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OFFICIAL ARMY RECORDS

1863-2

SAINT NICHOLAS HOTEL,

Springfield, Ill., August 24, 1863.

GENERAL: In answer to your inquiry of this date, I have to say that I was detached from my

regiment by order of Major-General Grant, with orders to report to you for duty upon your staff.

I was with you in the siege of Vicksburg up to the evening of May 22, when I was wounded and

caught by you in your arms as I fell. On May 22 I was repeatedly sent by you to different parts of

the field, and had good opportunities of knowing what was done by your corps (Thirteenth) on

that occasion.

At 10 o'clock your columns of attack moved forward to the assault. In less than one hour,

Joseph E. Griffith, a sergeant of the Twenty-second Iowa, with a part of the storming party,

entered one of the works of the enemy, drove the enemy out, and held the place for some hours

He captured 13 men with a lieutenant in this work, and reported them to you about 2 o'clock.

Lieutenant-Colonel Graham, of the Twenty-second Iowa, with a small detachment, entered

another fort and drove the enemy out, maintaining himself there until after nightfall, when the

enemy massed their forces upon us and drove us back from our line, which was up to the works

of the enemy, capturing Lieutenant-Colonel Graham and his men. The American flag floated

from on top of two of the enemy's works, and our men kept them there until after nightfall, as I

am informed. They were there when I was wounded, which was after 5 o'clock. All this time

many of our men were in the ditches of the enemy, and sent back for spades and shovels with

which to dig down the enemy's works.

About 5.30 o'clock a part, if not the whole, of Quinby's division arrived. McArthur did not

arrive until next day (May 23). I believed then if the two divisions had arrived in reasonable time

that we would have been able to have pushed through the lines of the enemy. It was so believed

by every officer I saw.

Your position during the assault was to the left and a little to the rear of our battery of 30-

pounder Parrotts, which was about 600-yards from the enemy's works. We could plainly see the

line of works in our front and to the extreme left of our corps, but a part of the right was

obstructed by the foliage of a grove of trees. This was the best point for observation along our

entire line, and from the top of the battery, where you often went for observation, you could see

perfectly everything in our front from right to left

In my opinion, it was about 1 miles from the elevated point in General McPherson's line

from which he and General Grant made observations. The position occupied by them was

perhaps higher ground, but I do not believe they could observe our movements with the accuracy

we could from the position occupied by you.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

H. C. WARMOTH,

Late Lieutenant-Colonel Aide-de-Camp.

8.--Letter of F. H. Mason, late captain and aide-de-camp.

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., August 24, 1863.

Maj. Gen. JOHN A. McCLERNAND:

SIR: Your note of this morning is received, and in reply I beg leave to submit the following

report:

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1. I was acting throughout the attack on Vicksburg in the capacity of aide-de-camp on your

staff, and being sent at various times to your division and brigade commanders with orders,

inquiries, &c., and being all the remainder of the time, when not thus Occupied in your

immediate presence, taking notes of the various incidents and hearing the various messages and

reports brought by staff and general officers to you, I enjoyed as good advantages for hearing

and seeing the assault and the part you took as could he possible for any one in my capacity.

2. At about 10.10 a.m. on the 22d, I saw the advance of General Lawler's brigade, of Carr's

division, rush up the slope leading to the large work of the enemy immediately to the left of the

railroad. Though met by a fierce fire, they continued to advance, leaped into the ditch, and began

to climb the enemy's parapet A moment afterward a flag was planted on the crest of the parapet

and held there by two men, while a party of fifteen or twenty (as I should judge) sprang over into

the fort, immediately after which those of the enemy who had been firing over the part of the fort

opposite to where the entrance was made disappeared, leading me to the belief that they had all

been driven by our men from the works. At this time you observed that the assaulting column

was weak, and ordered it to be vigorously supported, and also sent an aide to General Carr, with

orders to push Benton forward to create a diversion in favor of General Lawler, or, if necessary,

to his immediate support. Immediately afterward information was brought to you that the

advance of General Smith's division had effected a lodgment and forced the enemy to abandon a

portion of his rifle-pits; but whether the interior of the works had been reached, or merely the

ditch, I did not understand. A part, of the language of the officer bringing the report was that "our

flag is planted on the enemy's works." At 11.46 an officer arrived and said that the fort first

referred to was ours, and asked you to order that it should not be further fired upon. You seemed

incredulous, and sent me to Colonel Landram, who was in a very advanced position, to ascertain

as far as possible the exact state of the case. I found that officer, and, upon delivering my

message, received from him, in addition to his confident opinion that the fort was ours, a note

from Lieutenant-Colonel Graham, of the Twenty-second Iowa, with the remark that the "note

was written inside the fort." This note, the contents of which I do not remember with sufficient

accuracy to repeat, I delivered to you, believing fully that the fort was in our entire possession.

