1

*OFFICIAL ARMY RECORDS*

*1864-1*

HEADQUARTERS 
<p> SECOND BRIGADE, CAVALRY DIVISION,

Collierville, January 1, 1864.&nbsp;</p>
<p>

CAPTAIN:&nbsp;</p>
<p> I have the honor to submit the following report of the part
taken by the

detachments of this brigade which were left in camp when the command was
ordered out during

the recent advance of the enemy:

At 3 p.m. on the 24th of December, 1863, in compliance with orders
received from your

headquarters by telegraph, I ordered a detachment of 30 men, under
Lieutenant Dunham,

mounted on the wagon mules, to Macon, Tenn. They swam Wolf River about 7
miles northeast

of this place, and proceeded to Macon, reaching there about daylight on
the morning of the 25th,

found no enemy in the vicinity, and returned to camp, arriving about 3
p.m., 25th December.

On the 25th December, received orders from General Hurlbut to destroy
all the crossings of

Wolf River immediately. Telegraphed the orders to Germantown and La
Fayette, and sent details

from Collierville to perform the duty. On the 26th and on the morning of
the 27th December,

repeated the orders, and supposed that they were obeyed, but have since
learned that the

destruction of the bridge at La Fayette was only partial.

About half past 1 p.m., on the 27th December, received information that
the enemy in large

force was crossing the Wolf River at La Fayette; that they had driven
Lieutenant Roberts, Ninth

Illinois Cavalry, with his command of two companies of the Ninth
Illinois Cavalry, from the

town, and were pushing him west on the State Line road. This information
came by mounted

courier. I immediately mounted every man that was available in camp,
using the transportation

mules for the purpose, and sent Captain Foster, Second Iowa Cavalry, in
command of the

detachment, amounting to about 100 men, on the State Line road toward La
Fayette. They met

Lieutenant Roberts, Ninth Illinois Cavalry, with his command, about 50
men, 2 miles west of La

Fayette, and immediately joined with him and engaged the enemy; checked
their advance. Drove

it back half a mile, but heavy re-enforcements of the rebels coming up
they again drove our men

slowly but steadily back, pursuing them until within range of our guns
in the fort at Collierville,

which were opened. Our little detachment fought so stubbornly that it
was after dark when our

artillery opened.

The enemy, 2,000 strong, under General Forrest, formed a line of battle
three-fourths of a

mile east of the fort, sending 400 west and 600 south of the town. The
night was intensely dark,

and it was raining.

Before daylight on the morning of the 28th December, General Forrest
moved his whole

command south on the Chulahoma road. Soon after daylight the Ninth
Illinois Cavalry came into

camp from the east; about 9 a.m. Colonel Morgan's brigade arrived.

At 12 m. the Ninth Illinois Cavalry started in pursuit of the enemy, and
at 3 a.m. on the 29th,

Colonel Morgan's brigade followed. The pursuit was continued a few miles
south of the

Coldwater, but the enemy having twenty-four hours the start of any
considerable portion of our

forces, of course the pursuit was fruitless.

The command returned to camp on the morning of the 31st December.

The conduct of Captain Foster, Second Iowa Cavalry, and of Sergeant
Pullman, Ninth Illinois

Cavalry, and most of the men of their commands, is highly commendable.

Our casualties are as follows: Two men wounded and 8 men captured. The
losses of the

enemy much greater than ours, and as far as known were 1 man killed and
7 men wounded.

I am, captain, your most obedient servant,

EDWARD HATCH,

2

Colonel Second Iowa Cavalry, Commanding Brigade.&nbsp;</p>
<p>

Capt. SAMUEL L. WOODWARD,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Cav. Div., 16th A. C., Memphis, Tenn.&nbsp;</p>
<p>

HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., CAV. DIV., 16TH ARMY CORPS,

Collierville, Tenn., January 2, 1864.&nbsp;</p>
<p>

CAPTAIN:&nbsp;</p>
<p> I have the honor to submit the following report in regard to
the destruction of the

bridges at La Fayette:

In compliance with orders received by telegraph from your headquarters,
December 25,

1863, ordering the destruction of all crossings on Wolf River, I
telegraphed to Lieut. S. O.

Roberts, Ninth Illinois Cavalry, commanding at La Fayette, to destroy
all crossings on the Wolf,

in the vicinity of La Fayette. This order was repeated on the 26th and
27th days of December,

1863, and was received by Lieutenant Roberts (see certificate of
telegraph operator at

Collierville and La Fayette), but the destruction of the bridge was not
complete, a foot-path being

left, whereby the enemy crossed on the 27th December, and from thence south.

I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,&nbsp;</p>
<p>

W. SCOTT BELDEN,

Lieutenant, and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.&nbsp;<br>

Capt. T. H. HARRIS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.&nbsp;</p>
<p>

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

Chattanooga, January 15, 1864.&nbsp;</p>
<p>

GENERAL:&nbsp;</p>
<p> I have the honor to report the operations of my command from
December 1 to

31, 1863, as follows:

December 1, General Hooker returned to Chattanooga from Ringgold with
Geary's division,

of the Twelfth Corps, and Osterhaus' division, of the Fifteenth Corps.
Cruft's two brigades, of the

First Division, Fourth Corps, were ordered to proceed to Chickamauga
battlefield and bury such

of our dead as still remained unburied by the rebels. This duty
finished, they were to return to

their former positions on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad,
between Whiteside's and

Bridgeport. General Hooker, on evacuating Ringgold, destroyed the
railroad depot and other

buildings, as well as such captured property as could not be removed.
General Granger's corps

marched to the relief of Knoxville, acting in connection with General
Sherman's command,

which was also moving toward that place. Third Brigade, First Division
of Cavalry, Colonel

Watkins, of the Sixth Kentucky, commanding, was stationed at Rossville,
with an infantry

support of two regiments, to guard our south front. General Elliott,
with the First Cavalry

Division, was ordered to proceed from his position, in the vicinity of
Sparta, to Kingston, East

Tennessee. He received later instructions, to the effect that in case he
did not reach that place in

time to participate in the pursuit of Longstreet, he was to establish
his headquarters at Athens,

and throw out posts as far as possible to the southeast to observe the
movements of the enemy in

that direction.

Information given by deserters from the enemy places the rebel army in
our front as follows:

Cleburne's division is at Tunnel Hill, and the balance of the army is
stationed between there and

Dalton. They state that the troops are very much demoralized, the men
being very much scattered

from their regiments, and desertions are numerous. Buckner's corps was
not in the battles in front

of Chattanooga, it having gone to the assistance of Longstreet seven or
eight days previous.

3

December 3, Col. George P. Buell, Fifty-eighth Indiana Volunteers,
commanding Pioneer

Brigade, commenced constructing a double-track wagon road over the nose
of Lookout

Mountain.

December 13, General Gillem reports from Nashville that he had just
returned to that place

from the Tennessee River. The work on the Northwestern railroad was
progressing. Guerrillas

between the Cumberland and Duck Rivers broken up. Perkins and Ray were
disposed of, the

former having been killed and the latter captured. Refugees and
conscripts from the south side of

the river report that Forrest and Pillow are at Jackson, West Tennessee,
with about 4,000 men,

1,000 of whom are well mounted and organized.

December 15, a small party of rebels, under Maj. Joe Fontaine, Roddey's
adjutant, was

captured by General Dodge near Pulaski. They had been on a
reconnaissance along the Nashville

and Chattanooga Railroad and the Nashville and Decatur Railroad.
Measures were immediately

taken to guard against an attack on either railroad.

On the 17th, Howard's corps returned to Chattanooga from Knoxville; also
Davis' division, of

the Fourteenth Corps. The latter was posted along Spring Creek, south of
Missionary Ridge, and

the former returned to its position in Lookout Valley.

Through scouts we learn that the enemy is strengthening his position
between Tunnel Hill

and Dalton; also at Resaca, near the Coosa River, and at Allatoona
Mountains, the last named

place being a formidable position. Information from various sources
leads to the belief that

Hardee is making the Oostenaula River his front, defended by rifle-pits
and fortifications; also

the Etowah River. All deserters and scouts agree in their statements
that the rebels in our front

are disheartened and demoralized. President Lincoln's amnesty
proclamation was having a good

effect in encouraging desertions, and movements have been taken to
circulate it quite extensively

within the enemy's lines. The cavalry command, under General Elliott,
having been detained by

General Foster for duty in his department, Col. Eli Long, Fourth Ohio
Cavalry, commanding

Second Brigade, Second Division Cavalry, was stationed at Calhoun, on
the Hiwassee River, for

the purpose of watching the movements of the enemy in that vicinity. The
balance of the Second

Division, under command of General Crook, was ordered by General Grant,
on the 20th, to move

from Huntsville, where it then was, to Prospect, with a view to operate
against Forrest. General

W. S. Smith, chief of cavalry of the Military Division of the
Mississippi, with the Third, Fifth,

and Seventh Kentucky, Second and Fourth Tennessee, and Eighth Iowa
Cavalry Regiments,

started for Savannah on the 20th, to cross the Tennessee, and operate on
the flank and rear of

Forrest and drive him from West Tennessee. The operations of the cavalry
have been quite

brilliant during the month. Col. L. D. Watkins, commanding Third
Brigade, First Division, from

his position at Rossville: has made several successful raids into the
enemy's lines. On the 5th, a

reconnaissance sent by him proceeded as far as Ringgold without finding
any signs of the enemy,

except stragglers and deserters. Again on the 14th, with detachments of
the Fourth and Sixth

Kentucky Cavalry, numbering about 250 men, he made a reconnaissance
toward La Fayette,

surprised that town, capturing a colonel of the Georgia Home Guards, 6
officers of the rebel

signal corps, and about 38 horses and mules; our loss, none. On the 23d
he sent out a scout of

150 men from Fourth and Sixth Kentucky Regiments, under command of Major
Welling, of the

Fourth Kentucky, which proceeded as far as La Fayette, capturing at that
place 1 commissioned

officer, 16 non-commissioned and privates. 10 citizens (said to be
violent rebels), and 38 horses

and mules.

On the 22d, a party of Wheeler's cavalry, numbering about 75 men,
attacked a small party of

the Fourth Michigan Cavalry, stationed at Cleveland. Our loss was 1 or 2
captured, some

property lost, consisting of overcoats, saddles, &c., but the enemy were
finally driven off.

4

On the 23d, Geary's division, of the Twelfth Corps, left their camp at
Lookout Valley to take

up a position along the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, one brigade
to be stationed at

Bridgeport and the other at Stevenson.

On the 28th, Colonel Bernard Laiboldt, Second Missouri Infantry, in
charge of a train and

escort, principally of convalescents belonging to the Fourth Corps,
proceeding from Chattanooga

to Knoxville, was attacked by a force of Wheeler's cavalry, numbering
between 1,200 and 1,500,

as he was crossing the Hiwassee River at Charleston. He immediately
formed his guard in line of

battle on the south side of the river, succeeded in crossing all his
train in safety, and then charged

the astonished rebels and drove them in confusion. He then called upon
Col. Eli Long for cavalry

co-operation, who sent all the force he then had in camp, numbering 150
men. With this small

force Colonel Long charged the enemy with sabers and drove him 5 miles,
capturing 130

prisoners, including 5 commissioned officers. Our loss was 2 killed and
15 wounded. The enemy

left his dead and wounded, as well as quite a number of small-arms, &c.,
upon the field. Both

Colonels Laiboldt and Long are entitled to great credit for the manner
in which they repelled this

attack. I earnestly recommend them to favorable consideration for
promotion; Colonel Laiboldt,

for his executive ability and efficiency as a brigade commander of the
Second Division,

Twentieth Army Corps; Col. Eli Long, for the valuable service he
rendered during the recent

battles in front of Chattanooga and for many instances of previous good
conduct.

Provost-Marshal-General Wiles reports that 1,080 deserters from the
enemy have come into

the lines of this army between the 19th of October and December 31.

Twenty regiments had reorganized as veteran volunteers on the 1st of
January, 1864. A great

many others were preparing to reorganize as veterans.

I have the honor to annex hereto the official report of the operations
of the Second Brigade,

Second Division Cavalry, Col. Eli Long, Fourth Ohio Cavalry, commanding;
also that of Col.

Bernard Laiboldt, Second Missouri, concerning the repulse of Wheeler's
cavalry at Charleston,

and copies of the official reports of the cavalry force under General
Elliott at the engagement at

Mossy Creek, E. Tenn.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,&nbsp;</p>
<p>

GEO. H. THOMAS,

Major-General, U.S. Vols.,&nbsp;<br>
 Commanding.

Brig. Gen. LORENZO THOMAS,

Adjutant-General U.S. Army.&nbsp;<br>

HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CORPS,

Lookout Valley, Tenn., February 4, 1864.&nbsp;<br>
<br>

GENERAL:&nbsp;<br>
 I have the honor to submit the following report of the part
taken by my

command in those operations of the army which resulted in driving the
rebel forces from their

positions in the vicinity of Chattanooga, and of its participation,
immediately afterward, in their

pursuit.

In order that these operations may be distinctly understood--that the
troops concerned be

known and receive the honor due them--it is necessary to premise by
stating that the general

attack was ordered to be made on the enemy's extreme right at daylight
on the 21st of November,

and that preparatory orders were sent, through me, on the 18th, for the
Eleventh Corps to cross to

the north bank of the Tennessee River on the 20th. At this time the
Eleventh, and a part of the

Twelfth Corps, were encamped in Lookout Valley opposite to the left of
the enemy's line.

In consequence of the non-arrival of the force mainly relied on to lead
off, the attack was

postponed to the following morning, and again postponed until the 24th
for the same reason.

