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OFFICIAL ARMY RECORDS 1862-1

HEADQUARTERS,

Jefferson City, Mo., January 1, 1862.

J. C. KELTON, Assistant Adjutant-General:

SIR: I have the honor to report that in accordance with directions heretofore received from

department headquarters there have been sent from this post across the Missouri River the

following-named troops, viz: Five companies of the Eleventh Regiment Iowa Volunteers, and

four companies of the Third Iowa Cavalry now at Fulton, in Callaway County; also a detachment

of Merrill's Horse, numbering about 300, which will probably be in Columbia, Boone County,

to-morrow. I would recommend that troops be kept at these places during the entire winter or

until the bands of rebels infesting that neighborhood are effectually dispersed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

THOS. J. McKEAN,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Post.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, IOWA,

January. 8, 1862.

Lieut. Col. H. C. NUTT,

Aide-de-Camp, &c., Council Bluffs, Iowa:

SIR: I have just received a communication from citizens of Fremont County, of which the

inclosed is a copy.

You will immediately proceed to Sidney, in said county, and fully investigate the matters

therein set forth. Consult Judge Sears and Colonel Hedges, and if you shall be satisfied the

preservation of the public peace so requires, call into the service such of the volunteer companies

of the county as may be necessary to that end and keep them in service as long as their services

may be required. If, in your judgment, it shall be necessary to call out any military force, make

them call first upon the company at Sidney.

Call for no more troops than in your best judgment will be necessary and keep them in

service only so long as may be necessary. In this matter I must trust to your discretion, and I will

hold you responsible for its sound exercise. Procure proper quarters for such troops as you may

call out and make the best arrangements you can for their subsistence. You must make all your

arrangements as economically as possible. No extravagant charges for quarters or subsistence

will be allowed.

You will preserve the public peace and protect the prisoners at all hazards.

I desire full information on the following points:

I. Have rebels or rebel sympathizers from Missouri come into Fremont County, bringing with

them their property, or have such persons sent their property from Missouri into the county? If

so, give the names of such persons, a description of the property brought or sent, and the names

of the persons, if any, of our own citizens who have such property in possession.

II. Does the bringing or sending of the property of such persons into the county tend to

endanger the public peace?

III. I desire a full detail of all the facts connected with the attack on Mr. Fugitt and of the

capture of those under arrest with the causes of all the acts done, so far as you can ascertain

them.

IV. It has been stated to me that one or two persons, supposed to be of the party that attacked

Mr. Fugitt, were shot by some of our citizens near Hamburg upon refusal to surrender. You will

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investigate the facts of this transaction and report to me fully thereon. I am determined to

preserve the peace of our State and to protect the property of our citizens, but I am also

determined that our State shall not be made an asylum for rebels who have been compelled to

flee from their own State in consequence of their outrages on Union men there, if affording such

asylum is to peril the peace of our own people. I am also determined that those of our own

citizens who sympathize with and protect these fleeing rebels shall not make the consequences of

their own acts the pretext for a breach of the public peace.

The peace must be preserved, and those persons afforded full protection and a fair and

impartial trial.

You will report to me in writing as soon as possible, and keep me advised at intervals of the

situation of affairs.

Very respectfully,

SAMUEL J. KIRKWOOD.

COUNCIL BLUFFS, IOWA, January 17, 1862.

Hon. SAMUEL J. KIRKWOOD,

Governor of Iowa, Des Moines:

SIR: I received your letter, dated January 8, 1862, inclosing a communication from citizens

of Fremont County, and in accordance with your instructions I proceeded on to Sidney on the

morning of the 13th instant, for the purpose of carrying out said instructions, and have to report

my action as follows:

I found the statements contained in the communication above referred to to be true in all

material points. I will answer the four interrogations propounded in your letter in order:

1st. Yes. Rebels to the number of thirty families, at least, with a large amount of horses,

mules, cattle, hogs, &c., have left Missouri, came into Fremont County, and many of the same

class have sent their property who have not come into this State themselves. These persons have

come themselves or sent their property to save the same from seizure by the Government that

they have outraged for the past year. I was able to find the whereabouts and names of but a

portion of these persons, but such as I have found I append below, and will give you further

information upon this point, at an early day. The parties named below are all either rank

secessionists or rebel sympathizers, and I will make no distinction between them. It is enough to

know that they are "not with us"— are not Union men.

Mr. John Pugh has 5 horses, owned in Missouri; owner's name unknown. Mr. Freeman has 2

horses; owner unknown. Mr. Baldwin has 2 horses; owner unknown. H.G. Bowen has 15 horses

and mules, owned by Nichols and Schouler. Nichols lives at Saint Stevens, Nebr., and has

furnished the rebels in North Missouri with arms, and is a prominent rebel. Milton McCartners

has 8 or 10 horses and mules; owner unknown. Mr. Welty has 8 or 10 horses and mules, owned

by Mr. Holland, who lives near Rockport. The Heatt brothers have 6 horses, 60 hogs, and 25 or

30 cattle; owners' names unknown. They had consulted Mr. Cornish as to whether they could

lawfully keep stock which belonged to secessionists in Missouri, for if they could they could

make a large amount of money by so doing, as the secesh were willing to pay high prices. These

men (Heatt) have 6 horses, owned by one Hall, who left Missouri in the night to save his

property. Mr. Hollaway brought 25 horses and mules into this State, and has them scattered

around at several places. Mr. Davis has 8 horses, belonging to a man in Rockport, name

unknown; can be found and identified, as he is well known in Iowa. Mr. English (senator), some

three weeks ago, went to Missouri and brought the personal property of one Poindexter, either

the officer in Price's army or a brother; at all events a rabid rebel, and it is reported and believed

in Siduey that Poindexter himself is about McKinsock's Grove. Mr. English has a horse

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belonging to Poindexter now in his possession, but has sent him away from his own farm to a

brother-in-law's for fear of jayhawking.

The above property has all of it been sent from Missouri to avoid seizure and confiscation by

the Government. There have also been horses sent from Missouri lately by rebels who dared not

leave their goods in Fremont County, and one lot of 40 went on, the man saying he was too near

home in Fremont. I think that there are at the present time 100 to 125 horses in Fremont County,

brought there by rebels to save them. Many place the number much higher, but from all my

information I place the number as above.

In reply to your second question, I will say that by these acts I think the public peace is

endangered, and I find all the Union men in Fremont are very certain it does, and say that unless

it is stopped bloodshed will be the result. My reasons for thinking that it does endanger the

public peace are that there is great danger of this property being pursued by jayhawkers and

others, which would be almost certain to bring on a collision and bloodshed. Second, the

accession of these rebels to the number of the same kind and their sympathizers in Fremont

County increases the bitter feelings between the two parties, and which now requires but a word

to bring on a civil strife in that county. As a sample, one John Cooper, of McKinsock's Grove,

has, he says, 25 Missouri friends with him, and he will keep them there as long as they will stay;

that they are well armed, and will shoot the first man who tries to arrest any of their number or

seize a horse.

Questions 3 and 4 I will answer together. On the night of December 30 a body of armed men

from Missouri and Nebraska, under Capt. Warren Price, who is said to be the leader of a band of

jayhawkers, came to the house of T. F. Fugitt, between 10 or 12 p.m., for the purpose, as they

avowed on their way, of seizing some horses which had been taken from Missouri and owned by

rebels in Missouri. Several of the party entered the house and others went to the barn for the

horses. Fugitt got up and ran into another room and seized a double-barreled shot-gun and

instantly fired at the crowd. Then, instead of firing the other barrel, he clubbed his gun and

knocked down another. At this Price drew his revolver and fired four shots at Fugitt, all of which

took effect, one in the neck, which is a serious but not dangerous wound. Fugitt is rapidly

recovering. The party then left Fugitt's and went to several other places in the Grove and took in

all 11 horses. These Captain Price sent in charge of two men to Missouri, but the men lost their

way and at daylight were in sight of Sidney. They at once retraced their steps and tried to reach

Missouri via Hamburg.

In the mean time a party of some 40 men were in pursuit of the robbers, and when these two

men with 11 horses came to Hamburg they were hailed by C. McKinsock and Giles Corrlis. The

men paid no attention to the hail, when McKinsock and Corrlis both fired their rifles. Corrlis

killed his man dead, and McKinsock wounded the other, who was taken prisoner, and is now in

Fremont jail. He says that himself and the dead man were at Fugitt's, and that they reside in

Nebraska. The horses taken from the prisoner were left at Hamburg and proved up and taken

away by avowed rebels. No Union man has been molested, as I could learn.

The news of course spread like wild-fire, and early the next morning the sheriff and county

judge started with a posse of 100 men to arrest the horse thieves, and the sheriff said he would

follow them to Arkansas if he did not get them. On their way an incident occurred worthy of

note. These 100 men left Sidney in three parties, and it is asserted that when on the road persons

in one party were heard to hurrah for Jeff. Davis. The sheriff denies this, but I think it can be

proven, although it was not in the party in which the sheriff was at the immediate head. Arriving

at McKinsock's Grove this party stopped, and another one from the Grove, under the lead of H.

English, went into Missouri and arrested 12 men and brought them to the Grove to lynch them,

but as there was great doubt as to whether these were the men who were at Fugitt's, after keeping

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them at the Grove one day they were given over to the sheriff, who took them to Sidney, where

they were guarded by an armed force for three days, when, upon a legal examination before the

county judge, they were all discharged except one, who had waived examination and given bail

before, and the wounded man from Hamburg, who is now in jail.

The Missourians complain bitterly of not only the arrest, but of the men under whom it was

done and under whom they were placed as prisoners. They say that if they could have seen the

face of one single Union man, either among their captors or guards, they would have attributed it

to a mistake and said nothing, but now it looks as if their rebel enemies had run away to Iowa

and sent rebel sympathizers from Iowa and given them Union men's names, to be arrested,

maltreated, and nearly lynched.

There are many men whom I have seen from Atchison County who say that there is a large

number of Union men sworn to shoot Han English at sight, as they think him to be the leader of

their enemies in Iowa while these prisoners were in the hands of Fremont authorities. The

military at Rockport, hearing of the manner of the arrest, started to rescue them. At the line they

left all but 20 men, who went to Sidney and demanded the release of the prisoners, which was

refused, and there was danger of violence, but upon the assurance of Union men that the

prisoners should have a fair trial and would at once prove themselves innocent of the crime

charged, they were induced to return home, which they did, and on their way arrested in Iowa a

young man who had been in Price's army as a cook. The captain of Missouri troops claimed to

have made this and other arrests which he made in Missouri the same day by order of the

commanding officer at Saint Joe. The truth of this I do not know. What became of the prisoners

taken from Iowa by the Missouri troops I was unable to learn.

In the mean time, on Saturday, January 4, a report having gone to Rockport that the civil

authorities were going to give up the prisoners to the mob to be lynched, some 200 men from

Atchison County and thereabouts started for the rescue. They crossed the line and came to

Hamburg, where they were met by some 50 Iowa troops, who tore up the bridge and refused to

let them pass. Here again was a very near approach to open hostilities between Iowa and

Missouri citizens, but a flag of truce passed, and upon mutual explanation the Missouri men went

home; did not go to Sidney at all.

The Union men of Missouri say that all the party who went into Missouri were secessionists,

and that Iowa allows rebels to flee into her State to avoid punishment, and then allows

secessionists to come to Missouri and arrest Union men without a shadow of law or right. I was

able to disabuse them of this idea, or at least all I had a chance to talk with.

This feeling is particularly bitter between Union men in Missouri and the secesh

sympathizers in McKinsock's Grove, who are nearly all that kind, and being so near the line

increases the danger of collision. An armed guard is kept out now in many neighborhoods to

warn them of approach of enemies. I find, further, that many men who have been avowed rebels

and hooted at all soldiers as Lincoln thieves are now very clamorous for armed protection, and

now there is organized a company which has memorialized you for commissions and arms that

are not safe to arm.

The board of supervisors of Fremont are secesh, and they, at their last meeting, passed a

resolution instructing their chairmen, Mr. Sipple and Mr. Cornish, to transmit to you what they

wanted. They got Mr. Cornish in to have some Union influence. The chairman of supervisors

proposed a paper which did not suit Cornish, and he refused to sign it. Sipple then proposed

another, which he would not show Cornish, and sent the same to you. It is supposed to be a

request to commission, arm, and call in service their men at McKinsock's Grove. They are not

the men to have State arms. I also telegraphed you not to tom mission Fremont militia. I found

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the infantry were all good men, with sound Union officers, but the mounted company was

formed by Judge Rector, and is not sound.

One officer, Mr. Bovine, has since his election said that he was a secessionist, and he did not

care who knew it. We want no such men with either arms or authority. I told Colonel Hedges that

it should be disbanded and an infantry company put in its place, and told him that it was not

legally organized, and it is not, as there has been no special authority granted, as is necessary, to

organize any but infantry. I presume you will get the organization of another infantry company,

which will make Colonel Hedges' regiment to a maximum, when it should be commissioned at

once.

I did not call out any State troops, and will not, unless there should be an immediate

necessity for their service, until I hear from you again. My reasons are, 1st, the immediate danger

of collision I believe to have passed, and, 2d, that I doubt the policy of keeping an armed force

of State troops in Fremont County unless for immediate use. They should be commissioned and

armed and ready to go at an hour's notice, but I think should be called into camp only as a last

resort.

The best way to preserve the peace and remove the danger of collision I believe to be in

sending a small force of Federal troops, say one or two companies of cavalry, from Saint Joe or

Leavenworth, under some prudent, reliable Union officer, and clothe him with power to arrest

armed secessionists either in Missouri or Iowa and seize their effects, to be sent at once to

headquarters for adjudication. This will avoid increasing the personal hatred among the two

classes of our own citizens, which would be increased by arming and calling out any State troops

either from Iowa or Missouri, and lessen the danger of bloodshed if any arrests are to be made,

and the State troops would have no place to send prisoners even if they have authority to make

arrests. I feel certain that calling out any State troops would bring on a collision, and the aim is to

preserve the peace more than to conquer rebels, as I understand it.

I am sustained in this view by all the Union men in Fremont except Colonel Hedges, who is

very anxious to drill his regiment, but I would prefer sending an armed force in command of

some Federal officer who would have no personal enemies to deal with, and I think the arrest of

a very few men, and the seizure of the property belonging to rebels, who have sent the same to

Iowa for safety, will not only quiet the present troubles, but remove the danger of a recurrence in

future.

If I have been lengthy in this, it is because there was a good deal of ground to go over. I find

that in all facts I have stated the Union men from whom I receive my information are supported

by the statements of the other side, so far as I had an opportunity to inquire, in all material points.

Many of the facts in regard to Fugitt's case and the prisoners arrested were received from one

who was with the sheriff, and is called a secessionist by Union men. I refer to W. C. Sipple. He

claims to be a good Union man now. The Union men from whom I received most information

were Judge Sears, Colonel Hedges, Mr. Cornish, Mr. Linkinfitter, Mr. Warren, formerly sheriff,

and Squire Fanner, who lives at McKinsock's Grove, all of whom agree upon the case as I have

presented it.

Since my return I have received your letter of 14th instant. I will proceed at once to

Rockport, and on my return report such other facts as I may come in possession of. In the mean

time I hope to receive further instructions in regard to an armed force in Fremont County.

I remain, your most obedient servant,

H. C. NUTT.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, IOWA,

January 27, 1862.

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Hon. WM. H. SEWARD,

Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.:

SIR: I inclose herewith copies of a letter from myself to Colonel Nutt, dated January 14,

1862, and his reply, dated January 24, 1862, concerning the same subject touching which I wrote

you on the 23d instant. I am strengthened in the opinion there expressed, that some of the rebels

escaped from Missouri and some of their alders and abettors in our State should be arrested by

military authority, and that the property brought into our State to escape the officers of the

United States in Missouri should be taken possession of and legally dealt with. I am also satisfied

this should be done by United States officers, supported by United States troops. The secession

feeling is, as I am credibly informed and fully believe, very strong in Fremont County. The

Union men there and in Missouri are greatly exasperated that rebels from Missouri who have

been compelled to fly from that State because of these outrages on Union men should find an

asylum and protection in this State, and I am well satisfied that if these people cannot be dealt

with in some way legally, the jayhawkers will take the matter in their own hands and a small

border war will ensue. I have sent copies of the correspondence between Colonel Nutt and

myself to General Halleck, with the request to lay them before the Governor of Missouri, as I do

not know where to address him. Please consult the Iowa delegation in Congress on this subject,

and permit me to suggest that prompt and decided action will have a decidedly beneficial

influence. If arrests be made, the officer should be supported by United States troops.

Very respectfully,

SAMUEL J. KIRKWOOD.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, IOWA,

January 14, 1862.

Lieut. Col. H. C. NUTT,

Aide-de-camp, &c., Council Bluffs, Iowa :

SIR: Since writing you a few days since in regard to the difficulty in Fremont County I have

learned that troops from Missouri have been to Sidney and demanded the surrender into their

hands of the persons arrested on suspicion of having assaulted Mr. Fugitt; that the authorities in

charge of the prisoners very properly refused to surrender them; that the Missouri troops, on

their return, arrested in this State and took with them to Missouri one or more citizens of this

State, and that such a state of feeling exists in Fremont County and in Atchison County, Mo., that

there is imminent danger of collision between people.

In addition to the duties required by my former order, you will proceed as soon as possible to

Atchison County, and call upon the person who may be in command of the State or United States

troops there. You will exhibit to him my former letter of instructions to you and this letter. A

system of reprisals between the States must not be allowed to grow up. Our people must not

enter Missouri, as was done a few days since, arrest persons and bring them to this State for trial,

and people from Missouri must not demand prisoners in the hands of the civil authorities of this

State or arrest persons in this State and carry them to Missouri for trial. Such state of things can

produce but one result, and that is a border war.

If the person arrested by the men from Iowa, and who has not been discharged, is not in the

hands of the civil authorities, I would at once order his discharge. If the man or men arrested by

the returning Missouri troops are not in the hands of the civil authorities of Missouri, you are

instructed to ask his or their discharge.

Men in Iowa who have violated the laws of Missouri in that State can be reached in this State

by requisition from the Governor of Missouri. All men may rest assured the authorities of Iowa

will not make their State an asylum for rebels and traitors, and that all such will be promptly

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surrendered when legally applied for. The action of Iowa has thus far, I think, given the loyal

men of Missouri no ground to doubt the good faith of her authorities.

You will present these views plainly, but kindly, to the officer in command in Atchison

County and to other loyal citizens there, and communicate as freely with them as you can in

conversation. Inform all that jayhawking expeditions into our State cannot be permitted under the

claim of taking the property of rebels. The evil result of such course must be apparent. All

information showing that such persons are in our State and in regard to their property will be

placed at once in the hands of the United States officers for legal action, and they can thus be

legally dealt with. Nothing herein contained is intended to countermand anything contained in

my former letter. You may show both letters in Sidney, so that all may know what I intend. As

soon as I receive your report I will write to Governor Gamble. Your early attention to these

matters and your speedy report is expected.

Very respectfully,

SAMUEL J. KIRKWOOD.

COUNCIL BLUFFS, January 24, 1862.