3. Although from the great length of the line occupied by the Thirteenth Corps, and the

number of forts on the enemy's line, the attack seemed desperate, yet it was my belief that with

the aid of re-enforcements the position might be fully carried. On this point General Landram

said at 1.50 p.m.," If General Osterhaus, on my left, will press forward, I think the works can

soon be elected."

4. The position occupied by you during the day was a commanding knoll, about 600 yards

from the enemy's works, and upon which a battery of 30-pounder Parrotts had been planted.

From this point all your line could be seen, except a part of General Smith's command, which

formed your extreme right, and which, though near, was partially hidden by the foliage of trees

and the extreme unevenness of the ground. Your post of observation owed its entire safety to the

slight parapet in front, as many of the enemy's bullets went far beyond us into the woods, and

men were continually being wounded all about you. The distance from the above point to

General McPherson's headquarters, where General Grant was located, was, in my judgment, 1

miles; and although General Grant's position enjoyed some advantages in point of altitude, yet I

cannot believe that this or any other place afforded nearly so good a view of the Thirteenth Corps

as the one you occupied.

5. Boomer's brigade arrived at 5 o'clock, and was sent to the front. Twenty minutes afterward

a regiment arrived, and was held for some time in reserve near headquarters. This regiment may

have been part of the Second Brigade, of Quinby's division. The division of General McArthur

arrived at 10 a.m. the day following.

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6. The dispatches sent from time to time during the day to General Grant were less sanguine

of success and lees positive in regard to what had been already accomplished than my own

opinion, and, as I believed, the opinion of the majority of your officers.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. H. MASON,

Late Captain and Aide-de-Cam

9.--Letter of A. A. Blount, late captain Seventh Ohio Volunteer Artillery.

SPRINGFIELD, OHIO, September 5, 1863.

Maj. Gen. J. A. McCLERNAND:

GENERAL: Your favor of August 23 is received, requesting me to state what l know about

any of the colors of the Thirteenth Army Corps having been planted upon the enemy's forts

during the assault on May 22 upon the defenses of Vicksburg. In reply, I would state that I saw

the colors of the Seventy-seventh Illinois Regiment planted upon the parapet of one of the enemy

forts, as also were the colors of the Twenty-second Iowa Regiment, and that the men of the latter

regiment occupied one side of the fort, which was divided by a traverse. I heard General Carr

give orders to his artillery not to fire upon that fort, as it was in our possession. The regimental

flag of the Seventy-seventh Illinois remained upon the parapet of the fort from eight to ten hours,

when it was brought away. The national flag of the same regiment could not be brought away,

and was covered with earth in the ditch. I saw upon another fort directly in front of my battery

the colors of the Eighty-third Ohio Regiment, and I think those of the Sixteenth Iowa. There

were colors of other regiments planted upon the extreme slope of the parapet and upon the crest

of the glacis of other forts, where our men remained from eight to ten hours. It was the universal

opinion of officers and men that had we sufficient force the fort occupied by our men could have

been held.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. A. BLOUNT,

Late Captain Seventeenth Ohio Volunteer Artillery

Other letters in my possession might be added, but they would extend this communication

too much. Those already given will abundantly suffice for the purpose in hand. They not only

prove all I have denied or affirmed, but they prove more. They prove the promptness of my

assault; that Lawler's and Landram's commands, forming the column of attack on my left center,

planted their colors on the enemy's works; moreover, that they were carried inside of one of the

main forts; that officers and men of the commands of one or both of them forced their way into

the same fort; that observing that the assaulting column was weak, I ordered it to be supported;

that immediately afterward information was brought to me that the advance of Smith's division,

together with Benton's brigade, of Carr's division, forming another column of attack, had

effected another lodgment in the enemy's works, and had also planted our flag on them; that

prisoners had been captured and brought out of the fort assaulted by Lawler and Landram; that

afterward an officer brought word to me that the same fort was ours, and a request that it should

not be further fired upon; that, doubting, I sent a staff officer to verify the fact; that he brought

word from Colonel Landram not only that the fort was ours, but a note from Lieutenant-Colonel