Meanwhile orders were received for the Eleventh Corps to go to
Chattanooga, where it reported

5

on the 22d. This divided my command, and, as the orders contemplated no
advance from

Lookout Valley, application was made by me to the major-general
commanding the department

for authority to accompany the Eleventh Corps, assigning as a reason
that it was my duty to join

that part of my command going into battle. This was acceded to, and,
preparatory to leaving,

invitation was sent for Brigadier-General Geary, who was the senior
officer in my absence, to

examine with me the enemy's positions and defenses, and to be informed
at what points I desired

to have his troops held. This was to enable me to make use of the
telegraph in communicating

with him advisedly during the progress of the fight, should a favorable
opportunity present itself

for him to advance.

On the 23d, the commander of the department requested me to remain in
Lookout Valley,

and make a demonstration as early as possible the following morning on
the point of Lookout

Mountain, my command to consist of the parts of two divisions. Later in
the day, the 23d, a copy

of a telegram was received from the major-general commanding the
Division of the Mississippi

to the effect that in the event the pontoon bridge at Brown's Ferry
could not be repaired in season

for Osterhaus' division, of the Fifteenth Corps, to cross by 8 a.m. on
the 24th, the division would

report to me. Soon after, another telegram, from the headquarters of the
department, instructed

me, in the latter case, to take the point of Lookout Mountain if my
demonstration should develop

its practicability. At 2 a.m. word was received that the bridge could
not be put in serviceable

condition for twelve hours, but to be certain on the subject, a staff
officer was dispatched to

ascertain, and at 3.15 a.m., on the 24th, the report was confirmed.

As now composed, my command consisted of Osterhaus' division, Fifteenth
Corps; Cruft's,

of the Fourth; Geary's, of the Twelfth (excepting from the two
last-named divisions such

regiments as were required to protect our communications with Bridgeport
and Kelley's Ferry);

Battery K, of the First Ohio, and Battery I, First New York, of the
Eleventh Corps (the two

having horses for but one); a part of the Second Kentucky Cavalry, and
Company K, of the

Fifteenth Illinois Cavalry, making an aggregate force of 9,681. We were
all strangers, no one

division ever having seen either of the others.

Geary's division, supported by Whitaker's brigade, of Cruft's division,
was ordered to

proceed up the valley, cross the creek near Wauhatchie, and march down,
sweeping the rebels

from it. The other brigade of the Fourth Corps to advance, seize the
bridge just below the

railroad, and repair it. Osterhaus' division was to march up from
Brown's Ferry, under cover of

the hills, to the place of crossing; also, to furnish supports for the
batteries. The Ohio battery was

to take a position on Bald Hill, and the New York battery on the hill
directly in rear. The Second

Kentucky Cavalry was dispatched to observe the movements of the enemy in
the direction of

Trenton, and the Illinois company to perform orderly and escort duty.
This disposition of the

forces was ordered to be made as soon after daylight as practicable.

At this time the enemy's pickets formed a continuous line along the
right bank of Lookout

Creek, with the reserves in the valley, while his main force was
encamped in a hollow half way

up the slope of the mountain, the summit itself was held by three
brigades of Stevenson's

division, and these were comparatively safe, as the only means of access
from the west, for a

distance of 20 miles up the valley, was by two or three trails,
admitting of the passage of but 1

man at a time, and even those trails were held at the top by rebel
pickets. For this reason no

direct attempt was made for the dislodgment of this force. On the
Chattanooga side, which is less

precipitous, a road of easy grade has been made communicating with the
summit by zig-zag lines

running diagonally up the mountain side, and it was believed that before
our troops should gain

possession of this, the enemy on the top would evacuate his position, to
avoid being cut off from

his main body, to rejoin which would involve a march of 20 or 30 miles.

6

Viewed from whatever point, Lookout Mountain, with its high palisaded
crest, and its steep,

rugged, rocky, and deeply-furrowed slopes, presented an imposing barrier
to our advance, and

when to these natural obstacles were added almost interminable,
well-planned, and wellconstructed

defenses, held by Americans, the assault became an enterprise worthy of the

ambition and renown of the troops to whom it was intrusted.

On the northern slope, midway between the summit and the Tennessee, a
plateau or belt of

arable land encircles the crest. There a continuous line of earth-works
had been thrown up, while

redoubts, redans, and pits appeared lower down the slope, to repel an
assault from the direction

of the river. On each flank were rifle-pits, epaulements for batteries,
walls of stone, and abatis to

resist attacks from either the Chattanooga or Lookout Valleys. In the
valleys themselves were

earth-works of still greater extent.

Geary commenced his movement as instructed, crossed the creek at 8
o'clock, captured the

entire picket of 42 men posted to defend it, marched directly up the
mountain, until his right

rested on the palisades, and headed down the valley.

At the same time Grose's brigade advanced resolutely, with brisk
skirmishing, drove the

enemy from the bridge, and at once proceeded to put it in repair.

The firing at this point alarmed the rebels, and immediately their
columns were seen filing

down the mountain from their camps, and moving into their rifle-pits and
breastworks; at the

same time numbers established themselves behind the embankment of the
railroad, which

enabled them, without exposure, to sweep, with a fire of musketry, the
field over which our

troops would be compelled to march for a distance of 300 or 400 yards.

These dispositions were distinctly visible, and as facilities for
avoiding them were close at

hand, Osterhaus was directed to send a brigade, under cover of the hills
and trees, about 800

yards higher up the creek, and prepare a crossing at that point. This
was Brigadier-General

Woods' brigade.

Soon after this Cruft was ordered to leave a sufficient force at the
bridge to engage the

attention of the enemy, and for the balance of Grose's brigade to follow
Woods'. Meanwhile a

section of howitzers was planted to enfilade the positions the enemy had
taken, and Osterhaus

established a section of 20-pounder Parrotts to enfilade the route by
which the enemy had left his

camp. The battery on Bald Hill enfiladed the railroad and highway
leading to Chattanooga, and

all the batteries and sections of batteries had a direct or enfilading
fire within easy range on all

the positions taken by the rebels. Besides, the 20-pounder Parrotts
could be used with good effect

on the rebel camp on the side of the mountain. With this disposition of
the artillery it was

believed we would be able to prevent the enemy from dispatching relief
to oppose Geary, and

also keep him from running away.

At 11 o'clock Woods had completed his bridge. Geary's lines appeared
close by, his

skirmishers smartly engaged, and all the guns opened. Woods and Grose
then sprang across the

river, joined Geary's left, and moved down the valley. A few of the
enemy escaped from the

artillery fire, and those who did ran upon our infantry and were
captured. The balance of the

rebel forces were killed or taken prisoners, many of them remaining in
the bottom of their pits

for safety until forced out by our men.

Simultaneous with these operations the troops on the mountain rushed on
in their advance,

the right passing directly under the muzzles of the enemy's guns on the
summit, climbing over

ledges and bowlders, up hill and down, furiously driving the enemy from
his camp and from

position after position. This lasted until 12 o'clock, when Geary's
advance heroically rounded the

peak of the mountain.

Not knowing to what extent the enemy might be re-enforced, and fearing
from the rough

character of the field of operations that our lines might be disordered,
directions had been given

7

for the troops to halt on reaching this high ground, but, fired by
success, with a flying, panicstricken

enemy before them, they pressed impetuously forward. Cobham's brigade,
occupying

the high ground on the right, between the enemy's main line of defense
on the plateau and the

palisades, incessantly plied them with fire from above and behind, while
Ireland's brigade was

vigorously rolling them up on the flank, and both being closely
supported by the brigades of

Whitaker and Creighton, our success was uninterrupted and irresistible.

Before losing the advantages the ground presented us, the enemy had been
re-enforced.

Meantime, after having secured the prisoners, two of Osterhaus'
regiments had been sent forward

on the Chattanooga road, and the balance of his and Cruft's divisions
had joined Geary. All the

rebel efforts to resist us only resulted in rendering our success more
thorough. After two or three

short but sharp conflicts, the plateau was cleared. The enemy, with his
re-enforcements, driven

from the walls and pits around Craven's house (the last point at which
he could make a stand in

force), all broken and dismayed, were hurled in great numbers over the
rocks and precipices into

the valley.

It was now near 2 o'clock, and our operations were arrested by the
darkness. The clouds,

which had hovered over and enveloped the summit of the mountain during
the morning, and to

some extent favored our movements, gradually settled into the valley and
completely veiled it

from our view. Indeed, from the moment we had rounded the peak of the
mountain, it was only

from the roar of battle and the occasional glimpse our comrades in the
valley could catch of our

lines and standards that they knew of the strife or its progress; and
when, from these evidences,

our true condition was revealed to them, their painful anxiety yielded
to transports of joy which

only soldiers can feel in the earliest moments of dawning victory.

Deeming a descent into the valley imprudent, without more accurate
information of its

topography, and also of the position and strength of the enemy, our line
was established on the

east side of the mountain, the right resting on the palisades, and the
left near the mouth of

Chattanooga Creek, and this we strengthened by all the means at hand,
working until 4 o'clock,

when the commander of the department was informed that our position was
impregnable.

During all of these operations the batteries on Moccasin Point, under
Captain Naylor, had

been busily at work from the north bank of the Tennessee River, and had
contributed as much to

our assistance as the irregularities of the ground and the state of the
atmosphere would admit of.

From our position we commanded the enemy's lines of defense, stretching
across Chattanooga

Valley, by an enfilading fire, and also by a direct fire, many of his
camps, some of which were in

our immediate vicinity. Also direct communication had been opened with
Chattanooga, and at a

quarter past 5 o'clock Brigadier-General Carlin, Fourteenth Corps,
reported to me with his

brigade, and was assigned to duty on the right of the line, to relieve
Geary's command, almost

exhausted with the fatigue and excitement incident to their unparalleled
march.

To prevent artillery being brought forward, the enemy had undermined the
road and covered

it with felled timber. This was repaired and placed in serviceable
condition before morning.

During the day and until after midnight an irregular fire was kept up
along our line, and had

the appearance at one time of an effort to break it. This was on the
right, and was at once

vigorously and handsomely repelled. In this, Carlin's brigade rendered
excellent service. His

report is herewith forwarded.

Before daylight, anticipating the withdrawal of the rebel force from the
summit of the

mountain, parties from several regiments were dispatched to scale it,
but to the Eighth Kentucky

must belong the distinction of having been foremost to reach the crest
and at sunrise to display

our flag from the peak of Lookout, amid the wild and prolonged cheers of
the men whose

dauntless valor had borne it to that point.

8

During the night the enemy had quietly abandoned the mountain, leaving
behind 20,000

rations, the camp and garrison equipage of three brigades, and other
matériel.

An impenetrable mist still covered the face of the valley. Prisoners
reported that the enemy

had abandoned it, but, deeming it imprudent to descend, a reconnaissance
was ordered, and soon

after 9 o'clock report came in that the rebels had retired, but that
their pickets still held the right

bank of Chattanooga Creek, in the direction of Rossville. Soon after the
fog vanished, and

nothing was to be seen in the valley but the deserted and burning camps
of the enemy.

Among the fruits of the preceding operations may be enumerated the
concentration of the

army, the abandonment of defenses upward of 8 miles in extent, the
recovery of all the

advantages in position the enemy had gained from our army on the bloody
field of Chickamauga,

giving to us the undisputed navigation of the river and the control of
the railroad, the capture of

between 2,000 and 3,000 prisoners, 5 stand of colors, 2 pieces of
artillery, upward of 5,000

muskets, &c.

Of the troops opposed to us were four brigades of Walker's division,
Hardee's corps, a

portion of Stewart's division of Breckinridge's corps, and on the top of
the mountain were three

brigades of Steven-sons division.

In conformity with orders, two regiments were dispatched to hold the
mountain, Carlin's

brigade directed to await orders on the Summertown road, and at 10
o'clock my column,

Osterhaus (being nearest the road) leading, marched for Rossville.

On arriving at Chattanooga Creek it was discovered that the enemy had
destroyed the bridge,

and, in consequence, our pursuit was delayed nearly three hours. As soon
as the stringers were

laid, Osterhaus managed to throw over the Twenty-seventh Missouri
Regiment, and soon after

all of his infantry. The former deployed, pushed forward as skirmishers
to the gorge in

Missionary Ridge, and drew the fire of the artillery and infantry
holding it, and also discovered

that the enemy was attempting to cover a train of wagons loading with
stores at the Rossville

house.

As the position was one presenting many advantages for defense, the
skirmishers were

directed to keep the enemy engaged in front, while Woods' brigade was
taking the ridge on the

right, and four regiments of Williamson's on the left. Two other
regiments of this brigade were

posted on the road leading to Chattanooga to prevent surprise. In
executing these duties the

troops were necessarily exposed to the enemy's artillery, but as soon as
it was discovered that his

flanks were being turned and his retreat threatened, he hastily
evacuated the gap, leaving behind

large quantities of artillery and small-arm ammunition, wagons,
ambulances, and a house full of

commissary stores. Pursuit was made as far as consistent with my
instructions to clear

Missionary Ridge.

Meanwhile the bridge had been completed and all the troops over or
crossing. Osterhaus

received instructions to move, with his division, parallel with the
ridge on the east, Cruft on the

ridge, and Geary in the valley, to the west of it, within easy
supporting distance. The batteries

accompanied Geary, as it was not known that roads could be found for
them with the other

divisions without delaying the movements of the column.