Hon. SAMUEL J. KIRKWOOD,

Governor of Iowa, Des Moines:

SIR: In obedience to your letter of instructions, dated January 14, 1862, I went to Atchison

County, Mo., last Monday, and have spent several days there, and will now give you such

additional particulars as I gained while there. I found the prisoner who had been arrested by the

Missouri troops in Iowa released on parole. He is a Hungarian of more than ordinary

intelligence. I saw him, and learned he had been in Price's army, having been induced to go there

by wealthy rebels, who agreed to support his family whilst he was away. He says he soon saw

he was on the wrong side. When General Frémont's proclamation of amnesty was issued he left

for home, but fearing violence from the loyal Germans in Rockport, went to Iowa. He says he

was glad to be arrested, as he can now be with his family and be protected by troops. I told him if

he desired I could have him released and he could return to Iowa with me, which he declined. I

afterwards learned from the officer in command he had orders for his release from Saint Joseph

upon taking the oath. He is now at liberty.

I also saw the officer in command of the State troops, and had a very free and plain

conversation with him and other loyal men in regard to the invasion of Iowa. I do not think these

troops have done much to stop jayhawking, but have not taken sides with them. These troops

have now gone below to be mustered out, as they are six-months' men. Whether they will be

replaced by Federal troops I did not learn.

On my way to Missouri I found at Sidney an intense excitement. There was said to be a

reliable report that the jayhawkers had met on Sunday near Sidney Landing, and had agreed upon

Monday or Tuesday night as the time to "clean out" McKinsock's Grove. I was met by a petition,

signed by nearly every one along the line, calling for immediate help. A messenger had been sent

for me, and the prominent Union men were in council at Judge Sears' to decide what should be

done. I told them I was there on my way to Missouri, and if I saw or heard anything to justify

me, I would return at once. I was in doubt in regard to these reports, and would call out the

militia only as a last resort to repel invasion or preserve the public peace.

On my way to Rockport I became satisfied that the danger was not so imminent as had been

represented, and I learned from those that I thought knew that there was no armed force in

Atchison County at least. As soon as I had completed my business at Rockport I procured

conveyance and took with me a good loyal farmer and proceeded to visit several of the men who

had been arrested and taken to Iowa. I saw four of these men who were arrested by English and

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his party, one of them, William Lewis, a man who is called by the secessionists of Fremont

County a jayhawker. I am satisfied, from all I can learn, he has been and perhaps still is

cognizant of all the movements of the jayhawkers, but I am equally well satisfied he never goes

with them and was not at Fugitt's, but I think he knew they were going to Fugitt's. He is the

leader and controlling spirit among the loyal men in Northern Missouri. He is a man of wealth, a

little hard and rough, perhaps, but is loyal. He says boldly a jayhawker is a better man than a

secessionist. He is very bitter against English and the leaders in kidnapping.

I had a long interview with this man. He says he has been outraged by men from Iowa and

says he shall have his revenge. I told him plainly what were your views and that no invasion of

Iowa would be permitted for any purpose, but that any one who had violated the laws of

Missouri could be reached in Iowa in a legal manner. He seemed pleased, and said if the

authorities of Iowa would act in that spirit it was all he and his friends desired. He seemed to be

well aware of the result of the invading of either State, but such men he said must be reached,

and the jayhawkers were the only ones who had reached them as yet. I told him you had not been

aware, until the attack at Fugitt's, that rebels had left Missouri and gone to Iowa, and that you

were now taking steps to stop it. This seemed to put a new face on matters, and he said plainly

that they would try legal means first, and pledged himself to me that he would use his influence

to prevent Kansas jayhawkers or any others from invading Iowa. He further intimated that many

of these jayhawkers have gone south to join General Lane. He says four or five of these

kidnapers must be punished, and if civil law will do it, it will suit him, but if not, he knows what

will. He told me that he would at once take the legal steps to reach these men, and that no further

invasion of Iowa should take place in the mean time if he could prevent it. I was satisfied while

there that he was in earnest, and could and would do as he agreed, and on my return to Sidney

Judge Sears says he can and will make his word good in every respect, and I am satisfied there

will be no more jayhawking in Iowa for the present.

C. McKinsock, who shot the man at Hamburg, went through Missouri to Bloody Island, in

the Missouri River. This island is claimed by Iowa, Nebraska, and Missouri, and by the United

States. He was seen to go there; was followed, taken, and brought to Sidney Landing, in

Missouri, where he was arrested by a civil officer for kidnapping and taken to Rockport, and

bound over in $2,000 to appear for trial, and released. I found all the loyal men in Missouri

particularly bitter against English, and say he shall smart for the treatment he gave these men he

arrested. He cannot go 4 miles in Missouri by daylight a live man, I don't believe.

On my return to Sidney I found Colonel Hedges and Captain Harvey very anxious that I

should call out the militia for thirty days at least for drill. Captain Harvey very plainly told me he

had no fear of immediate invasion, but that they might be needed in future, and were very much

in need of drill. He says the military companies there have labored under many adverse

circumstances; men had been hooted at for joining companies and injured in their business, and

something was needed to infuse proper spirit in the men. I told him that it would be very

expensive; I suggested it would be poor patriotism that needed $13 a month to keep it up, but

that I would state the case to you fairly, and leave the responsibility with you.

In conclusion, I think immediate danger of trouble in Fremont County has passed, but I still

think there should be some Federal troops sent here, more to arrest secessionists and secession

property that has made Iowa an asylum than to protect us from invasion, but the officers placed

in command should be No. 1 in every respect. An inefficient or improvident officer would do

much harm, but one of the right kind, by making a few arrests of men and property, would in my

opinion not only end the present difficulty, but prevent forever its recurrence.

Judge Baldwin has shown me your dispatches, and we have consulted fully in regard to the

best course to pursue. He has promised to write you to-day. I will present our views briefly for

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your commendation, and then, if you think best, I will go to Saint Joe and do the best I can. The

troops at Saint Joe are to my knowledge much demoralized, and none that I know to be there are

fit for this service. I refer only to the Sixteenth Illinois, Colonel Smith, who is in command there,

and were I to go there he would send some of his own regiment and I could not object. I think the

best plan is for you to write General Halleck at Saint Louis, get cavalry— one company will

do— and stipulate for a superior man to take charge of them; give this officer full power to arrest

men and property, to be immediately sent to headquarters at Saint Joe or Leavenworth for trial.

This takes the matter from the border, and will prove a wholesome lesson for those who are not

arrested. If you still think best I will go to Saint Joe, Leavenworth, or Saint Louis, as you may

direct, and see what can be done.

Awaiting further orders, I remain, sir, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. C. NUTT.

SAINT LOUIS, January 12, 1862.

Brig. Gen. SAMUEL. CURTIS, Rolla:

GENERAL: In preparing your command for the field you will observe as far as possible the

inclosed memorandum with respect to transportation. All additional wagons attached to

companies and regiments should be turned into the general train. You must be very rigid in this

matter, as every organization will claim double the authorized amount of transportation. The

Ninth Iowa will be sent into the field with you as soon as possible. It cannot be spared just now,

as many of the bridges would be left unguarded.

Lieutenant-Colonel Herron reports that many of the Reserve Corps left their stations and

refused to guard the bridges. It will not do to leave this road unprotected. Every available man

here is under orders for Cairo and Paducah. Orders from Washington required three divisions

(24,000 men) to be sent down instantly, which would have stripped both you and Pope. I begged

and protested for time, in order that you might drive Price from the State. Orders and protests

have been repeated, and the matter is still undecided. I have detailed one regiment from Carlin,

four from Benton Barracks, and two from Prentiss' command. A part of Pope's will be withdrawn

as soon as the new insurrection north of the Missouri is suppressed. If the Government insists

upon sending more troops immediately, I fear your expedition must be given up for the present. I

really hope not. I expect to know by to-morrow or next day. Nearly all the organized forces in

Indiana and Illinois have been ordered to other commands. I have no troops just now to relieve

the Second Iowa. Will do so as soon as possible. I fully approve your plan as to a depot and the

immediate movement of infantry, but I must wait further orders from Washington. If they do not

come by Tuesday I shall telegraph you to move. I will send a reserve of several regiments as

soon as possible. The Forty-third Illinois have been ordered here for arms, which are just

received. They will be restored to Sigel's division as soon as properly armed. The Reserve Corps

should not be taken into the field; a part can be used for depot at Rolla, and a part sent to Pacific

to replace Herron if he can trust them for that purpose. I have directed that he replace his

regiment with them as far as possible.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,

Major-General.

SAINT LOUIS, January 13, 1862.

Brig. Gen. SAMUEL R. CURTIS, Commanding, Rolla:

10

GENERAL: Your telegram of this evening has determined me to order an advance without

waiting any longer for advices from Washington. I am quite sick with camp measles, but do not

mean to let the public service suffer on that account if I can help it.

Your suggestions about officers in arrest are approved. You are authorized to suspend their

arrest and order them into the field. The court-martial will close its proceedings and adjourn sine

die. Fletcher's battery will leave here for Rolla Wednesday morning. You now have twenty-four

pieces. This will give you thirty. When the Ninth Iowa joins you you will have six more. Dodge's

battery will also be sent to Rolla as soon as General Schofield can spare the section now with

him. The Forty-third Illinois will be sent to you as soon as they are better armed; also the Second

Iowa the moment I can relieve them. Perhaps I may be able to spare two other regiments in

course of the week. At any rate, your forces will be superior to any reliable estimate I have

received of Price's army. As your advance will necessarily be slow, the additional force will

reach you this side of Springfield and will serve as a reserve.

With regard to routes three have been proposed--that by Lebanon, that by Hartville, and a

middle road. Colonel Phelps thinks the middle road the best; others say not. You will act from

the best information you have there, which is better than I can get here.

Accounts are so contradictory that I am unable to advise you. Lebanon is certainly the best

military line if the road is equally good.

Distribute transportation as directed in my letter of yesterday, except, if you deem advisable,

give a limited number of provision wagons to each brigade or division. This is generally

preferable to making the provision train entirely separate from the troops. Ten days' provisions

will in that case go with each command.

Care should be taken about having provisions cooked in the morning for the day's march, and

also, when in the vicinity of the enemy, to have at least two days' cooked provisions in the

haversacks. If officers neglect this, the men suffer. Make marches at first short, so that the men

may be kept in order and not over fatigued.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,

Major-General.

SAINT LOUIS, January 12, 1862.

Brig. Gen. SAMUEL. CURTIS, Rolla:

GENERAL: In preparing your command for the field you will observe as far as possible the

inclosed memorandum with respect to transportation. All additional wagons attached to

companies and regiments should be turned into the general train. You must be very rigid in this

matter, as every organization will claim double the authorized amount of transportation. The

Ninth Iowa will be sent into the field with you as soon as possible. It cannot be spared just now,

as many of the bridges would be left unguarded.

Lieutenant-Colonel Herron reports that many of the Reserve Corps left their stations and

refused to guard the bridges. It will not do to leave this road unprotected. Every available man

here is under orders for Cairo and Paducah. Orders from Washington required three divisions

(24,000 men) to be sent down instantly, which would have stripped both you and Pope. I begged

and protested for time, in order that you might drive Price from the State. Orders and protests

have been repeated, and the matter is still undecided. I have detailed one regiment from Carlin,

four from Benton Barracks, and two from Prentiss' command. A part of Pope's will be withdrawn

as soon as the new insurrection north of the Missouri is suppressed. If the Government insists

upon sending more troops immediately, I fear your expedition must be given up for the present. I

really hope not. I expect to know by to-morrow or next day. Nearly all the organized forces in

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Indiana and Illinois have been ordered to other commands. I have no troops just now to relieve

the Second Iowa. Will do so as soon as possible. I fully approve your plan as to a depot and the

immediate movement of infantry, but I must wait further orders from Washington. If they do not

come by Tuesday I shall telegraph you to move. I will send a reserve of several regiments as

soon as possible. The Forty-third Illinois have been ordered here for arms, which are just

received. They will be restored to Sigel's division as soon as properly armed. The Reserve Corps

should not be taken into the field; a part can be used for depot at Rolla, and a part sent to Pacific

to replace Herron if he can trust them for that purpose. I have directed that he replace his

regiment with them as far as possible.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,

Major-General.

SAINT LOUIS, January 18, 1862.

Brig. Gen. SAMUEL R. CURTIS, Commanding, Rolla:

GENERAL: Yours of the 16th is just received. I shall immediately order the Ninth Iowa to

report to you. I find it impossible to get the Curtis Horse ready in time, and the larger

detachments sent from here to Cairo will prevent my giving you any more regiments from this

place; but I am determined to give you force enough to render it certain that you will drive Price

from the State. I have therefore ordered an entire division to march from Otterville to join your

command. They will either go by Linn Creek or Warsaw; if the former, they will direct their

march on Lebanon; if the latter, on Buffalo. I will know by Monday which route is deemed best.

General Pope will consult with officers who have been over both, and report their opinions.

Major Allen will send you 50 teams, and 50 extra will be sent from Otterville with that division.

The Pacific Railroad cannot bring them without interfering with supplies.

Major Allen expects 10,000 mittens in a few days. You will be the first to be supplied.

Cut down regimental transportation as much as possible. Get as many hand-mills as you can

for grinding corn. My great fear is that the Pacific Railroad will break down, and there may be a

delay of a few days before the company can be reorganized. They are greatly distressed for

money to pay their operatives and fear a strike. Captain Sheridan will receive $10,000 from

Major Allen. It is all the money we can rake and scrape together. We hope to get some from

Washington soon. If necessary, fix a fair schedule of prices for forage, &c., and take it: giving

Union men quartermasters' orders for payment. Take the bull by the horns. I will back you in

such forced requisitions where they become necessary for supplying the forces.

We must have no failure in this movement against Price. It must be the last.

Yours, truly,

H. W. HALLECK,

Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

Saint Louis, January 20, 1862.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,

General-in-Chief of the Army, Washington:

GENERAL: The cavalry sent to vicinity of Springfield found the enemy in force and were

obliged to fall back to Waynesville. The whole force at Rolla was ordered in advance to reenforce

them and attack Price. Additional troops were ordered from here to Rolla, increasing

General Curtis' army to about 12,000. I have just received a dispatch informing me that a council

of Generals Curtis, Sigel, and Asboth had decided that they required six regiments in addition to

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those ordered. I can send no more at present from Saint Louis, and consequently have ordered

General Pope to dispatch one division from near Sedalia to join General Curtis at Lebanon. This

will make his effective force over 15,000.

This winter campaign will be a hard one on account of the weather and roads, but they will

either beat Price or drive him from the State. Of the two divisions left at La Mine I purpose

sending one across the Missouri at Booneville to march through the secession counties of

Howard, Boone, Callaway, and Montgomery to Saint Charles and this city for transportation to

Cairo. They cannot be brought here by railroad, and the road north of the river is much the best.

Moreover, their presence in the counties named is important to break up secession bands and to

assist the Union men in organizing as State Militia. The condition of ice in the river is such that I

have been able to send only three of the five regiments ordered from here to Cairo. I hope to

dispatch some more this week. I hear nothing of the two regiments ordered from North Missouri

to Cairo more than a week ago. It is very probable that they cannot cross the river at Hannibal.

General Schofield hopes to be able to spare me two regiments from his command on the North

Missouri Railroad in a week or two. These will also be sent to Cairo.

I have received no information in respect to the general plan of campaign, and I therefore feel

much hesitation in recommending any line of operations for these and other troops which I may

be able to withdraw from Missouri. Of course this line must be subordinate to some general plan.

I take it for granted, general, that what has heretofore been done has been the result of political

policy rather than military strategy, and that the want of success on our part is attributable to the

politicians rather than to the generals.

So far it seems to me the war has been conducted upon what may be called popper-box

strategy— scattering our troops so as to render them inferior in numbers in any place where they

can meet the enemy. Occupying the circumference of a great circle, with the enemy within that

circumference and near the center, we cannot expect to strike any great blow, for he can

concentrate his forces on any one point sooner than we can ours. The division of our force upon

so many lines and points seems to me a fatal policy. I am aware that you, general, are in no way

responsible for this, these movements having been governed by political expediency and in many

cases directed by politicians in order to subserve particular interests; but is it not possible with

the new Secretary of War to introduce a different policy and to make our future movements in

accordance with military principles? On this supposition I venture to make a few suggestions in

regard to operations in the West.

The idea of moving down the Mississippi by steam is, in my opinion, impracticable, or at

least premature. It is not a proper line of operations, at least now. A much more feasible plan is

to move up the Cumberland and Tennessee, making Nashville the first objective point. This

would turn Columbus and force the abandonment of Bowling Green. Columbus cannot be taken

without an immense siege train and a terrible loss of life. I have thoroughly studied its defenses;

they are very strong. But it can be turned, paralyzed, and forced to surrender. This line of the

Cumberland or Tennessee is the great central line of the Western theater of war, with the Ohio

below the mouth of Green River as the base and two good navigable rivers extending far into the

interior of the theater of operations. But the plan should not be attempted without a large force,

not less than 60,000 effective men.

In connection with this movement I would move a small column of, say, 10,000 men from

Ironton on Pocahontas and Jacksonport in Arkansas, to cut the armies of Price and Mcintosh

from their depots of supplies at these places. Price would be thus compelled to fall back on Fort

Smith or to advance to the relief of these towns. In either case Southwestern Missouri would be

relieved of his presence. The forces I have sent against him will drive him out of this State, but

they cannot pursue him into Arkansas on the line of his retreat; that would be folly on our part. I

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would also take and hold New Madrid, so as to cut off river communication from the South with

Columbus. The occupation of New Madrid would entirely relieve Cairo, and almost the whole

garrison could be withdrawn from that place. This plan would require the occupation of Green

River with only a small force. Johnston and Buckner would not venture to cross that river with a

large army in their rear on the Cumberland. If they did, their fate would be sealed.

I am ignorant of General Buell's forces or plans. If he is strong enough to fight the enemy at

Bowling Green or to turn that place and force him to fall back in the direction of Nashville the

same object may be accomplished; but to operate both on Green River and on the Cumberland

with the enemy at Bowling Green is to move on converging exterior lines with the enemy inside

of the angle— always a most hazardous operation, unless each of the exterior forces is superior

to the enemy. Under any circumstances it is bad strategy, because it requires a double force to

accomplish a single object.

To carry out the plan proposed would make it necessary to suspend all minor operations. I

understand troops are being concentrated at Fort Leavenworth to move on Western Arkansas and

Texas. Such a project, if it be contemplated, is contrary to every military rule. Troops must be

sent to a base hundreds of miles from any enemy at an immense cost of transportation. The line

of operation is exterior and beyond relief, and the expense of supplies must be enormous. It can

lead to no possible military result, unless made so large as to cripple or paralyze any movement

on a truly strategic line. It certainly is not a military operation. It may, however, be intended to

gratify some political partisan. If it be intended to check Price's army, that can be much better

accomplished by a line parallel to or near to the main one, viz, on Pocahontas and Jacksonport,

the depots of his supplies.

The main central line will also require the withdrawal of all available troops from this State;

also those in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Ohio, which are armed and still to be armed,

and also the transfer to that route or near it of all the Kentucky troops not required to secure the

line of Green River.

The force at Cairo and on the Ohio River below the mouth of Green River is now about

15,000. Seven regiments have just been ordered there from Missouri. By the middle or last of

February I hope to send about 15,000 more. If 30,000 or 40,000 can be added from the sources

indicated there will be sufficient for holding Cairo, Fort Holt, and Paducah, and to form the

column proposed. The troops at Ironton could threaten Pocahontas until a sufficient force could

be detached from Curtis' army at Springfield to take and hold New Madrid and Jacksonport. So

long as the enemy controls the Mississippi below Columbus it might not be safe to attempt the

occupation of New Madrid before moving up the Cumberland or Tennessee, as otherwise large

force might at any time be thrown across the river from Columbus, to retake that place if once

captured by us.

