 a.m.
the Third Brigade, Col. Hugo Wangelin commanding, was detached, by order of Major-General
Logan, and sent to the left, leaving me the First Brigade, Col. Milo Smith, Twenty-sixth Iowa,
commanding, and the Second Brigade, Col. James A. Williamson, Fourth Iowa, commanding, of
the following effective strength:
Command. Officers. Men. Aggregate.
First Brigade.
26th Iowa 10 172 182
30th Iowa 20 263 283
27th Missouri 13 172 185
76th Ohio 24 389 413
Total 67 996 1,063
Second Brigade.
4th Iowa 22 278 300
9th Iowa 17 288 305
25th Iowa 22 343 365
Total Second Brigade 61 909 970
The Thirty-first Iowa absent at Roswell Factory guarding train. Aggregate in First and
Second Brigades, 2,033. Of this number there were between 200 and 300 on the skirmish line.
About 3 p.m. the rebels made a determined attack in heavy force upon the lines to my left,
and after having been several times repulsed, succeeded in breaking the lines and occupying the
pits, which gave them a position 300 or 400 yards to my left and rear. Finding my position
untenable, I threw back my left, forming a new line, facing the enemy's flank, my right resting at
the Howard house. I at the same time kept up a heavy fire of artillery on the enemy, preventing
them from taking off De Gress' battery of four 20-pounder Parrotts, of which they had
possession. Shortly after having taken my new position, I received a verbal order from General
M. L. Smith, commanding Fifteenth Army Corps, to attack the enemy in flank and rear, whilst
other troops moved up in front to retake the position. I immediately moved the Second Brigade
forward to attack in flank and rear, and the First Brigade to attack in flank and front. This proved
successful, and in less than fifteen minutes I had retaken De Gress' battery and driven the enemy
from the rifle-pits on their left as far as the railroad. The whole rebel line then fell back, and the
works were reoccupied by our troops. Whilst moving back the First Brigade to reoccupy their
original position, the enemy made a charge on one regiment (Fourth Iowa) of the Second
Brigade, which was posted on the reverse of an old rebel battery. The enemy was driven back
with great slaughter and made no further attacks that night. On the morning of the 23d my two
brigades were relieved by a division of the Twenty-third Corps, and I was directed to send one
brigade to the left of Sixteenth Army Corps, and to take position on the Decatur road about four
miles from Atlanta. On the 26th I was directed to move out with my division and occupy Decatur
for a short time, and to destroy the railroad from that point to Atlanta. I moved out immediately
with First and Second Brigades, and destroyed the road in the most thorough manner. On the
27th of July this division moved, with the remainder of the Fifteenth Army Corps, from the left
of the army to the right, a distance of from eight to ten miles, and went into bivouac in rear of the
Seventeenth Army Corps at 10 p.m. At 2 a.m. on the 28th of July I commenced forming line of
battle on the right of General G. A. Smith's division, Seventeenth Army Corps, and shortly after
daylight had the line formed. This line was at right angles to the general direction of the main
line. As soon as General G. A. Smith commenced to swing around into the line, I moved,
conforming to his movements and keeping connected with his right. When the movement was
completed my right rested near Ezra Chapel, the general direction of the line being nearly north
and south. As soon as I had got into position I directed brigade commanders to throw up a
temporary barricade of rails, which was done in about half an hour. The Fourth and Second
Divisions, Fifteenth Army Corps, were placed in position at right angles to the First Division.
Shortly after getting into position the enemy opened with artillery on the Fourth and Second
Divisions. A little after 12 o'clock the enemy made an attack on the Second and Fourth Divisions
in heavy force, but were repulsed with great loss. A little after 1 p.m. they made a determined
attack on the left of the Fourth Division and the right of the First. The assaults were several times
repulsed, but after each repulse the enemy charged in greater numbers and with greater
determination, but finding, however, that they could not break the lines, they finally withdrew.
This attack lasted something over all hour. They did not attack again in front of the First
Division. Only between 300 and 400 men of the Third Brigade were engaged, and there were
buried in front of the division of the enemy's dead, [sic] including 1 colonel, 1 major, and several
company officers. At a fair estimate there must have been at least one rebel killed or wounded
for every man engaged on my side.
I cannot speak in too high terms of the conduct of the officers and men under my command
during the 22d and 28th. I have to regret the loss, by wounding, of several valuable officers on
the 28th. Colonel Carskaddon, Ninth Iowa; Lieut. Col. Jacob Kaercher, Twelfth Missouri; Maj.