General Cruft, with his staff, preceded his column in ascending the
ridge to supervise the

formation of his lines, and was at once met by a line of the enemy's
skirmishers advancing. The

Ninth and Thirty-sixth Indiana Regiments sprang forward, ran into line
under their fire, and

instantly charging, drove back the rebels, while the residue of the
column formed their lines,

Grose's brigade, with the Fifty-first Ohio and Thirty-fifth Indiana, of
Whitaker's, in advance, the

balance of the latter closely supporting the front line. It was,
however, soon found that the ridge

on top was too narrow to admit of this formation, and the division was
thrown into four lines. By

9

this time the divisions of Geary and Osterhaus were abreast of it, and
all advanced at a charging

pace.

The enemy had selected for his advance line of defense the breastworks
thrown up by our

army on its return from Chickamauga, but such was the impetuosity of our
advance that his front

line was routed before an opportunity was afforded him to prepare for a
determined resistance.

Many of the fugitives, to escape, ran down the east slope to the lines
of Osterhaus, a few to the

west, and were picked up by Geary. The bulk of them, however, sought
refuge behind the second

line, and they, in their turn, were soon routed, and the fight became
almost a running one.

Whenever the accidents of the ground enabled the rebels to make an
advantageous stand, Geary

and Osterhaus, always in the right place, would pour a withering fire
into their flanks, and again

the race was renewed. This continued until near sunset, when those of
the enemy who had not

been killed or captured gave way, and in attempting to escape along the
ridge, ran into the arms

of Johnson's division, of the Fourteenth Corps, and were captured.

Our enemy, the prisoners stated, was Stewart's division. But few
escaped. Osterhaus atone

captured 2,000 of them. This officer names the Fourth Iowa,
Seventy-sixth Ohio, and Twentyseventh

Missouri Regiments as having been especially distinguished in this
engagement.

Landgraeber's battery of howitzers also rendered brilliant service on
this field.

Here our business for the day ended, and the troops went into bivouac,
with cheers and

rejoicings, which were caught up by other troops in the vicinity and
carried along the ridge until

lost in the distance.

Soon after daylight every effort was made, by reconnaissance and
inquiry, to ascertain the

whereabouts of the enemy, but to no purpose. The field was as silent as
the grave. Knowing the

desperate extremities to which he must be reduced by our success, with
his retreat seriously

threatened by the only line left him with a hope of success, I felt
satisfied the enemy must be in

full retreat, and accordingly suggested to the commander of the
department that my column

march to Graysville, if possible, to intercept him. This was approved
of, and, re-enforced by

Palmer's corps, all moved immediately in that direction, Palmer's corps
in advance.

On arriving at the west Fork of the Chickamauga River, it was found that
the enemy had

destroyed the bridge. To provide for this contingency, Major-General
Butterfield, my chief of

staff, had in the morning prudently requested that three pontoons, with
their balks and chesses,

might be dispatched for my use, but as they had not come up, after a
detention of several hours, a

bridge was constructed for the infantry, the officers swimming their
horses. It was not until after

3 o'clock the regiments were able to commence crossing, leaving the
artillery and ambulances to

follow as soon as practicable; also a regiment of infantry as a guard,
to complete the bridge, if

possible, for the artillery, and also to assist in throwing over the
pontoon bridge as soon as it

arrived. Partly in consequence of this delay, instructions were given
for Palmer's command to

continue on to Graysville on reaching the La Fayette road, and for the
balance of the command to

proceed to Ringgold (Cruft now leading), as this would enable me to
strike the railroad 5 or 6

miles to the south of where it was first intended. Palmer was to rejoin
me in the morning.

Soon after dark word was received from Palmer, through a member of his
staff, that he had

come up with the enemy, reported to be a battery and 2,000 or 3,000
infantry. Instructions were

sent him to attack them at once, and while forming his lines to the left
for that purpose, the

remaining part of the column was massed as it came up, to the right of
the road, and held

awaiting the movements of Palmer. His enemy was discovered to be a
battery of three pieces,

with a small escort, and was the rear of the rebel army on the road from
Graysville to Ringgold.

Three pieces of artillery were captured, and subsequently an additional
piece, with, I believe, a

few prisoners. I have received no report from this officer of his
operations while belonging to my

command, although mine has been delayed six weeks in waiting.

10

We were now fairly up with the enemy. This at 10 o'clock at night.
Cruft's division advanced

and took possession of the crest of Chickamauga hills, the enemy's
abandoned camp fires still

burning brightly on the side; and we all went into bivouac.

My artillery was not yet up, and in this connection I desire that the
especial attention of the

commander of the department may be called to that part of the report of
General Osterhaus

which relates to the conduct of the officers who had the pontoon bridge
in charge. I do not know

the names of the officers referred to;was not furnished with a copy of
their instructions, nor did

they report to me. The pontoons were not brought forward to the point of
crossing at all, and the

balks and chess-planks only reached their destination between 9 and 10
p.m.; distance from

Chattanooga 10 miles, and the roads excellent.

Then trestles had to be framed, and the bridge was not finished until 6
o'clock the following

morning.

The report of Lieut. H. C. Wharton, of the Engineers, and temporarily
attached to my staff,

who was left behind to hasten the completion of the bridge, is herewith
transmitted. No better

commentary on this culpable negligence is needed than is furnished by
the record of our

operations in the vicinity of Ringgold.

The town was distant 5 miles. At daylight the pursuit was renewed,
Osterhaus in advance,

Geary following, and Cruft in the rear. Evidences of the precipitate
flight of the enemy were

everywhere apparent; caissons, wagons, ambulances, arms, and ammunition
were abandoned in

the hurry and confusion of retreat. After going about 2 miles, we came
up with the camp he had

occupied during the night, the fires still burning. A large number of
prisoners were also taken

before reaching the East Fork of the Chickamauga River.

We found the ford, and also the bridge to the south of Ringgold, held by
a body of rebel

cavalry. These discharged their arms and quickly gave way before a
handful of our men, and

were closely pursued into the town.

I rode to the front on hearing the firing, where I found Osterhaus out
with his skirmishers,

intensely alive to all that was passing, and pushing onward briskly. He
informed me that four

pieces of artillery had just left the rebel camp, weakly escorted, and
ran into the gorge, which he

could have captured with a small force of cavalry. The gorge is to the
east of Ringgold, and we

were approaching it from the west. A little firing occurred between our
skirmishers, as they

entered the town, and small parties of the rebel cavalry and infantry,
the latter retiring in the

direction of the gap. This is a break in Taylor's Ridge of sufficient
width for the river to flow and

on its north bank room for an ordinary road and a railroad, when the
ridge rises with abruptness

on both sides 400 or 500 feet, and from thence, running nearly north and
south, continues

unbroken for many miles. Covering the entrance to it is a small patch of
young trees and

undergrowth.

It was represented by citizens friendly to our cause, and confirmed by
contrabands, that the

enemy had passed through Ringgold, sorely pressed, his animals
exhausted, and his army

hopelessly demoralized. In a small portion of it only had the officers
been able to preserve

regimental and company formations, many of the men having thrown away
their arms. A still

greater number were open and violent in their denunciations of the
Confederacy.

In order to gain time, it was the intention of the rear guard to make
use of the natural

advantages the gorge presented to check the pursuit. The troops relied
on for this were posted

behind the mountain and the trees, and the latter were also used to mask
a couple of pieces of

artillery. Only a feeble line of skirmishers appeared in sight.

The only way to ascertain the enemy's strength was to feel of him, and,
as our success, if

prompt, would be crowned with a rich harvest of matériel, without
waiting for my artillery (not

yet up, though after 9 o'clock), the skirmishers advanced. Woods
deployed his brigade in rear of

11

them under cover of the embankment of the railroad, and a brisk musketry
fire commenced

between the skirmishers. At the same time the enemy kept his artillery
busily at work. Their

skirmishers were driven in, and as we had learned the position of the
battery, the Thirteenth

Illinois Regiment, from the right of Woods' line was thrown forward to
seize some houses, from

which their gunners could be picked off by our men. These were
heroically taken and held by

that brave regiment. Apprehensive that he might lose his artillery, the
enemy advanced with a

superior force on our skirmishers, and they fell back behind Woods'
line, when that excellent

officer opened on the rebels and drove them into the gorge, they
leaving, as they fled, their dead

and wounded on the ground. Our skirmishers at once re-occupied their
line, the Thirteenth

Illinois all the time maintaining its position with resolution and
obstinacy. While this was going

on in front of the gorge, Osterhaus detached four regiments, under
Colonel Williamson, half a

mile to the left, to ascend the ridge and turn the enemy's right. Two of
these, the Seventy-sixth

Ohio, supported by the Fourth Iowa, were thrown forward, and as the
enemy appeared in great

force, when they had nearly gained the crest, Geary ordered four of his
regiments still farther to

the left, under Colonel Creighton, for the same object, where they also
found an overwhelming

force confronting them. Vigorous attacks were made by both of these
columns, in which the

troops exhibited extraordinary daring and devotion, but were compelled
to yield to numerical

superiority. The first took shelter in a depression in the side of the
ridge about 50 paces in rear of

their most advanced position, and there remained. The other column was
ordered to resume its

position on the railroad.

All the parties sent forward to ascertain the enemy's position and
strength were small, but the

attacks had been made with so much vigor, and succeeded so well in their
object, that I deemed it

unwise to call up the commands of Palmer and Cruft, and the remaining
brigades of Geary, to

deliver a general attack without my artillery. I therefore gave
instructions for no advance to be

made, and for the firing to be discontinued, except in self-defense.
These orders were conveyed

and delivered to every officer in command on our advance line.

Word was received from General Woods that appearances in his front were
indicative of a

forward movement on the part of the enemy, when Ireland's brigade, of
Geary's division, was

sent to strengthen him. Cobham's brigade, of the same division, took a
well-sheltered position

behind the knoll, midway between the depot and the opening to the gap.
These officers were also

ordered not to attack or to fire unless it should become necessary.

I may here state that the greatest difficulty I experienced with my new
command, and the one

which caused me the most solicitude, was to check and curb their
disposition to engage,

regardless of circumstances, and, it appears, almost of consequences.
This had also been the case

on Lookout Mountain and on Missionary Ridge. Despite my emphatic and
repeated instructions

to the contrary, a desultory fire was kept up on the right of the line
until the artillery arrived, and

you will see by the reports of commanders that, under cover of elevated
ground between my

position and our right, several small parties advanced to capture the
enemy's battery and harass

his flank at the gap. It is with no displeasure I refer to these
circumstances in evidence of the

animation of the troops, neither is it with a feeling of resentment, for
of that I was disarmed by

an abiding sense of their glorious achievements. It has never been my
fortune to serve with more

zealous and devoted troops.

Between 12 and 1 o'clock the artillery came up, not having been able to
cross the West Fork

of the Chickamauga until 8 o'clock on the morning of the 27th. Under my
acting chief of

artillery, Major Reynolds, in conjunction with Generals Geary and
Osterhaus, one section of 12-

pounder howitzers was placed in position to bear on the enemy in front
of our right and to

enfilade the gap; another section of 10-pounder Parrotts was assigned to
silence the enemy's

battery, and one section farther to the left, to bear on some troops
held in mass in front of Geary's

12

regiments. At the same time a regiment from Cruft's division had been
sent around by the bridge

to cross the Chickamauga, and, if possible, to gain the heights of the
ridge on the south side of

the river, the possession of which would give us a plunging fire upon
the enemy in the gorge.

Two companies had nearly gained the summit when they were recalled. The
artillery had opened

with marked effect, the enemy's guns were hauled to the rear, his troops
seen moving, and before

1 o'clock he was in full retreat. Williamson's brigade followed him over
the mountain, while

skirmishers from the Sixtieth and One hundred and second New York
Regiments pursued him

through the gap. Efforts were made to burn the railroad bridges, but the
rebels were driven from

them and the fires extinguished.

During the artillery firing the major-general commanding the Division of
the Mississippi

arrived, and gave directions for the pursuit to be discontinued. Later
in the day, soon after 3

o'clock, I received instructions from him to have a reconnaissance made
in the direction of

Tunnel Hill, the enemy's line of retreat, for purposes of observation,
and to convey to the enemy

the impression that we were still after him. Grose's brigade was
dispatched on this service. About

2 miles out he ran upon a small force of rebel cavalry and infantry, and
pursued them about a

mile and a half, when he fell upon what he supposed to be a division of
troops, posted on the

hills commanding the road. The brigade returned at 8 o'clock, and went
into bivouac. Colonel

Grose's report in this connection concludes by saying that "we found
broken caissons, wagons,

ambulances, dead and dying men of the enemy strewn along the way to a
horrible extent."

As some misapprehension appears to exist with regard to our losses in
this battle, it is proper

to observe that the reports of my division commanders exhibit a loss of
65 killed and 377

wounded, about one-half of the latter so severely that it was necessary
to have them conveyed to

the hospital for proper treatment.

They also show of the enemy killed and left on the field 130. Of his
wounded we had no

means of ascertaining, as only those severely hurt remained behind, and
they filled every house

by the wayside as far as our troops penetrated. A few of our wounded men
fell into the enemy's

hands, but were soon retaken. We captured 230 prisoners and 2 flags, to
make no mention of the

vast amount of property and matériel that fell into our hands. Adding to
the number of prisoners

and killed, as above stated, the lowest estimated proportion of wounded
to killed usual in battle

would make the losses of the enemy at least three to our one.

From this time the operations of the Right Wing, as it was now called,
became subordinate to

those of the column marching to the relief of the garrison of Knoxville.

Instructions reached me from the headquarters of the military division
to remain at Ringgold

during the 29th and 30th, unless it should be found practicable to
advance toward Dalton,

without fighting a battle, the object of my remaining, as stated, being
to protect Sherman's flank,

with authority to attack or move on Dalton should the enemy move up the
Dalton and Cleveland

road.