These suggestions are hastily written out, but they are the result of much anxious inquiry and

mature deliberation. I am confident that the plan, if properly carried out, would produce

important results. I also believe it to be feasible.

I have not designated any particular line or lines of movement. That must be a matter of

further study if the general idea should be approved. Perhaps the main column should move from

Smithland, between the rivers, by Dover, &c. Perhaps the line east of the Cumberland or that

west of the Tennessee would be preferable. These questions, however, are matters easily

determinable.

I have been sick for more than a week with the measles, and several members of my staff are

unable to attend to any duty. Under these circumstances some delay must occur in answering the

communications from the Adjutant-General of the Army.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

14

H. W. HALLECK,

Major-general.

SAINT LOUIS, January 21, 1862.

Brig. Gen. SAMUEL R. CURTIS, Commanding, &c., Rolla:

GENERAL: Yours of the 19th is received. I have already informed you that the Ninth Iowa

and a division from General Pope's command have been ordered to report to you. This will make

your force over 15,000 men. Should the Benton Hussars and the Forty-third Illinois be prepared

in time for the field they may be sent to your command. If not, they must go elsewhere. The

Second Iowa cannot be relieved before the last of next week, and it is still uncertain when the

Curtis Horse will be ready for the field. We have neither horses nor arms for them at present.

Brigades and divisions must be made up according to the circumstances of the particular case

and the exigencies of the service. If I were to attempt to gratify the wishes of particular

commands I should be obliged to transfer half the troops in this department at an enormous

expense, at a time when the Quartermaster's Department has not a single cent to pay necessary

expenses. It cannot be done and will not be attempted. I doubt very much whether I can send you

any more artillery than that taken by the division from Sedalia. If possible I will send you Mann's

or Spoor's, as I best can. I find it utterly impossible to unite fragments of regiments so as to

satisfy either men or officers and Governors of States.

I must call your attention to certain irregularities. Your dissolution of the general courtmartial

was contrary to law. When the officers composing the court are ordered into the field the

court ceases to act as such, but it cannot be dissolved or the prisoners released except by the

authority ordering it.

Again, your Special Orders, No. 41, ordering men from General Sherman's command, is

entirely irregular. You cannot give any orders to troops at Benton Barracks. You should have

made a requisition on me for the corporal and men wanted. These may appear small matters, but

they create difficulties mad annoyances which it takes much of my time to arrange. It is just as

easy to follow the law and regulations as it is to violate them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant.

H. W. HALLECK,

Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT CENTRAL MISSOURI,

Otterville, January 23, 1862.

Col. FRED. STEELE, Commanding at Sedalia:

The general commanding directs that you send as large a cavalry force as you can spare, not

less than live companies of your force at Sedalia, who, when joined by four companies from this

place, under Major Torrence, First Iowa Cavalry, will proceed to the neighborhood of Lexington,

thence to Waverly, thence across to Arrow Rock, and from thence to return directly to Sedalia,

so as to make a thorough scout of the whole region, but not to be absent over eight days, and to

report regularly by messengers to Sedalia. Reports reach the general commanding from

department headquarters, from Glasgow, and from Brunswick that the enemy is crossing in

considerable numbers at Brunswick and Waverly. Perhaps it will be best to send a section of

artillery; the whole to be under command of some responsible officer, without reference to the

corps to which he belongs. The four companies of Iowa cavalry will report to you at Sedalia tomorrow

night.

You will keep General Pope advised constantly of the movements and operations of this

force.

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By order of General Pope:

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, IOWA,

January 23, 1862.

Hon. W. H. SEWARD,

Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.:

SIR: Inclosed find copies of certain papers, showing an unfortunate condition of affairs in

Fremont County, the southwestern comity in this State. I am fully satisfied of the correctness of

the facts stated in the report of Colonel Nutt, and that the, if not the only, way to put down the

feeling there that now endangers the public peace is, as he suggests, to arrest the rebels who have

fled from Missouri into our State and some of these sympathizers on our side of the line and to

also seize the property of those men brought into our State from Missouri. The secession feeling

is strong in Fremont County, and, as the State authorities have no power to act in this class of

cases, I request that you will give such full power and instructions to United States officers in

this State and Missouri as will result in prompt and decided action. The United States district

attorney for this State, Mr. Gurley, is, and for some time has been, in Washington, by reason of

which the marshal, Mr. Hoxie, is deprived of his counsel.

If the marshal shall be directed to take any action in this matter, it will be necessary either

that he be directed to act without consultation with the district attorney or that the district

attorney return to the State.

Permit me again to impress upon you that, in my judgment, the safety of the people in the

county of Fremont, from a troublesome border warfare, requires the prompt arrest of the rebels

who have fled from Missouri and some of their sympathizers in this State and to seize the

property of rebels in this State.

Very truly,

SAMUEL J. KIRKWOOD.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 5.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,

Cairo, February 1, 1862.

For the temporary government the forces of this military district will be divided and

commanded as follows, to wit:

The First Brigade will consist of the Eighth, Eighteenth, Twenty-seventh, Twenty-ninth,

Thirtieth, and Thirty-first Regiments of Illinois Volunteers, Schwartz's, and Dresser's batteries,

and Stewart's, Dollins', O'Harnett's, and Carmichael's cavalry, Col. R. J. Oglesby, senior colonel

of the brigade, commanding.

The Second Brigade will consist of the Eleventh, Twentieth, Forty-fifth, and Forty-eighth

Illinois Infantry, Fourth Illinois Cavalry, Taylor's and McAllister's artillery (the latter with four

siege guns), Col. W. H. L. Wallace commanding.

The First and Second Brigades will constitute the First Division of the District of Cairo, and

will be commanded by Brig. Gen. John A. McClernand.

The Third Brigade will consist of the Eighth Wisconsin, Forty-ninth Illinois, Twenty-fifth

Indiana, four companies of artillery, and such troops as are yet to arrive, Brig. Gen. E. A. Paine

commanding.

The Fourth Brigade will be composed of the Tenth, Sixteenth, Twenty-second, and Thirtysecond

Illinois, and Tenth Iowa Infantry, Houghtaling's battery of light artillery, four companies

of the Seventh and two companies of the First Illinois Cavalry, Colonel Morgan commanding.

16

Gen. E. A. Paine is assigned to the command of Cairo and Mound City and Colonel Morgan

to the command of Bird's Point.

U.S. GRANT,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

SAINT LOUIS, February 5, 1862.

To the COMMANDING OFFICER AT PADUCAH, KY.,

For General Grant:

Ten thousand men have left Bowling Green to re-enforce Fort Henry. Order forward all your

available troops as rapidly as possible. I send down the Fourteenth Iowa to-day, the Forty-third

Illinois to-morrow, and the Second Iowa in a few days.

H.W. HALLECK,

Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

Saint Louis, February 8, 1862.

Major-General MCCLELLAN,

Washington, D.C.:

GENERAL: I have considered with due deliberation that part of your telegram of yesterday

in relation to General Buell's coming to the Cumberland River and taking command of the

expedition against Nashville. General Sherman ranks General Buell, and he is entitled to a

command in that direction. I propose, with due deference to your better judgment, the following

plan, as calculated to produce unity of action and to avoid any difficulties about rank and

command: Create a geographical division, to be called Western Division, or any other suitable

name, and to be composed of three departments, viz: Department of the Missouri, including the

present Department of Kansas and the States of Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, and Arkansas;

Department of the Mississippi, including the remainder of the present Department of the

Missouri and West Tennessee; Department of the Ohio, to be the same as at present, with the

addition of East Tennessee. If we penetrate into Alabama or Mississippi, they can be assigned

according to circumstances. General Buell would then retain his present command, with a small

addition; General Hunter could take the new Department of the Missouri, which, I have no

doubt, would be more agreeable to him than his present position; and General Hitchcock, if you

can get him appointed, could take the new Department of the Mississippi. I have no desire for

any larger command than I have now, but it seems to me that this would produce greater concert

of action, give more satisfaction to General Hunter, and economize your labor, as all your orders

for the West would then go through a single channel. Moreover, where troops of different

departments act together, as they must on the Cumberland and Tennessee and on the frontiers of

Kansas, Missouri, and Arkansas, they would be under one general head. This would avoid any

clashing of interests or difference of plans and policy.

I make these suggestions for your consideration.

If General Hitchcock cannot be appointed, General Sherman could take the Department of

the Mississippi. His health is greatly improved.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,

Major-General.

SAINT Louis, February 9, 1862.

Brig. Gen. G. W. CULLUM, Cairo:

17

All additional stores should be sent to Paducah. The First Nebraska leave to-night: the

Second Iowa will follow to-morrow night. General McClellan gives hopes of adopting my plan

entire, by sending a part of Buell's army to the Cumberland. If so, look out for lively times. The

gunboats should be prepared for the Cumberland with all possible dispatch. Hitchcock is

appointed.

H. W. HALLECK,

Major-General.

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS No. 8.

HDQRS. DISTRICT OF CAIRO,

Fort Henry, February 10, 1862.

The Seventeenth, Forty-third, and Forty-ninth Regiments Illinois Volunteers, commanded by

the senior colonel, will form the Third Brigade, First Division, of the Army in the field.

The Fourteenth Iowa, Twenty-fifth and Fifty-second Indiana Volunteers, Birge's

Sharpshooters, and one battalion Curtis' Horse will form the Fourth Brigade, Second Division.

By order of Brigadier-General Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS No. 9.

HDQRS. DISTRICT OF CAIRO,

Fort Henry, February 11, 1862.

The following changes and additions are made to present brigade organizations:

The Thirty-second Illinois Volunteers will be added to the Third Brigade, First Division; the

Fifty-second Indiana will be transferred to Third Brigade, Second Division; and Seventh Iowa

from the Third Brigade, Second Division, to the Fourth Brigade, Second Division.

The Second Iowa Regiment will be attached to this brigade immediately upon arrival.

By order of Brig. Gen. U.S. Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

Saint Louis, February 19, 1862.

N. B. BAKER, Des Moines, Iowa:

The Second Iowa Infantry proved themselves the bravest of the brave. They had the honor of

heading the column which entered Fort Donelson.

H. W. HALLECK,

Major-General.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 6.

HDQRS. DISTRICT WEST TENNESSEE,

Fort Donelson, February 21, 1862.

Troops in this military district will be brigaded and assigned to (divisions in the following

order, to wit:

First Division, Brig. Gen. J. A. McClernand, commanding:

First Brigade: Eighth, Twenty-ninth, Thirtieth, and Thirty-first Illinois Infantry, Dresser's

battery, Dollins', O'Harnett's, and Carmichael's cavalry.

18

Second Brigade: Eleventh, Eighteenth, Twentieth, and Forty-fifth Illinois Infantry, First

Battalion of Fourth Illinois Cavalry, and Taylor's battery.

Third Brigade: Seventeenth, Forty-third, Forty-ninth, and Fifty-second Illinois Infantry, and

McAllister's and Schwartz's batteries. Second Division, Brig. Gen. C. F. Smith commanding:

First Brigade: Second, Seventh, Twelfth, and Fourteenth Iowa Infantry, and Second Battalion

of Fourth Illinois Cavalry.

Second Brigade: Ninth and Twelfth Illinois and Thirteenth and Sixteenth Missouri Infantry,

Willard's battery, and detachment Regular Cavalry.

Third Brigade: Seventh, Fiftieth, Fifty-seventh, and Fifty-eighth Illinois Infantry, and two

companies Second Illinois Cavalry. -

The battalion of artillery commanded by Major Cavender will be Third Division, Brig. Gen.

L. Wallace, commanding:

First Brigade: Eighth Missouri, Eleventh, Twenty-fourth, and Fifty-second Indiana Infantry,

and Bulliss' battery.

Second Brigade: First Nebraska and Fifty-eighth, Sixty-eighth, and Seventy-eighth Ohio

Infantry, and four companies of Curtis' Horse.

Third Brigade: Twentieth, Fifty-sixth, and Seventy-sixth Ohio and Twenty-third Indiana

Infantry, and the remainder of Curtis' Horse. Fourth Division, Brig. Gen. S. A. Hurlbut,

commanding:

First Brigade: Fifteenth, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-second, and Forty-first Illinois Infantry, and

Burrows' battery of light artillery.

Second Brigade: Twenty-fifth Indiana, Fourteenth, Forty-sixth, and Forty-eighth Illinois

Infantry, and Mann's battery of light artillery.

Third Brigade: Thirty-first and Forty-fourth Indiana and Seventeenth and Twenty-fifth

Kentucky Infantry, and Third Battalion Fourth Illinois Cavalry.

The senior colonels of brigades will command them in every instance.

Brigade commanders will select from the regimental quartermasters of their commands one

to act as brigade commissary.

By order of Brig. Gen. U.S. Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH IOWA INFANTRY,

Fort Donelson, February 18, 1862.

SIR: In obedience to Special Orders, No. 2, headquarters Second Division, army in the field,

Brigadier-General Smith commanding, I have the honor to make the following report of the

operations of the Twelfth Iowa Volunteer Infantry in the recent attack on Fort Donelson, Tenn.:

On Wednesday, the 12th instant, the regiment, being a part of Col. J. Cook's (Third) brigade,

Second Division, marched from Fort Henry to the neighborhood of Fort Donelson, formed line

of battle to the left of the Dover road, and slept on their arms ready for action.

Thursday morning, at 8.30 o'clock, we marched down to and up the Dover road about half a

mile, when we filed to the left and formed line of battle; threw forward the flanking companies

as skirmishers, and marched forward down a long slope that lay in front, the grape shot and shell

of the enemy flying thick around us all the time. Our skirmishers advanced to the top of the hill

that lay in front of us. The battalion halted at two-thirds of the distance to the top of the hill,

where it was protected from the enemy's fire by the ridge in front. It was but a few minutes after

our skirmishers reached the top of the ridge in front when Private Edward C. Buckner, of

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Company A, was shot dead, a bail taking Bffect in the eye. No further damage occurred to the

regiment that day, though the enemy kept up a constant fire.

The following night was very stormy, and as we were ordered not to make fires, the men

suffered from the wet and cold.

Early on Friday morning skirmishing began between our men and the enemy, which was kept

up all day. During the day two of our men were struck with spent balls, but these did not disable

them.

At night-fall eight companies retired and built fires, but passed an unpleasant night.

Companies D and F remained as a guard over the ground we had occupied during the day.

Saturday until noon a random fire was kept up with the enemy. During this and the preceding

days we were nobly supported by the coolness, bravery, and efficiency of a portion of Birge's

sharpshooters, who co-operated with us. Our right flank was protected by the Fiftieth Illinois,

Colonel Bane commanding. Our front and left flanks were unsupported, except by our own

skirmishers and the sharpshooters.

At about 2 p.m. Saturday, 15th, the Twelfth Iowa, Fiftieth Illinois, and sharpshooters were

ordered to make a feint attack to draw the enemy's fire. The men went cheerfully to the work

assigned them, and kept up a warm fire on the enemy, while Colonel Lauman's brigade, on our

left, advanced on the enemy and got possession of a part of the enemy's outworks and hoisted the

American flag thereon. We were then ordered to their support. We moved rapidly by the left

flank and charged over the down timber which the enemy had cut for his protection. At this time

a galling fire of grape from the enemy poured in among us, wounding 8 or 10 of our men.

On reaching the breastworks some confusion was caused by the retreat of a portion of

Colonel Lauman's brigade, who, having expended all their ammunition, were compelled to fall

back. By some exertion our men were rallied, and we opened a warm fire on the enemy, who

also poured a warm fire of grape upon us from their battery on our right and of musketry on our

front. In this cross-fire we fought the enemy two hours, advancing on them into a ravine inside

their breastworks. At length we were withdrawal outside of the works. During this time we lost 1

man killed and 27 wounded.

During all this time Lieutenant-Colonel Coulter behaved with the utmost coolness and

bravery, performing his duties regardless of the danger to which he was exposed. Major

Brodtbeck and Sergeant-Major Morrisy aided much in rallying the men.

When we began to march to support Colonel Lauman, Companies A and G were out

skirmishing. I dispatched Adjutant Duncan to bring them up, which was speedily done, and he

performed all other duties required of him promptly and effectively.

Surgeon Parker was on duty at the hospital. Assistant Surgeon Finley performed faithful

service in attending the wounded.

Lieut. J. B. Dorr, quartermaster, was performing his duty in forwarding supplies. His energy

and efficiency cannot be too highly praised.

The color-bearer, Sergeant Grannis, showed much coolness amid the sharp fire of the enemy,

and, without particularizing, every commissioned officer of the regiment performed his duties

without flinching. The same may be said of the non-commissioned officers and privates, with but

few exceptions.

Respectfully,

J. J. WOODS,

Colonel Twelfth Iowa Volunteers.

Capt. THOMAS J. NEWSHAM,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

20

HDQRS. TWENTY-FIFTH REGIMENT INDIANA VOLUNTEERS,

Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 18, 1862.

In compliance with your order I herewith respectfully submit a report of the part taken by the

Twenty-fifth Regiment Indiana Volunteers in the actions which took place between our forces

and the rebels' on the left wing of our army on the 13th and 15th days of February, 1862, at Fort

Donelson.

The Twenty-fifth Indiana Regiment marched with the brigade from Fort Henry on the 12th of

February, and bivouacked at night on the extreme left of our lines, within less than half a mile of

the enemy. Everything remained quiet during the night. At 10 o'clock a.m. on the 13th we moved

forward in line of battle to the top of the hill which was between us and the enemy's breastworks.

Here I received your order to fix bayonets and charge the rebels, and, if possible, drive them

from their works. The timber was so thick that we could only see here and there a part of the

rebel works, but could form no idea of their range or extent. I sent forward, as directed, the flank

companies--A and B, Captains Saltzman and Rheinlander--to deploy as skirmishers, which they

did most admirably, and the regiment moved forward on the charge. Our flank companies as they

advanced found the enemy's works extended far to our left., and they very properly moved to the

left and took position on a hill, where they did valuable service by preventing a fire on our flank

from the enemy's rifle pits, and in keeping silent a 6-pounder field piece that was brought to bear

on us from that direction. At the foot of the hill the enemy poured on us a terrible fire of

musketry, grape, and canister, with a few shells.

The rebel breastworks were now in plain view on the top of the hill. The heavy timber on the

hill-side had been felled, forming a dense mass of brush and logs. Through and over these

obstacles our men advanced against the enemy's fire with perfect coolness and steadiness, never

halting for a moment until they received your order. After a halt of a few minutes they again

advanced within a short distance of the enemy's breastworks, when their fire from a 6-pounder

field piece and 12-pounder howitzer on our right was so destructive, that it became necessary to

halt and direct the men to lie down to save us from very heavy loss. After remaining under a very

heavy fire for two hours and fifteen minutes, with no opportunity to return the fire to advantage,

the enemy being almost entirely hid, and seeing no movement indicating a further advance from

any part of the line, I asked your permission to withdraw my regiment, to save it from heavy

loss where we could do no good. In retiring, owing to the nature of the ground and our exposed

position, the men were thrown into slight confusion, but they rallied promptly at the foot of the

hill and remained in that position until night, when we moved back, as directed by you, to the

ground we occupied in the morning. We lost in this action 14 killed and 61 wounded.