P. H. Murphy, Twenty-ninth Missouri; Capt. A. F. Affleck, Twelfth Missouri (since dead); all
brave and gallant officers, whose services cannot well be dispensed with. I would mention, as
deserving special notice for gallantry on the 22d of July, Col. James A. Williamson,
commanding Second Brigade; Col. Milo Smith, commanding First Brigade; Col. William B.
Woods, commanding Seventy-sixth Ohio Veteran Volunteers; Lieut. Col. A. Roberts,
commanding Thirtieth Iowa Volunteers; Lieut. Col. S. D. Nichols, commanding Fourth Iowa
Veteran Volunteers; Lieut. Col. T. G. Ferreby, commanding Twenty-sixth Iowa Volunteers; and
on the 28th, Col. Hugo Wangelin, Lieutenant-Colonel Kaercher, commanding Twelfth Missouri
[sic], commanding combined battalions of Seventeenth and Twenty-ninth Missouri; Col.
Theodore Meumann, commanding Third Missouri, and Capt. G. Froehlich, commanding Fourth
Ohio Battery.
To the members of my staff, Major Landgraeber, chief of artillery; Capt. W. A. Gordon,
assistant adjutant-general, and Lieut. C. M. Marriott, aide-de-camp, and the personal staff of
Brig. Gen. P. J. Osterhaus, Capt. C. Andel, Lieut. W. Henley, and Capt. A. A. Perkins, acting
assistant inspector-general, I am under many obligations for the energetic and efficient services
I inclose reports of my subordinate commanders, and remain your obedient servant,
Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Comdg. Division.
Lieut. Col. R. R. TOWERS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Fifteenth Army Corps.
Near Kingston, Ga., May 20, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by this brigade in
the approach and attack on Resaca, Ga.:
The brigade--consisting of the Twenty-sixth Iowa Volunteer Infantry, Col. Milo Smith
commanding; Thirtieth Iowa Volunteer Infantry, Lieut. Col. A. Roberts commanding; Twentyseventh
Missouri Volunteer Infantry, Col. Thomas Curly commanding; Seventy-sixth Ohio
Volunteer Infantry, Col. W. B. Woods commanding--left their camp near Sugar Valley Post-
Office on the morning of the 13th instant, having the advance of the division. Having arrived at a
cross-road, about two miles from Resaca, line of battle was formed, this brigade on the right of
the division. At about 1 p.m. it moved forward to attack, preceded by a heavy line of skirmishers.
After advancing about 600 yards, the skirmish line met the skirmishers of the enemy and drove
them back some distance to a ridge of hills near their supports, consisting of two or more
regiments and two pieces of artillery, advantageously posted to sweep the road in front. In the
course of half an hour the enemy's skirmishers were dislodged and driven, with their supports,
into the valley in front of the enemy's works near the town. This brigade, together with the
remainder of the division, moved forward and took possession of a range of hills overlooking
the enemy's works, and distant about 1,200 yards. This position was occupied during the
remainder of the day and night and until 4 o'clock on the afternoon of the 14th. Our skirmishers
were during this time constantly engaged with those of the enemy.
About 4 p.m. of the 14th I was ordered to place my brigade in position in the valley to take a
range of hills on the right and front occupied by the rebels. The Twenty-sixth Iowa Volunteers,
being then in front and engaged as skirmishers, not being available, the Third Missouri
Volunteers, Col. Theodore Meumann commanding, was sent me in their stead. I formed my
brigade in two lines, the Thirtieth Iowa and the Twenty-seventh Missouri forming the first line,
and the Seventy-sixth Ohio and the Third Missouri forming the second line. Brig. Gen. Giles A.
Smith, of the Second Division, Fifteenth Army Corps, with three regiments, made the attack to
my right at the same time. At about ten minutes before 6 p.m. the advance was sounded, and the
lines moved across the field at double-quick time in gallant style. The field was full of logs and
briers, and a muddy slough was to be waded at the very start, but these obstacles were quickly
overcome. The hills were gained in a remarkably quick time, the first line passing the first range
and driving the enemy from a second about fifty yards in front. The Third Missouri, although in
the second line, passed forward to the second range of hills, taking position in the first line. The
Seventy-sixth Ohio was formed as a reserve in rear of the first range. Five companies were
immediately thrown forward to occupy the first ridge, the other five being kept for the purpose of
strengthening the lines wherever needed. As soon as the enemy was driven back, a heavy fire
from the rebel batteries was opened from the front and left flank, the shells bursting almost in the
ranks. This cannonading lasted about half an hour and was remarkable for its precision.
