1 *OFFICIAL ARMY RECORDS* *1864-1* HEADQUARTERS
SECOND BRIGADE, CAVALRY DIVISION, Collierville, January 1, 1864.
CAPTAIN:
I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the detachments of this brigade which were left in camp when the command was ordered out during the recent advance of the enemy: At 3 p.m. on the 24th of December, 1863, in compliance with orders received from your headquarters by telegraph, I ordered a detachment of 30 men, under Lieutenant Dunham, mounted on the wagon mules, to Macon, Tenn. They swam Wolf River about 7 miles northeast of this place, and proceeded to Macon, reaching there about daylight on the morning of the 25th, found no enemy in the vicinity, and returned to camp, arriving about 3 p.m., 25th December. On the 25th December, received orders from General Hurlbut to destroy all the crossings of Wolf River immediately. Telegraphed the orders to Germantown and La Fayette, and sent details from Collierville to perform the duty. On the 26th and on the morning of the 27th December, repeated the orders, and supposed that they were obeyed, but have since learned that the destruction of the bridge at La Fayette was only partial. About half past 1 p.m., on the 27th December, received information that the enemy in large force was crossing the Wolf River at La Fayette; that they had driven Lieutenant Roberts, Ninth Illinois Cavalry, with his command of two companies of the Ninth Illinois Cavalry, from the town, and were pushing him west on the State Line road. This information came by mounted courier. I immediately mounted every man that was available in camp, using the transportation mules for the purpose, and sent Captain Foster, Second Iowa Cavalry, in command of the detachment, amounting to about 100 men, on the State Line road toward La Fayette. They met Lieutenant Roberts, Ninth Illinois Cavalry, with his command, about 50 men, 2 miles west of La Fayette, and immediately joined with him and engaged the enemy; checked their advance. Drove it back half a mile, but heavy re-enforcements of the rebels coming up they again drove our men slowly but steadily back, pursuing them until within range of our guns in the fort at Collierville, which were opened. Our little detachment fought so stubbornly that it was after dark when our artillery opened. The enemy, 2,000 strong, under General Forrest, formed a line of battle three-fourths of a mile east of the fort, sending 400 west and 600 south of the town. The night was intensely dark, and it was raining. Before daylight on the morning of the 28th December, General Forrest moved his whole command south on the Chulahoma road. Soon after daylight the Ninth Illinois Cavalry came into camp from the east; about 9 a.m. Colonel Morgan's brigade arrived. At 12 m. the Ninth Illinois Cavalry started in pursuit of the enemy, and at 3 a.m. on the 29th, Colonel Morgan's brigade followed. The pursuit was continued a few miles south of the Coldwater, but the enemy having twenty-four hours the start of any considerable portion of our forces, of course the pursuit was fruitless. The command returned to camp on the morning of the 31st December. The conduct of Captain Foster, Second Iowa Cavalry, and of Sergeant Pullman, Ninth Illinois Cavalry, and most of the men of their commands, is highly commendable. Our casualties are as follows: Two men wounded and 8 men captured. The losses of the enemy much greater than ours, and as far as known were 1 man killed and 7 men wounded. I am, captain, your most obedient servant, EDWARD HATCH, 2 Colonel Second Iowa Cavalry, Commanding Brigade.
Capt. SAMUEL L. WOODWARD, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Cav. Div., 16th A. C., Memphis, Tenn.
HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., CAV. DIV., 16TH ARMY CORPS, Collierville, Tenn., January 2, 1864.
CAPTAIN:
I have the honor to submit the following report in regard to the destruction of the bridges at La Fayette: In compliance with orders received by telegraph from your headquarters, December 25, 1863, ordering the destruction of all crossings on Wolf River, I telegraphed to Lieut. S. O. Roberts, Ninth Illinois Cavalry, commanding at La Fayette, to destroy all crossings on the Wolf, in the vicinity of La Fayette. This order was repeated on the 26th and 27th days of December, 1863, and was received by Lieutenant Roberts (see certificate of telegraph operator at Collierville and La Fayette), but the destruction of the bridge was not complete, a foot-path being left, whereby the enemy crossed on the 27th December, and from thence south. I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
W. SCOTT BELDEN,
Lieutenant, and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
Capt. T. H. HARRIS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Chattanooga, January 15, 1864.
GENERAL:
I have the honor to report the operations of my command from December 1 to 31, 1863, as follows: December 1, General Hooker returned to Chattanooga from Ringgold with Geary's division, of the Twelfth Corps, and Osterhaus' division, of the Fifteenth Corps. Cruft's two brigades, of the First Division, Fourth Corps, were ordered to proceed to Chickamauga battlefield and bury such of our dead as still remained unburied by the rebels. This duty finished, they were to return to their former positions on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, between Whiteside's and Bridgeport. General Hooker, on evacuating Ringgold, destroyed the railroad depot and other buildings, as well as such captured property as could not be removed. General Granger's corps marched to the relief of Knoxville, acting in connection with General Sherman's command, which was also moving toward that place. Third Brigade, First Division of Cavalry, Colonel Watkins, of the Sixth Kentucky, commanding, was stationed at Rossville, with an infantry support of two regiments, to guard our south front. General Elliott, with the First Cavalry Division, was ordered to proceed from his position, in the vicinity of Sparta, to Kingston, East Tennessee. He received later instructions, to the effect that in case he did not reach that place in time to participate in the pursuit of Longstreet, he was to establish his headquarters at Athens, and throw out posts as far as possible to the southeast to observe the movements of the enemy in that direction. Information given by deserters from the enemy places the rebel army in our front as follows: Cleburne's division is at Tunnel Hill, and the balance of the army is stationed between there and Dalton. They state that the troops are very much demoralized, the men being very much scattered from their regiments, and desertions are numerous. Buckner's corps was not in the battles in front of Chattanooga, it having gone to the assistance of Longstreet seven or eight days previous. 3 December 3, Col. George P. Buell, Fifty-eighth Indiana Volunteers, commanding Pioneer Brigade, commenced constructing a double-track wagon road over the nose of Lookout Mountain. December 13, General Gillem reports from Nashville that he had just returned to that place from the Tennessee River. The work on the Northwestern railroad was progressing. Guerrillas between the Cumberland and Duck Rivers broken up. Perkins and Ray were disposed of, the former having been killed and the latter captured. Refugees and conscripts from the south side of the river report that Forrest and Pillow are at Jackson, West Tennessee, with about 4,000 men, 1,000 of whom are well mounted and organized. December 15, a small party of rebels, under Maj. Joe Fontaine, Roddey's adjutant, was captured by General Dodge near Pulaski. They had been on a reconnaissance along the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad and the Nashville and Decatur Railroad. Measures were immediately taken to guard against an attack on either railroad. On the 17th, Howard's corps returned to Chattanooga from Knoxville; also Davis' division, of the Fourteenth Corps. The latter was posted along Spring Creek, south of Missionary Ridge, and the former returned to its position in Lookout Valley. Through scouts we learn that the enemy is strengthening his position between Tunnel Hill and Dalton; also at Resaca, near the Coosa River, and at Allatoona Mountains, the last named place being a formidable position. Information from various sources leads to the belief that Hardee is making the Oostenaula River his front, defended by rifle-pits and fortifications; also the Etowah River. All deserters and scouts agree in their statements that the rebels in our front are disheartened and demoralized. President Lincoln's amnesty proclamation was having a good effect in encouraging desertions, and movements have been taken to circulate it quite extensively within the enemy's lines. The cavalry command, under General Elliott, having been detained by General Foster for duty in his department, Col. Eli Long, Fourth Ohio Cavalry, commanding Second Brigade, Second Division Cavalry, was stationed at Calhoun, on the Hiwassee River, for the purpose of watching the movements of the enemy in that vicinity. The balance of the Second Division, under command of General Crook, was ordered by General Grant, on the 20th, to move from Huntsville, where it then was, to Prospect, with a view to operate against Forrest. General W. S. Smith, chief of cavalry of the Military Division of the Mississippi, with the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Kentucky, Second and Fourth Tennessee, and Eighth Iowa Cavalry Regiments, started for Savannah on the 20th, to cross the Tennessee, and operate on the flank and rear of Forrest and drive him from West Tennessee. The operations of the cavalry have been quite brilliant during the month. Col. L. D. Watkins, commanding Third Brigade, First Division, from his position at Rossville: has made several successful raids into the enemy's lines. On the 5th, a reconnaissance sent by him proceeded as far as Ringgold without finding any signs of the enemy, except stragglers and deserters. Again on the 14th, with detachments of the Fourth and Sixth Kentucky Cavalry, numbering about 250 men, he made a reconnaissance toward La Fayette, surprised that town, capturing a colonel of the Georgia Home Guards, 6 officers of the rebel signal corps, and about 38 horses and mules; our loss, none. On the 23d he sent out a scout of 150 men from Fourth and Sixth Kentucky Regiments, under command of Major Welling, of the Fourth Kentucky, which proceeded as far as La Fayette, capturing at that place 1 commissioned officer, 16 non-commissioned and privates. 10 citizens (said to be violent rebels), and 38 horses and mules. On the 22d, a party of Wheeler's cavalry, numbering about 75 men, attacked a small party of the Fourth Michigan Cavalry, stationed at Cleveland. Our loss was 1 or 2 captured, some property lost, consisting of overcoats, saddles, &c., but the enemy were finally driven off. 4 On the 23d, Geary's division, of the Twelfth Corps, left their camp at Lookout Valley to take up a position along the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, one brigade to be stationed at Bridgeport and the other at Stevenson. On the 28th, Colonel Bernard Laiboldt, Second Missouri Infantry, in charge of a train and escort, principally of convalescents belonging to the Fourth Corps, proceeding from Chattanooga to Knoxville, was attacked by a force of Wheeler's cavalry, numbering between 1,200 and 1,500, as he was crossing the Hiwassee River at Charleston. He immediately formed his guard in line of battle on the south side of the river, succeeded in crossing all his train in safety, and then charged the astonished rebels and drove them in confusion. He then called upon Col. Eli Long for cavalry co-operation, who sent all the force he then had in camp, numbering 150 men. With this small force Colonel Long charged the enemy with sabers and drove him 5 miles, capturing 130 prisoners, including 5 commissioned officers. Our loss was 2 killed and 15 wounded. The enemy left his dead and wounded, as well as quite a number of small-arms, &c., upon the field. Both Colonels Laiboldt and Long are entitled to great credit for the manner in which they repelled this attack. I earnestly recommend them to favorable consideration for promotion; Colonel Laiboldt, for his executive ability and efficiency as a brigade commander of the Second Division, Twentieth Army Corps; Col. Eli Long, for the valuable service he rendered during the recent battles in front of Chattanooga and for many instances of previous good conduct. Provost-Marshal-General Wiles reports that 1,080 deserters from the enemy have come into the lines of this army between the 19th of October and December 31. Twenty regiments had reorganized as veteran volunteers on the 1st of January, 1864. A great many others were preparing to reorganize as veterans. I have the honor to annex hereto the official report of the operations of the Second Brigade, Second Division Cavalry, Col. Eli Long, Fourth Ohio Cavalry, commanding; also that of Col. Bernard Laiboldt, Second Missouri, concerning the repulse of Wheeler's cavalry at Charleston, and copies of the official reports of the cavalry force under General Elliott at the engagement at Mossy Creek, E. Tenn. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General, U.S. Vols.,
Commanding.
Brig. Gen. LORENZO THOMAS,
Adjutant-General U.S. Army.
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,
Lookout Valley, Tenn., February 4, 1864.
GENERAL:
I have the honor to submit the following report of the part
taken by my
command in those operations of the army which resulted in driving the
rebel forces from their
positions in the vicinity of Chattanooga, and of its participation,
immediately afterward, in their
pursuit.
In order that these operations may be distinctly understood--that the
troops concerned be
known and receive the honor due them--it is necessary to premise by
stating that the general
attack was ordered to be made on the enemy's extreme right at daylight
on the 21st of November,
and that preparatory orders were sent, through me, on the 18th, for the
Eleventh Corps to cross to
the north bank of the Tennessee River on the 20th. At this time the
Eleventh, and a part of the
Twelfth Corps, were encamped in Lookout Valley opposite to the left of
the enemy's line.
In consequence of the non-arrival of the force mainly relied on to lead
off, the attack was
postponed to the following morning, and again postponed until the 24th
for the same reason.
Meanwhile orders were received for the Eleventh Corps to go to
Chattanooga, where it reported
5
on the 22d. This divided my command, and, as the orders contemplated no
advance from
Lookout Valley, application was made by me to the major-general
commanding the department
for authority to accompany the Eleventh Corps, assigning as a reason
that it was my duty to join
that part of my command going into battle. This was acceded to, and,
preparatory to leaving,
invitation was sent for Brigadier-General Geary, who was the senior
officer in my absence, to
examine with me the enemy's positions and defenses, and to be informed
at what points I desired
to have his troops held. This was to enable me to make use of the
telegraph in communicating
with him advisedly during the progress of the fight, should a favorable
opportunity present itself
for him to advance.
On the 23d, the commander of the department requested me to remain in
Lookout Valley,
and make a demonstration as early as possible the following morning on
the point of Lookout
Mountain, my command to consist of the parts of two divisions. Later in
the day, the 23d, a copy
of a telegram was received from the major-general commanding the
Division of the Mississippi
to the effect that in the event the pontoon bridge at Brown's Ferry
could not be repaired in season
for Osterhaus' division, of the Fifteenth Corps, to cross by 8 a.m. on
the 24th, the division would
report to me. Soon after, another telegram, from the headquarters of the
department, instructed
me, in the latter case, to take the point of Lookout Mountain if my
demonstration should develop
its practicability. At 2 a.m. word was received that the bridge could
not be put in serviceable
condition for twelve hours, but to be certain on the subject, a staff
officer was dispatched to
ascertain, and at 3.15 a.m., on the 24th, the report was confirmed.
As now composed, my command consisted of Osterhaus' division, Fifteenth
Corps; Cruft's,
of the Fourth; Geary's, of the Twelfth (excepting from the two
last-named divisions such
regiments as were required to protect our communications with Bridgeport
and Kelley's Ferry);
Battery K, of the First Ohio, and Battery I, First New York, of the
Eleventh Corps (the two
having horses for but one); a part of the Second Kentucky Cavalry, and
Company K, of the
Fifteenth Illinois Cavalry, making an aggregate force of 9,681. We were
all strangers, no one
division ever having seen either of the others.
Geary's division, supported by Whitaker's brigade, of Cruft's division,
was ordered to
proceed up the valley, cross the creek near Wauhatchie, and march down,
sweeping the rebels
from it. The other brigade of the Fourth Corps to advance, seize the
bridge just below the
railroad, and repair it. Osterhaus' division was to march up from
Brown's Ferry, under cover of
the hills, to the place of crossing; also, to furnish supports for the
batteries. The Ohio battery was
to take a position on Bald Hill, and the New York battery on the hill
directly in rear. The Second
Kentucky Cavalry was dispatched to observe the movements of the enemy in
the direction of
Trenton, and the Illinois company to perform orderly and escort duty.
This disposition of the
forces was ordered to be made as soon after daylight as practicable.
At this time the enemy's pickets formed a continuous line along the
right bank of Lookout
Creek, with the reserves in the valley, while his main force was
encamped in a hollow half way
up the slope of the mountain, the summit itself was held by three
brigades of Stevenson's
division, and these were comparatively safe, as the only means of access
from the west, for a
distance of 20 miles up the valley, was by two or three trails,
admitting of the passage of but 1
man at a time, and even those trails were held at the top by rebel
pickets. For this reason no
direct attempt was made for the dislodgment of this force. On the
Chattanooga side, which is less
precipitous, a road of easy grade has been made communicating with the
summit by zig-zag lines
running diagonally up the mountain side, and it was believed that before
our troops should gain
possession of this, the enemy on the top would evacuate his position, to
avoid being cut off from
his main body, to rejoin which would involve a march of 20 or 30 miles.
6
Viewed from whatever point, Lookout Mountain, with its high palisaded
crest, and its steep,
rugged, rocky, and deeply-furrowed slopes, presented an imposing barrier
to our advance, and
when to these natural obstacles were added almost interminable,
well-planned, and wellconstructed
defenses, held by Americans, the assault became an enterprise worthy of the
ambition and renown of the troops to whom it was intrusted.
On the northern slope, midway between the summit and the Tennessee, a
plateau or belt of
arable land encircles the crest. There a continuous line of earth-works
had been thrown up, while
redoubts, redans, and pits appeared lower down the slope, to repel an
assault from the direction
of the river. On each flank were rifle-pits, epaulements for batteries,
walls of stone, and abatis to
resist attacks from either the Chattanooga or Lookout Valleys. In the
valleys themselves were
earth-works of still greater extent.
Geary commenced his movement as instructed, crossed the creek at 8
o'clock, captured the
entire picket of 42 men posted to defend it, marched directly up the
mountain, until his right
rested on the palisades, and headed down the valley.
At the same time Grose's brigade advanced resolutely, with brisk
skirmishing, drove the
enemy from the bridge, and at once proceeded to put it in repair.
The firing at this point alarmed the rebels, and immediately their
columns were seen filing
down the mountain from their camps, and moving into their rifle-pits and
breastworks; at the
same time numbers established themselves behind the embankment of the
railroad, which
enabled them, without exposure, to sweep, with a fire of musketry, the
field over which our
troops would be compelled to march for a distance of 300 or 400 yards.
These dispositions were distinctly visible, and as facilities for
avoiding them were close at
hand, Osterhaus was directed to send a brigade, under cover of the hills
and trees, about 800
yards higher up the creek, and prepare a crossing at that point. This
was Brigadier-General
Woods' brigade.
Soon after this Cruft was ordered to leave a sufficient force at the
bridge to engage the
attention of the enemy, and for the balance of Grose's brigade to follow
Woods'. Meanwhile a
section of howitzers was planted to enfilade the positions the enemy had
taken, and Osterhaus
established a section of 20-pounder Parrotts to enfilade the route by
which the enemy had left his
camp. The battery on Bald Hill enfiladed the railroad and highway
leading to Chattanooga, and
all the batteries and sections of batteries had a direct or enfilading
fire within easy range on all
the positions taken by the rebels. Besides, the 20-pounder Parrotts
could be used with good effect
on the rebel camp on the side of the mountain. With this disposition of
the artillery it was
believed we would be able to prevent the enemy from dispatching relief
to oppose Geary, and
also keep him from running away.
At 11 o'clock Woods had completed his bridge. Geary's lines appeared
close by, his
skirmishers smartly engaged, and all the guns opened. Woods and Grose
then sprang across the
river, joined Geary's left, and moved down the valley. A few of the
enemy escaped from the
artillery fire, and those who did ran upon our infantry and were
captured. The balance of the
rebel forces were killed or taken prisoners, many of them remaining in
the bottom of their pits
for safety until forced out by our men.
Simultaneous with these operations the troops on the mountain rushed on
in their advance,
the right passing directly under the muzzles of the enemy's guns on the
summit, climbing over
ledges and bowlders, up hill and down, furiously driving the enemy from
his camp and from
position after position. This lasted until 12 o'clock, when Geary's
advance heroically rounded the
peak of the mountain.
Not knowing to what extent the enemy might be re-enforced, and fearing
from the rough
character of the field of operations that our lines might be disordered,
directions had been given
7
for the troops to halt on reaching this high ground, but, fired by
success, with a flying, panicstricken
enemy before them, they pressed impetuously forward. Cobham's brigade,
occupying
the high ground on the right, between the enemy's main line of defense
on the plateau and the
palisades, incessantly plied them with fire from above and behind, while
Ireland's brigade was
vigorously rolling them up on the flank, and both being closely
supported by the brigades of
Whitaker and Creighton, our success was uninterrupted and irresistible.
Before losing the advantages the ground presented us, the enemy had been
re-enforced.
Meantime, after having secured the prisoners, two of Osterhaus'
regiments had been sent forward
on the Chattanooga road, and the balance of his and Cruft's divisions
had joined Geary. All the
rebel efforts to resist us only resulted in rendering our success more
thorough. After two or three
short but sharp conflicts, the plateau was cleared. The enemy, with his
re-enforcements, driven
from the walls and pits around Craven's house (the last point at which
he could make a stand in
force), all broken and dismayed, were hurled in great numbers over the
rocks and precipices into
the valley.
It was now near 2 o'clock, and our operations were arrested by the
darkness. The clouds,
which had hovered over and enveloped the summit of the mountain during
the morning, and to
some extent favored our movements, gradually settled into the valley and
completely veiled it
from our view. Indeed, from the moment we had rounded the peak of the
mountain, it was only
from the roar of battle and the occasional glimpse our comrades in the
valley could catch of our
lines and standards that they knew of the strife or its progress; and
when, from these evidences,
our true condition was revealed to them, their painful anxiety yielded
to transports of joy which
only soldiers can feel in the earliest moments of dawning victory.
Deeming a descent into the valley imprudent, without more accurate
information of its
topography, and also of the position and strength of the enemy, our line
was established on the
east side of the mountain, the right resting on the palisades, and the
left near the mouth of
Chattanooga Creek, and this we strengthened by all the means at hand,
working until 4 o'clock,
when the commander of the department was informed that our position was
impregnable.
During all of these operations the batteries on Moccasin Point, under
Captain Naylor, had
been busily at work from the north bank of the Tennessee River, and had
contributed as much to
our assistance as the irregularities of the ground and the state of the
atmosphere would admit of.
From our position we commanded the enemy's lines of defense, stretching
across Chattanooga
Valley, by an enfilading fire, and also by a direct fire, many of his
camps, some of which were in
our immediate vicinity. Also direct communication had been opened with
Chattanooga, and at a
quarter past 5 o'clock Brigadier-General Carlin, Fourteenth Corps,
reported to me with his
brigade, and was assigned to duty on the right of the line, to relieve
Geary's command, almost
exhausted with the fatigue and excitement incident to their unparalleled
march.
To prevent artillery being brought forward, the enemy had undermined the
road and covered
it with felled timber. This was repaired and placed in serviceable
condition before morning.
During the day and until after midnight an irregular fire was kept up
along our line, and had
the appearance at one time of an effort to break it. This was on the
right, and was at once
vigorously and handsomely repelled. In this, Carlin's brigade rendered
excellent service. His
report is herewith forwarded.
Before daylight, anticipating the withdrawal of the rebel force from the
summit of the
mountain, parties from several regiments were dispatched to scale it,
but to the Eighth Kentucky
must belong the distinction of having been foremost to reach the crest
and at sunrise to display
our flag from the peak of Lookout, amid the wild and prolonged cheers of
the men whose
dauntless valor had borne it to that point.
8
During the night the enemy had quietly abandoned the mountain, leaving
behind 20,000
rations, the camp and garrison equipage of three brigades, and other
matériel.
An impenetrable mist still covered the face of the valley. Prisoners
reported that the enemy
had abandoned it, but, deeming it imprudent to descend, a reconnaissance
was ordered, and soon
after 9 o'clock report came in that the rebels had retired, but that
their pickets still held the right
bank of Chattanooga Creek, in the direction of Rossville. Soon after the
fog vanished, and
nothing was to be seen in the valley but the deserted and burning camps
of the enemy.
Among the fruits of the preceding operations may be enumerated the
concentration of the
army, the abandonment of defenses upward of 8 miles in extent, the
recovery of all the
advantages in position the enemy had gained from our army on the bloody
field of Chickamauga,
giving to us the undisputed navigation of the river and the control of
the railroad, the capture of
between 2,000 and 3,000 prisoners, 5 stand of colors, 2 pieces of
artillery, upward of 5,000
muskets, &c.
Of the troops opposed to us were four brigades of Walker's division,
Hardee's corps, a
portion of Stewart's division of Breckinridge's corps, and on the top of
the mountain were three
brigades of Steven-sons division.
In conformity with orders, two regiments were dispatched to hold the
mountain, Carlin's
brigade directed to await orders on the Summertown road, and at 10
o'clock my column,
Osterhaus (being nearest the road) leading, marched for Rossville.
On arriving at Chattanooga Creek it was discovered that the enemy had
destroyed the bridge,
and, in consequence, our pursuit was delayed nearly three hours. As soon
as the stringers were
laid, Osterhaus managed to throw over the Twenty-seventh Missouri
Regiment, and soon after
all of his infantry. The former deployed, pushed forward as skirmishers
to the gorge in
Missionary Ridge, and drew the fire of the artillery and infantry
holding it, and also discovered
that the enemy was attempting to cover a train of wagons loading with
stores at the Rossville
house.
As the position was one presenting many advantages for defense, the
skirmishers were
directed to keep the enemy engaged in front, while Woods' brigade was
taking the ridge on the
right, and four regiments of Williamson's on the left. Two other
regiments of this brigade were
posted on the road leading to Chattanooga to prevent surprise. In
executing these duties the
troops were necessarily exposed to the enemy's artillery, but as soon as
it was discovered that his
flanks were being turned and his retreat threatened, he hastily
evacuated the gap, leaving behind
large quantities of artillery and small-arm ammunition, wagons,
ambulances, and a house full of
commissary stores. Pursuit was made as far as consistent with my
instructions to clear
Missionary Ridge.
Meanwhile the bridge had been completed and all the troops over or
crossing. Osterhaus
received instructions to move, with his division, parallel with the
ridge on the east, Cruft on the
ridge, and Geary in the valley, to the west of it, within easy
supporting distance. The batteries
accompanied Geary, as it was not known that roads could be found for
them with the other
divisions without delaying the movements of the column.
General Cruft, with his staff, preceded his column in ascending the
ridge to supervise the
formation of his lines, and was at once met by a line of the enemy's
skirmishers advancing. The
Ninth and Thirty-sixth Indiana Regiments sprang forward, ran into line
under their fire, and
instantly charging, drove back the rebels, while the residue of the
column formed their lines,
Grose's brigade, with the Fifty-first Ohio and Thirty-fifth Indiana, of
Whitaker's, in advance, the
balance of the latter closely supporting the front line. It was,
however, soon found that the ridge
on top was too narrow to admit of this formation, and the division was
thrown into four lines. By
9
this time the divisions of Geary and Osterhaus were abreast of it, and
all advanced at a charging
pace.
The enemy had selected for his advance line of defense the breastworks
thrown up by our
army on its return from Chickamauga, but such was the impetuosity of our
advance that his front
line was routed before an opportunity was afforded him to prepare for a
determined resistance.
Many of the fugitives, to escape, ran down the east slope to the lines
of Osterhaus, a few to the
west, and were picked up by Geary. The bulk of them, however, sought
refuge behind the second
line, and they, in their turn, were soon routed, and the fight became
almost a running one.
Whenever the accidents of the ground enabled the rebels to make an
advantageous stand, Geary
and Osterhaus, always in the right place, would pour a withering fire
into their flanks, and again
the race was renewed. This continued until near sunset, when those of
the enemy who had not
been killed or captured gave way, and in attempting to escape along the
ridge, ran into the arms
of Johnson's division, of the Fourteenth Corps, and were captured.
Our enemy, the prisoners stated, was Stewart's division. But few
escaped. Osterhaus atone
captured 2,000 of them. This officer names the Fourth Iowa,
Seventy-sixth Ohio, and Twentyseventh
Missouri Regiments as having been especially distinguished in this
engagement.
Landgraeber's battery of howitzers also rendered brilliant service on
this field.
Here our business for the day ended, and the troops went into bivouac,
with cheers and
rejoicings, which were caught up by other troops in the vicinity and
carried along the ridge until
lost in the distance.
Soon after daylight every effort was made, by reconnaissance and
inquiry, to ascertain the
whereabouts of the enemy, but to no purpose. The field was as silent as
the grave. Knowing the
desperate extremities to which he must be reduced by our success, with
his retreat seriously
threatened by the only line left him with a hope of success, I felt
satisfied the enemy must be in
full retreat, and accordingly suggested to the commander of the
department that my column
march to Graysville, if possible, to intercept him. This was approved
of, and, re-enforced by
Palmer's corps, all moved immediately in that direction, Palmer's corps
in advance.
On arriving at the west Fork of the Chickamauga River, it was found that
the enemy had
destroyed the bridge. To provide for this contingency, Major-General
Butterfield, my chief of
staff, had in the morning prudently requested that three pontoons, with
their balks and chesses,
might be dispatched for my use, but as they had not come up, after a
detention of several hours, a
bridge was constructed for the infantry, the officers swimming their
horses. It was not until after
3 o'clock the regiments were able to commence crossing, leaving the
artillery and ambulances to
follow as soon as practicable; also a regiment of infantry as a guard,
to complete the bridge, if
possible, for the artillery, and also to assist in throwing over the
pontoon bridge as soon as it
arrived. Partly in consequence of this delay, instructions were given
for Palmer's command to
continue on to Graysville on reaching the La Fayette road, and for the
balance of the command to
proceed to Ringgold (Cruft now leading), as this would enable me to
strike the railroad 5 or 6
miles to the south of where it was first intended. Palmer was to rejoin
me in the morning.
Soon after dark word was received from Palmer, through a member of his
staff, that he had
come up with the enemy, reported to be a battery and 2,000 or 3,000
infantry. Instructions were
sent him to attack them at once, and while forming his lines to the left
for that purpose, the
remaining part of the column was massed as it came up, to the right of
the road, and held
awaiting the movements of Palmer. His enemy was discovered to be a
battery of three pieces,
with a small escort, and was the rear of the rebel army on the road from
Graysville to Ringgold.
Three pieces of artillery were captured, and subsequently an additional
piece, with, I believe, a
few prisoners. I have received no report from this officer of his
operations while belonging to my
command, although mine has been delayed six weeks in waiting.
10
We were now fairly up with the enemy. This at 10 o'clock at night.
Cruft's division advanced
and took possession of the crest of Chickamauga hills, the enemy's
abandoned camp fires still
burning brightly on the side; and we all went into bivouac.
My artillery was not yet up, and in this connection I desire that the
especial attention of the
commander of the department may be called to that part of the report of
General Osterhaus
which relates to the conduct of the officers who had the pontoon bridge
in charge. I do not know
the names of the officers referred to;was not furnished with a copy of
their instructions, nor did
they report to me. The pontoons were not brought forward to the point of
crossing at all, and the
balks and chess-planks only reached their destination between 9 and 10
p.m.; distance from
Chattanooga 10 miles, and the roads excellent.
Then trestles had to be framed, and the bridge was not finished until 6
o'clock the following
morning.
The report of Lieut. H. C. Wharton, of the Engineers, and temporarily
attached to my staff,
who was left behind to hasten the completion of the bridge, is herewith
transmitted. No better
commentary on this culpable negligence is needed than is furnished by
the record of our
operations in the vicinity of Ringgold.
The town was distant 5 miles. At daylight the pursuit was renewed,
Osterhaus in advance,
Geary following, and Cruft in the rear. Evidences of the precipitate
flight of the enemy were
everywhere apparent; caissons, wagons, ambulances, arms, and ammunition
were abandoned in
the hurry and confusion of retreat. After going about 2 miles, we came
up with the camp he had
occupied during the night, the fires still burning. A large number of
prisoners were also taken
before reaching the East Fork of the Chickamauga River.
We found the ford, and also the bridge to the south of Ringgold, held by
a body of rebel
cavalry. These discharged their arms and quickly gave way before a
handful of our men, and
were closely pursued into the town.
I rode to the front on hearing the firing, where I found Osterhaus out
with his skirmishers,
intensely alive to all that was passing, and pushing onward briskly. He
informed me that four
pieces of artillery had just left the rebel camp, weakly escorted, and
ran into the gorge, which he
could have captured with a small force of cavalry. The gorge is to the
east of Ringgold, and we
were approaching it from the west. A little firing occurred between our
skirmishers, as they
entered the town, and small parties of the rebel cavalry and infantry,
the latter retiring in the
direction of the gap. This is a break in Taylor's Ridge of sufficient
width for the river to flow and
on its north bank room for an ordinary road and a railroad, when the
ridge rises with abruptness
on both sides 400 or 500 feet, and from thence, running nearly north and
south, continues
unbroken for many miles. Covering the entrance to it is a small patch of
young trees and
undergrowth.
It was represented by citizens friendly to our cause, and confirmed by
contrabands, that the
enemy had passed through Ringgold, sorely pressed, his animals
exhausted, and his army
hopelessly demoralized. In a small portion of it only had the officers
been able to preserve
regimental and company formations, many of the men having thrown away
their arms. A still
greater number were open and violent in their denunciations of the
Confederacy.
In order to gain time, it was the intention of the rear guard to make
use of the natural
advantages the gorge presented to check the pursuit. The troops relied
on for this were posted
behind the mountain and the trees, and the latter were also used to mask
a couple of pieces of
artillery. Only a feeble line of skirmishers appeared in sight.
The only way to ascertain the enemy's strength was to feel of him, and,
as our success, if
prompt, would be crowned with a rich harvest of matériel, without
waiting for my artillery (not
yet up, though after 9 o'clock), the skirmishers advanced. Woods
deployed his brigade in rear of
11
them under cover of the embankment of the railroad, and a brisk musketry
fire commenced
between the skirmishers. At the same time the enemy kept his artillery
busily at work. Their
skirmishers were driven in, and as we had learned the position of the
battery, the Thirteenth
Illinois Regiment, from the right of Woods' line was thrown forward to
seize some houses, from
which their gunners could be picked off by our men. These were
heroically taken and held by
that brave regiment. Apprehensive that he might lose his artillery, the
enemy advanced with a
superior force on our skirmishers, and they fell back behind Woods'
line, when that excellent
officer opened on the rebels and drove them into the gorge, they
leaving, as they fled, their dead
and wounded on the ground. Our skirmishers at once re-occupied their
line, the Thirteenth
Illinois all the time maintaining its position with resolution and
obstinacy. While this was going
on in front of the gorge, Osterhaus detached four regiments, under
Colonel Williamson, half a
mile to the left, to ascend the ridge and turn the enemy's right. Two of
these, the Seventy-sixth
Ohio, supported by the Fourth Iowa, were thrown forward, and as the
enemy appeared in great
force, when they had nearly gained the crest, Geary ordered four of his
regiments still farther to
the left, under Colonel Creighton, for the same object, where they also
found an overwhelming
force confronting them. Vigorous attacks were made by both of these
columns, in which the
troops exhibited extraordinary daring and devotion, but were compelled
to yield to numerical
superiority. The first took shelter in a depression in the side of the
ridge about 50 paces in rear of
their most advanced position, and there remained. The other column was
ordered to resume its
position on the railroad.
All the parties sent forward to ascertain the enemy's position and
strength were small, but the
attacks had been made with so much vigor, and succeeded so well in their
object, that I deemed it
unwise to call up the commands of Palmer and Cruft, and the remaining
brigades of Geary, to
deliver a general attack without my artillery. I therefore gave
instructions for no advance to be
made, and for the firing to be discontinued, except in self-defense.
These orders were conveyed
and delivered to every officer in command on our advance line.
Word was received from General Woods that appearances in his front were
indicative of a
forward movement on the part of the enemy, when Ireland's brigade, of
Geary's division, was
sent to strengthen him. Cobham's brigade, of the same division, took a
well-sheltered position
behind the knoll, midway between the depot and the opening to the gap.
These officers were also
ordered not to attack or to fire unless it should become necessary.
I may here state that the greatest difficulty I experienced with my new
command, and the one
which caused me the most solicitude, was to check and curb their
disposition to engage,
regardless of circumstances, and, it appears, almost of consequences.
This had also been the case
on Lookout Mountain and on Missionary Ridge. Despite my emphatic and
repeated instructions
to the contrary, a desultory fire was kept up on the right of the line
until the artillery arrived, and
you will see by the reports of commanders that, under cover of elevated
ground between my
position and our right, several small parties advanced to capture the
enemy's battery and harass
his flank at the gap. It is with no displeasure I refer to these
circumstances in evidence of the
animation of the troops, neither is it with a feeling of resentment, for
of that I was disarmed by
an abiding sense of their glorious achievements. It has never been my
fortune to serve with more
zealous and devoted troops.
Between 12 and 1 o'clock the artillery came up, not having been able to
cross the West Fork
of the Chickamauga until 8 o'clock on the morning of the 27th. Under my
acting chief of
artillery, Major Reynolds, in conjunction with Generals Geary and
Osterhaus, one section of 12-
pounder howitzers was placed in position to bear on the enemy in front
of our right and to
enfilade the gap; another section of 10-pounder Parrotts was assigned to
silence the enemy's
battery, and one section farther to the left, to bear on some troops
held in mass in front of Geary's
12
regiments. At the same time a regiment from Cruft's division had been
sent around by the bridge
to cross the Chickamauga, and, if possible, to gain the heights of the
ridge on the south side of
the river, the possession of which would give us a plunging fire upon
the enemy in the gorge.
Two companies had nearly gained the summit when they were recalled. The
artillery had opened
with marked effect, the enemy's guns were hauled to the rear, his troops
seen moving, and before
1 o'clock he was in full retreat. Williamson's brigade followed him over
the mountain, while
skirmishers from the Sixtieth and One hundred and second New York
Regiments pursued him
through the gap. Efforts were made to burn the railroad bridges, but the
rebels were driven from
them and the fires extinguished.
During the artillery firing the major-general commanding the Division of
the Mississippi
arrived, and gave directions for the pursuit to be discontinued. Later
in the day, soon after 3
o'clock, I received instructions from him to have a reconnaissance made
in the direction of
Tunnel Hill, the enemy's line of retreat, for purposes of observation,
and to convey to the enemy
the impression that we were still after him. Grose's brigade was
dispatched on this service. About
2 miles out he ran upon a small force of rebel cavalry and infantry, and
pursued them about a
mile and a half, when he fell upon what he supposed to be a division of
troops, posted on the
hills commanding the road. The brigade returned at 8 o'clock, and went
into bivouac. Colonel
Grose's report in this connection concludes by saying that "we found
broken caissons, wagons,
ambulances, dead and dying men of the enemy strewn along the way to a
horrible extent."
As some misapprehension appears to exist with regard to our losses in
this battle, it is proper
to observe that the reports of my division commanders exhibit a loss of
65 killed and 377
wounded, about one-half of the latter so severely that it was necessary
to have them conveyed to
the hospital for proper treatment.
They also show of the enemy killed and left on the field 130. Of his
wounded we had no
means of ascertaining, as only those severely hurt remained behind, and
they filled every house
by the wayside as far as our troops penetrated. A few of our wounded men
fell into the enemy's
hands, but were soon retaken. We captured 230 prisoners and 2 flags, to
make no mention of the
vast amount of property and matériel that fell into our hands. Adding to
the number of prisoners
and killed, as above stated, the lowest estimated proportion of wounded
to killed usual in battle
would make the losses of the enemy at least three to our one.
From this time the operations of the Right Wing, as it was now called,
became subordinate to
those of the column marching to the relief of the garrison of Knoxville.
Instructions reached me from the headquarters of the military division
to remain at Ringgold
during the 29th and 30th, unless it should be found practicable to
advance toward Dalton,
without fighting a battle, the object of my remaining, as stated, being
to protect Sherman's flank,
with authority to attack or move on Dalton should the enemy move up the
Dalton and Cleveland
road.
In retreating, the enemy had halted a portion of his force at Tunnel
Hill, midway between
Ringgold and Dalton, and as he evinced no disposition to molest Sherman,
my command rested
at Ringgold. I was kept fully advised of the rebel movements through the
activity and daring of
the Second Kentucky Cavalry, which had joined me on the 28th.
In obedience to verbal directions given me by the commander of the
division, the railroad
was thoroughly destroyed for 2 miles, including the bridges on each side
of Ringgold, by
Palmer's and Cruft's commands; also the depot, tannery, all the mills,
and all matériel that could
be used in the support of an army. We found on our arrival large
quantities of forage and flour.
What was not required by the wants of the service was either sent to the
rear or burned.
Our wounded were as promptly and as well cared for as circumstances
would permit.
Surgeon Moore, the medical director of the Army of the Tennessee,
voluntarily left his chief to
13
devote himself to their relief, and under his active, skillful, and
humane auspices, and those of
the medical directors with the divisions, they were comfortably removed
to Chattanooga on the
28th. My sincere thanks are tendered to all the officers of the medical
staff for their zealous and
careful attentions to the wounded, on this as well as our former fields.
Especially are they due to
Surgeon Ball, medical director of Geary's division, and to Surgeon
Menzies, medical director of
Cruft's division.
On the 29th, Major-General Palmer returned to Chattanooga with his
command, having in
charge such prisoners as remained in Ringgold. On the 30th, the enemy
being reassured by the
cessation of our pursuit, sent a flag of truce to our advanced lines at
Catoosa, by Maj. Calhoun
Benham, requesting permission to bury his dead and care for his wounded,
abandoned on the
field of his last disaster at Ringgold.
Copies of this correspondence have heretofore been forwarded. Also, on
the 30th, under
instructions from department headquarters, Grose's brigade, Cruft's
division, marched for the old
battle-field at Chickamauga, to bury our dead; and on the 1st December,
the infantry and cavalry
remaining left Ringgold, Geary and Cruft to return to their old camps,
Osterhaus to encamp in
Chattanooga Valley.
The reports of commanders exhibit a loss in the campaign, including all
the engagements
herein reported, in killed, wounded, and missing, of 960.
Inconsiderable, in comparison with my
apprehension, or the ends accomplished; nevertheless, there is cause for
the deepest regret and
sorrow.
Among the fallen are some of the brightest names of the army. Creighton
and Crane, of the
Seventh Ohio; Acton, of the Fortieth Ohio; Bushnell, of the Thirteenth
Illinois; Elliott, of the
One hundred and second New York, and others, whose names my limits will
not allow me to
enumerate, will be remembered and lamented as long as courage and
patriotism are esteemed as
virtues among men. The reports of commanders also show the capture of
6,547 prisoners (not
including those taken by Palmer at Graysville, of which no return has
been received), also 7
pieces of artillery, 9 battle-flags, not less than 10,000 stand of
small-arms, 1 wagon train, and a
large amount of ammunition for artillery and infantry, forage, rations,
camp and garrison
equipage, caissons and limbers, ambulances, and other impedimenta. The
reports relating to the
capture of the flags are herewith transmitted.
In the foregoing, it has been impossible to furnish more than a general
outline of our
operations, relying upon the reports of subordinate commanders to give
particular and
discriminating information concerning the services of divisions,
brigades, regiments, and
batteries. These reports are herewith respectfully transmitted.
The attention of the major-general commanding is especially invited to
those of the division
commanders. As to the distinguished services of those commanders, I
cannot speak in terms too
high. They served me day and night, present or absent, with all of the
well-directed earnestness
and devotion they would have served themselves had they been charged
with the responsibilities
of the commander. The confidence inspired by their active and generous
co-operation, early
inspired me to feel that complete success was inevitable. My thanks are
due to General Carlin
and his brigade for their services on Lookout Mountain on the night of
the 24th. They were
posted in an exposed position, and when attacked repelled it with great
spirit and success.
I must also express my acknowledgments to Major-General Palmer and his
command for
services rendered while belonging to my column. Lieutenant Ayers, of the
signal corps, with his
assistants, rendered me valuable aid in his branch of the service during
our operations.
Major Reynolds, the chief of artillery of Geary's division, proved
himself to be a skillful
artillerist, and requires especial mention for his services. His
batteries were always posted with
14
judgment and served with marked ability. The precision of his fire at
Lookout and Ringgold
elicited universal admiration.
To my staff more than ever am I indebted for the assistance rendered
upon this occasion.
Major-General Butterfield, chief of staff, always useful in counsel, was
untiring and devoted on
the field; Capt. H. W. Perkins, assistant adjutant-general; Col. James
D. Fessenden, Maj. William
H. Lawrence, Capt. R. H. Hall, Lieuts. P. A. Oliver and Samuel W.
Taylor, aides-de-camp,
bravely and intelligently performed all their duties.
Lieut. H. C. Wharton, a promising young officer of Engineers, reported
to me from the staff
of the major-general commanding the department, and was unwearied in his
assistance, both as
an engineer and as an officer of my personal staff.
Major-General Howard has furnished me, for transmittal, his able report
of the operations
and services of the Eleventh Corps, from the time it passed from my
command, November 22, to
that of its return, December 17. As it relates to events of which I had
no personal knowledge, it
only remains to comply with his wishes, with the request that the
major-general commanding the
department will give it his especial attention.
I may add, that the zeal and devotedness displayed by this corps and its
commander, in
performing all the duties assigned them, and in cheerfully encountering
its perils and privations,
afford me great satisfaction.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General, Commanding.
Brig. Gen. WILLIAM D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
In Field, Culpeper Court- House, Va.,
March 25, 1864.
Respectfully forwarded to Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, Washington, D. C.
I know of no objection to the substitution of this for Major-General
Hooker's original report
of his operations in the battle of Chattanooga.
Attention is called to that part of the report giving, from the reports
of his subordinate
commanders, the number of prisoners and small-arms captured, which is
greater than the number
really captured by the whole army.
U.S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General, U. S. Army.
First Brigade, Second Cavalry Division, commanded by Col. Robert H. G.
Minty, Fourth
Michigan Cavalry.
January 1, the brigade was at Pulaski, Tenn., but was soon dispersed by
the regiments going
home on veteran furloughs, &c.
January 5, the Fourth U. S. Cavalry moved, in compliance with orders
from Brig. Gen. W. S.
Smith, from Pulaski, and arrived at Corinth, Miss., January 10.
January 11, it left Corinth by railroad and reached La Grange, Tenn.,
the next day.
January 12, the headquarters of the brigade started for Huntsville,
Ala., where it arrived on
the 14th, and remained for the rest of the month.
January 26, the Fourth U.S. Cavalry left La Grange and marched to
Collierville, Tenn., where
it remained until February 1. The Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry left
Pulaski, Tenn., on the 2d,
15
having re-enlisted as veteran volunteers, and proceeded to Nashville,
where it remained until the
18th.
On the 25th it arrived at Harrisburg, Pa., via Cairo, Ill.
On the 27th was furloughed for thirty days.
The Fourth Michigan Cavalry, the detachment under Major Robbins, on
courier duty
between Harrison and Calhoun, Tenn., on the 4th reported to Colonel
Long, at Calhoun, and
marched with his brigade to Cleveland and Charleston. From the 12th to
the 21st it was on picket
at Columbus; from the 21st to the 31st on duty at Calhoun. The
detachment under Major Gray
left Pulaski on the 9th and on the 19th arrived at Rossville, Ga.; 160
miles.
During the remainder of the month this detachment was employed in
scouting the country in
connection with the Twenty-eighth Kentucky Regiment, all being under the
command of Colonel
Boone, Twenty-eighth Kentucky. It was engaged in one or two slight
skirmishes.
The Fifth Iowa Cavalry left Pulaski, Tenn., on the 7th, having
re-enlisted. Moved to
Nashville, where it remained for the balance of the month, being delayed
in getting the veteran
bounties. The Third Indiana Cavalry was stationed for the most of the
month at Maryville, near
Knoxville, E. Tenn. It has made no report of its marches or actions.
First Brigade, Second Cavalry Division, commanded by Col. Robert H. G.
Minty, Fourth
Michigan Cavalry.
During the month brigade headquarters remained at Huntsville, Ala.
The Fourth U.S. Cavalry, being at Collierville, Tenn., with the
expedition under the
command of Brig. Gen. W. S. Smith, remained until the 11th, then marched
to New Albany,
where it arrived February 14.
February 16, marched and arrived at Okolona, Miss., on the 19th, and
West Point on the
20th, where it met and defeated a large force of the enemy under Forrest.
Returned to Okolona February 22, where it had another severe engagement
with Forrest's
forces. The rebels being too powerful, the command retreated that day,
and arrived at Memphis
on the 26th, where it remained during the rest of the month. The Seventh
Pennsylvania Cavalry
was on furlough in Pennsylvania, having re-enlisted as veteran
volunteers. The Fourth Michigan
Cavalry being at Ooltewah, Tenn., was during the month engaged on
several scouts, having
skirmished at Tunnel Hill, near Buzzard Roost; at Red Clay, near
Cleveland; at Cleveland, at
Dirt Town, and other places, acting with the Twenty-eighth Kentucky
Mounted Infantry, under
Colonel Boone. The Fifth Iowa Cavalry at home on furlough, having
re-enlisted as veterans. The
Third Indiana has made no report of events. They have been operating in
East Tennessee, near
Knoxville. Second Cavalry Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Kenner Garrard.
Division headquarters moved on the 4th instant from Huntsville, Ala.,
with three regiments
Third Brigade and detachments First and Second Brigades, to Columbia,
Tenn., for the purpose
of concentrating at that point the command preparatory to its
reorganization and refitting for the
summer campaign. Upon the reorganization of the cavalry, the Fifth Iowa
and Third Indiana
Cavalry (First Brigade), Second Kentucky and Tenth Ohio Cavalry (Second
Brigade), and
Ninety-second Illinois Volunteers (Third Brigade) were transferred from
this division to the
Third Division. Colonels Minty, Long, and Wilder reported with complete
commands (with the
exception of the First Ohio, Second Brigade, at Nashville, Tenn.) on the
25th instant at
Columbia, Tenn.
From the 25th to the 30th the division was active in completing
arrangements for operations
in the field. Under orders the command, with First and Third Brigades,
complete in arms, horses,
and equipments, moved for Chattanooga, Tenn., on the 30th. The Second
Brigade remained at
Columbia, Tenn., awaiting arms and horses.
16
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
Vicksburg, Miss., March 7, 1864.
GENERAL: I now have the honor to submit a report of the recent
operations in the State of
Mississippi:
You will remember that when in July last Vicksburg surrendered and a
detachment from the
Army of the Tennessee under my command had pushed the rebel army of
General Johnston into
and beyond Jackson, it was the purpose to go on eastward and destroy the
remaining railroads of
the State in and near Meridian.
The period of the year, the intense heat and drought, and the condition
of our men after the
long siege of Vicksburg rendered the accomplishment of the plan then
impracticable, and it had
to be deferred to a later period.
Events subsequently occurred during September in East Tennessee which
called General
Grant and my command to that quarter, but as soon as Chattanooga and
Knoxville became secure
and a respite was needed to repair the railroads to the rear, time and
an opportunity were offered
to accomplish what had before been designed.
I offered, if permitted, to break up the useless line of railroad from
Memphis to Corinth, to
attempt the destruction of Meridian without calling for a single man
from the army in the field.
Accordingly, disposing of my then command so as to cover and assist in
repairing the
railroads from Nashville to Decatur and Stevenson, with General Grant's
approval I returned in
person to the Mississippi River, reaching Memphis January 10.
I immediately ordered General Hurlbut to abandon Corinth and all minor
points, draw in all
public property, and forthwith prepare for field service two good
divisions of 5,000 men each,
ready to embark by the 25th. I found General William Sooy Smith, chief
of cavalry on General
Grant's staff, at Memphis. He had come from Middle Tennessee with about
2,500 cavalry in
pursuit of Forrest, who had in the meantime left West Tennessee and
fallen back of the
Tallahatchie. I ordered all the effective cavalry at once also to be
assembled and got ready for the
field. I found on General Hurlbut's tri-monthly return of January
10,1864, for duty, an aggregate
of cavalry of 9,231, with 7,638 serviceable horses. This, with the 2,500
brought with General
Smith, gave us over 10,000 effective cavalrymen and horses.
Having made these preliminary orders, I then hastened to Vicksburg and
gave General
McPherson similar orders for two divisions of infantry and artillery;
then back again to
Memphis, where I remained until the 27th.
In the meantime I learned the strength and distribution of the enemy I
had to encounter,
which was about as follows: On the 1st of February Lieutenant-General
Polk, chief in command
at Meridian, scattered companies of cavalry and infantry all over the
State, collecting taxes and
forcing conscripts--at Canton, Loring's division of infantry, 18 guns,
and about 7,000 men; at
Brandon, French's broken division of 10 guns and 3.000 men: two brigades
subsequently joined
French from Mobile, making his force about 5,000. Major-General Forrest
commanded the
cavalry district of North Mississippi, headquarters at Como; estimated
force, 4,000. Maj. Gen.
Stephen D. Lee commanded the southern district of Mississippi,
headquarters at Jackson. He had
General Jackson's division of three brigades, Ross', Starke's, and Wirt
Adams' posted in a
semicircle behind Vicksburg, and Ferguson's brigade was at this time
coming to Jackson from
Okolona. Lee's cavalry was about 4,000 strong.
My object was to break up the enemy's railroads at and about Meridian,
and to do the enemy
as much damage as possible in the month of February, and to be prepared
by the 1st of March to
assist General Banks in a similar dash at the Red River country,
especially Shreveport, the whole
to result in widening our domain along the Mississippi River, and
thereby set the troops hitherto
necessary to guard the river free for other military purposes.
17
My plan of action was as follows: General William Sooy Smith to move
from Memphis by or
before the 1st of February with an effective force of 7,000 cavalry
lightly equipped, to march
straight on Pontotoc, Okolona, Columbus Junction (Artesia), and
Meridian, to arrive there about
February 10, distance 250 miles; to disregard all minor objects, to
destroy railroads, bridges, corn
not wanted, and strike quick and well every enemy that should offer
opposition, while I with four
good divisions of infantry and artillery would at the same time move
from Vicksburg on the
same objective points, 150 miles distant. When met at Meridian, being
present in person, I could
then order anew according to the then circumstances, condition of roads
and time left at my
disposal.
I knew full well what would be the effect of this move, and in all my
orders and instructions I
dwelt particularly on the point of making no detachments, but to go
straight to the one sole
object, leaving the minor matters to the future.