On the 14th considerable firing was kept up between our skirmishers and the enemy's

sharpshooters, but nothing of importance occurred.

On the 15th, at 2 o'clock p.m., we formed a line of battle, and I sent forward Company B,

Captain Rheinlander, to deploy as skirmishers and advance in front of the regiment. This order

he executed promptly, and moved his company forward at double-quick. A few moments after,

the order came to me to move my regiment by the left flank and follow to support the Fiftysecond

Indiana and Second Iowa Regiments. This movement left Captain Rheinlander without

support, but he advanced boldly to the enemy's rifle pits to the right of the point where they were

being attacked by the Second Iowa and drove back the enemy, and was among the first, if not the

very first, of our forces that mounted the breastworks.

We moved by the left flank to the creek bottom on our left and beyond some old houses,

where the left halted and the right was brought forward, and we advanced in line of battle up the

hill on the run, and entered the enemy's works at the point where they had been taken by the

Second Iowa. We pushed forward across the field in the direction of the heaviest firing until we

21

reached the bottom of a deep hollow. Here we halted to form our line, which was somewhat

broken in advancing, and prepared to move forward, but seeing the forces in front of us slowly

retiring, we remained in line to cover them, and when they had all passed by us we marched back

in good order to the breastworks, which we held during the night. Our loss in this action was 40

wounded, many of them severely.

I cannot bestow too high praise on the conduct of the officers in both of these actions. To

Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan and Major Foster I am much indebted for the fearless and energetic

manner in which they discharged their duties. Their conduct is worthy of the highest

commendation. Adjutant Walker and Sergeant-Major Jones were brave, prompt, and faithful, and

were ever ready to carry orders in the thickest of the fight. Captain Laird, of Company K, was

severely wounded in the leg on the 13th while leading his company to the charge. He refused to

leave the field, and when at last he was compelled to leave he cheered his men when he retired.

Captains Saltzman and Rheinlander, commanding the flank companies, rendered very valuable

service, and were often placed in exposed positions. The other captains and lieutenants, almost

without exception, displayed great courage and energy, and are worthy of the highest praise. I

could not mention one without naming all. The regimental band and chaplain were actively

engaged in removing the wounded from the field and providing for their wants at the hospital

The conduct of the surgeon and assistant surgeon is esteemed worthy of especial mention. Asst.

Surg. Arthur White devoted himself to relieving the wants of the wounded and suffering at the

hospital, while the principal surgeon, l)r. John T. Walker, followed the regiment to the field, and

received the wounded as they fell in the fight. It was the first time that our men had ever been

exposed to the fire, and they stood it with the firmness of veterans. Many instances of personal

courage and good conduct of non-commissioned officers and men occurred, but so numerous

were they, that it would be difficult to point out particular cases. The conduct of the various

companies was uniformly good and worthy of the highest praise. The loss on the second day was

not so great as the first, although the fire was more severe, but we were not so much exposed to

the fire of grape, which was very destructive on the first day. Inclosed I send a list of the killed

and wounded.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES C. VEATCH,

Colonel Twenty-fifth Regiment Indiana Volunteers.

Col. J. G. LAUMAN,

Commanding Fourth Brigade, Second Division.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND IOWA INFANTRY,

Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 18, 1862.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report to you the part which my command took in the

capture of this place:

The Second Regiment Iowa Infantry was transported up the Cumberland River on the

steamer McGill, and landed about 3 miles below the fort on the 14th instant, and immediately

marched to the headquarters of General Smith, where I arrived about 11 a.m. of the same day,

and was by General Grant assigned to General Smith's division and by General Smith to your

brigade. When we arrived at the top of the hill, nearly opposite the right of the enemy's works, in

pursuance of an order from you I deployed Companies A and B as skirmishers. They

immediately crossed a ravine in front of our line and skirmished until night, when they were

called in.

In the mean time the regiment was assigned position on the extreme left of our forces, where

we spent a cold and disagreeable night, without tents or blankets. We remained in this position

22

until 2 p.m. the next day, when we were ordered to storm the fortifications of the enemy in front

by advancing the left wing of the regiment, supported a short distance in the rear by the right

wing. I took command of the left wing in person and proceeded in line of battle steadily up the

hill until we reached the fortifications without firing a gun. On reaching the works we found the

enemy fleeing before us, except a few, who were promptly put to the bayonet. I then gave the

order to fire, which was responded to with fatal precision until the right wing, with Lieutenant-

Colonel Baker, arrived, headed by General Smith, when we formed in line of battle, again under

a galling fire, and charged on the encampment across the ravine in front, the enemy still

retreating before us. After we had reached the summit of the hill beyond the ravine we made a

stand and occupied it for over an hour.

In the mean time the enemy were being re-enforced, and one of our regiments poured a

disastrous fire upon us in the rear. Our ammunition being nearly exhausted, I ordered my

command to fall back to the intrenchments, which they did steadily and in good order.

I am not able to name the regiment which fired upon our rear, but I do know that the greater

part of the casualties we received at that point was from that source, for I myself saw some of

my men fall who I know were shot from the hill behind us.

We then took our position behind the intrenchments, and soon afterwards, owing to an injury

received, as reported among the casualties of the engagement, I retired from the field, leaving

Lieutenant-Colonel Baker in command until the following morning.

During the night our pickets, who were posted in the enemy's camp, were fired upon several

times; but with that exception all remained quiet until morning, when the enemy gave signal for

a parley, which was succeeded by the joyful intelligence that they had surrendered the fort. We

were then ordered by General Smith to take the post of honor in marching to the enemy's fort,

where we planted our colors upon the battlements beside the white of the enemy, for which

generous consideration he has our hearty thanks.

When I come to speak of those who particularly distinguished themselves for coolness and

bravery, so many examples occur to me, that it seems invidious to make distinctions.

Of those few who were in the most responsible positions--Lieutenant-Colonel Baker, Major

Chipman, and Adjutant Tuttle--to say that they were cool and brave would not do them justice;

they were gallant to perfection. Lieutenant Colonel Baker had a ball pass through his cap and

come out near his temple. Major Chipman was along the first to fall, severely wounded, while

cheering on the men of the left wing, and refused to be carried from the field, but waved his

sword and exhorted the men to press forward.

Captains Slaymaker and Cloutman fell dead at the head of their companies before they

reached the intrenchments. Near them also fell Lieutenant Harper. His death was that of a true

and brave soldier.

Captains Cox, Mills, Moore, and Wilkin were at the head of their companies marked

examples of gallantry and efficiency.

Lieutenants Scofield, Ensign, Davis, Holmes, Huntington, Weaver, Mastick, Snowden, and

Godfrey--in fact, nearly all of my officers, commissioned and non-commissioned--deported

themselves nobly throughout the engagement.

Sergeant-Major Brawner deserves very honorable mention for his gallant conduct.

Surgeons Marsh and Nassau also deserve the highest praise for their skill and untiring

devotion to the welfare of the wounded. Dr. Nassau was particularly noticed for his bravery on

the field, taking off the wounded during a heavy fire from the enemy.

I cannot omit in this report an account of the color-guard. Color-Sergeant Doolittle fell early

in the engagement, pierced by four balls and dangerously wounded. The colors were then taken

by Corporal Page, Company B, who soon fell dead. They were again raised by Corporal

23

Churcher, Company I, who had his arm broken just as he entered the intrenchments, when they

were taken by Corporal Twombly, Company F, who was almost instantly knocked down by a

spent ball, immediately rose, and bore them gallantly to the end of the fight. Not a single man of

the color-guard but himself was on his feet at the close of the engagement.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. M. TUTTLE,

Colonel Second Iowa Infantry.

Col. J. G. LAUMAN,

Commanding Fourth Brigade.

FORT DONELSON, TENN., February 19, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the movement of the Seventh Regiment

Iowa Volunteer Infantry from February 12 to 15 inclusive:

The regiment left Fort Henry on the morning of the 12th and proceeded to the vicinity of Fort

Donelson, where it arrived about 6 p.m. same day. The regiment, by your orders, was placed in

position on an eminence about half a mile from the outer works of the enemy, to support the First

Missouri Battery, consisting of two 20-pounder Parrott guns, where it remained all night, the

regiment bivouacking without shelter or blankets.

On the morning of the 13th it was ordered by you to join its brigade on the extreme left wing,

where it took part with said brigade in the assault on the rebel fortifications during the day. At

sunset it returned to its former position, where it remained during the night, which was one of

great inclemency.

On the morning of the 14th it took position in rear of ground occupied the day previous,

where it remained quietly during the day and night, sending out through the day two companies

as skirmishers.

On the 15th, about 2 p.m., you ordered us forward to the charge on the west end of the

enemy's fortifications, where it came up in good order and passed the intrenchments and

rendered good service. It then took position in rear of the west breastworks, holding the position

we had gained till next morning, when the capitulation took place.

I am proud to say that the officers and men of the regiment behaved themselves with

coolness and courage and nobly retained the reputation formerly won.

Our casualties were 2 privates killed on the field; 2 lieutenants, 5 sergeants 2 corporals, and

28 privates wounded, most of them slightly and none mortally.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. C. PARROTT,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

Col. J. G. LAUMAN,

Commanding Fourth Brigade, Second Division.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH IOWA INFANTRY,

Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 19, 1862.

SIR: On February 13 my command, consisting of seven companies, was formed in line of

battle by order of Colonel Lauman, commanding brigade, and ordered to advance with the

Twenty-fifth Indiana upon the works in front and take a battery of two guns. I advanced under a

heavy fire of musketry until I passed the point of a ridge on my right. I then received a heavy fire

of grape from guns to the right, which, however, did but little damage, as the range was too high.

Perceiving no guns in front, and the line being much broken, owing to unevenness of the ground

and the thick fallen timber, I halted my command to place men in the best position to advance, it

24

being impossible to advance in line of battle; also to protect them as much as possible from the

crossfire from my right. I perceived at this time that the forces on my left, under the immediate

command of Colonel Lauman, had halted. I waited to see by their movements whether we were

to advance on the guns or the rifle pits, the latter being the direction pointed out to me by

Colonel Lauman when I was ordered to advance on the guns. After waiting about an hour, and

seeing no movement on my left, except from two advanced companies of skirmishers, who were

retiring behind the main line, I withdrew my left wing, which was most exposed, out of range of

the enemy's guns, and remained there until night: keeping a few of my best marksmen

sufficiently advanced to keep the enemy from coming outside their intrenchments to annoy my

men by their marksmen.

About dark I received an order from Colonel Lauman to tall back and take my old position

for t he night, but by a subsequent order from General Smith I took a position one-half mile

nearer the enemy.

My loss during the day was light, being but 2 killed and 14 wounded.

On Friday, the 14th instant, we remained in front of the enemy without changing our

position.

Saturday, the 15th, I remained in same position until after noon, we being on the right of our

brigade. Towards night the attack on the enemy's works was made by a flank movement of the

brigade, commencing on the left. Arriving in front of the enemy's works, I deployed my left wing

and marched them up the hill in line of battle. The right wing, owing to the nature of the ground,

moved up by the left flank and formed inside the intrenchments. After remaining some time

under a scattering fire of musketry and rather sharp fire of grape and shell, I formed my men

behind the intrenchments on each side of two pieces of artillery, which had been placed in

position after our entrance into the intrenchments, where we remained until morning, when the

enemy surrendered.

My men behaved themselves well during both engagements, holding their fire till ordered

and then delivering it with regularity and precision. I have never seen men behave themselves

better, whether under fire or bearing with patience and fortitude the fatigue and hardships

necessarily incident to so long an engagement in such weather. My loss this day was 1 killed and

7 wounded.

Where all behaved so well it is difficult to mention individuals without doing seeming

injustice to others, but may mention the valuable services rendered by Sergt. Maj. S. H. Smith,

who was shot dead by my side while encouraging the men on to enter the breastworks of the

enemy; also First Lieut. William W. Kirkwood, commanding Company K, rendered very

valuable assistance in forming the line in front of the enemy's breastworks.

Capt. Warren C. Jones, of Company I, also rendered valuable service in directing the fire of

my marksmen, especially protecting the retiring of the skirmishers on the 13th instant.

WM. T. SHAW,

Colonel Fourteenth Regiment Iowa Volunteers.

Col. J. G. LAUMAN,

Commanding Fourth Brigade, Second Division.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, U.S. FORCES,

Fort Henry, February 22, 1862.

The following is the official report of the killed, wounded, and missing of the Third Division

of the army in the battle of Fort Donelson, on Saturday, the 15th day of January, 1862, so far as

reported to me by brigade and regimental surgeons. Several regiments of the division remained

at Fort Donelson, whose surgeons will no doubt report directly to you.

25

Recapitulation.

O Officers. A Aggregate

M Enlisted Men.

--Killed-- -Wounded- Missing.

Command.O M O M O M A

11th Indiana ..... 4 2 27 .... .... 33

31st Indiana .... 9 8 44 .... .... 61

44th Indiana .... 3 1 31 .... .... 35

17th Kentucky .... 4 .... 31 .... .... 35

25th Kentucky 2 11 3 58 .... 5 79

3th Missouri 1 6 1 39 .... .... 47

Chicago Light Artillery. .... .... 3 .... .... 3

Total 3 37 15 233 .... 5 293

In making this report I take great pleasure in bearing testimony to the promptness,

faithfulness, and ability with which Brigade Surgeon Keenon and the surgeons and assistants of

this division of the army performed their duties. They followed their regiments into the midst of

danger and exposed their lives to aid the wounded. Surg. J. C. Thompson and Asst. Surg. Clay

Brown, of the Eleventh Indiana, and Surgeon Bailey and Assistant Surgeon Winnis, of the

Eighth Missouri, were exposed to a most terrible fire from the enemy, having been ordered to

follow their men into the field of battle by the medical director, H. S. Hewitt. The surgeons of

this division generally complain of discourteous treatment on the part of the medical director.

When manifesting an earnest solicitude for their wounded and making inquiries as to the time

and manner of transportation and ultimate destination they were rudely and offensively repulsed

without the desired information. They also complain that in the exercise of extra and arbitrary

power they were deprived the privilege of attending their own men, of dressing their wounds, or

attending them when taken to the boats. The report of such conduct is to me a matter of deep

regret, and against such conduct I beg leave to protest.

In my opinion, which is sustained by all the surgeons with whom I have conversed, the

removal of those on whom amputations and other severe operations had been performed was

unwise and highly injudicious, endangering the lives of those who might otherwise recover. The

houses occupied as hospitals could have been retained, and surgeons detailed to wait on them

until recovery had so far advanced as to render removal comparatively safe. The hurry of

moving, the necessary or careless displacement of dressings, the pain inflicted by incessant

jarring must add fearfully to the already dangerous condition of the wounded. If necessary,

surgeons and nurses in sufficient numbers would volunteer to render every service to those who

were injured in defense of their government. Had dangers of an attack or of falling into the

enemy's hands existed, the necessity of removal would have been imperative, but no such danger

existed. It is greatly to be feared that the mortality will be fearfully increased, more especially

when steamboats crowded with the wounded, as was the case with the steamer Tats, were sent

off without a single surgeon. Dressings would necessarily be displaced, requiring immediate

readjustment, and secondary hemorrhage likely to occur, which is always alarming, and

especially when the patient is in motion. There were surgeons belonging to this division anxious

to attend the wounded on their perilous journey whose services would have been cheerfully

dispensed with by their regiments, but they were refused, and ordered to join their regiments, and

the wounded sent without medical attention. Imperative duty compels me to report these facts,

unpleasant though it be. That they were suffered to occur can be attributed alone to incapacity or

willful neglect on the part of those having charge.

26

Most of the forenoon on the day of battle I was busily engaged at the hospital on the extreme

right, in a narrow valley near the scene of action, where the wounded from General

McClernand's division were rapidly crowding in. Here the slightly wounded, the mangled, the

dying, and the dead presented a scene which baffles description; and, adding to the difficulties

and dangers of our position, hundreds of armed soldiers rushed in, and remained until a volley of

musketry from the enemy caused them to seek other and safer quarters.

It was my fortune to administer to Lieutenant Colonels White and Erwin, of the Eleventh and

Thirty-first Illinois Regiments, in their last moments. They died without a murmur and without a

struggle--Colonel White, if I mistake not, from a shot in the neck, and Colonel Erwin, in the side.

When the hospital was fired on, Surgeon Thompson, of Illinois, and myself retired, with all the

wounded that could be moved, to hospitals farther in the rear. Since the surrender, officers of the

rebel army have informed me that the fire on the hospital was accidental and ceased the moment

the flag was seen. About noon I established a general hospital on the extreme left, in the

headquarters of General Grant, who very kindly and generously offered them for that purpose.

Notwithstanding the abundant supply of hospital stores which the medical director informed me

were on hand, nothing was sent us, neither medicine nor food, neither bandage nor plaster. The

field service of the surgeons and such articles as could be pressed into service constituted our

supply, and the little food obtained was secured by dint of perseverance from regimental

quartermasters. That hospital stores and provisions were not supplied under such circumstances

involves criminal neglect or incapacity on the part of those in charge of this department.

Kind and careful attention to the wounded soldier is a high and most sacred duty. Surgeon

Sexton, of [52d] Indiana Regiment and Assistant Surgeon Christy, of the Thirty-second Illinois,

were aiding me at the hospital. Surgeon Marsh, of the Second Iowa, and Assistant Surgeon

Martin at times gave us most valuable assistance. Dr. Sexton, an efficient and skillful surgeon

when sober, was so much under the influence of liquor for twenty-four hours as to be incapable

of discharging the responsible duties of his office. Assistant Surgeon Christy was exceedingly

kind, prompt, and skillful, rendering most timely and efficient aid.

In our hospital there were three amputations above the knee, a number of fingers taken off,

balls extracted, and wounds such as described in the foregoing report dressed.

All of which is most respectfully submitted.

THOS. W. FRY,

Brigade Surgeon, Acting Medical Director.

H. S. HEWITT,

Brigade Surgeon and Medical Director U. S. Force

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION,

Clarksville, Tenn., March 6, 1862.

GENERAL: In pursuance of orders from division headquarters I have the honor to submit the

following report:

Monday, the 3d day of February, the Seventh Infantry Illinois Volunteers, under my

command, embarked at Fort Holt, Ky., on board the steamer City of Memphis, under orders to

join an expedition against Fort Henry, Tenn. Landing at Paducah, I reported to you, from whom

orders were received assigning to the Third Brigade the following regiments, viz: Seventh

Illinois, Seventh Iowa, Twelfth Iowa, Thirteenth Missouri, and Fiftieth Illinois Volunteers, with

Captain Richardson's battery (20.pounder rifled guns) of First Missouri Light Artillery. In

company with other troops, the command arrived at Camp Halleck by river, 4 miles below Fort

Henry, on the afternoon of the 4th instant, when it was disembarked, under orders from

27

Brigadier-General Grant, commanding the District of Cairo, to proceed by land, without

transportation, under temporary command of General McClernand. The 5th instant remained at

Camp Halleck. On the morning of the 6th left Camp Halleck by land for Fort Henry. A severe

rain-storm the night previous to our departure, together with the swollen state of the streams

from continued rains and the absence of all transportation, rendered the march extremely

difficult, the troops suffering intensely from fording the numerous creeks, often wading so deep

as almost to submerge their cartridge-boxes. But, inspired by the frequent reports of artillery

from the gunboats, the men pressed on cheerfully. Impeded by the almost impassable roads and

the necessity of assisting Captain Richardson's battery out of the innumerable mud-holes, the

command proceeded slowly. About 2 p.m. received orders from General Grant to advance the

infantry without regard to the artillery. Having gone a short distance, the guide led us off the

road about a mile, which had to be countermarched. Surmounting every obstacle, the infantry

reached the outworks of Fort Henry soon after retreat, where they encamped on the damp ground

much wearied, many without a single blanket, all transportation having been left in the morning,

and some of the regiments leaving even their knapsacks. Captain Richardson's battery was left

midway between Camp Halleck and Fort Henry, being unable to proceed on account of the

impracticability of the roads. The 7th instant quartered the infantry in Fort Henry, partly in tents

and partly in barracks formerly occupied by the rebels.