Fortunately very little damage was done, and the men maintained their position. But few men
were lost in this charge, owing mainly to the fact that the lines were preceded to the front and left
by the Twelfth Missouri Infantry as skirmishers, commanded by Lieut. Col. Jacob Kaercher, who
moved his lines to the crest in gallant style. After the enemy's firing ceased, the lines were placed
in the most advantageous positions, and everything prepared as well as possible to resist any
attempt of the enemy to dislodge us. But as the lines were very thin, and having disposed of all
the reserve force except the five companies of the Seventy-sixth Ohio, and having learned from
General G. A. Smith that his entire right was exposed and liable to be turned, I sent to General
Logan, by his aide, Captain [Lieutenant] Moore, who came to inquire our progress, for four
regiments to be placed on the extreme right, and for two regiments to strengthen my lines and act
as a reserve. The brigade of Brigadier-General Lightburn was sent immediately to the right of
General Smith, and occupied the ground. About 8 p.m. the enemy advanced in strong force,
supposed to be a division and a half, for the purpose of dislodging our line. He was met with a
withering fire. His artillery opened at the same time and poured in a most terrific fire of case-shot
and shell, sweeping the crest of the ridge occupied by our troops, but the men remained firm. The
enemy advanced to the crest of the hill occupied by the Thirtieth Iowa, and the firing was
continued for some time at a distance not to exceed thirty yards, but owing to the nature of the
ground both parties fired too high. But little damage was therefore done. The five companies of
the Seventy-sixth Ohio were ordered to the top of the ridge on my right to occupy a portion of
the line then greatly needing aid. They did most useful and important service there, under
command of Maj. Edward Briggs. Colonel Roberts, of the Thirtieth Iowa, reported that his men
were almost out of ammunition. The fortunate arrival of Colonel Montgomery, with the Twentyfifth
Wisconsin and the Thirty-fifth New Jersey Regiments, enabled me to relieve the Thirtieth
Iowa. I sent the Twenty-fifth Wisconsin immediately forward. They advanced to the crest of the
second hill in the most gallant style, and poured in a fire which drove the enemy back to the crest
of the next hill, about fifty yards in rear, where they reformed, but did not venture again to
advance. Having heard from General Smith that he was hard pressed, I sent the Thirty-fifth New
Jersey to his assistance. This part of the engagement lasted about one hour and a quarter. It was
remarkable for the vigor of the attack and the stubbornness of the resistance. The enemy's
infantry attack having been repulsed, the cannonading was increased and lasted about threequarters
of an hour. During this time the shot and shell fell thick and fast; the artillery practice
was splendid, but fortunately little damage was done. The firing ceased about 10 o'clock. As
soon as possible I commenced throwing up rifle-pits. These were made sufficiently strong by
daylight to render us reasonably secure. About this time (10.30 o'clock) the Twenty-fifth Iowa,
Col. George A. Stone commanding, and the battalion composed of the Twenty-ninth and Thirtyfirst
Missouri Volunteers, under command of Lieut. Col. Joseph S. Gage, reported to me. The
battalion, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Gage, was sent forward to relieve the Twentyseventh
and Third Missouri. These latter regiments, and the Twenty-fifth Iowa Volunteers, were
placed in reserve. During the remainder of the night everything remained quiet.
At daylight on the 15th skirmishing commenced and was kept up all day. About 8 a.m. of the
15th the Fifteenth Michigan, Col. A. E. Jaquith commanding, reported to me. It was placed in a
ravine to strengthen the left of my line. This regiment belongs to the Fourth Division, Fifteenth
Army Corps. There was 1 man wounded in this regiment. The advantage gained by this position
was that it gave a fair view of the bridges in rear of the enemy's position and at short range, so
that they could be destroyed, by a vigorous cannonading, in an hour. During the night of the 15th
embrasures were put up, and two 20-pounder Parrotts and two Napoleon guns were put in
position to destroy the bridges, but during the night the enemy evacuated the works, and our
troops marched in on the morning of the 16th. I inclose lists of killed and wounded in my
brigade. The Twenty-sixth Iowa Volunteers, Col. Milo Smith commanding, which, at the time
the Other regiments of my brigade advanced to this charge, was out as skirmishers, performed
very gallant service as such. The list of killed and wounded shows the severity of this service.
The Third Missouri lost 1 killed and 11 wounded. The Twenty-fifth Wisconsin lost 24 in killed
and wounded. The battalion composed of the Twenty-ninth and Thirty-first Missouri lost 1 killed
and 2 wounded. The whole loss on my part of the line on the 14th and 15th was, therefore, 16
killed, 103 wounded, and 3 missing. This does not include the loss of the Twenty-sixth Iowa.