In retreating, the enemy had halted a portion of his force at Tunnel
Hill, midway between

Ringgold and Dalton, and as he evinced no disposition to molest Sherman,
my command rested

at Ringgold. I was kept fully advised of the rebel movements through the
activity and daring of

the Second Kentucky Cavalry, which had joined me on the 28th.

In obedience to verbal directions given me by the commander of the
division, the railroad

was thoroughly destroyed for 2 miles, including the bridges on each side
of Ringgold, by

Palmer's and Cruft's commands; also the depot, tannery, all the mills,
and all matériel that could

be used in the support of an army. We found on our arrival large
quantities of forage and flour.

What was not required by the wants of the service was either sent to the
rear or burned.

Our wounded were as promptly and as well cared for as circumstances
would permit.

Surgeon Moore, the medical director of the Army of the Tennessee,
voluntarily left his chief to

13

devote himself to their relief, and under his active, skillful, and
humane auspices, and those of

the medical directors with the divisions, they were comfortably removed
to Chattanooga on the

28th. My sincere thanks are tendered to all the officers of the medical
staff for their zealous and

careful attentions to the wounded, on this as well as our former fields.
Especially are they due to

Surgeon Ball, medical director of Geary's division, and to Surgeon
Menzies, medical director of

Cruft's division.

On the 29th, Major-General Palmer returned to Chattanooga with his
command, having in

charge such prisoners as remained in Ringgold. On the 30th, the enemy
being reassured by the

cessation of our pursuit, sent a flag of truce to our advanced lines at
Catoosa, by Maj. Calhoun

Benham, requesting permission to bury his dead and care for his wounded,
abandoned on the

field of his last disaster at Ringgold.

Copies of this correspondence have heretofore been forwarded. Also, on
the 30th, under

instructions from department headquarters, Grose's brigade, Cruft's
division, marched for the old

battle-field at Chickamauga, to bury our dead; and on the 1st December,
the infantry and cavalry

remaining left Ringgold, Geary and Cruft to return to their old camps,
Osterhaus to encamp in

Chattanooga Valley.

The reports of commanders exhibit a loss in the campaign, including all
the engagements

herein reported, in killed, wounded, and missing, of 960.
Inconsiderable, in comparison with my

apprehension, or the ends accomplished; nevertheless, there is cause for
the deepest regret and

sorrow.

Among the fallen are some of the brightest names of the army. Creighton
and Crane, of the

Seventh Ohio; Acton, of the Fortieth Ohio; Bushnell, of the Thirteenth
Illinois; Elliott, of the

One hundred and second New York, and others, whose names my limits will
not allow me to

enumerate, will be remembered and lamented as long as courage and
patriotism are esteemed as

virtues among men. The reports of commanders also show the capture of
6,547 prisoners (not

including those taken by Palmer at Graysville, of which no return has
been received), also 7

pieces of artillery, 9 battle-flags, not less than 10,000 stand of
small-arms, 1 wagon train, and a

large amount of ammunition for artillery and infantry, forage, rations,
camp and garrison

equipage, caissons and limbers, ambulances, and other impedimenta. The
reports relating to the

capture of the flags are herewith transmitted.

In the foregoing, it has been impossible to furnish more than a general
outline of our

operations, relying upon the reports of subordinate commanders to give
particular and

discriminating information concerning the services of divisions,
brigades, regiments, and

batteries. These reports are herewith respectfully transmitted.

The attention of the major-general commanding is especially invited to
those of the division

commanders. As to the distinguished services of those commanders, I
cannot speak in terms too

high. They served me day and night, present or absent, with all of the
well-directed earnestness

and devotion they would have served themselves had they been charged
with the responsibilities

of the commander. The confidence inspired by their active and generous
co-operation, early

inspired me to feel that complete success was inevitable. My thanks are
due to General Carlin

and his brigade for their services on Lookout Mountain on the night of
the 24th. They were

posted in an exposed position, and when attacked repelled it with great
spirit and success.

I must also express my acknowledgments to Major-General Palmer and his
command for

services rendered while belonging to my column. Lieutenant Ayers, of the
signal corps, with his

assistants, rendered me valuable aid in his branch of the service during
our operations.

Major Reynolds, the chief of artillery of Geary's division, proved
himself to be a skillful

artillerist, and requires especial mention for his services. His
batteries were always posted with

14

judgment and served with marked ability. The precision of his fire at
Lookout and Ringgold

elicited universal admiration.

To my staff more than ever am I indebted for the assistance rendered
upon this occasion.

Major-General Butterfield, chief of staff, always useful in counsel, was
untiring and devoted on

the field; Capt. H. W. Perkins, assistant adjutant-general; Col. James
D. Fessenden, Maj. William

H. Lawrence, Capt. R. H. Hall, Lieuts. P. A. Oliver and Samuel W.
Taylor, aides-de-camp,

bravely and intelligently performed all their duties.

Lieut. H. C. Wharton, a promising young officer of Engineers, reported
to me from the staff

of the major-general commanding the department, and was unwearied in his
assistance, both as

an engineer and as an officer of my personal staff.

Major-General Howard has furnished me, for transmittal, his able report
of the operations

and services of the Eleventh Corps, from the time it passed from my
command, November 22, to

that of its return, December 17. As it relates to events of which I had
no personal knowledge, it

only remains to comply with his wishes, with the request that the
major-general commanding the

department will give it his especial attention.

I may add, that the zeal and devotedness displayed by this corps and its
commander, in

performing all the duties assigned them, and in cheerfully encountering
its perils and privations,

afford me great satisfaction.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOOKER,

Major-General, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. WILLIAM D. WHIPPLE,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

In Field, Culpeper Court- House, Va.,

March 25, 1864.

Respectfully forwarded to Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, Washington, D. C.

I know of no objection to the substitution of this for Major-General
Hooker's original report

of his operations in the battle of Chattanooga.

Attention is called to that part of the report giving, from the reports
of his subordinate

commanders, the number of prisoners and small-arms captured, which is
greater than the number

really captured by the whole army.

U.S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General, U. S. Army.

First Brigade, Second Cavalry Division, commanded by Col. Robert H. G.
Minty, Fourth

Michigan Cavalry.

January 1, the brigade was at Pulaski, Tenn., but was soon dispersed by
the regiments going

home on veteran furloughs, &c.

January 5, the Fourth U. S. Cavalry moved, in compliance with orders
from Brig. Gen. W. S.

Smith, from Pulaski, and arrived at Corinth, Miss., January 10.

January 11, it left Corinth by railroad and reached La Grange, Tenn.,
the next day.

January 12, the headquarters of the brigade started for Huntsville,
Ala., where it arrived on

the 14th, and remained for the rest of the month.

January 26, the Fourth U.S. Cavalry left La Grange and marched to
Collierville, Tenn., where

it remained until February 1. The Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry left
Pulaski, Tenn., on the 2d,

15

having re-enlisted as veteran volunteers, and proceeded to Nashville,
where it remained until the

18th.

On the 25th it arrived at Harrisburg, Pa., via Cairo, Ill.

On the 27th was furloughed for thirty days.

The Fourth Michigan Cavalry, the detachment under Major Robbins, on
courier duty

between Harrison and Calhoun, Tenn., on the 4th reported to Colonel
Long, at Calhoun, and

marched with his brigade to Cleveland and Charleston. From the 12th to
the 21st it was on picket

at Columbus; from the 21st to the 31st on duty at Calhoun. The
detachment under Major Gray

left Pulaski on the 9th and on the 19th arrived at Rossville, Ga.; 160
miles.

During the remainder of the month this detachment was employed in
scouting the country in

connection with the Twenty-eighth Kentucky Regiment, all being under the
command of Colonel

Boone, Twenty-eighth Kentucky. It was engaged in one or two slight
skirmishes.

The Fifth Iowa Cavalry left Pulaski, Tenn., on the 7th, having
re-enlisted. Moved to

Nashville, where it remained for the balance of the month, being delayed
in getting the veteran

bounties. The Third Indiana Cavalry was stationed for the most of the
month at Maryville, near

Knoxville, E. Tenn. It has made no report of its marches or actions.

First Brigade, Second Cavalry Division, commanded by Col. Robert H. G.
Minty, Fourth

Michigan Cavalry.

During the month brigade headquarters remained at Huntsville, Ala.

The Fourth U.S. Cavalry, being at Collierville, Tenn., with the
expedition under the

command of Brig. Gen. W. S. Smith, remained until the 11th, then marched
to New Albany,

where it arrived February 14.

February 16, marched and arrived at Okolona, Miss., on the 19th, and
West Point on the

20th, where it met and defeated a large force of the enemy under Forrest.

Returned to Okolona February 22, where it had another severe engagement
with Forrest's

forces. The rebels being too powerful, the command retreated that day,
and arrived at Memphis

on the 26th, where it remained during the rest of the month. The Seventh
Pennsylvania Cavalry

was on furlough in Pennsylvania, having re-enlisted as veteran
volunteers. The Fourth Michigan

Cavalry being at Ooltewah, Tenn., was during the month engaged on
several scouts, having

skirmished at Tunnel Hill, near Buzzard Roost; at Red Clay, near
Cleveland; at Cleveland, at

Dirt Town, and other places, acting with the Twenty-eighth Kentucky
Mounted Infantry, under

Colonel Boone. The Fifth Iowa Cavalry at home on furlough, having
re-enlisted as veterans. The

Third Indiana has made no report of events. They have been operating in
East Tennessee, near

Knoxville. Second Cavalry Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Kenner Garrard.

Division headquarters moved on the 4th instant from Huntsville, Ala.,
with three regiments

Third Brigade and detachments First and Second Brigades, to Columbia,
Tenn., for the purpose

of concentrating at that point the command preparatory to its
reorganization and refitting for the

summer campaign. Upon the reorganization of the cavalry, the Fifth Iowa
and Third Indiana

Cavalry (First Brigade), Second Kentucky and Tenth Ohio Cavalry (Second
Brigade), and

Ninety-second Illinois Volunteers (Third Brigade) were transferred from
this division to the

Third Division. Colonels Minty, Long, and Wilder reported with complete
commands (with the

exception of the First Ohio, Second Brigade, at Nashville, Tenn.) on the
25th instant at

Columbia, Tenn.

From the 25th to the 30th the division was active in completing
arrangements for operations

in the field. Under orders the command, with First and Third Brigades,
complete in arms, horses,

and equipments, moved for Chattanooga, Tenn., on the 30th. The Second
Brigade remained at

Columbia, Tenn., awaiting arms and horses.

16

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,

Vicksburg, Miss., March 7, 1864.

GENERAL: I now have the honor to submit a report of the recent
operations in the State of

Mississippi:

You will remember that when in July last Vicksburg surrendered and a
detachment from the

Army of the Tennessee under my command had pushed the rebel army of
General Johnston into

and beyond Jackson, it was the purpose to go on eastward and destroy the
remaining railroads of

the State in and near Meridian.

The period of the year, the intense heat and drought, and the condition
of our men after the

long siege of Vicksburg rendered the accomplishment of the plan then
impracticable, and it had

to be deferred to a later period.

Events subsequently occurred during September in East Tennessee which
called General

Grant and my command to that quarter, but as soon as Chattanooga and
Knoxville became secure

and a respite was needed to repair the railroads to the rear, time and
an opportunity were offered

to accomplish what had before been designed.

I offered, if permitted, to break up the useless line of railroad from
Memphis to Corinth, to

attempt the destruction of Meridian without calling for a single man
from the army in the field.

Accordingly, disposing of my then command so as to cover and assist in
repairing the

railroads from Nashville to Decatur and Stevenson, with General Grant's
approval I returned in

person to the Mississippi River, reaching Memphis January 10.

I immediately ordered General Hurlbut to abandon Corinth and all minor
points, draw in all

public property, and forthwith prepare for field service two good
divisions of 5,000 men each,

ready to embark by the 25th. I found General William Sooy Smith, chief
of cavalry on General

Grant's staff, at Memphis. He had come from Middle Tennessee with about
2,500 cavalry in

pursuit of Forrest, who had in the meantime left West Tennessee and
fallen back of the

Tallahatchie. I ordered all the effective cavalry at once also to be
assembled and got ready for the

field. I found on General Hurlbut's tri-monthly return of January
10,1864, for duty, an aggregate

of cavalry of 9,231, with 7,638 serviceable horses. This, with the 2,500
brought with General

Smith, gave us over 10,000 effective cavalrymen and horses.

Having made these preliminary orders, I then hastened to Vicksburg and
gave General

McPherson similar orders for two divisions of infantry and artillery;
then back again to

Memphis, where I remained until the 27th.

In the meantime I learned the strength and distribution of the enemy I
had to encounter,

which was about as follows: On the 1st of February Lieutenant-General
Polk, chief in command

at Meridian, scattered companies of cavalry and infantry all over the
State, collecting taxes and

forcing conscripts--at Canton, Loring's division of infantry, 18 guns,
and about 7,000 men; at

Brandon, French's broken division of 10 guns and 3.000 men: two brigades
subsequently joined

French from Mobile, making his force about 5,000. Major-General Forrest
commanded the

cavalry district of North Mississippi, headquarters at Como; estimated
force, 4,000. Maj. Gen.

Stephen D. Lee commanded the southern district of Mississippi,
headquarters at Jackson. He had

General Jackson's division of three brigades, Ross', Starke's, and Wirt
Adams' posted in a

semicircle behind Vicksburg, and Ferguson's brigade was at this time
coming to Jackson from

Okolona. Lee's cavalry was about 4,000 strong.