I inclose herewith my instructions to General Smith with a copy of his
report, and must say it
is unsatisfactory. The delay in his start to the 11th of February, when
his orders contemplated his
being at Meridian on the 10th, and when he knew I was marching from
Vicksburg, is
unpardonable, and the mode and manner of his return to Memphis was not
what I expected from
an intended bold cavalry movement. I know that from February 1st to the
17th all of Lees
cavalry was to my front. We took daily prisoners from each brigade, so
that General Smith had
nothing to deal with except Forrest and the militia. I hope General
Smith will make these points
more clear to the general-in-chief, to whom he has returned at
Nashville, as noted in his report.
My own movement was successful in an eminent degree. We left Vicksburg
February 3 in
two columns, General Hurlbut's by Messinger's and General McPherson's by
the railroad bridge.
We met no opposition till General Hurlbut's head of column reached Joe
Davis' plantation, and
General McPherson's the Champion Hills.
The 5th was one continued skirmish for 18 miles, but we did not allow
the enemy's cavalry to
impede our march, but got into Jackson that night on his heels, whipping
him handsomely and
utterly disconcerting his plans. Loring and French were marching at the
time to concentrate with
the cavalry at Jackson, but were too late. We got into Jackson first,
secured their pontoon bridge,
repaired it, and commenced crossing Pearl River on the 6th, and on the
7th marched into
Brandon.
Next day, the 8th, the head of column reached Line Creek, 5 miles from
Morton, and on the
9th we entered Morton, General McPherson leading. I halted him there for
the balance of the day
to break railroads, and gave General Hurlbut the lead, and he kept it
all the way into Meridian.
Our march was steady and easy by Hillsborough and Decatur. Though
cavalry moved on our
flanks they gave us little concern, save in scaring in our stragglers
and foraging parties. At the
Tallahatta. 20 miles from Meridian, we found the road obstructed with
fallen timber, and,
satisfied the enemy was trying to save time to cover the removal of
railroad property from
Meridian, I dropped our trains with good escorts and pushed on over all
obstructions straight for
the Oktibbeha, where we found the bridge burning. A large cotton gin,
however, close by gave us
good material, and a couple of hours sufficed for a new bridge, and we
entered Meridian at 3.30
p.m. of the 14th with little opposition, and that was soon overcome by a
battalion of Colonel
Winslow's cavalry fighting on foot.
French's division had gone the night before and Loring's before day that
morning, Lee's
cavalry covering their retreat. General Polk had left for Demopolis at
10.30 that morning in the
cars. One locomotive and a train were burning as we reached the depot,
but all other rollingstock
had been removed to Mobile or toward Selma, 107 miles distant. I knew we
could not
overtake the enemy before he would cross the Tombigbee, and in fact I
was willing to gain our
18
point without battle, at so great a distance from the river, where the
care of wounded men would
have so taxed our ability to provide for them.
So I rested the army on the 15th, and on the 16th began a systematic and
thorough
destruction of the railroads centering at Meridian. The immense depots,
warehouses, and length
of sidetrack demonstrated the importance to the enemy of that place.
Through it he has
heretofore transported his armies and vast supplies, and by means of the
railroads large amounts
of corn, bacon, meal, and produce have been distributed to his armies.
For five days 10,000 men
worked hard and with a will in that work of destruction, with axes,
crowbars, sledges, clawbars,
and with fire, and I have no hesitation in pronouncing the work as well
done. Meridian, with its
depots, store-houses, arsenal, hospitals, offices, hotels, and
cantonments no longer exists.
To General Hurlbut I intrusted the destruction north and east of the
town, and to General
McPherson south and west. The former reports to me officially the
destruction of 60 miles of
road, with ties burned and iron bent, one locomotive destroyed, and 8
bridges burned. The latter
reports officially 55 miles of road destroyed, with 53 bridges and
culverts burned, and 6,075 feet
of trestle-work below Enterprise across a swamp burned, 19 locomotives,
28 cars, and 3 steam
sawmills destroyed and burned. The railroad is destroyed all the way
from Jackson to Meridian,
100 miles; from Meridian to and including the large bridge over the
Chickasawha below
Quitman; north to and including a bridge at Lauderdale Springs, and east
about 20 miles. The
enemy cannot use these roads to our prejudice in the coming campaign.
Having learned positively that the enemy's infantry had crossed the
Tombigbee eastward on
the 17th, and there being nothing between me and the Pearl River but
cavalry, which I could not
strike with infantry, I remained at Meridian until the 20th of February,
leaving me ten days to
reach Vicksburg and keep my appointment with General Banks, and hearing
nothing whatever of
General Smith, I ordered General McPherson to move back slowly on the
main road, taking four
days to Hillsborough, while I, with General Hurlbut's command and
Colonel Winslow's cavalry,
moved to the north to feel for General Smith.
On the 20th, I moved from Marion Station toward Muckalusha Old Town,
thence to Union,
where I dispatched Colonel Winslow with three regiments of cavalry to
Philadelphia and
Louisville, some 50 miles in the direction of Columbus, over the very
road by which General
Grierson moved during his celebrated raid, and by which road I supposed
he would feel for us. If
no tidings could be had of the cavalry, Colonel Winslow was to send a
couple of scouts to find
General Smith and order him to come to me at Canton, after which Colonel
Winslow was to
swing across to Kosciusko and come to Canton. The two infantry columns
came together as
appointed on the 23d at Hillsborough.
Next day we marched for Pearl River on separate roads, making for
Ratliff's Ferry. Securing
the ferry-boats there and at Edwards' above, a good floating bridge was
constructed by Captain
Hickenlooper, of General McPherson's staff, and the army passed Pearl
River, 25th and 26th.
Leaving a division to cover the bridge in case our cavalry should make
its appearance, the army
was bivouacked near Canton, where Colonel Winslow had arrived, having
executed his orders to
the very letter, but with no tidings of General Smith.
No enemy having troubled us during our march from Meridian to Canton,
and anxious to
afford our Memphis cavalry an opportunity to reach us, I left the army
at Canton, rode into
Vicksburg on the 28th, received my dispatches from General Banks, as
expected, and sent orders
back to General Hurlbut to remain there until the 3d of March, and then
come into Vicksburg,
while I hastened to New Orleans to confer with General Banks and Admiral
Porter, and adjust
the details of the next combined movement.
I returned to Vicksburg on the 6th instant, found all my army in, and
learned that General
Smith had not started from Memphis at all till the 11th of February; had
only reached West
19
Point, and turned back on the 22d, the march back to Memphis being too
rapid for a good effect.
Nevertheless, on the whole, we accomplished all I undertook. Our march
out and in from
Vicksburg was well accomplished; we beat the enemy wherever he opposed
or offered
resistance. We drove him out of Mississippi, destroyed the only
remaining railroads in the State,
the only roads by which he could maintain an army in Mississippi
threatening to our forces or the
main river. We subsisted our army and animals chiefly on his stores,
brought away about 400
prisoners and full 5,000 negroes, about 1,000 white refugees, about
3,000 animals (horses,
mules, and oxen), and any quantity of wagons and vehicles. Beyond Pearl
River we destroyed all
C. S. A. cotton and all that was used in the enemy's work at Meridian;
also many cotton-gins and
piles of cotton were burned by our soldiers and by negroes, without
orders and without detection.
I attach little importance to these matters, but the great result
attained is the hardwood and
confidence imparted to the command, which is now better fitted for war.
Animals and men
returned to Vicksburg after marching from 360 to 450 miles in the space
of the shortest month in
the year, in better health and condition than when we started.
Our losses may be summed up as follows:
Command Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total
General Hurlbut's 5 21 26 52
General McPherson's 7 21 46 74
Cavalry 9 26 9 44
Aggregate loss of men 21 68 81 170
We lost some mules and wagons that were out foraging, but the mules were
soon replaced by
captured animals, so that no delay re-suited. I know of no wagons lost
save nine, reported
verbally by General Hurlbut as having occurred after I came in from Canton.
Contemporaneous with these events was a diversion made on Mobile. I had
requested it of
General Banks before starting from Vicksburg, and he devolved it on
Admiral Farragut.
Occurring at the same time as my movement, it completely deceived our
enemy, and resulted in
an order for the removal of all its non-combatant population and caused
great alarm, which
seems to have spread through all Alabama. Their time is not yet, but
will come in the due order
of events.
I also sent at the same time, February 3, up the Yazoo a combined
expedition of gun-boats
and transports. Knowing that our movement inland would draw off force
from the Yazoo, I
asked Admiral Porter to send up the Yazoo a fleet of his light-clad
boats to explore the Yazoo,
Sunflower, and all tributaries where a sufficient draught of water could
be found, which he did,
viz: Five gun-boats, under command of Lieutenant-Commander Owen, U.S.
Navy, and I sent
along five transports, with two regiments, one of white, Eleventh
Illinois, Colonel Coates, and
one of black troops. My instructions for this expedition are submitted
herewith. I suppose it
fulfilled its objects, although Colonel Coates has not yet returned and
reported, but for some
reason, which he will explain, after going up as far as Fort Pemberton,
he returned and
disembarked at Yazoo City, sending his boats to Vicksburg with cotton
and forage. He reports
officially having sent in 1,521 bales of cotton, and that the gun-boats
had secured 207. I have
ordered 1,000 bales to be delivered to the Treasury agent, and I ask
that its proceeds be applied
to indemnify boats that have sustained damage while engaged in a
licensed and lawful
commerce, such as the Allen Collier, burned by the guerillas at Bolivar
Landing, and the Von
Phul, fired on at Morganza Bend. The balance of this cotton I have
placed with the post
quartermaster at Vicksburg, with orders to General McPherson to appoint
a board to pay back in
kind such loyal persons as Mrs. Grose and Dr. Duncan for cotton used by
our hospitals or burned
by guerrillas. It is folly for us to attempt to indemnify all, but in
this way we can give a support
20
to the smaller claimants and encourage them to cultivate their
plantations. The sooner all the
cotton in the Southern States is burned or got away the better, for it
is the cause of filling our
boats and towns with a class of heartless speculators that would corrupt
our officers and men and
sell their lives by foolish exposure that they might get out stolen
cotton and buy it cheap.
The full official reports of Generals Hurlbut and McPherson are not yet
in, but as soon as
received they will be forwarded, with a map showing our routes of march, &c.
The country is indebted to Generals Hurlbut and McPherson, the actual
commanders of the
troops in this expedition, whose experience and skill left me an easy
task, partaking more of the
character of a pleasant excursion than of hard military service.
Colonel Winslow, Fourth Iowa Cavalry, commanded the advance guard, and
handled his
cavalry brigade with skill and success. His flank attack on the heavy
cavalry force of the enemy
before Jackson, and his rapid pursuit into Jackson, securing to us the
use of the enemy's
pontoons, entitles him to promotion as brigadier of cavalry. I must also
give him the credit due
for his march from Union on Louisville and Kosciusko, and for making his
junction with the
main body of the army at Canton at the time appointed.
I have thanked in orders the officers and soldiers of the command for
their cheerfulness and
for their eagerness to fight, to march, or to work day or night as
required, but I must leave to
corps commanders the duty of recording their individual acts of merit.
In organizing and conducting this expedition I have been admirably
seconded by my personal
staff, viz, Major McCoy and Captains Dayton and Audenried. I hardly know
how to reward them
substantially, further than to commend them to the favorable notice of
our Government.
To Lieutenant-Colonel Bingham, my chief quartermaster, the only member
of my general
staff that I took from department headquarters, I am greatly indebted.
Through him were
obtained the steamboats and means by which these troops were so rapidly
assembled and
concentrated at great distances promptly on time.
When Colonel Coates makes me the official report of his operations up
the Yazoo, I will
indorse it according to my judgment at the time.
Accompanying this I send a complete file of orders and letters of
instruction issued during
the expedition.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.
Brig. Gen. JOHN A. RAWLINS,
Chief of Staff.
SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, No. 22.
HDQRS. DEPT. OF THE TENNESSEE,
Vicksburg, February 28, 1864.
I. The army in the field, now at Canton, will remain there till about
March 3 to hear from and
assist, if necessary, the cavalry expedition under command of Brig. Gen.
William Sooy Smith,
which should have left Memphis February 2 at furthest, but did not until
about the 11th. If heard
from, General McPherson with his corps will await his arrival, or till
he can communicate with
him, and order General Smith to the vicinity of Big Black bridge to
await further orders, or to act
offensively should a cavalry force of the enemy appear this side of
Pearl River.
II. General Hurlbut will, about March 3, move his command across Big
Black at or near
Moore's Bluff, and come to Vicksburg prepared to embark for Red River
about March 7 next.
III. Should General McPherson hear of the safety of the cavalry command
referred to, or hear
no tidings at all of it on or before the 3d next, he also will move down
the peninsula between
21
Pearl River and Big Black to the bridge at Messingers, or at the
railroad bridge, and resume his
former command at Vicksburg and district.
IV. The chief quartermaster of the department will collect a number of
steam-boats suitable
for the Red River of a capacity to transport 10,000 men, with artillery,
ordnance, and subsistence
stores for thirty days' operations, to be ready at Vicksburg by March 7.
V. The commissary of subsistence at Vicksburg will place at Haynes'
Bluff three days'
rations for General Hurlbut's command of 10,000 men, to be drawn by him
on his way down,
and the same for General McPherson's command at the Big Black bridge.
VI. The ordnance officer will be prepared to ship on board steamboats,
at the date before
named, the mortars and 30-pounder Parrotts with all their ammunition on
hand, and also a supply
of musket ammunition equal to 200 rounds per man for 10,000 men.
VII. Lieutenant Vernay, aide-de-camp to General McPherson, will collect
all the mail matter
and newspapers he can obtain for the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Army
Corps, and convey the
same to the army at Canton, and Colonel Winslow, chief of cavalry, will
furnish him an escort of
200 men, all to start on March 1.
VIII. Col. E. F. Winslow, Fourth Iowa Cavalry, will proceed with the
re-enlisted veterans of
that regiment to Iowa, and grant furloughs for thirty days after their
arrival at Keokuk. At the
expiration of the furloughs he will meet them at some rendezvous on the
Mississippi River, and
reconduct them back to the regiment at or near Vicksburg, Miss.
IX. The quartermaster's department will provide the necessary
transportation to and back.
By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman:
L. M. DAYTON,
Aide-de-Camp.
Itinerary of the Seventeenth Army Corps, Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson,
U. S. Army,
commanding, February 3-March 18.
February 3, the Third Brigade, First Division, Brig. Gen. Alexander
Chambers commanding;
the Third Division (with the exception of the Eighty-first Illinois
Infantry, suffering from smallpox,
and the Twenty-ninth Illinois Infantry, stationed at Natchez, Miss.), in
command of General
Leggett; the Fourth Division, commanded by General M. M. Crocker, and
the cavalry forces, in
command of Col. E. F. Winslow, Fourth Iowa Cavalry, left Vicksburg for
expedition toward
Meridian. Distance marched, 19 miles.
February 4, encountered the enemy at Champion's Hill and skirmished with
him the entire
day, advancing cautiously.
February 14, reached Meridian with some skirmishing and proceeded to
destroy railroad,
cars, &c.
February 15, the Fourth Division went to Enterprise.
February 16, the Third Brigade, Fourth Division, went to Quitman.
February 19, started on return march.
February 28, reached Canton.
February 29, encamped at Canton.
March 1, the Third and Fourth Divisions and Third Brigade, First
Division, at Canton, Miss.
March 5, returned to Vicksburg. The Eleventh Illinois Infantry, with a
portion of the colored
troops, is at Yazoo City.
March 7, Brig. Gen. T. Kilby Smith, with a portion of the Third Iowa
Infantry, Forty-first
Illinois Infantry, Fourteenth Wisconsin Infantry, Thirty-third
Wisconsin, Ninety-fifth Illinois,
and Eighty-first Illinois, and Battery M, First Missouri Light
Artillery, ordered up Red River.
22
March 18, Brigadier-General McArthur assigned to command of post and
defenses of
Vicksburg and Natchez during absence of Major-General McPherson. General
Leggett ordered
to Ohio to superintend recruiting for veteran regiments of his command.
HDQRS. ELEVENTH IOWA INFANTRY VOLUNTEERS,
March 6, 1864.
SIR: In reply to circular of this date I have the honor to reply: First.
Number of miles
marched, 340.
Second. Number of miles of railroad track destroyed, 2. No bridges or
trestle-work
destroyed.
Third. Number of killed, wounded, and missing, none; number of veterans
mustered in, 316;
number enlisted to be mustered in, 40; total, 356.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. HALL,
Colonel Eleventh Iowa Volunteer Infantry, Commanding.
Capt. JOHN C. MARVEN,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. ELEVENTH IOWA INFANTRY VOLUNTEERS,
Vicksburg, Miss., March 6, 1864.
SIR: In compliance with circular of March 5, I have the honor to report
that there was
destroyed by this command, under orders, during the late expedition, at
Morton, Miss., about 1
mile of railroad track, together with railroad buildings at that place,
and at Canton, Miss., about 1
mile of railroad track.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. HALL,
Colonel Eleventh Iowa Infantry Vols., Comdg. Regiment.
Capt. JOHN C. MARVEN,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH IOWA INFANTRY,
Near Vicksburg, Miss., March 6, 1864.
SIR: In reply to the circular from brigade headquarters, dated March 6,
1864, I have the
honor to report that on the late expedition to Meridian this regiment
marched about 320 miles.
Two miles of railroad track were destroyed; I bridge, I turn-table, 50
feet of trestle-work, and 1
passenger car burned near Brandon, Miss.
The loss of the regiment was 1 officer and 3 enlisted men captured near
Canton, Miss.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. W. BELKNAP,
Colonel Fifteenth Iowa Infantry, Commanding.
Capt. J. C. MARVEN,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Brigade
HEADQUARTERS SIXTEENTH IOWA VOLUNTEERS,
March 6, 1864.
SIR: In compliance with circular dated headquarters Third Brigade, First
Division,
Seventeenth Army Corps, Vicksburg, March 6, 1864, I have the honor to
make the following
23
report of the operations of the Sixteenth Regiment Iowa Infantry
Volunteers during the recent
campaign:
The regiment marched a distance of about 327 miles, destroyed
three-fourths mile of railroad
track and 40 feet of trestle-work.
The casualties in the regiment were: Accidentally wounded, 1; taken
prisoner, 4; left sick at
Brandon, 1; total, 6.
There are 281 men who have re-enlisted as veteran volunteers in the
regiment.
I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,
ADD. H. SANDERS,
Lieut. Col., Commanding Sixteenth Iowa Infantry.
Capt. J. C. MARVEN,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Brigade.
CAMP 53D REGIMENT ILLINOIS INFANTRY VOLUNTEERS,
Hebron, Miss., March 6, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to transmit herewith the following report:
On the morning of February 27, 1864, while in camp near Pearl River,
Miss., I was detailed
to take command of the foraging party from the Fifty-third Illinois
Infantry and report them to
the headquarters of First Brigade. Upon reporting, I was placed in
command of the foraging
party from the brigade, consisting of 66 privates and 4 sergeants from
the different regiments of
the brigade. My instructions from the acting assistant adjutant-general
were to forage under the
directions of Lieutenant Gillespie. Lieutenant Gillespie took the
advance, and I followed with the
guard. We started on a cross-road running north, and after traveling
about three-quarters of a
mile we came out on the Canton road. Taking the Canton road we traveled
about 1 mile, and then
left the Canton road and took a cross-road running northeast. This we
followed about 2 miles,
when Lieutenant Gillespie ordered a halt. He then directed me to leave a
sergeant and 13 men
from the Fifty-third Illinois to guard the road until we returned. I
left the guard, as directed,
giving the sergeant orders to throw out a picket on each flank and in
front. Lieutenant Gillespie
then directed me to move forward with the remainder of the party. Here
we left the road on
which we had been traveling and took a road running through a thick wood
and in an easterly
direction. When about 1 mile from the road where we left the guard,
Lieutenant Gillespie again
ordered a halt, and directed me to leave a sergeant and 10 men from the
Third Regiment Iowa
Infantry. The instructions which he directed me to give this guard were
as follows: If they saw
the enemy approaching they were to fall back to the guard from the
Fifty-third Illinois, which
had been left to guard the road. If they encountered no enemy they were
to remain where they
had been stationed until we returned or sent them orders to follow. We
then moved forward until
we came to a large swamp. Here Lieutenant Gillespie ordered another
halt. He then took 10
men as a guard and went in search of meat, which was supposed to be
concealed somewhere in
the swamp. He returned in about an hour, and directed me to send a
sergeant and 4 men back to
the squads which we had left as guards, with orders for the men of the
Third Iowa to join those
of the Fifty-third Illinois, the whole to return in a body to the Canton
road and there await our
return. After having sent the sergeant and 4 men back, Lieutenant
Gillespie directed me to follow
him. I did so, and after traveling about two hours we came out on the
Canton road at a point
about 7 miles northeast of our camps. Soon after striking the Canton
road we discovered a squad
of mounted men following in our rear. I paid but little attention to
them at first, thinking their
squad too small to trouble us. We had gone but a short distance farther
when one of the men
came up from the rear, and reported a strong force of the enemy pursuing
us. Our position at this
time not being a good one, I pushed on until I gained the top of a large
hill. Here I halted,
24
dismounted my men, and formed a line across the road. I had barely time
to accomplish this
when the enemy came in sight, about 50 in number. They were coming at a
gallop and in bad
order, the leader being some distance in advance of his men. I ordered
my men not to fire until I
gave them orders to do so. The rebel leader came up to within about 40
yards of me, when I
ordered him to halt. He did so. He having on a blue shirt or jacket
under his great coat, I asked
him who he was, as I was in some doubt upon that subject. He replied by
shouting, "Who are
you?" By this time several of his men came up with him, and I could see
that they wore the
Confederate uniform. I then ordered my men to fire. Our first volley
turned and confused them,
and our second emptied two saddles and sent them flying back in the
direction from which they
came. We kept up our fire as long as they were in sight. As soon as they
were out of sight I gave
the order to mount, and pushed on until I came near the road where the
squads from the Fiftythird
Illinois and Third Iowa had been ordered to meet us. About this time a
man who was some
distance in the rear came up and reported to me that the enemy were
coming on again with a
force larger than before. We were by this time at the road where the
Third Iowa sergeant and his
squad were ordered to report. Here we found Lieutenant Gillespie, who
had been missing since
the first attack. He reported that the sergeant and squad had not yet
come up. Thinking it best to
wait as long as possible for them, I ordered the men to dismount and
form line, leaving every
fourth man to hold horses. We then went back a short distance and formed
on the brow of a small
hill to wait for the enemy to approach. We waited but a short time
before they came, this time
about 150 strong. They came up in good order, formed line, and attempted
to charge us. Our first
fire broke and confused them. They retreated a short distance, formed
line, and again came up at
a charge, but with no better success than before. Our first volley
turned and scattered them and
emptied several saddles. Their leader soon formed them, and again they
came up at full gallop.
Again were they repulsed. This time their leader tumbled from his
saddle, and was not seen to
rise again. About this time a man from the Thirty-third Wisconsin
Infantry was severely
wounded. I ordered 2 men to take him to the rear, put him on a horse,
and start with him for
camp. When this was done I ordered the men to fall back and mount; then
we started for camp,
traveling as fast as our worn-out horses and mules could go without
leaving men behind. The
wounded man must have been captured, as his horse was too badly used up
to keep up with the
squad. I arrived in camp with all the men I took out except those who,
by direction of Lieutenant
Gillespie, had been left to guard roads. Nearly all of these men must
have been captured, as but 4
of them have ever returned to their commands. I cannot close this report
without first mentioning
the bravery and gallant conduct of Quartermaster Nichols, of the
Thirty-third Regiment
Wisconsin Infantry, who rendered me valuable and efficient service
throughout the different
skirmishes of the day.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN POTTER,
Captain Company F, 53d Regt. Ill. Inf. Vols.
Capt. WILLIAM WARNER,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
HEADQUARTERS THIRD IOWA INFANTRY,
Hebron, Miss., March 6, 1864.
SIR: In compliance with orders, I have the honor to make the following
report of the loss of
this regiment during the recent expedition. As the regiment was almost
constantly under the
immediate notice and direction of the general commanding the brigade,
and as the only detached
duty we were called upon to perform was the destruction of railroad at
Meridian and Enterprise, I
25
presume it is only necessary for me to make a detailed report of the
loss of the regiment in the
affair of the 28th of February.
On the morning of the 28th of February, 23 men of this regiment, under
charge of Sergt.
Daniel Buckley, Company A, were ordered to report to brigade
headquarters to go out with the
brigade foraging party. During the day the party was attacked by the
enemy's cavalry, and
Sergeant Buckley and 12 men of the detail from this regiment were taken
prisoners. The
following is a list of the names of the men captured. Private Francis M.
Coverston is known to be
wounded severely, perhaps mortally. Corpl. William H. Symms was seen to
fall from his horse,
and is supposed to be killed. Nothing is known of the fate of the rest
of the party.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant.
G. W. CROSLEY,
Major, Commanding Third Iowa Infantry.
Capt. WILLIAM WARNER,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY FORCES,
Near Vicksburg, Miss., February 29, 1864.
COLONEL: In obedience to orders from Major-General McPherson, my command
moved
over Big Black at the railroad bridge about noon, 3d instant, and
bivouacked at Baker's Creek
bridge.
Marched at 6.30 next morning toward Raymond, meeting enemy's cavalry in
some force
soon after leaving the Jackson road. A charge upon our left flank was
repulsed and the enemy
followed to the main road, from whence a detour was made and the enemy
again encountered at
Mr. Walton's, near Bolton. The Tenth Missouri (Major Benteen commanding)
being in front,
were dismounted, and the enemy driven immediately from his position with
some loss, among
others 1 major, 1 captain, and 1 second-lieutenant being killed.
On morning of 5th, taking a right-hand road at Woodman's, we entered
Clinton by the
Raymond road just after the enemy left the town, and found them strongly
posted 2 miles east,
when we moved to the right and approached Jackson by the Mississippi
Springs upper road, and
when arrived within 1 miles of the city discovered the enemy's column, 3
miles in length,
moving by fours toward and into J[ackson] on the main road half a mile
in front, falling back
before the advance of Major-General Hurlbut's column, then about 5 miles
from the city. Taking
advantage of the enemy's surprise at our sudden appearance, I moved
quickly forward to the
attack, dismounting the Fourth Iowa (Major Parkell commanding), which
was in front, that they
might gain the hill at intersection of the roads, and directing the
Eleventh Illinois (Lieutenant-
Colonel Kerr commanding) to deploy to the left, advance over the open
ground, ascend the hill,
and strike the enemy in his flank and rear. Observing that the enemy
advanced one regiment in
line to cover his flank and his lateral movement, I caused one rifled
gun to throw a few shells
into their column in order to aid the attack of Colonel Kerr. One shell
killed 3 men. Meantime
the Tenth Missouri were pushed forward, immediately following the Fourth
Iowa, and advancing
at a gallop closely pursued through the line of fortifications and into
Jackson that portion of the
enemy's column which retreated in that direction. The brigade of Colonel
Starke, with a portion
of the one in front, being thus cut off from the city, broke in disorder
and fled toward the Canton
road, the Eleventh Illinois capturing from them 1 Rodman gun and 1
ambulance, with
cannoneers and drivers. Leaving directions for the Fifth Illinois (Major
Farnan commanding) and
the Fourth Iowa to push out south and north, guarding the approaches to
the city, and directing
the battery to occupy the hill commanding the place, I proceeded, in
accordance with
instructions, to the rebel pontoon bridge, arriving just in time to
prevent, with Tenth Missouri, its
26
destruction. At this time it was quite dark, and the respective
regiments bivouacked in their
positions. By this success the enemy were prevented from occupying the
fortifications, from
destroying stores and the bridge, and a large number of men were
dispersed through the
surrounding country, who failed to rejoin their commands during the time
of the expedition.
Several rebel general officers escaped capture by hard riding.
The next morning, a reconnaissance for 5 miles toward Canton developed
no enemy in force,
but exhibited many evidences of hasty flight on preceding evening, quite
a number of wagons,
ambulances, and much other property being abandoned on this road.
Bivouacked near the asylum
until 9 a.m., 7th instant, when the command crossed Pearl River, and
taking a left-hand road 6
miles out entered Brandon, encamping 3 miles east of that place, in
advance of the army, after a
slight skirmish with some rebel cavalry.
At 6 o'clock next day took the advance of the army and encamped on Line
Creek,
skirmishing the entire distance, 19 miles.
Reporting to Major-General Hurlbut morning of 9th instant, we moved past
Morton, near
which place the enemy were found in line of battle on the preceding
evening, and encamped east
of Shockalo Creek.
Marched on 10th instant 16 miles, passing through Hillsborough, where we
had a short
skirmish, encamping 5 miles in advance of the army, on Ontagoloo Creek.
On the evening of the 11th, encamped east of Coonahatta Creek, marching
15 miles; Captain
Parsons, with two companies, proceeding to Lake Station and aiding in
the destruction of
property.
Encamped east of Chunky Creek at 5 p.m., 12th instant, after
considerable heavy
skirmishing.
Marching at daylight on 13th, encamped 10 miles west of Meridian,
fighting some hours
after dark (Fourth Iowa in advance), over a rough, mountainous country,
driving the enemy 5
miles and punishing him severely. Above one hundred stand of arms were
abandoned by him
during this fighting. The obstruction of these rough roads by felling of
timber was prevented.
Moved early on morning of 14th instant, meeting command of
Brigadier-General Ferguson 2
miles west of Meridian, driving the enemy speedily through the town.
Bivouacked at 3 p.m. on
plantation of Mr. McLamore, remaining there until morning of the 16th,
the enemy having
retreated beyond Marion.
During the march the command had been in the saddle twelve days; were
engaged with the
enemy much of that time, always successfully; had expended above 50,000
rounds small
ammunition. The enemy had left on the different fields 50 men dead, and
must of course have
lost others and had men wounded in due proportion. Thirty of these
wounded were found in one
hospital at Lauderdale Springs. The men had burned but one building, had
worked hard at
making roads and building bridges, and had conducted themselves as true
patriot soldiers.
The prisoners captured to this date numbered 72, many of them of rank,
and 37 deserters had
been received, all transferred to infantry commands.
Notwithstanding a march of above 175 miles, the horses were in better
condition than when
we left Big Black River.
The Eleventh Illinois Cavalry, being directed to report to Brig. Gen. M.
M. Crocker,
commanding Fourth Division, Seventeenth Army Corps, did not rejoin me
until after my arrival
at Canton, and I cannot now give any account of the operations of that
regiment during this
temporary detachment.
While the army remained in and around Meridian my command scouted to the
east and north,
destroying property, bridges, &c., and traveling many miles.
27
During the first two days of the return march we had the rear of the
Sixteenth Army Corps
marching to Union. At this point, acting under special instructions from
Maj. Gen. W. T.
Sherman, commanding Department of the Tennessee, I proceeded north,
through Philadelphia
and over the Pearl River, to a point about 10 miles south of Louisville,
thence across over to the
main road from that place to Kosciusko, passing through the latter
place, Thomastown, and
Sharon, to Canton, where we arrived at 2 p.m., 25th instant, one day in
advance of the army,
having met no enemy north of the Pearl.
The command of Brig. Gen. William Sooy Smith could not be definitely
heard from. I sent
two messengers eastward, with instructions to join him if possible.
Remained in bivouac on Three Mile Creek, east of Canton, during the 26th
instant.
Acting under orders from the major-general commanding, with Fourth Iowa
Cavalry, I had
the honor of escorting him to Big Black, arriving at Messinger's at
daylight, morning of the 28th.
The three regiments remaining at Canton were placed in charge of
Lieutenant-Colonel Kerr,
senior officer.
Not having received the reports of regimental commanders, I cannot give
exact account of
our casualties, but am confident they will not exceed following exhibit,
viz: Officers, no
casualties; enlisted men: killed. 10: wounded, 12; missing, 15; total,
37. Our capture of horses
largely exceeds the number of those killed and abandoned.
Just previous to our arrival at Canton the command gathered up a large
number of negroes
and mules. The negroes and several prisoners of war, captured on return
march, were transferred
to the infantry at Canton. Several mills, two fine bridges over the
Pearl, and some other property
was burned by order, and I regret to say that some other buildings were
wantonly destroyed. The
case of one officer caught firing a building has been reported through
proper channels.
I cannot praise too highly the conduct of the entire command, when under
fire, and
respectfully mention following officers as deserving especial credit:
Maj. F. W. Benteen and
Captain Neet, Tenth Missouri Cavalry; Captains Dee and Parsons and First
Lieut. Alonzo Clark,
Fourth Iowa Cavalry; also Capt. M. H. Williams, acting assistant
inspector-general, and First
Lieut. A. B. Fitch, acting assistant quartermaster (acting aides), both
of whom rendered me
valuable assistance.
The command traveled, previous to my leaving Canton, an average of 425
miles to the
regiment.
The number of men on the expedition was 1,400, of whom 1,300 were
subject to my orders.
I respectfully call your attention to the great want of horses and arms.
Hoping this brief report of the operations of the command will be
satisfactory, I have the
honor to be, your obedient servant,
E. F. WINSLOW,
Colonel and Chief of Cavalry.
Lieut. Col. WILLIAM T. CLARK,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Seventeenth Army Corps.
HEADQUARTERS CHIEF OF CAVALRY,
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Nashville, Tenn., March 4, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of recent cavalry
operations made by the
direction of Major-General Grant, commanding the Military Division of
the Mississippi, and in
accordance with the [orders and ] written instructions of Major-General
Sherman, commanding
the Department of the Tennessee, copies of which are herewith inclosed.
28
On the 28th day of December, 1863, I started from this city with the
Second, Third, and
Fourth Tennessee Cavalry Regiments, Third and Fifth Kentucky Cavalry,
and Twenty-eighth
Kentucky Mounted Infantry.
On the 30th, I reached Columbia, from which point I sent the Third
Kentucky Cavalry down
the north bank of Duck River to scour the country bordering that river
on the north to the
Tennessee River, and to watch that stream from the mouth of Duck River
to a point opposite Fort
Henry. The Fifth Kentucky Cavalry was ordered down the south bank of
Duck River to clear the
country to the Tennessee, and to watch that stream from the mouth of
Duck River to Savannah,
where this regiment was to communicate with me and receive further orders.
The object of these movements was to clear the country of the bands of
guerrillas that
infested it, and to watch any attempt that Forrest, who was then at
Jackson, Tenn., might make to
throw his force, or any portion of it, over into Middle Tennessee or
Kentucky.
These regiments captured some 50 guerrillas, and among them the
notorious Colonel
Hawkins.
The Third Kentucky Cavalry reported back at Nashville, according to its
instructions, and the
Fifth Kentucky met my command at Waynesborough and accompanied it from
that point. The
Twenty-eighth Kentucky Mounted Infantry was ordered from Columbia to
Pulaski, Tenn., where
it reported to General Crook, and was assigned to duty with the Second
Cavalry Division under
his command, agreeably to my instructions.
General Crook sent the Fourth U.S. Cavalry as escort to a supply train,
which I ordered him
to send through with rations for my command, from Pulaski to Savannah.
He also sent the
Seventy-second Indiana Mounted Infantry through from Pulaski to Savannah
to open
communication with that point, and hold the ferry-boats there until the
arrival of the command.
Upon reaching the Tennessee River, the whole command, consisting of the
Second, Third,
and Fourth Tennessee Cavalry, Fifth Kentucky Cavalry, Fourth U.S.
Cavalry, and Seventysecond
Indiana Mounted Infantry, was thrown across the river and moved toward
Corinth, which
point we reached on the 8th day of January. Forrest had moved southward
into Mississippi
before my command reached the Tennessee River, urged to this step by the
movement of the
troops of the Sixteenth Army Corps upon him.
Orders had been issued to abandon the railroad from Memphis to Corinth,
and I moved my
command to Collierville, where I awaited the arrival of Waring's brigade
from Columbus, from
which point it was ordered to move to join our other [cavalry] forces.
Owing to bad roads and the
freshets, which made the crossing of the streams extremely difficult,
especially that of the Obion
River, this brigade was delayed, and only reached Collierville on
Monday, the 8th day of
February.
For full particulars of this march, I beg leave to refer to Colonel
Waring's report. Much of its
ammunition had been sent by boats from Columbus, and it was encumbered
by a train which had
to be got rid of. By great effort the whole command was prepared for the
movement and put in
motion on the 11th day of February.
Forrest had taken position with all his forces behind the Tallahatchie
River, determined to
resist our crossing. I threw McMillen's brigade of infantry, temporarily
assigned to my
command, rapidly toward Panola, from Memphis, moving this brigade on the
8th day of
February, and on the 11th ordered it to move toward Wyatt, toward which
point I directed the
march of my whole cavalry force, until the impression was made that I
intended forcing a
crossing at that point, which I attacked with the brigade of infantry
and attracted the attention
and forces of the enemy there while I threw my whole cavalry force
around by way of New
Albany, where I crossed the Tallahatchie without firing a shot, although
we were delayed a
29
whole day at the crossing of Tippah Creek, that was swollen by a
freshet. We then moved rapidly
on Pontotoc and Houston.
When within 10 miles of Houston we encountered an outpost of the enemy,
consisting of
State troops, under General Gholson. These stampeded and ran away,
leaving a portion of their
arms behind them. We continued to advance until we encountered the enemy
in strong force
guarding the crossing of a swamp, which could only be passed by a
corduroy road, that was
narrow and about 1 mile in length. This we carried after some sharp
fighting, and our advance
pressed on to the crossing of the Houlka Swamp, 3 miles north of Houston
[this swamp extends
front a point 10 miles west of Houston to the], at the junction of the
Houlka with the Oktibbeha,
near West Point, and can only be crossed at a few points over narrow roads.
These roads were held by the enemy in force, and while our advance was
directed to make a
determined attack on the force holding the direct road to Houston, the
main body was moved
rapidly to the eastward on Okolona, where it arrived so unexpectedly as
to capture a number of
rebel officers and men on furlough.
From this point a regiment was thrown forward by a forced march to
Aberdeen to endeavor
to seize ferry-boats to effect a crossing of the Tombigbee if this
should prove desirable, but no
ferry-boats were found.
The following morning one brigade was moved to the support of this
regiment and to
threaten Columbus, while two brigades moved down the railroad toward
West Point, throwing
out strong detachments to make feints and watch the crossings of the
Sakatonchee, on our right,
and destroy the road as they went, together with vast amounts of corn
that was collected in cribs
near the railroad. They also destroyed all the Confederate cotton that
was found. The brigade that
went to Aberdeen did the same, and also destroyed a very extensive
tannery, together with about
2,000 hides.
Hearing that the enemy was concentrating in heavy force at West Point, I
concentrated my
command at Prairie Station, 15 miles north of West Point, and moved on
that place on the 20th
day of February. About 1 mile north of the town we encountered a rebel
brigade, which we drove
after a short, sharp fight. The whole command arrived near West Point at
about 3 p.m., and
careful reconnaissances were made of the Sakatonchee Swamp on our right,
the Oktibbeha on
our front, and the Tombigbee on our left. They were all found strongly
held by the enemy,
present in four brigades and to the number of about 6,000 or 7,000,
according to the best
information that could be obtained.
Exaggerated reports of Forrest's strength reached me constantly, and it
was reported that Lee
was about to re-enforce him with a portion or the whole of his command.
Columbus had been
evacuated, and all the State troops that could be assembled from every
quarter were drawn
together at my front to hold the Oktibbeha against me, while a heavy
force was seen moving to
my rear.
About 3,000 able-bodied negroes had taken refuge with us, mounted on as
many horses and
mules that they had brought in with them. We had' in addition to this
about 700 pack-mules, and
all these incumbrances had to be strongly guarded against the flank
attacks that were constantly
threatened. This absorbed about 2,000 of my available force. There
remained a little less than
5,000 men who could be thrown into action.
The enemy was in a position in my front and on my flanks which afforded
him every
advantage. The ground was so obstructed as to make it absolutely
necessary that we should fight
dismounted, and for this kind of fighting the enemy, armed with Enfield
and Austrian rifles, was
better prepared than our force, armed mainly with carbines. There was
but one of my brigades
that I could rely upon with full confidence. The conduct of the other
two on the march had been
such as to indicate such a lack of discipline as to create in my mind
the most serious
30
apprehensions as to what would be their conduct in action. Any reverse
to my command, situated
as it was, would have been fatal.
I was ten days late with my movement owing to the delay of Waring's
brigade in arriving
from Columbus, and had every reason to believe that General Sherman,
having accomplished the
purposes of his expedition, had returned to Vicksburg. Under the
circumstances I determined not
to move my encumbered command into the trap set for me by the rebels.
We had destroyed 2,000,000 bushels of corn, 2,000 bales of Confederate
cotton, and 30 miles
of railroad. We had captured about 200 prisoners, and 3,000 horses and
mules, and rescued as
many negroes, well fitted for our service. I therefore determined to
move back and draw the
enemy after me, that I might select my own positions and fight with the
advantages in our favor.
In this I succeeded perfectly, disposing my forces behind every crest of
a hill and in every
skirt of timber that furnished us cover, and receiving the enemy by
well-directed volleys at short
range we inflicted heavy losses upon him at every attack, while our own
casualties were
uniformly light, until we reached Okolona, where, after the Fourth
Regulars had driven one
entire rebel brigade out of the town three times, a portion of
McCrillis' brigade, sent to the
support of the Fourth, stampeded at the yells of our own men charging,
and galloped back
through and over everything, spreading confusion wherever they went and
driving Perkins'
battery of six small mountain howitzers off the road into a ditch, where
the imperfect carriages
they were mounted upon were all so broken that we could not get the
battery along and had to
abandon it after spiking the guns, chopping the carriages to pieces, and
destroying the
ammunition. Organized forces were immediately thrown to the rear and the
enemy handsomely
repulsed.
Skirmishing continued about 10 miles, when we reached a fine position at
Ivey's farm. Here
the ridge spread out into a wide, open field, along the northern margin
of which I deployed a line
of dismounted men consisting of four regiments. A battery was placed in
position near the road,
from which it could enfilade the column as it advanced. Just to the
right of the battery the
Fourth Missouri Cavalry [and six companies of the Seventh Indiana
Cavalry] were formed, and
mounted for a saber charge, and the Third Tennessee Cavalry (mounted)
was sent to the extreme
right with orders to charge in flank when the troops made the direct
charge in front.
While these dispositions were being made the enemy pressed our rear
guard, that was well
posted, very heavily, and were sorely handled. The rear guard was at
last called off rapidly, and
the rebel column let into the space prepared for them, when the battery
opened upon them in very
handsome style, and the dismounted troops poured volley after volley
into them. They pressed
their attack with great determination, but at last fell Back. Just as
they began to retire they were
charged very handsomely by the Fourth Missouri and Seventh Indiana in
front and by the Third
Tennessee in flank. This completely routed them, and they were driven
from the field with heavy
loss.
It was reported that Colonel Forrest, Brother to the general, commander
of a brigade, and
Colonel Barksdale fell, and McCulloch, another commander of a brigade,
and Colonel Barteau
were severely wounded in this affair.
Strong detachments were thrown out upon our flanks at every vulnerable
point, and every
attempt to cut our column by a flank attack was met and thwarted. Our
march was so rapid that
the enemy could not outstrip and intercept us, which he constantly
endeavored to do.
No heavy fighting occurred after we passed the Ivey farm, though
skirmishing continued as
far as Pontotoc. I then moved back to Memphis with everything that we
had captured, content
with the very great injury we had inflicted upon them, and feeling that
everything had been
achieved that was at all practicable under the circumstances.
31
My orders from General Sherman were so comprehensive as to embrace
everything that it
would be possible for me to do, and I could not regard them as
imperative that I should make a
junction with his forces at all hazards, but on the contrary, he
expressly stated that he could get
along without me if I found it impossible to get through.
Returning, I drew the enemy after me and inflicted heavy losses upon
him, and saved my
command, with all our captured stock and prisoners and rescued negroes,
with very trifling
losses except in stragglers captured.
Attempting to cut through to Sherman I would have lost my entire
command, and of course
could have rendered him no assistance.
The conduct of the entire Second Brigade, under Colonel Hepburn, was
worthy of all praise.
This brigade consists of the Second Iowa Cavalry, Major Coon commanding;
Sixth Illinois
Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Starr commanding; Seventh Illinois Cavalry,
Lieutenant-Colonel
Trafton commanding, [and Ninth Illinois Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel
Burgh commanding]. All
these officers acquitted themselves most creditably. The Fourth Missouri
Cavalry, Major
Heinrichs commanding; the Third Tennessee Cavalry, Major Minnis
commanding, and the
Seventh Indiana Cavalry, Colonel Shanks commanding, also made brilliant
charges, while the
Fourth Regulars, under Captain Bowman, charged a whole rebel brigade
three times, and routed
it at every charge.
Captain Bowman and Lieutenant Davis were particularly distinguished for
their gallantry.
Lieut. W. H. Ingerton, who acted as my assistant adjutant-general, led
the charge of the Third
Tennessee most brilliantly, and was uniformly distinguished by his skill
and dashing bravery.
[All the officers here referred to deserve promotion, and the interests
of the service would be
promoted by their advancement to higher rank. They are brave, skillful,
and valuable cavalry
officers.]
General Grierson's conduct was worthy of all praise. [Whenever there was
anything to be
done he was sure to be found. His skill in managing cavalry movements
and in handling
commands in action was obvious and admirable.]
Information since obtained fully justifies the decision to retire before
Forrest's force from
West Point. General Sherman's expeditionary force had withdrawn from
Meridian before my
arrival at West Point, on a line that could not have been known to me,
cut off as I was from any
communication with him. Forrest's force is ascertained to have been
rather above than below my
estimate. Chalmers was moving with two brigades by way of Houston to my
rear, while Lee,
with from 3,000 to 4,000 men, was ordered up to join Forrest in my front.
The country south of West Point and Houston abounds in swamps and
streams, extremely
difficult to cross when the defiles leading to and over them were held
by an enemy. The
incumbrances which already overburdened me would [have] increased and it
was impossible to
shake them off, and, involved in an exceedingly intricate and obstructed
country, I would have
been compelled to contend thus encumbered with a force numerically
largely superior to my
own; and, looking back upon the movement, I would in no way have been
justifiable in moving
at the time appointed without the whole force which I was ordered to
take. [By an unexpected
contingency the requirements of my orders became incompatible, and I was
compelled to adopt
the wiser alternative.] Had I moved with the Second and Third Brigades
only, I would have had
less than 5,000 men instead of full 7,000, and would have had the odds
largely against me from
the moment I dropped the infantry brigade and crossed the Tallahatchie
River, and, meeting with
disaster, would have been subjected to deserved censure.
The brigade moved from Columbus under orders not my own, and for its
delay I am in
nowise responsible.
32
This much I feel constrained to write in the nature of a defense for the
sake of my command,
as it must participate in the mortification of a supposed failure, when
we bear with us the
consciousness of success and duty well performed.
I have the honor to inclose herewith the report of Brig. Gen. B. H.
Grierson, second in
command, as also those of the brigade and regimental commanders, to
which I beg leave to refer
for lists of casualties from which the following recapitulation is
prepared: Killed, 47; wounded,
152; missing, 120; total casualties, 319.
A full list of the prisoners captured, about 200, is in course of
preparation, and will be
forwarded as soon as it can be completed.
Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
WM. SOOY SMITH,
Brig. Gen., Chief of Cavalry, Mil. Div. of the Mississippi.
Lieut. Col. R. M. SAWYER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Itinerary of the Cavalry Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, for February
and March.
During the month the First Division marched from Union City to
Collierville, Tenn., from
which point it operated with the whole division, under the immediate
control of Brig. Gen. W.
Sooy Smith.
February 20, the advance of the division engaged the enemy near West
Point, and drove him
with heavy loss across the Sakatonchee River.
February 21, we started upon our return to Memphis, the enemy under
Generals Lee and
Forrest following. We engaged them on the 21st, 22d, and 23d, each day
choosing our positions
and allowing them to come upon us. In each attack the enemy was repulsed
with fearful loss.
February 26, the division arrived safely back to the line of the Memphis
and Charleston
Railroad, having destroyed 30 miles of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, all
immense amount of
Confederate corn, cotton, and other property, and having brought in
about 200 prisoners, and
about 1,500 negroes and the same number of mules.
The troops of this division have been engaged during the month of March
in scouting and
patrolling from the post of Memphis; no important engagement has
occurred. Owing to the reenlistment
as veterans of three-fourths of all regiments in this division which
were eligible, the
effective force has been much reduced.
During the month the Second Iowa, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and
Ninth Illinois, and the
Fourth Missouri Cavalry have re-enlisted for the new term of three years.
The Third Michigan and Seventh Kansas Cavalry, which were re-enlisted
and sent home in
the early part of February, have not yet returned.
Owing to the scarcity in the supply of horses to this division, the
effective strength of the
command is reduced to less than 2,000. Only 1,500 horses have been
furnished during the last
ten months.
HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, CAVALRY DIVISION,
Germantown, Tenn., March 15, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following as a brief report of
the action of the
Second Brigade, Cavalry Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, in the late
expedition into
Mississippi:
In accordance to orders from the general commanding the Cavalry
Division, Sixteenth Army
Corps, I marched the Second Brigade, composed of the Second Iowa
Cavalry, Major Coon
33
commanding; Sixth Illinois Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Starr,
commanding; Seventh Illinois
Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Trafton, commanding; Ninth Illinois Cavalry,
Lieutenant-Colonel
Burgh commanding; Company K, First Illinois Light Artillery, Lieutenant
Curtis commanding,
and two companies of the pioneer corps, in all 2,900 strong, at 3
o'clock on the morning of the
11th of February, and effected a crossing of the Coldwater at Miller's
Ford and Doty's Mill by 3
o'clock of the afternoon. The whole command bivouacked that night 8
miles southeasterly from
Byhalia.
At an early hour the next day the march was resumed, and continued
without incident until a
point 2 miles east of Waterford was reached, when, at 8 p.m., the
brigade went into camp. Four
companies of the Second Iowa Cavalry, under command of Captain Horton,
were sent in the
direction of Wyatt to communicate with Colonel McMillen.
On the morning of the 13th the march was resumed. One battalion of the
Ninth Illinois
Cavalry, under command of Major Bishop, was sent to the railroad
crossing, in the direction of
Abbeville, to make a feint of crossing the Tallahatchie, and one
battalion of the Seventh Illinois
Cavalry, commanded by Captain Webster, was sent to form a junction with
Captain Horton. At 3
p.m. the brigade crossed the Tippah, at Callahan's Mills, on a bridge
built by the pioneer corps,
under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Starr, and encamped in the
vicinity of Potts' house.
The march was resumed at daylight, and the Tallahatchie crossed about 2
p.m. The brigade
encamped for the night and during the next day 5 miles south of New Albany.
On the 16th, the command marched 4 miles, encamping at Johnson's
plantation, 9 miles
south of New Albany.
On the night of the 17th, encamped 9 miles south of Pontotoc.
On the 18th, the Ninth Illinois Cavalry, by order of Brigadier-General
Grierson, moved upon
Aberdeen, 45 miles distant. Colonel Burgh, commanding, was opposed by a
few companies of
Confederate cavalry, which he quickly, dispersed, and reached Aberdeen,
from which he drove
the enemy's cavalry at sundown. He captured several prisoners of war,
large quantities of stores,
and many horses and mules. On the night of the 18th, the brigade
encamped 4 miles east of
Okolona.
On the 19th, passed through Aberdeen and to a point 2 miles east of
Prairie Station.
On the morning of the 20th, the entire command moved in the direction of
West Point, the
Second Brigade in the front. The Second Iowa Cavalry was in the advance
of the brigade, and
the Sixth Illinois Cavalry upon the left flank on the railroad, which
they effectually destroyed.
Immense quantities of corn belonging to the Confederacy was burned. Near
Loohattan Station
Colonel Starr reported the enemy in force at a point about 6 miles north
of West Point. The
advance, consisting of 17 men of Company K, Second Iowa Cavalry, under
command of
Lieutenant Bandy, ran upon a vastly superior force of the enemy.
Lieutenant Bandy immediately
charged them, putting them to flight, capturing several prisoners. His
conduct was gallant in the
extreme, and entitles him to the hearty commendation of his commanding
officers.
One and one-half miles north of West Point the enemy, reported to be
Colonel Forrest's
brigade, advantageously posted in timber and behind fences, vigorously
attacked and checked the
advance of the Second Iowa. The regiment was soon in position and so
supported by other parts
of the brigade that the enemy was routed, but not without the loss of
Lieutenant Dwire, Second
Iowa Cavalry, and 4 men wounded.
Lieutenant Dwire was a brave, earnest and faithful soldier, but the many
comrades who
mourn his loss have the comforting reflection that he died at his post
and in the full discharge of
his duty.
An hour later West Point was occupied by our forces, and the brigade
encamped for the night
in its vicinity.
34
On the morning of the 21st, one battalion of the Sixth Illinois Cavalry,
under command of
Major Whitsit, was ordered out to reconnoiter the West Point and Houston
road. He soon found a
superior force, and was re-enforced by the Second Iowa Cavalry. After an
engagement of two
hours the enemy were driven across the Sakatonchee. In this engagement
we lost several men
wounded.
While the Second Iowa and Major Whitsit's battalion were engaged, the
enemy, about 400
strong, made a demonstration on the West Point and Columbus road. They
were driven rapidly
back by Captain Webster, Seventh Illinois, and Captain Blackburn, Ninth
Illinois Cavalry, with
their respective companies.
After driving the enemy across the Sakatonchee and routing them on the
Columbus road, the
First and Third Brigades having been well advanced in the retrograde
movement, the Second
Brigade was ordered to retrace their steps of the day before and cover
the rear of the command,
the Second Iowa in the rear.
I directed Major Coon, commanding the Second Iowa, at any time when he
might be severely
pressed to sound the signal "halt." I also directed the other commanding
officers to have the
signal repeated from rear to the front of the brigade. Major Coon
replied that he could take care
of anything that was in the rear.