I cannot speak in too high terms of the conduct of the officers and men under my command.
They all did their duty nobly, and deserve the highest praise. The following-named officers
deserve special mention for gallantry, viz, Lieut. Col. A. Roberts, Thirtieth Iowa; Col. W. B.
Woods and Maj. Edward Briggs, Seventy-sixth Ohio; Col. Thomas Curly, Twenty-seventh
Missouri Volunteers, all of the First Brigade, First Division, Fifteenth Army Corps; also Col.
Theodore Meumann, commanding Third Missouri Volunteers, and Lieut. Col. J. S. Gage,
commanding battalion Twenty-ninth and Thirty-first Missouri Volunteers, of the Third Brigade,
First Division, Fifteenth Army Corps. Colonel Montgomery, of the Twenty-fifth Wisconsin,
Sixteenth Army Corps, rendered timely and efficient service, and deserves great credit.
To the members of my staff--Capt. Charles H. Kibler, assistant adjutant-general; First Lieut.
F. Critz, Thirtieth Iowa, aide-de-camp; Lieut. C. M. Marriott, Seventy-sixth Ohio, aide-de-camp;
First Lieut. William E. Ware, Twenty-seventh Missouri, acting assistant inspector-general--my
warmest thanks are due for the faithful and fearless manner in which they carried out all orders.
I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Capt. W. A. GORDON,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., First Div., Fifteenth Army Corps.
Near Kingston, Ga., May 21, 1864.
GENERAL: I take great pleasure in speaking in the highest terms of the conduct and
gallantry of Colonel Montgomery and his regiment, the Twenty-fifth Wisconsin, during the time
they were under my command at Resaca, on the 14th and 15th instant. The arrival of Colonel
Montgomery, with the Twenty-fifth Wisconsin and five companies of the Thirty-fifth New
Jersey, was opportune, as one of my regiments, the Thirtieth Iowa, was hard pressed and their
ammunition expended. I sent Colonel Montgomery forward with his regiment to relieve the
Thirtieth Iowa. This was done in admirable style; his regiment standing up bravely to their work,
and holding the crest of the hill until the enemy retired. They afterward worked faithfully on the
rifle-pits until they were completed. At the time the five companies of the Thirty-fifth New
Jersey reported I was obliged to send them to General G. A. Smith, on my right, who was also
hard pressed. General Smith wished me to speak most approvingly of the conduct of the portion
of this regiment sent to him.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Brig. Gen. G. M. DODGE,
Comdg. Sixteenth Army Corps.
Near Acworth, Ga., June 8, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to present the following report of the action of my brigade
during the late operations near Dallas, Ga.:
The brigade consisted of the following regiments, viz: Twenty-sixth Iowa Infantry, Col. Milo
Smith commanding, about 200 strong; Thirtieth Iowa Infantry, Lieut. Col. A. Roberts
commanding, about 300 strong; Twenty-seventh Missouri Infantry, Col. T. Curly commanding,
about 200 strong; Seventy-sixth Ohio Infantry, Col. W. B. Woods commanding, about 500
On the morning of the 27th of May, 1864, pursuant to orders of Brigadier-General Osterhaus,
I conducted two of my regiments, the Thirtieth Iowa Volunteers and the Twenty-seventh
Missouri Volunteers (the brigade being then in reserve), through the woods to the left of the
Villa Rica road, about half a mile to the south of Dallas, for the purpose of relieving some
regiments of the Second Brigade, who had earlier in the morning been engaged with the enemy. I
posted these regiments (the Thirtieth Iowa on the right) well to the front on the westerly slope of
a hill and across a ravine, connecting on my right with a regiment of General Giles A. Smith's
brigade, of the Second Division, and on the left with a regiment (Twelfth Missouri) of the Third
Brigade of this division. As soon as this disposition was made, and the line was covered with
skirmishers, I brought up my two other regiments and placed them in a second line, about
seventy-five yards in rear of the first. During the forenoon, by my direction, the two front
regiments commenced to intrench, and by night had constructed rifle-pits, which formed a good
defense. During all the day and most of the night the skirmishers in my front kept up a lively fire
with those of the enemy.