The 8th instant four companies of infantry were sent by transports to Camp Halleck, with

orders to bring up our baggage left there, and also Captain Richardson's battery, which they

accomplished, returning the following day. On the 8th the Thirteenth Missouri Volunteers, Col.

C. J. Wright, which had been assigned to the Third Brigade, arrived from Smithland. The 10th

instant, having with much trouble and labor made bridges over the slough formed by backwater

from the Tennessee River, the command encamped 1 mile from the river, immediately inside of

the outer fortifications, where we remained until the morning of the 12th.

On the 11th instant the Seventh Iowa Volunteers was transferred from the brigade and the

Fifty-second Indiana added, Major Cavender's entire battalion of First Missouri Light Artillery

having been in the mean time temporarily assigned to the brigade. Leaving Fort Henry at 8

o'clock a.m. the 12th instant, the command arrived within a mile and a half of Fort Donelson at 3

o'clock p.m., the road being excellent and all transportation having been left at Fort Henry.

Distance marched, 12 miles. The position assigned the brigade under my command was well

chosen, being a high ridge of nearly 1 mile in length, and almost, overlooking the enemy's works

on his right. In fine spirits, with full assurance of success, the troops passed the night, prepared

for an attack should a sally be made from the fort. The 13th, the men's haversacks being well

filled, a hearty breakfast was eaten at an early hour, and under orders at 8 a.m. I moved the

command up the Dover road to a point within one-half mile of the enemy's outer works;

deployed in line the Seventh Illinois on the right and Fifty-second Indiana on the left as

skirmishers. The command moved steadily forward through the dense timber, crossing the deep

ravine without resistance until the Seventh Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Babcock commanding,

found itself within short range of a battery till then undiscovered, which immediately upon

appearance of our colors opened a destructive fire, killing instantly Capt. N. E. Mendell,

Company I, and wounding several others. Owing to the density of the timber our own artillery

was not yet in position. The regiment retired beyond range and to the support of Captain

Richardson's battery, First Missouri Light Artillery, just going into position. With the remaining

four regiments I proceeded to the summit of a ridge overlooking the fort, a distance of nearly 600

yards intervening, the immensity of the abatis covering the whole precluding the possibility of

proceeding farther but by an unwarranted destruction of life, the enemy in force being secure,

concealed in his rifle pits and behind his palisades, from which continuous firing was kept up

28

during the remaining portion of the day, answered by sharpshooters and skirmishers from our

side, each side sustaining a slight loss. This position gained, it was held during the night, the men

resting on their arms without fires and without blankets, everything but arms and ammunition

having been east aside on approaching the fort.

On the 14th, after a long and weary night of watching, the men being unprovided with tents

or blankets and our immediate proximity to the enemy's works and batteries precluding the

possibility of building fires, knowing that, the light would draw his fire from his two strong

redoubts, under which we lay, the troops under my command arose at an early hour, shook the

thick covering of snow from their overcoats, partook of a meager breakfast, and cheerfully

resumed their old position under the intrenchments. Though suffering from the snow and rain of

the previous night, they returned during the whole of the day the enemy's fire, doing him no little

damage. Night again coming on, the troops fell back for rest and such refreshments as could

under the circumstances be had, reasons before mentioned preventing the building of fires.

Here necessity compels me to state that Colonel Wright, in violation of direct orders,

removed his command, the Thirteenth Missouri, to its first position occupied before the

investment. Immediately upon being informed of the same, I proceeded on foot, and in person

ordered his return. His compliance with the order again left the command in its original line and

in readiness for a combined attack on the following day.

Saturday, the 15th, after another night of snow and severe cold, the troops suffering

intensely, but without murmurs, four regiments of my command returned to their original

position (the Seventh Illinois having been sent the day previous farther to the right to support

Captain Richardson's battery), they having been permitted to fall back by companies out of range

of the enemy's guns to cook their breakfast and thaw their frozen clothes. At 9 a.m., in pursuance

of orders from division headquarters, the Thirteenth Missouri Volunteers was sent to the right to

support a battery left unprotected by the withdrawal of a portion of Colonel McArthur's brigade,

and the Fifty-second Indiana, Colonel Smith, was ordered to the extreme left to repel any sally

which the enemy might make from that quarter, a gap in his breastworks having been left for

egress, leaving only the Twelfth Iowa and Fiftieth Illinois, with one battalion of Birge's

Sharpshooters, to engage the enemy along a line of half a mile in extent. At 2 p.m. orders came

from General Smith to increase the number of skirmishers from my command and more

completely engage the enemy's attention, while he in person, with Colonel Lauman's brigade and

the Fifty-second Indiana, stormed the entrance previously mentioned.

The fortifications having been gained by General Smith and the enemy's infantry having been

driven back, I sent a messenger to General Grant, asking permission to move my brigade up to

the support of Colonel Lauman, and, if possible, take the enemy's batteries, which were pouring

in upon him a murderous fire of grape, canister, and shell. While awaiting the return of the

messenger information was received that the Stars and Stripes were flying over the main battery

of the enemy, when orders were immediately given to cease firing, which having been complied

with and the companies thrown out as skirmishers ordered to rejoin their commands, I

ascertained the Stars and Stripes were raised by the rebels that we might be drawn within their

reach. The messenger having returned, I abandoned the position, and with all the speed possible

proceeded over the abatis, under a heavy fire of grape and canister. The distance being short, the

discharges caused but little damage, overshooting us just enough to tear into shreds the colors of

the Seventh Illinois, which regiment had been ordered by General Grant to rejoin me, two pieces

of the battery it was supporting having been placed in position within the intrenchments, and

succeeded, with the assistance of infantry, in silencing the battery of the enemy, giving us at a

late hour full possession of his outer works on his right, he having been driven to take cover

under his inner intrenchments. The Fifty-second Indiana, from the lateness of the hour having

29

been ordered back, by direction of General Smith we were instructed to hold the position

obtained during the night and immediately prepare for a combined assault the following

morning, with the simple command from General Smith, "Take it, sir!" During the night the men

rested upon their arms, and for the first time built fires, which enabled them to rest more

comfortably.

Aroused at an early hour Sunday, the 16th, we partook of a scanty breakfast. Called to your

headquarters, I was directed to order two regiments to the relief of Colonel Lauman, two

additional regiments to their support a little retired, holding one regiment in reserve. The Seventh

Regiment having expended more ammunition the day previous than any of the others, having an

average of only nine rounds to the man, and being compelled to await the arrival of ammunition

with which to fill the boxes, was selected as the reserve. About the time of the arrival of the

ammunition, whilst the men were filling their boxes, the woods around were made to ring with

loud and enthusiastic cheers from the troops under the command of Colonel Lauman and myself,

announcing the unconditional surrender of Fort Donelson, giving us uninterrupted ingress into

and peaceful possession of its entire rebel contents. A full and complete statement of the number

of killed, wounded, and missing has in a previous report been supplied you.

In accordance with your order to allude to and particularize those deserving of

commendation, it affords me much pleasure to mention the following officers, viz: Colonel Bane

and Adjutant Brown, of the Fiftieth Illinois; Colonel Smith and staff, of the Fifty-second Indiana;

Colonel Woods and Major Brodtbeck, Twelfth Iowa, and Lieutenant-Colonel Babcock and

Major Rowett, Captain Monroe, Company B; Captain Ward, Company A; Captain Lawyer,

Company C, and Lieutenant Johnson, commanding Company I (Captain Mendell having been

killed in the first engagement), of the Seventh Illinois Volunteers, and the following gentlemen

of the medical staff, viz: Dr. R. L. Metcalf, surgeon, and James Hamilton, assistant surgeon,

Seventh Illinois; Dr. Finley, assistant surgeon of the Twelfth Iowa, and Dr. Brown, assistant

surgeon of the Thirteenth Missouri Volunteers, who were constantly upon the field, regardless of

danger and fatigue. Too high praise and commendation cannot be bestowed upon the medical

staff of my command. Being almost entirely destitute of staff officers myself, I cannot refrain

from an expression of both gratitude and approbation for the bravery and conduct exhibited by

Lieut. B. F. Smith, acting assistant adjutant-general of the Third Brigade, and Private John C.

Brand, composing my entire staff. Being repeatedly called upon to act in the same capacity

myself rendered the labors necessary for the proper command of the brigade more arduous than

upon any previous occasion.

There are doubtless many others deserving of especial mention at my hand for gallant

conduct, but, being almost wholly unacquainted with four regiments of my command, I am

unable to render to them the praise merited. Truth and justice require me to say that the entire

command behaved in a manner deserving of approbation, cheerfully enduring the fatigue and

exposure attendant upon the most inclement weather known in this latitude.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN COOK,

Colonel, Commanding Third Brigade, Second Division.

Brig. Gen. C. F. SMITH,

Comdg. Second Division, District West Tennessee, U.S. Army.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 80.

LEBANON, MO.,

February 9, 1862.

30

For the purpose of reorganizing and properly arranging the force in the District of

Southwestern Missouri the following assignment of troops is prescribed:

I. The Benton Hussars are attached to what has formerly been known as the Third Division,

and this division will hereafter be denominated the First Division.

II. The Fourth Missouri Cavalry, Colonel Waring commanding, is attached to the division

heretofore denominated the Fourth Division. Colonel Schaefer is appointed commander of the

First Brigade of the division, and Brigadier-General Asboth commanding division.

III. The two divisions thus designated are placed under the general command of Brigadier-

General Sigel.

IV. The First Missouri Cavalry, under Colonel Ellis, is assigned to the division of Col.

Jefferson C. Davis, which will be designated as the Third Division.

V. The Third Illinois Cavalry, the Ninth Iowa, and Dubuque Battery will constitute a brigade,

to be commanded by Col. William Vandever; the brigade now commanded by Colonel Dodge

and the brigade thus organized under Colonel Vandever will constitute the Fourth Division, to be

commanded by Colonel Carr.

VI. The remaining troops of this command, the Thirteenth Illinois, commanded by Colonel

Wyman, Colonel Phelps' regiment, Bowen's battalion, the Curtis Horse, and other troops not here

designated will report to these headquarters until otherwise ordered.

By order of Brig. Gen. S. R. Curtis:

T. I. McKENNY,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. SOUTHWESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI,

Marshfield, February 10, 1862.

Capt. J. C. KELTON,

Assistant Adjutant-General :

CAPTAIN: The Iowa cavalry are not needed at Rolla; they are needed here. I wish the

general would allow them to come forward. Van Dorn is moving up to join Price. Shall try to

prevent junction. My columns are arriving here. Let the cavalry re-enforce me. Van Dorn has

promised 30,000 or 40,000 at Springfield very soon. Expects to be there with 10,000 by the 15th.

These are the hopes and expectations of the enemy. I move on to attack in detail.

SAML. R. CURTIS,

Brigadier-General.

SUGAR CREEK CROSSING,

Six Miles from Arkansas Line, in Arkansas, Feb. 18, 1862.

Capt. N. H. McLEAN,

Assistant Adjutant-General :

The general's dispatch of the 14th is received. We rejoice again at the success of our

comrades in the East.

The enemy was re-enforced yesterday by the troops of McCulloch, and made another stand at

this place. His batteries opened fire upon us and were very soon replied to by mine. After a few

rounds of shot and shell I ordered a cavalry charge, which drove them from the high grounds

they occupied, with the loss of many killed and wounded and scattered. My loss is 13 killed and

15 to 20 wounded. Among the latter are Major Bowen, of my escort, in the wrist; my assistant

adjutant-general, Captain McKenny, severely but not dangerously; Captain Switzler, not

dangerously.

31

My advance camped at the battle ground. General Sigel's command is 4 miles back and will

reach me this morning. Have sent forward cavalry to annoy and explore. Cross Hollow is their

next point, 12 miles ahead. I shall await the arrival of the First and Second Divisions, as this is

their great boasted trap for the Federal army. Hope also the Third Iowa will arrive to-day.

SAML. R. CURTIS,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 37.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY IN THE FIELD,

Commerce, Mo.,February 25,1862.

The Twenty-sixth and Forty-seventh Illinois Regiments and the Fifth Iowa, with another

regiment hereafter to be designated, will form the Second Brigade of the Second Division, to be

commanded by Col. William H. Worthington, of Fifth Iowa Volunteers.

This brigade will march to-morrow morning as early as practicable to Benton, and there

report to Brig. Gen. John M. Palmer, commanding the Second Division.

Such of the sick of this brigade as are likely to be unfit for duty for some time and cannot be

cared for in their regiments will be shipped to Saint Louis by the first steamer.

Commanders of regiments will in no case send off any sick man without his descriptive

papers.

By order of General Pope:

SPEED BUTLER,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE SOUTHWEST,

Camp Halleck, March 3, 1862.

Brig. Gen. FRANZ SIGEL, Commanding Division:

GENERAL: Yours of this morning is duly received. I shall remain here at Gross Hollow till

you move around to Sugar Creek, when we must intrench ourselves. I hope your movement will

secure a thorough knowledge of the country and roads passing around our Sugar Creek station.

The Third Iowa reconnoitered within 5 miles of Fayetteville to-day; there was no sign of any

movement; but the people speak of continued augmentation of the enemy's forces.

The mill run by Colonel Dodge— Blackman's Mill, 16 miles southeast of this place— -was

burned last night by the rebels, and they also burned considerable forage in that region.

Other matters of interest will be communicated when we meet at Sugar Greek, which must be

soon, as I desire our camp to be arranged in view of some defenses.

I am, general, &c.,

SAML. R. CURTIS,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

New Madrid, March 12, 1862.

Brig. Gen. E. A. PAINE,

Commanding Fourth Division:

GENERAL: I have directed Colonel Elliott to report to you at daylight to-morrow morning

with the Second Iowa Cavalry, and also a battery of four pieces, now encamped with General

Hamilton's division. I desire you to hold your' division in readiness to march at daylight tomorrow

morning, with one day's cooked rations, full supply of ammunition, and everything in

complete order for fighting. As soon as you perceive Hamilton's division (on your right) in

32

motion, you will march your division to the road leading into New Madrid, through the center of

our lines, and down that road until you are barely out of range of the enemy's gunboats. You will

there remain until further orders. You will be careful to keep your pickets on the bayou road as

far towards the enemy as possible, that our left may not be turned without due warning. Form

your command in columns of division, doubled on the center, on each side of the road leading

into New Madrid, and keep them well in hand, so that you can advance against the enemy at the

shortest notice, being careful always to march well to the rear, so as to be quite out of range, and

not to draw the enemy's fire. I wish you, an hour after dark to-night, to re-enforce the lower

pickets along the bayou with four companies of sharpshooters, and direct them to feel their way

in towards the town and drive in the enemy's pickets, so as to distract his attention from the work

on the battery on our right. They had best keep up the enemy's alarm on our left in this way the

greater part of the night. Orders will be sent to you in time for further movements.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

Saint Louis, March 21, 1862.

Col. S. H. BOYD, Rolla, Mo.:

Send forward to General Curtis all available forces and ammunition without delay.

Additional troops will be sent from here as soon as they can be armed.

If any of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry refuse to go forward immediately arrest them for mutiny

and place them in confinement.

H. W. HALLECK,

Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT CENTRAL MISSOURI,

Jefferson City, Mo., March 23, 1862.

Capt. N.H. McLEAN,

Assistant Adjutant-General:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a communication, dated Saint

Louis, Mo., March 21, 1862, from Major-General Halleck, commanding the department,

touching certain reports of disturbances in La Fayette, Jackson, and Johnson Counties, in this

State. His instructions shall be attended to carefully and at the earliest possible day.

In connection with this, I would also mention, for the information of the major-general

commanding, that I have just heard rumors from other sources of a disorderly state of things in

Bates County, where a certain scoundrel, Jackman, heads a band of robbers and desperadoes,

numbering, it is reported by Colonel Warren, as high as 500. Before my arrival here my

predecessor, General McKean, had given orders which, when carried out, places eight companies

of the First Iowa Cavalry and one section First Missouri Light Artillery at Clinton, Henry

County. The object of this was undoubtedly to watch Jackman in Bates County, and also to keep

an eye to the quiet of the other counties adjacent to Henry. The order of General McKean directs

two companies First Iowa Cavalry, stationed at Lexington, to proceed to Sedalia when relieved

by Companies A and C, Missouri State Militia, from Booneville.

The two companies First Iowa Cavalry from Lexington are represented as being broken

down in horses and as requiring rest. When these two companies reach Sedalia, and General

McKean's orders are complied with, there will be four companies of cavalry at Sedalia.

I am, captain, your obedient servant,

33

JAS. TOTTEN,

Brigadier-General, Commanding District.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CENTRAL MISSOURI,

Jefferson City, Mo., April 3, 1862.

Capt. N.H. McLEAN,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Saint Louis, Mo.:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report, for the information of the Major-general commanding,

that official communications from Col. Fitz Henry Warren, First Iowa Cavalry, bearing date

Clinton, Mo., March 30, 1862, have been received, announcing the arrival of two of his scouting

parties. One brought in 15 prisoners, 5 horses, I secession ambulance, 2 wagons, and 2 yoke of

oxen belonging to Price's army. Two rebels were wounded; I fatally. The second detachment

mentioned returned with 4 prisoners, 3 horses, and I mule. One of our soldiers, Kelley, a gallant

boy of Company K, is badly wounded in the ankle and thigh.

At that date Colonel Warren had also two other detachments out. He seems to be following

up the guerrillas, of whom there are many in that quarter, with commendable energy.

I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAS. TOTTEN,

Brigadier-General, Commanding District.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 27.

HDQRS. DISTRICT CENTRAL MISSOURI,

Jefferson City, Mo., April 5, 1862.

1. Maj. W. M. G. Torrence, commanding at Warrensburg, will furnish Col. John A. Turley,

formerly of the Eighty-first Ohio Volunteers, every assistance and facility in his power to enable

him to thoroughly investigate the cause and manner of his brother's recent death at Warrensburg,

Mo.

2. Major Torrence will take measures to examine into the circumstances connected with the

murder of Mr. Turley. Also those attending the causes recently reported by Captain Thompson,

First Iowa Cavalry, viz, the burning of the residence, furniture, &c., of Colonel McCowan; the

shooting of Mr. Burrgess and his brother, and the burning of their dwelling; the killing by

Captain Houts' company of Mr. Piper on March 30, and the burning of some five dwellings by

the same, and any other misdemeanors which may come to his notice. He will place in arrest and

prefer charges against such officers or men as an examination shall indicate as guilty of these

outrages without sufficient cause. A minute report will be made to these headquarters upon these

cases, supported by charges and specifications, where wrong has been committed upon quiet and

unoffending citizens peaceably occupying their homes.