For a distance of 5 or 6 miles our rear guard was scarcely molested.
Afterward, for 2 or 3
miles, the skirmishing was heavy.
Eight miles from West Point General Grierson, with the Sixth and Ninth
Illinois Cavalry,
started to the relief of the brigade train, reported to be in imminent
danger, about 4 miles to the
front. Two companies of the Seventh Illinois were with the train.
In passing a swamp, about. 9 miles from West Point, the Second Iowa was
heavily pressed
by the enemy. When a short distance north of it I received word from
Major Coon that the
brigade was moving faster than it was possible for him to march, and
immediately afterward that
a line must be formed in order to give him relief.
The remaining companies of the Seventh Illinois were at once posted upon
eligible ground,
supporting Company K, First Illinois Artillery. Lieutenant Curtis opened
upon the enemy, and by
a well-directed fire checked temporarily their advance, and the Second
Iowa fell back behind the
line.
It is proper here to remark that no signals, as directed, were sounded
from the rear, and no
calls for assistance or re-enforcements were made that were not at once
responded to.
The Seventh and Ninth Illinois Cavalry alternately relieved the Second
Iowa as rear guard,
and, in compliance with orders to fall back as rapidly as possible and
fight only when absolutely
necessary, we resumed our march.
During the night the enemy was successfully ambuscaded by the Seventh
and Ninth Illinois,
and suffered a heavy loss.
The brigade encamped 2 miles south of Okolona, at which place Company K,
First Illinois
Light Artillery, was detached and attached to the Third Brigade.
At sunrise we resumed the march, the Second Brigade taking the advance.
Ten miles from
Okolona I was ordered by General Smith to form the brigade in line of
battle, making such
dispositions that the First and Third Brigades, then heavily pressed by
the enemy, might pass
through. The Sixth Illinois was detained by General Smith in the rear.
The Seventh Illinois I was
directed to send forward with the train. The Second Iowa and Ninth
Illinois were promptly
formed in fine positions, but were soon ordered farther to the rear,
where they met and checked
the advance of the enemy.
Some three hours the troops were used in forming successive lines, and
fighting their way
slowly back to Ivey's Hill, where lines were formed and a general
engagement tendered the
35
enemy. Dark put an end to the engagement, leaving our cavalry in
possession of the field, having
repulsed and beaten the enemy at every point where he made an attack.
Prior to this the Seventh
Illinois Cavalry had been relieved from duty with the train, and had
borne a distinguished part in
the various engagements of the day.
We bivouacked that night 2 miles south of Pontotoc, and the next day at
noon recrossed the
Tallahatchie at New Albany.
The last seen of the enemy he was 9 miles southeast of New Albany.
By slow marches we regained our camp at Germantown on Friday, the 26th
ultimo, at 12 m.,
after a march of 400 miles in eleven marching days.
In a report like this I cannot properly express my appreciation of the
heroic conduct of the
regimental commanders and all officers and men of the Second Brigade.
All bravely fought,
patiently endured, and in all respects exhibited the highest degree of
soldierly qualities. To
Lieutenant-Colonel Trafton and Lieutenant-Colonel Burgh, for their
earnest and hearty cooperation,
I am personally and greatly indebted and express my grateful thanks. The
members of
my staff were untiring in their efforts to effect the success of the
expedition, brave and zealous. I
made no calls upon their courage, patience, or endurance to which they
did not respond to my
full satisfaction.
At least 1,000 horses and mules were captured, but our marching the
first three days from
West Point was so severe that all were required to remount the men.
Several hundred negroes
were brought in.
Captain Schnitzer, acting provost-marshal, has not yet furnished a
report of the number of
prisoners captured, but I am safe in estimating them at 75 or 100.
For more particular information I transmit herewith the reports of the
regimental and
detachment commanders.
W. P. HEPBURN,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.
Capt. SAMUEL L. WOODWARD,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Memphis, Tenn.
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ILLINOIS CAVALRY,
Germantown, Tenn., March 1, 1864.
LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to report the following part taken by the
Sixth Illinois
Cavalry in the recent expedition under Brig. Gen. William Sooy Smith,
from Germantown,
Tenn., to West Point, Miss.:
On the morning of February 11, I received orders from Brigadier-General
Grierson to remain
at Germantown until the arrival of the train from Memphis. At 9 a.m.. on
the same day, I moved
toward Olive Branch, Miss., arriving there at 11.40 a.m., thence moving
south, crossing
Coldwater at Doty's Mill, thence south through Byhalia, joining and
bivouacking with the
brigade at a point 11 miles southwest of Holly Springs.
Moved at 8 a.m., February 12, in the direction of Waterford, passing
that place at dark;
encamped 1 miles southeast.
At daylight moved one battalion, with pioneer corps, to prepare a
crossing at Callahan's Mills
on the Tippah River. At 9 a.m. received orders to proceed with the two
remaining battalions to
the river, and assist in constructing a bridge for the crossing of the
command. Arrived at the river
at 12 m.; completed the bridge at 3.20 p.m.; marched with the brigade to
Okolona, Miss.,
encamping on the night of the 18th 5 miles east, where I received orders
at 8 p.m. to move with
the Sixth Illinois Cavalry and the battery of the Ninth Illinois Cavalry
to a point 9 miles north of
Aberdeen, Miss., communicating with Lieutenant-Colonel Burgh, Ninth
Illinois Cavalry, at
36
Aberdeen, and taking possession of Cotton Gin Ferry, over the Tombigbee
River, 10 miles above
Aberdeen.
At daylight I moved slowly toward Aberdeen, halting 6 miles north of
that place to feed. At
12 o'clock I fell in rear of the brigade, marching to a point 2 miles
east of Prairie Station, on the
Mobile and Ohio Railroad, where the regiment encamped with the brigade.
On the morning of the 20th of February, I received orders from
Brigadier-General Grierson
to proceed with the regiment along the railroad to Loohattan Station to
destroy all bridges,
culverts, railroad buildings, and C. S. property of whatever kind.
During the day the amount of
property destroyed was estimated at 500,000 bushels corn and 200 bales
fodder. I also burned 11
bridges and culverts.
Arriving at Loohattan Station, I found the enemy in force 1 miles east
of the station. I took
position at the railroad and communicated with General Grierson, who
instructed me to remain
until further orders, not, however, to advance. Soon after General
Grierson arrived in person,
with two battalions of Seventh Illinois Cavalry.
The enemy, consisting of the brigades of Colonels Forrest and McCulloch,
having discovered
the column moving on the main Okolona and West Point road, moved rapidly
in that direction.
At 1 a.m. General Grierson ordered the regiment to rejoin the column.
On the morning of February 20, I sent one battalion, under Maj. C. W.
Whitsit, to reconnoiter
on the Houston road. The enemy were found in small force about 2 miles
out. Being superior in
numbers to the battalion under Major Whitsit, the Second Iowa Cavalry
moved on the Houston
road, relieving him. Almost immediately after this, I was ordered to
move in the direction of
West Point, 1 mile distant, to ascertain the cause of an alarm in that
direction. I posted my
dismounted men on the railroad, and sent forward Captain Blackburn,
Company A, Ninth Illinois
Cavalry, and Capt. M. L. Webster, with one company Seventh Illinois
Cavalry, moving on the
Columbus road. They encountered a considerable force of the enemy's
cavalry; a vigorous attack
made by the companies of Captains Webster and Blackburn dispersed them
completely.
Receiving orders to take my place in the column, a line of march to the
rear having been
taken up, I marched out of West Point at 11 a.m., February 21. During
the day so many details of
companies and battalions were made to assist the Second Iowa Cavalry,
then covering the retreat,
that it is impossible to enumerate them.
At 10 a.m., February 22, I received orders from Brig. Gen. William Sooy
Smith to proceed to
the rear of the column with the Sixth Illinois Cavalry, there reporting
to Brigadier-General
Grierson. The rear of the column being somewhat confused, General
Grierson ordered my
regiment into position in advance of the First Brigade, two regiments of
the Third Brigade being
still in advance, skirmishing with the enemy. One of the three regiments
being pressed, Broke
and retreated through my line in disorder, scattering one battalion of
my regiment. The Third
Battalion, under Major Whitsit, on the left, and the Second Battalion,
under Capt. John Lynch,
on the right, held the enemy in check for some time, until they were
attacked on the flanks, when
they were withdrawn, Lieutenant-Colonel Thornburgh, Fourth Tennessee
Cavalry, having
formed one battalion of his regiment for their relief.
During the day the regiment was in action five different times. The
limited number of
cartridge-boxes and belts precluded the carrying of more than 40 rounds
of ammunition. This
amount having been expended before 5 p.m., the regiment was not engaged
until dark, when
General Grierson requested its assistance with or without ammunition.
The men responded
cheerfully to his call, and remained in position about half an hour,
until relieved by the Fourth
Missouri Cavalry of the First Brigade.
At about 11 a.m., February 23, I was ordered to relieve the Fifth
Kentucky and Third Illinois
Cavalry, then covering the retreat. The regiment marched in the rear a
distance of 9 miles to New
37
Albany without exchanging a shot. On the night of the 23d February, at 8
p.m., in obedience to
orders, I sent one battalion, under Major Whitsit, to encamp at Potts'
plantation, with instructions
to scout well the Hollow Ford and King's Bridge road; also the road to
Tippah River. This was
accomplished by daylight in the morning, the battalion halting at the
Tippah until the column had
passed. The regiment marched with the brigade from that point to
Germantown, Tenn., where it
is now stationed.
The loss of the regiment is 7 wounded and 5 missing.
Respectfully submitted.
M. H. STARR,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Sixth Illinois Cavalry.
Lieut. W. SCOTT BELDEN,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
HEADQUARTERS SECOND IOWA CAVALRY,
Germantown, Tenn., February 28, 1864.
LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to make the following report in regard to
the part taken by
the Second Iowa Cavalry on the recent raid in the State of Mississippi:
On the 1st day of this month I turned over my camp and garrison equipage
at Memphis, and
remained with my command and in bivouac on my camping-ground, exposed to
the cold weather
until the morning of the 5th instant, when I was ordered to Germantown,
Tenn. At this place my
command was in bivouac until the morning of the 11th.
In accordance with orders from brigade headquarters, my command,
consisting of the Second
Iowa Cavalry, 860 strong, and 4 pieces of artillery, 12-pounder mountain
howitzers, left this
place at 3 a.m., moving on the Mount Pleasant road; at 10 a.m. reached
the Cold-water at Miller's
Mills, and after some trifling repairs on the road passed the swamp and
took the Byhalia road,
arriving at that place at 3.30 p.m. At this place found Capt. Charles C.
Horton, commanding First
Battalion, Second Iowa Cavalry, armed with Colt revolving rifles, who
had been sent to make
necessary repairs at the crossing of the Coldwater, in advance of the
command. From Byhalia we
took the Chulahoma road for 5 miles and turned east some 4 miles, where
we camped for the
night.
At 8 a.m. of the 12th, Capt. C. C. Horton, commanding First Battalion,
was sent to
Chulahoma and to Wyatt Ferry, on the Tallahatchie, if necessary, to
communicate with Colonel
McMillen, commanding a brigade of infantry. At 8 a.m. the brigade was in
motion, the Second
Iowa Cavalry having the advance. During the forepart of the day there
was very little skirmishing
with a party of scouts, who were placed in the vicinity of Tallaloosa, 8
miles southwest of Holly
Springs, to watch the movements of our cavalry. Passing to the right of
Tallaloosa, we took the
road to Cox's plantation, thence turned east, taking the Waterford road.
Parties were sent in all
directions to ascertain the whereabouts and probable force of the enemy,
but no information
could be gained of a large force at any point on the Tallahatchie River;
but that night pickets
were placed at all available crossings on that river, with small scouts
or patrols on all roads
running north to the Memphis and Charleston Railroad.
During the afternoon it was pretty well understood that General
Forrest's main force had left
Oxford, Miss., his late headquarters, and gone south, some supposed to
Grenada. At sunset we
reached Old Waterford; at dark the depot and new town of Waterford. A
citizen of the place
informed us that the telegraph had been in operation up to one hour
previous, and of course the
enemy had been well posted as to our numbers and all movements made
during the 11th and
12th. The Second Brigade camped 3 miles southeast of Waterford, on
Brooks' plantation, finding
plenty of forage for animals and provision for men.
38
At 11.30 o'clock of the 13th, the command moved on the road to the
Tippah River, crossing
at Callahan's Mills and taking the road to Potts' plantation on the
Holly Springs road.
Bivouacked for the night on Parson Cooper's plantation.
The command was again in motion at daylight of the 14th on the New
Albany road, passing
Hickory Flats, and reached New Albany at 2 p.m. At sunset bivouacked 4
miles from this place,
on the road toward Pontotoc. Owing to the failure of Colonel Waring's
brigade to close up, the
whole command remained in bivouac during the whole of the 15th at this
place.
On the 16th only 10 miles were made, when we halted at Cherry Creek for
Colonel Waring's
brigade to close up with the main column.
On the 17th, the whole command being together, was put in motion at 8
a.m., and passed
Pontotoc at 11 a.m., and took the Houston road running south. Halted for
the night some 10
miles south of Pontotoc.
At daylight of the 18th, the column was again in motion, and, after a
march of some 4 miles,
took the Okolona road running east. At 4 p.m. we reached that place, and
camped 4 miles beyond
on the Aberdeen road.
At daylight on the 19th, were again moving on the road to Aberdeen, at
which place we
arrived at 11 a.m. After a short halt orders were received for us to
move on the Prairie Station
road, which was obeyed.
From Prairie Station the whole command took, on the morning of the 20th,
the West Point
road, the Second Iowa Cavalry having the advance. Not over 5 miles had
been gained when we
came up with a light picket of the enemy, and continued to have light
skirmishing for some 5
miles more, when we suddenly ran into a column consisting of about 250,
which were quickly
scattered by the three saber companies under Capt. George C. Graves.
After a halt of two hours for the column to close up, the march was
resumed. Light
skirmishing continued for some 3 miles, when the advance encountered a
force' of about 250.
Two companies of rifles were immediately dismounted, and in five minutes
the whole party was
dispersed. This was not done, however, without the loss of Lieutenant
Dwire, Company F, killed,
and 4 men wounded.
The enemy had, during this day's skirmish, 1 major seriously wounded in
the head, 2 men
killed, and 3 wounded. On reaching West Point it was ascertained that
the three Forrests
(general, colonel, and captain) had just left and passed west across the
Sakatonchee River, some
3 miles distant.
Up to the time of reaching West Point the largest force encountered was
reported to be 250 or
300. In no case had they made demonstration of a formidable resistance.
Having had the advance
during the entire day of the 20th, I had good opportunities for
gathering information of the
location and numbers of Forrest's command, and had at no time placed the
force at the
Sakatonchee bridge above 2,000 men, and this force without artillery.
When the command was ordered to fall back to Okolona, on the morning of
the 21st, I was
ordered to take the Second Iowa Cavalry and make a demonstration at the
bridge, which I did in
the following manner: After dismounting four rifle companies, I advanced
them as skirmishers
under cover of a fence and in close proximity with the enemy's
sharpshooters; I then brought
forward two of my 12-pounder howitzers and drove them easily from their
fences and houses
near the bridge. After some two hours' time used in skirmishing with the
rifle, and now and then
a shell with howitzers, I withdrew, in compliance with orders,
thoroughly convinced of two facts,
viz, first, that the enemy had no artillery at that place, and, second,
that the Federal force was at
least 4 to the enemy's 1. In obedience to orders I was in rear. The
Second Iowa Cavalry formed
the rear guard.
39
After leaving the bridge some 5 miles, firing commenced in the rear, and
increased for an
hour, when I was called upon by Capt. George C. Graves, in command of
the rear guard, for
assistance, as the enemy's force was pressing him and threatening his
flanks. One battalion of
rifles, under Capt. C. C. Horton, was immediately dismounted and placed
behind a fence, and the
saber companies brought in. The enemy, thinking the road clear, came up
with great boldness. At
this time two or three shells and three or four rounds from the rifles
checked the movement,
when my men retired in good order. From the demonstration of the enemy I
deemed it necessary
to dismount another battalion rifles, under Capt. Paul A. Queal, and
having eight companies
dismounted and the saber companies mounted to guard the flanks, I felt
that the rear of the
column was quite safe.
It having been reported to me that the enemy were moving on my left
flank, I found, on
examination, that a column was moving, and saw three stand of colors
displayed; but the
command to which they belonged could not have been over a battalion
each. By the assistance of
one battalion of the Sixth Illinois Cavalry I was enabled to withdraw my
command across a
swamp difficult of passage, and after mounting my men fell back some 3
miles, when I found
myself again attacked more furiously than before. At this place the
saber companies (mounted),
under command of Capt. George C. Graves, did great havoc with their
carbines. At one time 8
horses came into his lines with empty saddles. Here again I was
compelled to dismount all my
rifles, and it was with the greatest difficulty that I got my led horses
and howitzers out of the
timber in time to save them. My men on foot had become so completely
exhausted that I felt sure
at one time that one-half of them must be captured.
Lieut. P. L. Reed, who commands the battery, saved one piece in a heroic
manner. The two
lead horses having been killed in a narrow lane, he was compelled to
dismount men and bring off
one piece for some distance. Having seen the enemy on both flanks, I
sent to Captains Queal and
Horton to fall back with their dismounted men as fast as possible, but
they had traveled so far
that they were nearly exhausted.
Although I had given notice that my command was hard pressed and that I
was in great need
of re-enforcements, I had been unable to get assistance. Notwithstanding
the exhausted condition
of the men, they were brought off in the most heroic manner by Capts. C.
C. Horton and Paul A.
Queal, who pressed in the rear and on both flanks, repulsed the enemy
in-the rear, and drove
back their flanks until they had made good their escape.
On no occasion have I witnessed more determined coolness than on this.
There are many
officers and soldiers who deserve personal compliment for gallant
conduct in the action, but the
short space I am allowed here forbids that I should say more than that
all, both officers and men,
were never more gallant than on this occasion.
After the regiment had reached a point of safety we were relieved by the
Ninth Illinois
Cavalry, who acted as rear guard for the balance of the day. At night
camped near Okolona.
Passed Okolona early on the morning of the 22d, taking the road to
Pontotoc. When we had
marched some 10 miles on this road, orders were given that a line should
be formed by the
Second Brigade that the other two brigades might pass by.
By instructions from Brig. Gen. B. H. Grierson, my command was formed
upon a high ridge,
the riflemen lying close to the ground and the saber companies formed on
the right and left
flanks to guard against being outflanked. Until this time the enemy had
apparently had their own
way until they formed themselves within half circles, where bullets from
the five-shooting rifles
fell like hail. They were easily checked, but pursued continuously for
some time afterward.
Capt. Chas. P. Moore, Company K, who guarded the right flank, and
Lieutenant Hamilton,
Company M, on the left flank, are deserving of great praise for the part
performed by them on
this occasion.
40
About 3 p.m. I was ordered by General Grierson to use my regiment as
flankers, and guard
the left flank, as a column could then be seen threatening the command
in that direction. By
some misunderstanding one battalion was left flanking late at night,
while the balance had
flanked along until it reached the head of the column. The result was
that one battalion was in
rear and the balance in front, and all in compliance with orders. On
reaching the front was
ordered by General Grierson to move on until a suitable place could be
found on which to halt
the command.
At 4 a.m. of 23d, the command was again in motion on the Pontotoc
[road]. During the
forepart of the day a small force followed the rear guard to New Albany,
where the pursuit by the
enemy appears to have ceased.
Nothing of material interest took place until we arrived at Germantown,
Tenn., on the
afternoon of the 26th.
The casualties during the entire scout were as follows: First day (20th
February), 1 killed, 5
wounded; second day (21st February), 6 killed, 18 wounded, 8 missing;
third day (22d
February), 1 killed, 4 wounded, 3 missing. Total, 8 killed, 27 wounded,
11 missing. Total, 46.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
DATUS E. COON,
Major, Second Iowa Cavalry, Commanding Regiment.
First Lieut. W. SCOTT BELDEN,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
GERMANTOWN, TENN.,
March 1, 1864.
SIR: Agreeably to order received from you, I proceed to give a report of
our march on this
raid, commencing the 11th of February:
There was nothing of importance transpired more than forming in battery
some several times
until the 21st, when we formed and fired some 40 rounds in the prairie
to cover the retreat of the
Second Iowa Regiment, which had kept them (the rebels)in check until
they had expended nearly
all of their ammunition.
We were then ordered to fall back to the rear, and on the morning of the
22d we were
detached from the Second Brigade and attached to the Third Brigade for
the day, as they were in
the rear and had no artillery with them. We marched on until about 10
o'clock, when we arrived
at Okolona and formed ready for a fight, but were soon ordered to march
on. We had not
proceeded very far when we were unexpectedly surprised by the presence
of fleeing cavalry on
both sides of us. They were in perfect confusion; some hallooing, "Go
ahead, or we will be killed
:" while some few showed a willingness to fight. After some several
unsuccessful attempts to
form by battery I gave it up, and marched as best I could until I
received an order, purporting to
come from headquarters, for me to try and save the artillery by marching
through the field to the
right. I proceeded to comply with orders, and after crossing some two or
three almost impassable
ditches, and my horses being nearly entirely exhausted, I came to
another ditch some 6 feet deep.
I managed to get one gun over safe by the men dismounting and taking it
over by hand, and one
other, which by the time we got it over was broken so we had to leave
it. I ordered them to cut
the horses loose and cut the gearing up, and go ahead with the gun and
lead horses. I kept the
orderly sergeant, 1 corporal, and 2 privates back to help me destroy the
ammunition and spike
the guns, and when we left them we left them effectually disabled, for
the present at any rate. I
then proceeded to gather up my company with my single gun, and marched
with the Ninth
Illinois battery during the rest of our march.
41
I lost 30 horses during the march. Some of them I lost in the stampede,
but most of them
were worn out on march. I still have 80 horses, part serviceable and
part unserviceable. I lost my
5 packsaddles. The men and negroes, they say, were ordered to leave them
in the stampede, and I
couldn't find them any more. Nothing more worth note transpired.
Yours, respectfully,
I. W. CURTIS,
Lieutenant, Company K, First Illinois Light Artillery.
Col. WILLIAM P. HEPBURN.
HEADQUARTERS THIRD ILLINOIS CAVALRY,
Germantown, Tenn., February 27, 1864.
SIR: On the evening of the 13th February, I was ordered by Colonel
McCrillis, commanding
brigade, to proceed to Collins' Mill with my command, 7 miles out on
Salem road from where
brigade was camped at Widow Collins'.
Proceeded there immediately, and arrived at the mill at sundown. Ordered
Company B to
charge down on the mill and catch any of the enemy who might be there.
Lieutenant
Shellenberger did so. The enemy, to the number of 20, being on the
alert, made their escape in
the woods. Found no meal or flour. Got forage for my command, and
returned to camp at 9 p.m.
On 17th, my command being in advance of brigade and division, charged
into Pontotoc at 11
a.m. No enemy there. Proceeded through town on Houston road, 2 miles
out; found enemy's
picket, who by hard running made their escape. Kept the road and flanks
completely clear of all
enemy. Camped within 2 miles of Red Land. Ordered out by colonel
commanding brigade on
Houston road to proceed 3 or 4 miles and learn of any enemy to be found
in our front. Two miles
out found Gholson's command. Lieutenant Lucas, in charge of Companies H
and C, charged the
rebels and drove them in a swamp immediately in our front. On examining
the position of the
enemy, I found that if I advanced with my whole force I would have been
completely flanked.
Ordered Company M to flank on Red Land road, and Company B on road
leading to the right.
Dismounted Companies F and H to skirmish in swamp, and Company C to
support them
mounted. Advanced my skirmishers, under fire from the enemy, 200 yards
in the swamp, and
found that the enemy were in force superior to mine. Being in danger of
being flanked, I reported
the fact by an orderly to Colonel McCrillis, who ordered me to retire,
the object of the
reconnaissance being accomplished. Learnt from Colonel Thornburgh, who
advanced through
the swamp next morning, that we killed 7 of the enemy. My loss 1 man,
prisoner.
On 18th, ordered by colonel commanding brigade to march at 3.30 o'clock,
with my
command and Captain Kilborn's company of scouts, to go back to Pontotoc
and learn if any
enemy was there, and thence proceed direct to Okolona; did so, met but
few of the enemy, and
drove them. Arrived at Okolona at 2 p.m.; ordered out on Red Land road
to join the brigade, and
camp 3 miles out; did so, joining the brigade at sundown.
On 22d, Colonel McCrillis commanding, when line of battle was formed I
was ordered to
form my command to the left of the Pontotoc road, in the edge of first
timber out of Okolona; did
so. As column was passing out of town, I was ordered to move my command
on left flank in
column. Found, on account of thick brush and rapid movement of main
column, rather difficult,
but did so. Ordered to form line of battle on first ground that I could
do so on the left of road.
Moved out to form and was forming, when a mass of troops, moving very
rapidly, passed
through my line, who carried my men away by main force. Collected part
of Company H and a
few men of other companies under Lieutenant Lucas. Fought the enemy
every foot of the way
back, Lieutenant Davis, of the Fourth Regulars, and Lieutenant Sullivan,
adjutant of same
42
regiment, doing the same, and in conjunction with them we endeavored to
stay the progress of
the enemy, that our dismounted and wounded men might get away.
A mile or two back found Lieutenant Shellenberger with a mixed command,
mostly Third
men, formed in line, who had been rallied by himself and Captain
Perkins, acting assistant
inspector-general of brigade. Took command and fell back in rear of
Seventh Indiana in a very
orderly manner, where we formed. Reported the fact to you and received
permission to fall back
in rear of column and reorganize my command. On my way back reported to
General Grierson,
who ordered me on right flank. Went there, and, the column being in
rapid retreat, was forced
after an hour or two to fall into road.
Ordered by General Smith to dismount and fight on foot; did so, forming
my men in line with
Second Iowa. Enemy being reported to have flanked us, I rode out to see.
While in my
momentary absence some officer unknown ordered the troops to rally on
their horses and move
to the rear. On learning the fact I sent Lieutenant Lucas to bring them
back, but it growing dark,
the enemy fell back and the fight was over. I may state that during the
absence of my command I
did all I could to encourage and rally other commands.
On 23d, the column being in line of march from Pontotoc to New Albany, I
was dropped out
of brigade in center of column to act as rear guard for division, with
Fifth Kentucky for support.
Ordered not to fight the enemy, only sufficient to keep him from
molesting column and staying
the march.
The column having passed, my command was attacked by about 300 of the
enemy, with a
column moving on right flank. Kept up a running fight for two hours, and
at a creek 9 miles from
New Albany put an effectual stop to the enemy with the assistance of
three companies of Fifth
Kentucky under Major Cheek; relieved as rear guard by Sixth Illinois, my
horses being played
out.
My total loss so far as I can learn is 3 killed, 1 wounded mortally, 1
dangerously, and 8
missing.
I would just add that my force in any fighting did not exceed 150 men,
and on the 23d not
more than 60. As our movements had to be rapid, I was compelled to keep
my worst mounted
men with the main column.
I must also report the fact that Captain Lay disgraced the good name of
the regiment by
retiring with a portion of his company (F) at first fire on both days.
Lieutenants Lucas, Company
M, and Shellenberger, Company B, behaved very gallantly. Sergeants
Graham, Company B;
Onion, Galliher, Kingery, Company H, and Tricket, Company F, were
conspicuous for bravery.
Respectfully submitted.
A. B. KIRKBRIDE,
Captain, Commanding Third Illinois Cavalry.
Colonel MCCRILLIS.
HEADQUARTERS THIRTY-FIRST IOWA VOLUNTEERS,
Woodville, Ala., March 16, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that on the 14th instant, in
obedience to orders, I left
camp about 11 a.m. with my command, and proceeded toward Claysville,
Ala. I reached Reed's
plantation, 5 miles from Claysville, about 5 p.m., where a train of
eighteen wagons of the Second
Brigade were awaiting our arrival, guarded by 20 men from the
Twenty-ninth Missouri Infantry.
I placed 108 of my men in the wagons, and proceeded that night with them
to Claysville, leaving
the remainder of the regiment at Reed's plantation under the command of
Major Stimming. I
found Captain House at Claysville with 30 men from the Twenty-ninth
Missouri Infantry, and
between 20 and 30 men from the Fourth and Ninth Iowa regiments.
43
On the morning of the 15th, the teams were loaded with forage near the
town, and at 10 a.m.
I started to return to camp with my command and the men commanded by
Captain House,
leaving no guard whatever at Claysville. About 3 p.m., when about 3
miles this side of Reed's
plantation, I received an order to "remain at Cottonville, if not
already past that place." I knew of
no such place as Cottonville, but learned on inquiry that it was near
Deposit, 10 miles from
where we then were. I then continued the march to camp, and arrived here
at 8 p.m.
While at Claysville I visited the bank of the river, from which I could
distinctly see
Guntersville and a few of the enemy moving about, but discovered nothing
unusual. I also
investigated the numerous reports about citizens having conducted the
party who made the
attack, on the morning of the 14th, but I found nothing sufficiently
reliable to justify making any
arrests.
I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. W. JENKINS,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Thirty-first Iowa.
Capt. W. A. GORDON,
Assistant Adjutant-General, 1st Div., 15th Army Corps.
HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SIXTH IOWA VOLUNTEERS,
Fort Osterhaus, Vienna, Ala., April 21, 1864.
SIR: I regret to report that this morning about 8.30 a.m. a detail of 1
sergeant, 1 corporal, and
6 men, who were returning from duty as patrols on Tennessee, were
captured by a force of the
enemy at Harrison's Gap. The men were marching leisurely, and the enemy
having concealed
themselves fired into the leading 4, mortally wounding 1 and another
seriously. They numbered
about 30 men. This detail was the only one on the river at the time, the
remaining ones having
been ordered to camp early in the day.
I mounted men immediately and started in pursuit, but information did
not reach me till too
late, and I was only able to see the prisoners on the other side.
Efforts were made to get the wounded back, but without avail. The enemy
did not cross on
my front, but evidently had the aid and counsel of citizens.
I would respectfully suggest that, with the general's permission, I can
cross the Tennessee
and retaliate by capturing and destroying whatever there may be on the
other side. All my
officers and men are anxious to have a trial with the guerrillas.
I am, most respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN LUBBERS,
Major, Commanding Twenty-sixth Iowa.
P. S.--Inclosed I send a communication which was left on this bank of
the river where the
enemy crossed with the prisoners.
JOHN LUBBERS,
Major, Commanding.
Capt. W. A. GORDON, A. A. G.
HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE,
Memphis, Tenn., May 8, 1864.
GENERAL: I send you a copy of my last dispatch from General Sturgis. You
will see that he
is obliged to give over the chase after Forrest. I regret very much that
we could not intercept and
hold him or cut him up. I have done all that it was possible for any man
to do since I came here.
Could I have had a co-operating force from the Tennessee River, I should
have had him fast.
44
On the night of the 2d instant he was at Purdy, with 4,000 or 5,000 men,
retreating south.
Could that point have been occupied before that we should have had him
fast, for the swollen
condition of the Hatchie would have prevented him from crossing to any
point south of that
stream. As it is, he is now no doubt proceeding with all his force to
harass you. Of this I have
advised you by telegraph. He would concentrate at Tupelo and move from
there. The cars are
running from Tupelo to Mobile. They are also running to Panola, with a
break at Grenada. They
are obtaining all the supplies they can from the lines of these roads,
and General Polk, at
Demopolis, has been drawing most of his supplies from these sources.
My cavalry will be in in three or four days. I have with Sturgis 3,500,
and about 800 have
arrived here since he left. I could rally now nearly 5,000 cavalry here,
but 1,400 of that belongs
to Vicksburg, viz, the Fourth Iowa, a part of which was stopped on its
way down, and the
balance, together with 300 men of Tenth Missouri, were brought up from
there. These troops I
must send back to Vicksburg.
In the course of ten days I shall hope to receive an accession to my
cavalry from the returning
veteran regiments, and by that time my cavalry now with Sturgis will be
recruited. Forrest will
then be hovering around you. I shall be glad to then send the Vicksburg
cavalry to that point
overland, with a force of cavalry from here to see them safely through.
I would send them out to
the line of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, with instructions to follow
the line from Tupelo well
down to Meridian and effectually destroy the road so that it cannot
again be repaired. I would
then have them strike across to Yazoo City, destroying the railroad on
the way between Canton
and Grenada and capture Yazoo City if in possession of the enemy. If
Yazoo City is occupied by
the enemy, a force with gunboats could be sent up from Vicksburg to
co-operate. After waiting at
Yazoo City long enough to recruit the cavalry belonging here they could
return, finishing
destruction of Mississippi Central and Memphis and Mississippi
Railroads, north of Grenada.
When they got ready to return from Yazoo City I would send out an
infantry force from here
to meet them at Panola, and see them safely back. If such a move as this
should meet with
approval I should like to be authorized to make it, when in my judgment
it can be made
successfully.
I have just received your telegram of the 6th, informing me that 5,000
militia from the
northwest had been ordered to report to me. I don't want them unless the
troops I now have are to
be taken away, and had rather not have them. I have got all the troops I
need for defense, and
with my returning cavalry I can carry the war into Mississippi and
Alabama, if you desire it. At
Saint Louis is the Ninth Iowa Cavalry, fully armed, equipped, and
mounted, 1,000 strong. They
have been doing nothing for six months but guarding Benton Barracks. Why
cannot we have
them here?
The main object of Forrest's visit to West Tennessee, as avowed by
himself, was to draw
troops from General Sherman, to protect exposed points. In that he has
signally failed. West
Tennessee and Kentucky are now clear of any organized rebel force, and
no place in this district
is in any danger or in any way threatened.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
C. C. WASHBURN,
Major-General, Commanding.
Maj. Gen. J. B. MCPHERSON,
Commanding Department of the Tennessee.
HEADQUARTERS U.S. FORCES IN THE FIELD,
Memphis, Tenn., May 12, 1864.
45
MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations
of this command,
consisting of Col. George E. Waring's cavalry division, 3,000 strong,
with six pieces of artillery
and four mountain howitzers; Col. W. L. McMillen's infantry brigade,
2,000 strong, with six
pieces of artillery; and Colonel Harris' infantry brigade, 1,400 strong,
with four pieces of
artillery.
In compliance with Special Orders, No. 7, headquarters District of West
Tennessee, issued
April 29, the Cavalry Division (excepting the Fourth Regiment Iowa
Cavalry) and the One
hundred and thirteenth Illinois Infantry moved early on the morning of
the 30th ultimo in the
direction of Somerville, while Colonel McMillen's brigade, provided with
a pontoon bridge,
were transported by railroad to Grissom's Station, where it would be
joined by the Fourth Iowa
Cavalry, with instructions to cross the Wolf River there and join the
cavalry at Somerville.
Owing to the heavy rains the roads were in very bad condition, and the
delays occasioned in
constructing and repairing bridges rendered it impossible for the
cavalry column to move beyond
Raleigh, 15 miles from Memphis.
Early the next morning (May 1) the march was resumed, and the wagons
used for the
transportation of the One hundred and thirteenth Illinois Infantry
ordered to report at Memphis,
under a cavalry escort from the halt made during the day, 15 miles east
of Raleigh.
This column encamped for the night 23 miles east of Raleigh, and entered
Somerville
Monday morning, the 2d instant, at 11 a.m., when I halted the cavalry to
await the approach of
Colonel McMilen's brigade, who informed me by courier that he had
succeeded in crossing the
Wolf River with one regiment of infantry and three companies of cavalry.
The regiment of
infantry he immediately sent forward to bridge the north fork of the
same stream. I subsequently
received word from him that in attempting to cross his train the bridge,
which he reported as
being a very imperfect and bad one, was rendered completely useless by a
wagon breaking
through and sinking one of the boats. This made it necessary to
construct a new bridge, and the
remainder of his command could not be moved over until 3 o'clock Tuesday
morning (May 3).
Having received information that Forrest was concentrating his force at
Jackson with the
intention of moving south, and also intelligence from the major-general
commanding the district
that it had been unofficially reported to him that a division of our
infantry had moved up the
Tennessee River with the intention of occupying Purdy, and thus to cut
off Forrest's line of
retreat in that direction, I did not deem it safe to move forward the
entire cavalry force until the
infantry had arrived to within supporting distance, or had at least
effected the crossing of the
Wolf River and its fork, as it would have enabled the enemy to pass over
the Hatchie River at the
Estenaula crossing, on the direct road from Somerville to Jackson, by
means of the pontoon he
had with him, and to move between the cavalry and Colonel McMillen's
infantry brigade, thus
giving him an opportunity to destroy both in detail. Under these
circumstances I ordered Colonel
Waring, at 1 p.m., May 2, to send Colonel Kargé forward to Bolivar with
the Second New Jersey
and Tenth Missouri Cavalry, with two pieces of artillery (in all, 700
strong), for the purpose of
gaining more definite information of the enemy's movements, and, if
possible, to secure the
bridge he had thrown across the Hatchie River at that point. The
remainder of Colonel Waring's
division I halted 5 miles from Somerville, on the Bolivar road, to
support Colonel Kargé should
he meet with any considerable force, or to oppose an advance from the
Estenaula crossing should
that be attempted, until I could gain satisfactory tidings from Colonel
McMillen, to whom I had
sent word to move up with all dispatch.
During the night I received information from Colonel Kargé that his
advance had
encountered the enemy's vedettes, 7 miles from Bolivar, to which place
he pursued them, and
then met the enemy with a force equal if not larger than his own,
commanded by Forrest in
person. After a sharp engagement of nearly an hour's duration he had
succeeded in dislodging the
46
enemy from the earth-works and rifle-pits, which had been thrown up
there before, and finally
drove him through the swampy bottoms in the direction of Pocahontas and
Middleton, not,
however, until the bridge over the Hatchie River had been destroyed. Our
loss in this
engagement was 2 killed and 10 wounded. The enemy's loss was much
heavier, owing to the
determination of our troops and the superiority of our arms and
artillery, which the enemy was
not at all provided with. Among his wounded were several officers,
including Forrest's adjutantgeneral,
whose arm was shattered by a carbine ball.
I immediately ordered the entire cavalry force to move to Bolivar at
daylight in the morning
(May 3), and ordered Colonel McMillen to join there as rapidly as
possible with his own brigade,
as well as the additional infantry force commanded by Colonel Harris,
and which had overtaken
him while bridging the Wolf River.
The cavalry arrived at Bolivar on the afternoon of the 3d instant, so as
to push forward
toward Purdy and to co-operate with the force from the Tennessee River,
which I judged, from
the information received, had arrived from Cairo and was moving in that
direction also. In the
mean time I had sent 200 of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry, commanded by
Captains Woods and -------
, of the same regiment, to the Brownsville and Estenaula crossings, with
instructions to press
laborers and tools, and to lay out timber for bridges, thus to occupy
the attention of the enemy
and prevent his crossing there until a new bridge could be built at
Bolivar, so as to move on to
Purdy.
The infantry and the supply train arrived at Bolivar on the 4th instant,
at noon, where the
remainder of the day was consumed in issuing rations and affording the
infantry a short and
necessary rest.
The bridge was nearly completed when I felt convinced from information
brought in by
scouts that the rear of Forrest's command had reached Purdy on Monday
night, the 2d instant,
and that his entire force was pushing on to Tupelo, Miss.; also that
there was no co-operating
force moving up from the Tennessee River.
The enemy, having all cavalry, was enabled to move much more rapidly,
and could keep our
pursuing force, the greater portion being infantry, at any distance he
might desire. Though he had
already a two days' march the advantage, and a rapid and unfordable
stream as a safe barrier
against any flank movement, I ordered Colonel Waring to pursue with his
cavalry division at
daylight on the morning of the 5th and to move as far in the direction
of Ripley as possible,
thinking that the enemy would make a stand there to enable him to move
off the immense train
of supplies he was reported as sending down by way of Corinth.
On the 6th instant I directed Colonel Waring to send reconnoitering
parties to Ripley, to
Hatchietown, and to Salem, and with his command at Mud Creek (8 miles
north of Ripley) I
directed him to await the arrival of the infantry, which came up in the
afternoon of the same day.
Information brought in by the reconnoitering forces as well as that
derived from prisoners
captured at Ripley, from citizens of that place, and a deserter, proved
beyond a doubt that
Forrest's forces had again united at Tupelo, on the Mobile and Ohio
Railroad, and were moving
toward Okolona. The immense trains he was reported as having brought
with him was an entire
exaggeration, and consisted only of pressed wagons for the
transportation of sufficient forage to
give two brigades a two days' supply at Corinth and five days' rations
to his men, and were
released and returned to their owners.
Knowing that a further pursuit in a country entirely destitute of forage
would compel me to
abandon much of my artillery in another day, from the fact that many
horses had already given
out and been abandoned along the road, and it being represented to me
that the condition of the
horses of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry in particular was such that it would
necessitate the abandoning
of one-half of them unless they could have ample rest and forage, I
therefore held a consultation
47
with commanding officers of divisions and brigades, who unanimously
agreed with me to move
back to the railroad terminus, and were of the opinion that to continue
the pursuit to Tupelo or
Okolona would be certain disaster to ourselves unless amply provided
with rations and forage
necessary for such a campaign.
On the morning of the 7th the infantry, followed by the cavalry,
therefore marched to 4 miles
beyond Salem, and the whole command encamped on the Lamar road. The
troops being
exhausted from long and fatiguing marches, and the horses much jaded and
broken down, I did
not move on Sunday, the 8th instant, but allowed both men and animals to
rest.
Receiving the dispatch of the major-general commanding the same
afternoon to return to
Moscow, and informing me that trains would be there to receive the
infantry, I moved the
command to Grissom's Station the next day (9th instant), where the
greater portion of the
infantry was embarked on the cars and arrived at Memphis in the night.
The remainder of the
infantry arrived at Memphis on Monday, the 10th instant, while
instructions were given Colonel
Waring, commanding the cavalry, to return to Memphis with his division
and to escort the
wagon train and artillery.
Though it is desirable to have chronicled a defeat and rout of the
enemy, the results of the
expedition are the same; his forces were divided and compelled to
abandon a section of country
he had so long occupied. His thorough knowledge of the country, and the
advantage in having
good [horses], together with the sympathies of the people in giving him
information of our
movements, enabled him to beat a rapid retreat to Mississippi, into
which State he was pursued
for 30 miles, and the chase only then given up when the poverty and
barrenness of the country to
subsist an army unprovided for a regular campaign made it necessary. The
plan of campaign
suggested by Major-General Washburn was based in a measure upon the idea
of a co-operating
force at Purdy, and had that force been in position it would have closed
the only door by which
Forrest's command could possibly have escaped, and I believe would have
resulted in its capture
or destruction.
I avail myself of this opportunity to thank the general commanding the
district for the
promptness with which everything in his power was furnished me to render
the expedition
successful.
I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. D. STURGIS,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Expedition.
Maj. WILLIAM H. MORGAN, A. A. G.
COLLIERVILLE, TENN.,
January 2, 1864.
General GRIERSON:
Patrol, just in by way of Quinn and Jackson's Mill, Olive Branch, Centre
Hill, and Forest
Hill, reports that nothing could be heard of the enemy except that it
was the report that Forrest
had crossed the Tallahatchie River and was still going south.
D. E. COON,
Major Second Iowa Cavalry, Commanding
MEMPHIS, TENN., January 2, 1864.
Major COON,
Collierville:
48
Send a good battalion of the Second Iowa Cavalry with camp equipage in
wagons, to start
early in the morning for this place. Send the rest of the regiment as
soon after as possible by
road; the camp equipage to be sent by rail. You had best come in by rail
today and select a camp.
B. H. GRIERSON,
Brigadier-General.
HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, 15TH ARMY CORPS,
January 6, 1864.
Col. J. BANBURY, Comdg. Third Brigade:
COLONEL: As one regiment of General Morgan L. Smith's division will
arrive here this
p.m., the Fifth Iowa Volunteer Infantry can move with the rest of the
command to-morrow
morning.
You will detail from your command 25 men, under a commissioned officer,
for guard duty,
to remain with the stores on the cars and guard them to their destination.
By order of Brig. Gen. John E. Smith:
M. ROCHESTER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
SPECIAL ORDERS No. 2.
HEADQUARTERS GILBERT'S BRIGADE,
Memphis, Tenn., January 6, 1864.
I. Capt. Otis Whitney. Company H, Twenty-seventh Regiment Iowa
Volunteers; Capt. James
W. Cheney. Company D, Forty-ninth Regiment Illinois Volunteers; Second
Lieut. Herman C.
Hemenway, Company C, Twenty-seventh Iowa Volunteers, are appointed a
board to investigate
the matter pertaining to the taking of certain goods from the house of
Mrs. Julia Baker by men of
this brigade. They will ascertain as near as possible the kind,
quantity, and quality of the goods
taken, with their value, by whom taken, and how disposed of,
identifying, if possible, the men. If
not able to identify the men, ascertain the company or companies. If the
companies cannot be
ascertained, ascertain the regiment, reporting the facts as early as
practicable to these
headquarters.
By order of Col. James I. Gilbert, Twenty-seventh Regiment Iowa
Volunteer Infantry,
commanding brigade.
C. T. GRANGER,
Capt. Co. K, 27th Iowa, and Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen.
HEADQUARTERS SECOND CAVALRY DIVISION,
Pulaski, Tenn., January 8, 1864.
Colonel BOONE,
Twenty-eighth Kentucky Volunteer Infantry :
The general commanding directs that you prepare your regiment
immediately for the march.
You will march to-morrow morning at 7 o'clock, and will move to
Rossville, before
Chattanooga, by the nearest and best routes, and there take post and
announce your arrival at that
place to Brigadier-General Whipple, assistant adjutant-general and chief
of staff, Department of
the Cumberland, at Chattanooga, Tenn. The commanding officer Fifth Iowa
Cavalry will report
to you and accompany your command. The quartermaster of this division
will turn over to your
regimental quartermaster eight wagons and teams. You will send drivers
to these headquarters
for the teams. Any quartermaster's stores needed by your command will be
furnished by the
division quartermaster.
49
By command of Brigadier-General Crook:
[ROBERT P. KENNEDY],
Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Woodville, Ala., January 9, 1864.
Lieut. Col. A. ROBERTS,
Thirtieth Iowa, Commanding Detail at Claysville:
COLONEL: Before returning to camp you will make a reconnaissance in the
vicinity of
Guntersville, crossing to ascertain the force of the enemy there, what
they are doing, &c.; in a
word, get all the information possible.
It is reported here that there is a large force on the other side of the
river, and they are
fortifying strongly at Guntersville, and also at Roe's Island. Make as
thorough a reconnaissance
on this side of the river as possible, and then return. Seventy-five
mounted are ordered to
Claysville and will remain in the vicinity until further order. Keep the
two men of the mounted
infantry until you finish your reconnaissance and then send them in
advance with your report.
By order of Brig. Gen. C. R. Woods:
C. H. KIBLER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
HEADQUARTERS SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Memphis, Tenn., January 11, 1864.
Brig. Gen. A. J. SMITH,
Comdg. District of Columbus, Columbus, Ky.:
GENERAL: Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman, commanding department, orders that two
divisions,
of at least 5,000 each, of infantry, and a division of cavalry of the
same number, be forwarded at
once from this corps for a special expedition. You will receive herewith
your orders. I need not
say to you that rapidity of execution is necessary. Both General Sherman
and myself rely upon
promptness on your part. I desire that you will procure and bring with
you as much of the
Spencer rifle ammunition as practicable, as we have another regiment
just coming in armed with
that weapon. There is at Saint Louis a battery of Napoleon guns in hands
of the quartermaster for
transportation. They are for the Second Iowa Battery, with General
Tuttle, and will be much
needed. You will oblige me by telegraphing in my name for that battery
to be sent at once by rail
to Cairo, and thence hurry it forward as soon as practicable. General
Sherman desires that you
will send the regiments forward that have been longest in garrison, and
that you will come down
yourself, either with the infantry or cavalry force, as you prefer.
Three wagons will be allowed to
a regiment. All baggage to be reduced to a minimum and superfluities
thrown away without
remorse. Send forward all spare transportation for brigade and division
trains. Twelve boats are
ordered down. If you have at Cairo or Columbus any quantity of stockings
and army shoes, bring
them down; also, all the horse and mule shoes and nails you can lay your
hands on, as we are
almost out. Require strict inspection and report of the state of your
command as to clothing,
especially drawers, shirts, stockings, and shoes. We have a heavy march
before us, and the
command must be fully prepared. It is the intention of General Sherman
to move with the
artillery and infantry and such troops as he can get from Vicksburg
direct on Demopolis and
Selma, the cavalry moving down the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to meet us
near Meridian, thus
forcing the enemy to let go of their hold on Dalton or endangering the
loss of Selma, and perhaps
Mobile. Close attention is therefore necessary to the fitting out of the
individual soldier and will
be impressed upon field and line officers. You will notify the citizens
of Paducah and Columbus
50
of the necessity of their standing upon their own defense, and give such
instructions as will bring
about this result.
Your obedient servant,
S. A. HURLBUT,
Major-Genera
HDQRS. CAVALRY DIVISION, SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Memphis, Tenn., January 12, 1864.
Maj. D. E. COON,
Commanding Second Iowa Cavalry:
MAJOR: In obedience to orders from headquarters Sixteenth Army Corps,
you will detail a
full company of your command, with five commissioned officers (about 75
men, a captain, and 4
lieutenants), well mounted, armed, and equipped, with four days' rations
and forage in wagon, to
report to headquarters Major-General Hurlbut promptly at 8.30 o'clock
to-morrow morning.
January 13.
By order of Brig. Gen. B. H. Grierson:
S. L. WOODWARD,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. CAVALRY DIVISION, SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Memphis, Tenn., January 14, 1864.
Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War:
SIR: Permit me most respectfully and earnestly to recommend to your
consideration Col.
Edward Hatch, of the Second Iowa Cavalry, for promotion to
brigadier-general. He has been
under my command for the past twelve months, and for the last eight
months has commanded a
brigade of cavalry. He has proved himself to be an efficient and
skillful officer, and has rendered
invaluable services to the country. I consider his promotion not only
due to himself but to the
best interests of the service. He is now slowly recovering from a wound
through his lungs
received in a recent engagement at Moscow, Tenn.
Most respectfully, your obedient servant,
B. H. GRIERSON,
Brig. Gen., Comdg. Cav. Div., Sixteenth Army Corp.
POCAHONTAS, January 17, 1864.
General TUTTLE,
La Grange:
Two hundred men of Newsom's regiment crossed the road last night 1 mile
east of
Middleton. A citizen who was pressed as a guide reports that about 800
more will cross to-night
at the same point. Captain Burmeister, Thirty-fifth Iowa, who commands
at Middleton, reports
the above in person. I should like to intercept them. Can I get a train
from Corinth to take a
regiment from Pocahontas?
JAS. L. GEDDES,
Colonel, Commanding.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
Memphis, Tenn., January 21, 1864.
Maj. Gen. FREDERICK STEELE,
51
Commanding Department of Arkansas, Little Rock:
DEAR GENERAL: I have been down to Vicksburg and back and find things
along the river
more satisfactory than I expected. Since the firing on the Swan near
Morganza, in General
Banks' department, I hear of little molestation to the boats, which seem
to navigate the river to
the extent of the demand of Government and commerce. I have watched your
progress with
interest and pleasure. You seem to be laying the foundation deep for
reconstruction of
government in Arkansas, and I esteem your success of infinite
importance. Since I went to
Chattanooga and Knoxville the troops in this department have been
comparatively stationary, but
I am on the point of putting a considerable force in motion toward an
objective point that will, in
my judgment, result in permanent good. I was in hopes by this time Red
River would be up and
admit of operations against Shreveport, but this must be deferred for a
time. I should like to meet
you there. I observe that the troops detached from this department to
Arkansas are still reported
as a part of the Army of the Tennessee. I will make an order to drop
them from our returns, so as
to leave them exclusively to you. I suppose Helena will also fall to
your command. According to
the returns you have four companies of the Thirty-second Iowa, and the
other six are in this
department, namely, Island No. 10 and Columbus. I have ordered these
down and think the
regiment, which has long been cut up, should be reunited. I would
respectfully request that you
send the four companies to Memphis, or, if you need the regiment more
than I do, I will let you
have the six. The regiment should be united, and the lesser detachment,
as a rule, should go to
the larger. You will be pained to hear that Duke is dead. I rode him on
our march to Bridgeport,
when, learning that forage was very scarce up at Chattanooga, I left him
in charge of Lieutenant-
Colonel Le Duc, quartermaster at Bridgeport, with special instructions
as to feed and care. I took
other inferior horses with me to Chattanooga and Knoxville; these did
well, but on my return to
Bridgeport I found Duke dead. Doubtless he was kept on shelled corn
exclusively. They have no
hay in that army, and animals have died by the thousand. I never had a
horse that suited me so
well as Duke, and I was indebted to you for him, and it gives me real
pain to tell you of his death
from this cause. I should like to hear from you.
Your friend,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.
SPECIAL ORDERS No. 20.
HDQRS. MIL. DIV. OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Nashville, Tenn., January 25, 1864.
1. Brig. Gen. William Vandever, U.S. Volunteers, will proceed without
delay to Des Moines,
Iowa, and there report to His Excellency the Governor of that State for
duty in assisting to
organize the new regiments being there recruited, and especially in the
superintending of the
reorganization and returning to their respective commands in this
military division the re-enlisted
or veteran regiments of said State as are or may be on furlough
immediately on the expiration of
their respective furloughs.