Early in the morning of the 28th of May I sent the Seventy-sixth Ohio Volunteers to relieve
the Twenty-seventh Missouri and Thirtieth Iowa Volunteers in front, these two regiments retiring
and making part of the second line. The skirmishing was heavy in my front during the forenoon,
and until about 4 p.m. During the day the intrenchments were much strengthened, and the timber
immediately in front cut down. At about 3.30 p.m. the extreme right of our whole line, under
General Harrow, having been fiercely attacked, necessitating its re-enforcement by the Second
Brigade of this division, which moved rapidly to the right, under the direction of Brigadier-
General Osterhaus in person; at his request I took command of the two remaining brigades. Very
soon afterward, at about 4 p.m., the enemy advanced in force to attack in front of these two
brigades and to the right and left. The skirmishers were hurriedly driven in, their view of the
approaching enemy being much shut out by the broken nature of the ground in front. As soon as
the skirmishers, or such as were able, had rejoined their regiments, and the enemy had appeared
in view, a general discharge of fire-arms from the rifle-pits commenced. The enemy's line soon
wavered, rallied, wavered, and then disappeared, leaving their dead and severely wounded
behind. So hasty was their retreat that some of the skirmishers of the Third Brigade, who were
taken prisoners on their advance, were overlooked, and thus escaped. The nearest approach to
any part of the line occupied by the First and Third Brigades was in that part of the Third
Brigade held by the Third Missouri Volunteers, where a few of the enemy advanced to within
about twenty yards of the rifle-pits. The ground in front of that regiment was more favorable for
their advance. A rebel color bearer was there shot down. During this charge four Napoleon guns
of the Fourth Ohio Battery, Capt. George Froehlich commanding, which were in position about
the center of the lines of the two brigades, were notably and gallantly served, pouring an almost
continuous fire into the advancing and retreating ranks of the enemy, and contributing much
toward his repulse. The troops all behaved during this assault with the greatest gallantry. This
charge and repulse did not occupy more than half an hour, at which time our skirmishers were
again pushed out. They captured in front of the two brigades about 15 of the enemy. Fifteen
others, mortally wounded, were brought in. The dead, in considerable numbers, lay in front. The
enemy captured were of the First Kentucky Brigade, of Bate's division, of Hardee's corps. About
the time the enemy retired Brigadier-General Osterhaus returned from the right, and I returned to
my brigade. The loss in my brigade was very small, as shown by the list inclosed. Toward dark
the Twenty-sixth Iowa was sent to relieve the Twelfth Missouri, of the Third Brigade, thus
extending my front the space occupied by the latter regiment. A renewal of the attack during the
night having been apprehended, everything was made ready to meet it. It was not made.
During the next day (the 29th) the Twenty-seventh Missouri and Thirtieth Iowa Volunteers
occupied the front line, relieving the Twenty-sixth Iowa and Seventy-sixth Ohio Volunteers. To
render our position more secure; a second line of rifle-pits had been constructed about seventyfive
yards in rear of the front line. During the night the enemy again approached in some force
on the right of General Dodge's line. A very continuous firing was kept up for some time,
extending toward the right. As soon as possible, perceiving that the enemy did not return the fire,
I caused the firing in my front to cease. One man of the pickets of the Twenty-sixth Iowa
Volunteers was wounded--mortally, I fear--by our own fire, and 1 man of the Seventy-sixth Ohio
Volunteers pickets was missing.
During the attack on the 28th I occupied a point where I could see the whole line held by the
two brigades. Not a man or officer flinched, and the closer the enemy came the more firm the
line appeared to stand. I must mention as conspicuous in bravery during the attack Col. Hugo
Wangelin, commanding Third Brigade, and Col. William B. Woods, commanding the Seventysixth
Ohio Volunteers, which regiment occupied the entire front line of the First Brigade.
The members of my staff--Capt. Charles H. Kibler, assistant adjutant-general; Lieuts. F. Critz
and C. M. Marriott, aides-de-camp, and Lieut. William E. Ware, acting assistant inspectorgeneral--
behaved as they have always done--in the most gallant style.
It was expected that on the night of the 29th our troops would be withdrawn from that part of
the line. The attack and alarm probably delayed the movement. The same position was occupied
on the 30th and 31st.
On the morning of the 1st of June this brigade was withdrawn in good order to the left,
encamping in the vicinity of New Hope Church.
I append a list of casualties in my brigade between the morning of the 27th of May and June
1, 1864.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Capt. W. A. GORDON,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., First Div., Fifteenth Army Corps.
Near Atlanta, Ga., August 5, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my brigade--
consisting of the Seventy-sixth Ohio Infantry, Col. William B. Woods commanding; Thirtieth
Iowa Infantry, Lieut. Col. Aurelius Roberts commanding; Twenty-sixth Iowa Infantry, Lieut.