My object was to break up the enemy's railroads at and about Meridian,
and to do the enemy

as much damage as possible in the month of February, and to be prepared
by the 1st of March to

assist General Banks in a similar dash at the Red River country,
especially Shreveport, the whole

to result in widening our domain along the Mississippi River, and
thereby set the troops hitherto

necessary to guard the river free for other military purposes.

17

My plan of action was as follows: General William Sooy Smith to move
from Memphis by or

before the 1st of February with an effective force of 7,000 cavalry
lightly equipped, to march

straight on Pontotoc, Okolona, Columbus Junction (Artesia), and
Meridian, to arrive there about

February 10, distance 250 miles; to disregard all minor objects, to
destroy railroads, bridges, corn

not wanted, and strike quick and well every enemy that should offer
opposition, while I with four

good divisions of infantry and artillery would at the same time move
from Vicksburg on the

same objective points, 150 miles distant. When met at Meridian, being
present in person, I could

then order anew according to the then circumstances, condition of roads
and time left at my

disposal.

I knew full well what would be the effect of this move, and in all my
orders and instructions I

dwelt particularly on the point of making no detachments, but to go
straight to the one sole

object, leaving the minor matters to the future.

I inclose herewith my instructions to General Smith with a copy of his
report, and must say it

is unsatisfactory. The delay in his start to the 11th of February, when
his orders contemplated his

being at Meridian on the 10th, and when he knew I was marching from
Vicksburg, is

unpardonable, and the mode and manner of his return to Memphis was not
what I expected from

an intended bold cavalry movement. I know that from February 1st to the
17th all of Lees

cavalry was to my front. We took daily prisoners from each brigade, so
that General Smith had

nothing to deal with except Forrest and the militia. I hope General
Smith will make these points

more clear to the general-in-chief, to whom he has returned at
Nashville, as noted in his report.

My own movement was successful in an eminent degree. We left Vicksburg
February 3 in

two columns, General Hurlbut's by Messinger's and General McPherson's by
the railroad bridge.

We met no opposition till General Hurlbut's head of column reached Joe
Davis' plantation, and

General McPherson's the Champion Hills.

The 5th was one continued skirmish for 18 miles, but we did not allow
the enemy's cavalry to

impede our march, but got into Jackson that night on his heels, whipping
him handsomely and

utterly disconcerting his plans. Loring and French were marching at the
time to concentrate with

the cavalry at Jackson, but were too late. We got into Jackson first,
secured their pontoon bridge,

repaired it, and commenced crossing Pearl River on the 6th, and on the
7th marched into

Brandon.

Next day, the 8th, the head of column reached Line Creek, 5 miles from
Morton, and on the

9th we entered Morton, General McPherson leading. I halted him there for
the balance of the day

to break railroads, and gave General Hurlbut the lead, and he kept it
all the way into Meridian.

Our march was steady and easy by Hillsborough and Decatur. Though
cavalry moved on our

flanks they gave us little concern, save in scaring in our stragglers
and foraging parties. At the

Tallahatta. 20 miles from Meridian, we found the road obstructed with
fallen timber, and,

satisfied the enemy was trying to save time to cover the removal of
railroad property from

Meridian, I dropped our trains with good escorts and pushed on over all
obstructions straight for

the Oktibbeha, where we found the bridge burning. A large cotton gin,
however, close by gave us

good material, and a couple of hours sufficed for a new bridge, and we
entered Meridian at 3.30

p.m. of the 14th with little opposition, and that was soon overcome by a
battalion of Colonel

Winslow's cavalry fighting on foot.

French's division had gone the night before and Loring's before day that
morning, Lee's

cavalry covering their retreat. General Polk had left for Demopolis at
10.30 that morning in the

cars. One locomotive and a train were burning as we reached the depot,
but all other rollingstock

had been removed to Mobile or toward Selma, 107 miles distant. I knew we
could not

overtake the enemy before he would cross the Tombigbee, and in fact I
was willing to gain our

18

point without battle, at so great a distance from the river, where the
care of wounded men would

have so taxed our ability to provide for them.

So I rested the army on the 15th, and on the 16th began a systematic and
thorough

destruction of the railroads centering at Meridian. The immense depots,
warehouses, and length

of sidetrack demonstrated the importance to the enemy of that place.
Through it he has

heretofore transported his armies and vast supplies, and by means of the
railroads large amounts

of corn, bacon, meal, and produce have been distributed to his armies.
For five days 10,000 men

worked hard and with a will in that work of destruction, with axes,
crowbars, sledges, clawbars,

and with fire, and I have no hesitation in pronouncing the work as well
done. Meridian, with its

depots, store-houses, arsenal, hospitals, offices, hotels, and
cantonments no longer exists.

To General Hurlbut I intrusted the destruction north and east of the
town, and to General

McPherson south and west. The former reports to me officially the
destruction of 60 miles of

road, with ties burned and iron bent, one locomotive destroyed, and 8
bridges burned. The latter

reports officially 55 miles of road destroyed, with 53 bridges and
culverts burned, and 6,075 feet

of trestle-work below Enterprise across a swamp burned, 19 locomotives,
28 cars, and 3 steam

sawmills destroyed and burned. The railroad is destroyed all the way
from Jackson to Meridian,

100 miles; from Meridian to and including the large bridge over the
Chickasawha below

Quitman; north to and including a bridge at Lauderdale Springs, and east
about 20 miles. The

enemy cannot use these roads to our prejudice in the coming campaign.

Having learned positively that the enemy's infantry had crossed the
Tombigbee eastward on

the 17th, and there being nothing between me and the Pearl River but
cavalry, which I could not

strike with infantry, I remained at Meridian until the 20th of February,
leaving me ten days to

reach Vicksburg and keep my appointment with General Banks, and hearing
nothing whatever of

General Smith, I ordered General McPherson to move back slowly on the
main road, taking four

days to Hillsborough, while I, with General Hurlbut's command and
Colonel Winslow's cavalry,

moved to the north to feel for General Smith.

On the 20th, I moved from Marion Station toward Muckalusha Old Town,
thence to Union,

where I dispatched Colonel Winslow with three regiments of cavalry to
Philadelphia and

Louisville, some 50 miles in the direction of Columbus, over the very
road by which General

Grierson moved during his celebrated raid, and by which road I supposed
he would feel for us. If

no tidings could be had of the cavalry, Colonel Winslow was to send a
couple of scouts to find

General Smith and order him to come to me at Canton, after which Colonel
Winslow was to

swing across to Kosciusko and come to Canton. The two infantry columns
came together as

appointed on the 23d at Hillsborough.

Next day we marched for Pearl River on separate roads, making for
Ratliff's Ferry. Securing

the ferry-boats there and at Edwards' above, a good floating bridge was
constructed by Captain

Hickenlooper, of General McPherson's staff, and the army passed Pearl
River, 25th and 26th.

Leaving a division to cover the bridge in case our cavalry should make
its appearance, the army

was bivouacked near Canton, where Colonel Winslow had arrived, having
executed his orders to

the very letter, but with no tidings of General Smith.

No enemy having troubled us during our march from Meridian to Canton,
and anxious to

afford our Memphis cavalry an opportunity to reach us, I left the army
at Canton, rode into

Vicksburg on the 28th, received my dispatches from General Banks, as
expected, and sent orders

back to General Hurlbut to remain there until the 3d of March, and then
come into Vicksburg,

while I hastened to New Orleans to confer with General Banks and Admiral
Porter, and adjust

the details of the next combined movement.

I returned to Vicksburg on the 6th instant, found all my army in, and
learned that General

Smith had not started from Memphis at all till the 11th of February; had
only reached West

19

Point, and turned back on the 22d, the march back to Memphis being too
rapid for a good effect.

Nevertheless, on the whole, we accomplished all I undertook. Our march
out and in from

Vicksburg was well accomplished; we beat the enemy wherever he opposed
or offered

resistance. We drove him out of Mississippi, destroyed the only
remaining railroads in the State,

the only roads by which he could maintain an army in Mississippi
threatening to our forces or the

main river. We subsisted our army and animals chiefly on his stores,
brought away about 400

prisoners and full 5,000 negroes, about 1,000 white refugees, about
3,000 animals (horses,

mules, and oxen), and any quantity of wagons and vehicles. Beyond Pearl
River we destroyed all

C. S. A. cotton and all that was used in the enemy's work at Meridian;
also many cotton-gins and

piles of cotton were burned by our soldiers and by negroes, without
orders and without detection.

I attach little importance to these matters, but the great result
attained is the hardwood and

confidence imparted to the command, which is now better fitted for war.
Animals and men

returned to Vicksburg after marching from 360 to 450 miles in the space
of the shortest month in

the year, in better health and condition than when we started.

Our losses may be summed up as follows:

Command Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total

General Hurlbut's 5 21 26 52

General McPherson's 7 21 46 74

Cavalry 9 26 9 44

Aggregate loss of men 21 68 81 170

We lost some mules and wagons that were out foraging, but the mules were
soon replaced by

captured animals, so that no delay re-suited. I know of no wagons lost
save nine, reported

verbally by General Hurlbut as having occurred after I came in from Canton.

Contemporaneous with these events was a diversion made on Mobile. I had
requested it of

General Banks before starting from Vicksburg, and he devolved it on
Admiral Farragut.

Occurring at the same time as my movement, it completely deceived our
enemy, and resulted in

an order for the removal of all its non-combatant population and caused
great alarm, which

seems to have spread through all Alabama. Their time is not yet, but
will come in the due order

of events.

I also sent at the same time, February 3, up the Yazoo a combined
expedition of gun-boats

and transports. Knowing that our movement inland would draw off force
from the Yazoo, I

asked Admiral Porter to send up the Yazoo a fleet of his light-clad
boats to explore the Yazoo,

Sunflower, and all tributaries where a sufficient draught of water could
be found, which he did,

viz: Five gun-boats, under command of Lieutenant-Commander Owen, U.S.
Navy, and I sent

along five transports, with two regiments, one of white, Eleventh
Illinois, Colonel Coates, and

one of black troops. My instructions for this expedition are submitted
herewith. I suppose it

fulfilled its objects, although Colonel Coates has not yet returned and
reported, but for some

reason, which he will explain, after going up as far as Fort Pemberton,
he returned and

disembarked at Yazoo City, sending his boats to Vicksburg with cotton
and forage. He reports

officially having sent in 1,521 bales of cotton, and that the gun-boats
had secured 207. I have

ordered 1,000 bales to be delivered to the Treasury agent, and I ask
that its proceeds be applied

to indemnify boats that have sustained damage while engaged in a
licensed and lawful

commerce, such as the Allen Collier, burned by the guerillas at Bolivar
Landing, and the Von

Phul, fired on at Morganza Bend. The balance of this cotton I have
placed with the post

quartermaster at Vicksburg, with orders to General McPherson to appoint
a board to pay back in

kind such loyal persons as Mrs. Grose and Dr. Duncan for cotton used by
our hospitals or burned

by guerrillas. It is folly for us to attempt to indemnify all, but in
this way we can give a support

20

to the smaller claimants and encourage them to cultivate their
plantations. The sooner all the

cotton in the Southern States is burned or got away the better, for it
is the cause of filling our

boats and towns with a class of heartless speculators that would corrupt
our officers and men and

sell their lives by foolish exposure that they might get out stolen
cotton and buy it cheap.

The full official reports of Generals Hurlbut and McPherson are not yet
in, but as soon as

received they will be forwarded, with a map showing our routes of march, &c.

The country is indebted to Generals Hurlbut and McPherson, the actual
commanders of the

troops in this expedition, whose experience and skill left me an easy
task, partaking more of the

character of a pleasant excursion than of hard military service.

Colonel Winslow, Fourth Iowa Cavalry, commanded the advance guard, and
handled his

cavalry brigade with skill and success. His flank attack on the heavy
cavalry force of the enemy

before Jackson, and his rapid pursuit into Jackson, securing to us the
use of the enemy's

pontoons, entitles him to promotion as brigadier of cavalry. I must also
give him the credit due

for his march from Union on Louisville and Kosciusko, and for making his
junction with the

main body of the army at Canton at the time appointed.

I have thanked in orders the officers and soldiers of the command for
their cheerfulness and

for their eagerness to fight, to march, or to work day or night as
required, but I must leave to

corps commanders the duty of recording their individual acts of merit.

In organizing and conducting this expedition I have been admirably
seconded by my personal

staff, viz, Major McCoy and Captains Dayton and Audenried. I hardly know
how to reward them

substantially, further than to commend them to the favorable notice of
our Government.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Bingham, my chief quartermaster, the only member
of my general

staff that I took from department headquarters, I am greatly indebted.
Through him were

obtained the steamboats and means by which these troops were so rapidly
assembled and

concentrated at great distances promptly on time.

When Colonel Coates makes me the official report of his operations up
the Yazoo, I will

indorse it according to my judgment at the time.

Accompanying this I send a complete file of orders and letters of
instruction issued during

the expedition.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,

Major-General.

Brig. Gen. JOHN A. RAWLINS,

Chief of Staff.

SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, No. 22.

HDQRS. DEPT. OF THE TENNESSEE,

Vicksburg, February 28, 1864.

I. The army in the field, now at Canton, will remain there till about
March 3 to hear from and

assist, if necessary, the cavalry expedition under command of Brig. Gen.
William Sooy Smith,

which should have left Memphis February 2 at furthest, but did not until
about the 11th. If heard

from, General McPherson with his corps will await his arrival, or till
he can communicate with

him, and order General Smith to the vicinity of Big Black bridge to
await further orders, or to act

offensively should a cavalry force of the enemy appear this side of
Pearl River.

II. General Hurlbut will, about March 3, move his command across Big
Black at or near

Moore's Bluff, and come to Vicksburg prepared to embark for Red River
about March 7 next.