It is desired that he particularly impress upon His Excellency the
Governor of the State of
Iowa the absolute necessity and importance of the immediate and prompt
return to the field of
the veteran regiments of that State as soon and as fast as their
furloughs expire, for our weakness
from the great numbers of the old regiments that have veteranized and
gone home is seriously
felt and little is expected to be accomplished until they returns.
He is authorized in the name of the general commanding to detail such
staff officers from
Iowa regiments belonging to this command, now on furlough, as he may
require to facilitate him
in the discharge of the duties hereby assigned to him.
52
The quartermaster's department will furnish him any transportation he
may require necessary
for the full and complete execution of this order.
He will report in writing from time to time his progress in the
execution of this order, and
upon the full execution of the same will report in person to these
headquarters.
By order of Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant:
SPECIAL ORDERS No. 30.
HDQRS. CAV. DIV., 16TH ARMY CORPS,
Memphis, Tenn., January 26, 1864.
I. Col. J. K. Mizner will immediately cause the Third Michigan Cavalry
to be mustered as
veteran volunteers and move with them to Memphis, turning over those of
the Third Michigan
and Seventh Kansas who have not re-enlisted to the Second Iowa Cavalry
at Memphis. The
dismounted men of the First Alabama Cavalry will be sent by rail, with
their camp and garrison
equipage, to Memphis; the mounted men will move by common road to the
same point.
II. Col. Edward Prince, commanding Seventh Illinois Cavalry, will, as
soon as the infantry
shall have left La Grange, send his train with camp and garrison
equipage and sufficient escort
by wagon road to Germantown, Tenn., and such surplus stores as cannot be
carried in wagons
will be sent by rail.
Colonel Prince will then remain with the effective force of his command,
except guard for
train, at La Grange until further orders.
By order of Brig. Gen. B. H. Grierson:
S. L. WOODWARD,
Assistant Adjutant-Genera
HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Huntsville, January 28, 1864.
Lieutenant-Colonel BUSWELL,
Comdg. Tenth Iowa and Ninety-third Illinois Vols.:
COLONEL: You will move forward rapidly with your command to Mooresville,
Ala.,
carrying two days' rations in haversacks and three in wagons, and sixty
rounds of ammunition in
cartridge-boxes. You will relieve Lieutenant-Colonel Biggs' command at
Mooresville, which
moves to another point. You will advise with Lieutenant-Colonel Biggs
about the proper
precaution to be taken at Mooresville to insure your maintaining your
position at that point. You
will keep guards upon the railroad from Mooresville to the junction of
the railroads, and will
learn from Lieutenant-Colonel Biggs the locality of a crossing at the
Tennessee River near
Mooresville, which will also require to be guarded.
By order of Brig. Gen. John E. Smith:
M. ROCHESTER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF NASHVILLE,
Nashville, Tenn., January 30, 1864.
Brig. Gen. W. D. WHIPPLE,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Dept. of the Cumberland:
GENERAL: I think it proper I should report to you touching affairs in
this district generally,
and I do so.
53
The troops are generally under good discipline and very well drilled;
far better than I
expected to find.
They are well equipped and in good condition, excepting of course the
Fifth Tennessee
Cavalry, Colonel Stokes, and a few others who are neither well drilled,
disciplined, or equipped.
It is proper for me to remark here that two battalions of that regiment
will never be of service
together, and I shall press upon Governor Johnson the suggestion of the
general commanding the
department to separate them.
Generally matters go on pretty well between the military and the people
in the district, but
with some exceptions. They have not gone so well at and about Gallatin.
At other posts in the
district there has been no real cause for complaint, the post commanders
having been vigilant in
suppressing the rebellion and just in their treatment of the people.
I call especial attention to the admirable administration of affairs in
his command by Col.
Henry R. Mizner, Fourteenth Michigan Volunteers, at Columbia. His
troops, generally led by
Maj. Thomas C. Fitz Gibbon, a very efficient and gallant officer, have
captured, I believe, more
armed rebels than he has men in his regiment.
The disposition of the people to return to their allegiance is general
and apparent. I think that
eight-tenths of the people of this district desire the restoration of
civil authority and the old
Government, and will say so when the proper occasion is offered. I have
conversed with most of
the leading and influential men of the district, and think I am not
deceived.
The change is very marked and decided, and the general commanding
himself would be
surprised to see it.
The disorders and confusion incident to the war have caused great
suffering, of which they
are heartily tired, and are desirous of peace on almost any terms.
The negro population is giving much trouble to the military, as well as
to the people. Slavery
is virtually dead in Tennessee, although the State is excepted from the
emancipation
proclamation. Negroes leave their homes and stroll over the country
uncontrolled. Hundreds of
them are supported by the Government who neither work nor are able to
work. Many straggling
negroes have arms obtained from soldiers, and by their insolence and
threats greatly alarm and
intimidate white families, who are not allowed to keep arms, or who
would generally be afraid to
use if they had them. The military cannot look after these things
through the country, and there
are no civil authorities to do it.
In many cases negroes leave their homes to work for themselves, boarding
and lodging with
their masters, defiantly asserting their right to do it. It is now and
has been for some time the
practice of soldiers to go to the country and bring in wagon-loads of
negro women and children
to this city, and I suppose to other posts. Protections are granted to
some slaves to remain with
their owners, exempt from labor, as in case of Mrs. Buchanan, relative
to Secretary. E. H. East,
whose letter on that subject is forwarded with this. General Paine has
adopted the policy of
hiring slaves to their owners by printed contracts, made in blank and
filled up for the occasion,
which, though a flagrant usurpation, I have not interfered with his
action on that and many other
subjects, preferring to submit such matters to the consideration of the
general commanding the
department, which I shall do in a separate communication forwarded at
the same time this goes.
Inclosed I send you blank contract used by Brigadier-General Paine.
Officers in command of colored troops are in constant habit of pressing
all able-bodied slaves
into the military service of the United States.
One communication from citizens near McMinnville on that subject I have
already forwarded
you. Many similar complaints have been made.
This State being excepted from the emancipation proclamation, I supposed
all [these] things
are against good faith and the policy of the Government. Forced
enlistments I have endeavored
54
to stop, but find it difficult if not impracticable to do so. In fact,
as district commander, I am
satisfied I am unable to correct the evils complained of connected with
the black population, and,
besides, I am not willing to take upon myself the fixing of any rules in
these matters without
orders or advice from department headquarters. At best, the remedy would
be difficult to find,
and I suppose can only be furnished by the restoration of civil
authority. By proclamation
Governor Johnson has ordered elections in March of civil officers.
I desire to call attention to another matter. From impressments, legal
and illegal, and from
thefts, there are very few horses, mules, or oxen left on the farms, and
the few that are left are
almost worthless. At present there are many large farms without one
serviceable work beast on
the place. The farmers are afraid to purchase because of repeated
impressments. Every mounted
regiment that goes through the country takes what it pleases of stock,
&c., and pays what price,
or none at all, it likes. Between the loyal and disloyal no
discrimination is made. Unless an order
be made preventing future impressments and protecting the farmers,
little or no crops will be
produced.
When the civil authority shall be restored, assurances of protection
from department
headquarters to all persons who would take the oath of amnesty
prescribed in the President's
proclamation, in my opinion, would induce the community almost in a body
to voluntarily take
that oath and seek the protection of Government. At present that
proclamation is of little practical
utility amongst the people, as there is no person appointed by whom the
oath should be
administered, no place or time fixed for that purpose. It would seem
that some importance should
be attached to the administration of that oath to produce the effect
designed, and should not be
(as oaths heretofore) lightly administered.
The policy of seizing houses in Nashville in which to place commissary
and quartermaster
stores is bad for the Government and unjust to the people; it is done at
an enormous expense, as
rents average high here and the Government cannot afford to take a loyal
man's store-house
without paying him a fair compensation. A very small portion of the
rents thus paid would be
sufficient to erect temporary buildings, which would furnish ample room
for all such stores.
Several quite extensive buildings of the character indicated' have been
erected and others are
nearly completed, but it would certainly be better if all Government
stores were kept in
Government buildings, as it would save expense of labor in handling the
stores and placing them
in and taking them out of upper stories of houses, as well as of money
in rents.
The building of the Northwestern Railroad is progressing pretty well.
The following is a
report of the present condition of the road:
From Nashville: Road in running order, 34 miles; ready for grading and
iron, 20 miles.
From Tennessee River in this direction: Ready for iron, 18 miles;
grading yet to be done, 6
miles.
Colonel Innes, First Michigan Engineers and Mechanics, reports that he
requires two more
negro regiments, [with] which, in addition to some 300 of McCallum's men
(he understands is
ordered to report to him, and that if the quartermaster will send
forward the iron he can get one
or two more engines to send to the Tennessee River), he can finish the
road ready for business in
sixty days. Fifteen hundred tons of iron for that road left Pittsburg
for this place three days ago. I
shall endeavor to supply Colonel Innes with the forces he desires as
soon as it may be done.
The Fourteenth Michigan (Colonel Mizner) is re-enlisting, and will soon
probably go on
furlough as veterans. Other troops will have to fill their place.
The road to Columbia, including bridges built, was repaired by men
principally under my
command. Some time since, as you were informed at the time, I sent a
regiment of colored troops
to guard at small bridges and to erect stockades. This I thought
necessary, as squads of the
55
enemy were going through the country and might interrupt transportation
by the destruction of
those bridges.
When General Wards brigade, now ordered to the front, shall leave here,
there will not be
enough troops to guard the railroad between this and Murfreesborough and
the supplies at this
point. There will then be but four regiments left here--the Thirteenth
Wisconsin, Seventy-third
Ohio, Eighteenth Michigan, and One hundred and second Ohio; one of them
must be sent on the
railroad toward Murfreesborough.
The Thirteenth Wisconsin has re-enlisted and will soon go home, thus
leaving two regiments
of infantry and Colonel Galbraith's battalion of cavalry to guard this
place. It seems to me that
now one of the two regiments at McMinnville could be spared from that
point--Twenty-third
Missouri Volunteers--to this place, thus leaving Colonel Gilbert, the
more efficient of the two, in
command of the post. It is hoped that the bridge now being built by him
will be finished by the
time the Twenty-third Missouri starts for this place, if you think it
should be so ordered; but even
the addition of that regiment will not afford a sufficient guard for the
supplies here. I have
telegraphed on this subject to-day. The Eighth Iowa Cavalry is on the
line of the Northwestern
Railroad, and General Gillem thinks it is needed there.
Respectfully submitted.
LOVELL H. ROUSSEAU,
Major-Genera
MEMPHIS, TENN., February 4, 1864.
Brig. Gen. W. S. SMITH,
Collierville :
Scout of Second Iowa returned from Hernando reports all quiet in that
direction. No force of
the enemy this side of Coldwater Station. Balance of detachment of
Seventh Illinois in from La
Grange; brought 4 prisoners captured near La Grange. McGuirk's command
gone south from that
point.
B. H. GRIERSON,
Brigadier-General.
MEMPHIS, TENN., February 4, 1864.
Brig. Gen. W. SOOY SMITH,
Collierville, Tenn.:
Scouts sent out late this afternoon not yet returned. First Alabama
ordered south at daylight
in the morning, also 200 men from Germantown. Shall I hold the Second
Iowa to move when the
infantry starts?
B. H. GRIERSON,
Brigadier-General.
SPECIAL ORDERS No. 42.
HDQRS. LEFT WING, 16TH ARMY CORPS,
Pulaski, Tenn., February 15, 1864.
VIII. It having been ascertained that the following-named citizens were
engaged in breaking
up and driving out of this country Mr. J. W. Waldron, a staunch Union
man, and that they
purchased a portion of his goods when publicly sold by a band of
guerrillas under the lead of one
Captain Emerson, it is hereby ordered that they pay to Col. J. B.
Weaver, Second Regiment Iowa
Infantry Volunteers, commanding post of Pulaski, the sums set opposite
their names,
56
respectively, and that Colonel Weaver turn over to the said J. W.
Waldron or his family the
amount so collected, and make report of the same in compliance with
General Orders, No. 4,
1864. headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi: Clay Stinmitt,
$1,000; John Marks,
$800; Quarles Mayfield, $300.
By order of Brig. Gen. G. M. Dodge:
J. W. BARNES,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
GERMANTOWN, February 27, 1864--10.15 p.m.
General GRIERSON:
Colonel Waring was past a point opposite and 4 miles north of this place
at noon to-day. He
expected to encamp 6 miles from Memphis to-night. Very many stragglers
were following his
column.
I learned unofficially of two orders that have been received by officers
of this brigade this
afternoon, signed by your adjutant-general, that did not pass this
brigade headquarters. I
respectfully request that if such irregularities are to continue you
will at least require him to
notify me of his action.
Your obedient servant,
W. P. HEPBURN,
Lieut. Col. Second Iowa Cavalry, Comdg. Second Brigade.
HEADQUARTERS,
Vicksburg, February 28, 1864--3 p.m.
Generals HURLBUT and MCPHERSON,
Canton:
DEAR GENERALS: Igor here at 10 a.m. I find an immense mail, but nothing
clear and
distinct as to the Red River trip, except that Banks has made
preparations to embark on the 5th,
and expects Steele to march via Monroe and he across the country or up
the river. Grant's orders
are silent, but I infer that if Banks makes the expedition we are to be
auxiliary, in which event I
propose to send General Hurlbut's corps, viz, the divisions of A. J.
Smith, Tuttle, and Veatch; but
to make matters clear I will take a fleet steamer and run down to Red
River to see Admiral Porter
and thence to New Orleans, and be back to meet you at Vicksburg by the
6th. I send by Vernay
orders for you to leave March 3, unless in the mean time you hear of
General Sooy Smith, when
General McPherson must support him if he needs it and escort him into
the Big Black to await
my return. I met your trains going out, and will have three days' supply
for each of you at
Haynes' Bluff and bridge. I send back with Vernay the dismounted men of
the Fourth Iowa
remounted. There are at Big Black 500 recruits for Hurlbut, and Tuttle
has received his share.
You can on arrival at Vicksburg furlough, say, one-half the men entitled
to furloughs, provided it
does not exceed one regiment to a brigade. Appeal to the others on the
ground of patriotism. I
may be troubled to find boats enough for Hurlbut's command, as the
quartermaster at Saint Louis
telegraphs that Banks has taken forty boats, and we must get some down
here by stopping those
in transition. Bingham will remain here to attend to this. The Yazoo
expedition is up at Yazoo
City, and it might be well for General Hurlbut to communicate with it,
as he passes near. I make
the order for Hurlbut to come down that way, because I think he will
find more forage than on
the road I came. Everything is quiet here and everywhere. This whole
country has been alarmed
by reports of us, but I hope they will soon be relieved. Sooy Smith did
not leave Memphis until
the 11th--- one day after he should have been at Meridian. If he meets
with trouble he must take
it to himself; but should he come within reach of Canton I want
McPherson to feel out for him
57
and bring him in, but I suppose he will strike Winslow's trail and
follow it in. Captain Vernay
will bring out all newspapers and mail. I will be back by the time you
reach Vicksburg.
Yours,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General
SPECIAL ORDERS, No. 50.
HDQRS. 2D DIV., 16TH ARMY CORPS,
Pulaski, Tenn., March 4, 1864.
I. The Seventh Iowa Veteran Volunteer Infantry will proceed at once with
camp and garrison
equipage to Prospect, Tenn.. and relieve the Twenty-seventh Ohio
Infantry Veteran Volunteers.
This regiment (Seventh Iowa) will report through its proper brigade at
this place.
II. One section of artillery, to be designated by Capt. Fred. Welker,
Chief of Artillery,
Second Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, will accompany the Seventh Iowa
Veteran Volunteers
to Prospect, Tenn., and be stationed there until further orders. If
possible, the artillery will be
moved on the same train with the infantry, but if not, as soon
thereafter as practicable.
III. Col. E. W. Rice, Seventh Iowa Infantry Veteran Volunteers, having
returned with his
regiment, will at once assume command of the First Brigade, Second
Division, Sixteenth Army
Corps, he being the senior officer present therewith.
By order of Brig. Gen. T. W. Sweeny, commanding:
L. H. EVERTS,
Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General.
SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, No. 15.
HDQRS. SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Vicksburg, Miss., March 7, 1864.
II. The following batteries, with their entire equipage and
transportation, will as soon as
transportation can be obtained proceed to Memphis, Tenn., there
reporting for orders to these
headquarters: Ninth Indiana Battery, Fourteenth Indiana Battery, Company
E, First Illinois Light
Artillery; Sixth Indiana Battery. The quartermaster's department will
furnish necessary
transportation.
III. The Ninth Indiana Battery will report to Brig. Gen. A. J. Smith,
commanding Red River
expedition, for duty and orders.
IV. The Second Iowa Battery is relieved from duty with the Red River
expedition, and will
proceed to Memphis, Tenn., with entire equipage and transportation. The
quartermaster's
department will furnish necessary transportation.
By order of Maj. Gen. S. A. Hurlbut:
T. H. HARRIS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
SPECIAL ORDERS, No. 55.
HDQRS. DIV., 16TH ARMY CORPS,
Pulaski, Tenn., March 11, 1864.
I. The commanding officer Eighty-first Ohio Volunteer Infantry will
proceed without delay
with that portion of his regiment now at this place to Lynnville, Tenn.,
to relieve the troops of the
Third Brigade guarding railroad. One company will be dropped at railroad
bridge above
Reynolds' Station, relieving Captain Dykeman's company of the
Thirty-ninth Iowa Infantry
58
Volunteers. The headquarters of the regiment will be established at
Lynnville or the station, but
the largest force will be stationed at Culleoka, where there is an
important trestle, and a
competent officer will be sent in the command of the troops to be
stationed at that place. Upon
relieving the troops at the different bridges, &c., the officers so
relieving will be careful to
procure all written orders and instructions and such other information
possible in reference to
his duties. If stockades have not already been constructed they will be
put up without delay, and
so located as to best protect the bridges, &c.
By order of Brig. Gen. T. W. Sweeny, commanding:
L. H. EVERTS,
Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General
MEMPHIS, March 12, 1864.
General HURLBUT:
Push the Twelfth Iowa along as fast as possible. I must have two
divisions of veterans back
from furlough by April 15. My orders from Grant are imperative; not an
hours delay should be
made. This applies to all regiments going home. Let Colonel Woods go
along; the matter of
overstaying his leave can as well be inquired into when he returns. It
is time now that we must
look to [sic].
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General, Commanding
HEADQUARTERS SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Vicksburg, Miss., March 13, 1864.
His Excellency WILLIAM M. STONE, Governor of Iowa:
SIR: I have the honor to call your attention to the fact that
three-fourths of the men from
Iowa in my command have re-enlisted as veteran volunteers, and that the
Fourth Iowa Cavalry,
Eleventh, Thirteenth, and Fifteenth Iowa Infantry have already been
ordered on furloughs, to
report through you to the superintendent of recruiting service for
furlough and reorganization.
While the veteran regiments from other armies have many of them been
sent to your State, thus
having the first opportunity to secure recruits, the exigency of the
service required the men of the
Seventeenth Corps in active campaign in the heart of the enemy's
country, from which they have
just successfully returned.
In behalf of these men of Iowa, who went without a murmur on the
expedition, actuated by
the same spirit of self-denial and patriotism which has ever
characterized them, and with that
gallantry which has won for them on many a bloody battle-field a
reputation of which their State
and country may be proud, I respectfully bespeak Your Excellency's
peculiar interest, unusual
exertion being required to preserve the organization of the regiments
and to fill their commands
up to the maximum.
I trust, sir, that every effort will be made in behalf of these
regiments, and that I may be
permitted to welcome them back to the Seventeenth Army Corps at the
expiration of their
furloughs with full ranks, prepared to win fresh laurels on new fields.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JAS. B. McPHERSON,
Major-General.
WOODVILLE, March 14, 1864.
General MORGAN L. SMITH:
59
Learning that your mounted infantry is in pursuit of the rebel cavalry,
I will say that I sent
this morning one regiment of infantry, Thirty-first Iowa Infantry,
toward Claysville.
P. J. OSTERHAUS,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Woodville, Ala., March 28, 1864.
Major LUBBERS,
Commanding Twenty-sixth Iowa:
MAJOR: It has been ascertained that Mead's company of guerrillas and
bushwhackers are in
a cave on the mountain where Clear Creek empties into Paint Rock River.
Is Clear Creek near your neighborhood; and, if so, can you make a
descent on these rascals?
The horses of the gang are said to be kept in the mountain.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. A. GORDON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, April 2, 1864---8.30 p.m.
Major-General SHERMAN,
Nashville:
In the absence of Lieutenant-General Grant, now at Fort Monroe, your
telegram of 11 a.m. of
this date has been submitted to me. Under the provisions of the act of
Congress, you are
authorized by the President to take military possession of railroads
within your command, to the
exclusion of all other business, when in your opinion the service
requires such exclusive use.
Colonel McCallum has made provision for a large increase of motive power
and rolling-stock.
General Grant's return is expected to-morrow. Colonel Hatch, of Iowa,
and Colonel Edward M.
McCook, are nominated for brigadiers.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
SPECIAL ORDERS, No. 91.
HDQRS. SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Vicksburg, Miss., April 4, 1864.
The following is the organization of the Post and Defenses of Vicksburg,
Brig. Gen. J.
McArthur commanding:
Garrison proper, to be borne on post returns:
First. The Seventh Missouri Infantry, Seventeenth Illinois Infantry,
Eighty-first Illinois
Infantry, One hundred and twenty-fourth Illinois Infantry, Eighth Ohio
Battery, Twenty-sixth
Ohio Battery, will form a brigade, under command of Brig. Gen. J. A. Maltby.
Second. The First Division, U.S. Colored Troops, Brig. Gen. J. P.
Hawkins commanding; the
Second Brigade of the division, Colonel Scofield commanding, will be
reported as on detached
service at Haynes' Bluff.
Third. The Fourth Regiment U.S. Heavy Artillery (colored), Col. H. Lieb
commanding.
Defenses:
First. The First Division, Brig. Gen. E. S. Dennis commanding, composed
of the First
Brigade, commanded by Col. F. A. Starring, comprising the following
regiments, viz: First
Kansas Mounted Infantry, Seventy-second Illinois Infantry, Fifty-eighth
Ohio Infantry, Thirtieth
60
Missouri Infantry. The Second and Third Brigades, comprising the
Fourteenth Wisconsin,
Eleventh Illinois, Ninety-fifth Illinois, and regiments to be assigned
from the Fourth Division.
Artillery: Seventh Ohio Battery; Battery L, Second Illinois Light
Artillery; Battery M, First
Missouri Light Artillery. Cavalry: Second Regiment Wisconsin Cavalry.
Second. The cavalry forces commanded by Lieut. Col. J. H. Peters will
report direct to post
headquarters.
VII. Brig. Gen. M. M. Crocker, commanding Fourth Division, will direct
the followingnamed
regiments and battalions of his command to proceed forthwith, with their
entire camp and
garrison equipage, to Big Black River bridge, and report to Brig. Gen.
E. S, Dennis, commanding
First Division, for orders, viz: Third Iowa Infantry, Forty-first
Illinois Infantry, Thirty-third
Wisconsin Infantry, Fourteenth Illinois Infantry, Fifteenth Illinois
Infantry, Forty-sixth Illinois
Infantry, Seventy-sixth Illinois Infantry, Seventh Ohio Battery.
Brigadier-General Crocker will
then repair to Vicksburg and there proceed to carry out the instructions
of the major-general
commanding the department.
VIII. Col. R. K. Scott, Sixty-eighth Regiment Ohio Infantry Volunteers,
will forthwith
proceed with the battalions formed from the veteran regiments of First
and Third Divisions,
except the Iowa battalion, Major Pomutz commanding, to Cairo, Ill.,
there to await further
orders.
XII. The following-named batteries, with their entire camp and garrison
equipage, will
forthwith report to Capt. J. T. Conklin, acting chief quartermaster
Seventeenth Army Corps, for
transportation to Cairo, Ill., at which point they will report to
Captain Spear, Fifteenth Ohio
Battery, for assignment to camp, and await further orders: First
Minnesota Battery; Battery C,
First Missouri Light Artillery; Battery H, First Michigan Light
Artillery; Battery D, First Illinois
Light Artillery; Third Ohio Battery, Tenth Ohio Battery.
Maj. T. D. Maurice, chief of artillery, Third Division, will in person
superintend the shipment
of the batteries of the Third Division.
By order of Major-General McPherson:
WM. T. CLARK,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
HUNTSVILLE, April 6, 1864.
Major-General SHERMAN:
I have not received your memorandum of movements which General Corse
carried down the
Mississippi. In addition to notifying the governors of Ohio, Indiana,
Illinois, and Iowa about
directing the return of veteran regiments, batteries, &c., you want to
notify the governors of
Missouri, Wisconsin, Kansas, and Minnesota.
JAS. B. McPHERSON,
Major-General.
SAINT LOUIS, Mo., April 17, 1864-5.30 p.m.
(Received 9.30 p.m.)
Lieut. Gen. U.S. GRANT,
Culpeper, Va.:
The Ninth Iowa will be sent as ordered. The Twelfth Missouri and
Thirteenth Illinois Cavalry
can follow, but they are not mounted, nor have we any other mounted
troops within 120 miles of
Saint Louis. Judging from the last news of the rebels going south from
Fort Pillow, and the tenor
of your dispatches, I shall await your orders before sending forward
foot troops.
W. S. ROSECRANS,
61
Major-General
LEXINGTON, April 18, 1864.
General SHERMAN:
I have about 3,000 men now mounted. General Schofield has called for
1,000 of them. Can I
not get the Third Iowa, now in Saint Louis, to in part replace those
taken by General Schofield? I
am trying in every direction to get horses. The whole force I now have,
6,000 strong, will be
armed and equipped by the 1st of May. Please have the Third Iowa Cavalry
sent to me.
GEORGE STONEMAN,
Major-General.
WOODVILLE, ALA.,
April 20, 1864.
Maj. R. R. TOWNES,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Huntsville, Ala.:
Effective strength of infantry at Woodville and Paint Rock is 209
commissioned officers and
3,704 enlisted men. Effective strength of infantry at Vienna, 17
commissioned officers and 274
enlisted men. Effective strength of infantry at Cottonville is 14
commissioned officers and 262
enlisted men. Effective strength of artillery is 7 commissioned officers
and 192 enlisted men.
Aggregate present, all arms, including sick, is 5,155. Aggregate present
and absent is 7,621. The
First Iowa Battery, aggregate 152, has been transferred to the Fourth
Division since last report.
P. JOS. OSTERHAUS,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
April 26, 1864--3 p.m.
Maj. Gen. W. T. SHERMAN,
Nashville, Tenn.:
The Third Iowa Cavalry can be mounted at Saint Louis. Its last orders
were for Vicksburg.
Where shall it go?
H. HALLECK,
Major-General, Chief of Staff
NASHVILLE, TENN., April 26, 1864.
(Received 9.36 p.m.)
Major-General HALLECK:
The Third Iowa should stop at Memphis. I will be at Chattanooga May 1,
but will leave
General Webster and other staff officers at Nashville. All well here.
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.
HEADQUARTERS POST AND DEFENSES,
Vicksburg, Miss., April 26, 1864.
Maj. Gen. C. C. WASHBURN,
Commanding District of West Tennessee:
GENERAL: Your dispatch by the hand of Major Morgan is received and being
acted on as
far as practicable. I send you 575 men, mounted and equipped, leaving me
about 400 for this
post, and these rather poorly mounted. I send also the dismounted men of
the Fourth Iowa,
62
numbering about 230 more. I am sorry your information was such as to
lead you to expect so
many men from here, but such is the condition of affairs. The last raid
of General Sherman to
Meridian has told severely on the horses of this command. I do not deem
it safe, with my
extended line, to reduce my cavalry force any more, as I will now be
scarcely able to do more
than picket the several roads leading to the city. I require about 2,500
horses and carbines to
equip this command. I would be obliged to you if you can assist in
procuring them. Your old
regiment has only 125 serviceable horses. I am extremely desirous to
assist Colonel Stephens in
his efforts in refitting his regiment. I inclose to you the nearest
information I have as to the
strength and condition of the enemy's cavalry, together with some other
information that I
consider reliable, which may be of some service to you.
Accept my congratulations in having you so near a neighbor.
Most respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. McARTHUR,
Brigadier-General
HEADQUARTERS SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Cairo, Ill., April 27, 1864.
Lieut. Col. W. T. CLARK,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Department and Army of the Tennessee:
SIR: I beg leave to report to the major-general commanding that I have
received copies of
instructions to Major-General Washburn, Maj. Gen. H. W. Slocum, and
Brigadier-General
Prince, for which I am indebted.
As there is visible contradiction between these orders and Special
Orders, No. 150, Adjutant-
General's Office, which latter order is, to say the least, ill-advised,
I propose to state for the
information of the major-general my views of my rights and duties.
There is no such district as West Tennessee, nor has there been for more
than a year. It was
abolished when General Grant took command of the department and has
never been reinstated. I
never commanded any such district, and therefore cannot be relieved from
it. I do command the
Sixteenth Army Corps, and intend to until properly removed. The troops
within the old District
of West Tennessee are part of that corps and subject to my command.
The order of Major-General McPherson is correct as I understand it, and
places Major-
General Washburn in command of the District of Memphis, including
therein all of the District
of Columbus except Cairo, with orders to report to me.
Personally, it is a matter of indifference to me what disposition the
authorities make of me,
but I intend that that disposition shall be made openly, fairly, and
distinctly, and that neither the
rights of the Sixteenth Army Corps nor my own shall be evaded by any
such orders as Special
Orders, No. 150.
Lieutenant-General Grant, acting under mistaken information, has done me
an injustice
which can only be rectified by a court of inquiry, which has already
been demanded.
You will no doubt have heard from Memphis that General Washburn has
stopped the Fourth
Iowa Cavalry, en route for Vicksburg, and has sent Major Morgan to
Vicksburg with orders to
stop and turn back all boats he meets, and to bring up from Vicksburg
all the cavalry there. This,
of course, General Slocum, under your orders, is not likely to permit,
nor is it desirable that an
officer of such large experience in the field and success as General
Washburn, sent to Memphis
expressly to punish Forrest, with a force that I considered inadequate,
should be re-enforced to
the extent contemplated. He was sent there to do that which "marked
timidity" on my part
prevented from being done, and should use only the material which I left
there. He also, as I
understand, wants more infantry, which I presume he will find somewhere.
63
The truth is that the enemy are running the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to
Tupelo, and are
working a heavy force toward Corinth so as to complete that part. Until
that is done, Corinth will
be headquarters for Forrest, who is now withdrawing his forage and
supplies from Jackson.
Detached bands may be held in West Tennessee, but I think the main force
will concentrate
around Corinth. If they do, and Washburn moves out on Saturday, he will
have his hands full.
The cavalry of Grierson, now at Memphis, is of little value. Horses are
run down, what there
are of them. All the dash and energy they ever had was taken out by Sooy
Smith's misfortune.
The Fourth Missouri, Second New Jersey, Nineteenth Pennsylvania, Sixth
Tennessee, and
Seventh Indiana are the only organized regiments remaining, of which the
Fourth Missouri is the
only one reliable for serious action. The rest of the command is of
detachments of non-veterans,
and not near enough horses to mount these. I have sent heretofore
statements of the infantry.
If General Washburn attempts the movement he contemplates with the force
I left in
Memphis, and conducts it as he has conducted his previous commands, he
will probably lose
Memphis. If he is sufficiently re-enforced and the command led by an
officer of experience and
knowledge, it may do something that will be creditable. It is my plain
duty to notify you, from
my knowledge of that country, that any serious disaster to the covering
force at Memphis will
result in the loss of the city, and that a movement of infantry from the
garrison 60 or 70 miles
into the country will expose them to the danger of a move by the enemy's
mounted men, under
cover of the Wolf, or Hatchie, or Coldwater, upon the reduced garrison.
I may overestimate the
danger, but my personal record leads me to feel sure that I shall not be
charged with personal
timidity. I therefore affirm as my deliberate opinion that no movement
should be made to bring
Forrest to action with less than 5,000 good men, and that it is
infinitely better and safer to wait
the return of the veteran cavalry, now past due. I do not believe that
Banks can or will permit A.
J. Smith's command to return without imperiling his expedition, for they
are the life of his force.
I shall remain here and wait events with philosophic resignation, and in
order to carry on the
business of the corps have ordered my headquarters here, "possessing my
soul" with patience
until the Government make up their minds whether they want my services
or not.
I am, colonel, your obedient servant.
S. A. HURLBUT,
Major-General, Comdg. Sixteenth Army Corps.
HDQRS. CAVALRY DIVISION, SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Memphis, Tenn., April 28, 1864.
Capt. M. M. LAWTTIMER,
Commanding Provisional Cavalry Regiment:
CAPTAIN: In pursuance of the inclosed order of General Washburn, you
will send out a
party of a commissioned officer and 25 men on each of the following
roads: Horn Lake,
Hernando, and Holly Ford. They will start at precisely 3 o'clock
to-morrow morning. Those on
the Horn Lake and Hernando roads will go about 10 miles. The party on
the Holly Ford road will
go to the crossing of the Nonconnah. These parties will all remain out
until 3 o'clock in the
afternoon. They will allow all persons coming in to pass without
interruption; but will arrest and
detain all persons going out, keeping them out of sight of the road, so
that parties coming in will
not see them, and their operations will not be reported in Memphis. At 3
o'clock p.m. they will
return, and will bring with them to the city all parties whom they have
arrested.
The First Brigade is instructed to send out similar parties on each of
the other roads running
from Memphis.
64
At 3 o'clock to-morrow you will send other parties of 20 men each on the
following roads:
The Randolph, New and Old Raleigh, Germantown, New State Line, Pigeon
Roost, Holly Ford,
Hernando, and Horn Lake.
They will go out a distance of 5 or 6 miles on each road, and keep
themselves well
concealed, allowing every one to pass in, but detaining all who attempt
to pass out. These last
parties will remain out until relieved. These last scouts must be made
up of the detachments of
the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Illinois, Seventh Kansas, and Third
Michigan. The detachments of
the Second Iowa and Sixth Illinois will await orders in camp. Be very
explicit in the instructions
of your officers, and be sure that they understand their instructions.
By order of Col. G. E. Waring, jr., Fourth Missouri Cavalry, commanding
division:
S. L. WOODWARD,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
CAIRO, April 28, 1864---noon.
Maj. Gen. W. T. SHERMAN, Nashville:
The First Illinois Cavalry en route for Vicksburg; the Ninth Illinois
Cavalry, for Memphis,
are here without horses, and go to-day; the Eighth Iowa Infantry, of
Mower's division, is here
for-Memphis, and the Twelfth will be here to-morrow. Five thousand
Springfield muskets with
accouterments should be sent to arm returning troops.
S. A. HURLBUT,
Major-General
ATHENS, ALA., April 29, 1864.
Brig. Gen. T. W. SWEENY,
Commanding Second Division:
From the dispatch you received last night you will perceive that our
line of march has been
changed, and we will not for the present be troubled with any enemy. You
can therefore march
your brigades separately, with parts of train accompanying each, &c. I
want to make as quick a
march as the roads will admit of; therefore take every advantage in
camping, starting column,
&c. Lieutenant-Colonel Bingham, chief quartermaster of Department and
Army of the
Tennessee, will have forage for you at Huntsville; take enough to last
you to Stevenson, where I
will have more ready to take us to our destination. We can get rations
also at either place should
we need them.
The pioneer corps will join you at Huntsville; Colonel Bane's brigade
also, and I shall want a
report of the force you have in the field at that point. Should I not
overtake you there, leave it
with General McPherson and push right on, taking the best and most
feasible road you can find.
General Veatch will move May 1, and this will keep him one or two days
behind you.
The Seventh Illinois, for the present, will be kept guarding the river,
and I believe the
Seventh Iowa have some 15 or 20 mounted men that you can use for your
inspectors, in
accordance with General Orders, No. 44. I have given such instructions
as will cause our mail to
follow us. I fear you will have trouble to-day at Tunnel Hill, but hope not.
Communicate with me by messenger or telegraph, if possible, of your
daily progress.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. M. DODGE,
Brigadier-General.
SAINT LOUIS, April 29, 1864.
Major-General SHERMAN:
65
I have mounted the Third Iowa, 800 strong, and sent it to Memphis by
General Halleck's
order. General Rosecrans has taken possession of the Third Michigan
Cavalry here at Saint
Louis.
J. W. DAVIDSON,
Brigadier-General.
HEADQUARTERS SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Cairo, Ill., April 30, 1864.
Maj. Gen. C. C. WASHBURN,
Commanding District of Memphis-
GENERAL: I expected before this to have received reports from you, but I
am informed by
Colonel Harris that you had not received General McPherson's orders. I
am instructed by Major-
General McPherson to exercise general supervision of all movements
against Forrest. Hence it
was of prime necessity that I should hear from you. I am in the dark as
to your movements and
plans, except as I hear of them through third persons.
In stopping the Fourth Iowa Cavalry, en route for Vicksburg, you have
exceeded your
authority and probably crippled General Slocum. Nothing but the most
extreme necessity will
justify this course. So I am informed you have sent for the cavalry from
Vicksburg. This, unless
you have private orders authorizing such jurisdiction, is an usurpation,
and that, too, upon an
officer very much your senior. Every effort is being made to send down
to you the troops of your
command and the returning veterans of Mower's division.
I shall continue to urge the horses and material forward as fast as can
be done, so that the
cavalry now disorganized may be fitted up for the campaign. I would
advise you not to put too
much confidence in the cavalry at present about Memphis. From the
breaking up of regimental
organizations, the Smith retreat, and the carelessness of officers, they
are far from being in good
condition for an active campaign. As soon as the veterans return I wish
the best regiments
supplied with the Spencer carbine, which has been promised and I suppose
will be there.
You will send me as soon as you possibly can a detailed statement of
your acts since taking
command, and your plans for action; also your present effective force of
all arms. Advise me
constantly day by day of movements and of what you learn from scouts,
and here-alter send no
telegrams direct to any superior officers. Send your information here
and I will have it
telegraphed if advisable to be done.
I shall be pleased to give you at all times every assistance
practicable, and I will sustain you
frankly in all energetic measures for the public good.
Do not move against Forrest at any distance from Memphis without
sufficient force to beat
him if you bring him to action. Of the amount of that force I will not
assume to determine, as my
opinion on that question has been called in question. If you do go or
have gone when this reaches
Memphis, the officer whom you leave in charge must look with special
care to the south
approaches to Fort Pickering.
I am, general, with great respect, your obedient servant,
S. A. HURLBUT,
Major-General, Commanding
HEADQUARTERS SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Cairo, Ill., April 30, 1864.
Lieut. Col. W. T. CLARK,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Army and Department of the Tennessee:
66
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt this day of personal letter
of instructions to me
from Maj. Gen. J. B. McPherson, of date of April 19. Where it has been
delayed I do not know. I
forwarded to Major-General Washburn official copy of instructions from
Major-General
McPherson to him, which he states never before reached him. I have
ordered him to report to me,
but have not yet received any reply. If Major-General Washburn reports
so that I can exercise
supervision over movements against Forrest I will do so, but I rather
imagine that he considers
himself just now in a sort of independent command. I learn indirectly
that he proposes to move
today from Memphis. What force he takes or in what direction I am not
advised.
I have placed the Fifty-second Indiana and Twenty-first Missouri,
returned veterans of A. J.
Smith's division, at Columbus.
General Prince in a day or two will be strong enough for offensive
operations as far as it can
be done by infantry.
The Eighth and Twelfth Iowa, returned veterans of Mower's division, go
to Memphis to-day,
and I have, in pursuance of orders from General Sherman, directed all my
cavalry at Saint Louis
to be forwarded to Memphis, horses to follow.
I am, colonel, very respectfully,
S. A. HURLBUT,
Major-general.
HDQRS. LOCAL DEFENSE COMPANY OF REFUGIO Co.,
Lamar, February 13, 1864.
SIR: In my communication of the 11th instant, by special courier, I
informed you of the
landing of the enemy at this place in considerable force. Early on the
morning of the 11th the
enemy landed 75 men under 3 officers--a captain and 2 lieutenants (Iowa
troops). They took
down the large warehouse here, and removed all they could carry of it on
board the large scow
they brought with them. The men were then turned loose, as it seems, for
indiscriminate plunder.
They entered almost all the houses and took whatever they desired,
defenseless families suffering
the most. Just before dark the enemy hauled out into the bay and
anchored. Early in the morning
of the 12th, they returned toward the shore in their barges and boarded
the schooner Lizzie
Bacon, which lies sunk near the beach. They pumped her out, and after an
ineffectual attempt to
get her out they abandoned her, proceeded to their large scow, set sail,
and at sundown of the
12th were out of sight. They stood toward the pass of Aransas. By design
I directed J. B. Wells,
esq., a member of my company and resident of Lamar, to enact the quiet
citizen and meet the
enemy upon their landing. He derived from the 3 officers before
mentioned the following: They
told him that all of Corpus Christi had come over to them; that they had
upon Mustang Island a
Texas regiment enlisted in Corpus Christi and elsewhere on the coast,
and that Banks had 25,000
troops with which he intended taking Galveston, but said that "our
heaviest force, and the one
upon which we mainly depend, is coming by way of Red River--a force so
large that Texas will
be overrun in less than three months hence."
During the invasion of the enemy on the 11th, a small boat was seen
coming from Saint
Mary's. To my astonishment she stood on and landed on the beach just
above the enemy, when
the 2 men in her leaped ashore and started to run across the prairie.
They were pursued, fired at
several times, and captured without injury. Mr. Wells informed me they
were a lieutenant of
Captain Hobby's company, Colonel Hobby's regiment, and one T. Beran,
whom the lieutenant
had employed at Saint Mary's to bring him to Lamar. The lieutenant is
from Bee County; name
unknown. My scouts front Saint Joseph's inform me as follows: Every
building of any size on
Saint Joseph's has been removed to Mustang, where a city seems to be
rising. The fortifications
are all on Mustang. The enemy only occasionally cross to Saint Joseph's
in large parties to hunt
67
cattle, &c., which have become very wild from constant shooting among
them and want of
water. Their communication with Saluria is now by water. On Mustang is
now a large force of
cavalry, &c. From Black Jack Reef, Saint Mary's, Carlos Head, and
Nine-Mile Point (Live Oak)
all is quiet.
Among the recent invaders were several citizens of Corpus Christi; one
Anderson (captain)
and his son were the most conspicuous. Certain it is that every movement
here was well known
to the enemy. I have determined in consequence to stop all communication
with Corpus until
ordered otherwise, as well as the islands.
I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. P. UPTON,
Captain, Comdg. Local Defense Co., Refugio County.
Col. JAMES DUFF,
Comdg. Second Brig., First Div., Victoria, Tex.
CAMP OF DETACHMENT THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Grand Ecore, La., April 16, 1864.
MAJOR: In pursuance of orders, I herewith report the part taken by the
Third Division in the
campaign from Natchitoches, La., to Sabine Cross-Roads, and of the
detachment of the
Thirteenth Army Corps, consisting of the Third and Fourth Divisions,
after the battle of
Mansfield and the wounding of Brigadier-General Ransom up to their
arrival at this place. The
Third Division left Natchitoches on the 6th instant, and encamped at
Mayon Bayou, 16 miles, at
evening. On the 7th instant marched to Pleasant Hill, a distance of 19
miles. On the 8th, moved
to Saint Patrick's Bayou, a distance of 10 miles, and went into camp a
little after 12 o'clock. I had
placed out my pickets, about 3 p.m., when I received orders through
Major-General Franklin to
move some 5 miles and support the Fourth Division, who were then
reported to be engaged
with the enemy. I moved, leaving my wagon train, which had not yet
arrived, and five companies
of the Twenty-fourth Iowa Volunteer Infantry with five companies of the
Twenty-ninth
Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry, making a whole regiment which had been
detailed in the morning
to guard the trains of the Third and Fourth Divisions. The pickets fell
in on the march, and I
arrived with my command at the scene of the conflict about 4.15 p.m.,
with the following men:
First Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Flory commanding--Forty-sixth Indiana
Veteran Volunteer
Infantry, 13 officers and 252 men; Twenty-ninth Wisconsin Volunteer
Infantry (five companies),
5 officers and 183 men; total, 18 officers and 435 men. Second Brigade,
Colonel Raynor
commanding--Fifty-sixth Ohio Veteran Volunteer Infantry, 9 officers and
224 men; Twentyfourth
Iowa Volunteer Infantry (five companies), 6 officers and 182 men;
Twenty-eighth Iowa
Volunteer Infantry, 13 officers and 406 men; total, 28 officers and 812
men. Total in division, 46
officers and 1,247 men.
When I arrived near the ground I found the road so full of teams and
stragglers on foot and
on horseback as to make it impossible to move any farther, and I
commenced forming a line of
battle, throwing the First Brigade on the right of the road and the
Second on the left. I had only
commenced the movement when I received orders from Major-General Banks,
commanding
department, to do as I had commenced and advance on "double-quick" and
occupy the edge of
the woods in front. I pushed the command forward as rapidly as possible
until I reached the edge
of the woods, when I ordered the command to halt and open fire on the
masses of the enemy
moving down in front. The entire force of the enemy was checked and held
for nearly an hour,
when they commenced moving in masses on our left flank. I sent the
Twenty-fourth Iowa
Volunteer Infantry, which I held in reserve, to check the movements of
the enemy on our left
flank. The enemy now moved in masses on our right flank. The Forty-sixth
Indiana Veteran
68
Volunteers, being on our extreme right, were, by order of
Lieutenant-Colonel Flory, ordered to
change front to meet the charge, but in a few minutes they were crushed
by overwhelming
numbers and obliged to give way. The left flank was at about the same
time turned and gave
way. A heavy body of the enemy, moving down the road on our center in
two lines and
supported by a line of cavalry, completed our discomfiture, and we were
soon in confusion.
I received from time to time verbal orders from Major-General Banks,
commanding
department, from Major-General Franklin, commanding U.S. forces in
Western Louisiana, who
were with me in the front, and from Brigadier-General Stone, chief of
Major-General Banks'
staff. I endeavored to rally the men in vain, for having entirely
expended their ammunition not
enough could be collected together in any one place in the dense forest
to offer any hope in a
bayonet charge against the largely superior force of the enemy. The jam
of the cavalry train,
which caused the loss of the artillery of the Fourth Division and the
loss of nearly all of my
ambulances, filled as they were with wounded, increased the confusion.
We rallied about onehalf
mile behind the Nineteenth Army Corps, and General Ransom being wounded,
I took
command of both divisions and collected about 800 men. I had just
supplied my men with
ammunition when I was ordered to fall back to Pleasant Hill in charge of
the train, where I
arrived at 8 o'clock next morning.
The loss in my division was 314 killed, wounded, and missing. Among
those reported killed
is Lieutenant-Colonel Flory, commanding First Brigade. Among the wounded
are Colonel
Connell, Twenty-eighth Iowa Volunteer Infantry, left arm amputated; and
Captain Dimmitt,
acting assistant inspector-general, of my staff, who had his left thigh
broken. Both are in the
hands of the enemy.
One of my orderlies bearing the division flag was wounded in the
shoulder by the discharge
of a spherical case, and another had a horse shot under him. So far as I
know, every officer did
his whole duty, and I am every way satisfied with the conduct of the
men. They did all that could
be expected of them, crushed and overwhelmed as they were by vastly
superior numbers. My
staff--Captain Mohr, acting assistant adjutant-general; Captain Dimmitt,
acting assistant
inspector-general; Lieut. H. H. Hyatt, aide-de-camp, and Lieutenant
Dougherty, First Infantry,
assistant commissary of musters--bravely and fearlessly supported me,
carrying orders, under a
terrific fire, to every point indicated.
On the morning of the 9th, at 11 o'clock, I received verbal instructions
from Major-General
Franklin, commanding, to move the detachment of the Thirteenth Army
Corps on a circuitous
route and to protect a large train which should proceed in advance of me
to Crump's Hill and
toward Grand Ecore. I started about 12 m., and at 2 p.m. I received
orders from some person to
me now unknown, purporting to come from General Stone or Major-General
Banks, I have
forgotten which, that I must watch and protect our left flank and
carefully guard the train, and for
that purpose halt until it had advanced out of the way of danger. At 5
o'clock I was about 4
miles from Pleasant Hill, and could distinctly hear the musketry firing
of the engagement of
Saturday. I received no other orders, those sent me having miscarried.
Had I received the orders
sent I think I could have carried at least 2,000 armed men into the
fight and added very much to
the enemy's rout that day, and greatly gratified the feelings of the men
of my command, suffering
as they were from the mortification of their previous discomfiture. I
arrived at Crump's Hill
about 2.30 a.m. of the 10th, and rested for three hours, when I moved on
to Mayon Bayou, 7
miles. On the 11th I left Mayon Bayou at 4 a.m., and arrived at this
place at 10 a.m.
I am, truly, your obedient servant,
R. A. CAMERON,
Brigadier-General of Volunteers.
Maj. WICKHAM HOFFMAN,
69
ASST. Adjt. Gen., Nineteenth Army Corps.
The Second Brigade, under command of Brigadier-General Lawler, shipped
from Matagorda
Island to New Orleans April 18; arrived in that city on the 21st, left
for Alexandria on the 24th,
and arrived there the 26th. The brigade remained in the vicinity of
Alexandria, skirmishing more
or less every day with the enemy until May 13, when it marched with the
army for the
Mississippi.
May 22.--Arrived safely at Morganza, La., where it has since remained.
The Thirty-fourth
Iowa Volunteers was transferred to the Fourth Division, May 11, by order
of General Lawler,
commanding detachment of Thirteenth Corps, in the field.
April 25.--The Twenty-third Iowa and one wing of Twenty-second Iowa,
belonging to First
Brigade, shipped from Matagorda Island. Headquarters of the division and
the remaining wing of
the Twenty-second Iowa embarked for New Orleans April 29; arrived May 1.
On May 4, left New Orleans with Twenty-third Iowa and left wing of
Twenty-second Iowa
Volunteers for Alexandria; arrived at Fort De Russy and found the river
blockaded by heavy
batteries. Returned to the mouth of Red River, and remained until the
army arrived at Simsport,
when the troops joined it. The remainder of the First Brigade had not
yet left Texas at last report.
HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., THIRD DIV., 13TH ARMY CORPS,
Grand Ecore, La., April 11, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to respectfully report the part taken by this
brigade on the march
from Natchitoches to and during the action near Mansfield, on the 8th
instant: The brigade
(composed as follows, Twenty-eighth Iowa, Col. John Connell commanding,
aggregate, 493;
Twenty-fourth Iowa, Maj. Ed. Wright commanding, aggregate, 388;
Fifty-sixth Ohio, Capt. M.
Manring commanding, aggregate, 224; total, 1,105) left Natchitoches on
the morning of the 6th
instant, and after a march of 35 miles arrived at Pleasant Hill, La.,
about 1.30 p.m. on the 7th.
Soon after having been assigned a camp-ground the brigade was ordered
forward to support a
portion of the cavalry command, which was heavily skirmishing with the
enemy about 2 miles in
our front. We were led forward by General Cameron (commanding division)
in person. After
marching about 1 mile we were informed that the enemy had fallen back,
and the men were
allowed to return to camp. On the morning of the 8th instant the march
was resumed. Soon after
starting upon the road, the occasional sound of cannon and the continued
dropping fire of
musketry told us that the advance were sharply skirmishing. This brigade
was soon detached
from the division and ordered to the front. The enemy, though
stubbornly, fell back before our
cavalry and a portion of the Fourth Division, Thirteenth Corps d'Armée,
and we had not reached
the extreme front when we arrived at the first branch of Bayou Saint
Patrick, where the brigade
was ordered to encamp in line of battle. This was about 11 a.m. Mean
time, the large train
belonging to General Lee's cavalry passed to our front, and our own
arrived with the remainder
of the division. About 3 p.m. the firing at the front became brisk, and
we were soon after ordered
forward, five companies of the Twenty-fourth Iowa being left with our
wagon train. The division
hurried forward, marching 6 miles, mostly at the double-quick. Upon
nearing the Moss
plantation the brigade was directed to form in the thick woods on the
left side of the Mansfield
road, in the following order: The right of the Fifty-sixth Ohio resting
on the road, and the
Twenty-eighth Iowa on their left, while the Twenty-fourth Iowa formed a
second line in the rear
of the two other regiments. In this order we moved steadily forward
until the open fields of the
plantation were reached. Here we found two guns of the First Indiana
Battery and a few men of
the Fourth Division, Thirteenth Army Corps, on the right of the road,
hotly engaged with a heavy
force of the enemy, who occupied a rising piece of ground in the center
of the field, and another
70
heavy mass with artillery posted on the extreme farther side. B
direction of General Cameron the
line pressed on into the open field, taking advantage of a slight
elevation, and at once opened fire
upon the enemy, whose force more than quadrupled our own. I soon after
moved the Twentyfourth
Iowa from their position in the rear to the front, on the left of the
Twenty-eighth Iowa.
Under a heavy fire the men lay for over an hour, not daring to advance
against an enemy who
numbered thousands to our hundreds, and until their ammunition was
almost entirely expended,
while the enemy, plainly in sight, was adding to his force and extending
his line, which from the
first greatly outflanked us. A heavy column, composed both of cavalry
and infantry, were seen to
detach themselves from the enemy's right and advance far on our left,
where they formed in line
perpendicular to our front and charged forward on our left. A force of
cavalry which had been
sent to our left to protect it fired one volley and fled, leaving our
men exposed to a most telling
enfilading fire, and from which fire nearly all our loss occurred. Mean
time, the First Brigade of
the division had been similarly outflanked on the right and driven from
the field, which left us as
badly exposed on the right. At the same time the heavy masses which had
been gathering in our
front came forward in an irresistible column. The division had, with
little or no support, and
numbering less than 1,200, kept in check an army of 10,000 or 12,000 for
at least an hour and a
half.