Col. T. G. Ferreby commanding; Twenty-seventh Missouri Infantry, Maj. D. O'Connor
commanding--in the engagements of the 22d and 28th of July, 1864:
On the morning of the 22d of July, the position I then occupied being near the main Atlanta
and Decatur road and within some two miles of the city, skirmishers reported the enemy's
evacuation of their works, and, in compliance with orders from general commanding division, I
at once moved my brigade forward and took position in the deserted works of the enemy,
immediately on the left of the Second Brigade of this division, placing the Twenty-seventh
Missouri Infantry and Thirtieth Iowa Infantry in the front line, and on the right and left of the
Fourth Ohio Battery, respectively, with skirmishers thrown well out to the front, who reported
the enemy in strong occupation of their second line of works. The Seventy-sixth Ohio and
Twenty-sixth Iowa Infantry were held in reserve. There was a vacancy between my left and the
troops nearest adjoining of some 250 yards, the intervening ground much depressed and
swampy. So soon as proper tools could be obtained, the enemy's rifle-pits were reversed, and my
position strengthened with all possible dispatch. From demonstrations now making by the
enemy, it became manifest they were massing troops immediately in front of the Second
Division, on my left, which was soon proven by their attack in such force as to break through our
lines at that point. I made immediate preparations accordingly, not, however, withdrawing my
skirmishers, and by refusing my left having completely changed my front so as to face the flank
of the lines on my left, I made room for the Second Brigade on my right, and moved rapidly
forward across the swamp now appearing in my front, at once attacking the enemy on their flank,
and so vigorously that they were soon obliged to abandon the works they had temporarily
occupied, together with De Gress' battery of 20-pounders that had been in their possession, and
also leaving their dead and wounded in our hands. The works being now strengthened by the
arrival of more forces, my brigade was at once ordered back to reoccupy its original position.
The movement was not executed any too soon, as the enemy was quick to improve the advantage
presented, and before we could resume our position in the works had already hurriedly driven in
our skirmishers and were pressing rapidly forward. The Second Brigade had been so
advantageously posted in the gap heretofore mentioned that they were able to suddenly check the
advancing column, and their well-directed volleys, aided by the Thirtieth Iowa, now in its old
position in the works, soon drove the enemy back to the timber from which they had emerged
with such confidence. I cannot speak in too great praise of the troops of my command for
conduct throughout the entire day. Officers and men performed their whole duty. The loss
sustained by the brigade during the charge made to regain our works was 32 killed and wounded;
1 commissioned officer shot dead on the field, while nobly in performance of his duty, and 1
very severely wounded.
The next morning I was relieved by a brigade from the Twenty-third Army Corps, and
moved back on the Decatur road, two miles from that town, taking position almost on the
extreme flank of our army, with Second Brigade on my right and brigade of Sixteenth Corps on
my left. Being relieved here (though I may mention my brigade spent one entire day in
thoroughly destroying the Atlanta and Augusta Railroad from Decatur some three miles running
west) I moved, with other troops of the division, to the extreme right of the army, and on the
morning of 28th of July formed my brigade in two lines, placing the Twenty-seventh Missouri
and Twenty-sixth Iowa in the advance, in an open corn-field, connecting with the Seventeenth
Army Corps on my left and Second Brigade of First Division on my right. This was about three
miles west by south from Atlanta. Skirmishers were at once thrown forward, but met few of the
enemy. About 8 o'clock the line moved forward, and advanced through the heavy timber for the
distance of half a mile, our skirmishers continuing to meet with but slight opposition. Here it
became evident we were approaching the enemy's position, and we moved with the necessary
precaution, skirmishers gradually feeling their ground. At 12 o'clock the line was halted on a
ridge of timber land, in front of which was a gentle valley of open country, rising again on the
opposite side in timber, about half a mile distant, where it was evident the enemy had taken
position. Their skirmishers, at first occupying the field, were soon driven to the timber land by
the bold advance of our own, who were at once advantageously posted. The enemy now, by
musketry and artillery, manifested himself off on our extreme right, and my two regiments in the
front line were at once ordered to throw up works with such tools as could be obtained. The work
was not completed before the firing indicated a gradual approach to our position. Soon the right
of the division becoming hotly engaged, one of my reserve regiments, the Seventy-sixth Ohio,
was dispatched as an additional reserve to that line, no demonstration being made in my
immediate front. Advantage was now taken to strengthen my works and prepare for the attack
that threatened my line. My brigade thus lay throughout the afternoon, the troops not becoming
engaged, although my skirmishers did good work from time to time engaging the attention of the
enemy and guarding against any movement on their part directed toward my line. At night and
the next day I continued to strengthen my lines, when I was relieved by the Seventeenth Corps,
and moved to the right to position in reserve since occupied.