In these investigations Major Torrence will be guided by General Orders, No. 8, of

November 26, 1861, General Orders, No. 13, of December 4, 1861, Department of the Missouri,

and the thirty-second, thirty-third, forty-first, fifty-first, and fifty-fourth Articles of War.

By command of Brig. Gen. James Totten, commanding district:

LUCIEN J. BARNES,

Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,

Commanding Department of the Missouri:

34

GENERAL: I have the honor to transmit herewith copy of a report addressed to your

headquarters by Lieutenant Amory. The original report I forwarded through General Pope's

headquarters. I have no doubt but that this is a correct report of the affair. Lieutenant Amory

thinks that justice was not done him in General Pope's report. Lieutenant Amory's account is

corroborated by Dr. Brodie and Lieutenant Gordon. If the matter were investigated I think it

would be found that there are other inaccuracies in the official report of the expedition and affair

near Milford.

I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,

FRED'K STEELE,

Colonel Eighth Iowa Infantry, commanding at Sedalia.

CAMP NEAR FAYETTE, MO.,

January 10, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that in compliance with your order I marched my

command to Booneville, and was there joined by three companies of Merrill's Horse, under

Major Hunt, and at the earliest day possible crossed the Missouri River, and reached camp near

Fayette on the evening of the 5th instant, when I was there joined by four companies of the First

Missouri, under command of Major Hubbard, and one company of the Fourth Ohio, Captain

Foster. We proceeded at once to gather information of the enemy's movements by sending scouts

through different portions of this and adjoining counties.

On the 7th instant reconnaissances in force were made to Glasgow, Roanoke, and

surrounding country, and information received that one Colonel Poindexter was recruiting in this

and other counties, and that he had his principal camp somewhere on the headwaters of Silver

Creek, with a force of regularly enlisted men from 600 to 800 strong, together with an equal

number of aiders and abettors of rebellion. Early upon the morning of the 8th instant we moved

out of camp with 500 mounted men in search of their camp, and marched to Roanoke, 15 miles

distant, and then in the direction of Silver Creek. When within 4 miles of where the camp was

reported to be the column was halted, and the following disposition made of our forces: To

Major Hunt was assigned the command of that portion of his forces armed with carbines, and

with Major Hubbard's command and Captain Foster's company to form the advance of the

column, to attack the camp, draw their fire, and reply with carbines, when the First Iowa and a

portion of Merrill's Horse were to charge upon the camp, mounted, if possible, and if not

practicable charge with revolver and saber on foot. To Lieutenant Dustin, of Company F, First

Iowa, was assigned the advance guard, supported by Lieutenant Burrows, First Missouri.

All being in readiness the column moved forward rapidly, the advance guard driving the

enemy's pickets and rushing to the entrance of the camp. The column followed soon after,

dismounted, and drew the enemy's fire. They were in a strong position, being protected by

ravines, thick underbrush, and timber. Their volley was promptly answered by our forces pouring

in a galling fire. Three companies of the First Iowa and a part of a company of Merrill's Horse

were then ordered forward to charge the camp, which was promptly done. The enemy were now

thrown into confusion and soon began to retreat, leaving horses, guns, together with camp and

garrison equipage. It was a complete rout, as the appearance of the camp fully attested. Two

companies from the rear were ordered to cut off their retreat, but the darkness and heavy fog,

together with the thick underbrush, rendered it impossible.

To avoid surprise and to be able to move all our forces forward an order was given to destroy

the camp and look up dead and wounded. This was soon accomplished, and the darkness

forbidding further pursuit, the whole command was then moved to camp, 23 miles distant. The

prompt action of the troops throughout is worthy of the highest praise. Lieutenant Dustin is

35

worthy of honorable mention for his gallant conduct in leading the advance guard; also Major

Hunt, of Merrill's Horse; Captains Clinton and Mondell, of the First Missouri, for their gallant

and cool bearing during the entire action.

The loss of the enemy cannot be actually ascertained, but from the most reliable information

their loss in killed and wounded cannot be less than 80 to 100.

Yours, most obediently,

W. M. G. TORRENCE,

Major, First Battalion, First Iowa Cavalry.

Brigadier-General Pope.,

Otterille, Mo.

HEADQUARTERS MERRILL'S HORSE:

Columbia, Mo., January 10, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that on the night of Sunday, the 5th, nearly at daylight,

I received a dispatch from Colonel Birge (at Sturgeon), stating that a party of some 300 or 400

rebels had camped that night at Renick, and were to move next morning to Roanoke, some 12 or

15 miles from there, with the object of crossing the river at Arrow Rock or Brunswick, and

stating that he would attempt to overtake them by daylight of the 6th, and requesting me to cooperate.

Not approving the plan proposed for me by Colonel Birge, I sent Lieutenant-Colonel

Shaffer, with all the men I could spare, to go by way of Fayette and thence north towards

Roanoke and cut off the retreat of the enemy, should Colonel Birge's command not succeed in

overtaking him at Renick. Colonel Birge, I understand, went to Renick, and not finding the

enemy, returned to Sturgeon the same day. Lieutenant-Colonel Shaffer reached Fayette late the

night of the 6th, and there found a large cavalry force, consisting of detachments from the First

Missouri Cavalry, under command of Major Hubbard, First Iowa Cavalry, under Major

Torrence, and Merrill's Horse, under Major Hunt. He then learned during the night that the

enemy, variously estimated at from 1,300 to 2,500, were encamped on Smith's farm, about o

miles from Roanoke. At the same time he received information that the remains of the command

of Colonel Dorsey, which had been engaged in the Mount Zion fight, was then marching to

attack me at Columbia. I had only part of one company left when Colonel Shaffer left me, and he

knew that part of that would be sent to Jefferson City to escort the provision train. Early next

morning he sent the command of Major Hubbard, which he had found at Fayette, re-enforced by

one company of his own command, to find the enemy's camp, and returned at once to Columbia

with the rest of his command.

Major Hubbard found the enemy's camp about 14 miles northwest of Fayette about 3 o'clock

p.m., and immediately attacked them, routing them completely and taking possession of their

camp, which he entirely destroyed. I have no official reports of the engagement from the part of

my regiment engaged, and I presume before this Major Hubbard's reports have been received.

The loss of my regiment was 2 killed and 3 wounded. The enemy's loss is not positively

reported, but 5 are known to have been killed and 14 taken prisoners. This is only what is

certainly known.

Capt. J. B. Watson, of the rebel army (and believed to have been concerned in the Magi

burning), now on recruiting service near here, was captured, with two of his men, to-day by a

part of my command.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LEWIS MERRILL,

Colonel, Commanding Merrill's Horse.

Capt. J. C. KELTON,

36

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. TENTH REGIMENT IOWA, VOLUNTEERS,

Bird's Point, Mo., January 8, 1862.

SIR: In pursuance of your orders, on the 7th instant I took the cars with my command at 9

o'clock p.m. We left the cars at 11 p.m., joined the cavalry attached to my command, and

proceeded towards Prairie road, on which, at one Swank's house, a body of Tennessee cavalry,

numbering about 1,000 men, were supposed to be encamped. I formed my line as follows: Guide

and two troops at the head of the column; Company A, Tenth Regiment Iowa Volunteers, as

advance guards; then formed the detachment of the same regiment and that of the Twentieth

Illinois, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Small, of the Tenth Iowa, the cavalry in the

center; then the detachment from the Eleventh and Twenty-second Illinois Regiments, under the

command of Lieutenant-Colonel Ransom, the Twenty-second bringing up the rear. We

proceeded in the greatest and perfect stillness, my instructions being to surprise and fight the

rebel forces. The night was cloudy and rainy. Our guide several times lost his way, which

delayed our progress considerably. At last, at 4 o'clock in the morning, we heard the distant and

faint sound of a bugle. Marching on, we emerged into a more open country and a better-beaten

road, but our guide having lost all calculation he did not know which side to take, and was

obliged to awake the inmates of a farm-house and led us in the direction indicated by them. We

passed seven farm-houses without molestation.

Towards 5 o'clock we found ourselves on the back track to Charleston. Here only was I

informed by the guide that we had passed the pretended camp of the rebels. I think he did not

know it himself. We marched a short distance in this direction, till we reached a farm-house

with the door open and fire and light in the room. As it looked to me a little suspicious, I detailed

Captain Stoddard, with a squad of men, to visit it. He entered it, and found the owner, Mr.

Rodan, washing himself, and the different members of his family at household work. When

asked whether he had seen any rebel soldiers, he replied that he had seen but one soldier during

the last two weeks. Nothing extraordinary having been discovered, Captain Stoddard returned to

his post, and we resumed our march. We had not proceeded more than 150 yards when, as soon

as the guide and advance guards passed, a body of rebels, almost 75 or 80 men, ambuscaded on

the right of the road behind a rail fence, opened upon the detachment of the Tenth Iowa a deadly

fire, covering almost all its length. I was at the head of this detachment, with Lieutenant-Colonel

Small, commanding. The men were thrown into confusion, returned the fire at random, and

probably without effect, but by our united efforts they were rallied in less than two minutes.

Captains Randleman and Lusby, having been ordered to cross the fence and pursue the rebels,

did it with spirit and promptitude, but the rebels, as usual, disappeared. Not knowing the force of

the rebels, I thought it prudent to reform our line to the rear in the woods on our left, and began

the painful duty of collecting our sick and wounded. Assistant Surgeon Dr. Willey, and his aid,

Ephraim R. Davis, steward, took with considerable zeal and activity to their work, and a little

later were ably assisted by Dr. Bailey, of the Twentieth Illinois. Short as the fire was, the Tenth

Iowa had 5 killed, 2 mortally wounded, and 15 more or less severely. The line of ambuscade did

not reach the other detachment. I must remark that even towards dawn the darkness was so

intense that I did not dare to push my advance guard forward. I followed it closely for fear that

we might lose each other. I could not throw out any flanks, because, even at the shortest distance,

the connection must have to be kept up by hailing, which would have frustrated all attempts to

surprise the rebels, by giving them early and continued warning. Deplorable as the result has

been, I have to congratulate the promptitude with which every officer and man, notwithstanding

the effect of first surprise, obeyed every order. Lieutenant-Colonel Small and all the officers

37

have done their duty. On the 8th instant, in the morning, we put our sick on the cars and returned

to our quarters.

The man Rodan having willfully and damnably denied all knowledge of the presence of the

rebels, while in all probability the ambush proceeded from his house, I arrested and had him

turned over to the officer of the post guard. He is at all events guilty of a capital crime, having

misled us by his feigned ignorance and caused by this our severe loss. The charges against him

will be made out and forwarded to the proper place.

Finally let me add the acknowledgment of prompt obedience and strict preservation of order

to all officers and men of the other detachments composing my command.

I have the honor to be, yours, respectfully,

N. PERCZEL,

Colonel, Commanding Expedition,

Brig. Gen. E. A. PAINE,

Commanding Bird's Point.

HDQRS. SOUTHWESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI,

SUGAR CREEK CROSSING,

6 MILES FROM LINE IN ARKANSAS,

February 18, 1862.

CAPTAIN: The general's dispatch of the 14th is received. We rejoice again at the success of

our comrades in the East.

The enemy was re-enforced yesterday by the troops of McCulloch and made another stand at

this place. His batteries opened on us and were very soon replied to by mine. After a few rounds

of shot and shell I ordered a cavalry charge, which drove them from the high grounds they

occupy, with the loss of many killed, wounded, and scattered. My loss is 13 killed and 15 or 20

wounded. Among the latter are Major Bowen, of my escort, in the wrist; my assistant adjutantgeneral,

Captain McKenny, severely cut, but not dangerously; Captain Switzler, not dangerously.

My advance encamped on the battle ground. General Sigel's command is 4 miles back and

will reach me this morning. Have sent cavalry forward to annoy and explore. Cross Hollow is

their next point, 12 miles ahead. I shall also await the arrival of the First and Second Divisions,

as this is their great boasted trap for the Federal Army. Hope also the Third Iowa will arrive today.

Very respectfully, &c.,

SAML. R. CURTIS,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. N. H. McLEAN,

Assistant Adjutant-General

HEADQUARTERS POST OF SPRINGFIELD, Mo.,

February 20, 1862.

GENERAL: Learning that the secession flag was in Mount Vernon, and that a small party of

Price's soldiers (cut off by your advance to the southward) had entered the place, I dispatched

Captain Mudgett, of the Third Iowa Cavalry, with 30 men of his command, to capture them.

They left here on the 18th and returned on the evening of the 19th, having been perfectly

successful. They took the flag and 5 prisoners, and once more raised the Stars and Stripes over

the courthouse.

38

I have discovered the whereabouts of some 125 rebels some 28 miles from here, who were

cut off from joining Price, and axe reported to have a train with them. I have organized a

sufficient force, and as soon as my spies return shall send after them.

Respectfully, yours,

JAMES K. MILLS,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Post.

Brigadier-General CURTIS,

Commanding Army of Southwest

[Received Saint Louis, February 21, 1862.]

I sent a cavalry three under Brigadier-General Asboth yesterday to take Bentonville. A small

force was routed; their equipments taken; a large flag, arms, and teams were brought in. It is

difficult to procure information of the topography of the country. Cross Hollow is a deep ravine,

in thick brush, flanked by the White River Mountains.

General Sigel's force and five companies of the Third Iowa have arrived, so my force is again

united. I want to take Cross Hollow and Fayetteville, but see nothing else this side of the

Arkansas River worth going after, and I have no means of crossing that river. Forage and meat

are found in abundance, but the taking of it is attended with considerable labor, and tends to

demoralize my troops and draw after me a horde of camp followers, who commit many outrages.

The scattered blankets and coats on the field show that the enemy had made a more extensive

arrangement for battle than I supposed. Their rout wits complete, but, they keep their artillery so

far back in defiles I have not yet been able to secure it. I shall make a reconnaissance in force

today, and have private scouts also busy feeling the enemy in his brushy cavern.

SAML. R. CURTIS,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Capt. N. H. McCLEAN,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 1. -- Report of Lieut. Col. S. N. Wood, Sixth Missouri Cavalry.

HEADQUARTERS WOOD'S BATTALION,

SIXTH MISSOURI VOLUNTEER CAVALRY,

Rolla, February 26, 1862.

COLONEL: According to your order of February 15 I left camp Sunday, February 16, 1862,

with all my available force, consisting of Company A, Capt. S. A. Breese, 42 men; Company B,

Captain Hackney, 25 men; Company C, Lieutenants Martin and Hawkins, 27 men; Company D,

Capt. E. M. Morris, 29 men; Company E, Captain De Gress and Lieutenant Cole, 29 men; total,

152; arrived at Salem, Mo., the same evening, and reported to Major Drake, Third Iowa Cavalry;

got what information I could, and we mutually agreed upon an expedition south, and both went

to work to get our commands ready to move. Major Drake's command consisted of Captain

Miller and Lieutenant Cherrie and 60 men, Lieutenant McDannal and 50 men; total, 110 men;

making a total force of 262 men; Company A, of my battalion, taking along their mountain

howitzer. We camped Monday night 8 miles south of Salem. Tuesday we traveled 30 miles, to

Roark's store, in Spring Valley. Wednesday morning at 1 o'clock we were in our saddles and on

our way to either Thomasville or West Plains. Eight miles brought us to Harlow's Mill, a

notorious rebel rendezvous, and 30 miles from either Thomasville or West Plains. A cold sleet

had fallen all the morning. My men were completely saturated and almost frozen. We were

compelled to halt and build fires to keep from freezing.

39

Here I learned that Coleman's infantry was at West Plains, but no troops in Thomasville.

Where Coleman himself was I could not learn. I immediately detailed a small wagon guard, and

with the balance of command, including our mountain howitzer, pushed on 30 miles to West

Plains. I sent Major Drake with the Third Iowa Battalion to take position on the south and east of

the town. I sent Companies D, E, and C to the west, and prepared to enter the town on the north

with Company A and the howitzer, supported on our left by Company B. At 3 p.m. we thus had

the town completely surrounded. We advanced and entered the place, a brisk firing having

commenced on our part. Not over half a dozen shots were fired by the rebels, they breaking and

running in every direction. Supposing them posted in force in the court-house, Sergeant Moody

opened fire upon the building with the howitzer. One shot with canister covered the entire front

with bullet-holes. A shell passed through both walls and three partitions and then exploded.

The contest was brief. None killed or wounded on our side. Their loss was 5 killed, 1

mortally wounded (died before leaving the place), 8 slightly wounded, and 60 taken prisoners.

We remained in town (which is only 10 miles from the Arkansas line) until the next day (20th) at

2 p.m. Of the prisoners taken about 20 were released, as there was no evidence connecting them

with the rebel army. We also captured about 40 horses and 60 stand of arms, together with

several wagons. I append a list of prisoners and captured property.

At 2 p.m. Tuesday (20th), learning that Colonel Coleman and 30 men were in Texas County,

we marched north 20 miles to Hutton Valley, made one or two arrests, sending scouts in all

directions to ascertain Coleman's position. We remained in Hulton Valley until noon (21st), but

hearing nothing of Coleman we marched 20 miles north to Elk Creek. Saturday I marched the

main command to Houston, sending Captain De Gress and 20 men to Smiley's Mill for flour.

Captain De Gress fell in with a party of 11 rebels, killed 2 and took 1 prisoner, arriving at camp

at 9 o'clock p.m. Believing that other parties of rebels were in the county, I determined to scout

the whole county.

I immediately prepared orders, and from 2 to 4 a.m. Sunday morning had sent out seven

scouting parties of from 15 to 20 each. Hearing that Coleman had a fort near Smiley's Mill, I sent

Captain Breese and 20 men to ascertain the fact, and if true to destroy it. The captain found a

large frame house, the property of Dick Smiley. The inside partitions had been removed. Logs

had been put up as high as a man's breast all around the house. Outside of this a ditch had been

dug, the dirt being thrown between the logs and the building. A door had been heavily planked

and port-holes cut just above the logs, making a position, if occupied by a few men, hard to take

without artillery. Captain Breese set fire to it and burned it down. Lieutenant Cherrie returned

before night, having found 10 armed rebels at Judge Gilmore's, and captured the entire party.

Three or four other prisoners were taken.

Monday morning, being satisfied' Colonel Coleman and party had escaped south, and no

further work left for us to do, and being out of provisions, I directed Major Drake to return with

his command to Salem, taking my own command, prisoners, and horses, and returning to Rolla,

arriving here at I o'clock this day. The total number of prisoners is 60.

In conclusion I must bear testimony to the gallantry of the officers and soldiers constituting

the command. We started with but five days' rations of sugar and coffee and but two of other

articles, depending upon what the country afforded for subsistence. Without tents, traveling 225

miles in ten days, sleeping on the ground, half of the command constantly on guard, yet both

officers and men endured it all without a murmur.

I have the honor, colonel, to be, your obedient servant,

S. N. WOOD. Lieut. Col.,

Commanding Wood's Battalion, Sixth Mo. Vols.

Col. J. B. WYMAN,

40

Commanding Post, Rolla, Mo.

No. 2. -- Report of Maj. William C. Drake, Third Iowa Cavalry.

HEADQUARTERS POST AT SALEM, Mo.,

March 4, 1862.

I have been unable to make regular reports of my command, owing to absence on sundry and

divers scouts, &c. At the time our last report should have been made we were out on a scout in

force.