Graham, of the Twenty second Iowa, with the remark that "the note was written inside of the

fort," and that he was fully persuaded of the truth of the information; that the Twenty-second

Iowa advanced against one fort, and the Eleventh Wisconsin against another, and that Colonel

Stone and Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlap (killed) saw the Twenty-second and Twenty-first Iowa

Regiments advance upon two different forts, and the enemy retire from both, and the rifle pits

connecting them, down a hill and toward the city, and talked about it while it was going on. They

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prove that I could have used more men in making my assault, and with timely re-enforcements of

two divisions would have crowned it with success; that my position was much more favorable

than General Grant's for seeing what was going on in front of my corps; that my position was

near the center of my line, and only 500 or 600 yards from the enemy's works, while General

Grant's was about 1 miles to the right of my position; that my dispatches to General Grant were

a qualification rather than an exaggeration of my success, and that the re-enforcements finally

ordered by General Grant did not arrive in time, Quinby's division only arriving about 5 o'clock,

and too late to be properly formed and successfully applied, and McArthur's not until next day.

As I have already shown, General Grant says that--

The works entered by him (Sergeant Griffith) from its position could give us no practical

advantage, unless others to the right and left of it were carried and held at the same time.

Is not this declaration too broad? Is it not as much as to say that no practical advantage could

have been derived from taking any part less than the whole of the enemy's works at once; that the

possession of any part, however extended, flanked by other parts held by the enemy, would have

been worthless? Is it not as much as to say that' the only condition of our success was the

impossibility of carrying the whole of the enemy's line, which was much longer than our own, at

once, and consequently that our attack must have been by our forces in line, instead of in

column, as he directed? And yet, strange enough, he censures me for asking for the co-operation

of a simultaneous attack by Sherman and McPherson, according to the terms of his original plan,

and without which, by his own admission, "no practical advantage" could have resulted from

Sergeant Griffith's partial success. By his own showing, I only asked for what his original plan

promised, and what, by his own admission, was necessary to our success.

This of itself is a sufficient refutation of the charge that what I asked for makes me

responsible for the "increase of our mortality list fully 50 per cent.;" but, apart from it, there is

another essential fact which goes to the root of this whole matter, which makes General Grant

responsible not only for the alleged increase of our mortality list, but for our whole loss, and

which truth and justice require should be laid bare. I allude to General Grant's order of May 21

for the assault. That order was issued by him with knowledge of the diminished numbers and

exhausted condition of our forces, with knowledge of the roughness of the ground over which

they had to pass, and with at least partial knowledge of the great strength of the enemy's position

and works, and was deemed not only by me, but by all my general officers who spoke to me

upon the subject, as unfortunate and likely to bring disaster upon us rather than the enemy. My

answer to these officers was that it was an order, and, if possible, must be executed. They

answered, "if we fail it shall not be our fault," and their partial success while others failed, and

the carnage of hundreds of their number who fell killed or wounded in gaining that success,

conclusively testify that their final failure was not their fault; indeed, General Grant himself

testifies to it, as I have already shown, by his admission in another part of his report that the

assault was gallant in the extreme but the enemy's position was too strong, both naturally and

artificially, to be taken in that way "--by assault.

Comparing General Grant's report with his dispatches, another discrepancy will appear. He

says in his report that the asked-for "diversion was promptly and vigorously made without

advancing our position or giving us other advantages," leaving it to be inferred that unmitigated

evil was the consequence of the diversion ; yet in one of his dispatches he says that "Sherman

has gained some successes," and in another, dated 2.30 (two hours and a half after my dispatch

stating that I had part possession of two forts), he says, "Sherman is getting on well," proving

that the diversion was justifying itself and inspiring him with hope of success.

General Grant speaks of Sherman ordering "a renewal of the assault on his front," and of a

"diversion" in my favor both by Sherman and McPherson, leaving the inference that there had

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been a cessation of the assault by both of them. This cessation was either by General Grant's

order or with his consent, or without both; and this brings me to a most grave and important

point. If it was by General Grant's order or with his consent, he failed to notify me of the fact,

leaving me under the operation of his original order, discriminating against my corps and

dooming it to stand in the breach and press the assault alone and unsupported, and, as a forlorn

hope, to be destroyed in a desperate effort to accomplish an object that he had abandoned; and, if

so, does not the blood of the hundreds of brave men who were thus sacrificed cry aloud against

him? If it was without either his order or consent, it was a case of deplorable disobedience, and

the same responsibility attaches to him for not advising me of it.