The loss in the brigade during this day was 2 commissioned officers and 10 enlisted men
I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Colonel Twenty-sixth Iowa Infantry, Comdg. Brigade.
Capt. W. A. GORDON,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., First Div., Fifteenth Army Corps.
Near Lovejoy's Station, Ga., September 4, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit herewith the following report of the operations of this
brigade from August 23, the date of my assuming command, until the fall of Atlanta, September
On the 23d of August the brigade--consisting of the Seventy-sixth Ohio Veteran Infantry.
Col. William B. Woods commanding; Twenty-sixth Iowa Infantry, Lieut. Col. Thomas G.
Ferreby commanding; Thirtieth Iowa Infantry, Lieut. Col. Aurelius Roberts commanding;
Twenty-seventh Missouri Infantry, Col. Thomas Curly commanding--was in position in the front
line of works about Atlanta as occupied by this division, connecting on the right and left,
respectively, with the Fourteenth Army Corps and the Second Division, Fifteenth Corps, and
remained so located until the night of the 26th, when, in obedience to orders from Major-General
Osterhaus, commanding division, the line of works was abandoned. The brigade moved out at 8
p.m. without any loss, and at once took up the line of march for Utoy Creek. Halting toward
daylight, the march was resumed at 7 o'clock the morning of the 27th, and at 4 o'clock that
evening my brigade took position on the south side of the Montgomery railroad, near Shadna
Church, and at once began the erection of works such as before dark made my position safe and
tenable. The 28th was spent in completing the destruction of the West Point road; the regiment
so engaged, the Twenty-sixth Iowa Infantry, thoroughly performing the duty assigned it by
burning the ties and so bending the iron as to make it wholly valueless. The morning of the 29th I
started, together with the remainder of the division, marching toward Jonesborough, on the
Macon railroad. Crossing the Flint River a mile and a half from Jonesborough at 12 that night, I
moved forward to within three-quarters of a mile of the town and went into position in the
second line, on the left of the main Jonesborough road, my right resting on the same and
connecting with the Second Brigade of this division, my left extending to the edge of the open
field in rear of the left of Second Division, Fifteenth Corps. The following morning (the 30th) I
at once erected a substantial line of works on the line as selected, making my position in every
respect secure. During the morning, by the order of the major-general commanding division, two
of my regiments, the Seventy-sixth Ohio and Twenty-sixth Iowa, were detached from my
command, with orders to report to General Hazen, commanding Second Division, Fifteenth
Corps. I herewith inclose the report of Colonel Woods, Seventy-sixth Ohio, the senior officer, of
the part taken by the regiments while so detached. The afternoon of the 31st, from the enemy's
demonstrations, it became evident he would attack our lines, and during the fighting that soon
followed my remaining two regiments were held in reserve.
That night I was ordered to complete the connection of our lines with the Sixteenth Corps,
which work was well done by the Thirtieth Iowa Infantry, and on the following day (September
1) I was again ordered to complete a gap that existed in our works, which object was
satisfactorily accomplished by the Twenty-seventh Missouri Infantry. The morning of September
2, it being found that the enemy had abandoned his works around Jonesborough, my brigade (the
two regiments hitherto detached having reported) joined the division in the pursuit toward
Lovejoy's Station. Finding the enemy behind his fortifications, under the direction of the majorgeneral
commanding division I at once deployed my brigade, moved forward to a ridge of land
about 800 yards from the enemy's main line of works, and connecting my lines on the right with
the Second Brigade, and on the left, the railroad, with the Fourth Army Corps, I began throwing
up works, night already approaching, and made my position secure. My command still occupies
this position.
It is but justice to the officers and men of this brigade to state that under all circumstances
have they shown themselves willing and ready to endure the labor and hardship required of them,
and always prompt to do their whole duty before the enemy.
I append herewith a list of casualties.
I am, captain, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
Colonel Twenty-sixth Iowa infantry, Comdg. Brigade.
Capt. W. A. GORDON,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., First Div., Fifteenth Army Corps.
Itinerary of the First Brigade, First Division, Fifteenth Army Corps, for June and July, 1864.
June 1.--This brigade was encamped near New Hope Church, Ga., and remained there until
the enemy evacuated that position.
June 6.--Moved to the neighborhood of Acworth, Ga.
June 10.--Moved in front of enemy's first position near Kenesaw Mountain, where, and in
front of his second position, it has remained, intrenching, skirmishing, &c.