Our men, attacked on either flank, without support from any quarter and
without
ammunition, fell back at first in some order, but becoming broken, run
down, and mixed with our
own cavalry, soon became much disorganized.
After collecting the greater portion of the brigade in rear of the line
formed by the Nineteenth
Corps d'Armée, I received orders to retire to Pleasant Bill, distant
about 18 miles, from which we
had marched in the morning. This distance the exhausted men accomplished
by daylight on the
morning of the 9th instant.
The conduct of both officers and men was all that could be desired.
Where all performed
their duty special mention is not essential. Col. John Connell, of the
Twenty-eighth Iowa, is
among the missing, and is supposed to have been mortally wounded. Brave
even to a fault, he
remained on the field till too late, and was seen to fall before the
last heavy volley poured upon
the devoted division. His loss will be severely felt, not only by his
regiment, where it is
irreparable, but by his brother officers and comrades in arms, to whom
his many noble and
generous qualities had endeared him. Lieut. Thomas Hughes, acting
brigade quartermaster, was
upon the field rendering every assistance in his power; he is also among
the missing, and is
supposed to be a prisoner, we hope unhurt. Dr. Witherwax and Assistant
Surgeon Lyons, of the
Twenty-fourth Iowa, with Asst. Surg. P.M. McFarland, remained upon the
field caring for our
wounded, and are now in the hands of the enemy.
The brigade entered the action as follows: Twenty-eighth Iowa, 406 men
and 13 officers; five
companies of Twenty-fourth Iowa, 182 men and 6 officers; Fifty-sixth
Ohio, 224 men and 9
officers; total, 812 men and 28 officers.
During the action the loss was as follows: Known to be killed, 11;
wounded, 69; missing, 65;
total, 145. Many of the missing are either killed or wounded. Appended
herewith, and made a
part of this report, is the report of the several regimental commanders,
with a detailed list of their
casualties.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. H. RAYNOR,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.
Capt. OSCAR MOHR,
Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., Third Div., 13th Army Corps.
71
HDQRS. TWENTY-FOURTH IOWA INFANTRY VOLS.,
Pleasant Hill, La., April 9, 1864.
SIR: In obedience to orders I have the honor to make the following
report of the part taken by
the Twenty-fourth Iowa Volunteer Infantry in the expedition from
Natchitoches, La., to Sabine
CrossRoads:
The regiment, numbering 388, rank and file, marched with the brigade
from Natchitoches on
the 6th instant, arriving at Pleasant Hill on the evening of the 7th,
without anything particular
having occurred. On the morning of the 8th, five companies, viz, A, D,
I, C, and H, were detailed
as train guard and marched in rear of the Third Division train. The
other four companies under
my command marched to a point 7 miles distant from Sabine Cross-Roads,
and went into camp
with the brigade on a branch of Saint Patrick's Bayou. About 2 p.m. the
command was ordered to
the front, where the Fourth Division was engaged with the enemy. We
arrived on the battle-field
about 4 p.m., and were joined by Company F, provost guard at division
headquarters. The
command then numbered 159 rank and file. I was ordered to move in rear
of the Twenty-eighth
Iowa and Fifty-sixth Ohio, on the left of the road as reserve, and move
forward, preserving a
distance of 200 yards in the rear. The command remained in this position
for about half an hour,
when I was ordered to move forward and engage the enemy at once, which I
did by obliquing to
the left and coming in on the left of the Twenty-eighth Iowa. We held
this position for near one
hour, when the balance of the brigade having exhausted their ammunition,
we were compelled to
retire before a much superior force both on our left flank and in our
front. Then, in obedience to
orders, we fell back with the remainder of the brigade to Pleasant Hill,
and went into camp on the
morning of the 9th instant at 7 o'clock. Our loss was 1 surgeon and 29
enlisted men, a part of
whom were wounded.
My command on the morning of the 9th numbered 362 enlisted men, 296 of
whom are armed
and equipped, 23 sick, 13 on extra duty, 30 without arms. This does not
include Company F,
which is still on duty at division headquarters.
I am, very respectfully,
ED. WRIGHT,
Major, Commanding Regiment.
Lieut. C. B. BRADSHAW,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-EIGHTH IOWA INFANTRY,
Grand Ecore, La., April 13, 1864.
MAJOR: In compliance with circular issued from headquarters U.S. Forces
Western
Louisiana, bearing date April 11, 1864, I herewith send you an official
report of the part taken
by the Twenty-eighth Iowa Volunteer Infantry in the expedition from
Natchitoches to Sabine
Cross-Roads.
The regiment left Natchitoches on the morning of the 6th of April as a
part of the Second
Brigade, Third Division, Thirteenth Army Corps, and after a rapid march
of 35 miles reached
Pleasant Hill on the following day at 2 p.m. After a few minutes' pause
the regiment was ordered
out to support General Lee's cavalry, then engaging the enemy. It went
out promptly, near 500
strong, not leaving camp guards.
After advancing 1 mile and waiting one hour we were ordered to return to
camp. At 5.30 a.m.
the following morning we moved with the division forward to support
General Lee's cavalry and
one brigade of the Fourth Division, then driving the enemy. On reaching
---- Creek, a distance of
10 miles, we were ordered to halt in line of battle, our regiment
resting on the right of the
division. At 2.30 p.m. we were ordered forward with the division to join
Lee's cavalry and the
72
Fourth Division, then engaging the enemy. At 3.30 p.m. reached the field
of action and formed
on the extreme left of the division, supported by the Twenty-fourth
Iowa, and were the first to
open fire on the enemy and were soon exposed to the fire of the enemy's
battery, which poured
shrapnel and shell upon us.
It soon became evident that the enemy were flanking us on the left, and
the Twenty-fourth
Iowa was sent to protect it. This not being sufficient, a small force of
cavalry was sent also. Here
the regiment advanced 100 yards into the open field, and it soon became
evident that this
position was untenable and the regiment fell back again. We held our
position for two hours,
received the constant fire of the enemy's infantry, and being exposed to
his artillery, which
played with telling effect upon our ranks, our ammunition being
exhausted and the enemy
already having gained our rear, and having no support whatever, we were
compelled to retreat,
which we did in the best possible manner with the rest of the division.
We went into the engagement 500 strong and in the best of order. I
cannot personate in
praises, for all most nobly did their duty. Not one officer flinched,
not a man gave back. Col.
John Connell had his horse shot under him early in the action, but
remained on the field cheering
and urging his men to the last, and it was supposed fell mortally
wounded while retreating from
the field. A truer patriot and braver man fell not on that bloody field.
Loved most by those who
knew him best, his loss to the regiment is irreparable. He possessed not
only the respect but the
affection of his men. Adjt. J. G. Strong, while heroically and
fearlessly doing his duty, was
knocked from his horse by a minie-ball, inflicting a severe wound in the
right shoulder, and was
taken from the field. Having his wound dressed, returned to the field,
and continued rallying the
men in the thickest of the fire. First Lieut. H. H. Weaver was wounded
in the right cheek while
leading his company and compelled to leave the field. Second Lieut. O.
F. Dorrance, while
cheering his men in action, was severely wounded in the right hip and
had to be borne from the
field.
I regret that space will not permit me to speak of all the officers
standing up like men and
facing the rain of death, and of the privates and non-commissioned
officers especially that fell in
the conflict, yielding up their lives upon their country's altar. Better
soldiers live not in any army
nor rest on any battle-field.
Appended I send you a list of the casualties of the regiment.
THOMAS DILLON,
Captain, Commanding Regiment.
Maj. EDWARD WRIGHT,
Comdg. Second Brig., Third Div., 13th Army Corps.
SAINT Louis, Mo., September 26, 1865.
GENERAL: In compliance with your request, I have the honor to report in
full, as follows,
the operations of the detachments of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Army
Corps, under my
command, forming a part of the Red River expedition in 1864. Partial
reports were made and
forwarded to Maj. Gen. N. P. Banks from time to time, including lists of
casualties and captures.
The troops under my command, consisting of five regiments of infantry of
the First Division,
Sixteenth Army Corps, under the immediate command of Brig. Gen. Joseph
A. Mower, ten
regiments of infantry and two batteries of light artillery of the Third
Division, Sixteenth Army
Corps (my own division), and six regiments of infantry and one battery
of light artillery from the
Seventeenth Army Corps, under the command of Brig. Gen. Thomas Kilby
Smith, left Vicksburg
at 6 p.m. on the 10th day of March, 1864, on transports, pursuant to
orders from you, which were
in effect as follows:
73
To proceed with the command to the mouth of the Red River, where I would
find Admiral
Porter with a portion of the Mississippi Squadron to convoy my fleet up
Red River, and after
conference with him to proceed to Alexandria, La., and report to Maj.
Gen. N. P. Banks,
commanding Department of the Gulf, reaching Alexandria, if possible, on
the 17th of March,
from which point Major-General Banks would assume the command and
direction of the
expedition in person.
On arriving at the mouth of the Red River, at about 12 m., March 11,
1864, a dispatch was
received from Major-General Banks, stating that the heavy rains had so
delayed his column that
he would not be able to reach Alexandria before March 21, 1864. On
conferring with Admiral
Porter, I learned that Fort De Russy, a strong fort on the right bank of
Red River, equidistant
from the mouth of Red River and Alexandria, and mounting ten guns, had
been garrisoned by the
enemy and which it would be necessary to take before we could proceed to
Alexandria. It was
therefore deemed best to act against it in conjunction, the army in the
rear by land and the navy
by river. Leaving the mouth of Red River at about 12 m., March 12, 1864,
we proceeded up Red
River to the mouth of the Atchafalaya Bayou; thence with the transports
down the Atchafalaya
Bayou to Simsport, a point on its right bank near the mouth of Bayou De
Glaize and 30 miles by
land from Fort De Russy, reaching Simsport at about 5 p.m. of the same day.
On the morning of the 13th, I sent out the two divisions of the
Sixteenth Army Corps, under
command of Brig. Gen. J. A. Mower, with directions to move out about 5
miles on the Fort De
Russy road, capture or disperse any parties of the enemy in that
vicinity, and gain all the
information possible of the state of the roads and position of the
enemy. The division of the
Seventeenth Army Corps was ordered under arms to be in readiness to
support him if necessary.
About 3 miles from the landing, in the fork of the Yellow Bayou and
Bayou De Glaize, General
Mower came upon a brigade of the enemy, under command of General William
R. Scurry,
occupying a fort, then in process of construction, but who abandoned
their work and fled at his
approach. He pursued them about 2 miles, capturing 6 of their wagons and
about 20 prisoners,
when, having gained the necessary information and having no cavalry with
which to make an
effectual pursuit, I ordered him to return with his command to the
landing. I immediately
disembarked my land transportation, and, directing the transports to
join the Mississippi
Squadron under command of Admiral Porter and proceed with it to Fort De
Russy, moved
forward my whole command on the road to Fort De Russy. Leaving the
landing at about 9 p.m.,
we bivouacked for the night 4 miles from Simsport. At 3 o'clock on the
morning of the 14th, I
again moved forward toward Fort De Russy. Two bridges which we had to
cross were set on fire
by the retreating brigade of the enemy, but were extinguished by our
advance before they were
seriously damaged. On reaching Mansura I learned that the bridges across
the Bayou De Glaize
had been destroyed, and that the rebel General Walker, commanding a
division, had marched out
from Fort De Russy with his command to the point where he supposed we
would cross the
bayou, about 5 miles west from Mansura, had formed a junction with
Scurry's brigade, and
intended to oppose our crossing. I immediately ordered the bayou to be
bridged at Mansura,
taking the material from an old cotton-gin, and by crossing companies at
the same time on a
ferry-boat had my whole command across before General Walker was aware
that the advance
had halted. Directing General Thomas Kilby Smith, who was at the rear of
my column, to keep
well closed up and watch carefully the left flank and rear, I at once
moved forward toward Fort
De Russy, leaving General Walker and his command on the left.
On arriving near the fort I found that it was occupied by a garrison of
about 350 men. I
therefore halted my column 1 miles from the fort, and, after covering my
left flank and rear
from any attack that Walker could possibly make, directed General Mower
to advance with the
First and Second Brigades of the Third Division, Sixteenth Army Corps,
in line of battle, with
74
skirmishers thrown well to the front, followed by the Third Brigade
within supporting distance.
As soon as the line came within sight of the fort the enemy opened upon
it with five pieces of
artillery from the fort, doing, however, but little execution. Their
guns on the land side all being
en barbette, the skirmishers of the Second Brigade soon silenced them.
At about 6.30 p.m. the
order to charge was given, and the First and Second Brigades advanced
under a scattering fire
from the enemy, whose infantry were kept down by my skirmishers, and
scaled the parapet
within twenty minutes from the time the order to charge was given. The
enemy then surrendered.
Our loss was 3 killed and 35 wounded; total, 38. Full lists of
casualties and captures accompany
this report. We captured 319 prisoners, 10 pieces of artillery, and a
large quantity of ordnance
and ordnance stores, marching during the day 26 miles, bridging a bayou,
and capturing the fort
before sunset. Among the pieces of artillery taken were two 9-inch
Dahlgren guns, which were
captured by the enemy, one from the steamer Indianola and one from the
Harriet Lane. Owing to
obstructions in the river the gun-boat fleet did not arrive until after
the fort was captured. Of the
artillery captured, four pieces were in the fort and six in a water
battery on the bank of the river,
about 400 yards from the fort, connected with it by a covered way. Two
of the guns in the water
battery were casemated, and the casemate plated with a double thickness
of railroad iron. The
fleet arrived during the night, and the gun-boats passed up the river.
The artillery captured, with
the exception of two 6-pounder iron guns, was taken on board the several
boats of the fleet. All
ordnance and ordnance stores captured have been taken up and accounted
for by Lieut. J. B.
Pannes, Seventeenth New York Infantry, acting ordnance officer.
On the evening of the 15th instant I sent Brigadier-General Mower, with
the First and Third
Divisions, Sixteenth Army Corps, on transports to occupy Alexandria,
retaining at Fort De Russy
General Thomas Kilby Smith's command, of the Seventeenth Army Corps, for
the purpose of
dismantling the fort and destroying effectually the magazines and
casemates. This was
accomplished on the 15th, 16th, and 17th, by tearing down the revetments
on the inside of the
parapet and digging ditches across the parapet, so that, from the nature
of the soil of which it was
constructed, the first rain-storm would nearly level it. The magazines,
which were bomb-proof
and four in number, were totally destroyed by blowing them up with a
portion of the powder
captured. The casemates were destroyed by piling wood under them and
burning them down, the
iron bending with the heat. Before they were burned the gun-boat Essex
tested their strength with
a 100-pounder Parrott at a distance of about 300 yards, firing three
shots. The projectile in each
case cut through the iron plating, but was stopped by the oak backing.
The two 6-pounder iron
guns were also destroyed by bursting. On the morning of the 18th, I left
with the remainder of
my command for Alexandria, at which place we arrived about 5 p.m. same day.
General Mower, upon his arrival on the 16th, found the place had been
evacuated but a few
hours before, the enemy retreating toward Natchitoches. He took
possession of three pieces of
artillery and some ordnance stores, which the enemy had not time to
remove. My instructions
being to report to Major-General Banks at this place I disembarked my
command and went into
camp, he not having arrived. On the morning of the 19th 100 cavalry,
sent forward with
dispatches from the advance of the land column of General Banks'
command, arrived. On the
20th, the Cavalry Division of his command, under command of Brig. Gen.
A. L. Lee, arrived and
went into camp, and the same day Brigadier-General Stone, chief of
staff, with a portion of the
staff of Major-General Banks, came by river. Learning that a portion of
General Dick Taylor's
command were in the vicinity of Henderson's Hill, on Bayou Rapides,
about 22 miles from
Alexandria, on the direct road to Natchitoches, I directed
Brigadier-General Mower to take the
First Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, one regiment of infantry and one
battery of light artillery
from the Third Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, and the First Brigade,
Cavalry Division, of
General Lee's command, and proceed to Henderson's Hill, dislodge the
enemy from that position,
75
and send forward his cavalry to Red River, clearing all the country
between Bayou Rapides and
Red River. Leaving Alexandria on the morning of the 21st, General Mower
reached the vicinity
of Henderson's Hill the same night and found it occupied by the enemy
with both cavalry and
artillery. Leaving three regiments of infantry, one section of the
battery, and the cavalry to
occupy the attention of the enemy in front, he took two regiments of
infantry, one section of the
battery, and the Sixteenth Indiana Mounted Infantry and made a detour to
the left under cover of
the darkness and came in on their rear. Here, capturing a courier who
had been sent from the hill
with dispatches for General Dick Taylor, he succeeded in obtaining the
countersign, and learning
from the dispatches that there was only one regiment of cavalry and one
battery of artillery on
the hill he moved forward and completely surprised the whole force,
capturing them in detail at
their camp-fires without a shot being fired. The regiment was the Second
Louisiana (rebel)
Cavalry, with horses and equipments, and Edgar's battery of light
artillery, of four pieces, all
complete, the prisoners numbering 262. The detachment making the capture
had marched that
day over 30 miles through rain and mud. On the morning of the 22d,
General Mower returned
with his command to Alexandria.
On the 26th, General Banks having arrived, I was directed by him to
march my command to
Cotile Landing and await the arrival of our transports, it being
considered dangerous to attempt
to take them over the falls with the troops on them. I arrived with the
command at Cotile
Landing on the 28th; embarked the troops as the transports arrived, and
on the 2d of April
proceeded up the river, with orders to report to Major-General Banks at
Grand Ecore. Arrived at
Grand Ecore on the 3d, and was ordered by Major-General Banks to be in
readiness to leave for
Shreveport by land on the 7th instant, and to send the transports with
all surplus subsistence
stores, baggage, &c., with sufficient guard, by water to the mouth of
Loggy Bayou; at that point
to await further orders. I accordingly detached Brig. Gen. Thomas Kilby
Smith with his
Seventeenth Corps for duty with the boats, and directed him to consult
with Admiral Porter as to
the time and manner of starting. I left with the two divisions of the
Sixteenth Corps on the 7th
instant, bringing up the rear of the land column. General T. Kilby Smith
also left on the same day
with the transports, and his report of this part of the expedition is
herewith submitted. Moving
toward Pleasant Hill in the rear of the land column, the trains of the
cavalry, Thirteenth, and
Sixteenth Corps, all being in front of me, and the roads very bad, my
progress was consequently
slow. We kept well closed up, however, on the train, and encamped on the
night of the 7th about
8 miles from Grand Ecore. Moving forward at daylight on the morning of
the 8th, we encamped
at night about 2 miles from Pleasant Hill, having marched about 21
miles. Heard heavy
cannonading in front during the afternoon, and sent forward word to
General Banks my exact
position, and also stated that if he desired I could pass the train with
a portion or all of my
command. Soon after I learned that the cause of the cannonading was an
attack by the enemy
upon the cavalry and the Thirteenth Army Corps, which were in the
advance about 8 miles
beyond Pleasant Hill, and whom the enemy had repulsed and totally
routed, capturing their
artillery and wagons, and with a loss of nearly one-half the Thirteenth
Corps, and that the enemy
were only checked by night and the Nineteenth Corps. Ordering my men to
bivouac upon their
arms, and throwing out pickets to their flanks and rear, we rested until
morning, when, by
permission of General Banks, I moved forward to, Pleasant Hill and
formed line of battle across
the Mansfield road. During the night and morning the remaining and
disorganized parties of the
cavalry and Thirteenth Army Corps arriving, passed through the lines and
halted. Early in the
morning they, with the trains, were ordered to proceed immediately to
Grand Ecore, leaving on
the field part of the Nineteenth and two divisions of the Sixteenth Army
Corps. Line of battle
was formed as follows: First Brigade of General Emory's command of the
Nineteenth Corps on
the extreme right and right flank, the Third and First Divisions,
Sixteenth Army Corps, on the
76
right and left center, and the remaining troops of the Thirteenth Corps
on the extreme left and left
flank, my right lapping a brigade on Emory's left and about 400 yards in
its rear. The Second
Brigade, Third Division, Col. William T. Shaw commanding, was ordered
early in the morning
to report to Brigadier-General Emory, and was stationed in front of the
center of his command.
The enemy's skirmishers appeared on Colonel Shaw's front about noon, and
there was
desultory skirmishing at different parts of the line until about 4.30
p.m., when the enemy made
his attack on the right center, driving in the outposts and the brigade
of the Nineteenth Corps in
my front through my line, they reforming in my rear. Advancing my line
slightly to be able to
close with and support Shaw's brigade, the battle immediately became
general. The enemy had
been re-enforced during the afternoon with two divisions of infantry
from Price's command, and
their troops, flushed with their success of the previous day, seemed
determined to break through
our line, charging it with desperate energy. Fearing that Shaw's brigade
might be totally
enveloped, I directed him to fall back and connect with my right. In the
mean time the enemy's
right had advanced beyond my extreme left and were taken in flank and
rolled up by the First
Brigade, Third Division, Col. William F. Lynch commanding. Seizing the
opportunity I ordered
a charge by the whole line, and we drove them back, desperately
fighting, step by step across the
field, through the wood, and into the open field beyond, fully a mile
from the battle-field, when
they took advantage of the darkness and fell back toward Mansfield
thoroughly whipped and
demoralized. In the charge we captured nearly 1,000 prisoners, five
pieces of artillery, and six
caissons. The artillery was brought off, but the caissons were left
until morning. The casualties in
my command were as follows: Killed, 98; wounded, 529; missing, 124;
total, 751. A large
proportion of the missing were of the Thirty-second Iowa, which was on
the left of Shaw's
brigade, and were nearly surrounded in the early part of the battle
during the enemy's first
charge. The loss of the enemy in killed was unusually severe.
A brigade of cavalry which charged Shaw's brigade in the early part of
the action were
almost annihilated, he allowing them to approach within 50 yards before
opening fire. The
prisoners captured were many of them from Missouri regiments, belonging
to the divisions that
had re-enforced the enemy during the engagement. The darkness compelled
us to cease pursuit.
Anticipating the order to follow up our success by a vigorous pursuit,
the next morning I sent
the Third Brigade, Third Division, Col. R. M. Moore commanding, about 2
miles out on the
road taken by the retreating enemy, with orders to watch their movements
and gain all the
information possible, and fell back with the remainder of my command and
bivouacked in line
on the field of battle. The opinion of Major-General Banks as to the
action of the command and
its results may be gathered from his own words to me on the field just
after the final charge,
when, riding up to me, he remarked, shaking me by the hand, "God bless
you, general; you have
saved the army."
About 12 o'clock on the night of the 9th, I received orders from General
Banks to have my
command in readiness to move at 2 o'clock in the morning, and at that
hour to withdraw them
silently from the field and follow the Nineteenth Army Corps back to
Grand Ecore, making such
disposition of my troops and trains as would enable me to repel an
attack on the rear of the
column. I represented to him that the dead of my command were not
buried, and that I had not
the means of transporting my wounded; that many of the wounded had not
yet been gathered in
from the field, and asked of him permission to remain until noon the
next day to give me an
opportunity to bury my dead and leave the wounded as well provided for
as the circumstances
would permit. I also urged the fact that General Thomas Kilby Smith's
command, then 30 miles
above us on transports in the river, would undoubtedly be captured and
the transports lost if left
to themselves. The permission to remain was, however, refused and the
order to move made
peremptory. I therefore provided as well as possible for the wounded,
left medical officers to
77
attend to them, and moved at the designated hour, following the
Nineteenth Corps. We reached
Grand Ecore on the evening of the 11th, no attack on the rear having
been made by the enemy,
and went into camp. On the evening of the 13th, nothing having been
heard from a portion of our
transports save that they had been attacked with infantry and artillery
upon both sides of the
river, I marched up with two brigades of my command on the north bank of
the river to help
them through, if possible, crossing the river at Grand Ecore at about 4
p.m. We reached Campti,
12 miles above, the same night and met a portion of the fleet there,
they having by energy, good
judgment, and rare good fortune succeeded in running the batteries and
land forces of the enemy
without the loss of a boat, though some were completely riddled with
shot. The report of Brig.
Gen. T. Kilby Smith accompanies this, and you are also respectfully
referred to the report of
Rear-Admiral D. D. Porter, already on file. On the 14th, I returned to
Grand Ecore with the rear
of the fleet.
Pursuant to orders from Major-General Banks, after placing a proper
guard on each of my
transports, with directions for them to proceed down the river to
Alexandria, I moved with the
remainder of my command on the 20th to Natchitoches. Occupying this
place as a point de
resistance with my troops, the remainder of General Banks' forces passed
between us and the
river, continuing the retreat to Alexandria.
On the morning of the 21st, I left Natchitoches and fell in the rear of
the land column, which
position I occupied with my command, alternating the divisions day by
day until we reached
Alexandria. From the day of our leaving Natchitoches, the enemy pushed
the pursuit vigorously;
the rear was skirmishing every day and nearly all day. Twice during the
march we were obliged
to form line and teach them a lesson. At Cloutierville, on the 23d, they
charged the rear division,
General T. Kilby Smith's, but he repulsed them neatly and thoroughly
after about an hour's
fighting. During this engagement in the rear, the advance, having
reached Cane River, found the
bluffs on the other side occupied by a small force of the enemy, who
disputed the crossing.
Although the cavalry, Thirteenth, and Nineteenth Corps, were in advance
of me, and
notwithstanding the engagement with the enemy's cavalry in the rear,
General Banks sent back
an order for me to send General Mower with a strong brigade to force the
passage of Cane River.
Fearing to weaken my line during the engagement, I answered him in
substance that it would be
impracticable for me to comply with the order. Later in the day the
passage was easily forced by
detachments of the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Corps. On the afternoon of
the 26th, we reached
Alexandria and went into camp in line of battle, the Nineteenth Corps on
the right, the Thirteenth
Corps in advance of the center, and my command on the left. We remained
in the vicinity of
Alexandria in the same relative position until the 13th of May, the
interim being occupied in
getting the gun-boats over the falls and daily skirmishing with the enemy.
On the 28th of April, the enemy having driven in the skirmishers of the
Thirteenth Corps, the
corps fell back reluctantly, in compliance, it was said, with orders
from Major-General Banks,
three times repeated, abandoning and setting on fire their camp and
garrison equipage, stores,
and forage. Not knowing that it was done by order, I took the Second
Brigade, Third Division,
Sixteenth Army Corps, Col. William T. Shaw commanding, and put out the
fire, rescued the
stores, and saved much of the camp and garrison equipage. This brigade
remained on the ground
until the next morning, when it returned to its camp.
On the 13th of May, the boats having passed the falls, the retreat was
again resumed, my
command falling into its old place in the rear. Continuing down the
river as far as Fort De Russy,
in order to be at hand to protect the boats if necessary, we reached the
fort on the night of the
14th. From this point the guards on the boats were considered sufficient
to protect them, and they
were therefore ordered around to Simsport, on the Atchafalaya Bayou,
toward which the land
column was turned. On the 15th instant, while crossing Avoyelles
Prairie, a brigade of the
78
enemy's cavalry, with about twelve pieces of artillery, appeared in
front and attempted to delay
and annoy the column. My command was ordered forward into line on the
right of the
Nineteenth Corps, the Thirteenth Corps being on the extreme left. Line
being formed, I sent
Capt. William S. Burns, acting assistant inspector-general of my staff,
to report the fact and ask
for instructions, which were given him by Brig. Gen. William Dwight,
chief of staff of Major-
General Banks, in the following words: "Say to General Smith that the
Thirteenth Corps will
press their (the enemy's) right. He with his command will attack their
left, while with the
Nineteenth Corps we pierce their center."
As the several commands moved forward in line to execute these
instructions, the brigade of
cavalry galloped away, taking their artillery with them. We reached the
vicinity of Simsport on
the 16th, skirmishing with the pursuing cavalry. Our boats being there,
a bridge was made of
them across the Atchafalaya, and on the 17th, 18th, and 19th, the
Thirteenth and Nineteenth
Corps and the cavalry crossed the bayou.
On the 18th of May, while lying in line protecting the crossing of the
other corps, the enemy
made a severe attack on the lines, driving in the skirmishers. I was at
the time at the landing, but
had left orders with General Mower, in case the enemy attacked, to use
whatever force was
necessary to drive them back. He therefore ordered the line forward,
driving them easily for
about 2 miles across an open field and through a briar thicket, thickly
interspersed with dead
trees on the other side, beyond which he found them drawn up in force
far outnumbering his,
with about twenty pieces of artillery posted to support them.
Withdrawing to the edge of the first
field General Mower formed line, concealed by the thicket, and bringing
his artillery up to close
range awaited their advance. They soon came, when, after giving them a
few rounds of canister
and case-shot, he ordered a charge with the bayonet, repulsing them with
terrible slaughter and
driving them again through the thicket into the field beyond under
protection of their artillery.
Withdrawing to his old position near the thicket they charged him again,
and were a second
time driven back with severe loss. The firing during the second charge
set the thicket on fire, so
that it formed a barrier impassable for either party. Withdrawing his
troops to the open field,
General Mower sent those that had been the heaviest engaged to their
camps and formed a new
line with the remainder, who bivouacked in line during the night. We
captured 156 prisoners in
the charge. Our loss was: Killed, 38; wounded, 226; missing, 3; total,
267. Lists of casualties and
captures are herewith inclosed, with reports of brigade and division
commanders. No further
attack was made, and pursuit by the enemy stopped from this day.
I crossed the bridge on the 20th, bringing up the rear, and marched to
Red River Landing, on
the Mississippi River, whither our boats had been sent, and reported, by
order of Major-General
Banks, to Maj. Gen. E. R. S. Canby for further orders, and was by him
directed to proceed to
Vicksburg with my command, which I did, reaching that place on the 23d
of May, having been
gone seventy-four days.
The results of the expedition may be summed up as follows: I captured
with my command 22
pieces of artillery, 1,757 prisoners, and Fort De Russy, with a strong
casemated battery, which
the gunboats would not have been able to pass. My loss was 153 killed,
849 wounded, and 133
missing; total, 1,135; also 1 6-mule wagon. My entire command numbered
originally 9,200.
Of the general officers attached to my command I cannot speak too
highly. Brig. Gen. (now
Maj. Gen.) J. A. Mower, by his perception and prompt action at Fort De
Russy, Henderson's Hill,
and Pleasant Hill, and by his gallantry and skill at Yellow Bayou, near
Simsport, May 18, has
won the right to a high estimate and position in the annals of the war.
Quick perception, ready
courage, an abundant vitality, added to skill and education, give him
the power to sway men as if
by magnetism. Brig. Gen. Thomas Kilby Smith, with excellent judgment and
skill, brought the
boats safely through the intricacies and shoals of Red River back to
Grand Ecore, although
79
continually under fire. His repulse of the cavalry charge upon his
division at Cloutierville was
well and neatly done. I commend him as a gallant officer and gentleman.
I had hearty and
energetic co-operation on the part of my brigade commanders, two of
whom, Col. S. G. Hill,
Thirty-fifth Iowa, and Col. William F. Lynch, Fifty-eighth Illinois,
were severely wounded. Col.
William T. Shaw, Fourteenth Iowa, commanding brigade, proved himself an
excellent officer
and rendered invaluable service at Fort De Russy, Pleasant Hill, and
Yellow Bayou. He is a
brave, energetic, and intelligent officer.
To all the officers and men of the command praise is due for their
cheerful, enduring, and
ready obedience. Each and all the officers of my staff were untiring and
active in their respective
duties. I am much indebted to their intelligent action and ready
appreciation of the situation.
Arms, eyes, and heads seemed their main attributes during the whole
campaign. I add their
names as a matter of record, as their well-deserved promotion has
overtaken all who are now in
service: Capt. John Hough, assistant adjutant-general; Capt. William S.
Burns, Fourth Missouri
Cavalry, acting assistant inspector-general; Capt. J. J. Lyon,
Twenty-fourth Missouri Infantry,
judge-advocate; Surg. N. R. Derby, medical director, wounded May 18;
Maj. E. A. Warner,
Fourteenth Iowa Infantry, provost-marshal; Capt. Ross Wilkinson,
aide-de-camp; Capt. Samuel
Caldwell, Eighth Illinois Infantry, acting aide-de-camp; Lieut. George
W. Fetterman, Fifteenth
U. S. Infantry, assistant commissary of musters; Lieut. John B. Pannes,
Seventeenth New York
Infantry, ordnance officer.
I have the honor to be, with much respect, your obedient servant,
A. J. SMITH,
Major-General.
Maj. Gen. W. T. SHERMAN.
HDQRS. FIRST AND THIRD DIVS., 16TH ARMY CORPS,
Alexandria, La., March 24, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that, in compliance with orders
received from General
A. J. Smith, I moved out from Alexandria on the morning of the 21st
instant for the purpose of
driving the enemy from Henderson's Hill, where they were reported to
have an outpost. The
expedition consisted of the Second Brigade, First Division, Colonel
Hubbard commanding; the
Third Brigade, First Division, Colonel Hill commanding; the Eighty-ninth
Regiment Indiana
Infantry Volunteers, and the Ninth Indiana Battery; also a brigade of
cavalry under Colonel
Lucas, of the Sixteenth Indiana Mounted Infantry, that regiment forming
a portion of his
command. A small party of the enemy's cavalry was met about 13 miles out
from Alexandria,
and rapidly driven by Colonel Lucas for 10 miles, when our advance came
within range of the
enemy's battery, consisting of four field guns, in position on
Henderson's Hill. I directed the
cavalry to annoy the enemy in front while I crossed a bayou with Colonel
Hubbard's brigade and
the Sixteenth Indiana Mounted Infantry, of Colonel Lucas' command,
together with a section of
artillery, for the purpose of getting in the enemy's rear and capturing
him. My guide, in
endeavoring to take me by a near route to the rear of the hill, led me
into a swamp which was
impassable. I then found a road, which I followed, and from which I made
my way to the
enemy's camp, where I captured about 250 prisoners, 200 horses, and 4
guns, together with their
caissons. The enemy were picked up in detail. The Sixteenth Indiana
Mounted Infantry were in
advance until we came near the hill; they then moved off the road on
which the infantry
advanced. Captain Sample, my assistant adjutant-general, was the first
man that arrived at the
first section of the enemy's guns; their horses were harnessed and
hitched. The Thirty-fifth Iowa
Infantry were in advance of the infantry, and came up with the guns
immediately after Captain
Sample, who himself captured several small parties of the rebels. The
Sixteenth Indiana Mounted
80
Infantry claim to have captured the next section, which was posted up
the road; none of them
were there, however, when the Thirty-fifth Iowa arrived at the guns; the
men of the Sixteenth
Indiana may have been first at the guns and left them for the purpose of
capturing prisoners.
After capturing the battery and men, I recrossed the bayou and went into
camp, having marched
30 miles that day. On the morning of the 22d, I returned to Alexandria.
I would respectfully call attention to the conduct of Captain Sample, my
assistant adjutantgeneral,
who, by his coolness and prudence, captured many squads of the enemy at
their campfires
without allowing them to fire a gun. Also to the gallantry of one of my
orderlies, Private
Deacon J. Whittaker, Second Iowa Battery, who, while carrying a
dispatch, captured a rebel
major and two privates and brought them in. I recommend him for
promotion. No casualties to
report. I send herewith an inventory of ordnance and ordnance stores
captured. A list of prisoners
has already been forwarded.
I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOS. A. MOWER,
Brig. Gen., Comdg. First and Third Divs., 16th A. C.
Capt. J. HOUGH,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. FIRST AND THIRD DIVS., 16TH ARMY CORPS,
On Steamer Des Moines, Vicksburg, Miss., May 23, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report, for the information of the general
commanding the
detachment of Red River expedition, that, in obedience to the orders
received from him to the
effect that if the enemy should pursue me I should attack and drive them
back, I moved across
Yellow Bayou at about 11 o'clock of the 18th instant, with Colonel
Hill's brigade, consisting only
of two regiments, the Thirty-third Missouri and the Thirty-fifth Iowa,
and Colonel Lynch's
brigade, and Colonel Shaw's brigade of the Third Division. I skirmished
with the enemy about 2
miles, when I came to a dense thicket, which I penetrated and found the
enemy in large force on
the opposite side of a field. They opened on my line with twelve pieces
of rifled artillery. I had
with me Lieutenant Tiemeyer's battery of rifled guns, with the Third
Indiana Battery and four
smooth-bore guns of the Ninth Indiana Battery. I put Lieutenant
Tiemeyer's battery in position
on the right of the line and the Ninth Indiana Battery near the left,
having two regiments on the
left of it for support. I had just got my line formed after passing
through the thicket when the
enemy moved upon us, coming in columns in mass on our left and in line
of battle in our front. I
immediately sent for two regiments of Colonel Shaw's brigade, which had
been held in reserve,
but before they arrived the cavalry on my left flank were driven back,
the enemy following them
and getting in rear of my left flank. I immediately ordered the Third
Indiana Battery and the two
regiments on the left of it to move in such a direction as brought them
nearly at right angles with
the balance of my line and facing the enemy, who were moving down on our
flank. I also
ordered the other portion of the line, which had driven the enemy in
their front, to fall back so as
to connect with the right of the troops, whose position I had changed.
The troops on the left were
now formed facing the woods. Just as they had got into position the two
regiments of Colonel
Shaw's brigade, which were held in reserve and which I had previously
sent for, came up, and I
put them into position on the left. I then ordered the battery to be
doubled-shotted with canister.
The enemy on our flank were soon driven back, and with great slaughter.
I then (after resting the
men a few minutes and giving them an opportunity to replenish their
ammunition) ordered
another advance. I found that the enemy had made an advance and had
entered the thicket,
through which the main portion of my line had to pass. We encountered
them in the thicket, and
a short but desperate struggle ensued, in which they were driven into
and part way across the
81
open field beyond, with great loss in killed and wounded and about 160
prisoners. My left being
exposed, the cavalry having been again driven back, I ordered my troops
back to reoccupy their
original position, the enemy first being driven from our left. I left a
line of skirmishers in front of
the thicket. The enemy did not attempt to make another attack. I have
been since informed by the
chaplain of the Fifty-eighth Illinois, who was captured a few days
previous and afterward
released, that the enemy acknowledged a loss in that engagement of about
600 killed and
wounded. This, together with the prisoners captured by us, would make
their loss nearly three
times as great as our own.
Too much praise cannot be given either to officers or men in meeting and
repelling two
distinct charges of the enemy, in both of which their force was greatly
superior to our own. The
conduct of Colonel Hill deserves special mention. He was in the thickest
of the fire; was himself
wounded, and had his horse shot. Colonel Lynch, who had had permission
to visit the boats at
the Atchafalaya, some 4 miles distant, on hearing the artillery
immediately repaired to the field
of battle, and rushing in with his usual impetuosity, was almost
immediately wounded. The
command of his brigade then devolved upon Colonel Kinney, of the One
hundred and nineteenth
Illinois, who fought his brigade gallantly until his horse was wounded
and fell upon him, injuring
him so that he had to retire temporarily from the field. The command
then devolved upon
Lieutenant-Colonel Craven, Eighty-ninth Indiana, who sustained the
well-earned reputation of
the brigade. Colonel Shaw handled his men with skill and coolness and
aided in repelling the
charge of the enemy on the flank and in driving them back. I will also
mention Lieutenant
Tiemeyer, Company M, First Missouri Light Artillery, who did good
execution, notwithstanding
his battery was exposed to a galling fire from the enemy's batteries,
who at times concentrated
their whole artillery fire upon him. He deserves great praise for the
manner in which he handled
his guns. Captain Brown, of the Ninth Indiana Battery, although his guns
were not able to reach
the rifled guns of the enemy, poured a deadly fire into the masses of
the enemy as they charged
on the left.
To the officers of my staff, Captain Sample and Lieutenants Christensen,
Meagher, and
O'Reilly, who rendered efficient aid in conveying orders along the line,
under the heaviest of the
fire, my sincere thanks are due. The last two had their horses shot
under them.
A list of the prisoners captured, also a list of the casualties, have
already been forwarded. I
herewith inclose the reports of the brigade commanders.
I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOS. A. MOWER,
Brig. Gen., Comdg. 1st and 3d Divs., 16th Army Corps.
Capt. J. HOUGH,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Detach. 16th and 17th Army Corps.
HDQRS. FIFTH MINNESOTA VET. VOL. INFANTRY,
Vicksburg, Miss., May 25, 1864.
COLONEL: I have the honor to report, as briefly as possible, the part
taken by the Fifth
Minnesota Veterans in the recent Red River expedition. This expedition
has been the most severe
one in which the regiment has ever been engaged. The fact that it failed
in the accomplishment of
its professed object and, in fact, suffered unaccountable disaster, made
our exodus from the State
of Louisiana, consuming forty days, all the more irksome. On the 10th of
March we left
Vicksburg on board of transports and landed at Simsport, on the
Atchafalaya Bayou, on the 12th.
Our brigade immediately initiated operations on the Red River by putting
to rout General
Scurry's command, which was encamped near our landing. The enemy
withdrew to Fort Scurry,
3 miles distant, and not fancying the aspect of affairs as we approached
in line of battle with
82
fixed bayonets, he forsook his works and beat a hasty retreat. We
pursued him for 4 miles and
succeeded in capturing his rear guard and 4 loaded wagons, and were then
recalled to our boats.
At 9 o'clock the same evening General Smith's whole command took up the
line of march for
Fort De Russy, arriving there at 4 p.m. the next day, and by dusk had
the fort and garrison in our
possession. This fort was built with the best of engineering skill, and
was well calculated for a
small force to successfully resist a much superior besieging one. Our
brigade during the day was
the rear guard of the Sixteenth Army Corps, and came up only in time to
form in the second line
of battle and witness the glorious sight of our boys scaling the
parapets, which were fully 20 feet
high from the bottom of the ditch.
On the 15th, we re-embarked on the transports, which had followed us up
the river, and took
peaceable possession of Alexandria on the 16th. On the 21st, our
division, accompanied by a
small force of General Banks' cavalry, which had just arrived, made a
reconnaissance to
Henderson's Hill, 22 miles from Alexandria on the Shreveport road. We
made a forced march
and found the enemy in a strong position. After a short demonstration in
front we commenced a
flank movement, crossed a bayou, and entered a pine forest. Amid the
darkness and in a
drenching rain-storm, we waded through mud and water, over ridges and
across low bottoms, till
we reached the enemy's rear. We relieved his pickets, substituted our
own, and took the camp by
surprise. The enemy were looking for their own re-enforcements, which
they were hourly
expecting. We captured 1 four-gun battery with caissons and homes,
including 80 prisoners, the
darkness covering the escape of the others.
On the 26th and 27th, we marched to Cotile Landing, which is above the
Red River rapids,
and 28 miles from Alexandria, and on the 2d of April again embarked and
arrived at Grand
Ecore on the 3d. In the mean time, General Banks had arrived at
Alexandria and moved on in
advance of us to Natchitoches. We remained in Grand Ecore four or five
days, during which time
we made several reconnaissances on the east side of the river, and
encountered the enemy in
several skirmishes. On the 4th, the regiment, with the Thirty-fifth
Iowa, Colonel Hubbard
commanding, was sent out on the double-quick to Campti, 5 miles distant,
to the relief of our
cavalry, which was being roughly handled. We found the enemy across a
small bayou, sheltered
in the large timber, and successfully resisting the persistent efforts
of the cavalry to dislodge him.
I immediately deployed my regiment on the right and left of the road,
and moved rapidly forward
toward and across the bayou. The boys advanced with cheers and
well-directed fire, which the
rebels were not able or disposed to withstand. They withdrew, leaving
behind their killed and
wounded, who fell into our hands. On the 7th, with cheerful spirits, we
took up the line of march
for Shreveport, never once considering the possibility of a failure to
accomplish our purpose.
General Banks, with the cavalry under General Lee, the Nineteenth, and
detachment of
Thirteenth Army Corps, preceded us one day. On the 8th, late in the
evening, we reached
Pleasant Hill, and from stragglers first heard of that day's disaster
and rout to our advance, which
reports were afterward too fully confirmed. On the 9th, the enemy
advanced to the attack,
flushed with victory and strengthened with re-enforcements, and fought
with reckless
desperation. On that day it devolved upon the detachments of the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Army Corps, forming General Smith's command of veteran troops, to arrest
and turn back the
tide of battle and disaster. The position of the Fifth during the
engagement was on the extreme
right of the Sixteenth Army Corps. During the night a new line of battle
was formed, 1 miles in
advance of our first position, the Fifth being placed near the center
and in the first line. As we
rested on our arms, listening to the cries and groans of the wounded,
who were lying thickly
around and among us, each one felt that morning would witness the
opening of, if possible, a still
fiercer struggle than that of the previous day. To our great surprise,
at 3 o'clock in the morning,
83
we were quietly withdrawn from the battle-field and marched back to
Grand Ecore without
molestation.
On the 20th, the retrograde movement was resumed, General Smith being
assigned to the
rear, and to the general protection of General Banks' 12 miles of
wagons. We were warmly
attacked on leaving there, and on each of the three days consumed in
reaching Alexandria, the
regiment participating on the 22d and 23d. On the 2d of May the
Sixteenth Army Corps, under
command of General Mower, was sent out 8 miles toward Cloutierville to
hold the enemy back,
and to get and retain possession of the large amount of forage in that
section. Here we remained
eight days, engaged in a continual skirmish, culminating at times in a
general engagement.
During the eight days, as well as during the whole expedition, the Fifth
was frequently selected
by Colonel Hubbard, at the request of the commanding general of the
division, and sent forward
to act as skirmishers and sharpshooters. General Mower formerly
commanded our brigade, and
he accredits to the Fifth Minnesota great efficiency in this kind of
duty. On the 14th, we again
fell in rear of General Banks and his wagon train, followed the windings
of the Red River, and
camped near Fort De Russy on the night of the 15th. On the 16th occurred
the battle of
Marksville, or Belle Prairie. The field was a splendid one for a fair
and equal contest, a smooth,
clear prairie, slightly descending to the south, 3 or 4 miles in extent,
and surrounded by heavy
timber. We were turned out before daybreak and taken into the fight
without our usual coffee and
hard-tack. As we marched through Marksville about sunrise we discovered
the Nineteenth Army
Corps already initiating operations, which it afterward devolved upon us
to finish. The Sixteenth
and Seventeenth Army Corps were formed in column of regiments, and moved
across the prairie
to the right, and some distance from the Nineteenth Army Corps, the
Fifth Minnesota in advance.
It was a splendid sight; our whole force and every movement could be
clearly and distinctly
seen. On the left was the Nineteenth Army Corps, advancing in line of
battle with a line of
skirmishers in front, engaging and slowly forcing back those of the
enemy. To the rear of the
Nineteenth was the Thirteenth, also advancing in line of battle. In the
rear of and following us
was a long column of regiments, the numerous banners glistening in the
clear morning sunlight,
and seeming to wave defiance to the foe. Our movements were soon changed
from that in
column to that en echelon and then into line of battle, all the
regiments forming on the right of
brigade. The enemy in front of us held a position in the edge of the
timber, and only a portion of
his line could at first be seen. He very soon disclosed the positions of
four excellent batteries of
heavy guns, which were particularly devoted to us. In the mean time the
Nineteenth Army Corps
had halted, and the remainder of the work was left for General Smith's
command. The fight
lasted about four hours, and during the closing scene it required the
extra exertions of the enemy
to save his batteries from our grasp. The long wagon train heretofore
referred to, and especial
instructions on this occasion as on many others, prevented pursuit.
The enemy followed us closely the next day, and on the 18th, on Bayou De
Glaize, ensued
the last battle of the series conducted by General Mower, and
participated in by the troops of the
Sixteenth Army Corps alone. The Fifth Minnesota was here used as
skirmishers. The fight
commenced about 10 a.m., and continued for six hours. We drove the enemy
back on this as on
every other occasion, with a loss to him of upward of 500 men, and we
would gladly have
pursued and punished him for his insolence.
On the 20th, we once more looked upon the waters of the noble
Mississippi. We hailed the
sight with cheers. The waters of the Mississippi appeared as clear as
crystal and [were] relished
like the fountain waters of Minnesota, so great was the contrast with
the muddy waters of the
dried up Red River and its bayous. We arrived at Vicksburg on transports
on the 24th.
Great credit is due to Surgeon Kennedy, one of the leading operating
surgeons of the
command, and his assistant, Dr. Leonard, for their exertions in behalf
of the wounded. I can also
84
heartily commend the action of every officer and private of the regiment
in the several battles
and skirmishes of this expedition. I think I am safe in assuring you
that the Fifth lost none of its
prestige and none of its reputation as a fighting regiment. Colonel
Hubbard has been in command
of the brigade since leaving Vicksburg. I cheerfully acknowledge that
any credit which the
regiment or the brigade has gained in the expedition is in a great
measure due to the coolness, the
courage, the watchful attention to duty, and the personal example of
daring of himself and staff.
Colonel Hubbard possesses the entire confidence of his command. Every
officer and soldier
knows and feels that his inspiration in battle is not due to whisky, and
they follow him without
fear or mistrust.
I am happy to be able to inform you that the regiment has been
providentially spared from
serious loss; 15 men wounded, and most of them not seriously, and 3 men
prisoners, embraces
the entire list of casualties.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN C. BECHT,
Major, Commanding Regiment.
Col. OSCAR MALMROS,
Adjutant-General of Minnesota, Saint Paul.
HDQRS. THIRD BRIG., FIRST DIV., 16TH ARMY CORPS,
Alexandria, La., March 25, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of
this command for
March 21 and 22, 1864: In obedience to orders from headquarters First
and Third Divisions,
Sixteenth Army Corps, this brigade, consisting of Thirty-third Missouri
Volunteer Infantry and
the Thirty-fifth Iowa Volunteer Infantry Regiments, moved from their
camp in Alexandria, La.,
at 6.30 a.m., March 21, and marched in the advance of the division in
the following order: First,
the Thirty-fifth Regiment Iowa Volunteer Infantry; second, the Ninth
Indiana Battery; third, the
Thirty-third Regiment Missouri Volunteer Infantry. The brigade was
halted at I p.m. about 22
miles from this place, where the enemy had opened fire with artillery on
the cavalry in our
advance with some effect. It being apparent that the enemy had chosen a
very strong position in
our front, across Bayou Rapides, on a high hill, this brigade was
ordered to the front to support
the battery then in position. Shortly after the brigade was ordered
across Bayou Rapides to the
right of the enemy's position, and after a tedious march of about 8
miles, through marshes and a
dense pine forest, in a hard rain and cold wind, we halted. The men were
much fatigued and
thoroughly wet, suffering from cold and a severe hail-storm; some were
compelled from
exhaustion to leave the ranks. The enemy being seen in the advance, the
Thirty-third Regiment
Missouri Volunteers was ordered to support a section of Battery G, Fifth
U.S. Artillery, and
Company C, Thirty-fifth Regiment Iowa Volunteers, was deployed and sent
forward as
skirmishers. After a halt of about 2 hours we discovered that the camp
of the enemy was some
distance to our right.
It being now dark the Thirty-fifth Iowa Volunteers, followed by the
Thirty-third Missouri
Volunteers, was ordered forward toward the position of the enemy, and at
about 10.30 p.m.
arrived at the enemy's outer pickets. Eight picket-posts were now in
succession relieved of their
guards, and three couriers, one guidon colors, and an ambulance, with
horses, &c., captured, and
the prisoners sent to the rear of the first regiment, without the firing
of a gun or causing any
alarm whatever. At about midnight we arrived at the main camp of the
rebels. The Thirty-fifth
Iowa quickly surrounded a number of the enemy in a house, and mounted
their men on the
horses hitched to a section of the enemy's battery and caissons, before
our presence was at all
discovered by them; it was a complete surprise. There was every
indication that the camp was in
85
readiness for an attack; horses were hitched, guns were in position, two
of them were charged
with canister, but so silent was our approach and so rapid our movements
in their camp, that they
did not use their artillery, and fired but a few rifle shots before the
capture was complete. After
the capture of the first section of artillery and a lot of officers and
men in a large house, as also a
large lot of cavalry horses equipped, both regiments were ordered with
bayonets fixed to charge
through the camp, and succeeded in capturing another section of
artillery, with caissons and
horses complete, and also a number of rebels mounted. Passing out of the
enemy's main camp to
the bayou, we found the bridge over Bayou Rapides destroyed by fire. We
then moved to our
left, along the bayou, the Thirty-third Regiment Missouri Volunteers in
the advance, with two
companies out as skirmishers. Passing through an open field and into an
old cavalry camp, about
40 more prisoners and horses were taken. Finding here the frame-work of
a partially destroyed
bridge, we in half an hour repaired it and crossed over, and marched 2
miles, through deep mud
and water, to near the place where we crossed the bayou at 1 p.m., and
bivouacked for the few
remaining hours of the night at 3 a.m., having marched about 35 miles in
22 hours.
On the morning of the 22d, the Thirty-third Missouri Volunteers was
ordered forward to
support the Ninth Indiana Battery, while the captured property was
secured, and the enemy's
camp at Henderson's Hill entirely destroyed. At 12 m. we took up our
line of march toward
Alexandria, the Thirty-fifth Iowa Volunteers having in charge the
prisoners of war and the
captured battery. Arrived within 8 miles of Alexandria and camped for
the night. Next morning
(23d) marched at 6 a.m., and arrived in Alexandria at 1 p.m.
Much of the credit of this successful exploit is due to Lieut. Col. W.
B. Keeler, commanding
the Thirty-fifth Iowa Volunteers, and to Lieut. Col. W. H. Heath,
commanding Thirty-third
Missouri Volunteers, for their promptness in obeying orders, and their
activity in bringing up
their regiments promptly and in good order, notwithstanding the men were
very much fatigued;
also to Lieut. H. Hoover, acting assistant adjutant-general, and Lieut.