General Grant's account of the battle of Champion's Hill also does me and portions of my

command injustice. Emphasizing what himself and others did, and assuming that the field of

action was limited by the Operations of McPherson's corps and of Hovey's division, of my corps,

he indirectly arraigns me for want of zeal, promptitude, and energy. He says he was at Clinton on

May 15, and Sherman at Jackson, and that the latter, responsively to his order, promptly moved

forward toward Bolton on the morning of the battle; that he (General Grant) ordered McPherson

forward at 5.45 a.m., and sent Lieutenant-Colonel [James H.] Wilson, of his staff, "with verbal

instructions to" me "as to the disposition of my forces," and followed himself at an early hour

from Clinton; that he found "Hovey's division disposed for the attack," but would "not permit it

to be commenced until he could hear from" me," who was advancing with four divisions;" that"

Logan rode up" and told him that if "Hovey could make another dash at the enemy, he could

come up from where he then was and capture the greater part of their three," and that, after all

this, he saw me with Carr's division to his left, and that "Osterhaus' division soon afterward

appeared, with his skirmishers well in advance."

General Grant says all this, but he accidentally or otherwise omits to state what is essential to

a proper understanding of the incidents and agencies of that battle. He omits to state that while he

was yet behind at Clinton, I selected the lines of advance of the Thirteenth Army Corps,

including Blair's division, and moved all the forces forward to the attack except McPherson's;

that revoking an order changing my disposition of Blair's forces, he afterward sent a dispatch to

me, saying, "Your disposition of Blair's forces is satisfactory; place him to the best advantage,"

&c.; that on the day before the battle I urged him in a dispatch to move McPherson's corps upon

the right of Hovey, to cut off the enemy if I should beat him; that on the morning of the battle,

after putting my columns in motion, I hastened to General McPherson's headquarters, in my rear,

before he had risen, and urged him to do the same for the same purpose, and to support Hovey;

that the subsequent execution of this movement secured to us many prisoners and a number of

cannon.

He omits to state that the enemy's skirmishers and artillery were first encountered on my left

by General Smith's division, supported by General Blair's; next by General Osterhaus' division,

supported by General Carr's, and next by General Hovey, forming my right, and that l informed

him that I had received a dispatch from the latter, dated 9.30 a.m., notifying me that he had found

the enemy strongly posted, and believed that his right flank would encounter severe resistance;

and that I asked him whether McPherson should not support Hovey, and whether I should bring

on a general engagement; that afterward, sending several dispatches, he failed to answer any

more directly than by the following dispatch, dated 12.35 p.m.: "As soon as your command is all

in hand, throw forward skirmishers and feel the enemy, and attack him in force if an opportunity

occurs, and I will see that Hovey and McPherson fully co-operate," as though Hovey had not

been hotly and desperately engaged since 11 a.m.

He also fails to state that upon the receipt of this dispatch I immediately ordered my center

and left to "attack the enemy vigorously and press for victory;" that he allowed Hovey's division

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to be forced back twice or thrice with great loss from the ground gained, although, as was

credibly reported, there was a brigade or division of McPherson's corps unengaged and within

easy supporting distance. Moreover, that he sent me several dispatches leading me to the belief

that the enemy was in greatest force in front of my center and left, and warning me to guard

against letting him gain the rear of that part of my line; and that after or about the time the enemy

gave way on the right, Garrard's brigade, leading my right center, was so formidably opposed as

to need the sup port of Benton's and Lindsey's, leaving my left center to be supported by Lawler's

brigade, forming a reserve.

He omits all these things, and, in fine, to notice the fact that an early official dispatch sent by

him to Washington giving an account of the battle was so unjust even to Hovey's division as to

cause Hovey to make it the subject of a communication to me complaining of it, and me to

concur in it and send it to General Grant.

My position during the battle was with my center, composed of Osterhaus' and Carr's

divisions, and during its progress, when I ordered Osterhaus to push forward and make a

diversion in favor of Hovey, he sent me word that his column was as much advanced as Hovey's,

was contending with great difficulties, and was doing all it could do. General Grant coming up

and finding Hovey's division forming for the attack, remained on the right.

In noticing the battle of Black River Bridge, General Grant also omits the fact that he did not

come up until after I had disposed my forces and brought them into action. In noticing the batt