III. Should General McPherson hear of the safety of the cavalry command
referred to, or hear

no tidings at all of it on or before the 3d next, he also will move down
the peninsula between

21

Pearl River and Big Black to the bridge at Messingers, or at the
railroad bridge, and resume his

former command at Vicksburg and district.

IV. The chief quartermaster of the department will collect a number of
steam-boats suitable

for the Red River of a capacity to transport 10,000 men, with artillery,
ordnance, and subsistence

stores for thirty days' operations, to be ready at Vicksburg by March 7.

V. The commissary of subsistence at Vicksburg will place at Haynes'
Bluff three days'

rations for General Hurlbut's command of 10,000 men, to be drawn by him
on his way down,

and the same for General McPherson's command at the Big Black bridge.

VI. The ordnance officer will be prepared to ship on board steamboats,
at the date before

named, the mortars and 30-pounder Parrotts with all their ammunition on
hand, and also a supply

of musket ammunition equal to 200 rounds per man for 10,000 men.

VII. Lieutenant Vernay, aide-de-camp to General McPherson, will collect
all the mail matter

and newspapers he can obtain for the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Army
Corps, and convey the

same to the army at Canton, and Colonel Winslow, chief of cavalry, will
furnish him an escort of

200 men, all to start on March 1.

VIII. Col. E. F. Winslow, Fourth Iowa Cavalry, will proceed with the
re-enlisted veterans of

that regiment to Iowa, and grant furloughs for thirty days after their
arrival at Keokuk. At the

expiration of the furloughs he will meet them at some rendezvous on the
Mississippi River, and

reconduct them back to the regiment at or near Vicksburg, Miss.

IX. The quartermaster's department will provide the necessary
transportation to and back.

By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON,

Aide-de-Camp.

Itinerary of the Seventeenth Army Corps, Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson,
U. S. Army,

commanding, February 3-March 18.

February 3, the Third Brigade, First Division, Brig. Gen. Alexander
Chambers commanding;

the Third Division (with the exception of the Eighty-first Illinois
Infantry, suffering from smallpox,

and the Twenty-ninth Illinois Infantry, stationed at Natchez, Miss.), in
command of General

Leggett; the Fourth Division, commanded by General M. M. Crocker, and
the cavalry forces, in

command of Col. E. F. Winslow, Fourth Iowa Cavalry, left Vicksburg for
expedition toward

Meridian. Distance marched, 19 miles.

February 4, encountered the enemy at Champion's Hill and skirmished with
him the entire

day, advancing cautiously.

February 14, reached Meridian with some skirmishing and proceeded to
destroy railroad,

cars, &c.

February 15, the Fourth Division went to Enterprise.

February 16, the Third Brigade, Fourth Division, went to Quitman.

February 19, started on return march.

February 28, reached Canton.

February 29, encamped at Canton.

March 1, the Third and Fourth Divisions and Third Brigade, First
Division, at Canton, Miss.

March 5, returned to Vicksburg. The Eleventh Illinois Infantry, with a
portion of the colored

troops, is at Yazoo City.

March 7, Brig. Gen. T. Kilby Smith, with a portion of the Third Iowa
Infantry, Forty-first

Illinois Infantry, Fourteenth Wisconsin Infantry, Thirty-third
Wisconsin, Ninety-fifth Illinois,

and Eighty-first Illinois, and Battery M, First Missouri Light
Artillery, ordered up Red River.

22

March 18, Brigadier-General McArthur assigned to command of post and
defenses of

Vicksburg and Natchez during absence of Major-General McPherson. General
Leggett ordered

to Ohio to superintend recruiting for veteran regiments of his command.

HDQRS. ELEVENTH IOWA INFANTRY VOLUNTEERS,

March 6, 1864.

SIR: In reply to circular of this date I have the honor to reply: First.
Number of miles

marched, 340.

Second. Number of miles of railroad track destroyed, 2. No bridges or
trestle-work

destroyed.

Third. Number of killed, wounded, and missing, none; number of veterans
mustered in, 316;

number enlisted to be mustered in, 40; total, 356.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. HALL,

Colonel Eleventh Iowa Volunteer Infantry, Commanding.

Capt. JOHN C. MARVEN,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. ELEVENTH IOWA INFANTRY VOLUNTEERS,

Vicksburg, Miss., March 6, 1864.

SIR: In compliance with circular of March 5, I have the honor to report
that there was

destroyed by this command, under orders, during the late expedition, at
Morton, Miss., about 1

mile of railroad track, together with railroad buildings at that place,
and at Canton, Miss., about 1

mile of railroad track.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. HALL,

Colonel Eleventh Iowa Infantry Vols., Comdg. Regiment.

Capt. JOHN C. MARVEN,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH IOWA INFANTRY,

Near Vicksburg, Miss., March 6, 1864.

SIR: In reply to the circular from brigade headquarters, dated March 6,
1864, I have the

honor to report that on the late expedition to Meridian this regiment
marched about 320 miles.

Two miles of railroad track were destroyed; I bridge, I turn-table, 50
feet of trestle-work, and 1

passenger car burned near Brandon, Miss.

The loss of the regiment was 1 officer and 3 enlisted men captured near
Canton, Miss.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. W. BELKNAP,

Colonel Fifteenth Iowa Infantry, Commanding.

Capt. J. C. MARVEN,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Brigade

HEADQUARTERS SIXTEENTH IOWA VOLUNTEERS,

March 6, 1864.

SIR: In compliance with circular dated headquarters Third Brigade, First
Division,

Seventeenth Army Corps, Vicksburg, March 6, 1864, I have the honor to
make the following

23

report of the operations of the Sixteenth Regiment Iowa Infantry
Volunteers during the recent

campaign:

The regiment marched a distance of about 327 miles, destroyed
three-fourths mile of railroad

track and 40 feet of trestle-work.

The casualties in the regiment were: Accidentally wounded, 1; taken
prisoner, 4; left sick at

Brandon, 1; total, 6.

There are 281 men who have re-enlisted as veteran volunteers in the
regiment.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

ADD. H. SANDERS,

Lieut. Col., Commanding Sixteenth Iowa Infantry.

Capt. J. C. MARVEN,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Brigade.

CAMP 53D REGIMENT ILLINOIS INFANTRY VOLUNTEERS,

Hebron, Miss., March 6, 1864.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to transmit herewith the following report:

On the morning of February 27, 1864, while in camp near Pearl River,
Miss., I was detailed

to take command of the foraging party from the Fifty-third Illinois
Infantry and report them to

the headquarters of First Brigade. Upon reporting, I was placed in
command of the foraging

party from the brigade, consisting of 66 privates and 4 sergeants from
the different regiments of

the brigade. My instructions from the acting assistant adjutant-general
were to forage under the

directions of Lieutenant Gillespie. Lieutenant Gillespie took the
advance, and I followed with the

guard. We started on a cross-road running north, and after traveling
about three-quarters of a

mile we came out on the Canton road. Taking the Canton road we traveled
about 1 mile, and then

left the Canton road and took a cross-road running northeast. This we
followed about 2 miles,

when Lieutenant Gillespie ordered a halt. He then directed me to leave a
sergeant and 13 men

from the Fifty-third Illinois to guard the road until we returned. I
left the guard, as directed,

giving the sergeant orders to throw out a picket on each flank and in
front. Lieutenant Gillespie

then directed me to move forward with the remainder of the party. Here
we left the road on

which we had been traveling and took a road running through a thick wood
and in an easterly

direction. When about 1 mile from the road where we left the guard,
Lieutenant Gillespie again

ordered a halt, and directed me to leave a sergeant and 10 men from the
Third Regiment Iowa

Infantry. The instructions which he directed me to give this guard were
as follows: If they saw

the enemy approaching they were to fall back to the guard from the
Fifty-third Illinois, which

had been left to guard the road. If they encountered no enemy they were
to remain where they

had been stationed until we returned or sent them orders to follow. We
then moved forward until

we came to a large swamp. Here Lieutenant Gillespie ordered another
halt. He then took 10

men as a guard and went in search of meat, which was supposed to be
concealed somewhere in

the swamp. He returned in about an hour, and directed me to send a
sergeant and 4 men back to

the squads which we had left as guards, with orders for the men of the
Third Iowa to join those

of the Fifty-third Illinois, the whole to return in a body to the Canton
road and there await our

return. After having sent the sergeant and 4 men back, Lieutenant
Gillespie directed me to follow

him. I did so, and after traveling about two hours we came out on the
Canton road at a point

about 7 miles northeast of our camps. Soon after striking the Canton
road we discovered a squad

of mounted men following in our rear. I paid but little attention to
them at first, thinking their

squad too small to trouble us. We had gone but a short distance farther
when one of the men

came up from the rear, and reported a strong force of the enemy pursuing
us. Our position at this

time not being a good one, I pushed on until I gained the top of a large
hill. Here I halted,

24

dismounted my men, and formed a line across the road. I had barely time
to accomplish this

when the enemy came in sight, about 50 in number. They were coming at a
gallop and in bad

order, the leader being some distance in advance of his men. I ordered
my men not to fire until I

gave them orders to do so. The rebel leader came up to within about 40
yards of me, when I

ordered him to halt. He did so. He having on a blue shirt or jacket
under his great coat, I asked

him who he was, as I was in some doubt upon that subject. He replied by
shouting, "Who are

you?" By this time several of his men came up with him, and I could see
that they wore the

Confederate uniform. I then ordered my men to fire. Our first volley
turned and confused them,

and our second emptied two saddles and sent them flying back in the
direction from which they

came. We kept up our fire as long as they were in sight. As soon as they
were out of sight I gave

the order to mount, and pushed on until I came near the road where the
squads from the Fiftythird

Illinois and Third Iowa had been ordered to meet us. About this time a
man who was some

distance in the rear came up and reported to me that the enemy were
coming on again with a

force larger than before. We were by this time at the road where the
Third Iowa sergeant and his

squad were ordered to report. Here we found Lieutenant Gillespie, who
had been missing since

the first attack. He reported that the sergeant and squad had not yet
come up. Thinking it best to

wait as long as possible for them, I ordered the men to dismount and
form line, leaving every

fourth man to hold horses. We then went back a short distance and formed
on the brow of a small

hill to wait for the enemy to approach. We waited but a short time
before they came, this time

about 150 strong. They came up in good order, formed line, and attempted
to charge us. Our first

fire broke and confused them. They retreated a short distance, formed
line, and again came up at

a charge, but with no better success than before. Our first volley
turned and scattered them and

emptied several saddles. Their leader soon formed them, and again they
came up at full gallop.

Again were they repulsed. This time their leader tumbled from his
saddle, and was not seen to

rise again. About this time a man from the Thirty-third Wisconsin
Infantry was severely

wounded. I ordered 2 men to take him to the rear, put him on a horse,
and start with him for

camp. When this was done I ordered the men to fall back and mount; then
we started for camp,

traveling as fast as our worn-out horses and mules could go without
leaving men behind. The

wounded man must have been captured, as his horse was too badly used up
to keep up with the

squad. I arrived in camp with all the men I took out except those who,
by direction of Lieutenant

Gillespie, had been left to guard roads. Nearly all of these men must
have been captured, as but 4

of them have ever returned to their commands. I cannot close this report
without first mentioning

the bravery and gallant conduct of Quartermaster Nichols, of the
Thirty-third Regiment

Wisconsin Infantry, who rendered me valuable and efficient service
throughout the different

skirmishes of the day.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN POTTER,

Captain Company F, 53d Regt. Ill. Inf. Vols.

Capt. WILLIAM WARNER,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD IOWA INFANTRY,

Hebron, Miss., March 6, 1864.

SIR: In compliance with orders, I have the honor to make the following
report of the loss of

this regiment during the recent expedition. As the regiment was almost
constantly under the

immediate notice and direction of the general commanding the brigade,
and as the only detached

duty we were called upon to perform was the destruction of railroad at
Meridian and Enterprise, I

25

presume it is only necessary for me to make a detailed report of the
loss of the regiment in the

affair of the 28th of February.

On the morning of the 28th of February, 23 men of this regiment, under
charge of Sergt.

Daniel Buckley, Company A, were ordered to report to brigade
headquarters to go out with the

brigade foraging party. During the day the party was attacked by the
enemy's cavalry, and

Sergeant Buckley and 12 men of the detail from this regiment were taken
prisoners. The

following is a list of the names of the men captured. Private Francis M.
Coverston is known to be

wounded severely, perhaps mortally. Corpl. William H. Symms was seen to
fall from his horse,

and is supposed to be killed. Nothing is known of the fate of the rest
of the party.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant.

G. W. CROSLEY,

Major, Commanding Third Iowa Infantry.

Capt. WILLIAM WARNER,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY FORCES,

Near Vicksburg, Miss., February 29, 1864.

COLONEL: In obedience to orders from Major-General McPherson, my command
moved

over Big Black at the railroad bridge about noon, 3d instant, and
bivouacked at Baker's Creek

bridge.

Marched at 6.30 next morning toward Raymond, meeting enemy's cavalry in
some force

soon after leaving the Jackson road. A charge upon our left flank was
repulsed and the enemy

followed to the main road, from whence a detour was made and the enemy
again encountered at

Mr. Walton's, near Bolton. The Tenth Missouri (Major Benteen commanding)
being in front,

were dismounted, and the enemy driven immediately from his position with
some loss, among

others 1 major, 1 captain, and 1 second-lieutenant being killed.