On February 17, 120 of my command were attached to Lieut. Col. S. N. Wood's battalion of

120 men, under orders to scout through Dent, Shannon, Howell, and Texas Counties. We

returned, bringing with us 100 prisoners, 80 horses, mules, &c., 80 rifles and shot-guns, 2 kegs

of powder, a large lot of commissary stores, and other contraband articles, including wagons,

ambulance, buggy, &c., most of which were captured at West Plains, the county seat of Howell

County, and the balance at Houston, the county seat of Texas.

West Plains was the headquarters of Colonel Coleman, the guerrilla chief of this country. He

had there at the time of our descent about 40 infantry, forming a nucleus for a regiment of Price's

army. Himself and his cavalry force were absent on a scout. At about a mile and a half before

reaching the town Colonel Wood's battalion and ours separated, to enter the town from different

sides. Our boys got there first and made the attack, resulting in 6 killed and 10 wounded of the

enemy and the rest prisoners. After the fight was all over Wood's men came up.

Our boys behaved like veterans and did credit to your command. We expected to find

Coleman and his mounted men there and looked for quite a brush, but we were disappointed. At

Houston we expected a fight, but found no one there to oppose our entry. Took possession of the

town; remained there over Sunday, and returned on Monday to Salem. Colonel Wood took

prisoners and property to Rolla. General Halleck telegraphed to General McClellan that Colonel

Wood had driven the rebels from Dent, Shannon, Howell, and Texas Counties.

The Third Iowa Cavalry was not mentioned, at which the boys feel highly indignant after

doing all the work.

For state of my command would refer you to accompanying report.

With great respect, I am, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM C. DRAKE,

Major, Commanding.

Col. CYRUS BUSSEY.

HEADQUARTERS AT COLONEL TIBBETT'S,

Fayetteville, Washington Co., Ark., Feb. 23, 1862--11.20 o'clock.

GENERAL: I am now in Fayetteville. The Stars and Stripes float from its court-house. The

enemy's picket, driven in by my men, retreated from the town, and, joined by some others, are

drawn up at a short distance from it. The buildings in the town square are still burning. We have

already several prisoners taken in arms, among them two officers. Your instructions as to the

occupation of the town will be fully complied with. The Third Iowa Cavalry I now order to

charge upon the enemy.

ASBOTH,

Brigadier-General, Commanding Second Division.

General SAMUEL R. CURTIS,

Commanding Southwestern District, Dept. of the Missouri.

NEW MADRID, MO., April 1, 1862.

41

Was absent when your dispatch arrived. Canal is finished and boats now descending bayou to

this place; expect them here to-night. Enemy commenced erecting batteries at points of high

land, only landing places on river; little serious to be feared from them. Our floating battery,

properly placed, will deal easily with them or any other obstacle to landing. Have erected two

batteries, of two 32s each, but a mile and a half below the 24-pounder battery, opposite mouth of

slough (see sketch sent you). These batteries cover handsomely the landing on opposite shore. I

have no apprehension of the result. Commodore Foote promises to run a couple of his boats past

Island No. 10 to-night. If so, all difficulty is over. Troops in fine condition and can be relied on.

Railroad to Sikeston under water and roads to Commerce bad. Best send anything for this

command to Island No. 8, with orders to Colonel Buford to send it through the canal in barges or

flats; easy communication in this way for stores. Do not be uneasy; no precaution will be

omitted, and there is no fear of the result in the command. I telegraphed yesterday that gunboats

had again been repulsed by our Iowa battery, one of them so badly damaged as to drift broadside

down the river, unable to work her engines.

JNO. POPE,

Major-General.

General HALLECK.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

Camp five miles from Corinth, Miss., May 2, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations which resulted

in the capture of Island No. 10 and the batteries on the main shore, together with the whole of the

land forces of the enemy in that vicinity. A brief sketch of the topography of the immediate

neighborhood seems essential to a full understanding of the operations of the army.

Island No. 10 lies at the bottom of a great bend of the Mississippi, immediately north of it

being a long, narrow promontory on the Missouri shore. The river from Island No. 10 flows

northwest to New Madrid, where it again makes a great bend to the south as far as Tiptonville,

otherwise called Meriwether's Landing, so that opposite New Madrid also is a long narrow

promontory. From Island No. 8 across the land to New Madrid is 6 miles, while by river it is 15;

so likewise the distance from Island No. 10 to Tiptonville is 5 miles, while by water it is 27.

Commencing at Hickman, a great swamp, which afterwards becomes Reelfoot Lake, extends

along the left bank of the Mississippi and discharges its waters into the river 40 miles below

Tiptonville, leaving the whole peninsula opposite New Madrid between it and the river. This

peninsula, therefore, is itself an island, having the Mississippi River on three sides and Reelfoot

Lake and the great swamps which border it on the other. A good road leads from Island No. 10

along the west bank of Reelfoot Lake to Tiptonville. The only means of supply, therefore, for the

forces at and around Island No. 10 in this peninsula were by the river. When the river was

blockaded at New Madrid supplies and re-enforcements were landed at Tiptonville and conveyed

across the neck of the peninsula by land. There was no communication with the interior except

by a small flat-boat, which plied across Reelfoot Lake, a distance of 2 miles, and that through an

opening cut through cypress swamps for the purpose. Supplies and re-enforcements or escape to

any considerable extent were therefore impracticable on the land side. One mile below

Tiptonville begin the great swamps along the Mississippi on both sides, and no dry ground is to

be found except in occasional spots for at least 60 miles below. By intercepting the navigation of

the river below Tiptonville and commanding by heavy artillery the lowest point of dry ground

near that place the enemy would be at once cut off from his resources and prevented from

escaping.

42

Immediately after the reduction of New Madrid this subject engaged my attention. The roads

along the river in the direction of Point Pleasant followed a narrow strip of dry land between the

swamps and the river, and were very miry and difficult. With much labor the heavy guns

captured from the enemy at New Madrid were dragged by hand and established in battery at

several prominent points along the river, the lower battery being placed immediately opposite the

lowest point of dry ground below Tiptonville. This extended my lines 17 miles along the river. A

week was thus passed in severe labor. The enemy, perceiving the consequence of establishing

these batteries, attempted in every way by his gunboats to prevent their construction. They were

therefore in every case established in the night. As soon as daylight unmasked our lowest battery

the enemy saw at once that we must either be dislodged or all reliable communication with his

forces would be cut off. Five gunboats, therefore, at once advanced against the battery, which

consisted of two 24-pounder siege guns and two 10-pounder Parrotts, manned by a detachment

of the First United States Infantry, under Lieutenant Bates, and supported by General Palmer's

division, encamped 1 miles in rear. Rifle pits for 500 sharpshooters were dug on the flanks of

the battery, close to the river bank, and were constantly occupied. The gunboats ran up to within

300 yards, and a furious cannonade was kept up for an hour and a half, when they were repulsed

with the loss of one gunboat sunk, several badly damaged, and many men shot down at their

guns by our sharpshooters from the rifle pits. Our loss was 1 man killed. From that time no

attempt was made against the battery, and all communication from below with the forces near

Island No. 10 cut off. One of the gunboats would occasionally, during a dark night, steal up close

along the opposite shore to Tiptonville, but always at such great risk that it was seldom

undertaken. Neither supplies nor men could be taken up or carried off in this way.

Such was the condition of affair's on the 16th of March. The object for which the land forces

had been moved upon New Madrid was accomplished in the capture of that place and the

blockade of the river to any supplies and re-enforcements for the enemy at and around Island No.

10.

Meantime the flotilla had been firing at long range both from the gun and mortar boats at the

batteries of the enemy on and opposite the island for seven consecutive days without any

apparent effect and without any advance whatever toward their reduction. This result was

doubtless due to defective construction of the boats.

On the 16th of March I received your dispatch, directing me if possible to construct a road

through the swamps to a point on the Missouri shore opposite Island No. 10 and transfer a

portion of my force sufficient to erect batteries at that point to assist in the artillery practice on

the enemy's batteries. I accordingly dispatched Col. J. W. Bissell, Engineer Regiment, to

examine the country with this view, directing him at the same time, if he found it impracticable

to build a road through the swamps and overflow of the river, to ascertain whether it were

possible to dig a canal across the peninsula from some point above Island No. 10 to New Madrid,

in order that steam transports might be brought to me, which would enable my command to cross

the river. The idea of the canal was suggested to me by General Schuyler Hamilton in a

conversation upon the necessity of crossing the river and assailing the enemy's batteries near

Island No. 10 in the rear.

On the 17th March I suggested to Commodore Foote by letter that he should run the enemy's

batteries with one of his gunboats, and thus enable me to cross the river with my command,

assuring him that by this means I could throw into the rear of the enemy men enough to deal with

any force he might have. This request the commodore declined on the ground of impracticability.

Colonel Bissell having reported a road impracticable, but that a route could be found for a

channel sufficient for small steamers, I immediately directed him to commence the canal with his

whole regiment, and to call on Colonel Buford, commanding the land forces temporarily with the

43

flotilla, which had been placed under my command, for any assistance in men or material

necessary for the work. Supplies of such articles as were needed and four steamers of light

draught were sent for to Cairo, and the work begun. It was my purpose to make the canal deep

enough for the gunboats, but it was not found practicable to do so within any reasonable period.

The work performed by Colonel Bissell and his regiment of engineers was beyond measure

difficult, and its completion was delayed much beyond my expectations. The canal is 12 miles

long, 6 miles of which are through very heavy timber. An avenue 50 feet wide was made through

it by sawing off trees of large size 4 feet under water. For nineteen days the work was

prosecuted with untiring energy and determination, under exposures and privations very unusual

even in the history of warfare. It was completed on the 4th of April, and will long remain a

monument of enterprise and skill.

During all this period the flotilla had kept up its fire upon the batteries of the enemy, but

without making any progress toward their reduction. It had by this time become very apparent

that the capture of Island No. 10 could not be made unless the land forces could be thrown across

the river and their works carried by the rear; but during this long delay, the enemy, anticipating

such a movement, had erected batteries along the shore from Island No. 10 entirely around to

Tiptonville at every point where troops could be landed. The difficulty of crossing the river in

force had therefore been greatly increased, and what would have been a comparatively safe

undertaking three weeks before had become one full of peril. It is not necessary to state to you

that the passage of a great river, lined with batteries and in the face of the enemy, is one of the

most difficult and hazardous operations of war, and cannot be justified except in a case of urgent

necessity. Such a case seemed presented for my action. Without this movement operations

against Island No. 10 must have been abandoned and the land forces at least withdrawn. It is but

bare justice to say that although the full peril of the movement was thoroughly understood by my

whole command, there was not an officer or man who was not anxious to be placed in the

advance.

There seemed little hope of any assistance from the gunboats. I therefore had several heavy

coal-barges brought into the upper end of the canal, which during the progress of the work were

made into floating batteries. Each battery consisted of three heavy barges, lashed together and

bolted with iron. The middle barge was bulk-headed all around, so as to give 4 feet of thickness

of solid timber both at the sides and on the ends. The heavy guns, three in number, were mounted

on it, and protected by traverses of sand bags. It also carried 80 sharpshooters. The barges

outside of it had a first layer in the bottom of empty water-tight barrels, securely lashed, then

layers of dry cottonwood rafts and cotton bales packed close. They were then floored over at top

to keep everything in its place, so that a shot penetrating the outer barges must pass through 20

feet of rails and cotton before reaching the middle one, which carried the men and guns. The

arrangements of water barrels and cotton bales was made in order that, even if penetrated

frequently by the enemy's shot and filled with water, the outer barges could not sink. It was my

purpose, when all was ready, to tow one or two of these batteries over the river to a point exactly

opposite New Madrid, where swamps prevented any access to the river, and where the enemy,

therefore, had been unable to establish his batteries. When near the shore the floating batteries,

with their crews, were to be cut loose from the steamers and allowed to float down the river to

the point selected for landing the troops. As soon as they arrived within short range of it they

were to cast out their anchors, so as to hold the barges firmly, and open fire upon the enemy's

batteries. I think that these batteries would have accomplished their purpose, and my whole force

volunteered to man them. They were well provided with small boats, to be kept out of danger,

and even if the worst happened, and the batteries were sunk by the enemy's fire, the men would

meet with no worse fate than capture.

44

On the 5th April the steamers and barges were brought near to the mouth of the bayou which

discharges into the Mississippi at New Madrid, but were kept carefully out of sight of the river

whilst our floating batteries were being completed. The enemy, as we afterwards learned, had

received positive advices of the construction of the canal, but were unable to believe that such a

work was practicable. The first assurance they had of its completion was the appearance of the

four steamers loaded with troops on the morning of the 7th April.

On the 4th Commodore Foote allowed one of the gunboats to run the batteries at Island No.

10, and Captain Walke, U.S. Navy, who had volunteered (as appears from the commodore's

order to him), came through that night with the gunboat Carondelet. Although many shots were

fired at him as he passed the batteries, his boat was not once struck. He informed me of his

arrival early on the 5th.

On the morning of the 6th I sent General Granger, Colonel Smith, of the Forty-third Ohio,

and Capt. L. H. Marshall, of my staff, to make a reconnaissance of the river below, and requested

Captain Walke to take them on board the Carondelet and run down the river, to ascertain

precisely the character of the banks and the position and number of the enemy's batteries. The

whole day was spent in this reconnaissance, the Carondelet steaming down the river in the midst

of a heavy fire from the enemy's batteries along the shore. The whole bank for 15 miles was

lined with heavy guns at intervals, in no case exceeding 1 mile. Intrenchments for infantry were

also thrown up along the shore between the batteries. On his return up the river Captain Walke

silenced the enemy's batteries opposite Point Pleasant, and a small infantry force, under Capt. L.

H. Marshall, landed and spiked the guns.

On the night of the 6th, at my urgent request, Commodore Foote ordered the Pittsburgh also

to run down to New Madrid. She arrived at daylight, having, like the Carondelet, come through

untouched. I directed Captain Walke to proceed down the river at daylight on the 7th with two

gunboats, and if possible silence the batteries near Watson's Landing, the point which had been

selected to land the troops, and at the same time I brought the four steamers into the river, and

embarked Paine's division, which consisted of the Tenth, Sixteenth, Twenty-second, and Fiftyfirst

Illinois Regiments, with Houghtaling's battery of artillery.

The land batteries of 32-pounders, under Captain Williams, First United States Infantry,

which I had established some days before, opposite the point where the troops were to land, were

ordered to open their fire upon the enemy's batteries opposite as soon as it was possible to see

them.

A heavy storm commenced on the night of the 6th, and continued with short intermission for

several days. The morning of the 7th was very dark, and the rain fell heavily until midday. As

soon as it was fairly light our heavy batteries on the land opened their fire vigorously upon the

batteries of the enemy, and the two gunboats ran down the river and joined in the action.

I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of Captain Walke during the whole of these

operations. Prompt, gallant, and cheerful, he performed the hazardous service assigned him with

signal skill and success. About 12 o'clock m. he signaled me that the batteries near our place of

landing were silenced, and the steamers containing Paine's division moved out from the landing

and began to cross the river, preceded by the gunboats.

The whole force designed to cross had been drawn up along the river bank, and saluted the

passing steamers with cheers of exultation. As soon as we began to cross the river the enemy

commenced to evacuate his position along the bank and the batteries along the Tennessee shore

opposite Island No. 10. His whole force was in motion towards Tiptonville, with the exception

of the few artillerists on the island, who in the haste of retreat had been abandoned.

As Paine's division was passing opposite the point I occupied on the shore one of my spies,

who had crossed on the gunboats from the silenced battery, informed me of this hurried retreat of

45

the enemy. I signaled General Paine to stop his boats, and sent him the information, with orders

to land as rapidly as possible on the opposite shore and push forward to Tiptonville, to which

point the enemy's forces were tending from every direction. I sent no force to occupy the

deserted batteries opposite Island No. 10, as it was my first purpose to capture the whole army of

the enemy.

At 8 or 9 o'clock that night (the 7th) the small force abandoned on the island, finding

themselves deserted, and fearing an attack in the rear from our land forces, which they knew had

crossed the river in the morning, sent a message to Commodore Foote, surrendering to him. The

divisions were pushed forward to Tiptonville as fast as they were landed, Paine leading. The

enemy attempted to make a stand several times near that place, but Paine did not once deploy his

columns. By midnight all our forces were across the river and pushing forward rapidly to

Tiptonville.

The enemy, retreating before Paine and from Island No. 10, met at Tiptonville during the

night in great confusion, and were driven back into the swamps by the advance of our forces,

until, at 4 o'clock a.m. on the 8th, finding themselves completely cut off, and being apparently

unable to resist, they laid down their arms and surrendered at discretion. They were so scattered

and confused that it was several days before anything like an accurate account of their number

could be made.

Meantime I had directed Col. W. L. Elliott, of the Second Iowa Cavalry, who had crossed the

river after dark, to proceed as soon as day dawned to take possession of the enemy's abandoned

works on the Tennessee shore opposite Island No. 10, and to save the steamers if he possibly

could. He reached there before sunrise that morning, the 8th, and took possession of the

encampments, the immense quantities of stores and supplies, and of all the enemy's batteries on

the main-land. He also brought in about 200 prisoners. After posting his guards and taking

possession of the steamers not sunk or injured he remained until the forces from the flotilla

landed. As Colonel Buford was in command of these forces, Colonel Elliott turned over to his

infantry force his prisoners, batteries, and captured property for safe-keeping, and proceeded to

scour the country in the direction of Tiptonville, along Reelfoot Lake, as directed.

It is almost impossible to give a correct account of the immense quantity of artillery,

ammunition, and supplies of every description which fell into our hands. Three generals, 273

field and company officers, 6,700 privates, 123 pieces of heavy artillery, 35 pieces of field

artillery) all of the very best character and latest patterns), 7,000 stand of small-arms, tents for

12,000 men, several wharf-boat loads of provisions, an immense quantity of ammunition of all

kinds, many hundred horses and mules, with wagons and harness, &c., are among the spoils.

Very few, if any, of the enemy escaped, and only by wading and swimming through the swamps.

The conduct of the troops was splendid throughout, as the results of this operation and its

whole progress very plainly indicate. We have crossed this great river, the banks of which were

lined with batteries and defended by 7,000 men. We have pursued and captured the whole force

of the enemy and all his supplies and material of war, and have again recrossed and reoccupied

the camps at New Madrid, without losing a man or meeting with any accident. Such results

bespeak efficiency, good conduct, high discipline, and soldierly deportment of the best character

far more conclusively than they can be exhibited in pitched battle or the storming of fortified

places. Patience, willing labor, endurance of hardship and privation for long periods, cheerful

and prompt obedience, order and discipline, bravery and spirit, are the qualities which these

operations have developed in the forces under my command, and which assure for them a

brilliant and successful career in arms. It is difficult to express the feeling which such conduct

has occasioned one fortunate enough to be the commander of such troops. There are few material

46

obstacles within the range of warfare which a man of courage and spirit would hesitate to

encounter with such a force.

To the division and brigade commanders, whose reports I transmit, I leave the grateful

privilege of designating in detail the forces engaged in these operations. Generals Paine, Stanley,

Hamilton, and Plummer crossed the river, together with a portion of General Granger's cavalry

division, under Col. W. L. Elliott, Second Iowa Cavalry. To all these officers I am deeply

indebted for their efficient and cordial aid in every portion of our operations. They conducted

their divisions with eminent skill and vigor, and to them I am largely indebted for the discipline

and efficiency of this command.