O. O. England, acting
assistant inspector-general of this brigade, for their efficiency and
promptness in dispatching
orders and capturing prisoners.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. G. HILL,
Colonel Thirty-fifth Iowa Vols., Comdg. Brig.
Capt. J. B. SAMPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. THIRD BRIG., FIRST DIV., 16TH ARMY CORPS,
Grand Ecore, La., April 13, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by
the Third Brigade,
First Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, in the action at Pleasant Hill,
La., on the 9th instant: At 3
p.m. this brigade, consisting of the Thirty-third Missouri Volunteers
and the Thirty-fifth Iowa
Volunteers (less three companies from each regiment detailed on picket
duty in the rear), was
ordered forward to take position in line of battle, the enemy in force
at that time menacing our
front lines, and ordered to take position on the left center, as
reserves, between the Third Indiana
Battery and the First Vermont Battery, and in the rear of the
Eighty-ninth Regiment Indiana
Volunteers, then formed in line of battle on Pleasant Hill, in front of
the woods, remaining in this
position until 4.30 p.m. I received orders to form one regiment on the
right of the Third Indiana
Battery, to support the battery. The Thirty-third Missouri Volunteers
was at once placed in this
position, while the brigade was under a severe fire from the enemy, who
had succeeded in
breaking the first line of battle in front and were rapidly advancing.
The firing becoming still
more severe, the men were ordered to lie down to prevent unnecessary
loss of life. The enemy
86
continued to press the retreating brigades of the first line so closely
as to prevent their reforming
their lines. At this juncture the brigade was ordered to rise up and
advance on the enemy, who
had by this time broken our second line of battle. Here Lieut. Col.
William H. Heath,
commanding the Thirty-third Missouri Volunteers, was severely wounded in
the head while
gallantly leading his command, and was compelled to leave the field,
leaving Maj. George W.
Van Beek in command. The brigade continued to advance, firing incessant
and destructive
volleys into the ranks of the enemy, who could no longer withstand the
strong fire poured into
them from our troops, began to waver, and were immediately charged very
determinedly and
compelled to fall back in great disorder, then followed closely by our
troops. The Thirty-fifth
Iowa soon encountered a large force of the enemy in a ravine thickly
covered with bushes, and
suffered severely from their fire, but they at once gallantly charged
the enemy, killing and
wounding many and capturing about 60 prisoners. The Thirty-third
Missouri Volunteers were
exposed to the fire of a four-gun battery placed in the edge of the
woods, the shots, however,
mostly passing over them. They promptly charged on the battery,
receiving a volley from those
supporting the battery, who broke and fled in confusion after
discharging their pieces, leaving the
battery in our possession. The regiments now entered the woods,
following the retreating enemy,
who under cover closely contested our advance. The regiments, in
pursuing the scattered forces
of the enemy, became separated, but were soon brought together again and
continued to follow
the fleeing, scattered forces of the defeated rebels through the thick
woods until dark; night
prevented further operations. At 7 p.m. the brigade was moved back on
the open part of the
battle-field and bivouacked for the night.
Too much praise cannot be awarded to the officers and men of the
Thirty-third Missouri
Volunteers, and the officers and men of the Thirty-fifth Iowa
Volunteers, for their coolness under
a severe fire, their prompt obedience of orders, and good, soldier-like
conduct during this severe
contest; their bravery deserved victory. The following is a
recapitulation of casualties, a list of
which has already been furnished to you: Killed, 8; wounded, 68;
missing, 2; total, 78. Special
favorable mention is also due to Lieut. Henry Hoover, acting assistant
adjutant-general; Lieut. O.
O. England, acting assistant inspector-general, and Lieut. R. M. Reed,
aide-de-camp, of this
command, for their gallant conduct when exposed to the combined fires of
the enemy's musketry
and artillery, their prompt obedience of all orders; they have performed
their part well.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. G. HILL,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.
Capt. J. B. SAMPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. THIRD BRIG., FIRST Div., 16TH ARMY CORPS,
Vicksburg, Miss., May 28, 1864.
Official report of the part taken by the Third Brigade, First Division,
Sixteenth Army Corps,
in the battle of Bayou De Glaize, La., May 18, 1864: This brigade,
consisting of the Thirty-third
Missouri Volunteers, Thirty-fifth Iowa Volunteers, and detachments of
the Eleventh Missouri
and Eighth and Twelfth Iowa Veteran Volunteer Infantry, was ordered by
Brigadier-General
Mower to move across Bayou Avoyelles, near Bayou De Glaize, at 11 a.m.,
where the enemy
was engaging our skirmishers. At our approach they fell back before our
skirmishers, who were
exposed to a severe fire on their right flank from across Bayou De
Glaize. Here one of the
bravest and most efficient officers, Capt. George C. Burmeister,
Thirty-fifth Iowa, was severely
wounded (shot through the breast) while commanding his company as
skirmishers. After
marching about 2 miles, we found the enemy in force with quite a number
of pieces of artillery. I
87
sent two companies to the front as skirmishers. After a heavy artillery
fire from both sides,
lasting about one hour, we were ordered forward. With much difficulty we
moved by right of
companies to the front, through a dense briar thicket, about one-half
mile wide, all the time
exposed to a severe fire from the enemy's artillery. In the edge of this
thicket we encountered the
forces of the enemy. They could not long stand the fire from our ranks,
and fell back under
cover of their batteries. By order of Brigadier-General Mower, we now
moved back to prevent a
threatened flank movement on our left, carrying with us our dead and
wounded. About threefourths
of a mile back we formed a new line and advanced our skirmishers, and at
4 p.m. were
again ordered to move forward, which was promptly done amidst cheers
along our entire line.
We again found the enemy posted near the edge of the thicket, this time
greatly outnumbering us.
We charged them promptly, pouring volley after volley, deliberately
aimed, into their works as
we advanced. They fled before us, leaving many of their number dead and
wounded on the field.
We captured in both charges about 160 prisoners. In this last charge I
was wounded in the ankle,
and horse shot; and my son, Fred. Hill, acting orderly, was shot through
the head and killed, and
his horse also shot. We were now exposed, in plain sight and at short
range, to the enemy's
artillery. We soon fell back under cover of the thicket, carrying with
us our dead and wounded.
At 6 p.m. we were ordered to the rear as reserves, Lieut. Col. William
B. Keeler, Thirty-fifth
Iowa, now commanding the brigade. At 7 p.m. we were moved to a position
in the front line, on
the left, in the woods, and at 9 p.m. we were ordered back on account of
the fatigue of our men
across Bayou Avoyelles.
Our loss was —, a list of which has already been furnished.
The wounds were generally very severe, being at very close range. Many
of the wounded
have since died. I must again express my admiration of the bravery and
noble conduct of the
officers and men whom I had the honor to command in this engagement.
More could not be
expected of any.
S. G. HILL,
Colonel Thirty-fifth Iowa, Commanding Brigade.
[Capt. JAMES B. SAMPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General. ]
HDQRS. THIRTY-FIFTH REGT. IOWA INFANTRY VOLS.,
Alexandria, La., March 24, 1864.
SIR: In obedience to orders I have the honor to herewith transmit the
operations and list of
casualties incident to the Thirty-fifth Regiment Iowa Infantry
Volunteers from the 21st to the 23d
of March, 1864, inclusive. In obedience to orders, on the 21st the
regiment was ready to move at
5.30 a.m., left in front, and in advance of the division, with two days'
rations; soon after we took
up our line of march and arrived within 3 miles of Henderson's Hill, the
enemy shelling the
advance. After a few moments' rest the brigade was ordered forward,
crossed Bayou Rapides,
took a by-road, and after a long, tedious march in the rain and hail,
through swamp and a dense
pine forest, we arrived in the rear of Henderson's Hill, where the enemy
was camped, capturing
the outposts and pickets, and arriving in the main camp about 12 m.,
surprising the enemy and
capturing 4 pieces of artillery (2 were loaded with canister), 4
caissons filled with fixed
ammunition, 32 horses attached to the artillery, ready for immediate
action; also 222 prisoners,
including 16 officers, 126 horses equipped, 1 guidon, an ambulance with
some surgical
instruments and medicines, which the division surgeon took charge of, 92
stand of small-arms,
many of which, through the darkness of the night and for the want of
transportation, were either
broken up or thrown into the bayou, and in consequence thereof was
enabled to bring off only 12
stand of small-arms.
88
Casualties, 1 man slightly wounded in the mouth by a pistol-shot; he was
carrying the colors
at the time.
At about 2 a.m. on the 22d marched 3 miles from Henderson's Hill,
recrossed the bayou, and
camped till morning. On the 22d, marched within 8 miles of Alexandria,
camped till morning,
and on the 23d marched to Alexandria, La., our present camp.
Most respectfully, yours,
WM. B. KEELER,
Lieut. Col., Comdg. Thirty-fifth Regt. Iowa Infantry Vols.
Lieut. HENRY HOOVER,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. THIRTY-FIFTH REGIMENT IOWA VOL. INFY.,
Grand Ecore, La., April 13, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations
and movements of the
Thirty-fifth Regiment Iowa Volunteer Infantry at Pleasant Hill, La., on
the 9th day of April,
1864:
In obedience to your orders the regiment was formed in line of battle in
rear of Thirty-third
Regiment Missouri Volunteer Infantry at about 5 p.m. of the 9th instant,
which position we
occupied until ordered forward at about 5.15 o'clock; advanced a short
distance in line of battle,
when I received orders to form the regiment on the right of the
Thirty-third Missouri Infantry,
which movement was almost immediately countermanded by a staff officer
from Major-General
Banks, who directed me to change my course by the left oblique, which I
did, passing to the left
of the Thirty-third Missouri Infantry into a deserted camp in good
order, where we were met by a
terrific volley from the advance column of the enemy, who were strongly
posted in a ravine,
filled with an undergrowth of cane, which killed and wounded many of my
men and checked our
advance for a moment, but for a moment only; the men instantly rallied,
and with one prolonged
cheer that arose above the din of battle they charged forward in the
most gallant style, driving the
enemy before them in confusion from the field into the timber, killing,
wounding, and capturing
many of them. After driving them about 200 yards, we halted, reformed,
and moved forward
again nearly one-fourth of a mile through the timber, passing on our way
two cannon that the
enemy had abandoned. We then halted in the road, when I was ordered by
General Mower to
advance the left of the regiment to a position oblique with the road,
and then to move forward,
which I did. Advancing a few paces I received the fire of an advancing
column of the enemy; my
brave men stood it with unflinching courage, and with cheers they poured
into them a
tremendous volley, scattering and driving them in all directions. This
ended the battle for the
day, and we were victorious. It was now dark, and in obedience to your
orders I moved the
regiment out of the timber by the right flank and formed on the left of
Thirty-third Missouri
Volunteer Infantry, when, after issuing ammunition, we bivouacked for
the night. Too much
praise cannot be given to both officers and men for their brave,
courageous, and noble conduct in
the execution of all orders, and the coolness and discipline displayed
by them on the field of
battle. All did well, and I thank them. Our loss was as follows:
Commissioned officers wounded,
3; killed, 1; enlisted men wounded, 54; killed, 5; missing, 1; total
loss in regiment, 64 officers
and men.
Hoping, colonel, in your report my regiment will be favorably mentioned
for their gallantry
and courage, I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. B. KEELER,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Comdg. Thirty-fifth Iowa Infy. Regt.
Col. S. G. HILL,
89
Commanding Third Brigade.
HDQRS. THIRTY-FIFTH REGT. IOWA INFANTRY VOLS.,
Alexandria, La., March 24, 1864.
SIR: In obedience to orders I have the honor to herewith transmit the
operations and list of
casualties incident to the Thirty-fifth Regiment Iowa Infantry
Volunteers from the 21st to the 23d
of March, 1864, inclusive. In obedience to orders, on the 21st the
regiment was ready to move at
5.30 a.m., left in front, and in advance of the division, with two days'
rations; soon after we took
up our line of march and arrived within 3 miles of Henderson's Hill, the
enemy shelling the
advance. After a few moments' rest the brigade was ordered forward,
crossed Bayou Rapides,
took a by-road, and after a long, tedious march in the rain and hail,
through swamp and a dense
pine forest, we arrived in the rear of Henderson's Hill, where the enemy
was camped, capturing
the outposts and pickets, and arriving in the main camp about 12 m.,
surprising the enemy and
capturing 4 pieces of artillery (2 were loaded with canister), 4
caissons filled with fixed
ammunition, 32 horses attached to the artillery, ready for immediate
action; also 222 prisoners,
including 16 officers, 126 horses equipped, 1 guidon, an ambulance with
some surgical
instruments and medicines, which the division surgeon took charge of, 92
stand of small-arms,
many of which, through the darkness of the night and for the want of
transportation, were either
broken up or thrown into the bayou, and in consequence thereof was
enabled to bring off only 12
stand of small-arms.
Casualties, 1 man slightly wounded in the mouth by a pistol-shot; he was
carrying the colors
at the time.
At about 2 a.m. on the 22d marched 3 miles from Henderson's Hill,
recrossed the bayou, and
camped till morning. On the 22d, marched within 8 miles of Alexandria,
camped till morning,
and on the 23d marched to Alexandria, La., our present camp.
Most respectfully, yours,
WM. B. KEELER,
Lieut. Col., Comdg. Thirty-fifth Regt. Iowa Infantry Vols.
Lieut. HENRY HOOVER,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. THIRTY-FIFTH REGIMENT IOWA VOL. INFY.,
Grand Ecore, La., April 13, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations
and movements of the
Thirty-fifth Regiment Iowa Volunteer Infantry at Pleasant Hill, La., on
the 9th day of April,
1864:
In obedience to your orders the regiment was formed in line of battle in
rear of Thirty-third
Regiment Missouri Volunteer Infantry at about 5 p.m. of the 9th instant,
which position we
occupied until ordered forward at about 5.15 o'clock; advanced a short
distance in line of battle,
when I received orders to form the regiment on the right of the
Thirty-third Missouri Infantry,
which movement was almost immediately countermanded by a staff officer
from Major-General
Banks, who directed me to change my course by the left oblique, which I
did, passing to the left
of the Thirty-third Missouri Infantry into a deserted camp in good
order, where we were met by a
terrific volley from the advance column of the enemy, who were strongly
posted in a ravine,
filled with an undergrowth of cane, which killed and wounded many of my
men and checked our
advance for a moment, but for a moment only; the men instantly rallied,
and with one prolonged
cheer that arose above the din of battle they charged forward in the
most gallant style, driving the
enemy before them in confusion from the field into the timber, killing,
wounding, and capturing
90
many of them. After driving them about 200 yards, we halted, reformed,
and moved forward
again nearly one-fourth of a mile through the timber, passing on our way
two cannon that the
enemy had abandoned. We then halted in the road, when I was ordered by
General Mower to
advance the left of the regiment to a position oblique with the road,
and then to move forward,
which I did. Advancing a few paces I received the fire of an advancing
column of the enemy; my
brave men stood it with unflinching courage, and with cheers they poured
into them a
tremendous volley, scattering and driving them in all directions. This
ended the battle for the
day, and we were victorious. It was now dark, and in obedience to your
orders I moved the
regiment out of the timber by the right flank and formed on the left of
Thirty-third Missouri
Volunteer Infantry, when, after issuing ammunition, we bivouacked for
the night. Too much
praise cannot be given to both officers and men for their brave,
courageous, and noble conduct in
the execution of all orders, and the coolness and discipline displayed
by them on the field of
battle. All did well, and I thank them. Our loss was as follows:
Commissioned officers wounded,
3; killed, 1; enlisted men wounded, 54; killed, 5; missing, 1; total
loss in regiment, 64 officers
and men.
Hoping, colonel, in your report my regiment will be favorably mentioned
for their gallantry
and courage, I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. B. KEELER,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Comdg. Thirty-fifth Iowa Infy. Regt.
Col. S. G. HILL,
Commanding Third Brigade.
HDQRS. THIRTY-THIRD MISSOURI VOLUNTEERS,
Alexandria, La., March 23, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to report that, in obedience to orders from
brigade headquarters, this
regiment moved with other troops of the First Division, Sixteenth Army
Corps, from Alexandria,
La., at 6.30 a.m., on Monday, March 21, 1864, arriving in front of the
enemy's position at
Henderson's Hill, La., at about 12 m. of the same day. After a short
rest we crossed, with other
troops of the command, to the lower side of Bayou Rapides, and after a
march of about 5 miles
through marshy lands and pine forests, were halted and ordered to
support a section of Battery G,
Fifth U.S. Artillery. We moved in rear of that section for about 1 mile,
when a halt was ordered
for rest. The men had suffered very severely from hard marching and bad
roads. The rain had
fallen from 1 to 6 p.m., making the ground very soft and slippery, and
compelling some of them
from sheer exhaustion to leave the ranks. In addition to this, it had
hailed severely, and was very
cold. After quite a long halt, it being ascertained that we were in the
rear of the enemy's camp at
Henderson's Hill, and between him and the camp of the rebel General
Walker, arrangements
were made for an immediate attack. The Thirty-fifth Iowa Infantry, being
in advance, was
ordered to move on the former camp, and the Second Brigade having come
up I was ordered to
leave the artillery with them, and move immediately forward to support
the Thirty-fifth Iowa,
which I did at once, moving rapidly up. The enemy's pickets were
relieved by the advance and
placed under guard, a section of his battery, with caissons and horses,
captured, and the center of
his camp gained without raising any alarm or meeting any opposition, the
enemy mistaking us
for re-enforcements which had been requested from General Walker. Moving
rapidly now, with
fixed bayonets, through his camp, we succeeded, without resistance,
except a few pistol-shots, in
capturing a gun and limber and two caissons, all with homes complete,
besides a number of
prisoners, cavalry horses and equipments, and a few small-arms. The
Thirty-fifth Iowa being
already burdened with prisoners, we were ordered to turn over all our
captures to them, and
move to the front, which was done at once, and we passed out of the
enemy's main camp to the
91
Bayou Rapides. Finding the bridge over this bayou in our front destroyed
by fire, we moved to
our left along the bayou, under orders of the brigade commander,
throwing out Companies D and
H as skirmishers. Passing through an open field, our skirmishers picked
up a few prisoners, and
crossing a ravine came upon a deserted camp of the enemy's cavalry, a
few stragglers of whom
we captured, with a number of horses and equipments. Finding the
frame-work of a partially
destroyed bridge at this point, we in half an hour repaired it, and the
enemy's camp being broken
up, we were ordered to cross, and moved back toward Alexandria in a
driving rain, 2 miles,
where we bivouacked for the night at 2 a.m., March 22. At daylight we
moved back once more
toward Jones' Point to support the Ninth Indiana Battery, which was
ordered to cover our forces
while the captured property was being removed from the enemy's camp. At
12 m. the same day
we moved with the main column back toward Alexandria, where we arrived
at 11 a.m. this day.
No casualties occurred in this regiment during the affair.
I am, sir, yours, very truly,
WM. H. HEATH,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Comdg. Thirty-third Missouri Vols.
Lieut. H. HOOVER,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. THIRTY-THIRD MISSOURI INFANTRY VOLS.,
Vicksburg, Miss., May 29, 1864.
SIR: In pursuance of orders received, I have the honor to make the
following report of the
part taken by the Thirty-third Missouri Infantry Volunteers in the
battle of the 18th instant at
Bayou De Glaize: At about 9 a.m. I received orders to move from the
position I then occupied,
viz, in rear of the levee on Avoyelles Bayou, and take a position in the
center of the field, in front
of Fort Carroll and on the left of Battery M, First Missouri Light
Artillery. I remained in this
position about half an hour, when it was ascertained that the enemy were
advancing in force with
a number of pieces of artillery, and I was again ordered to move forward
and take position on the
right of the Third Brigade and in the edge of the woods. At this
juncture I was ordered to send
forward four companies as skirmishers. I accordingly sent Companies C,
D, E, and G, with
orders for E and G to advance and ascertain the position of the enemy
and C and D to deploy to
the right along the bayou, to prevent the enemy's sharpshooters from
getting a flank fire upon us.
The enemy on meeting our skirmishers in front of our line threw a heavy
force against them,
compelling them to fall back. At this time I received orders to charge
the enemy, who were now
pouring a heavy and destructive fire of musketry and artillery upon us,
which I did successfully,
driving the enemy entirely out of the timber and compelling them to fall
back upon their
reserves, which were stationed midway of an open field and in rear of a
sugar-mill and buildings
of the plantation. Upon arriving at the field I received orders to fall
back, under cover of the
timber, and reform. This being accomplished, I was ordered to fall back
to my first position in
rear and on the edge of the above-mentioned timber. All this was
accomplished under a heavy
fire of the enemy's artillery. In the charge my regiment lost quite a
number wounded. The enemy
seeing us fall back again advanced upon our lines, assisted by fresh
troops, and a second time
caused our skirmishers to fall back. At this juncture I was again
ordered to charge the enemy and
if possible dislodge them, although the fire was very severe. I again
charged with the brigade,
again compelling the enemy to retire, which they did in a confused and
disorganized mass,
leaving behind them their dead and wounded and many prisoners in our
possession. Owing to a
misunderstanding of orders received I continued charging across the open
field, and had
advanced about 150 yards into the field, when I received orders to fall
back and reform under
cover of the woods. My loss in this charge was more severe than in the
first, owing to our being
92
in plain view and the enemy opening upon us with his artillery for the
purpose of covering the
retreat of his troops.
As soon as I could collect the prisoners and my dead and wounded
together I was ordered to
fall back to my first position. In the charge I succeeded in capturing
about 40 prisoners, which I
ordered to be placed with a number the Thirty-fifth Iowa had taken in
the same charge. By this
time re-enforcements came forward, and I was ordered to fall back some
600 yards and form in a
ditch in the field in the rear of the timber, for the purpose of
resting, as my men were very much
fatigued from the effects of the two charges we had made. Soon after I
was ordered to move and
take position with my brigade upon the extreme left, in which position I
remained until 8 p.m.,
when I was ordered to move back to Avoyelles Bayou and bivouac for the
night.
The following is a list of casualties of the regiment: A number of
others are slightly
wounded, but not sufficiently to warrant their being reported. Too much
praise cannot be
awarded to the officers and men of my regiment for the coolness and
bravery displayed while
under the enemy's fire.
I have the honor to be, your most obedient servant,
GEO. W. VAN BEEK,
Major, Commanding Regiment.
Lieut. HENRY HOOVER,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. FIRST BRIG., THIRD DIV., 16TH ARMY CORPS,
Mouth Red River, La., May 20, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by
this brigade in the
battle of Bayou De Glaize, fought on the 18th instant near Simsport,
La.: Col. W. F. Lynch,
Fifty-eighth Illinois Volunteers, being absent at the time, the command
of the brigade devolved
on me. At 9 a.m. skirmishing with our cavalry in front caused General
Mower to move Colonel
Hill's brigade to the front, and at 11 o'clock I received orders to move
the First Brigade forward,
and in a few moments was in motion, arriving at or near the scene of
action at 12 m., having
moved out by the flank, the One hundred and nineteenth Illinois
Volunteers in advance, Lieut.
Col. S. E. Taylor commanding, followed by the Ninth Indiana Battery,
Capt. G. R. Brown
commanding; next the Fifty-eighth Illinois, Capt. R. W. Healy
commanding, with the Eightyninth
Indiana, Lieut. Col. H. Craven commanding, bringing up the rear. I then
filed to the left,
and moved across the field, forming with my left resting on the woods.
From thence I moved
forward to a ditch, where I halted to await orders. I soon received
orders for the Fifty-eighth
Illinois to move forward and join on the left of Colonel Hill's brigade,
and for the other two
regiments to remain in their position until Colonel Shaw's brigade came
up on the right, then to
move forward on a line with him. I then sent for the Ninth Indiana
Battery, which had been left
near the road. In a short time Colonel Shaw's brigade and the battery
came up and we moved
forward into the timber. Here Colonel Shaw's brigade was halted, while I
moved forward and
formed on the left of the Fifty-eighth Illinois, when the whole line was
halted. Skirmishers were
thrown out in front and on the left to protect the flank, and the Ninth
Indiana Battery was brought
into position between the One hundred and nineteenth Illinois and the
Eighty-ninth Indiana, and
opened a heavy fire upon the enemy. But it was not long before the enemy
got fine range on our
battery, and put in several very close shots, which compelled us to
change the position of the
battery farther to the left, which was soon done and firing renewed from
the guns. We soon
ascertained that the shots fell short, doing no great damage to the
enemy. During this time,
however, the enemy was steadily advancing, the skirmishing becoming
heavier. The enemy was
93
gradually driving our skirmish line in, and advancing in overwhelming
numbers. The order was
passed to fix bayonets and charge the enemy.
In a moment the whole line was in motion, soon meeting the advancing
foe, and pouring into
his ranks a deadly fire as the men advanced on double-quick. With cheer
upon cheer we
advanced. The enemy faltered, stopped, turned, and fled before the
glittering line of bayonets and
galling fire of our men, who nobly pressed forward through the woods to
the open field beyond.
Here we halted, being too weak to press the charge farther. I then
discovered that an effort was
being made to turn my left flank. I immediately changed the front of the
One hundred and
nineteenth Illinois obliquely to the rear on first company in order to
protect the line. I then
received the order to fall back, and, facing the brigade by the rear
rank, moved back in line of
battle to the open field originally occupied by us. In checking the
attempt made by the enemy to
turn my left, the Ninth Indiana Battery rendered great service,
double-shotting the guns with
canister. The Twenty-seventh Iowa was ordered to its support, and one
section of the Third
Indiana Battery also came to its assistance, and all poured such a
murderous fire into the ranks of
the enemy that he was compelled to fall back in great disorder. I then
reformed the brigade,
moving farther to the right, and then advancing again to the fence in
rear of the timber. Here I
halted until the Second Brigade, Colonel Shaw, was placed in position on
my left. At this time I
learned that Colonel Lynch had arrived on the field during the charge,
and that he had been
severely wounded and carried off the field in a moment after he arrived.
The enemy, having
rallied as we fell back, made another attack upon our skirmish lines,
and with greatly superior
numbers thought to overwhelm our little band; but the men, nothing
daunted or disheartened at
the loss of their comrades, charged the enemy the second time with such
daring bravery that he
again fell back, pursued by our men through the woods into the open
field. Again we were
ordered to fall back to the original position, and again the enemy
attempted to turn our left flank,
but with no better success than at first. After falling back to the open
field the second time, reenforcements
came up, but the enemy had already received such punishment as induced
him not
to try another attack.
Darkness soon came on, and the brigade was ordered back to the camp
across Yellow Bayou,
while the fresh troops took position behind a hedge in the open ground
near the battle-field. This,
perhaps, was one of the most severe battles of the war, considering the
numbers engaged on our
side, having but three brigades, of less than 1,000 men each, to contend
against at least three
times their number, as it is asserted by prisoners taken that the enemy
had 21,000 men, 10,000
of whom were in reserve. The day was excessively warm, and many of our
men fell from
sunstroke and exhaustion. There being no water in our reach, the men
suffered exceedingly for
want of it. The position occupied by this brigade was the most exposed,
as will be seen from the
loss, which is 13 commissioned officers and 146 enlisted men killed and
wounded.
Too much praise cannot be given to the officers and men who participated
in this
engagement. Each one seemed to think that success depended upon his own
individual exertions
and governed himself accordingly. To their extraordinary coolness and
bravery is attributed the
success of the engagement against such vastly superior numbers. It is
proper here to state that the
last charge of the brigade was conducted by Lieut. Col. Hervey Craven,
of the Eighty-ninth
Indiana Volunteers. My horse having been killed in the first charge and
fallen upon my left leg, I
was compelled, after reforming the brigade and moving it forward, to
transfer the command
temporarily to him. Of acts of personal bravery I am unable to speak, as
all did so well it is
almost impossible to particularize. The killed and wounded of the
brigade were with two
exceptions carried from the field. We took several prisoners in each
charge, but I am not able to
give the exact number. To Lieut. Col. Hervey Craven and Maj. Samuel
Henry, of the Eightyninth
Indiana Volunteers; Capt. R. W. Healy, commanding Fifty-eighth Illinois
Volunteers;
94
Lieut. Col. Samuel E. Taylor and Maj. W. H. Watson, of the One hundred
and nineteenth Illinois
Volunteers; Lieut. George Sawin, acting assistant adjutant-general, and
Lieut. William Wallis,
acting assistant inspector-general, First Brigade, and to Capt. George
R. Brown, Ninth Indiana
Battery, I tender my thanks, and to all the officers and men under my
command for their
coolness and bravery in this engagement. My only cause of regret is that
so many brave and good
men fell at the hands of the enemy.
I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS J. KINNEY,
Colonel 119th Illinois Infantry, Comdg. Brigade.
Capt. J. B. SAMPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., THIRD DIV., 16TH ARMY CORPS,
Alexandria, La., March 17, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 14th of
March, 1864, my
command, consisting of the Fourteenth, Twenty-seventh, and Thirty-second
Iowa and Twentyfourth
Missouri Regiments, and Third Indiana Battery, was ordered to take the
advance in line of
march toward Fort De Russy, 28 miles distant. We started at 6 o'clock,
with the enemy's forces
close in front. They fell back as we advanced, attempting to burn
bridges and retard our progress.
We pressed them closely, and although several bridges were fired, little
damage was done to
affect our progress till we reached the Bayou De Glaize, where they had
burned the bridge and
made a stand on the opposite bank with a force of about 600 or 800 men.
I immediately ordered
forward the Third Indiana Battery, with a regiment of infantry, and
opened fire on them, clearing
the banks so as to enable me to cross my infantry unmolested in a scow
which they had left
uninjured, and also enable the pioneer corps to construct a bridge on
which to cross the artillery
and teams. I was here delayed about two hours. As soon as my artillery
had crossed, I pushed
rapidly forward till I arrived at the town of Marksville, 2 miles
distant from the fort. Here, by
order of Brigadier-General Smith, the Twenty-seventh Iowa was left to
close up the rear of the
army. With the rest of my command I pushed on rapidly toward the fort.
At about 4 p.m. I came within range of the guns on the enemy's work. I
ordered the Third
Indiana Battery to take position on or near the main road leading to and
within 800 yards of the
fort and open fire immediately. I then deployed the Fourteenth Iowa on
the right and the Twentyfourth
Missouri on the left of the battery for its support. Lieutenant-Colonel
Newbold,
commanding Fourteenth Iowa, sent forward two companies of his regiment
as skirmishers and
took possession of a line of rifle-pits, about 300 yards from the main
fort, which enabled me to
greatly annoy the enemy's gunners. At this time the fire was exceedingly
brisk from both artillery
and musketry, which was replied to with equal energy and rapidity from
the fort. Colonel Scott,
commanding the Thirty-second Iowa, had now arrived with his regiment. I
ordered him to the
right of an open space on the Marksville road to watch the water battery
and support the
skirmishers of the Fourteenth Iowa, that by this time extended some
distance to the right. This
movement was promptly executed, and the position gained with but slight
loss. A general assault
was now determined on, and I was ordered to advance my brigade, when I
heard heavy firing on
the left. Colonel Gilbert, commanding Twenty-seventh Iowa, had now
arrived, and as my
skirmishers from the Fourteenth Iowa had exhausted their ammunition, I
ordered him to advance
with his regiment to the ground occupied by them. The heavy firing at
this time commenced on
the left, and the command forward was given to all the regiments except
the Twenty-fourth
Missouri, to which I had already dispatched my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant
Berg, with the order,
but just before his arrival the regiment was ordered forward, and led in
person by Brigadier-
95
General Mower, commanding division. The advance was, however, nearly
simultaneous with the
whole brigade, the different regiments arriving at nearly the same time
at the works of the
enemy. The Twenty-fourth Missouri, led by General Mower in person, has
the honor of being the
first of my brigade to plant their colors on the walls of the fort, and
as far as my observation went
the first that were raised on the works of the enemy. At 6 p.m. the
enemy had surrendered. My
command had in twelve hours marched 28 miles, been delayed two hours in
building a bridge,
fought two hours, stormed and assisted in capturing Fort De Russy--a
good day's work.
My special thanks are due to Captain Cockefair, Lieutenant Ginn, and the
other officers and
men of the Third Indiana Battery, for their promptness in bringing on
the action and the steady
bravery with which they maintained their fire for nearly two hours under
the heavy fire of the
enemy's batteries; also to Colonel Gilbert, Twenty-seventh Iowa; Colonel
Scott, Thirty-second
Iowa; Lieutenant-Colonel Newbold, Fourteenth Iowa, and Major Fyan,
Twenty-fourth Missouri,
and all their officers and men, for the promptness and enthusiasm with
which they executed all
orders, and the good order with which they came into action, after so
long and fatiguing a march.
I am proud to say that not a single instance came under my observation
of any officer or soldier
attempting to shun danger or duty during the engagement, and my
opportunity was good for
observing each regiment as it came under fire. To my staff officers,
Captain Granger, Twentyseventh
Iowa; Lieutenant Buell, Fourteenth Iowa; Lieutenant Rapp, Thirty-third
Missouri, and
Lieutenant Berg, Third Indiana Battery, I am under great obligations for
their valuable
assistance rendered during the action; also for the prompt and efficient
manner in which they
fulfilled the duties of their positions.
A list of casualties has already been forwarded.
I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. T. SHAW,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.
Capt. J. B. SAMPLE,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., First and Third Divs., 16th Army Corps.
HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., THIRD DIV., 16TH ARMY CORPS,
Grand Ecore, La., April 15, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that at 10 a.m., April 9, 1864, I
was ordered to report
with my brigade, consisting of the Fourteenth Iowa Infantry,
Twenty-seventh Iowa Infantry,
Thirty-second Iowa Infantry, and Twenty-fourth Missouri Infantry, to
Major-General Banks. By
him I was ordered to proceed with my command to the front, and report to
Brigadier-General
Emory, which I did at about 10.30 a.m. Brigadier-General Emory ordered
me to relieve
Brigadier-General McMillan, who was posted on the left of the Mansfield
road and at right
angles to it, in a dense thicket, with an old field in front dotted over
with small pines. About 100
yards to his front and on his right were four guns of the Twenty-fifth
New York Battery.
Brigadier-General Dwight's command was posted on McMillan's right, and
diagonally to his
rear. On the right of the New York battery was a ridge, which completely
commanded
McMillan's whole line and the town, and which also covered the approach
of the enemy. I
therefore deemed it proper to occupy this ridge with the Twenty-fourth
Missouri Infantry, and
relieve General McMillan with the balance of my brigade. This was
accordingly done and
General McMillan retired. This left a gap on my left and also threw my
right beyond General
Dwight's support, but with this disadvantage I considered the position
better than the one
occupied by the troops I had relieved. At this time General Smith came
up, to whom I pointed
out the position of my forces, which was approved, except that he
ordered me to move my main
line farther to the right, which brought three companies of the
Fourteenth Iowa in and on the
96
right of the Mansfield road; this, consequently, left a greater gap on
my left. General Emory was
aware of the changes by my brigade, but I cannot learn that he gave any
orders for a
corresponding change of Dwight's brigade. General Emory at this time
left the front, and I saw
no more of him till after dark that night, these dispositions having
brought Dwight's brigade in
the rear of my second regiment, and nearly perpendicular to my line of
battle.
At this time my skirmishers were heavily engaged, and an attack appeared
imminent. I
deemed it prudent to consult with General Dwight, as General Emory had
left that part of the
field, and I could neither find him or any of his staff. I accordingly
went along the line of his
brigade to the place where he had his brigade flag, but could neither
find him nor any of his staff,
when I was informed by some officers that they had seen an officer near
a house in the rear,
trying to get a tent pitched, whom they understood to be General Dwight.
I accordingly rode to
the place, and after much difficulty, I aroused an officer who was
pointed out as his assistant
adjutant-general. From him I learned that General Dwight was away, but
said he would send me
word as soon as he returned. After waiting some time, I again went to
his headquarters, but was
unable to learn where he could be found. The enemy's skirmishers had now
(3 p.m.) passed my
right, and my skirmishers were pressed so closely that it had become
necessary to support them
with another company. I again went in search of General Dwight, and this
time found him after a
great deal of difficulty. He appeared to understand my position, and
promised to send the
necessary support; this he not only failed to do, but withdrew farther
to the rear. At about 4 p.m.
General Stone rode to the front. I rode with him along my line, showing
him the change that had
been made from Emory's original line and the necessity of a
corresponding change in Dwight's
line. After examining this part of the field his remark was, "Your
position is well chosen; it is
admirable; it could not be better. I will see that your flanks are
properly supported, for this
position must be held at all hazards," and immediately passed to my
rear, as supposed, to give
the necessary orders, but no orders came. A few moments before 5 o'clock
the enemy opened
heavily on me with artillery, which was replied to feebly, for a few
moments, by the Twentyfifth
New York Battery, when they limbered up and disgracefully left the
field, leaving one
caisson and one gun in the road, which were drawn off by Lieutenant
Buell, of my staff. At the
same time General Dwight fell entirely out of my sight to the rear.
While my battery was leaving
a dash was made by the enemy's cavalry to capture it, but they were so
well received by the
Fourteenth Iowa and Twenty-fourth Missouri that not a single man
escaped, their leader, Colonel
Bagley [Buchel], falling dead in the ranks of the Fourteenth Iowa. This
attack was followed by
their infantry, which advanced in two lines, extending beyond both my
right and left. They
advanced steadily and in good order across the open field in my front,
until they got within easy
range; then my whole line opened upon them, stopping their advance but
not preventing them
from replying vigorously to my fire, causing heavy loss. My men held
their ground, keeping up a
steady and well-directed fire, which soon compelled their first line to
fall back in disorder. In the
mean time fighting had commenced on my left, and our line to my left had
fallen back, so as to
enable the enemy to pass in rear of my left. They had also passed around
my right and were
firing on my flank, when their second line advanced, and I was again
engaged along my whole
front.
At this time I received an order from General Smith to fall back, as the
enemy was getting in
my rear. My staff officers having all been dispatched to different
officers for support, and being
myself on the right of my brigade, I had to ride to the left in rear of
my brigade to give the order
to withdraw. The brush and timber was so thick I could scarcely see 10
paces as I passed down
the line. I sent the order to Colonel Gilbert, Twenty-seventh Iowa, to
fall back as soon as the
regiment on his right should commence retreating. I then pushed on to
give the necessary orders
to Colonel Scott, Thirty-second Iowa, when I met the enemy's forces
entirely in his rear,
97
preventing me from communicating with him. I was therefore compelled to
leave him to act
without orders. Hurrying back to the right, I found the Twenty-fourth
Missouri had been
compelled to change its front to receive the attack from the right; also
that the enemy was
pressing my front with overwhelming numbers, the ammunition of the
Fourteenth Iowa and
Twenty-fourth Missouri nearly exhausted, Lieutenant-Colonel Newbold,
commanding
Fourteenth Iowa, shot dead, his adjutant mortally wounded. I therefore
considered it necessary to
give the orders to fall back to the three regiments with which I could
communicate, leaving
Colonel Scott, Thirty-second Iowa, to extricate himself as best he
could. Owing to the heavy
firing and great loss of officers in the Fourteenth Iowa and
Twenty-fourth Missouri, I was
compelled to give the orders to the men in person to fall back, which,
together with the thick
brush, caused a temporary confusion in their ranks, but they rapidly
reformed and were ready
again to meet the enemy, but night had set in and the fighting ceased.
My men fought well,
holding their ground till ordered to retire, and although my loss was
three times that of any other
brigade on the field, they were still in such condition that the
commanding general saw fit to give
them the responsible post of covering the retreat of the army, which
commenced at 1 o'clock the
next morning, and was accomplished in safety.
I have to report the loss of many valuable officers and men. Among them
I will mention
Lieutenant-Colonel Mix, Thirty-second Iowa, in whom the State has lost a
valuable citizen and
the army a good soldier; and Lieutenant-Colonel Newbold, commanding
Fourteenth Iowa, a
Christian gentleman, and a brave, industrious, and conscientious
officer, whose loss to his
regiment is irreparable.
I cannot speak too highly of my regimental commanders. Of Col. John
Scott, Thirty-second
Iowa, it is sufficient praise to say that he is worthy to command the
Thirty-second Iowa Infantry-
-a regiment which, after having been entirely surrounded and cut off
from the rest of the
command, with nearly one-half of its number either killed or wounded,
among them many of
their best and most prominent officers, successfully forced its way
through the enemy's lines, and
was in line ready and anxious to meet the enemy in less than thirty
minutes. Of Colonel Gilbert,
Twenty-seventh Iowa, and his regiment I can say that they did their
whole duty. Although they
had never been under fire before, they gave their fire with coolness and
precision of veterans,
and fully sustained the reputation of Iowa soldiers. Colonel Gilbert,
although wounded early in
the action, remained in command of his men until the fighting ceased. Of
Lieutenant-Colonel
Newbold, commanding Fourteenth Iowa, and his regiment, upon whose
banners were inscribed
Donelson, Shiloh, Siege of Corinth, and Corinth, they fully maintained
the credit of a name
already glorious in the annals of their country. To Major Fyan,
Twenty-fourth Missouri, with his
command and a detachment of Twenty-first Missouri (those heroes who had
learned to fight
under old Dave Moore), I cannot give too great praise for the successful
manner in which they
defended so long the important position that was assigned them--a
position the most important in
our whole line, and which, had it been defended less obstinately, might
have endangered our
whole army. The long list of killed and wounded, amounting to nearly
500, shows the desperate
valor with which my men fought. My men were the first In the fight, the
longest in the fight, and
in the hardest of the fight, and were the last to leave the
battle-field, and were ready and willing
to remain and reap the fruits of a victory which they had so dearly
purchased; but they were
soldiers and must obey the orders of their superiors. To Captain
Granger, Lieutenant Berg, and
Lieutenant Buell, of staff, I return my warmest thanks for their able
assistance during the action.
My warmest gratitude is due to my orderly, Frederick Nolan, Company K,
Fourteenth Iowa, for
his constant presence whenever needed during the hottest of the action,
and in the most exposed
position.
98
In closing this report I have to state that, although under General
Emory's orders, and the
farthest advanced of any troops in the field, and skirmishing with the
enemy for six hours before
the attack commenced, I neither saw General Emory or any of his staff
until after the fighting
had ceased, nor was I able to find him, although I dispatched several
messengers to him to report
the situation of affairs. Inclosed herewith please find plan of that
part of the battlefield occupied
by my brigade.
WM. T. SHAW,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.
Capt. J. B. SAMPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., THIRD DIV., 16TH ARMY CORPS,
Vicksburg, Miss., May 26, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the part taken by my brigade in the
action of Bayou De
Glaize, May 18, 1864.
My brigade was placed in reserve at the commencement of the action. I
was ordered to send
forward a regiment to support a battery on the right. I sent forward
Major Fyan, Twenty-fourth
Missouri I next sent to the left my two Napoleon guns, under Lieutenant
Burns, Third Indiana
Battery, my two James rifles having already been engaged under
Lieutenant Ginn. I was next
ordered to send another regiment up to support the batteries on the
left. I sent forward the
Fourteenth Iowa, commanded by Capt. L. A. Crane. This left but two
regiments in reserve, viz,
Thirty-second Iowa, Major Eberhart commanding, and Twenty-seventh Iowa,
Colonel Gilbert
commanding. I soon perceived that the enemy was pressing closely our
left, and without waiting
orders I ordered the two regiments in reserve to move slowly to the left
while I rode to the front
to see how the battle went. I soon saw that the cavalry on the left had
given way, and that the
enemy was turning our left flank. I immediately ordered the reserve into
line at double-quick,
fronting to the left, when the enemy made their appearance through the
timber in their front, but
a well-directed fire from the Twenty-seventh and Thirty-second Iowa, the
Ninth Indiana Battery,
and the two 12-pounder Napoleons of the Third Indiana Battery, also the
Fourteenth Iowa, which
had changed its front, soon sent them back with heavy loss. The enemy,
having been heavily reenforced,
again advanced, when I was ordered to move forward and meet him. I moved
forward,
meeting him in the edge of the timber, driving him out of the timber,
across an open field, under
the protection of their artillery, inflicting upon him heavy loss. I
then halted and withdrew with
the balance of the line out of range of canister, and remained till
dark, when we fell back to the
ground occupied the night before. My list of casualties I have already
forwarded. My loss,
though heavy, is comparatively light when it is considered that I was
twice engaged at short
range with nearly four times my number of infantry, and that I was for
two hours under a heavy
fire of artillery.
WM. T. SHAW,
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.
Capt. J. B. SAMPLE,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., 1st and 3d Divs., 16th Army Corps.
HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH IOWA INFANTRY,
On the Steamer Ewing, March 15, 1864.
COLONEL: In compliance with instructions from your headquarters I hasten
to send you a
list of the killed and wounded, and also a report of the part taken by
the Fourteenth Iowa in the
capture of Fort De Russy, March 14, 1864. On nearing the enemy, posted
within his
99
fortifications, two companies of my command, D and I, under Capt. W. C.
Jones, Company I,
were ordered to deploy as skirmishers to the right of the road, where
the enemy's fortifications
were supposed to be situated. Much of the ground passed over was wet and
swampy, yet the
advance was in good order and without a halt, until they reached the
outer works of the enemy,
within 350 yards of the main fort. The enemy seeing this opened fire on
them from the fort,
which was returned with telling effect. This was the opening of the
battle. I sent out another
company, under Lieutenant King, Company K, which took position in the
swamp on the left of
the other skirmishers, and did good execution. These three companies,
aided by one company of
the Thirty-second Iowa, which had been ordered to report to Captain
Jones, kept up such a
destructive fire that it became impossible for the enemy to use his
guns, consequently the
artillery firing in that direction entirely ceased. I advanced the
regiment, which had been posted a
short distance in rear of the skirmishers, as you directed, when the
firing became brisk on the
extreme left of the line. The nature of the ground for a short distance
was such as to break the
line very much, but as soon as the open field was reached and the
command forward was given
by the officers, the regiment, joined by the skirmishers, dashed through
the field into the ditch
and clambered over the parapet into the fort with a shout that drowned
the rattle of the enemy's
musketry.
Officers and men acted nobly. None were killed. Below is a list of the
wounded, which I am
happy to know is very small.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOSEPH H. NEWBOLD,
Lieut. Col., Comdg. Fourteenth Iowa Vol. Infantry.
Col. WILLIAM T. SHAW,
Commanding Second Brigade.
HDQRS. FOURTEENTH IOWA INFANTRY VOLUNTEERS,
Grand Ecore, La., April 12, 1864.
COLONEL: In compliance with instructions from your headquarters I
herewith submit the
following report of the part taken by the Fourteenth Iowa Infantry
Volunteers in the battle of
Pleasant Hill, La., April 9, 1864: The regiment moved out to the front
with the brigade to which
it was attached at a few minutes of 11 a.m., taking position upon a line
parallel with an open
field, the right resting upon a road immediately in rear of the
Twenty-fifth New York Battery.
Company I, under command of Second Lieut. G. H. Logan; Company K, under
command of
Capt. William J. Campbell, were deployed as skirmishers across the
center of the field, their left
resting upon the skirmish line of the Twenty-seventh Iowa. Skirmishing
occurred at intervals
until 4.30 p.m., when the enemy advanced, by a terrible cavalry charge,
our skirmishers rallying
in their appropriate places. The Twenty-fifth New York Battery fell back
in rear of us. We
reserved our fire until the enemy were in easy pistol range, when we
opened fire upon them,
which almost annihilated them, horses and riders rolling almost within
our lines. This charge was
followed by an advance of infantry in two lines, when the conflict
became general. The enemy
was repulsed in front with a heavy slaughter. The second line advanced
upon our front and a line
at right angles upon right flank, opening a terrible cross-fire. Our
right was changed in the new
direction to meet the new line. In this deadly cross-fire our lamented
lieutenant-colonel, J. H.
Newbold, fell from his horse mortally wounded, the ball passing through
his body from the right
breast, disabling his left arm. Here also fell Lieutenant Logan,
Lieutenant McMillen, Lieutenant
Shanklin, and Lieutenant Hazlett, officers beloved by all, nobly laying
their bodies a bloody
sacrifice upon their country's altar. The long list of casualties below
clearly indicates the
irreproachable bravery and indomitable will of the regiment.
100
Upon the fall of Lieutenant-Colonel Newbold I assumed command of the
regiment, and I
tender my most hearty thanks to the officers, commissioned,
non-commissioned, and privates,
for the gallant manner in which they sustained their reputation, gained
upon the bloody fields of
Donelson. Shiloh, Corinth, De Russy, and Pleasant Hill. I withdrew the
regiment with the rest of
the brigade, by your order, at 6 p.m.
WARREN C. JONES,
Captain, Comdg. Fourteenth Regiment Iowa Infy. Vols.
Col. WILLIAM T. SHAW,
Commanding Second Brigade.
HDQRS. FOURTEENTH IOWA VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
In the Field, May 22, 1864.
COLONEL: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken
by the Fourteenth
Iowa Volunteer Infantry in the battle of Bayou De, Glaize, La., on the
18th day of May, 1864:
After forming my command in line of battle under your direction, and
being marched nearly to a
belt of timber known as Old Oaks, I marched the regiment by the left
flank, as you directed, into
the timber to support the Ninth Indiana Battery. The enemy being
repulsed I reformed on the
main line on the right of a section of the Third Indiana Battery, and
again advanced, under a
heavy fire from the front and left, and drove the enemy out of the
timber and across an open
field, a distance of nearly a mile, when I was ordered to halt my
command. No further advance
was made during the day.
The conduct of both officers and men during the engagement, with very
few exceptions, was
good. The following is a list of killed and wounded, as shown by reports
of company
commanders.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
L. A. CRANE,
Captain, Comdg. Fourteenth Iowa Vol. Infantry.
Col. W. T. Shaw,
Comdg. Second Brig., Third Div., 16th Army Corps.
HDQRS. TWENTY-SEVENTH REGT. IOWA VOL. INFY.,
On Board Steamer Diadem, Alexandria, La., March 17, 1864.
CAPTAIN: In compliance with orders from headquarters Second Brigade,
Third Division,
Sixteenth Army Corps, I have the honor to report that while on the march
near the town of
Marksville, La., on the 14th day of March, 1864, the Twenty-seventh
Regiment Iowa Volunteer
Infantry was ordered to halt in the town as provost guards until the
army had passed through,
after which we were to resume our march. When the column had moved by I
assembled the
guards and moved rapidly forward, keeping well closed up on the train
just in my advance. When
cannonading commenced the remainder of the brigade to which my regiment
was attached were
in the advance, having moved forward while we were on duty as provost
guards in the town of
Marksville. I immediately sent forward Lieutenant Peck, acting adjutant,
to Colonel Shaw,
commanding brigade, requesting him that I might be permitted to take my
place in the brigade.
Lieutenant Peck returned and reported to me that he had failed to find
Colonel Shaw. I sent him a
second time. The request was granted, and we were directed to move
forward. We were ordered
to relieve the Fourteenth Iowa Infantry, and moved up to do so, but at
that moment a
simultaneous charge was ordered. It was a long way to the fort (De
Russy). The ground over
which we must charge was well cleared of trees. Many logs lay on the
ground, and several
ditches were to be crossed. At the command, "Forward, double-quick,
march!" the entire
101
regiment sprang forward with a will, moving too rapidly at times for a
long charge, but- all the
time under apparent good control. We sprang into the ditch on the east
and south sides of the
fort, and mounted the parapet in all haste. When the fort was
surrendered a part of my regiment,
with- others of other regiments, joined in a fire of musketry, and with
them united in a wild,
ringing, vociferous yell of joy. It was the first time we had ever
charged upon an enemy's works,
and it has not been reported to me that any officer or soldier failed to
do his duty and to do it
well. Our list of casualties is as follows: Robert Beck, private,
Company G, dangerously
wounded in the left breast by accidental discharge of gun.
I have the honor to be, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JAS. I. GILBERT,
Colonel, Commanding Regiment.
Capt. C. T. GRANGER,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. TWENTY-SEVENTH REGT. IOWA VOL. INFY.,
Grand Ecore, La., April 11, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the following list of casualties in
the Twenty-seventh
Regiment Iowa Infantry Volunteers at the battle of Pleasant Hill, April
9, 1864, together with
remarks:
About 10 a.m. we were ordered into line. Moved 1 miles on the road to
Shreveport and took
position on the left center of the brigade, in the advance line,
relieving the Fifteenth Maine
Volunteer Infantry. Our line was established in the edge of a thick
wood. Our men were ordered
to lie down. An open field lay to our front. Company B was immediately
thrown out as
skirmishers. Firing was quite brisk among the skirmishers until 3.30
p.m., the enemy's
skirmishers appearing at times and falling back. At 3.30 p.m. the enemy
advanced in force. Our
skirmishers fought well until overpowered and driven in. Immediately
they resumed their place
in the regiment, when the enemy steadily approached in strong columns.
At this point a bold
cavalry charge was made by the enemy along the Shreveport road. Our men
remained quiet until
they had approached to within short range, when a full volley was fired
into the rebel ranks. The
effect was telling. Riders reeled and fell senseless. Horses were struck
as dead as if a bolt of
heaven had riven the very air. The scene was an appalling one. Scarcely
a man who made that
charge but met death on the spot. The enemy had moved up on the left of
the advance line in
strong force. The line had already broken away to the left, and news
came from my left that the
enemy was flanking us. Already they were firing in our rear. Several
shots had taken effect in the
ranks of Companies B and G. The enemy advanced in our front in solid
columns. We met them
with a determined fire. Volley after volley was fired into their ranks.