The following officers have been wounded: June 15, Capt. William Dixon, Company D,
Thirtieth Iowa, near Kenesaw; June 16, Maj. John Lubbers, Twenty-sixth Iowa, near Kenesaw;
June 24, First Lieut. Frank Critz, Thirtieth Iowa, aide-de-camp, near Kenesaw.
July 1.--This brigade was encamped near Kenesaw Mountain.
July 3.--The enemy evacuating, the brigade moved into Marietta.
July 5.--Moved toward Nickajack Creek.
July 13.--Moved via Marietta to Roswell Factory.
July 14.--Crossed the Chattahoochee.
July 17.--Thence via Decatur to position in front of Atlanta, on main Atlanta and Decatur
road, which it reached on the 19th.
July 22.--Was engaged in the attack made by the enemy on our lines, with loss of 1 officer
killed and 1 severely wounded.
July 23.--Moved back on Decatur road.
July 24.--Destroyed railroad from Decatur to near Atlanta, some three miles.
July 26.--Moved to extreme right of line and now occupy reserve position, some three miles
west by south from Atlanta.
The following officers wounded: July 22, First Lieut. Miles Arnold, Seventy-sixth Ohio, near
Atlanta, Ga.; July 28, First Lieut. E. F. Byng, Company B, Twenty-sixth Iowa, and Capt. P. H.
Bence, Company F, Thirtieth Iowa, near Atlanta, Ga.
Near Jonesborough, Ga., September 2, 1864.
COLONEL: I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 31st of August I was
ordered by Major-General Osterhaus, commanding the First Division, Fifteenth Army Corps, to
take the Seventy-sixth Ohio and Twenty-sixth Iowa Infantry, of the First Brigade, under your
command, and report with them to Brigadier-General Hazen, commanding the Second Division,
Fifteenth Army Corps. I immediately moved with the regiments designated to the left and
reported to General Hazen. These regiments, the Seventy-sixth Ohio, commanded by Maj. E.
Briggs, and the Twenty-sixth Iowa, commanded by Capt. J. G. Crozer, rendered valuable
assistance in repulsing the attack of the enemy on the 31st ultimo, and on the 1st instant pressed
the flanks of the enemy with a strong line of skirmishers, while attacked in front by the
Fourteenth Corps. On the morning of the 2d instant, by command of Major-General Logan, I
reported to you with my command.
During the operations of these two days both officers and men acted with alacrity, zeal, and
courage, and deserve commendation. I append a list of casualties.
I have the honor to be, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Colonel Seventy-sixth Ohio Infantry.
Comdg. First Brig., First Div., 15th Army Corps.
Kingston, Ga., May 20, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of the action of the Second Brigade
in the battle of Resaca:
This brigade is composed of the Fourth, Ninth, Twenty-fifth, and Thirty-first Iowa Infantry
Regiments, commanded, respectively, by Major Nichols, Colonel Carskaddon, Colonel Stone,
and Colonel Smyth.
About 10 o'clock on the 13th instant the brigade was ordered into line of battle immediately
on the left of the First Brigade, where it remained for two or three hours, when I received orders
to move my brigade forward, which I did, taking the direction and keeping the alignment of the
First Brigade until I arrived near the fortified hill from where the enemy kept up a heavy fire of
artillery and musketry. At this point I halted, keeping my right aligned with the First Brigade,
and advancing my left wing, so as to bring them under cover, where I remained until the enemy
fell back, when I advanced, with the First Brigade on my right, and took possession of the hill
immediately in front of the enemy's fortifications, where I remained, skirmishing until a late hour
at night. On the morning of the 14th commenced skirmishing at daylight, and kept it up all day,
suffering considerable loss. Late in the afternoon of the 14th I was ordered, by General
Osterhaus, to send one regiment to support a battery which was engaging the enemy's
fortifications. In obedience to this order, I sent the Twenty-fifth Iowa, Colonel Stone. A little
later in the evening I was ordered to send a regiment to support the First Brigade, which was
assaulting the enemy's line on my right, and, in obedience thereto, sent the Twenty-fifth Iowa,
and moved the Fourth into position to support the battery. I remained in line of battle during the
night of the 14th, skirmishing until a late hour, and again resumed the skirmishing at daylight on
the 15th, and continued it through the day and until late at night. At daylight on the 16th I
received an order from General Osterhaus to advance into the town of Resaca, the enemy having
evacuated it during the night.
I have only to say, in conclusion, that there was neither straggling nor cowardice in my
command. All were anxious to do their duty. I herewith inclose list of casualties.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Colonel Fourth Iowa Infantry, Commanding Brigade.
[Capt. W. A. GORDON,
Assistant Adjutant-General, First Division.]