On morning of 5th, taking a right-hand road at Woodman's, we entered
Clinton by the

Raymond road just after the enemy left the town, and found them strongly
posted 2 miles east,

when we moved to the right and approached Jackson by the Mississippi
Springs upper road, and

when arrived within 1 miles of the city discovered the enemy's column, 3
miles in length,

moving by fours toward and into J[ackson] on the main road half a mile
in front, falling back

before the advance of Major-General Hurlbut's column, then about 5 miles
from the city. Taking

advantage of the enemy's surprise at our sudden appearance, I moved
quickly forward to the

attack, dismounting the Fourth Iowa (Major Parkell commanding), which
was in front, that they

might gain the hill at intersection of the roads, and directing the
Eleventh Illinois (Lieutenant-

Colonel Kerr commanding) to deploy to the left, advance over the open
ground, ascend the hill,

and strike the enemy in his flank and rear. Observing that the enemy
advanced one regiment in

line to cover his flank and his lateral movement, I caused one rifled
gun to throw a few shells

into their column in order to aid the attack of Colonel Kerr. One shell
killed 3 men. Meantime

the Tenth Missouri were pushed forward, immediately following the Fourth
Iowa, and advancing

at a gallop closely pursued through the line of fortifications and into
Jackson that portion of the

enemy's column which retreated in that direction. The brigade of Colonel
Starke, with a portion

of the one in front, being thus cut off from the city, broke in disorder
and fled toward the Canton

road, the Eleventh Illinois capturing from them 1 Rodman gun and 1
ambulance, with

cannoneers and drivers. Leaving directions for the Fifth Illinois (Major
Farnan commanding) and

the Fourth Iowa to push out south and north, guarding the approaches to
the city, and directing

the battery to occupy the hill commanding the place, I proceeded, in
accordance with

instructions, to the rebel pontoon bridge, arriving just in time to
prevent, with Tenth Missouri, its

26

destruction. At this time it was quite dark, and the respective
regiments bivouacked in their

positions. By this success the enemy were prevented from occupying the
fortifications, from

destroying stores and the bridge, and a large number of men were
dispersed through the

surrounding country, who failed to rejoin their commands during the time
of the expedition.

Several rebel general officers escaped capture by hard riding.

The next morning, a reconnaissance for 5 miles toward Canton developed
no enemy in force,

but exhibited many evidences of hasty flight on preceding evening, quite
a number of wagons,

ambulances, and much other property being abandoned on this road.
Bivouacked near the asylum

until 9 a.m., 7th instant, when the command crossed Pearl River, and
taking a left-hand road 6

miles out entered Brandon, encamping 3 miles east of that place, in
advance of the army, after a

slight skirmish with some rebel cavalry.

At 6 o'clock next day took the advance of the army and encamped on Line
Creek,

skirmishing the entire distance, 19 miles.

Reporting to Major-General Hurlbut morning of 9th instant, we moved past
Morton, near

which place the enemy were found in line of battle on the preceding
evening, and encamped east

of Shockalo Creek.

Marched on 10th instant 16 miles, passing through Hillsborough, where we
had a short

skirmish, encamping 5 miles in advance of the army, on Ontagoloo Creek.

On the evening of the 11th, encamped east of Coonahatta Creek, marching
15 miles; Captain

Parsons, with two companies, proceeding to Lake Station and aiding in
the destruction of

property.

Encamped east of Chunky Creek at 5 p.m., 12th instant, after
considerable heavy

skirmishing.

Marching at daylight on 13th, encamped 10 miles west of Meridian,
fighting some hours

after dark (Fourth Iowa in advance), over a rough, mountainous country,
driving the enemy 5

miles and punishing him severely. Above one hundred stand of arms were
abandoned by him

during this fighting. The obstruction of these rough roads by felling of
timber was prevented.

Moved early on morning of 14th instant, meeting command of
Brigadier-General Ferguson 2

miles west of Meridian, driving the enemy speedily through the town.
Bivouacked at 3 p.m. on

plantation of Mr. McLamore, remaining there until morning of the 16th,
the enemy having

retreated beyond Marion.

During the march the command had been in the saddle twelve days; were
engaged with the

enemy much of that time, always successfully; had expended above 50,000
rounds small

ammunition. The enemy had left on the different fields 50 men dead, and
must of course have

lost others and had men wounded in due proportion. Thirty of these
wounded were found in one

hospital at Lauderdale Springs. The men had burned but one building, had
worked hard at

making roads and building bridges, and had conducted themselves as true
patriot soldiers.

The prisoners captured to this date numbered 72, many of them of rank,
and 37 deserters had

been received, all transferred to infantry commands.

Notwithstanding a march of above 175 miles, the horses were in better
condition than when

we left Big Black River.

The Eleventh Illinois Cavalry, being directed to report to Brig. Gen. M.
M. Crocker,

commanding Fourth Division, Seventeenth Army Corps, did not rejoin me
until after my arrival

at Canton, and I cannot now give any account of the operations of that
regiment during this

temporary detachment.

While the army remained in and around Meridian my command scouted to the
east and north,

destroying property, bridges, &c., and traveling many miles.

27

During the first two days of the return march we had the rear of the
Sixteenth Army Corps

marching to Union. At this point, acting under special instructions from
Maj. Gen. W. T.

Sherman, commanding Department of the Tennessee, I proceeded north,
through Philadelphia

and over the Pearl River, to a point about 10 miles south of Louisville,
thence across over to the

main road from that place to Kosciusko, passing through the latter
place, Thomastown, and

Sharon, to Canton, where we arrived at 2 p.m., 25th instant, one day in
advance of the army,

having met no enemy north of the Pearl.

The command of Brig. Gen. William Sooy Smith could not be definitely
heard from. I sent

two messengers eastward, with instructions to join him if possible.

Remained in bivouac on Three Mile Creek, east of Canton, during the 26th
instant.

Acting under orders from the major-general commanding, with Fourth Iowa
Cavalry, I had

the honor of escorting him to Big Black, arriving at Messinger's at
daylight, morning of the 28th.

The three regiments remaining at Canton were placed in charge of
Lieutenant-Colonel Kerr,

senior officer.

Not having received the reports of regimental commanders, I cannot give
exact account of

our casualties, but am confident they will not exceed following exhibit,
viz: Officers, no

casualties; enlisted men: killed. 10: wounded, 12; missing, 15; total,
37. Our capture of horses

largely exceeds the number of those killed and abandoned.

Just previous to our arrival at Canton the command gathered up a large
number of negroes

and mules. The negroes and several prisoners of war, captured on return
march, were transferred

to the infantry at Canton. Several mills, two fine bridges over the
Pearl, and some other property

was burned by order, and I regret to say that some other buildings were
wantonly destroyed. The

case of one officer caught firing a building has been reported through
proper channels.

I cannot praise too highly the conduct of the entire command, when under
fire, and

respectfully mention following officers as deserving especial credit:
Maj. F. W. Benteen and

Captain Neet, Tenth Missouri Cavalry; Captains Dee and Parsons and First
Lieut. Alonzo Clark,

Fourth Iowa Cavalry; also Capt. M. H. Williams, acting assistant
inspector-general, and First

Lieut. A. B. Fitch, acting assistant quartermaster (acting aides), both
of whom rendered me

valuable assistance.

The command traveled, previous to my leaving Canton, an average of 425
miles to the

regiment.

The number of men on the expedition was 1,400, of whom 1,300 were
subject to my orders.

I respectfully call your attention to the great want of horses and arms.

Hoping this brief report of the operations of the command will be
satisfactory, I have the

honor to be, your obedient servant,

E. F. WINSLOW,

Colonel and Chief of Cavalry.

Lieut. Col. WILLIAM T. CLARK,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Seventeenth Army Corps.

HEADQUARTERS CHIEF OF CAVALRY,

MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

Nashville, Tenn., March 4, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of recent cavalry
operations made by the

direction of Major-General Grant, commanding the Military Division of
the Mississippi, and in

accordance with the [orders and ] written instructions of Major-General
Sherman, commanding

the Department of the Tennessee, copies of which are herewith inclosed.

28

On the 28th day of December, 1863, I started from this city with the
Second, Third, and

Fourth Tennessee Cavalry Regiments, Third and Fifth Kentucky Cavalry,
and Twenty-eighth

Kentucky Mounted Infantry.

On the 30th, I reached Columbia, from which point I sent the Third
Kentucky Cavalry down

the north bank of Duck River to scour the country bordering that river
on the north to the

Tennessee River, and to watch that stream from the mouth of Duck River
to a point opposite Fort

Henry. The Fifth Kentucky Cavalry was ordered down the south bank of
Duck River to clear the

country to the Tennessee, and to watch that stream from the mouth of
Duck River to Savannah,

where this regiment was to communicate with me and receive further orders.

The object of these movements was to clear the country of the bands of
guerrillas that

infested it, and to watch any attempt that Forrest, who was then at
Jackson, Tenn., might make to

throw his force, or any portion of it, over into Middle Tennessee or
Kentucky.

These regiments captured some 50 guerrillas, and among them the
notorious Colonel

Hawkins.

The Third Kentucky Cavalry reported back at Nashville, according to its
instructions, and the

Fifth Kentucky met my command at Waynesborough and accompanied it from
that point. The

Twenty-eighth Kentucky Mounted Infantry was ordered from Columbia to
Pulaski, Tenn., where

it reported to General Crook, and was assigned to duty with the Second
Cavalry Division under

his command, agreeably to my instructions.

General Crook sent the Fourth U.S. Cavalry as escort to a supply train,
which I ordered him

to send through with rations for my command, from Pulaski to Savannah.
He also sent the

Seventy-second Indiana Mounted Infantry through from Pulaski to Savannah
to open

communication with that point, and hold the ferry-boats there until the
arrival of the command.

Upon reaching the Tennessee River, the whole command, consisting of the
Second, Third,

and Fourth Tennessee Cavalry, Fifth Kentucky Cavalry, Fourth U.S.
Cavalry, and Seventysecond

Indiana Mounted Infantry, was thrown across the river and moved toward
Corinth, which

point we reached on the 8th day of January. Forrest had moved southward
into Mississippi

before my command reached the Tennessee River, urged to this step by the
movement of the

troops of the Sixteenth Army Corps upon him.

Orders had been issued to abandon the railroad from Memphis to Corinth,
and I moved my

command to Collierville, where I awaited the arrival of Waring's brigade
from Columbus, from

which point it was ordered to move to join our other [cavalry] forces.
Owing to bad roads and the

freshets, which made the crossing of the streams extremely difficult,
especially that of the Obion

River, this brigade was delayed, and only reached Collierville on
Monday, the 8th day of

February.

For full particulars of this march, I beg leave to refer to Colonel
Waring's report. Much of its

ammunition had been sent by boats from Columbus, and it was encumbered
by a train which had

to be got rid of. By great effort the whole command was prepared for the
movement and put in

motion on the 11th day of February.

Forrest had taken position with all his forces behind the Tallahatchie
River, determined to

resist our crossing. I threw McMillen's brigade of infantry, temporarily
assigned to my

command, rapidly toward Panola, from Memphis, moving this brigade on the
8th day of

February, and on the 11th ordered it to move toward Wyatt, toward which
point I directed the

march of my whole cavalry force, until the impression was made that I
intended forcing a

crossing at that point, which I attacked with the brigade of infantry
and attracted the attention

and forces of the enemy there while I threw my whole cavalry force
around by way of New

Albany, where I crossed the Tallahatchie without firing a shot, although
we were delayed a

29

whole day at the crossing of Tippah Creek, that was swollen by a
freshet. We then moved rapidly

on Pontotoc and Houston.

When within 10 miles of Houston we encountered an outpost of the enemy,
consisting of

State troops, under General Gholson. These stampeded and ran away,
leaving a portion of their

arms behind them. We continued to advance until we encountered the enemy
in strong force

guarding the crossing of a swamp, which could only be passed by a
corduroy road, that was

narrow and about 1 mile in length. This we carried after some sharp
fighting, and our advance

pressed on to the crossing of the Houlka Swamp, 3 miles north of Houston
[this swamp extends

front a point 10 miles west of Houston to the], at the junction of the
Houlka with the Oktibbeha,

near West Point, and can only be crossed at a few points over narrow roads.

These roads were held by the enemy in force, and while our advance was
directed to make a

determined attack on the force holding the direct road to Houston, the
main body was moved

rapidly to the eastward on Okolona, where it arrived so unexpectedly as
to capture a number of

rebel officers and men on furlough.

From this point a regiment was thrown forward by a forced march to
Aberdeen to endeavor

to seize ferry-boats to effect a crossing of the Tombigbee if this
should prove desirable, but no

ferry-boats were found.

The following morning one brigade was moved to the support of this
regiment and to

threaten Columbus, while two brigades moved down the railroad toward
West Point, throwing

out strong detachments to make feints and watch the crossings of the
Sakatonchee, on our right,

and destroy the road as they went, together with vast amounts of corn
that was collected in cribs

near the railroad. They also destroyed all the Confederate cotton that
was found. The brigade that

went to Aberdeen did the same, and also destroyed a very extensive
tannery, together with about

2,000 hides.

Hearing that the enemy was concentrating in heavy force at West Point, I
concentrated my

command at Prairie Station, 15 miles north of West Point, and moved on
that place on the 20th

day of February. About 1 mile north of the town we encountered a rebel
brigade, which we drove

after a short, sharp fight. The whole command arrived near West Point at
about 3 p.m., and

careful reconnaissances were made of the Sakatonchee Swamp on our right,
the Oktibbeha on

our front, and the Tombigbee on our left. They were all found strongly
held by the enemy,

present in four brigades and to the number of about 6,000 or 7,000,
according to the best

information that could be obtained.

Exaggerated reports of Forrest's strength reached me constantly, and it
was reported that Lee

was about to re-enforce him with a portion or the whole of his command.
Columbus had been

evacuated, and all the State troops that could be assembled from every
quarter were drawn

together at my front to hold the Oktibbeha against me, while a heavy
force was seen moving to

my rear.