For two hours the rattle of
musketry was incessant and deafening. Several shot and a number of shell
struck immediately by
us, bursting and wounding a number of men. About 5.30 p.m. the order was
given to retire, but
was not received by me until other regiments had retired, leaving both
flanks of my regiment
greatly exposed. We fell back in good order and in line until the enemy
was discovered to be
flanking us, when the line was broken, and we escaped through a narrow
passage, the enemy
pouring a sharp fire upon both flanks, and closing in rapidly on our
rear. At this point a large part
of those reported in the following list were killed or wounded. We
immediately formed line in
the rear of supporting column and awaited orders.
I am well pleased with the conduct of the men on that occasion. I would
like to mention the
names of some of the officers and soldiers who distinguished themselves,
but all conducted
themselves so bravely and so well that I refrain from mentioning any
save Capt. J. M. Holbrook,
Company F, who, after having received a severe wound, led his company
with distinguished
102
gallantry until a second severe wound was received, and the regiment had
reformed in the rear of
the supporting column.
I have the honor to be, captain, very respectfully,
JAS. I. GILBERT,
Colonel, Commanding Regiment.
Capt. C. T. GRANGER,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. TWENTY-SEVENTH REGT. IOWA VOL. INFY.,
Steamer Diadem, May 26, 1864.
LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part
taken by my
regiment in the battle of Old Oaks, La., on the 18th May, 1864: At about
11 a.m. the brigade to
which my regiment was attached, commanded by Col. William T. Shaw, was
ordered to move
out by the right flank on the Marksville road, which lies parallel with
Bayou De Glaize. The
brigade moved about 1 mile up Bayou De Glaize, when they were ordered to
form line of battle
at right angles with the bayou. My post formed the right center of the
brigade. We were ordered
to advance in line, and moved forward about half a mile, when we were
ordered to lie down. We
were now about 500 yards in the rear of the advance line of battle. We
staid in this position for
the space of two hours, subjected meanwhile to the artillery fire of the
enemy, which was very
heavy. At 3 p.m. we were ordered to move by the left flank at a
double-quick about 500 yards,
when we formed a line perpendicularly to the rear of our former line,
and at this point we were
subjected to a very heavy fire from the small-arms of the enemy, but in
about fifteen minutes
succeeded in repulsing him. We then changed front again by moving by the
right flank and filing
right, and remained in this position nearly a half hour, when we were
ordered to advance. We
moved forward about 1,000 yards through a heavy piece of timber, driving
the enemy before us,
but as we came out on the open ground the enemy opened on us with grape
and canister, forcing
us to retire. We fell back to our former position in good order,
considering the roughness of the
ground and the thickness of the underbrush. We staid in this position
about one-half hour, when
we were ordered to fall back by the flank nearly a half mile, where we
lay until sunset. We were
then ordered back to the position occupied by the regiment the night
before, where we lay all
night. The loss of the regiment was 3 killed and 14 wounded. Officers
and men of my command
behaved with the greatest coolness and bravery. Where all did so well it
is useless to
particularize.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JAS. I. GILBERT,
Colonel, Commanding Regiment.
Lieut. W. G. DONNAN,
Acting Assistant Adjutants-General.
HDQRS. THIRTY-SECOND IOWA INFANTRY,
Steamer Southwester, near Fort De Russy, La., Mar. 15, 1864.
CAPTAIN: In relation to the part sustained by my command in the capture
of Fort De Russy,
on yesterday, I have the honor to report that when the attack commenced
my regiment, preceded
by the Fourteenth Iowa Infantry, Third Indiana Battery, and
Twenty-fourth Missouri Infantry,
was approaching on the Marksville road, moving by the right flank and
about 2 miles distant. I
advanced in this manner as rapidly as was consistent with efficiency
until within supporting
distance of the battery, and formed line of battle, my left resting on
the road. I was here met by
Brigadier-General Mower, and ordered into position on the extreme right.
To obtain a position
103
partially covered from the fort by uneven ground intervening, also some
unfinished and
unoccupied works, but exposed to the fire of the water battery, it was
necessary to cross an open
field. This was done under a heavy fire of shell and musketry, which
fortunately was too high to
be very destructive. One shell exploded in the ranks, killing 1 man and
for a moment disabling
others by the shock. Presently I ordered forward 12 men to act as
sharpshooters, and soon after
advanced three companies from my right for the same purpose. While in
this position I was
ordered, on hearing heavy firing on my left, to advance the command,
open fire, and take such
cover as I could find within short range of the works, but not to storm
them. In obeying this order
I soon discovered that the works were to be entered at once. Officers
and men dashed forward
with shouts into the ditch, over the parapet, and into the fort. In this
advance 2 men were
wounded, I very dangerously, 1 severely. While all behaved well, many
acted with conspicuous
gallantry. Their highest compliment is in the words of the prisoners:
"The men on the right took
the fort."
With devout thankfulness that the list is so short I append statement of
casualties.
I am, very respectfully, your most obedient,
JOHN SCOTT,
Colonel, Commanding Regiment.
Capt. C. T. GRANGER,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. THIRTY-SECOND IOWA VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
Grand Ecore, La., April 12, 1864.
SIR: In relation to the engagement at Pleasant Hill, La., on the 9th
instant, and the matters
intimately connected therewith, I have the honor to report that on the
morning of the 7th instant,
moving from Grand Ecore, according to the order of the march for that
day my regiment was in
the rear of the brigade. Everything progressed satisfactorily until
about 2 p.m., when we
encountered the headquarters train of Major-General Banks, entirely
blocking the way and
hindering our progress. The wagons were overloaded, and were said to
contain articles ranging in
weight from paper collars to iron bedsteads. In this manner two
brigades, including artillery and
trains, were delayed more than four hours in the midst of heavy
rain-storms. Finally the troops
passed by in an effort to reach the assigned camping-ground before dark,
but failed, and camped
2 miles short of the proper position, subsistence and camp equipage not
coming up until the night
was far advanced.
On the 8th, we moved forward 20 miles, and camped near Pleasant Hill at
sunset. For several
hours had heard heavy artillery some miles in advance. During the night
our camp was overrun
with stragglers from the front, who circulated the wildest stories of
disaster and loss of men,
artillery, and trains.
On the morning of the 9th, these were repeated and exaggerated. The road
was seen to be
filled with teams crowding to the rear. Evidences of past defeat and
prospective retreat were
everywhere visible. These were the moral surroundings as my command was
moved to the
extreme front, and took position in line of battle at 10 a.m., relieving
a portion of the Nineteenth
Corps. My position in line, being on the extreme left of the brigade,
was supported on the right
by the other regiments of the brigade, and more immediately by the
Twenty-seventh Iowa
Infantry. My left, for some reason still unknown to me, was without
support, though threatened,
and might be considered a key to the whole position. I rested in the
edge of a woods in the rear of
an old field, which extended for a mile to my front, and across which my
skirmishers
occasionally exchanged shots with the enemy's pickets throughout the
day, but without casualty
to my command. Our line was at right angles to the Mansfield road, and
about 1 mile from the
104
village of Pleasant Hill. About 4 p.m. the activity of the enemy's
skirmishers increased, and in a
short time he advanced across the open space in our front in heavy
force, moving in column by
battalion, deploying as he advanced. My skirmishers were recalled, and
my left company, which
had been thrown forward and to the left to cover my exposed flank, was
forced back with some
loss, and took its proper position in the line. The fire of my command
was reserved until the
enemy was within easy range, and when opened was so destructive that he
faltered, passed to my
left and through the open space to my rear, losing heavily by the fire
of my left wing as he
passed, but threatening to cut off my command from our main forces. I at
once sent information
to my superior and to the commander of the troops on my immediate right
of this peril to the
whole line, but without orders to abandon my position, though very
critical, I could do nothing
but change the front of my extreme left to face the new danger, and
protect my flank and rear, if
possible. This was done, and a well-directed fire kept up to the front
and left, which kept the
enemy at bay.
Mean time he was steadily pouring his columns past- my left, and working
across the rear of
my position, so that in a short time the battle was in full force far in
my rear. In this state of
affairs I discovered that all the troops on my right had been withdrawn,
taking with them a
portion of my right wing. Lieutenant-Colonel Mix, in charge of the right
wing, and Captain
Miller, commanding Company B, on my extreme right, fell fatally wounded.
My attention had
been chiefly directed to the front and left, as the exposed directions,
and I only came to a
knowledge of the retrograde of the right when the first three companies
were already gone. The
timber and undergrowth were such that I could not observe my whole line
from any one point.
The movement was promptly checked, but the ground thus left vacant was
promptly occupied by
the enemy, and a destructive fire opened upon us from a new direction,
rendering it necessary
that it should be met by a new line, which was done. My lines now faced
in three directions. I
was completely enveloped, without orders, and virtually in the hands of
the enemy, had he dared
to close in and overwhelm us with his masses now around us. This was my
position until after
sunset, by which time the enemy had left my front, passing now by my
right to the rear, where
the fight was still raging, and observing by the fire and the cheers of
our men that he had been
forced back on the left, and that our forces in that direction could not
be distant, I moved by the
left flank about 200 yards to the left and rear, where I met and joined
our most advanced troops.
My brave men were nearly out of ammunition, which for the past hour had
been well husbanded.
They were exhausted, but not dismayed, and felt that the battle-field
was ours. I inclose a list of
the killed, wounded, and missing, a total of 210, which I desire may be
considered a part of this
report.
Owing to all parties from my command being unable to pass the
picket-lines during the night
to visit the wounded still upon the field, and then compelled to abandon
them very unexpectedly
in the morning, there is a degree of uncertainty in relation to the
casualties that is extremely
embarrassing and painful. I fear the number of fatal casualties will
exceed the number stated, and
that of those marked "missing" many are killed or wounded. From an early
period of the action
our position was such that disabled men seeking the hospital would
necessarily fall into the
hands of the enemy in our rear. Lieut. Col. Edward H. Mix fell at his
post, cheering and
encouraging the command by his example. The same was the glorious fate
of Capt. Amos B.
Miller. In them, as also in Capt. Hubert F. Peebles, Capt. Michael
Ackerman, First Lieut. John
Devine, all dangerously wounded, and First Lieut. Thomas O. Howard,
fatally wounded, I mourn
the loss of good men as well as gallant soldiers. The record of others
is found in casualty list, and
in the body of this report. To Captain Jonathan Hutchison my especial
thanks are due, not only
for his gallant conduct, but also for repressing reckless exposure among
the men of the
105
command, and thus saving valuable lives. His son, a youth of much
promise, was killed by his
side early in the action.
Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
JOHN SCOTT,
Colonel Thirty-second Iowa Infantry, Comdg. Regt.
Col. WILLIAM T. SHAW,
Commanding Brigade.
HEADQUARTERS THIRTY-SECOND IOWA INFANTRY,
Steamer Southwester, May 23, 1864.
SIR: In relation to the part taken by my command in the action on Bayou
De Glaize, on the
18th instant, I have the honor to report that at 10 a.m. my regiment was
ordered forward with the
brigade to engage the enemy. In the brigade we occupied the position of
Third Battalion; on the
right, Twenty-seventh Iowa and Twenty-fourth Missouri, on the left,
Fourteenth Iowa.
During the first part of the action, being in the second line, we were
under a heavy fire from
artillery. Some guns from Third and Ninth Indiana Batteries being thrown
forward on the left,
the Fourteenth Iowa was detached as support. A few minutes after, the
cavalry on the left, being
pressed very heavily, gave way, permitting the enemy to bring a heavy
force against the left. At
this time I received orders to move by the left flank into the woods;
but the enemy having
advanced so rapidly as the batteries came out, Brigadier-General Mower
in person gave me
orders to change front by filing the battalion to the left, which was
done in time to meet the
attack. Being at the left of the battalion I found the right to have
been detached from the Twentyseventh
Iowa and moved back to a ditch, forming an oblique line toward the
enemy. This, I have
since understood, was done by orders given by an officer belonging to
Brigadier-General
Mower's staff, but without my knowledge. The enemy was repulsed after a
brisk action of ten or
fifteen minutes. We were afterward thrown forward into the woods, but
were not again under
fire. Owing to the intense heat and necessary rapidity of our movements,
many of the men were
entirely exhausted and had to be carried from the field. Officers and
men conducted themselves
in a creditable manner during the engagement. I send herewith a list of
casualties.
G. A. EBERHART,
Major, Commanding Thirty-second Iowa Infantry.
Lieut. W. G. DONNAN,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Pass Cavallo, Tex., March 24, 1864.
COLONEL: Major Thomson, commanding Twentieth Regiment Iowa Volunteer
Infantry,
stationed at Aransas Pass, reports, 22d instant, that a wood party from
his command, in boats,
having put in at Corpus Christi during a severe norther, was attacked
there by a band of partisan
rangers under Major Nolan. The rebels were repulsed with the loss of 1
killed and 3 wounded.
No loss on our side.
Your obedient servant,
JNO. A. McCLERNAND,
Major-General, Commanding.
Lieut. Col. RICHARD B. IRWIN,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Dept. of the Gulf.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARKANSAS, &c.,
106
Camden, Ark., April 22, 1864.
GENERAL: We arrived here on the 15th instant, having been delayed about
ten days by bad
roads and the failure of the command from Fort Smith to join us
according to agreement. We
have been bushwhacked, attacked in front and rear and flank, and have
driven Price out of two
defensive works, each about 1 3/4 miles in extent. The rebels gained no
success until since we
arrived here they captured a forage train. There seems to be no doubt
that Banks has fallen back
to Alexandria. If he gives up the expedition Smith will send a large
force against me, and
endeavor to recapture this place, which virtually gives us command of
the Ouachita. Price is in
front of us at present. He commanded in person at Prairie D'Ane. Kirby
Smith has promised to
send him re-enforcements, and it is reported that they will soon be
here. Several of my regiments
have enlisted as veterans, and must be furloughed or go out of service
on account of breach of
contract. To prevent this I have just ordered the veterans of the First
Iowa Cavalry home. Two of
my veteran regiments have been seized and ordered elsewhere. I hope that
due consideration will
be given to this department. It appears to me bad policy to give the
rebels an opportunity of reestablishing
themselves firmly in their Trans-Mississippi Department after they have
been nearly
beaten out of it. I cannot understand why Banks fell back, if he started
from Alexandria prepared
to go to Shreveport. If one of my emissaries had not returned I should
have known nothing of his
movements except from report. Although I believe we can beat Price, I do
not expect to meet
successfully the whole force which Kirby Smith could send against me, if
Banks should let him
go. This is a strong place. The rebels have fortified it for us, but
until we can get the assistance of
the gun-boats on the Ouachita the Arkansas must be our base of supplies.
The rebels have a large
cavalry force, and it is not safe to send a train without a large
escort. One was captured the other
day escorted by 1,300 men, two James guns, and two mountain howitzers.
It is useless to talk of
obtaining supplies in this country for my command. The country is
well-nigh exhausted, and the
people are threatened with starvation. A bearer of dispatches from
General Banks has just
arrived. I suppose dispatches of a similar import have been sent you. It
is reported that 8,000
infantry joined Price yesterday from Shreveport. Price was undoubtedly
re-enforced, to what
extent I do not know. They are just opening with artillery upon my outposts.
I will write you soon.
Very truly yours,
F. STEELE,
Major-General.
P. S.--Banks was at Grand Ecore when the bearer of dispatches left him,
having fallen back
30 miles from Pleasant Hill, where the battle was fought.
F. S.
LITTLE ROCK, May 4, 1864.
P. S.--This letter was sent by a bearer of dispatches who did not get
through. Another
dispatch was sent to you, and one addressed to General Halleck, which
failed also.
Very respectfully,
F. STEELE,
Major-General.
Maj. Gen. W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARKANSAS,
Little Rock, May 4, 1864.
107
GENERAL: On my arrival at this place night before last I learned that my
dispatches from
Camden up to the 18th ultimo had been forwarded to you, and also
dispatches from Colonel
Clayton and General Andrews giving imperfect accounts of subsequent events.
I shall defer my detailed report of the campaign until reports and
returns of casualties can be
obtained from subordinate commanders, giving in this only a synopsis of
the operations since the
18th ultimo. The command had been on short rations during the whole
campaign, except when
occasionally supplies could be obtained in the country. On the 20th
ultimo we received a supply
from Pine Bluff, with ten days' half rations for the command. Some meat
was obtained on the
east side of the Ouachita, and one small grist-mill and ten hand-mills
were constantly kept at
work grinding corn, for which the country for a great distance from
Camden on both sides of the
river was scoured. Four thousand or 5,000 bushels were captured on the
steamer Homer. The
rebels destroyed all the good mills and all the corn in the neighborhood
of Camden. On the 22d
ultimo the supply train was sent back under escort of a brigade of
infantry (about 1,600 men),
400 cavalry, and four pieces of artillery. Captain Dunham, bearer of
dispatches from General
Banks, arrived, confirming the report which I had previously received
that Banks had fallen back
behind intrenchments at Grand Ecore. I also received information that
Price had been re-enforced
by 8,000 infantry from Shreveport. In the evening of this day he opened
with artillery upon my
outposts. Captain Dunham returned with dispatches to General Banks,
informing him of my
inability to advance on account of a want of supplies and the superior
rebel force in front of me.
He had sent me a request to move forward at once and join him on Red
River. On the night of the
25th, we learned that the train, the artillery, and most of the infantry
of the escort had been
captured by a force under Fagan, said to be 5,000 or 6,000 strong. This
force must have crossed
the Ouachita 50 or 60 miles below Camden, as my cavalry scouting parties
and spies reported the
country all clear between the Moro and Washita, and that no crossing of
the river by rebels could
be heard of. The rebels came up between the Moro and Saline and attacked
the train about 8
miles from the crossing on the latter in the Moro Swamp. Our troops
fought gallantly, but were
overwhelmed by a dash of the rebels. Lieutenant-Colonel Drake, their
gallant commander, was
severely wounded and taken prisoner. About 500 veterans of the First
Iowa Cavalry, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Caldwell, going on furlough, were a few miles in rear
of the train when it
was attacked. On hearing the firing they pressed forward, but were met
by a superior force and
fighting fell back. I sent all of my available cavalry to their support.
They returned to Camden,
having lost 1 lieutenant captured and a few men wounded. They captured a
rebel captain and
killed a colonel, who led the attack upon them.
We received information through prisoners, deserters, and spies that
Kirby Smith had come
up with re-enforcements from Shreveport, and was present at the
cannonading on our outposts on
the 22d. If we had been supplied at Camden I could have held the place
against Kirby Smith's
entire force, but on learning that my communications were effectually
interrupted, and that the
line of the Arkansas was threatened by so large a force of the enemy, I
decided to fall back at
once. The ammunition and baggage trains were put across the river on the
pontoon bridge, and
at-nightfall on the 26th the troops commenced to cross, the pickets
being kept in position until
everything was over, when they were quietly withdrawn and the pontoon
bridge taken up without
any suspicion on the part of the enemy that the movement had commenced.
To avoid the bad
roads through the Moro Swamp on the Mount Elba road, the march was
directed toward Jenkins'
Ferry, via Princeton. Fagan, with a considerable force, crossed our road
a few hours in advance
of us, moving toward Benton, where it was said he was going to cross the
Saline for the purpose
of threatening Little Rock.
Our advance reached the Saline at Jenkins' Ferry at 2 p.m. 29th. It
rained very heavily. The
pontoon was laid, and the cavalry commenced crossing immediately. The
stream was high and
108
was continually rising from the rain which continued to fall. From the
same cause the bottom,
being cut up by our artillery and baggage trains, was becoming almost
impassable and required
corduroying. Before the rear of the column got into the bottom it was
attacked -by infantry and
artillery. No damage was done us; the rebels were kept off by our
skirmishers. The infantry
bivouacked in the bottom, while the trains and artillery were being
crossed all night.
At daylight on the morning of the 30th, the enemy commenced skirmishing
with our pickets.
I suppose it was Fagan's command, which had returned on our rear. The
firing did not become
very heavy for several hours. I directed General Carr, with nearly all
the effective cavalry force,
to move as rapidly as possible by the shortest route to Little Rock to
intercept any rebel force that
might be moving in that direction. The Saline bottom is 2 miles wide on
each side of the river
along the Jenkins' Ferry road. The rain continued and many of the wagons
became irretrievably
stuck in the mud on the east side of the river. Some of the animals,
from exhaustion and want of
forage, were unable to make their way through the miry places without
the harness, consequently
a good deal of baggage and some of the wagons had to be destroyed and
teams doubled on the
ammunition train. The trains and artillery were parked on the high
grounds, 2 miles from the
bridge, as they arrived. They were guarded at first only by about 1,500
dismounted and
ineffective cavalry. As we did not know where the enemy might strike us,
it was thought prudent
to order forward two regiments of infantry to their support. While the
crossing was going on
General Salomon was left with his division, consisting of the brigades
of General Rice and
Colonel Engelmann, supported by General Thayer's division of the Army of
the Frontier, except
two regiments that had been sent to the front to cover our rear and
prevent the enemy from
interrupting the crossing. The fire of the enemy became heavy, and
Salomon formed his line of
battle in a good position for defense, the right resting perpendicularly
on an impassable bayou,
and the left, which was protected by a wooded swamp against anything
except, perhaps,
skirmishers, was thrown back. The reserve was so posted that any part of
the line which might be
pressed could be promptly re-enforced. About 9 a.m. the enemy made a
desperate assault in
heavy force upon our line, but were handsomely repulsed, our troops
having the advantage in
cover as well as position. General Salomon asked for more troops, and
expressed some doubts of
being able to hold his position without them. I ordered up two regiments
of infantry that had
been sent to the front, and instructed him to hold his position at all
hazards. This effort was
renewed with redoubled energy, but they were again repulsed and driven
back with great
slaughter.
At 10.30 a.m. another assault was made along the whole line and the
rebels repulsed and
driven off the field, our troops charging them as they fell back. The
Second Kansas (colored)
took 2 guns and the Twenty-ninth Iowa 1, under the immediate direction
of General Rice. A
number of prisoners were captured, officers and privates, all of whom
concurred in saying that
Kirby Smith and Price were both present, and that they had nine brigades
of infantry. Smith did
not know that we had evacuated Camden until noon next day, when he
immediately gave orders
for the pursuit. His troops were crossed on a raft constructed of logs
with planks nailed across
them, at the very spot where our pontoon bridge lay. The artillery was
crossed in a flat-boat.
They marched without baggage, with five days' rations in haversacks, and
expected to capture
our entire command. They did not capture a man except those whom I
thought it necessary
should be left on the battle-field. This necessity I regretted, but
thought it of more vital
importance to secure the safe passage of my command across the Saline
than to attempt to bring
off wounded men for whom I did not have proper transportation. More were
brought off than we
could have carried away had they been as severely wounded as those who
were left behind.
Some of our troops pursued the retreating rebels a mile, and even over
the whole field. They say
the enemy's loss was five to one compared with ours. I cannot now give a
correct estimate of the
109
loss on either side, but will endeavor to do so in my detailed report.
The number of our troops
engaged did not exceed 4,000. I have no means of estimating that of the
enemy, but it was at
least three times this number, with artillery. All our artillery had
been sent across the river early
in the day except one section, and even that was withdrawn to get it out
of the mud. At the time
the enemy was routed, all of our trains and artillery had just completed
the passage of the river.
The enemy having disappeared from the field our troops were withdrawn
and passed over the
bridge without interruption from the enemy. The bridge was kept two
hours to pass over our
wounded men and stragglers. It was nearly worn out (India-rubber
floats), having been in use
over two years; some parts of it were 2 feet under water and I ordered
it to be destroyed. We had
no transportation for it, the mules were exhausted, the wagons were
destroyed. It had done good
service; without it my whole command would in all probability have been
lost. General Halleck
sent it to me two years ago last March, to operate on Current and Black
Rivers. One surgeon and
two assistant surgeons, with sufficient number of hospital attendants,
were left to attend the
wounded. Hospital supplies were also left. The rebels did not attempt to
follow us. The rain
continued until late in the evening and the road toward Little Rock had
become almost
impassable for trains and artillery. I ordered the worst of the wagons
and the least valuable
baggage to be destroyed, and the best teams to be put to the artillery
and the remaining wagons.
The ambulances and wagons carrying the sick and wounded and all the
refugees were started
toward Pine Bluff, that being the nearest route to the Arkansas and the
one least liable to
interruption from the enemy. The command and the trains were started
toward Little Rock, in
order to frustrate the designs which the enemy was supposed to have on
that place. Owing to the
state of the roads, for the first 5 miles progress was very slow, and it
became necessary to destroy
a few more wagons which could not be got along. We moved on as rapidly
as possible and
reached this place on the 2d instant, without having seen the enemy
after they retired from the
battle-field near Jenkins' Ferry. It was reported, however, that Fagan
crossed some artillery and
part of his troops at Benton for the purpose of threatening Little Rock.
If this were true they
retired on learning that we were marching on the same point. Our troops
behaved in all the
engagements of this campaign in the most gallant manner. I have never
seen troops in whom I
had more confidence on the battle-field, and I regret exceedingly the
necessities which have
caused me to lose so many brave men in detail, while I firmly believe
that while together they
could not have been routed on a fair field by the superior force which
Kirby Smith could have
brought against them. The conduct of the colored troops of my command
proves that the African
can be made as formidable in battle as a soldier of any other color.
I wish to recommend to the favorable consideration of the Government,
for gallant and
meritorious conduct on the field, Brig. Gen. F. Salomon, commanding
division; Brig. Gen. S. A.
Rice, commanding brigade. These are both officers of superior merit.
General Rice has been
twice wounded during recent campaign. At Jenkins' Ferry he received a
wound which will cause
the loss of his right foot. His self-possession, good judgment, energy,
and faculty for managing
men in the camp as well as in the field entitles him to distinguished
honor. He was wounded in a
charge upon the enemy's battery, after which his brigade fell to the
command of Col. C. E.
Salomon, Ninth Wisconsin Infantry, who managed it with skill. Brig. Gen.
J. M. Thayer,
although commanding the reserve, was frequently under fire and deserves
special mention.
Colonel Engelmann, Forty-third Illinois, commanded a brigade of
Salomon's division.
Very respectfully, general, your obedient servant.
F. STEELE,
Major-General, Commanding.
Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Chief of Staff.
110
LITTLE ROCK, ARK., May 5, 1864.
MAJOR: In compliance with paragraph 490, Revised Regulations (1863), and
by request of
Major-General Steele, commanding the Department of Arkansas, I have the
honor to submit the
following report: In obedience to orders of Maj. Gen. F. Steele, the
troops commenced to move
from this place on the 23d day of March, 1864, on what is known as the
military road leading to
Benton and Rockport. The bridge train, consisting of thirty-four wagons,
with two companies of
the Twenty-fourth Missouri Volunteer Infantry, under command of Capt. S.
P. Barris; the senior
officer present, acting as pontoniers, moved out on that day at the head
of the general supply
train. The battalion being small in numbers, at my request General
Steele re-enforced them by a
detail of 100 men from what was then known as the Fourth Arkansas,
African descent. These
men were recruits for one of the colored regiments, and were unarmed.
Spades, shovels, picks,
and axes were distributed among them, and they were usefully employed on
the march in
repairing the road, helping the bridge train through bad places, and
useful as pontoniers
whenever the bridge was laid. The advance of the column encamped on the
Saline River, 26
miles from Little Rock, on the 24th. It had rained on the 24th, and we
found the road soft in the
Saline bottom, which became badly cut up before the train was all over
on the 25th. It became
necessary to corduroy a portion of it in order to get the whole train
over. Upon leaving the
bottom we met with long and steep hills of a sticky red clay, which
clung to the wheels with
great tenacity, and to overcome it the animals had to exert their utmost
strength. So exhausted
were the mules that they were unable to make but a short march. The
whole command encamped
in and around the town of Rockport on the 26th. This town lies on the
east side of the Washita
(Ouachita) River, on quite high but gently rolling ground. It was almost
entirely deserted. The
river here was a beautiful and clear stream, flowing over a fine
gravelly bed. It was fordable
opposite the town for single horsemen, and was fordable 1 miles below
the town for the whole
army. I examined this ford very minutely and found its greatest depth,
for a distance of 150 feet
in width, to be not more than 30 inches at that time. This river rising
very quickly, and affected
by showers even, it was decided to lay the bridge across the stream
above the ford, so as to be
certain and at the same time to pass the infantry over. At daylight the
bridge was in position and
its construction commenced. The cavalry and train forded the river and
took up the march for
Arkadelphia. The mountain howitzers and infantry crossed on the bridge.
It was thrown to an
island, making its length 217 feet. From the island to the west bank it
was bridged by a
temporary one made by the pioneer company of the Third Division. The
bridge was dismantled,
loaded on the wagons, and continued the day's march in the rear of the
train. Our march
proceeded without delay to Arkadelphia. We found Bayou Roche well named,
for the ford was
quite deep and filled with bowlders of considerable size. Caddo Creek
was a beautiful, flowing
stream of about 150 feet, where we forded it. The pioneer company, by
taking an old ferry-boat
and anchoring it below the ford where it was more narrow, extemporized a
bridge of about 75
feet in length, over which the infantry passed. The whole command
encamped in and around
Arkadelphia on the 29th of March, where the general expected to make a
junction with General
Thayer by the 1st of April.
Excepting continual skirmishing with the enemy by our advance from the
time we reached
Benton until we arrived at Arkadelphia, we had nothing to disturb us or
our progress, save the
natural obstacles incident to bad roads and crossing of streams. Scouts
and spies had been sent in
the direction that General Thayer was expected, but we could hear
nothing from him. This was
explained afterward by the fact that want of forage and bad roads had
caused him to follow
another line of march, and in consequence a much longer one.
111
General Steele proposed to move his command on the 1st, on the road to
Washington as far
as Spoonville, a distance of 12 miles. His instructions were to go by
the way of Camden and
Arkadelphia. From Arkadelphia to go to Camden were three traveled routes
by citizens--one to
cross the Washita at that point and follow down the east bank of the
river and recross it in the
vicinity of Camden; another down the west bank of the river and cross
the Little Missouri near
its mouth; and another, well known and most traveled, which crosses the
Little Missouri River at
Tate's Ferry. Upon a careful examination all were rejected--the first
from plain military motives;
the second because the first 30 miles lay entirely in the alluvial
bottom of the river, and its utter
impracticability for a wagon train like ours; and the third because of
the crossing of the Terre
Noir Creek, the long bottom on the north side of the river at the ferry
with the high bluff on the
south side, and the enemy expected us to cross there and had made
preparations at that point to
dispute our crossing. The general decided to move on the Washington road
for 20 miles, and
while he threw forward a small force, to make it appear he was still
upon that road, to turn off
due south, passing through Okolona, seize Elkin's Ferry, a good
crossing, and used often by
citizens going from a little town called Rome to Washington.
On the 1st, the command encamped at Spoonville. At this point the enemy
were still in doubt
as to our course; for we were near the road to Tate's Ferry, on the road
to Washington, and if
General Thayer followed his original route proposed, or the one we had
come from Rockport to
Caddo Creek, he would save a march of 12 miles. Feeling certain that no
enemy north of the
Little Missouri River could impede General Thayer's progress, and not
being able to hear from
him, the general commanding thought it best to proceed and hold the
crossing of the Little
Missouri River. I regarded the Little Missouri River at that time to be
a more serious obstacle
than the enemy. It was between us and Camden. It manifestly takes its
name from its
resemblance to the Missouri River. Very much smaller, but after a heavy
rain the color of its
water, rapid current, sudden turns and bends and drift wood and snags
make it a copy of its
namesake, only differing in size. The main stream has a good gravelly
bed where we crossed it,
but low banks. On each side for at least 2 miles the country is a low,
level flat of alluvial
formation, generally of a very dark color, in many places resting on a
mushy, sticky, yellow clay,
which would squeeze out of crevices and holes whenever any pressure was
brought to bear near
it. This bottom, passable for the ordinary travel of such a community as
this in dry weather, was
only passable with great labor by an army train, but after a few hours
of rain becomes one
quagmire and morass, and the passage of an army train soon converts it
into a sea of mud.
On moving from Spoonville on the 2d, the rear was attacked by Shelby,
who made several
vigorous charges, but was handsomely repulsed by our troops under
command of Brig. Gen. S.
A. Rice, who had the fortune to command in rear on that day. Our advance
of cavalry developed
the forces of Marmaduke and Cabell, who were determined to dispute our
advance on the
Washington road, but in accordance with the plans before determined
upon, General Steele threw
forward cavalry and seized Elkin's Ferry, re-enforcing them with a
brigade of infantry. While the
command encamped at and near the ferry and still waited for General
Thayer, a brigade of
infantry, under Colonel Engelmann, and one of cavalry, under Colonel
Ritter, all under
command of the former officer, were sent back as far as Spoonville to
communicate with
General Thayer, if possible, and drive Shelby away from the rear. Near
Okolona Colonel
Engelmann met Shelby and whipped him. He moved to Spoonville and returned.
On the afternoon of the 3d, the enemy discovered our pickets near
Elkin's Ferry. Marmaduke
and Cabell hurried around to our front, and on the morning of the 4th
made a fierce attack, but
were repulsed with ease by our forces. It was reported on the evening of
the 5th that the enemy
were felling trees and fortifying in our front. General Steele
determined to wait no longer but to
move against them. On the 6th, the column moved, and after some
skirmishing the enemy fled,
112
leaving over a mile of breast-works of timber and earth crowning the
hills which overlook the
bottom and perfectly commanding the road along which we had to march. A
messenger through
from Little Rock joined us to-day and reported General Thayer at
Rockport when he passed. It
was decided by General Steele to wait for him at this place, known as
the Widow Cornelius', and
3 miles to the ferry. On the 7th, working parties were sent back to
repair the roads so as to pass
General Thayer's train. At nightfall it commenced to rain, and lasted
for several hours.
Daylight the next morning showed that all the work of the day before was
undone;
corduroying and bridges were all afloat, the whole bottom nearly was
under water, and the Little
Missouri was no longer fordable, having risen 3 feet. The bridge train
was ordered to the ferry,
and working details placed on the road to repair the worst places. It
was after dark before the
bridge train reached the river. The head of General Thayer's column was
on the high ground on
the other side, and had nearly 3 miles of bottom to cross. At daylight,
under my personal
supervision, the bridge was laid. The stream was very rapid, but with a
strong cable stretched
across and fastened to two large trees and the pontoons doubled, a firm
bridge of 140 feet in
length was finished. It was ready before the head of his column reached
the bank, and passed his
whole command and train without any delay or hinderance. His whole train
was across, but all of
it did not get out of the bottom that night.
The whole command moved on the 10th for Prairie D'Ane. You will perceive
by the map that
We were on the direct road to Spring Hill, which was on the road and the
nearest way to
Shreveport--a road traveled by the rebels more than the one by
Washington and Fulton. The road
leading from Camden to Washington intersects this road nearly at right
angles on the prairie. The
enemy occupied the ground in front of the junction of these roads, under
command of General
Price, who had here concentrated all his forces that were available.
Their position was a good
one and well chosen, on a gentle swelling ridge, with their flanks
resting in the timbered land.
We had to advance our front over the open-ground in easy range, while
our skirmishers drove in
their flankers. The skirmish was brisk, and the enemy used their
artillery freely, but we easily
drove them from their position and held it. After nightfall they
gallantly charged one of our
batteries, but were repulsed. They fell back on the right-hand road,
which leads to Washington.
General Steele moved against them the next day as soon as he got his
troops in line of battle, but
night came on before we had crossed the prairie.
The men laid under arms and resumed the movement at daylight of the
12th, turning the left
of the enemy's position, causing him to evacuate nearly a mile of
rifle-pits, with positions for
artillery, and nearly a mile of felled timber thrown up as breast-works.
Cavalry-were thrown
forward on this road as if it was the intention to follow on, while the
main column with train took
the road to Camden. The head of the column encamped on the Terre Rouge
Creek that night. The
bottom for 1 mile was so bad that the command was delayed very much the
next day in crossing.
All that I have said about the Little Missouri bottom applies even more
forcibly to this stream.
The next obstacle was Cypress Bayou, as it is on the maps, but called by
the country people
Caney. Here two bridges had to be repaired, and some corduroying to be
done. From this point
until we reached Camden the road was good. While the advance was
crossing the Terre Rouge
Creek the rear was attacked by the enemy. General Thayer had command of
the rear and drove
them back, scattering them with ease.
On the evening of the 14th, our scouting parties from the front
discovered the enemy in force.
They had evidently made a forced march from Washington by what is called
the middle road, to
get in our front to detain us, while Price, moving by the lower or main
stage road, hoped to reach
Camden before us. General Steele ordered the start at 4 a.m. the next
day, and although the
enemy made a gallant resistance, at a point 14 miles from Camden, he was
quickly driven from
his position and followed up so closely that no line was formed between
that point and Camden,
113
the advance marching in and taking possession of the city and works
before dark, having
marched 21 miles and fought quite a battle on that day, the 15th. Under
orders from General
Steele, I laid the pontoon bridge across the Washita River at a point
opposite the town
connecting with the road to Pine Bluff. At this place the length of the
bridge was 265 feet. The
rest of the time that I was in Camden was devoted to a careful
reconnaissance of our whole front.
A tracing of the map of the town of Camden, with the position of the
forts, made under my
direction by Lieut. F. Sommer, Twenty-ninth Iowa Volunteer Infantry, who
acted as assistant
engineer on this campaign, accompanies this report.
We had received rumors that General Banks had met with a severe repulse
on Red River.
This was confirmed by the arrival of an aide-de-camp of that general,
who acknowledged the
defeat and brought a request that General Steele would move immediately
forward and join him
on Red River. To suppose that a force of about 12,000 men, without
supplies, ammunition scant,
could move over a country nearly barren of forage and exhausted of
supplies, in the face of an
active and exultant enemy, under the command of one of the most
energetic and skillful of the
rebel generals, and then to cross a river like the Red to make a
junction with General Banks'
forces, leaving all this country open, was so absurd that General Steele
did not entertain it for
one moment. The results of the past few days prove the accuracy of
General Steele's judgment.
The command had marched the whole distance on half rations of hard
bread, quarter rations
of bacon, and full rations of coffee and salt, relying on the country
for the filling out of the
ration, and of this short allowance we had very little left. The country
was foraged around for
corn to supply the place of bread and forage for our suffering animals.
It was on one of these
foraging expeditions for corn that we lost the train captured by the
enemy on the 18th.
On the 20th, we received a supply train of ten days' rations, in the
same proportion as before
mentioned. This train was immediately sent back for a fresh supply,
leaving Camden on the 23d,
protected by an entire brigade of infantry, four pieces of artillery,
and a proper proportion of
cavalry. On the evening of the 25th, we heard of its capture. Scouting
parties had gone up and
down the east bank of the Washita for 30 miles before it started, and no
evidence of the enemy
was seen. We have since learned that they made a forced march of 48
miles on the 24th and 8
miles on the morning of the 25th, having crossed the Washita nearly 50
miles below Camden.
This event showed the precarious nature of our supplies.
Our scouting parties in the front had succeeded in capturing prisoners
who claimed to belong
to infantry divisions of the enemy. Our spies, deserters coming into our
lines, and stories told us
by the residents of the country, all coincide that General Kirby Smith
in person, with reenforcements
of infantry, had joined Price. Our position was by no means a safe one.
With an
army superior in numbers in our front, and a mounted force of not less
than 6,000 to act upon our
line of communications, and with the meager supply of rations on hand,
it was evident that a
crisis was at hand. General Steele immediately gave orders to evacuate
the town, to move over
the river such wagons and artillery during the day that would not
attract the attention of the
residents of the place. At nightfall pickets were doubled, vigilance
exercised, tattoo beaten and
sounded at the usual time and in the same places, and the whole army
commenced to move
across the river. At daylight the whole army was safe and the bridge
taken up and all on the road
to Princeton. This was the 27th. The army encamped at Princeton on the
28th. The 29th saw us at
Jenkins' Ferry on the Saline River, where the direct road leads to
Little Rock, and also a fair road
to Pine Bluff. The river was too deep to ford, and the pontoon train was
hurried up, thrown
across under my direction and personal supervision, and ready for troops
to pass at 4.15 p.m. All
the cavalry and many wagons were passed over before dark. There was
slight skirmishing in the
rear in the afternoon. Rain commenced to fall about 12 m., and poured
incessantly all day and
night. I never saw it rain harder than it did during the night. The
bottom, which extends at least 2
114
miles on each side, possesses all the characteristics of the Little
Missouri, being, if anything,
much worse. It soon became a sea of mud, in which wagons settled to the
axles and mules
floundered about without a resting place for their feet. Fires were made
along the road, pioneers
and working details set to work, and every exertion made to push the
impedimenta across before
daylight, it being evident that the enemy were in force in our rear. But
we failed. The rain came
down in torrents, putting out many of the fires, the men became
exhausted, and both they and the
animals sank down in the mud and mire, wherever they were, to seek a few
hours' repose. At
daylight we resumed our labors, and by 11 a.m. everything was across the
river except the
infantry and one section of artillery. During this time a severe
engagement was going on and
lasted until 12.30 p.m., at which hour, the enemy having been badly
beaten, our troops were
withdrawn to the east side of the river. The last of the infantry had
crossed before 2.05 p.m. Our
troops, with artillery, were drawn up on the bank protecting the bridge
until it was decided to
take it up. The bridge was kept intact for three-quarters of an hour
longer to allow such stragglers
or wounded who may have loitered behind to pass over. One of the
hospital attendants from the
hospital on the battle-field having arrived with a message from the
surgeon in charge to his
brigade commander, having stated that there were no men on the road, I,
acting under the orders
of Major-General Steele, gave the command for destroying the bridge. The
reason for this order
was our inability to carry it with us. It had in the natural course of
the train become the rear. The
mules could scarcely pull the wagons, much less when loaded, and over
such a road it was
impossible to get it along. The pontoons were very much the worse for
wear, and several were
worn out, so as no longer to be reliable. It was destroyed by cutting
each compartment with an ax
and piercing them with the bayonet. Many of the chesses were split with
axes and then thrown in
the stream, and some of the balks were thrown in after cutting them in
two parts. The bridge was
dismantled by successive rafts and destroyed by detail. When the last
pontoon was destroyed, I
ordered the commanding officer to move his command to the high ground
and select a camp. I
then left the river bank and rode to the front and reported to
Major-General Steele. Excepting a
very bad piece of road which extended for about 2 miles after leaving
the 2 miles of bottom of
the Saline River, there was no other obstacle or hinderance to our
march, but those 2 miles
surpass any that I have ever seen, and from the absence of small timber
and brushwood it was
difficult to repair it; but by sacrificing a great deal, destroying many
wagons, and by the men
taking hold of them we finally pushed through this place. On the 3d, the
command marched into
Little Rock.
I would respectfully call the general's attention to the want of
engineer troops in this army
corps. The pioneer company worked well; the ordinary details badly. The
failure to receive extra
pay for fatigue duty is very defective. Men will not work as they are
required to, unless receiving
something more, under our present organizations. The same remark applies
to those pontoniers,
or men acting as such. If they only receive the same pay while on that
service that they do while
on ordinary duty it is impossible to get them to take that pride in
their business and work with
zeal when the service requires it.
A requisition for a new bridge has already been forwarded to Colonel
Simpson at Cincinnati,
asking for one of the same kind as the old one. Although having serious
defects, the reduction in
number of wagons is so important a matter in this country that it
overcomes the other faults.
Allow me to call the attention of the general commanding to the ever
prompt and cordial cooperation
of Lieut. F. Sommer, Twenty-ninth Iowa Volunteer Infantry, in all my
duties while on
the march.
I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. B. WHEELER,
Captain of Engineers, Chief Engineer.
115
Maj. W. D. GREEN,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, SEVENTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, near Elkin's Ford,
On Little Missouri River, Ark., April 7, 1864.
LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to submit the following report of the
operations of my
command since leaving Little Rock:
This division, consisting of three brigades of infantry (ten regiments
in all) and three batteries
of artillery (sixteen guns), marched from Little Rock, Ark., on the 23d
ultimo, as part of the
forces under command of Maj. Gen. F. Steele. Nothing of particular
interest occurred until the 2d
instant. On that day the march was continued from Hollywood
(Witherspoonville), on the
Washington road. The Second Brigade, commanded by Col. William E.
McLean, of Forty-third
Indiana Infantry, was in the advance, and the Third, Col. A. Engelmann,
Forty-third Illinois
Infantry, commanding, in the center. The First Brigade, consisting of
the Ninth Wisconsin,
Fiftieth Indiana, Thirty-third Iowa, and Twenty-ninth Iowa Infantry,
with Voegele's battery of
four guns, all under command of Brig. Gen. Samuel A. Rice, was placed in
the rear with orders
to guard the general supply and pontoon trains, and to camp at or near
Okolona and in the
vicinity of the other portion of the command. An attack upon the rear
from the enemy was
considered probable, and General Rice was instructed to make such
dispositions as should insure
the safety of our trains. The nature of the country and the condition of
the roads made this task
difficult, as the trains extended to considerable length, and General
Rice had no cavalry to
protect his flanks or to give notice of the enemy's movement. At noon
the rear guard, consisting
of the Twenty-ninth Iowa Infantry, under command of Col. Thomas H.
Benton, jr., and one
section of Voegele's battery, was attacked near Gentry's Creek by the
enemy under General
Shelby, numbering about 1,500, with three pieces of artillery. General
Rice ordered the Fiftieth
Indiana from the front to the rear, to re-enforce the rear guard. After
a sharp engagement the
enemy was repulsed, and General Rice moved on his command toward
Okolona. About half a
mile this side of the junction of the Washington and Camden roads the
enemy, having been reenforced,
made another attack and were again driven back after hard fighting.
General Rice's
command reached Okolona at 10 p.m. During this engagement it became
necessary for General
Rice to withdraw from the front all his forces except the Thirty-third
Iowa, which was disposed
at intervals along the train. I therefore ordered the Twenty-seventh
Wisconsin, of Colonel
Engelmann's brigade, to cover and protect the train, which arrived in
camp without the loss of a
wagon. On the arrival of the Third Brigade at Okolona one regiment had
been sent to support the
cavalry forces, which were retreating from the Washington road. The
remaining forces of
Colonel Engelmann's brigade I disposed to protect the trains as they
came in. The battery
(Captain Vaughn's) was fired on by a party of the enemy who approached
on the Arkadelphia
road. Our loss this day was as follows: Killed, 8; wounded, 32; wounded
and missing, 5;
missing, 18; total, 63. Four of the missing have since returned to their
respective regiments,
reducing the number of casualties to 59. The loss of the enemy cannot be
accurately stated, but
from information deemed reliable, I have good reason to believe that his
loss is greatly in excess
of our own. On the evening of the 2d, Col. William E. McLean's brigade,
excepting the Seventyseventh
Ohio and two pieces of Stange's battery, was sent forward to cross the
Little Missouri
River at Elkin's Ford, 4 miles beyond Okolona, with a view of holding
the ford. This duty was
promptly performed, and Colonel McLean took possession of the position
at 9 p.m. without
opposition.
116
On the morning of the 3d, Colonel Engelmann's brigade, re-en-forced by
the Seventy-seventh
Ohio Infantry, of Colonel McLean's brigade, and consisting in all of
four regiments of infantry
and Vaughn's battery of six guns, was left at Okolona with orders to
proceed with Colonel
Ritter's cavalry brigade as far back as Hollywood, and endeavor to
communicate with General
Thayer. The First Brigade moved on to Elkin's Ford and encamped on the
left bank of the Little
Missouri. Colonel Engelmann's command was attacked by the enemy at
Okolona before the
arrival of the cavalry forces under Colonel Ritter. The enemy was driven
back and pursued by
the Twenty-seventh Wisconsin Infantry, Colonel Krez commanding, for 2
miles. Our losses were
as follows: Killed, 3; wounded, 7; total, 10.
On the arrival of Colonel Ritter's cavalry command at Okolona, Colonel
Engelmann marched
toward Hollywood, which place he reached on the 4th. He returned with
his command and
rejoined the division in camp near Elkin's Ford on the evening of the
5th, reporting that he had
not heard from General Thayer. On the 3d instant the enemy made some
demonstrations in front
of Colonel McLean's position. Three companies of the Forty-third Indiana
were sent forward as
skirmishers, and soon ascertained the enemy's position. Sixteen enlisted
men of the enemy being
cut off came into our lines and surrendered. Early on the morning of the
4th, the enemy attacked
Colonel McLean's command, consisting of the Thirty-sixth Iowa and
Forty-third Indiana
Infantry and four pieces of Battery E, Second Missouri Light Artillery,
in force, under command
of Marmaduke in person. The action lasted until 11 a.m., at which time
the enemy's forces
retired, having been repulsed at all points. During the progress of this
engagement, Colonel
McLean being pressed by the enemy, I ordered the Twenty-ninth Iowa and
Ninth Wisconsin
Infantry, of General Rice's brigade (under command of General Rice), to
his support. The enemy
retired soon after the arrival of these re-enforcements, the
Twenty-ninth Iowa rendering efficient
service at the close of the action. General Rice was slightly wounded in
the head during the
engagement. The enemy's force, as nearly as could be ascertained,
consisted of Cabell's and
Greene's brigades, with five pieces of artillery, only four of which
were brought into action. In
the early part of the action Lieutenant Fackler, aide-de-camp to General
Marmaduke, was
captured by our skirmishers under Lieutenant-Colonel Drake, Thirty-sixth
Iowa Infantry. Our
casualties were as follows: Wounded, commissioned officer (Brig. Gen. S.
A. Rice), 1; enlisted
men, 25. From all appearances the enemy's loss must have reached 50
killed and wounded.
Detailed reports from brigade and regimental commanders are herewith
inclosed, to which I
beg leave to refer. I embrace this opportunity to commend the conduct of
all the officers and men
of my command who took part in the operations above referred to. I
desire especially to notice
the promptness and ability displayed by commanders of brigades,
regiments, and batteries.
Recapitulation of casualties up to date: Killed: Enlisted men, 11.
Wounded: Commissioned
officers, 4; enlisted men, 60. Missing: enlisted men, 23. Total:
Commissioned officers, 4;
enlisted men, 94.
Respectfully submitting the above report, I have the honor to be, sir,
very respectfully, your
obedient servant,
F. SALOMON,
Brig. Gen., Comdg. Third Division, Seventh Army Corps.
Lieut. GEORGE O. SOKALSKI,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Seventh Army Corps.
HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, SEVENTH ARMY CORPS,
Little Rock, Ark., May 10, 1864.
MAJOR: I have heretofore submitted detailed reports of the operations of
this division up to
and including the 15th of April, and have now the honor to forward a
report of further
117
operations, as follows: During the occupation of Camden, April 15 to 26,
inclusive, the troops of
my command were very constantly on duty as pickets, provost guards,
escorts for forage trains,
fatigue parties, and other like duties. On the 22d of April, pursuant to
instructions from
department headquarters, Col. William E. McLean's brigade, and four
pieces of Stange's battery,
under charge of Lieut. Charles Peetz, were ordered to escort a train
going to Pine Bluff, the
commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Drake, reporting in person to
Major-General Steele for
special instructions.
On the morning of the 25th, about 40 miles from Camden, the train was
attacked by 6,000 of
the enemy, under Generals Fagan and Shelby, and after a desperate
resistance, lasting three
hours, wherein 600 or more of the enemy were killed and wounded, the
entire train and most of
the escort were captured. Our loss in killed and wounded is said to have
been 250. The report of
Lieutenant-Colonel Drake is herewith inclosed. On the 26th of April my
division was ready to
take up its march at the hour appointed, but the crossing of the trains
occupied more time than
was anticipated, and I could not commence to move until 12 p.m. Mean
time, the Second and
Sixth Kansas Cavalry having reported to me for duty, I caused two
squadrons, under command
of Captain Gunther, to patrol the town and prevent all irregularities,
and I take pleasure in adding
that this duty was successfully performed. The army was withdrawn to its
last soldier without
confusion or accident.
From the crossing of the Washita until reaching the Saline bottom, on
the evening of the 29th
of April, nothing unusual occurred. During the afternoon of that day my
rear guard was
occasionally fired upon, but the march was not seriously molested. This
firing, however, was
sufficient to inform us that the enemy were following, and deeming it
important to preserve for
our own use the entire bottom, I directed Colonel Engelmann to leave on
the crest of the hill one
regiment from his brigade, which, with two squadrons Sixth Kansas
Cavalry, Captain Rogers
commanding, and one section of Vaughn's battery, was instructed to hold
the bottom. Very
shortly thereafter skirmishing began and was kept up until dark, the
enemy appearing in such
considerable force that I directed one regiment to be sent from Rice's
brigade to assist in holding
the hills. These demonstrations in our rear convinced me that with
returning daylight we might
expect an attack, and I made my dispositions accordingly, withdrawing my
troops at 3 a.m.
beyond effective artillery range from the hill. By this I not only
contracted my lines, but covered
my right flank with a small bayou, rendering any movements of the enemy
from that direction
impracticable, while on the left the bottom was more swampy and
difficult of passage, if
possible, than that on which my troops were posted, and over which our
trains and artillery were
being sent forward to the river. At daylight my advance was 2 miles from
the river. The
intervening country, naturally low and swampy, was now more than half
covered with water, in
consequence of heavy rains the day and night immediately preceding.
There were yet 2 miles in
length of train and artillery between me and the river, which must all
cross before I could begin
to withdraw. I had therefore to hold the position. At 5 a.m. skirmishing
began in front, the
Thirty-third Iowa being first engaged, afterward supported by the
Fiftieth Indiana. Deeming this
line too -far advanced, I ordered General Rice to form a new line about
half a mile in the rear
nearer the river and in the timber. Scarcely had the first line been
withdrawn before the enemy
attacked the second with skirmishers, mounted and partly dressed in our
uniform. The better to
conceal their purposes they drove in their advance a flock of sheep,
leading our men to suppose
that they were a forage party from our own army. This ruse did not
deceive us.