General Paine, fortunate in having the advance, exhibited conspicuous gallantry and vigor,

and had the satisfaction to receive the surrender of the enemy. General Palmer was posted ten

days before the final operations in support and in charge of the battery below Tiptonville.

Throughout he was prompt and active in the discharge of his duties.

Of Colonel Bissell, Engineer Regiment, and his regiment I can hardly say too much. Untiring

and determined, no difficulties discouraged them and no labor was too much for their energy.

They have conducted and completed a work which will be memorable in the history of this war.

My own personal staff--Major Butler, assistant adjutant-general; Major Morgan and Captain

Marshall, aides-de-camp; Maj. J. M. Corse, inspector-general, and Surg. O. W. Nixon, medical

director--rendered me important service, and were in all respects zealous and efficient.

Our success was complete and overwhelming, and it gives me profound satisfaction to report

that it was accomplished without loss of life.

I am, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. POPE,

Major-General, Commanding.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,

Commanding Department of the Mississippi, Saint Louis, Mo.

HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY,

Camp near New Madrid, MO., March 16, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the opera-t ions of the artillery under

my command during the investment and evacuation of New Madrid. Having been ordered by the

general commanding to make a reconnaissance of the enemy's works and select a position to

plant a siege battery, I went down on the 11th instant, with Capt. L. H. Marshall, First Infantry,

and a squadron of dragoons, within about a half mile of the enemy's works. From this position

(northwest from the town) I could see distinctly their gunboats and lower fort. I determined at

once, from my observation, where to plant the battery, and on the 12th instant went to the same

point again, in company with Colonel Bissell, of the Engineers, and Captain Marshall, to satisfy

myself that I was not mistaken in the selection of the ground. Colonel Bissell and Captain

Marshall thought the position to be a good one. The same evening, at dusk, Colonel Bissell and

myself, with Colonel Morgan's brigade, the Tenth and Sixteenth Illinois Regiments, went down

within about 500 yards in rear of the position where the battery was to be established. At this

point one regiment was deployed as skirmishers and the other furnished with spades and shovels.

The skirmishers advanced about 50 yards in front of the men in rear with spades and shovels,

until the latter arrived on the ground where the battery was to be established. In a few moments

the work was laid out and the men put to work. At daylight the work was completed., and three

24-pounder siege guns and one 8-inch howitzer put in position. This work was undoubtedly

completed before the enemy had any knowledge of it. At daylight in the morning the enemy's

forts and gunboats opened upon our battery and kept up a constant cannonading until about 12

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o'clock m. After this they continued to fire at intervals until sundown. Captain Mower, of the

First Infantry, and Lieutenant Reeder, with Companies A and H, served the guns, and all

conducted themselves in the most gallant and creditable manner. Captain Mower remained in the

battery until the town was evacuated by the enemy, and then placed our siege guns in the

enemy's fort.

During the investment of New Madrid, Capt. A.M. Powell, First Missouri Light Artillery;

Capt. Henry Hescock, same regiment; Capt. N. T. Spoor, Second Iowa Light Artillery, Captain

Sands, Eleventh Ohio Light Artillery; and Lieutenant Darling's battery, Company F, Second

Artillery, U.S. Army, were frequently under the enemy's fire, and all behaved in a very creditable

manner.

Captain Powell, a few days after our arrival in front of New Madrid, was detached from the

command and went to Point Pleasant with Colonel Plummer.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. L. LOTHROP,

Major, First Missouri Light Artillery, Commanding Artillery.

Maj. SPEED BUTLER,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

Pittsburg Landing, April 22, 1862.

SIR: I have to report that February 27, 1862, at Commerce, Mo., I received orders to

organize the First Division of this army. The First Brigade, under Col. John Groesbeck, was

composed of the Thirty-ninth Ohio, Major Noyes commanding; Forty-third Ohio, Colonel Smith

commanding, and Twenty-seventh Ohio, Colonel Fuller. The Second Brigade, Col. J. B.

Plummer commanding, was composed of the Sixty-third Ohio, Colonel Sprague; Twenty-sixth

Illinois, Colonel Loomis, and Eleventh Missouri, Lieutenant-Colonel Panabaker commanding.

The Seventh Illinois Cavalry, under Colonel Kellogg; a detachment of the First United States

Infantry, under Captain Williams; two companies of Engineer troops, volunteers, under Major

Hasie, and Captain Sands' Eleventh Ohio Battery were also attached to the First Division.

The division marched from Commerce on the morning of the 28th of February, and reached

Hunter's farm at midnight, the roads being almost impassable. The troops bivouacked that night

in the mud and rain without a murmur. By order of General Pope, Colonel Kellogg's Seventh

Illinois Cavalry was dispatched in pursuit of Jeff. Thompson and his band. After a running fight

three light pieces of his artillery were captured and several prisoners taken, among them Capt.

James T. Hogane and Lieut. D. B. Griswold, Engineers, C. S. Army. No official report of this

affair, which was highly creditable to the Seventh Illinois Cavalry, was made to me.

Proceeding by easy stages, we reached New Madrid March 3, 1862. On the 2d of March,

Col. J. L. Kirby Smith, Forty-third Ohio, escorted by Colonel Kellogg's Seventh Illinois Cavalry,

made a daring reconnaissance, penetrating into the town of New Madrid to within three-quarters

of a mile of the enemy's intrenchments. On the 3d the First Division advanced upon the town,

Kellogg's cavalry forming the advance guard and covering the flanks. Colonel Fuller's Twentyseventh

Ohio deployed as skirmishers, supported by a section of Sands' Eleventh Ohio Battery

and closely followed by the whole division. The enemy's pickets were gallantly driven in by

Colonel Fuller's regiment. The orders to the division were to feel the enemy, seizing any

advantage which might offer. To this end the Thirty-ninth Ohio was advanced, by order of

General Pope, as skirmishers on the right flank, and were pushed forward on a line with Colonel

Fuller's Twenty-seventh Ohio to within 1 miles of the enemy's principal works. Colonel Smith's

Forty-third Ohio, in line of battle, supported Colonel Fuller, and protected the left flank of the

48

division, supported by Sands' battery in the center, while Col. J. B. Plummer's brigade supported

the right. The enemy withdrew to their intrenchments, but kept up an unremitting fire of solid

shot and shell from five gunboats and their works, 24-pounder shot, shell from 32-pounders and

64-pounders, besides missiles from guns of smaller caliber. The troops, unable to reply, evinced

a calmness and steadiness worthy of veterans.

Reconnaissances having demonstrated that an assault of the enemy's works with the bayonet

must have involved an unnecessary loss of life to our troops, it was most prudently not resorted

to, though the bearing of the troops was such as to give reasonable hopes of success. On the other

hand, it seemed doubtful whether, if taken, the works could be held against the fire of the

enemy's gunboats.

Brigadier-General Stanley arrived in camp on the evening of the 3d. On the 4th a

reorganization of division, &c., was made. General Stanley being from Ohio, the Ohio regiments

passed from under my command. Having had evidence of their gallantry and coolness under fire,

and feeling grateful for the cheerfulness with which both officers and men had responded to my

efforts to enforce discipline and excite their ardor, I parted with them with regret. Their place,

however, in the reorganization of brigades and divisions was well filled by the Fifth Iowa,

Lieutenant-Colonel Matthies, and Fifty-ninth Indiana, Col. J. I. Alexander, Colonel Worthington

commanding the brigade thus constituted.

On the night of the 4th Colonel Worthington; with four guns, and Colonel Smith's command

from the Forty-third Ohio, five companies of the Fifth Iowa, and two companies of the Fiftyninth

Indiana, drove in the enemy's pickets and opened a brisk fire on his position. (See his

report herewith.) The general commanding having decided to occupy Point Pleasant, 7 miles

below New Madrid, I cheerfully proposed Col. J. B. Plummer and the Second Brigade of my

now Second Division for this service. This brigade consisted of the Eleventh Missouri,

Lieutenant-Colonel Panabaker, and Twenty-sixth Illinois, Colonel Loomis. He proceeded on it

on the 5th instant. At his request, my aide-de-camp, Lieut. William B. Caw, accompanied him.

The success which crowned Colonel Plummer's efforts reflected honor on the Second Division.

On the 6th, by direction of the commanding general, I detailed Major Robertson, in

command of two companies of the Fifth Iowa, and Forty-sixth Indiana, Colonel Fitch, of General

Palmer's division, temporarily attached to my division, to report to Col. Gordon Granger, who

pressed the enemy on our left vigorously, driving in his skirmishers, but was unable, from want

of heavy artillery, to make any serious impression, on account of the heavy fire of the enemy's

gunboats and the exposed character of the position, without undue exposure of our troops.

Colonel Granger speaks in the following terms of the officers and men engaged in this affair:

CAMP IN FRONT OF NEW MADRID, March 6, 1862.

As commander of the column mentioned within, which moved upon New Madrid yesterday,

it affords me much satisfaction to more than corroborate every statement of the modest but

gallant Major Robertson. His officers and men, under a terrific fire of round shot and shell for

some two hours, behaved like veterans, and quite surprised me by their coolness and indifference

to the danger which surrounded them. Major Robertson was especially conspicuous, never

dismounting from his horse, although their sharpshooters tried their best to pick him off.

Lieutenant Gordon, Fourth United States Cavalry, aide-de-camp, displayed rare courage with the

skirmishers, and deserves especial notice.

On the 7th instant a demonstration was made by the First Brigade of the Second Division, in

conjunction with General Stanley's division. (See report herewith.) Colonel Plummer having

received promotion as brigadier-general, a reorganization again took place on the 11th instant,

and the Tenth Iowa and Twenty-sixth Missouri were constituted the Second Brigade of the

Second Division, under Colonel Perczel.

49

On the 13th the Second Division was held in reserve as the support of the First Division. On

the 14th, at 2 o'clock a.m., with Colonel Slack's brigade of General Palmer's Third Division,

composed of the Forty-sixth and Forty-seventh Indiana, the Second Division was formed to

march to the relief of General Stanley's First Division and the guards of the trenches. The

darkness was palpable. The rain poured down in torrents. The men were obliged to wade through

pools knee-deep. Silence having been strictly enjoined, the division, hoping to have the honor of

leading in the assault on the enemy's works, moved steadily forward with cheerful alacrity, those

assigned to that duty taking post in the rifle pits, half full of water, without a murmur. A heavy

fog shrouded everything from view as the day dawned, and we waited anxiously its lifting, in

order to open fire on the enemy from our batteries. At 6 a.m. the evacuation of the place was

reported, as stated in my report of the 14th instant, as general of the trenches.

Under very considerable privations and hardships, under the severe ordeal of long exposure

to the shot and shell of the enemy without power to reply, all the various regiments, both officers

and men, who have been under my orders, have deserved commendation.

Transports having reached us through a channel cut with enormous labor under the direction

of Colonel Bissell, on a suggestion advanced by the subscriber, March 17, 1862, the Second

Division embarked on them April 7, to cross the Mississippi, which was accomplished in gallant

style, but without opposition, the gunboats Carondelet and Pittsburgh, under Captain Walke,

having in dashing style silenced the enemy's shore batteries. The division marched 4 miles in the

direction of Tiptonville and bivouacked, lying upon their arms. At dawn, April 8, 1862, we

pushed forward, and learned as we advanced of the evacuation of Island No. 10, and

subsequently of the surrender of the whole force of the enemy. Arrived at Tiptonville, the

Second Division was detailed as guard for the prisoners of war. The deportment of the officers

and men towards them was worthy of the highest praise. It was that of brave and generous men

toward a discomfited enemy, and produced upon the minds of the prisoners of war a marked

effect. After exposure of no ordinary kind, without tents and only partial rations, having

accomplished the service assigned to the Second Division, it returned to New Madrid.

Col. G. W. Cumming, Fifty-first Illinois, and the troops under his command, deserve marked

commendation for the energy and devotion exhibited in caring for the prisoners of war and

securing the captured property. Col. William H. Worthington, Fifth Iowa, commanding First

Brigade, and Col. Nicholas Perczel, Tenth Iowa, commanding Second Brigade, showed on all

occasions so much promptitude, so much attention to the health and welfare as well as

instruction of the brigades under their respective commands--the camp of the Second Division

exciting the emulation of the whole army--as to prove them well fitted for their responsible

positions, and inspiring the men and officers under their orders with a confidence which could

not fail to prove of the highest value in an engagement.

April 12 the division embarked on transports and proceeded down the Mississippi River

toward Fort Pillow, reaching a point 5 miles above it Sunday, April 13. Here reconnaissances on

the Arkansas shore were pushed by Lieut. William B. Gaw, Volunteer Engineers, with great

boldness and entire success, during the 14th, 15th, and 16th, when orders were received to

proceed to Pittsburg Landing, Tenn.

The general commanding will have himself observed the creditable and zealous devotion and

unflinching readiness in discharge of duty evinced by the officers composing my staff, especially

First Lieut. William C. Russell, Eighth Missouri Volunteers, aide-de-camp and acting assistant

adjutant-general, who to close attention to his office duties added coolness and gallantry under

fire; Lieut. William B. Gaw, Volunteer Engineers; Brigade Surg. Will? Varian, who, in addition

to his medical duties, intelligently and efficiently performed, has at all times cheerfully

volunteered his services as an aide-de-camp; First Lieut. H. Seymour Burt, Sixty-third Ohio,

50

acting aide-de camp, has distinguished himself by his promptitude and gallantry; First Lieut.

Charles A. Nazro, Twenty-sixth Illinois, as division quartermaster, has greatly assisted me by

his attention and efficiency in the discharge of his arduous duties; Second Lieut. James E.

Merriman, Twenty-sixth Illinois, acting aide-de-camp, also deserves mention for his active

efforts until thrown out of activity by indisposition. I am informed by General Plummer that

Lieut. William B. Gaw, aide-de camp on my staff, rendered to him very important services in the

construction of the batteries at Point Pleasant and in making reconnaissances of the vicinity. In

justice to the Second Michigan Cavalry. I should mention the cool and soldierly bearing of a

portion of it detailed by the commanding general as an escort to myself on a reconnaissance

ordered by him March 3, 1862. From their ranks the first blood was drawn on that day, and

though, to their chagrin, early ordered back by me, I am satisfied they would unhesitatingly have

advanced wherever ordered. Captain Sands, Eleventh Ohio Battery, has on all occasions

exhibited fine soldierly conduct, as the accompanying report exhibits.

I inclose the reports of Colonel Worthington and Colonel Perczel; also that of Major

Robertson; to all of which your attention is invited.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SCHUYLER HAMILTON,

Brig. Gen. Vols., U.S. Army, Comdg. Second Division.

Capt. GEORGE A. WILLIAMS,

Chief of Staff.

HDQRS. 1ST BRIG., 2D DIV., ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

March 22, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the expedition under my command on

the night of the 4th instant:

I left camp at 9 p.m., accompanied by Colonel Smith, of the Forty-third Ohio Infantry, with

his command, and two guns of the Missouri and two of the Michigan artillery, together with five

companies of the Fifth Iowa Infantry and two of the Fifty-ninth Indiana Infantry, of my brigade.

Proceeding cautiously, with skirmishers on either side of my advance, to the suburbs of the town,

I came upon the pickets of the enemy, who were posted in strong force. Receiving their fire,

which was immediately returned, we drove them back. The guns of the Michigan battery were

immediately brought into position on the left side of the road lending into town, near an old

church, and opened a fire of shell upon the town. In a few seconds the guns of the Missouri

battery, supported by Colonel Smith's command were brought into position upon the right side of

the road, and opened fire immediately. The enemy responded with very heavy guns, and soon

obtained our exact range and distance; but few of their shells exploded, their fire coming from

one gunboat stationed at the lower fort, one opposite the town, and one above the town. Our

firing continued until the ammunition of the artillery was nearly exhausted, when the entire

command was withdrawn in good order to the camp.

The conduct of all the troops engaged, both officers and men, was creditable to themselves

and our command, this being the first time ever under fire.

I regret to state that we lost 1 man killed from Company A, of the Fifth Iowa Infantry; one

arm broken in Company I, of the same regiment; these being the only casualties worthy of

notice.

I am, sir, most respectfully, yours,

W. H. WORTHINGTON,

Colonel, Commanding First Brigade, Second Division.

Lieut. WILLIAM C. RUSSELL,

51

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. FIFTH IOWA VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,

March 6, 1862.

SIR: In obedience to an order issued from Col. W. H. Worthington, Fifth Iowa Infantry,

commanding First Brigade, Second Division, Army of the Mississippi, I took three companies of

the Fifty-ninth Indiana and two companies (A and B) of the Fifth Iowa Volunteer Infantry to Col.

G. Granger, of the Third Michigan Cavalry, and was by him ordered to deploy the two Iowa and

two of the Indiana companies as skirmishers to atttack the town of New Madrid, Mo., on the

north.

Throwing out my skirmishers, I advanced upon and engaged the enemy's pickets about 400

yards north of the town plat, in a large corn field, driving them to their guard quarters within the

town. Pressing closely upon them, and seeing that they were supported by 400 or 500 infantry

and a piece of light artillery, I sheltered my men behind a fence, awaiting my support, the Fortysixth

Indiana Regiment being designated for that purpose. After keeping my men thus protected

for a length of time, I sent word to Colonel Granger by one of his aides of my position and

discoveries, and requested orders to advance or retire, when I received orders to retire to the

middle of the corn field, which I did in good order. This position I held nearly an hour, when I

was ordered by Colonel Granger to withdraw my skirmishers and return to camp.

It affords me pleasure to compliment the promptness, coolness and energy of the officers and

men of my command throughout.

Our loss consisted of 1 man killed of the Fifty-ninth Indiana and 2 of the Fifth Iowa

wounded.

W. S. ROBERTSON,

Major, Fifth Iowa Volunteer Infantry.

Lieut. B. F. PATTERSON,

Acting Assistant Adjutant-General,

ON BOARD STEAMBOAT CITY OF ALTON,

April 19, 1862.

SIR: In pursuance of Special Orders, No. 11, I have the honor to report as follows:

The Tenth Regiment Iowa Volunteers and Twenty-sixth Regiment Missouri Volunteers

formed the Second Brigade of your division, then in camp near New Madrid. On the 12th of

March the Second Division had been ordered out in the morning at 5 o'clock, and took position

in the center of the line of battle formed by the whole army towards New Madrid, the Second

Brigade in the second line. At 3 o'clock p.m. the Second Division had been ordered back to

camp. The 13th, at 3 o'clock in the morning, we marched to the right of New Madrid, to relieve

the division of General Stanley, and had to protect our batteries operating against the lower fort

of the rebels. The Second Brigade was drawn up in a corn field, a small wooded land separating

them from the rebel batteries. According to your orders, a company as skirmishers had been

thrown forward under Captain Randleman, who at 7 o'clock a.m. reported that 2 men had come

to them with a flag of truce, asserting that New Madrid and all its forts had been evacuated the

night previous by the rebels. I reported the case to you, and received your orders to send a field

officer and 20 men to New Madrid, that he may inquire if the statement be true. I detailed Major

McCalla, accordingly, who entered the rebel forts, found them deserted, and reported to this

effect. You then ordered four companies, one from each regiment of your division, to occupy the

town and the forts, which being accomplished, the Second Brigade was ordered back into camp.