About 3,000 able-bodied negroes had taken refuge with us, mounted on as
many horses and

mules that they had brought in with them. We had' in addition to this
about 700 pack-mules, and

all these incumbrances had to be strongly guarded against the flank
attacks that were constantly

threatened. This absorbed about 2,000 of my available force. There
remained a little less than

5,000 men who could be thrown into action.

The enemy was in a position in my front and on my flanks which afforded
him every

advantage. The ground was so obstructed as to make it absolutely
necessary that we should fight

dismounted, and for this kind of fighting the enemy, armed with Enfield
and Austrian rifles, was

better prepared than our force, armed mainly with carbines. There was
but one of my brigades

that I could rely upon with full confidence. The conduct of the other
two on the march had been

such as to indicate such a lack of discipline as to create in my mind
the most serious

30

apprehensions as to what would be their conduct in action. Any reverse
to my command, situated

as it was, would have been fatal.

I was ten days late with my movement owing to the delay of Waring's
brigade in arriving

from Columbus, and had every reason to believe that General Sherman,
having accomplished the

purposes of his expedition, had returned to Vicksburg. Under the
circumstances I determined not

to move my encumbered command into the trap set for me by the rebels.

We had destroyed 2,000,000 bushels of corn, 2,000 bales of Confederate
cotton, and 30 miles

of railroad. We had captured about 200 prisoners, and 3,000 horses and
mules, and rescued as

many negroes, well fitted for our service. I therefore determined to
move back and draw the

enemy after me, that I might select my own positions and fight with the
advantages in our favor.

In this I succeeded perfectly, disposing my forces behind every crest of
a hill and in every

skirt of timber that furnished us cover, and receiving the enemy by
well-directed volleys at short

range we inflicted heavy losses upon him at every attack, while our own
casualties were

uniformly light, until we reached Okolona, where, after the Fourth
Regulars had driven one

entire rebel brigade out of the town three times, a portion of
McCrillis' brigade, sent to the

support of the Fourth, stampeded at the yells of our own men charging,
and galloped back

through and over everything, spreading confusion wherever they went and
driving Perkins'

battery of six small mountain howitzers off the road into a ditch, where
the imperfect carriages

they were mounted upon were all so broken that we could not get the
battery along and had to

abandon it after spiking the guns, chopping the carriages to pieces, and
destroying the

ammunition. Organized forces were immediately thrown to the rear and the
enemy handsomely

repulsed.

Skirmishing continued about 10 miles, when we reached a fine position at
Ivey's farm. Here

the ridge spread out into a wide, open field, along the northern margin
of which I deployed a line

of dismounted men consisting of four regiments. A battery was placed in
position near the road,

from which it could enfilade the column as it advanced. Just to the
right of the battery the

Fourth Missouri Cavalry [and six companies of the Seventh Indiana
Cavalry] were formed, and

mounted for a saber charge, and the Third Tennessee Cavalry (mounted)
was sent to the extreme

right with orders to charge in flank when the troops made the direct
charge in front.

While these dispositions were being made the enemy pressed our rear
guard, that was well

posted, very heavily, and were sorely handled. The rear guard was at
last called off rapidly, and

the rebel column let into the space prepared for them, when the battery
opened upon them in very

handsome style, and the dismounted troops poured volley after volley
into them. They pressed

their attack with great determination, but at last fell Back. Just as
they began to retire they were

charged very handsomely by the Fourth Missouri and Seventh Indiana in
front and by the Third

Tennessee in flank. This completely routed them, and they were driven
from the field with heavy

loss.

It was reported that Colonel Forrest, Brother to the general, commander
of a brigade, and

Colonel Barksdale fell, and McCulloch, another commander of a brigade,
and Colonel Barteau

were severely wounded in this affair.

Strong detachments were thrown out upon our flanks at every vulnerable
point, and every

attempt to cut our column by a flank attack was met and thwarted. Our
march was so rapid that

the enemy could not outstrip and intercept us, which he constantly
endeavored to do.

No heavy fighting occurred after we passed the Ivey farm, though
skirmishing continued as

far as Pontotoc. I then moved back to Memphis with everything that we
had captured, content

with the very great injury we had inflicted upon them, and feeling that
everything had been

achieved that was at all practicable under the circumstances.

31

My orders from General Sherman were so comprehensive as to embrace
everything that it

would be possible for me to do, and I could not regard them as
imperative that I should make a

junction with his forces at all hazards, but on the contrary, he
expressly stated that he could get

along without me if I found it impossible to get through.

Returning, I drew the enemy after me and inflicted heavy losses upon
him, and saved my

command, with all our captured stock and prisoners and rescued negroes,
with very trifling

losses except in stragglers captured.

Attempting to cut through to Sherman I would have lost my entire
command, and of course

could have rendered him no assistance.

The conduct of the entire Second Brigade, under Colonel Hepburn, was
worthy of all praise.

This brigade consists of the Second Iowa Cavalry, Major Coon commanding;
Sixth Illinois

Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Starr commanding; Seventh Illinois Cavalry,
Lieutenant-Colonel

Trafton commanding, [and Ninth Illinois Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel
Burgh commanding]. All

these officers acquitted themselves most creditably. The Fourth Missouri
Cavalry, Major

Heinrichs commanding; the Third Tennessee Cavalry, Major Minnis
commanding, and the

Seventh Indiana Cavalry, Colonel Shanks commanding, also made brilliant
charges, while the

Fourth Regulars, under Captain Bowman, charged a whole rebel brigade
three times, and routed

it at every charge.

Captain Bowman and Lieutenant Davis were particularly distinguished for
their gallantry.

Lieut. W. H. Ingerton, who acted as my assistant adjutant-general, led
the charge of the Third

Tennessee most brilliantly, and was uniformly distinguished by his skill
and dashing bravery.

[All the officers here referred to deserve promotion, and the interests
of the service would be

promoted by their advancement to higher rank. They are brave, skillful,
and valuable cavalry

officers.]

General Grierson's conduct was worthy of all praise. [Whenever there was
anything to be

done he was sure to be found. His skill in managing cavalry movements
and in handling

commands in action was obvious and admirable.]

Information since obtained fully justifies the decision to retire before
Forrest's force from

West Point. General Sherman's expeditionary force had withdrawn from
Meridian before my

arrival at West Point, on a line that could not have been known to me,
cut off as I was from any

communication with him. Forrest's force is ascertained to have been
rather above than below my

estimate. Chalmers was moving with two brigades by way of Houston to my
rear, while Lee,

with from 3,000 to 4,000 men, was ordered up to join Forrest in my front.

The country south of West Point and Houston abounds in swamps and
streams, extremely

difficult to cross when the defiles leading to and over them were held
by an enemy. The

incumbrances which already overburdened me would [have] increased and it
was impossible to

shake them off, and, involved in an exceedingly intricate and obstructed
country, I would have

been compelled to contend thus encumbered with a force numerically
largely superior to my

own; and, looking back upon the movement, I would in no way have been
justifiable in moving

at the time appointed without the whole force which I was ordered to
take. [By an unexpected

contingency the requirements of my orders became incompatible, and I was
compelled to adopt

the wiser alternative.] Had I moved with the Second and Third Brigades
only, I would have had

less than 5,000 men instead of full 7,000, and would have had the odds
largely against me from

the moment I dropped the infantry brigade and crossed the Tallahatchie
River, and, meeting with

disaster, would have been subjected to deserved censure.

The brigade moved from Columbus under orders not my own, and for its
delay I am in

nowise responsible.

32

This much I feel constrained to write in the nature of a defense for the
sake of my command,

as it must participate in the mortification of a supposed failure, when
we bear with us the

consciousness of success and duty well performed.

I have the honor to inclose herewith the report of Brig. Gen. B. H.
Grierson, second in

command, as also those of the brigade and regimental commanders, to
which I beg leave to refer

for lists of casualties from which the following recapitulation is
prepared: Killed, 47; wounded,

152; missing, 120; total casualties, 319.

A full list of the prisoners captured, about 200, is in course of
preparation, and will be

forwarded as soon as it can be completed.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

WM. SOOY SMITH,

Brig. Gen., Chief of Cavalry, Mil. Div. of the Mississippi.

Lieut. Col. R. M. SAWYER,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

Itinerary of the Cavalry Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, for February
and March.

During the month the First Division marched from Union City to
Collierville, Tenn., from

which point it operated with the whole division, under the immediate
control of Brig. Gen. W.

Sooy Smith.

February 20, the advance of the division engaged the enemy near West
Point, and drove him

with heavy loss across the Sakatonchee River.

February 21, we started upon our return to Memphis, the enemy under
Generals Lee and

Forrest following. We engaged them on the 21st, 22d, and 23d, each day
choosing our positions

and allowing them to come upon us. In each attack the enemy was repulsed
with fearful loss.

February 26, the division arrived safely back to the line of the Memphis
and Charleston

Railroad, having destroyed 30 miles of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, all
immense amount of

Confederate corn, cotton, and other property, and having brought in
about 200 prisoners, and

about 1,500 negroes and the same number of mules.

The troops of this division have been engaged during the month of March
in scouting and

patrolling from the post of Memphis; no important engagement has
occurred. Owing to the reenlistment

as veterans of three-fourths of all regiments in this division which
were eligible, the

effective force has been much reduced.

During the month the Second Iowa, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and
Ninth Illinois, and the

Fourth Missouri Cavalry have re-enlisted for the new term of three years.

The Third Michigan and Seventh Kansas Cavalry, which were re-enlisted
and sent home in

the early part of February, have not yet returned.

Owing to the scarcity in the supply of horses to this division, the
effective strength of the

command is reduced to less than 2,000. Only 1,500 horses have been
furnished during the last

ten months.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, CAVALRY DIVISION,

Germantown, Tenn., March 15, 1864.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following as a brief report of
the action of the

Second Brigade, Cavalry Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, in the late
expedition into

Mississippi:

In accordance to orders from the general commanding the Cavalry
Division, Sixteenth Army

Corps, I marched the Second Brigade, composed of the Second Iowa
Cavalry, Major Coon

33

commanding; Sixth Illinois Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Starr,
commanding; Seventh Illinois

Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Trafton, commanding; Ninth Illinois Cavalry,
Lieutenant-Colonel

Burgh commanding; Company K, First Illinois Light Artillery, Lieutenant
Curtis commanding,

and two companies of the pioneer corps, in all 2,900 strong, at 3
o'clock on the morning of the

11th of February, and effected a crossing of the Coldwater at Miller's
Ford and Doty's Mill by 3

o'clock of the afternoon. The whole command bivouacked that night 8
miles southeasterly from

Byhalia.

At an early hour the next day the march was resumed, and continued
without incident until a

point 2 miles east of Waterford was reached, when, at 8 p.m., the
brigade went into camp. Four

companies of the Second Iowa Cavalry, under command of Captain Horton,
were sent in the

direction of Wyatt to communicate with Colonel McMillen.

On the morning of the 13th the march was resumed. One battalion of the
Ninth Illinois

Cavalry, under command of Major Bishop, was sent to the railroad
crossing, in the direction of

Abbeville, to make a feint of crossing the Tallahatchie, and one
battalion of the Seventh Illinois

Cavalry, commanded by Captain Webster, was sent to form a junction with
Captain Horton. At 3

p.m. the brigade crossed the Tippah, at Callahan's Mills, on a bridge
built by the pioneer corps,

under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Starr, and encamped in the
vicinity of Potts' house.

The march was resumed at daylight, and the Tallahatchie crossed about 2
p.m. The brigade

encamped for the night and during the next day 5 miles south of New Albany.

On the 16th, the command marched 4 miles, encamping at Johnson's
plantation, 9 miles

south of New Albany.

On the night of the 17th, encamped 9 miles south of Pontotoc.

On the 18th, the Ninth Illinois Cavalry, by order of Brigadier-General
Grierson, moved upon

Aberdeen, 45 miles distant. Colonel Burgh, commanding, was opposed by a
few companies of

Confederate cavalry, which he quickly, dispersed, and reached Aberdeen,
from which he drove

the enemy's cavalry at sundown. He captured several prisoners of war,
large quantities of stores,

and many horses and mules. On the night of the 18th, the brigade
encamped 4 miles east of

Okolona.

On the 19th, passed through Aberdeen and to a point 2 miles east of
Prairie Station.

On the morning of the 20th, the entire command moved in the direction of
West Point, the

Second Brigade in the front. The Second Iowa Cavalry was in the advance
of the brigade, and

the Sixth Illinois Cavalry upon the left flank on the railroad, which
they effectually destroyed.

Immense quantities of corn belonging to the Confederacy was burned. Near
Loohattan Station

Colonel Starr reported the enemy in force at a point about 6 miles north
of West Point. The

advance, consisting of 17 men of Company K, Second Iowa Cavalry, under
command of

Lieutenant Bandy, ran upon a vastly superior force of the enemy.
Lieutenant Bandy immediately

charged them, putting them to flight, capturing several prisoners. His
conduct was gallant in the

extreme, and entitles him to the hearty commendation of his commanding
officers.

One and one-half miles north of West Point the enemy, reported to be
Colonel Forrest's

brigade, advantageously posted in timber and behind fences, vigorously
attacked and checked the

advance of the Second Iowa. The regiment was soon in position and so
supported by other parts

of the brigade that the enemy was routed, but not without the loss of
Lieutenant Dwire, Second

Iowa Cavalry, and 4 men wounded.

Lieutenant Dwire was a brave, earnest and faithful soldier, but the many
comrades who

mourn his loss have the comforting reflection that he