The first attack seemed principally directed against our right, which
the enemy endeavored to
turn, but the detachment of the Second Brigade and two companies of the
Twenty-ninth Iowa
had been sent across the bayou, otherwise called Toxie Creek, and foiled
the enemy's plan. The
attention of the enemy was then directed to our left, held by the
Fiftieth Indiana. The Thirty-third
118
Iowa was sent thither by General Rice, but the assault of the enemy was
so heavy and persistent
that our troops fell }lack some 250 yards. At this juncture the
Twenty-seventh Wisconsin
(Engelmann's brigade) was sent to the left. The Second Kansas Colored
Infantry, of General
Thayer's command, having reported to me, I sent it to report to General
Rice on the right, and
there it soon became engaged, and throughout the action bore itself with
conspicuous gallantry.
Soon thereafter a portion of the First Arkansas reported, and was sent
to the left, and following
them came the Twelfth Kansas Infantry, which was also sent to the left.
This latter regiment went
in with a cheer, driving the enemy before them, when General Rice
advanced his whole line
nearly 300 yards. The balance of Engelmann's brigade was sent to the
right. The enemy now
brought up artillery on our right, but so carefully did our
sharpshooters watch his movements that
he was permitted to fire only 3 rounds. I had one section of Vaughn's
battery in position, and
permitted the lieutenant (Thomas) in command to fire 1 round to assure
our own troops that in
case of need we too had artillery that could be used. The second attack
from the enemy was soon
at its height, but our brave men, notwithstanding the overwhelming
numbers of the enemy,
obstinately stood their ground, and at a favorable moment the Second
Kansas (colored) and
Twenty-ninth Iowa charged upon and captured the enemy's guns, three in
number. The enemy,
driven at every point, now opportunely gave us a few moments' time in
which to replenish our
supply of ammunition. This was brought up from the rear by mounted
troopers, my own escort
assisting.
I had determined now to withdraw my forces still nearer the river, as
opportunity might offer,
but before I was able to effect the movement brisk firing in the front
assured me that the enemy
was again advancing. At first the firing seemed to be heaviest on the
right, but soon it extended
along the whole line and for three-quarters of an hour the roar of
musketry was incessant. Early
in this assault Brigadier-General Rice, ever in the front, was wounded
in the ankle, and
compelled to leave the field, the command of the brigade devolving upon
Col. C. E. Salomon, of
the Ninth Wisconsin, who hereafter led the brigade, and by his presence
and personal disregard
of danger gave great encouragement to his men. Bravely did our troops
maintain their ground,
never once wavering, never once yielding. I confess that I had not a
little anxiety as to the result.
Every man was engaged, and regiments were sent from one portion of the
line to another,
wherever their services seemed to be most needed. I sent to the rear to
hasten forward General
Thayer's troops, but these with the exception of those already engaged
were across the river, and
could not be brought forward in time to be of assistance. Our men,
however, forgot that they
were tired, forgot that they were hungry, forgot that [they] were
outnumbered, only remembering
that they were ordered to hold their ground. This they held, repulsing
the enemy at every point,
inflicting fearful damage, capturing three guns, as before stated,
several prisoners, and three
colors; two of these were taken by the Fiftieth Indiana and one by the
Ninth Wisconsin. The
Forty-third Illinois pursued the enemy through the bottom quite to the
base of the ridge. At 12
o'clock firing ceased. Learning from prisoners that the enemy was
continually receiving reenforcements,
I determined to withdraw nearer the river, where my lines would be
shorter and
my flanks still better protected. At this juncture the major-general
commanding arrived in person
on the field and approved my plan. I therefore proceeded to withdraw my
forces, slowly and in
good order, collecting my dead and wounded, bringing away as many as
possible, and leaving
the others, in charge of a surgeon and attendants, at the house which
had been used as field
hospital. The crossing of the river was effected without further
molestation. For further details of
the parts taken by different regiments in this battle, reference is made
to the full and able reports
of my brigade commanders, which are herewith forwarded. Our losses were
severe. Brigadier-
General Rice, as before stated, was severely wounded in the foot.
Colonel Mackey, Thirty-third
Iowa, was shot through the arm, breaking the bone above the elbow.
Colonel Adams,
119
commanding the brigade from General Thayer's division, was wounded in
the arm, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Hayes, Twelfth Kansas, in the thigh.
I have no report of the loss in the regiments from General Thayer's
command. The enemy's
loss greatly exceeded our own and is estimated to be at least three to
our one. They lost 2
brigadier-generals killed on the field, besides many field and line
officers. The enemy was
commanded by General E. Kirby Smith in person, and from the best
information I can obtain
numbered 20,000 men. The fact that after we had retired the enemy sent a
flag of truce to the
battle-field is conclusive evidence that they acknowledge us victorious.
Our forces engaged did
not exceed 4,000 men, and I cannot too much commend their bravery and
heroic endurance.
Officers and men alike did their whole duty. I take pleasure in adding
my approval to the
commendations made by brigade commanders. Brig. Gen. S. A. Rice merits
special mention, not
only for conspicuous gallantry, cool and correct judgment in action, but
also for his continual
personal attention to his command. During the entire expedition his
services have been
invaluable, and it is not without reluctance that I am obliged to part
with him, even temporarily.
My thanks are due, and I commend to you the members of my staff for
their untiring energy,
their bravery and devotion to our cause. Accompanying this I hand you a
list of their names.
They have served me well and faithfully, and I shall ever retain a
lively personal interest in their
welfare.
The first part of the march from Saline River to Little Rock was through
a quicksand bottom;
men and animals were completely worn out, and it was impossible to bring
through the entire
train. Much property was necessarily destroyed; otherwise there were no
incidents of importance.
My division entered Little Rock May 3, at noon, having been absent just
five weeks. During this
time we marched nearly or quite 300 miles, much of the way through a
country quite destitute of
any improved roads. The labors devolving upon the pioneer corps of my
division have been
incessant. They have worked night and day, and I know not of any body of
men connected with
the army entitled to greater credit than they.
I have the honor to inclose herewith tabular statements of the effective
strength with which I
left Little Rock, and the losses sustained by regiments in the different
skirmishes and actions.
From these it will be seen that my division left Little Rock numbering
5,226 officers and men,
and that its aggregate loss in killed, wounded, and missing has been 1,775.
I have the honor to remain, your most obedient servant,
F. SALOMON,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Maj. W. D. GREEN,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Department of Arkansas.
HDQRS. FIRST BRIG., THIRD DIV., 7TH ARMY CORPS,
Camp on Little Missouri River, Ark., April 5, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 2d of
April my command
left the camp at Witherspoonville at 8 o'clock, in charge of the supply,
pontoon, and brigade
trains. The Ninth Wisconsin Infantry, Col. C. E. Salomon commanding, and
Fiftieth Indiana
Infantry, Lieut. Col. S. T. Wells commanding, with a section of Captain
Voegele's battery, were
placed in front. The Thirty-third Iowa Infantry, under Major Gibson, was
placed at intervals
along the train, each company being kept intact under its officers. The
Twenty-ninth Iowa
Infantry, under Col. Thomas H. Benton, jr., with a section of Captain
Voegele's battery, was
placed in the rear. About 12 o'clock the rear guard was attacked at
Gentry's Creek by General
Shelby's command, some 1,500 strong, with three pieces of artillery. I
proceeded at once to the
field of action and ordered the Fiftieth Indiana to the rear to
re-enforce the Twenty-ninth Iowa.
120
Colonel Benton, on being attacked, immediately deployed his men, and
with the artillery
engaged the enemy, and after repulsing them fell back about half a mile
to the summit of the
ridge near Terre Noir Creek. Here the artillery was placed in position
and line of battle formed in
time to meet the enemy. While the firing was going on the Fiftieth
Indiana came up to the
support of the Twenty-ninth [Iowa]. The enemy on the left of my line
took the summit of the hill.
I immediately ordered a charge and they were driven back at all points
in great confusion and
with heavy loss. We then fell back as rapidly as possible in hopes of
regaining the train, which in
the interval had moved rapidly to the front, and which was menaced by
another column reported
to be under General Cabell, and which was moving from another direction
on the road from
Washington. The Fiftieth Indiana during this part of the march took the
rear, and were relieved
on reaching the road to Camden, by the way of Okolona, by a portion of
the Ninth Wisconsin,
with the second section of Captain Voegele's battery. About half a mile
from this side of the
junction of the road the enemy, having been re-enforced, formed line of
battle, opened with their
artillery, and engaged us again. We rapidly formed line of battle on a
ridge, throwing the Ninth
Wisconsin on the left, the Fiftieth Indiana on the right, with the
Twenty-ninth Iowa in reserve,
and a section of artillery in the center commanding the road. The
engagement only lasted some
thirty minutes, when the enemy were again driven back with a heavy loss
and made no further
attempts to reach our trains. This was about 6 o'clock in the evening. I
proceeded with my
command without any further engagement, and rejoined the residue of your
command at
Okolona at 9.30 p.m.
From 12 m. to 6 p.m. there was more or less skirmishing most of the
time, and owing to the
length of the train, which was some 3 miles, it made its protection a
matter of serious difficulty.
The officers and soldiers of my command behaved with great coolness and
bravery. The Thirtythird
Iowa, under Major Gibson, though not engaged, had an important and
dangerous duty to
perform, and did it well.
The officers and soldiers of all the regiments of my command met my
highest expectations.
Captain Voegele with his battery did good execution. My loss was 8
killed, 32 wounded, 23
missing; total, 63. I inclose you regimental and battery reports, which
will give you the full
details of the part taken by each in the series of engagements. I also
inclose a complete list of
casualties.
I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
SAML. A. RICE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Capt. A. BLOCKI,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., 3d Div., 7th Army Corps.
HDQRS. FIRST BRIG., THIRD DIV., 7TH ARMY CORPS,
Camden, Ark., April 17, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken
by my command
in the various series of engagements since the action on the Little
Missouri at Elkin's Ferry on
the 4th instant. On the 10th instant my command met the enemy on the
edge of Prairie D'Ane,
where, under your order, I formed line of battle on the left of
Engelmann's brigade and advanced,
flanking the enemy's right, at the same time pouring in a heavy fire of
artillery from Voegele's
battery. The well-directed fire of the battery, together with the
advance of the troops, soon drove
the enemy from the field. I camped during the night on the edge of the
prairie under cover of the
rising ground. The enemy during the night attempted to shell our camps
and draw the fire of our
artillery. I ordered Captain Voegele not to reply. On the 11th, in
compliance with your orders, I
moved my command across the prairie to engage the enemy. We were on the
left of the line, and
121
my troops moved in double column at deploying intervals, with a regiment
in reserve. After
coming within range of the enemy's artillery, we were halted under your
orders, as the day was
too far advanced to make the assault that evening. Under cover of night
our troops were again
withdrawn to a more secure and better position. At 5 o'clock the ensuing
morning my troops,
under your order, formed the right and Engelmann's brigade your left.
Preceded by a heavy body
of skirmishers, who engaged small parties of the enemy, we proceeded
across Prairie D'Ane, and
soon were beyond the enemy's works, which they had been compelled to
evacuate in
consequence of the able manner in which the attack was planned and
executed by your division
and the other divisions of the army. On the 14th, my brigade was ordered
to move to White Oak
Creek, and, in conjunction with a brigade of cavalry, proceed as soon as
possible to Camden. We
reached White Oak Creek about 8 p.m., reported to General Carr, and
encamped for the night.
Early the next morning, in conjunction with his cavalry, we proceeded on
the road to Camden;
our skirmishers and those of the cavalry were in front. Near the
junction of the middle
Washington and Camden road we came upon the enemy's skirmishers. Our
skirmishers, with
those of the cavalry, with occasional firing from the mountain
howitzers, drove the enemy some
2 miles, when they opened upon us with five pieces of artillery. Captain
Stange immediately
brought his battery into position. I formed the Thirty-third Iowa on the
right, Twenty-ninth Iowa
on the left, the other portions of my command in reserve, and sent out
sharpshooters to pick off
their cannoneers, together with heavy bodies of skirmishers, on the
right and left of our line, to
feel the enemy's position and draw their fire, if possible. General Carr
had ordered the cavalry on
becoming engaged to immediately form on the flanks and engage the enemy.
About an hour after
the cannonading opened, having learned that the cavalry, owing to the
character of the ground,
had been unable to form on the flanks, I ordered the Ninth Wisconsin,
under Colonel Salomon,
to turn the left flank of the enemy, and General Carr ordered the
cavalry to co-operate in the
movement. The enemy soon retreated. We proceeded then to Camden,
skirmishing nearly all the
way, and subject occasionally-to a short fire of artillery.
I append a complete list of casualties in the various actions. The
officers and soldiers of my
command have done their duty faithfully and well. To individualize some
would be doing
injustice to others. I take pleasure in referring to the invaluable aid'
afforded by all the officers of
my staff during the entire campaign.
I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
SAML. A. RICE,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Capt. A. BLOCKI,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
LITTLE ROCK, ARK., May 8, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations
of my command
during the recent campaign in the southwestern part of Arkansas: We left
Little Rock on the 23d
of March and arrived by easy marches with the army at Arkadelphia on the
29th. On the 2d of
April my command was assigned to the duty of guarding the supply train
of the army. As my
rear guard was passing a ravine near Terre Noir Creek, on the
Arkadelphia and Washington road,
Shelby's brigade attacked it, with the intention of overpowering it and
cutting off our train. I had
but one regiment in the rear, the Twenty-ninth Iowa Infantry, numbering
about 540 men, with
one section of Voegele's battery. Colonel Benton, commanding this
regiment, held the enemy's
entire force in check until I arrived in the rear, when, seeing the
condition of affairs, I
immediately sent for the Fiftieth Indiana, which was at the head of the
train, about 4 miles farther
on. The train, with the Thirty-third Iowa divided up among it, moved on,
and was soon in a
122
position to be safe from any attacks. After the arrival of the Fiftieth
Indiana I formed my line and
received the attack of the enemy, and repulsed him, with severe loss. I
then moved toward the
train, stopping wherever I was pressed too hard, and forming my line
repeatedly repulsed their
onsets. After falling back in this way about 4 miles I found a
detachment of four companies of
the Ninth Wisconsin Infantry and a section of artillery guarding the
Washington road until I
should come up. This detachment of the Ninth Wisconsin was placed in the
rear, and we moved
on the Elkin's Ferry road. After we had turned down this road the enemy
made a most
determined and vigorous assault, but were repulsed by the Ninth
Wisconsin and Fiftieth Indiana,
and troubled us no more. I have already made full report of this action.
On the 4th of April Marmaduke, with a large force of cavalry, attacked
McLean's brigade on
the south side of the Little Missouri River. Under your orders two
regiments of my brigade
moved across to McLean's assistance. Having been directed by you to
support McLean, I
conferred with him in order to ascertain his exact position, so that my
troops could be properly
disposed. I formed my command with two companies of the Twenty-ninth
Iowa in the rear of the
Thirty-sixth Iowa, the other eight companies on the right. The Ninth
Wisconsin was held in
reserve on the north side of Howard's Creek. At this time I saw that
Stange's battery, of
McLean's brigade, was in direct range of the enemy's sharpshooters, and
I took the responsibility
to order it to move beyond Howard's Creek, where its fire would be
equally effective, and at the
same time the battery would be safe. The forces under my command
continued in this position
until the close of the engagement. On the 10th of April my brigade again
met the enemy on
Prairie D'Ane, where a severe skirmish ensued, in which the rebel forces
were driven from their
position. On the 11th of April we moved out with the rest of your
command on Prairie D'Ane
and offered battle, but the enemy retired to his fortifications across
the prairie, and the attack was
not made, owing to the lateness of the hour. On the next day we moved
out to attack the enemy's
works, but after a skirmish we found that they were evacuated. April 15,
my brigade was ordered
to take the advance to move into Camden, information having been
received that the enemy was
trying to reach and reoccupy that place. I came up to the rebel rear 15
miles from Camden, and,
assisted by a detachment of 250 skirmishers from General Carr's cavalry,
fought them to within 3
miles of Camden, where they turned off the road. The rest of the march
was without interruption.
On the 26th of April the army set out on its return to Little Rock. My
entire brigade, with the
artillery, crossed the pontoon bridge in forty minutes. I arrived at
Jenkins' Ferry, on the Saline,
on the evening of the 29th. During the evening the enemy skirmished with
your rear, under
Colonel Engelmann. You directed me at dark to send one regiment to
report to Colonel
Engelmann. The Thirty-third Iowa was accordingly sent, and was placed by
him half a mile
beyond his camp, on the Princeton road. During the night the trains were
constantly engaged in
crossing the Saline River. The terrible condition of the roads, and a
heavy, continuous rain made
this operation necessarily a slow one, and morning found a large part of
the train still on the
south side of the river.
At daylight I went to the rear to see the Thirty-third Iowa, and finding
them too far from
support, I ordered Colonel Mackey to bring in his skirmishers,
preparatory to falling back, and
sent to you for permission to bring the regiment back to the remainder
of my brigade. As soon as
Colonel Mackey's skirmishers commenced to move, the enemy commenced the
attack. I then
immediately ordered the Fiftieth Indiana up to their support, forming
that regiment on the left.
Receiving orders from you to fall back still farther, I formed a new
line with the Ninth Wisconsin
and Twenty-ninth Iowa about half a mile in the rear of my first line and
withdrew my first line
behind it. The Thirty-third Iowa, which had been without fires all
night, was now permitted to go
to the rear to get breakfast. I then formed the Fiftieth en echelon on
the left and crossed the
detachment of the Second Brigade over the creek on my right with two
companies of the
123
Twenty-ninth Iowa. My line had barely been formed and skirmishers
deployed when the enemy
renewed the attack. Their efforts seemed at first principally directed
to my right flank. They were
repulsed in this attack, but immediately made a determined assault on my
left. I now sent the
Thirty-third Iowa to the left of the Fiftieth Indiana. The assault of
the enemy was heavy and
determined, and they succeeded in turning the left flank of the
Thirty-third, driving them some
250 yards. At this juncture the Twelfth Kansas Infantry came forward and
I moved them up to
the left of the Thirty-third. They came up with a cheer and drove the
enemy before them. The
Thirty-third then advanced, and at the same time my whole line was moved
up nearly 300 yards
beyond its former position. The enemy now again began to turn his
attention to my right and
threw a force across Toxie Creek, which covered my right, and moved down
through the dense
woods and got a raking fire on my right. The Second Kansas (colored)
came up at this time, and
I threw them forward in advance of the Ninth Wisconsin and Twenty-ninth
Iowa to relieve those
regiments, as their ammunition was nearly all expended. The Forty-third
Illinois had moved up;
under your orders, to support the troops on the right of the creek. The
Twenty-seventh Wisconsin
had also moved up to support my left. The enemy now brought up a section
of artillery and
furiously renewed the attack from the open field in front of my right.
After a long, desperate
struggle he was repulsed and the Second Kansas Colored Infantry and
Twenty-ninth Iowa
Infantry moved forward and took his guns. These two guns, with their
caissons, were brought
off. With the exception of brisk skirmishing, the firing lulled for a
while, during which time my
troops replenished their cartridge-boxes and prepared for another'
attack, which was expected to
follow. The enemy now made a feint on my right and immediately followed
it by an assault on
the left. The Fiftieth Indiana and Thirty-third Iowa, flanked and
supported by the Twelfth
Kansas, four companies of the Fortieth Iowa, and the detachment of the
Second Brigade (which
had some time before been moved from the right to that point),
vigorously poured their fire into
the advancing columns of the enemy. As this fight was going on while I
was moving to the left
of my line I was struck by a ball in the foot and compelled to leave the
field, and from this time I
know nothing of the engagement from personal observation. After I left
the field the fight
continued nearly three-quarters of an hour, at the end of which time the
rebel forces received
their last repulse and drew off at 12 o'clock, leaving us masters of the
field. Owing to the rain
and spongy nature of the ground I did not bring my artillery into
action, and to the infantry alone
is due all the glory of this well-fought battle. Three colors were taken
from the enemy by my
command--2 were taken by the Fiftieth Indiana, and 1 by the Ninth Wisconsin.
I take the highest pleasure in referring to the gallant conduct of the
officers and men of my
entire command, from the time of our first action on the Terre Noir down
to the close of the
bloody battle of Jenkins' Ferry. Colonel Salomon, commanding Ninth
Wisconsin; Colonel
Benton, commanding Twenty-ninth Iowa; Colonel Mackey, commanding
Thirty-third Iowa;
Lieutenant-Colonel Wells, commanding Fiftieth Indiana, and Captain
Voegele, commanding my
battery, all did their duty nobly and were always at their posts.
Colonel Mackey received a severe
wound in the arm while leading his men in the battle of Jenkins' Ferry,
and Colonel Benton and
Lieutenant-Colonel Wells had their horses killed under them. I feel it
my duty to make honorable
mention of Colonel Adams, commanding a brigade of General Thayer's
division, who reported to
me for orders with the Twelfth Kansas Infantry and Second Kansas Colored
Infantry. He did his
duty well and was wounded in the arm while near the line of the Second
Kansas. Colonel
Crawford, of the Second Kansas, behaved with the most marked gallantry.
Lieutenant-Colonel
Hayes, of the Twelfth Kansas, distinguished himself by his coolness and
bravery, and received a
dangerous wound in the thigh. Captain Darnall, of the Forty-third
Indiana, commanding
detachment of Second Brigade, behaved well and was severely wounded
while cheering his men.
A squadron of the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry, under command of Captain
Campbell, rendered
124
very efficient service in protecting my left flank. Colonel Salomon took
command of the brigade
after I was taken from the field. I take special pleasure in this
connection in referring to the
officers of my staff, Captain Townsend, acting assistant
inspector-general; Lieutenant Lacey,
acting assistant adjutant-general; Lieutenants Duncan and Baylies, my
aides, all displayed the
highest soldierly qualities. Captain Townsend was killed on the march
while accompanying the
train escorted by the Second Brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Drake.
Lieutenant Duncan had
his horse killed under him on the Terre Noir, and Lieutenant Lacey's
horse was wounded by a
shell from the enemy on Prairie D'Ane. It is with pleasure that I refer
to Lieutenant Wilson,
acting assistant quartermaster, whose conduct on the entire expedition
showed that he is
eminently qualified for the position he fills. I transmit herewith the
reports of regimental
commanders and a complete list of casualties.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
SAML. A. RICE,
Brigadier-General.
Capt. A. BLOCKI,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. FIFTIETH INDIANA INFANTRY VOLUNTEERS,
In the Field, April 3, 1864.
LIEUTENANT: I have to report that on yesterday, my regiment being
ordered to the support
of the Twenty-ninth Iowa Infantry, which was engaging the enemy at the
rear of the wagon train,
I hastened to the scene of action with all possible speed and there
reported to General Rice, who
ordered me to place my regiment in position immediately in the rear of
the Twenty-ninth, which
was at once done and the flanks well covered with skirmishers. The
formation was scarcely
completed when a fierce charge by cavalry was made against the left
wing, with the evident
intention of capturing our artillery, which was posted in the center.
The Twenty-ninth Iowa
gradually retiring over the crest of the hill as a decoy, the charge was
received at short range, and
repulsed with fearful loss to the enemy, when he immediately retired
from our front. Our forces
being ordered to fall back on the wagon train, I was ordered to cover
the rear, which was
effectually done for 2 miles, though with constant skirmishing, when I
was relieved by the Ninth
Wisconsin. Shortly after the enemy made another attack, when my regiment
was ordered to the
rear where a sharp engagement was going on with the Ninth. I immediately
changed front to the
rear and charged upon the enemy on our right and drove them from the
field. I was then ordered
to resume the march. The regiment had scarcely got into the road when a
charge was made by
the enemy on our left in direction of our artillery. Our front was again
changed to the rear and
the enemy again handsomely repulsed, when he shortly left off the
pursuit. The first charge of
the enemy on our left was repulsed by Companies A, under Captain McCoy,
B, under Captain
Peck, and G, under Captain Carothers, all under Major Attkisson. At each
subsequent attack the
whole regiment was engaged. Both officers and men, without exception,
displayed the utmost
coolness and courage. The casualties of the day were 4 killed, 11
wounded, and 7 missing.
Very respectfully,
S. T. WELLS,
Lieut. Col. Fiftieth Indiana Vols., Comdg. Regt.
Lieut. JOHN F. LACEY,
Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., 1st Brig., 3d Div., 7th Army Corps.
HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-NINTH Iowa INFANTRY,
Camp on Little Missouri River, April 5, 1864.
125
SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 2d instant I was assigned to
the duty of guarding
the rear of our supply train. My command, consisting of the Twenty-ninth
Iowa Infantry and one
section of Captain Voegele's battery, was formed in the following order:
One company
immediately in rear of the train as an advance guard, followed by the
battery; the main body of
the regiment, consisting of seven companies, two companies as a rear
guard, and a sergeant and
8 men in the extreme rear. While passing a narrow, muddy defile, caused
by a small stream 1
mile east of Terre Noir Creek, a body of Shelby's cavalry, supposed to
be 1,200 strong, made a
sudden dash upon our rear guards. The guards, supported by our left
wing, rallied promptly,
opened a brisk fire, and momentarily checked the advance of the enemy,
which enabled us to
pass the defile and deploy our forces on either side of the road. I
ordered the battery into position
and opened fire on the enemy, which was instantly replied to with vigor
and accuracy. After a
brief and spirited contest, the enemy fell back. I then advanced to
Terre Noir Creek, and after
crossing it again opened fire with the battery and a volley from the
rear guard. Believing that the
enemy was endeavoring to flank us. I withdrew my forces rapidly to the
high ground 1 mile in
advance. Just before my advance reached the highest elevation the enemy
again attacked our
rear, but was held in check by our skirmishers until I succeeded in
getting the battery into
position and deploying the main body of my forces on the crown of the
hill. At this point the
enemy made a desperate charge, but after a hotly contested action of an
hours' duration he was
driven back in confusion, and evidently with considerable loss. During
the engagement Brig.
Gen. S. A. Rice, with the Fiftieth Indiana Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel
Wells commanding
(whose conduct on the occasion deserves the highest commendation),
arrived and assumed
command. My command was now ordered to the front, and was subsequently
halted and
deployed twice as a reserve, but was not again engaged with the enemy. I
am under special
obligations to Maj. C. B. Shoemaker and Adjutant Joseph Lyman, of my
command (Lieutenant-
Colonel Patterson was absent on sick leave), for their prompt and
efficient co-operation from the
commencement to the close of the series of engagements in which we took
part. Great credit is
also due to my line officers and men for the readiness with which they
conformed to the
embarrassing circumstances by which we were surrounded, and the
unfaltering determination
with which they resisted the approach of the enemy. Captain Voegele,
with his battery, rendered
us valuable services whenever opportunity offered. The total loss to my
command was 4
enlisted-men killed, 4 enlisted men missing, 3 officers and 16 enlisted
men wounded; aggregate,
27.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOMAS H. BENTON,
JR., Colonel Twenty-ninth Iowa Infantry, Commanding.
Lieut. JOHN F. LACEY,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. THIRTY-THIRD IOWA INFANTRY VOLS.,
Camden, Ark., April 20, 1864.
LIEUTENANT: In compliance with general orders from headquarters First
Brigade, I
herewith transmit you the following report pertaining to the
Thirty-third Regiment Iowa Infantry
Volunteers, during the recent campaign, including list of casualties,
&c.: Prior to the arrival of
our forces at Prairie D'Ane, the part taken in any engagement by my
regiment was entirely
unimportant. On arriving at Prairie D'Ane I was ordered to form line of
battle and move to the
left of the Fiftieth Indiana, which was done. I was then ordered to form
column by division, and
in that order I moved forward onto the prairie. While crossing a slough
in the timber joining the
prairie, a shell from the enemy's gun exploded near the regiment,
killing 1 man and breaking
126
several guns. On reaching the open ground I again deployed, sending
forward two companies as
skirmishers, with instructions to move steadily forward, which they did,
driving the enemy
before them, the regiment moving to their support. In this order I moved
forward till the regiment
rested where the enemy's artillery first opened fire. It then being
dark, the skirmishers were
ordered to rest in place, and the regiment retired 200 yards to
unexposed ground, and
bivouacked. At 11 p.m. the enemy dashed upon the skirmish line, but was
repulsed without
injury to us. The transactions of the following day are unimportant.
On the morning of the 13th of April we moved, in connection with the
entire forces, through
and to the west of Prairie D'Ane, our skirmishers steadily driving the
enemy before them. On
approaching their works on the Camden and Washington road the enemy
hastily withdrew. From
this time till the morning of the 15th nothing worthy of note
transpired. On the 15th day of April
my regiment was the advance infantry. Two companies were deployed as
skirmishers on either
side of the road, and having moved forward 2 miles, were fired upon by
the enemy. The
skirmishers moved forward, driving them, assisted by a howitzer, until
they came in range of the
enemy's artillery, which was opened upon us, wounding 4 men. My regiment
supported the
Second Missouri Battery on the right. Having taken this position, I sent
forward three
sharpshooters from each company to assist the skirmishers and annoy the
enemy's gunners. After
an engagement of two hours the enemy withdrew from his position, after
which the march was
resumed. At about 2 miles distance we were again fired on. While
awaiting orders a shell from
the enemy's gun burst near my regiment, dangerously wounding 1 man. A
sharp skirmish was
kept up for 2 miles, when the enemy withdrew from our front. Our entire
loss in killed and
wounded when we reached Camden amounted to 1 killed and 4 wounded. I was
relieved of my
command on the 19th of April, while in camp at Camden, Colonel Mackey
having arrived at the
regiment.
H. D. GIBSON,
Major, Commanding Regiment.
Lieut. JOHN F. LACEY,
Acting. Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. THIRTY-THIRD IOWA INFANTRY VOLS.,
Little Rock, Ark., May 6, 1864.
LIEUTENANT: I have the honor herewith to transmit you the following
report of the
engagement in which the Thirty-third Regiment Iowa Infantry took part
from the time of my
taking command at Camden, Ark., until its arrival at Little Rock,
including a list of casualties,
&c.: I arrived at Camden on the 19th day of April, and immediately took
command of my
regiment, at this time 600 strong. Nothing of particular interest took
place from the time of the
evacuation of Camden until my arrival at Saline River.
On the evening of the 29th, at 6.30 p.m., I was ordered to the rear on
the Camden road to
support Colonel Engelmann's brigade, an attack being anticipated during
the night. I stood at
arms during the entire night, the enemy making no particular
demonstration, although in
speaking distance. Night very dark and raining most of the time.
About 4 a.m. on the 30th, I received orders that as soon as the
Forty-third Illinois Infantry, on
my left, was withdrawn I should retire about three-quarters of a mile
toward the river and take
position covering the passage of the troops while crossing. This
movement I executed without
being discovered by the enemy. This position I occupied half an hour,
when the enemy made his
appearance. The skirmishers immediately engaged them, holding them in
check for half an hour,
when I was relieved by the Twenty-seventh Wisconsin Infantry. I marched
my command to a
new position, 1 mile in the direction of the crossing. In twenty minutes
the engagement became
127
general, and I was ordered to the support of the Fiftieth Indiana
Infantry, on the left. From this
time until the close of the battle the regiment was almost continually
engaged. As to the conduct
of both officers and men of my command I cannot speak in terms too high.
To attempt
distinction would be injustice to my command, as all did their duty
nobly. A short time before
the close of the action I received a wound in my right arm, which
compelled me to quit the field,
the command of the regiment devolving upon Captain Boydston, Company A,
who at the close
of the engagement marched the regiment off in good order. The regiment
arrived in camp at
Little Rock, Ark., on the 3d day of May, 1864. Nothing of importance
transpired during the
remainder of our march.
It would be doing great injustice to the enlisted men of my command to
fail to notice the
manner in which they endured the fatigue and privations of the march,
the rations being
exhausted on the 29th of April. For the operations of the regiment prior
to my command,
reference is made to the report of Maj. H. D. Gibson, herewith transmitted.
With the highest respect, your obedient servant,
C. H. MACKEY,
Colonel, Commanding.
Lieut. JOHN F. LACEY,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
Extent of casualties: Killed, enlisted men, 8. Wounded, commissioned
officers, 6; enlisted
men, 96. Missing, enlisted men, 13. Total loss, 123.
HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, THIRD DIVISION,
Camp No. 11, near Elkin's Ford, Ark., April 6, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith the following report of the
operations of the brigade
under my command from the time of its arrival at Elkin's Ford on the
Little Missouri River to
this date, embracing the engagements of the 3d and 4th instant at that
place with two brigades
from Marmaduke's division, under command of Generals Cabell and Greene.
Having been
notified by Brigadier-General Salomon on the afternoon of the 2d
instant, while upon the march
from Spoonville, of the importance of taking and holding Elkin's Ford, I
made a forced march
with my command, crossing the river after dark, preceded by a squadron
of cavalry sent forward
as advance pickets. One regiment of my brigade (the Seventy-seventh Ohio
Infantry, Col.
William B. Mason commanding), and one section of artillery from my
battery, were detached
after leaving Okolona by order of Major-General Steele to support the
cavalry, supposed at that
time to be engaging the enemy at Antoine. The remainder of my forces,
consisting of the Thirtysixth
Iowa Infantry, Col. C. W. Kittredge commanding; Forty-third Indiana
Infantry, Maj. W. W.
Norris commanding, and Battery E, Second Missouri Light Artillery,
Lieutenant Peetz
commanding, encamped near the bank of the river. The day after my
arrival occasional firing
along our picket-lines and skirmishing in front convinced me that the
enemy were on the alert,
either for the purpose of watching the movements of the army, of which
my brigade constituted
the advance, or if possible, by a direct attack upon me in overpowering
numbers, to cut me off
before re-enforcements could be obtained from across the river.
Early on the morning of the 3d instant I ordered Major Norris,
Forty-third Indiana, to proceed
with four companies of that regiment to the front to reconnoiter the
position of the enemy,
deploy the men as skirmishers, and support the cavalry pickets. He soon
succeeded in
discovering the position of the advanced pickets and skirmishers of the
enemy, drove them back
for some distance, pressing them so closely that, the retreat of a
number of them being cut off, 16
came into our lines and surrendered. On the same evening, being
satisfied that the enemy were in
our front in force and designed attacking us during the night or early
in the morning, I ordered
128
Lieutenant-Colonel Drake, Thirty-sixth Iowa, to proceed with three
companies from that
regiment and three from the Forty-third Indiana to a position on the
main road leading from the
ford immediately in our front, to deploy his men on the right and left
of the road, watch the
movements of the enemy, and resist their approach as long as was
prudent, and retire to the
reserves when they approached in force. One section of artillery, under
Lieutenant Peetz, was
planted so as to fully command the road and the leading approaches on
our right and left.
At 6 o'clock on the morning of the 4th, the enemy approached in force
and commenced an
attack on the advanced companies of Lieutenant-Colonel Drake, who
resisted them gallantly for
near two hours, being well supported by the artillery of Lieutenant
Peetz. The report of
Lieutenant-Colonel Drake, giving a detailed statement of the disposition
of his forces and
skirmishes with the enemy, is submitted herewith. The capture by his
force early in the morning
of a rebel lieutenant, an aide-de-camp upon the staff of General
Marmaduke, confirmed me in
the belief that that general was near us in person with a large portion
of his division. After a very
lively skirmish of near two hours, the enemy having discovered the
position of our battery and
replying to it vigorously with four pieces of artillery, our pickets and
advanced companies were
driven back upon their infantry reserves. The enemy (since ascertained
to be General Cabell's
brigade, 1,600 strong) charged with a yell upon our left for the purpose
of flanking us and
capturing our battery. Their approach from the cover of the timber was
met gallantly by two or
three well-directed volleys from the Thirty-sixth Iowa. Colonel
Kittredge's report of the part
taken by his regiment in resisting this charge of the enemy is herewith
forwarded, together with
the report of Major Norris.
Immediately after the charge and repulse of the enemy the re-enforcement
sent for by me
arrived, consisting of the Twenty-ninth Iowa Infantry and Ninth
Wisconsin Infantry, of
Brigadier-General Rice's brigade, but before they were put in position
by him the enemy
withdrew, not, however, until a grape-shot from their battery had
inflicted a slight wound upon
the general's head, from the effects of which I am gratified to say he
has recovered.
In looking upon the results of this engagement and the great disparity
of numbers of the
forces engaged, I cannot but regard this encounter as one reflecting the
highest praise upon the
coolness and unflinching courage of the men of my command, all of whom
acquitted themselves
well. My entire list of casualties (most of which are slight wounds)
will not exceed 30, while the
new-made graves of 18 of the enemy are in sight of our present
encampment, and they confess to
a loss of more than 50 in wounded. My especial thanks are due Col. C. W.
Kittredge, Lieutenant-
Colonel Drake, Maj. W. W. Norris, and Lieutenant Peetz, for their prompt
co-operation and
gallant disposition of their forces; and also to my personal staff,
Capt. W. S. Magill, Capt. W. E.
Whitridge, Lieut. E. P. Pearce, and Lieut. Charles J. Eagler, for the
assistance they rendered me
in carrying orders under the fire of the enemy.
I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. E. McLEAN,
Colonel Forty-third Indiana Infy., Comdg. Second Brigade.
Capt. A. BLOCKI,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., THIRD DIV., 7TH ARMY CORPS,
Camden, Ark., April 20, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to submit to you the following report of the
participation of the brigade
under my command in the events of the present expedition since my last
report of the 6th instant,
which embraced operations to that date: On the 7th instant, three days
after the battle of Elkin's
Ford, this brigade moved on the road and encamped with the residue of
the forces composing
129
this army upon the Cornelius plantation (awaiting the co-operation of
the division under
command of Brigadier-General Thayer), where the enemy had erected
fortifications upon the
hills extending over a circuit of near 3 miles, and which had been
evacuated by them on the
evening previous to our arrival. On the 10th instant, General Thayer's
division having arrived,
our forces proceeded to Prairie D'Ane, a distance of 6 miles, at the
edge of which the enemy's
skirmishers awaited us, supported by artillery, and commenced a vigorous
attack upon the
advance. A lively skirmish here ensuing the rebel skirmishers fell back,
withdrawing their
artillery, and our forces advanced until our line of skirmishers was
established on the prairie, a
mile from the timber. It being now dark and our forces having a good
position we halted for the
night; until 11 o'clock heavy cannonading and brisk skirmishing
continued with slight intervals.
Upon the day of this march this brigade was charged with guarding the
general supply and
pontoon trains, but at the beginning of the skirmishing the
Seventy-seventh Ohio was ordered by
me to advance and occupy a position in line on the right of the road,
and the Thirty-sixth Iowa,
which was posted along the train in detachments by my order, advanced on
double-quick a
distance of over 2 miles, and was soon posted in position on the left of
the road on the prairie.
These two regiments remained in line under arms all night. The
Forty-third Indiana, which was
in rear of the whole train, did not arrive in camp near the prairie
until about midnight. My
artillery, Company E, Second Missouri Light Artillery, by the order of
General Salomon, was
rapidly hurried to the front and took position on the extreme right of
our line of defense, where it
did most excellent service.
On the afternoon of the 11th, it being evident that the enemy were in
large force upon our
right, I was ordered to take a position in line on the right, and
co-operate with the cavalry brigade
of Lieutenant-Colonel Caldwell. Here my brigade bivouacked the remainder
of the day and the
following night, sleeping upon their arms. The next day, the army
advancing upon the rebel
fortifications, this brigade, with one section of artillery (Vaughn's
battery), marched in close
column in the center between the First and Third Brigades, with orders
to support either, as the
necessity should require. The enemy's pickets gave way before our line
of skirmishers when the
general advance took place, and the small remnant of the forces left by
them to keep up
appearance of resistance soon fled through the woods, leaving their long
line of fortifications.
The conduct of the men of the brigade upon the occasion of this advance,
with the probability
of battle before them, was most admirable. Upon the day of the
successful entry of our troops
into Camden, my brigade being again charged with the guarding of the
general supply and
pontoon trains, did not participate in the fight occurring upon that
occasion. I take pleasure in
reporting that during the whole expedition the conduct and discipline of
the men of the brigade
has been without exception most excellent, and their willingness to do
any duty assigned them,
attended with whatever danger, most marked and gratifying.
I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. E. McLEAN,
Colonel Forty-third Indiana Infy., Comdg. Second Brigade.
Capt. A. BLOCKI,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. THIRTY-SIXTH REGT. IOWA VOL. INFANTRY,
Camp at Elkin's Ford, Ark., April 5, 1864.
COLONEL: I have the honor to report that on the evening of the 2d
instant this regiment
crossed the Little Missouri River at the lord known as Elkin's Ford and
went into camp upon the
south bank of the river and just to the right of the ford, the
Forty-third Indiana Infantry
occupying the ground to our left across the road, these regiments being
the only part of the army
130
that crossed the river, excepting small cavalry outposts who picketed
the grounds to our front,
the rest of the army having gone into camp on the north bank of the
river and in our rear. On the
evening of the 3d instant I received your order to send three companies
to the front, with orders
to support the cavalry outposts and, if necessary, skirmish with the
enemy, holding him in check
until a larger force could be sent forward. I ordered Lieut. Col. F. M.
Drake to take command of
Companies D, G, and A and carry out your instructions, which he
immediately did, you
strengthening his command soon after with three companies of the
Forty-third Indiana Infantry.
A copy of his report I have the honor to inclose herewith, from which
you will see that he with
his small command held the large force of the enemy in check for several
hours. About 6 o'clock
on the morning of the 4th instant the skirmishers were briskly engaged,
and you ordered me to
move forward with the seven remaining companies of the regiment. I moved
up to the rear of the
skirmishers and a little in advance of two pieces of Battery E, Second
Missouri Artillery, which I
found had been put in position during the night. I rode forward to speak
with Lieutenant-Colonel
Drake, who was gallantly holding his ground against such immense odds,
when a rebel officer
was brought in and promptly sent to your headquarters, and who proved to
be a member of
General Marmaduke's staff. You now came up in person and ordered me to
move a little to the
rear, which I did, immediately observing that the whole line of
skirmishers to the left of the road
were giving way and rapidly retreating across an open field in their
rear. I now formed in line on
the left of the road a little to the rear of the battery, ordering the
men to lie down. I received no
further orders until the battle was over. The firing now being brisk and
the battery fully occupied,
handsomely replying to a battery of the enemy which seemed to have
secured a very accurate
range, I advanced my line of battle a few steps, my right resting
directly upon the left of the
battery, the men lying down as before, being slightly protected by a
rise in the ground directly in
front. The enemy were now firing rapidly with artillery and musketry,
and I became satisfied
they were charging upon the battery, and as they made their appearance
in the open ground, I
ordered my command to stand up and fire. Our battery now limbered up and
retreated across the
creek in our rear. I, however, poured in a few well-directed volleys,
which sent the enemy back
as rapidly as they had advanced a few moments before. The firing now
nearly ceased on both
sides. I found that Lieutenant-Colonel Drake had gradually and in good
order fallen back on the
right of the road, nearly parallel with the regiment and just to the
front of the Twenty-ninth Iowa
Infantry, who were now in line on the right of the road in my rear
across the creek, and I ordered
him to form his companies in their proper order upon the left of the
regiment. The regiment
remained upon the field all night, but the enemy had evidently
retreated. The officers and men of
the regiment behaved gallantly, as they must needs have done to have
held in check and finally
driven from the field, with the aid of two pieces of artillery a small
command of the First Iowa
Cavalry and three companies of the Forty-third Indiana Infantry, an
enemy 3,000 strong.
Lieutenant-Colonel Drake especially deserves honorable mention for the
gallant manner in
which he performed his duties. My casualties were 17 wounded, many
severely and some
mortally, a list of whom I have already had the honor to transmit.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
C. W. KITTREDGE,
Colonel Thirty-sixth Iowa Infantry.
Col. WILLIAM E. MCLEAN,
Commanding Second Brigade.
CAMP THIRTY-SIXTH IOWA VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
Near Elkin's Ford, Ark., April 6, 1864.
131
SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken
by the detachment
under my command in the battle of Elkin's Ford, on the Little Missouri
River, Ark., on the 3d
and 4th instant: By order of Col. William E. McLean, commanding Second
Brigade, about 5
p.m. on the 3d instant, in command of three companies of the
Thirty-sixth Iowa Infantry and
three companies of the Forty-third Indiana Infantry, I proceeded along
the road running
perpendicular from the ford through the woods to the front, and took a
position about 100 paces
in rear of the picket-post on the road, behind a deserted orchard. The
picket-post, composed of
about 100 men of the First Iowa Cavalry, commanded by Captain Mcintyre,
I found on my
arrival was engaged skirmishing with the advance pickets of the enemy. I
immediately went
forward among the line of skirmishers until I could observe the enemy's
movements, and from
close observation soon became satisfied that they were in considerable
force, and were covering
preparations to attack us next morning. I at once apprised Colonel
McLean concerning my
apprehensions, who immediately sent to my support Lieutenant Peetz, with
a section of light
artillery, and ordered me to assume command of all the forces to the
front, deploy my men on the
right and left of the road, and if attacked, to hold my position as long
as I thought prudent, and
fall back on the reserves. The cavalry post, now composed of Companies C
and D, First Iowa
Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenants Ronaldson and Walker (who had at this
time relieved
Captain McIntyre), covered about 200 paces of our front with cavalry
vedettes, and I deployed
Companies D, G, and A, Thirty-sixth Iowa, on the right of the road at
intervals of 100 paces
between companies, making I) my center, placed at the road. I deployed
Companies E, H, and C,
Forty-third Indiana, at same company intervals on the left of the road,
the battery taking position
about 200 paces in rear of my center, and threw well forward and to my
flanks a strong infantry
picket. I ordered each company to keep up a few watchers, the Balance to
sleep on their arms
until 4 o'clock next morning, when all should get up and breakfast
before daylight. I ordered the
cavalry, as soon as attacked, to dismount and send all their horses to
the rear. Soon after daylight
on the morning of the 4th instant the enemy engaged the cavalry pickets,
and almost
simultaneously made a determined effort to turn my left flank. I met
them on the left with
Companies H and C, deployed as skirmishers, and ordered Company D,
Captain Hale, to move
forward and deploy to support the cavalry. I immediately discovered the
enemy entering the
orchard in heavy force in line of battle, and moved forward Companies G
and E on a line with D.
The engagement was now becoming very warm, and my men were falling
wounded on my right
and left, but by a very determined effort we finally succeeded in
driving back the rebel column
into the woods in front of the orchard. I immediately dispatched an
orderly to Colonel McLean,
informing him we were engaged with about 2,000 of the enemy and calling
for re-enforcements.
A strong effort was now made by the enemy to turn my right flank, when I
moved forward
Company A, Captain Porter, deployed to protect it. My whole force was
now deployed, covering
the enemy's front, and the engagement was general along my entire line.
I now called upon
Lieutenant Peetz to open upon them with his battery, which he had barely
commenced doing
when the enemy opened upon us with four field pieces, and for near one
hour from this time the
engagement on both sides was very severe. With a force of about 300 men
we were contending
against Generals Cabell and Greene's brigades, commanded by General
Marmaduke in person.
My officers and men without exception fought with desperation, and we
succeeded in checking
the enemy, and holding a position about 50 paces in rear of our old
line. A lull then ensued of
some minutes, taking advantage of which I ordered my line to advance to
our old position and
take the men's knapsacks, which had been left on the ground where we
encamped, now in
possession of the enemy. The men went forward, retook their knapsacks,
and Company D,
Captain Hale, captured while doing so Lieutenant Fackler, an
aide-de-camp of General
Marmaduke. We were now again in possession of the ground held by us at
the commencement of
132
the engagement, and were fully assured from appearances that so far the
enemy had received
more than he had bargained for.
Fearing the enemy were posting artillery on my flanks to enfilade us or
in position to give us
a raking cross-fire, I ordered Captain Porter, on my right, and
Lieutenant Holman, on my left, to
advance a few skirmishers to their front and flank and feel for the
enemy. They had not advanced
far until they were both engaged. The enemy had posted a piece of
artillery in front of each of
my flanks, and with a cross-fire and a direct fire from his four pieces
of artillery commenced
raking the wood with solid shot, grape, and shell, while his combined
forces in one continuous
line rushed upon us, firing volleys of musketry and yelling like demons.
For some time we held a
perfect line, falling back slowly, and contesting every inch of ground,
expecting support, until
my line on the left of the road, being forced into an open field, gave
way entirely, and fell back
on their reserves. I now determined to hold my position on the right of
the road at all hazards
until re-enforced. I succeeded in doing so, and after several hours'
severe fighting finally
repulsed the enemy, but not without considerable loss. About the time my
left gave way, Colonel
Kittredge took a position with the balance of the Thirty-sixth Iowa in
rear of the field, and
repulsed the enemy's charge on my left.
During the engagement, which lasted until near noon with my detachment,
the cavalry was
commanded by Lieutenants Walker, Ronaldson, McCormick, and Dow, First
Iowa Cavalry; the
artillery by Lieutenant Peetz, [Battery E,] Second Missouri Light
Artillery; Companies A, G,
and D, Thirty-sixth Iowa, by Captains Porter, Fee, and Hale, and
Lieutenants Baird, Pearson, and
Birnbaum; Companies E, H, and C, Forty-third Indiana, by Lieutenants
Thompson, Cooper, and
Holman; and I cannot but express the highest commendation for the
coolness and bravery they
exhibited during this terrible and unequal contest, and the men proved
themselves all heroes.
Privates George Barr and Harvey J. Clingenpeel, Company C, First Iowa
Cavalry, acted as my
orderlies during the engagement, and were of great service; they are
good and brave soldiers.
The casualties of my detachment are 1 officer, Lieutenant Dow, slightly
wounded in head, and
30 men wounded, 11 of them supposed mortally, several of whom have since
died. The
proportion is 12 from the Thirty-sixth Iowa, 11 from the First Iowa
Cavalry, 4 from the Fortythird
Indiana, and 3 from the [Battery El Second Missouri Light Artillery, a
list of which will be
reported by regimental commanders.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
F. M. DRAKE,
Lieut. Col. 36th Iowa Infy., Comdg. Detach. 2d Brig.
Capt. W. E. WHITRIDGE,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.
HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., THIRD DIV., 7TH ARMY CORPS,
Marks' Mills, April 25, 1864.
SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 22d day of April, by order
of Brigadier-General
Salomon, the Second Brigade Was detailed to escort a supply train,
consisting of 240
Government wagons and a number of sutler and other private wagons, from
Camden to Pine
Bluff. Col. William E. McLean, Forty-third Indiana Infantry, the brigade
commander, being sick,
was unable to go personally in command. Col. C. W. Kittredge,
Thirty-sixth Iowa, Col. W. B.
Mason, Seventy-seventh Ohio, being also sick, the command devolved upon
me as the ranking
officer. At the request of Colonel McLean I reported to Major-General
Steele for instructions,
who ordered me to move with the train early next morning to Pine Bluff,
and when the same was
loaded to return with it to Camden. In obedience to his instructions I
crossed the Ouachita that
evening and encamped on the opposite bank, where the train was parked.
My forces consisted of
133
the Forty-third Indiana Infantry, Maj. W. W. Norris commanding, about
300 strong; Thirty-sixth
Iowa Infantry, Maj. A. H. Hamilton commanding, about 500 strong:
Seventy-seventh Ohio
Infantry, about 400 strong, Captain McCormick commanding, and two
sections of Battery E,
Second Missouri Light Artillery, Lieutenant Peetz commanding.
Next morning at daylight' Major McCauley, First Indiana Cavalry,
reported to me for duty
with a detachment of 240 men from that regiment and the Seventh Missouri
Cavalry. I would
further report that in addition to the above-named forces there
accompanied the train Lieutenant
Schrom, of General Salomon's staff, Captain Sprague, of General Carr's
staff, and Captain
Townsend, of General Rice's staff, together with a large number of
citizens, cotton speculators,
Arkansas refugees, sutlers, and other army followers, and also some 300
negroes. At 5 a.m. on
the 23d instant I moved and encamped about 18 miles from Camden. The
advance under Major
McCauley, during the afternoon, encountered a few squads of rebel
cavalry along the road, but
we did not discover the enemy in any force. Finding the roads much worn
by the loaded supply
trains to Camden and greatly damaged by recent rains, I organized a
pioneer corps, consisting of
about 75 colored recruits. By much exertion I succeeded in reaching the
edge of the Moro
Bottom on the evening of the 24th, where I encamped, keeping my pioneer
corps at work during
the night, bridging the slough and corduroying the bottom. On the 24th,
Major McCauley had
been diligently scouting all parts of the country, but was unable to
discover any enemy. During
the night I placed a cavalry picket of 1 officer and 25 men about 2
miles in my rear, at the
junction of the Chambersville and Camden roads, with instructions to
patrol at daylight on each
road to the rear for 5 miles. I also placed a cavalry picket of 10 men
at the junction of the
Princeton road, about 2 miles in my advance, with orders to patrol on
that road at daylight, 5
miles, and ordered Major McCauley to send an officer and 75 men forward
at daylight to the
junction of the Warren road, about 6 miles in advance, and take
position, to send patrols on that
road for 4 or 5 miles, and to go himself with the balance of his command
at daylight to the
picket-post in our rear, and remain until patrols returned. On the 25th,
I moved my pioneer corps
at daylight and started the train, the Forty-third Indiana, Major
Norris, with one section of
artillery, taking the advance, with instructions to proceed on the march
and take a position at the
junction of the Warren and Pine Bluff roads,' and, if the patrol on
these roads should report any
enemy advancing, to cover their front with a strong line of skirmishers.
I remained at camp with the Thirty-sixth Iowa and Seventy-seventh Ohio